Belgian Domestic Steel Cartels and the Re-Rollers, 1933-38

Daniel Barbezat Amherst College

The 1920swere years of rebuildingafter the devastationof World War I. The systemof industrialorganization that createdthe rapidgrowth in the westernEuropean steel industries until 1913was shattered and each national industryhad to redefineitself in the postwarenvironment. To facilitatethe restructuringof theirdomestic steel industries, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, andGermany made a commonagreement in 1926that protected their internal marketsfrom eachother. However,these agreements collapsed during the depressionof 1930-1932. In the midst of the chaos, it was clear to each of the former internationalcartel members that if theywere to reorganizetheir industries after the shockof the depressionyears, they againwould have to unite internationally,albeit on differentterms. By 1933the westernEuropean steel industryhad formed both domestic and international cartels, and the member countrieshad embarkedupon a new period,now gearedto rebuildingtheir internationalmarkets. The new internationalcartel protecteddomestic marketsand created "the first real EuropeanSteel Cartel" [6, p. 453]. For its operation,each nation had to havea domesticcartel in orderto coordinate productionand establishquotas on exports. Unlike the earlier internationalcartel of 1926, which concentratedon domesticproduction and maintenance of constantproduction shares, the new internationalagreements applied only to internationaltrade. The member countrieswere free to followany domestic production policies they wished; however,in internationalmarkets, "the times [were] gone that the separate producernations could play off one another,putting pressure on the export prices"[11]. As we wouldsuspect, the operationsand reactionto the new internationalorder varied among the differentnational cartels. The Belgianscreated a domesticcartel in orderto participatein the internationalcartel. However,because of their industrialstructure and their inabilityto adaptto changes,the domesticcartels had difficultyestablishing a unifieddomestic policy which jeopardized both domestic and international arrangements.

11thank David Wheelock and Patricia O'Brien for comments onan earlier version of the paper. This researchwas funded by a DissertationFellowship from the Social Science ResearchCouncil jointly with the AmericanCouncil of LearnedSocieties, under grants from the Ford Foundation and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. I thank each of these groups for their assistance.

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The Belgian Steel Cartel

The Belgiansteel industry was an importantpart of westernEuropean industry,especially in itsparticipation in worldtrade. In the 1920sthere were no internal Belgiancartels and only weak adherenceto the international agreements. In contrast,from 1933-1939the Belgiansteel industryhad internalorganizations allocating quotas and settingprices for all important products. Even thoughthe Belgianswere able to form cartelsin order to participatein theinternational cartels, they were constrained by their domestic industrialorganization and their relianceon foreignmarkets. The major problemwas the recalcitranceof the numerousand powerfulnon-vertically integratedBelgian works, the so-calledre-rollers. Since the re-rollershad to purchasesemi-finished steel inputs, they refused to paythe cartelprices of the domesticproducers who were all membersof the cartel. By sellingtheir productsboth domestically and abroadat lowerprices and in excessof any quotaschemes, the re-rollerscould disrupt the cartel'ssales or pricingpolicy. In addition,the Belgiansexported over 80% of theiroutput and had a growing excesscapacity [10, p. 46]. This combinationmade any restriction of exports in the faceof a manageddomestic policy very difficult. The mainadministrative body was the Comptoir de Vente Sid6rurgique de la Belgique(referred hereafter as Cosibel), which governed all theinternal cartelsand interactedwith the internationalexport cartel. There alsowere importanttrade organizations for steelproducers, such as the Comptoirdes Haut Fourneauxet AcieriesBeiges, or the Union CommercialeBeige de M6tallurgie,which coordinated the sales of Angleur-Athus,Cockerill, Sambre et Moselle, Providence,the Laminoirsde Chfitelet,the Laminoirsdu Monceau and la Brugeoise.However, the actualdecisions of the cartelswere handled in the meetingsof Cosibeland all otherorganizations formally declared to followthe rulesof Cosibel.In additionto thesedomestic organizations the Groupementdes Industries Sid6rurgiques Luxembourg (GISL) linkedtheir domesticprices and sales with the Belgians? Throughoutthe 1930sthe cartelwent throughphases of cohesionand disintegration.As a typicalexample, the directorsof Ougr6elamented in April 1934that "the organization (Cosibel) is hardlyable to maintainbecause the quotasare not fixedin a precisefashion" [28]. Writing in early 1932 BaronCop6e, one of theoriginal founders of the Belgiancartels, reported that, "The demandsof certainø firms have causeda breakdownof the cartel. Under theseconditions, the battlehas begun more bitterly again" [8]. The mainproblem was with the quotaassignments for the two firmsBo•l and

2Forthe plans forthe agreements seethe Accords between Cosibel andGISL from July 24 and July26, 1933,In additionto theseaccords the Luxemburgergroup was further tied to the Belgiansby the Belgianfirm Ougr6e'sownership of one of the three firms of the Luxemburgergroup, Rondange [3].

