Transcription of the interview with Étienne Davignon (Brussels, 11 December 2007 and 14 January 2008) Caption: Transcription of the interview with Étienne Davignon, Head of Cabinet of Belgian Foreign Ministers Paul-Henri Spaak from 1964 to 1966 and Pierre Harmel from 1966 to 1969, Director-General for Policy in the Belgian Foreign Ministry from 1969 to 1976, author of a report on the problems of political unification (the Davignon Report) in 1970, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the International Energy Agency from 1974 to 1977, Member of the Commission of the European Communities with special responsibility for the Internal Market and Industrial Affairs, the Customs Union, the Information Market and Innovation, Energy, the Euratom Supply Agency and International Nuclear Relations from 1977 to 1981, and Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities with special responsibility for Industrial Affairs, Energy, the Euratom Supply Agency, Research and Science and the Joint Research Centre from 1981 to 1985, carried out by the Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe (CVCE) on 11 December 2007 and 14 January 2008 in the studios of the Council of the European Union in Brussels. The interview was conducted by Étienne Deschamps, a Researcher at the CVCE, and particularly focuses on the following subjects: the empty chair crisis, Paul-Henri Spaak’s European commitment, the question of British accession to the European Communities and the ‘Harmel Report’, the Hague Summit in 1969, Pierre Werner and the Werner Report, the ‘Davignon Report’, the European Communities and the 1973 oil crisis, the ‘Davignon Plan’, the establishment of an industrial policy at Community level and Davignon’s work at the Commission of the European Communities. Source: Interview d'Étienne Davignon / ÉTIENNE DAVIGNON, Étienne Deschamps.- Bruxelles: CVCE [Prod.], 11.12.2007-14.01.2008. CVCE, Sanem. - VIDEO (02:42:59, Couleur, Son original). Copyright: Transcription CVCE.EU by UNI.LU All rights of reproduction, of public communication, of adaptation, of distribution or of dissemination via Internet, internal network or any other means are strictly reserved in all countries. Consult the legal notice and the terms and conditions of use regarding this site. URL: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/transcription_of_the_interview_with_etienne_davignon_bru ssels_11_december_2007_and_14_january_2008-en-49af1f33-d219-4c3f-9422- 72bebdcd8524.html Last updated: 04/07/2016 1/31 Transcription of the interview with Étienne Davignon (Brussels, 11 December 2007 and 14 January 2008) Contents 1. The empty chair crisis............................................................................................................................1 2. Paul-Henri Spaak’s European commitment..........................................................................................9 3. The question of British accession to the European Communities and the ‘Harmel Report’.............10 4. The Hague Summit in 1969.................................................................................................................13 5. The ‘Davignon Report’........................................................................................................................15 6. The European Communities and the 1973 oil crisis...........................................................................19 7. The ‘Davignon Plan’...........................................................................................................................22 8. The establishment of an industrial policy at Community level..........................................................24 9. His work at the Commission of the European Communities.............................................................26 1. The empty chair crisis [Étienne Deschamps] Mr Davignon, I am extremely grateful to you for having agreed to give us a little of your time today, here in Brussels, for us to talk about some aspects of your career as a diplomat and a European figure. If you don’t mind, I suggest that we go straight to the heart of the matter, with a look at the familiar topic of the ‘empty chair crisis’ of 1965–66. You played a prominent part in it yourself, and I would be glad if you would tell us what you remember, not just about the crisis, but also about the personal part Spaak, as Belgian Foreign Minister, was able to play in finding a way out of it, of resolving the crisis. [Étienne Davignon] Well, we have to remember how the crisis originated, because unless we do that it is very hard to understand the procedures that had to be followed to get out of it. So, we were at a time when we were just about to move into applying the treaty in its final form. We were still in stage one of the treaty, and the treaty stipulated that there was a balance between the common market — in other words the part relating, let us say, to industry and freedom of movement — and a common policy, the policy on agriculture. So the Council had to decide on the agricultural policy and its financial implications. The President of the Commission, Mr Hallstein, thought it was a good time for a political revival, in other words for adding to the Treaty of Rome the things it hadn’t been possible to do at the outset: giving Parliament greater powers, more voting and so on, and he drafted a Commission memorandum which, in a sense, exploited the need to devise an agricultural policy as a way of getting, in return for the agricultural policy, more all-round progress on European integration. [Étienne Deschamps] Because Hallstein was a federalist by inclination? [Étienne Davignon] He was completely federalist — in fact everyone was a federalist, apart from the French. So, there was a general tendency for him to think it was a tool he could use and he put his plan before the European Parliament before submitting it to the Member States. There he ran into his first hitch because what the Commission was supposed to do, at the time — and you must always look at things from the point of view of what was necessary at the time — was address itself first of all to the Council, to the Member States, and Parliament didn’t play the part it plays now. So that was the first setback. The French said no to Hallstein’s memorandum, but of course the discussions about finalising the agricultural policy, the financial regulation, went on and there was a series of Council 2/31 meetings, then a Council, the last one, which was fairly dramatic and where no agreement was reached. But there it was, the Council of Ministers, no less, couldn’t agree on the agricultural policy. So you must never forget that at the outset, when the French said that the obligations laid down by the treaty were not being honoured, they were right. And a lot of work was put into finding an agreement, but no agreement was reached on the substance. How far was it affected by the fact that there was nothing on offer in return, politically speaking? That’s very difficult to assess. The net result was that that they didn’t come to any agreement. So, the dispute started with a failure to honour a collective obligation and with the new factor of the Hallstein memorandum. And at this point General de Gaulle decided that, if that was how things were, he wouldn’t attend Council meetings any more. That raised three issues. The first one was: Could we take the view that a five-member Council could take decisions, in some way? Would decisions have to be taken by all six members or, if five of them decided and another one didn’t because it was not there, would that be legally valid or not? The treaty had obviously not made any provision for this eventuality, because the treaty had not even made provision for the possibility of leaving the European Community. That was the first question. The second issue was: There was a default from the commitments everyone had given, as the common market had not been supplemented by the agricultural aspect, or the financial aspect which was to pay for the agricultural policy. And thirdly: How were we to get out of it, given the first two points I have mentioned? Well, to begin with there was a period when Hallstein and a number of countries were saying: ‘Right, well, if France isn’t there, that’s its problem, not ours.’ You should know, of course, that France was still attending the permanent representatives’ meeting; not the ambassador — we were a bit into the traditional diplomatic practice of recalling an ambassador, but it didn’t make much difference recalling an ambassador if you had a representative at the permanent representatives’ table. But it does show that de Gaulle was, after all, still stuck in the traditional bilateral way of seeing things and hadn’t yet grasped the special nature of multilateral politics. And there was a preliminary discussion in the Council, without the French, where Hallstein said he hoped we would take a decision on the arrangements for oranges. There was quite a fierce set- to between Spaak and Hallstein, with Spaak saying: ‘We can’t regard the Council as being properly constituted, we can discuss matters but we can’t take the view that unanimity is automatically required, because there could be a unanimous vote by one person.’ So there was quite a lively set-to, and the first issue was left unresolved. On the second issue: What would become of the Hallstein memorandum? That’s what it actually came down to, the writing was on the wall, because once it became clear that the French wouldn’t want it, it would not be possible to get it approved, because that would require a unanimous vote, as it was something more than what we already had, so that’s clearly where we were; could we use Article 237 or not, the one which lays down that additions can be made to the treaty by unanimous vote. Fairly quickly, then, just before the summer, we got round to asking ourselves what we would do. And of course the question of what we should do was a simple one. How were we to get the French back to the table, since the situation we were in was clearly an intolerable one.