Military Intelligence and Long-Term Planning in the Ninth Century: The
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applyparastyle “fig//caption/p[1]” parastyle “FigCapt” Mediaevistik 33 . 2020 89 2020 Bernard S. Bachrach, David S. Bachrach, University of New Hampshire 1 University of Minnesota Emeritus 1 Military Intelligence and Long-Term Planning in the 89 Ninth Century The Carolingians and Their Adversaries 112 2020 Abstract: Historians of warfare in the western tradition have devoted considerable attention to the problem of military intelligence from the Greek and Persian wars of the fifth century B.C.E. up to the recent past. Strikingly absent from this conversation, however, has been the treatment of the acquisition and analysis of information for military purposes in pre-Crusade Europe, particularly in the Carolingian and immediate post-Carolingian world. In part, this lacuna is the result of a general neglect by modern scholars of military matters in the ninth and tenth centuries. A second major reason for the lack of studies of military intelligence is the dead hand of nineteenth-century romantic-nationalist historiography that has imposed a “dark-age” straight-jacket on many aspects of the history of the early medieval world. This emphatically includes the history of warfare, which has been treated in the context of a putatively Tacitean or Beowulfian quest for honor and booty, rather than as a highly complex element of governmental activity. The present study addresses this gap in modern understanding of the complex nature of early medieval warfare through an examination of military intelligence in the ninth century with a focus on the Carolingians and their opponents, primarily the Vikings, the Muslim polity in Spain, and the Slavs. The study is divided into three parts that examine in turn, strategic intelligence, campaign intelligence, and tactical or battlefield intelligence. Keywords: Carolingian warfare, Vikings, Slavs, Muslims, military intelligence, strategic in- telligence, campaign intelligence, tactical intelligence, long-term planning. Historiographical Context The scholarly traditions dealing with the conduct of war in both the Roman Empire and the Later Middle Ages have long recognized the crucial importance of examining in detail the matrix of questions regarding the gathering and analysis of military in- telligence for both short term and long-term decision-making.1 By contrast, scholar- ship focused on the military history of early medieval Europe has been exceptionally reticent to engage with the problem of military intelligence. There are no monographs regarding this subject in the early Middle Ages. Moreover, there are just a small hand- ful of articles concerning military intelligence in the period between the end of the Roman Empire and the First Crusade.2 Even among this limited group of studies, none The online edition of this publication is available open access and licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution CC-BY 4.0 license. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ © 2020 Bernard S. Bachrach, David S. Bachrach https://doi.org/10.3726/med.2020.01.04 90 Mediaevistik 33 . 2020 consider in detail the ninth century, which is the focus of the present study, particularly after the death of Charlemagne in 814.3 The reluctance to engage with the problem of military intelligence is due to several factors. First, the military history of the Regnum Francorum in the century follo- wing Charlemagne’s death has suffered significant scholarly neglect in comparison to the preceding period.4 There are, for example, no published monographs on the armies and military organization of Charlemagne’s son Louis the Pious (814‒840), his grandsons Lothair I (840‒854), Louis the German (840‒876), and Charles the Bald (840‒877), or any of their sons and further descendants.5 As a consequence, many of the most basic questions regarding the organization and conduct of war in the ninth century within the lands of the Carolingian Empire, its successor realms, and along its frontiers have yet to be asked, much less answered.6 As a corollary to the comparative dearth of detailed studies of warfare and military organization in the post-Charlemagne Regnum Francorum, many of the limited discussions of the military history of this period perpetuate a “dark-age” model, first developed by na- tionalist historians in the nineteenth century, that emphasizes the putative existence of a booty-hungry warrior society mirroring the world of Tacitus’s Germania, or the Beowulf poet, often on the basis of the misrepresentation of both the written and ma- terial sources.7 This effort to present early medieval warfare as primitive, small-scale, and lacking any aspects of what today we would call military science, has limited interest in sophisticated aspects of the conduct of war such as military architecture, logistics, training, military education, and intelligence gathering, the last of which is considered in the following study. Organization of this Study Despite the ongoing influence of nineteenth century romantic-nationalist models, it is clear that many early medieval rulers, including Charlemagne and his descendants throughout much of the Carolingian Empire, enjoyed considerable long-term military success.8 Ineluctably, this success was based upon the effective management of a wide range of resources that required a high level of sophistication. As specialists in other historical periods have made abundantly clear, an important element of these military resources throughout the history of western warfare has been the establishment of a capable apparatus for the acquisition of timely information regarding a broad spec- trum of topics.9 The focus in this essay is on the efforts by military leaders to acquire intelligence for both long-term and immediate use over the course of the ninth century, with particular respect to the Carolingians and their adversaries. By illuminating the extensive efforts of both the Carolingians and their opponents, including the Muslims in Spain, the Vikings, and the Slavs, to acquire and utilize militarily useful informa- tion in both the long and short term, we hope to develop a more realistic picture of the overall conduct of war during the ninth century and to help dispel the lingering cob- webs of nineteenth century nationalist historiographies perpetuated in the primitivist depiction of “barbarian” warfare. Mediaevistik 33 . 2020 91 The acquisition of intelligence can be divided somewhat arbitrarily into three main categories: strategic intelligence, campaign intelligence, and battlefield or tactical intelligence. Although the material considered in these categories necessarily over- lapped, strategic intelligence is concerned with developing information about both political and military interests that extend beyond a single campaigning season, and also relates to the development of a wide range of resources to plan for and meet long- term military needs. The discussion below regarding strategic intelligence, therefore, is divided into two parts treating, respectively, the acquisition of this intelligence, and its use in long-term military planning. Campaign intelligence considers matters that might impact the success of the campaign as a whole such as the overall physical and military topography of the region through which the army is to march, the evaluation of factors that would impinge upon the logistical support of the army, the overall scale and disposition of the enemy’s forces, and an evaluation of the resources that would be required to meet the campaign’s objectives. Battlefield or tactical intelligence was and is concerned primarily with information that might impact decision-making about the conduct of a particular military encounter such as the size and location of the enemy force as well as its composition and disposition. The historian of this period is particularly fortunate in the survival of a wide range of written sources that shed light on the conduct of war, generally, as well as the spe- cific question of the gathering of military intelligence and its use in developing both long and short term responses to threats and potential threats posed by adversaries. These include a substantial number of historiographical texts, many of which were written by men with either personal experience in the conduct of war, or with access to numerous informants who were experts in this topic. In addition to histories and annals, we have letters, handbooks, and prescriptive commands as well as the “work product” of intelligence gathering operations that also treat military matters. These written sources of information are complemented by an enormous, and continual- ly growing, corpus of material sources developed through excavations, which both corroborate information provided by written sources, and also shed light on military activities, such as the construction of numerous fortifications, that are not recorded in any surviving texts. Strategic Intelligence In the late eighth or early ninth century, Abbot Adalhard of Corbie (died 826), Charle- magne’s first cousin, composed a handbook regarding the administration of the royal court entitled De ordine Palatii, which included substantial information relating to the collection of military intelligence.10 The text of De ordine Palatii subsequently was reworked by Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims (845‒882) during the late 870s for the use of the royal court under the West Frankish ruler King Carloman II (879‒884). Notably, however, Hincmar did not choose to revise the sections of the text that dealt with military matters