3Onthe document "themajority of"(la plupart des) was first typed and then penciled out and "certain"(certaines) was written above, 220

Clabecq,both re-rollers. Van Hoegaerden,head of Cosibeland President of theOugr6e works, felt theconflict could be resolved by increasing their quotas from 5.34% to 6.20%. There were alsosome problems with the Usines M6tallurgiquesde Hainaut,but like his opinionof the other two firms,Van Hoegaerdenfelt that Hainaut would causeno continuedproblems and was simplytrying to bargain[18]. Van Hoegaerden'spredications about the quota problemsseemed correct and in October1932 Cop6ereported, "the cartel (Cosibel)is virtually realized between the Belgian firms. The organizationof the cartelis well in progressand the organizationsshould be workingby the time the internationalcartel is created"[19]. However,as a signalof things to come,Van Hoegaerdenlamented three monthslater that "Much to the amazementof everybody,Clabecq declared to be no longerin agreementwith the cartel contractbecause the Usinesde M6tallurgiquede Hainaut was granteda higherquota" [17]. Clabecq'srenunciation caused a largeresponse in the internationaljournals, as analysts predicted that the international export cartelswould not be possiblebecause of Belgium'sinternal problems. This illustratesthe processof the Quotenkampf.With imperfectcartels, the allocation of quotas is determined more like a complex,multi-lateral monopolymodel with indeterminate quotas based on bargaining power, rather thanon a deterministicmulti-plant firm model. Sincethe firmsdid not have a commongoal, theyfought over commonpolicy. The Kartell Rundschaureported in May 1933 that the international cartelswere in jeopardy because theBelgian firms were not yet in agreement. 4 The article specificallyputs the blame on the re-rollers,with the large re- rollerClabecq receiving much attention; the re-rollers found themselves in the dilemmaof notwanting higher prices but wanting the export cartels. 5 The re-rollersdestabilized not onlythe Belgiancartels, but thewhole international networkof exportcartels. In order that the re-rollersparticipate in the domesticaccords, price concessionswould have to be made on semi-finishedproducts. Producers decidedto givethe re-rollers discounts on semiinputs. This was fine, but who shouldbear the costs for theseconcessions? Only some of Cosibel'smembers actuallysold semis, and those that did not felt unjustlyburdened in supporting lowerprices for the re-rollers.This issuewas first raisedin the third meeting of the Conseild'Administration of Cosibelon June 14, 1933, and by the eleventhmeeting of March 14, 1934 the issuewas still unresolved[1]. Ironically,conditions for establishingrules for the re-rollers,a cleardiscount policyfor semis,allowed Clabecq to requestto join, yet their implementation causedClabecq to complainsince the firm, asa member,refused to helppay for anyof the coststo semiproducers.

4TheKartefi Rundschau ishere quoting anarticle published inthe Frankfurtar Zeitung on May 13, 1933.

5predictionsaboutthe ease of conciliation withHainaut were incorrect. Hainaut was formally acceptedinto Cosibela full year afterCosibel was formed [25]. 221

In the seventhmeeting of the Conseilon September13, 1933a general formulawas accepted: re-rollers would receive a 25 percentrebate on blooms anda 20 percentrebate for billettes(except for the Ph6nixworks which would havea slightlyhigher base price). Theserebates were conditionalupon the re-rollersnot reselling the goods and agreeing to cooperatewith Cosibel. The re-rollersfeared that at theseprices their inputdemands would not be met. So the producersagreed that the priceswould not merelybe guidelines,but that re-rollerswould meet their input needsat theseprices. With these provisionalrules, Clabecqasked to join and was formally acceptedon February14, 1934,with MonsieurGermau as its delegateto the cartel. Once in the cartel,however, Clabecq was still the sourceof problems. Immediatelyafter joining, Germau demandedthat his firm be granteda higherthick plate quota. This causeda furor withinthe carteland Monsieur L. Bo61of the UsinesG. Bo61refused to participatein any concessionsto Clabecq.The othermembers did whatthe Belgiansalways did in the faceof large internalproblems: they pointedout the implicationsof the domestic conflictto the internationalsituation. This time they stressed the importance of the internal accords for the formation of the new bilateral accords within the internationalexport cartel. As the membersput it, "Therewould be no agreementbetween the Germansand Belgians until an accordwas developed internallywith the Belgianre-rollers" [24]. About the sametime, in the German cartels, Gerwin of the StahlwerksVerband reported that arrangementsbetween the Belgians and the German cartels were not possible becausethe Belgianshad not cometo an agreementwith their re-rollers. As an outsider,the Forgesde Clabecqrepresented a graveproblem for both the domesticand internationalexport cartels. In fact, Clabecq's adherenceto the domesticagreements was seenas so importantthat the Clabecqworks "were threatenedwith the City of Brussels'severing its agreementconcerning the purchaseof electricenergy if Clabecqshould renounceits adherenceto the cartel"[9, p. 88]. Thisis a beautifulexample of Patinkin'sconclusion that in orderto remainviable, cartels often must resort to non-economicmeans, like governmentalforce, to insureits members' compliance[27, p. 200]. After Clabecqand Hainaut became members the othermembers held a specialmeeting of Cosibelon June6, 1934. The cartelhad been operating for one year and the memberswere not satisfiedwith its performance. Internalquotas still had not been settled although it wason the agendasof the meetingsfor overten months.Even the long-standingre-roller problem was not solvedand memberscomplained that this wasbecause, at leastto some extent,the cartelhad been ineffective in preventingFrench supplies of semis to the infamousDemerbes works, even though there were set international accordswhich made such French exports illegal [15]. By supplyingsemis to theBelgian re-rollers, the French made the re-rollers independent, and threats from Belgiansemi producers of cuttingsemi supplies carried no weight. In this negativeclimate the memberstried to make the internal arrangementsmore importantby linking participationdomestically to participationinternationally. The membersagreed that if a firm freeditself from the Belgiancartels then it did so alsofrom the InternationalExport 222

Cartel, formed in June of 1933 [16]. In additionto their new domestic initiative,the members agreed that an accordwith the French limiting exports of semisinto Belgiummust be pursuedanew in orderto controlthe Belgian re-rollers.Although the Belgiansteel market was much more organized in the 1930sthan in the 1920s,even by 1934the Belgiansteel producers could not preventthe destabilizing imports of semisby the French and were not able to forcethe Belgianre-rollers to followBelgian cartel policy. The French,who had long supplied semi-finished products to Belgian re-rollers and ownedseveral of them, came to realize that the re-rollerswere affectingmore than just the Belgianmarket. MonsieurDieudonnfi, head of the Luxembourggroup, wrote the Comit• Sidfirurgiquede la France(CSF) on November7, 1936 statingthat, "mostof the organizedbusiness on the continentis beingtroubled by the dissidenceof Jemappes[a Belgianre-roller with large French ownership]"[12]. On November23, 1936, Theodore Laurent,of Marine-Homficourtand the CSF, respondedto Pucheu,who had writtenhim aboutthe letterfrom Dieudonn•,"I agree,"wrote Laurent, "with themeasures sought to controlJemappes--radical suppression of semisupplies as long as the firm troublesthe markets"[13]. The French, who had participatedin supplyingsemis to the re-rollersfor overa decade,finally were affected by this disruptionand joined forces with the Belgians and Luxembourgersto suppressthe dissidents.This dramaticallyillustrates how disruptivethe Belgiandissidents were, not onlyto the Belgianmarket, but to the international markets, too. Anotherinternational factor which made the conflictbetween producers and re-rollersmore severewas the British protectivetariff of one-thirdad valoremimposed from April 1932,up from the previoustariff of only 10%. UnderSchedule II, ClassIII of the tariff all steelproducts (including pig iron) were subjectto the new tariff. The tariff was designedto give the British steelindustry a chanceto reorganizewithout competitive pressure from the continent.This hurt the Belgiansteel industry more than any other country. In everysteel product except "forged pieces" the Belgian steel industry was the majorexporter to the Britishmarket. Evenwith the dramatic import reductions the British producers wanted evenhigher tariffs, but the Britishgovernment refused, demanding rather that the newly formed British Steel Federationnegotiate with the continental producersfor importrestrictions. Steel producers in westernEurope were not unitedon howto bargainwith the British. The largeintegrated works wanted to secure their semi-finished market while the re-rollers were interested in otherproducts. The tensionwas particularly acute in Belgium.The Belgian producersfelt "It is necessary,as soon as possible, to suppressthe dissidence of the re-rollersbecause of the negotiationswith the Britishover semis" [30]. No agreementcould be reacheduntil early 1935 when the British government, "inorder to facilitatenegotiation," raised the tariff to 50% [5, p. 183]. On July 31, 1935the InternationalSteel Cartel acquiescedand agreedto exportonly 670,000tons for the firstyear (of which255,329 tons were semis) and 525,000 tonsfor the next(of which195,869 tons were semis). In returnthe tariffwas reducedto 20%. In orderthat outsiders(small re-rollers, for example)could not exportand use up the fixed exportquantity, the producerscreated a 223

licensescheme, whereby the InternationalCartel receivedquota certificates up to the permittedlimits [5, p. 184]. Each of the internationalcartel members went throughsome sort of reorganizationin 1934-35.For Belgiumthe problemwas the distributionof exports to Britain among producer and re-rollers' goods. The British "weapon"further weakened the Belgian coordination and even though Cosibel wasable to live throughthe shock,it neverrecovered and the rift betweenthe Belgian cartel membersgrew, with the re-rollersbecoming even more aggressivein their demands.The Belgiancartels were unableto maintain their agreementsfrom the externalBritish shock because of the conflictwith the re-rollers. In mid 1934the Belgiangovernment, sensitive to the problemswithin the steelindustry and worried aboutinternational markets, felt it neededto encouragethe internalorganization of Belgianindustry. In July 1934King Alfred issueda royaldecree giving him the rightto establishgroups fostering the Comit6Nationale du Commerce'sresolution of May 1934that permitted and encouragedBelgian producers to unite in order to fight international competition[7, p. 39]. Althoughthe governmentdid not establishnew steel cartelsthe governmentdid become increasingly involved in settingexport and pricecontrols. What the decreeand the Comit6'sresolution did do, however, wasto givethe steelproducers the spacein orderto operatetheir cartels both nationallyand internationally,something American steel firms, for example, couldnot do.6 After 1935,with the devaluationof the Belga,there started a moveto exportmore steel,often outsidethe controlof the Belgiancartels. In his studyof inter-warBelgium, Robin Hogg states that, "the most dangerous time for Cosibelcame after the devaluationin 1935"[10, p. 46]. This threatened boththe internalBelgian cartels and the internationalexport agreements with Franceand Germany. By 1936domestic prices for steelgoods were actually lowerthan world prices, so firms would deliver steel products as if theywere beingsold domestically and then theywould "reroute" the productsfor the export market and these "fraudulentdeliveries" (livraisons frauduleuses) became increasinglycommon, disrupting both the domesticand foreign produceragreements. The governmentfelt it hadto interveneagain; this time to secureBelgian industry's steel inputs. The governmentsuggested granting exportlicenses for all provenexport contracts, limiting the availabilityof the export trade and providinginformation on export volume. Monsieur Dieudonn6ofthe Luxembourg group 7 suggested thatif domesticprices were higher,then firms would not have an incentiveto try to cheatin thismanner. He suggestedraising prices 36% for bars and forms,but the cartel finally

6Americansteelfirms could operate export cartels under the protection ofthe Webb- PomereneAct, but domesticcartels were illegal. The exportgroup never achieved the unity necessaryto participatefully in the internationalcartel. 7TheLuxembourg groupparticipated inthe Belgian meetings andvoted oncartel policies, makingthe Luxembourgproducers de facto membersof the Belgiancartels. 224

agreedon a flat increaseof 50 BF per ton, unlessthere were no export licenses,in whichcase the increasewould rise to 100BF per ton. The Belgian firms had beenoperating under the conclusionsof the Cartel'sTechnical Reportof June10, 1935. In thisreport, the TechnicalCommission reviewed the standingof the Belgiansteel cartels within the domesticeconomy and concludedthat, "In order to keepup a strongmorale and not expose ourselves to attack,it is indispensablenot to raisethe pricesfor productsthat mustbe consumeddomestically" [26]. Yet, by adheringto thispolicy and by cheating on their deliveries,some firms were strongly under their domesticquotas. In a letter to Cosibelon June16, 1935Monsieur G. Bo•l complainedthat the under-quotapositions of Ougr6e,Cockerill and Angleur, all largefirms, were hurtingthe carteland that these firms should be forcedto "acceptthe orders that they are offered"[1]. On April 9, 1936 the exportlicense scheme began with "no major shocksor inconveniences,"and Cosibelpaid for the generalcosts for the licenses[23]. Even with the rebates and licenses,though, there were complaintsabout domestic supplies of steelproducts. In the Forty-sixth Meetingof Cosibel,the membersreported that the re-rollerde Nimy had complainedto the governmentthat the "Carteld'Acier" refused to furnishit with semisand that thiswas reported in the majornewspapers [1]. At the sametime domesticprices were rising, and on December23, 1936Cosibel reportedthat itsprices of merchantbars and structural shapes would rise by 75 BF per ton, thickplates by 100 BF per ton, and semisby 80 BF per ton (only 60 BF per ton for domesticre-rollers producing for the domestic market) [1]. This helpedmake domestic sales more attractivebut did not equalizedomestic and world prices. Thecartel continued to complainabout low domestic prices and did not wantto expanddomestic steel sales, while the Belgianconsumers and the governmentdemanded that the Belgian industrial input demands be satisfied. The re-rollersof steelmade many appeals to the government,calling their situation"catastrophic" because of the lack of domesticsupplies. Even domesticconsumers in the buildingand constructionindustry complained to the government.The GermanStahlwerks-Verband, worried that no internal solutionwould be reachedcirculated a letter to its directorscomplaining that, "Aslong as an agreementis noteffect [between the Belgian producers and the re-rollers],the possibilityof priceincreases does not exist"[14]. In order to solvethe problemof fraudulentexports and unserviced domesticdemand, M. Colsonof the Trade Ministrysuggested that Cosibel workin conjunctionwith his Department and create quotas for steelexports. He plannedto successivelyreduce exports and increasethe domesticsteel salesby 15,000tons per month,reaching a finaldistribution of salesat 175,000 tonssold domestically and 85,000 tons exported. In conjunctionwith this he suggestedthree measures to ensurethe plan'ssuccess: 1) to takethe license schemeaway from the industryand giveit to a governmentorganization to administer,2) to extendthe licenseto all metalgoods which would limit the finishingindustry's exports, and 3) to allocateexport licenses only after the domesticdemand has been satisfied [20]. The membersof Cosibelreacted againstthe plan warning that, "This plan of thegovernment's isvery dangerous 225

becauseit is verydifficult to reestablishexport markets after theyhave been brokenfor a time"[20]. In an industryso dependenton exportmarkets for its sales,the Belgiansteel producers were not willing to harmthese markets, even if it meant discordwithin Belgiumitself and potentialproblems internationallywith othersteel producers. For the restof 1937Cosibel struggled with risingproduction costs and problemsin its salespolicies. Even Cosibelitself was endangeredby the changingproduction costs. Members were facing in February1937 a 4 BF per tonincrease in ore pricesand an increasein averagetransport prices of 10%, a 50 BF increasein the priceof coke,and a 2 1/2% increasein labor costs. Thesemeant an increasein the costsof merchantbars and structuralshapes of 100 BF and 110 BF for thick plates[21]. For thesethree productsthe membersproposed that the priceincreases be twicethe costincreases. This movewas made after severalfirms complained that theywere makinglosses on sales;some members even claimed up to a 120BF lossper ton soldin the lastquarter. Based on the costincreases Cosibel proposed the followingnew semi-finishedprices: for blooms730 BF insteadof 665 BF, for billettes760 BF insteadof 690 BF and for largets870 BF insteadof 780 BF. The Luxemourggroup, not havingto worryabout problems with re-rollers,asked that bloomsbe raised to 750 BF and billetresto 870 BF; the membersof Cosibelcould not givean answerand said that this would have to be resolved in the next meeting. In April the membersagreed upon the prices: for blooms869 BF, for billettes902 BF and for largets948 BF, with the rebate of70 BF, as in the past, for re-rollers producing forthe domestic market. 8 Re-rollerswere not happywith how domesticprices were changing relativeto worldprices and how prices were changing relative to eachother. M. Bo61,a re-roller,complained that it wasabnormal for certainsemis to be pricedthe sameas merchantbars. As discussedearlier, the re-rollerswere alwaysconcerned with the priceof their inputsand especiallyresented any gain to semi-finishedproducers in the form of higher prices. Monsieur D'Heur, Presidentof Cosibel,responded that the price of semisvaried dependingupon the marketand so couldbe comparedwith merchantbar prices, and he gave the examplethat between billettes for domestic consumptionand merchantbars there was still a differenceof 190 BF [22]. Further,he arguedthat there had been substantialincreases in the average domesticprices since the beginningof the year. As Robert de Strycker reportedin his "La M6tallurgieen 1937,"the Belgianemphasis on semis,in additionto worryinginternally about re-rollers, also was based on the rapid expansionof semiexports to England[29, pp. 127-140]. As D'Heur claimed,the priceswere rising in 1937and the relativegain in semisand merchantbars was about the same. The statementby D'Heur started a conversation on the merits of the difference in the domestic and world pricesand endedwith harshwords on the viabilityof the cartels. In the Sixty-firstmeeting of Cosibel'smembers on December3, 1937Monsieur

8Theprices for blooms inMarch had been 730 BF, for billetres 760BF, and for largets 870, so the increasesfor the second quarterof 1937 representsubstantial changes. 22•

D'Heur lamentedthat someof the statementshad been interpretedby the internationalpress as a denunciationof the accords.He assuredthe other membersthat denialshad been sent, but that unfortunately"all the noiseover this have alreadydisturbed the marketsprofoundly -- marketsthat were alreadyin a particularweak position" [2].

Conclusion

The Belgiancartel, although it desperatelyattempted to createa strong, united policy, was faced with internal power strugglesand a hostile environmentto its intentions.It neededto coordinatedomestic production in orderto participatein the exportcartel arrangements but wasunable to do so completelybecause of the conflictsbetween the re-rollersand the integrated works. Thisinternal conflict weakened the cartel'sability to enforcepolicies and to respondto market changes,as in the caseof the British tariff. The governmentwas interested in the cartel'sstability for exchangeearnings and its internationalagreements with otherEuropean nations but alsowanted the domesticmarket to receiveneeded steel inputs, which tended to destabilize the cartel. So governmentpolicy was alternatively beneficial toward the cartel and opposedto it becauseof its conflictingobjectives.

References

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17. Minutesof the Meetingof the Comit6Permanent of Ougr6e,January 23, 1933,Cockerill 1341. 18. Minutesof the Meetingof the Comit6 Permanentof Ougr6e, September23, 1933, Cockerill 1341. 19. Minutesof the Meetingof the Conseild'Administration of Esp•rance-Longdoz,October 20, 1932, cockerill 1169. 20. Minutesof the Fifty-thirdMeeting of the conselld'Administration of cosibel, February 12, 1937, Angleur-Athus307. 21. Minutesof the Fifty-fourthMeeting of the Conseild'Administration of Cosibel,February 24, 1937, Angleur-Athus307. 22. Minutesof the Fifty-sixthMeeting of the conseil d'Administrationof Cosibel,June 22, 1937, Angleur-Athus307. 23. Minutesof the Forty-secondMeeting of the Conseild'Administration of Cosibel,April 15, 1936, Angleur-Athus306. 24. Minutesof the Tenth Meetingof the Conseild'Administration of Cosibel,February 14, 1934, Angleur-Athus306. 25. Minutesof the ThirteenthMeeting of the conseil d'Administrationof Cosibel,May 23, 1934, Angleur-Athus306. 26. Minutesof the Twenty-firstMeeting of the Conseild'Administration of Cosibel,June 10, 1935, Angleur-Athus306. 27. Don Patinkin,"Multiple Plant Firms, Cartelsand ImperfectCompetition," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 61 (February 1947) 26. Reportfrom the Comit6Permanent of Ougr6e,April 27, 1934, Cockerill1341. 29. Robert de Strycker,"La M•tallurgieen 1937," Bulletinde I'institutdes Sciences Economiques(Universit• de Louvain,February 1938). 30. Twenty-fifthMeeting of the conselld'Administration of Cosibel,June 26, 1935,Angleur- Athus 306. 31. Am• Wibail, "La Sid6rurgiebeige en 1932," Bulletin de I'institutdes Sciences Econorniques(Universit6 de Louvain,February 1933).