A Crack in the Shell New Documents Expose a Hidden Climate History

Key Findings

• A major new trove of Shell documents unearthed by • In a 1991 film, Shell acknowledged both the scale Jelmer Mommers of De Correspondent and released and scope of potential climate harms to human so- by Climate Files sheds new light on the contrast be- ciety, ecosystems, and the environment, and warned tween Shell’s internal discussions and its public ac- of potential impacts to food security and the rise of tions during a critical window for cllimate action. “global warming refugees.”

• As Shell faces climate litigation and investigation in • Despite these warnings, and contrary to its public a growing number of countries, including the Neth- image, Shell maintained active membership in an erlands, these documents, paired with new historical array of industry trade groups and front groups that materials, prove Shell had early, repeated, and often carried out a decades-long campaign of climate de- urgent notice of climate risks linked to its products. nial and climate obstruction.

• A Shell executive authored a 1958 report noting in- • More than six decades after it was put on notice dustry research into fossil carbon in the atmosphere. of climate risks from its products, Shell continues aggressively pushing to open new oil and gas hori- • In 1962, Shell’s Chief Geologist acknowledged zons—including the rapidly melting Arctic. possible human and environmental risks of global warming and highlighted calls by other scientists to • Shell’s new Sky Scenario is the epitome of this di- increase reliance on solar energy. chotomy: Shell’s model sets out a vision to meet Par- is goals, even as the company acknowledges that it • A confidential report from 1988 stated that Shell ac- has no intent to pursue that vision. counted for 4% of global carbon emissions in 1984. Shell now faces mounting litigation based on market • The new revelations pose risks not only for Shell it- share theories of liability. self, but for other oil majors whose role in the cli- mate crisis have received relatively less attention. • In 1989, Shell took the first steps to protect its own offshore oil platforms from the risks of rising seas, • These findings demonstrate that while these investi- even as it joined oil industry efforts to sow public gations may have begun with ExxonMobil, they are doubt about climate change. unlikely to end there. Introduction documents expose the dichotomies strates, however, Exxon was by no between the two for the first time. means the only company active- Royal Dutch Shell, the major inte- ly engaged in climate science, the grated oil and gas company head- With Shell facing litigation and in- misrepresentation of that science, quartered in the Netherlands and in- vestigation in a growing number or – more fundamentally – the con- corporated in the United Kingdom, of jurisdictions, from US courts to tinued production of fossil fuels is among the largest historic produc- human rights bodies in the Philip- in the face of mounting evidence ers of fossil fuels and, through that pines, this information comes at a and mounting impacts. Shell was production, one of the largest con- critical juncture. an early and recurring participant tributors to atmospheric greenhouse in climate denial and obstruction Absence of Evidence is not gas emissions. In a landmark analysis schemes in the United States and of the world’s largest carbon produc- Evidence of Absence Europe but then made public exits ers by the Climate Accountability from the groups coordinating them, From #ExxonKnew to government Institute, emissions attributable to often after much of the core work investigations to exposés by re- Shell’s products and operations rank had been done. As discussed more searchers and media outlets, Exx- fifth among the 50 investor-owned fully herein, that exit was not only onMobil has garnered far greater companies on the list, accounting belated, but also incomplete. for 2% of industrial greenhouse gas attention than other major oil com- emissions since the beginning of the panies, particularly those based pri- Ironically, the release of the new industrial revolution. marily outside the United States. Shell documents, including confi- Significant, compelling, and grow- dential internal communications, Notwithstanding the global impor- ing documentary and testimony ev- highlights a second and equally im- tance of its operations, its significant idence demonstrates that investiga- portant factor at play in Shell’s lower contribution to cumulative CO2 tions into Exxon are both justified profile relative to ExxonMobil: quite emissions and its active engagement and urgently needed – a perspective simply, we’ve seen few documents of on climate science, and climate pol- upheld by a growing array of courts this kind. By contrast, a substantial icy for decades, Shell’s knowledge of and human rights bodies. number of once internal communi- and role in the climate crisis has re- cations from Exxon, American Pe- At the same time, a compelling ceived comparatively less attention troleum Institute, and other indus- and growing body of evidence also than other leading Carbon Majors, try actors have become public over makes clear that while investigations such as ExxonMobil. the years, whether through investi- into climate accountability may be- gation, litigation, or leaks. A major new tranche of internal gin with ExxonMobil, they cannot Shell documents unearthed by and should not end there. While this distinction may seem Jelmer Mommers from journal- tautological, it is not: information To some extent, the relative lack of ism platform De Correspondent breeds new information. Whether attention paid to Shell to date may and first released on Climate Files in investigation or litigation, one reflect differences, real or perceived, demonstrates that Shell’s history of document leads to another, yielding in the public posture of the compa- flying below the climate investiga- names, dates, and connections that nies with respect to climate change. tion radar may be at an end. The create an ever-expanding (and ever Shell, unlike Exxon, has at times documents, spanning the 1980s and more accurate) roadmap to where been more proactive about acknowl- 1990s, cover a critical period in the additional documents might be edging the reality of climate change history of climate science, climate found. For this reason, this latest set and has been vocal about its corpo- policy, and public debates about the of documents is significant, filling in rate commitment to combating cli- risks and realities of both. By bring- missing pieces of a story that spans mate change, despite the insufficien- ing to light Shell’s internal discus- decades, continents, and an array of cies of those commitments. sions of climate risks at a time when disciplines. Just as the disclosure of the company’s external actions have As previous work by CIEL and nu- Exxon documents has informed and already been documented, these merous other researchers demon- fueled new investigations into that

A Crack in the Shell | 2 | Center for International Environmental Law company’s conduct, the availabili- United Kingdom, and its historic ment stretching back to the 1950s. ty for the first time of a significant leadership from within those coun- It proves unequivocally that Shell, number of Shell documents heralds tries, Shell has operated actively and like ExxonMobil, was on early and a potential step change in the speed extensively throughout the world explicit notice of potential climate and scale of future revelations. for well over a century, including risks associated with the company’s the United States. Shell has operated core products – fossil fuels. It docu- The greater attention paid to Exx- in the United States since the early ments that Shell, like ExxonMobil, on and other US oil producers also years of the 20th century, organized had at its disposal both profound arises, in part, precisely because they its first US company in 1928, was scientific expertise in relevant disci- are widely considered US compa- listed on the New York Stock Ex- plines and the resources to deploy nies – notwithstanding their own change in 1954, and chaired the that expertise to profoundly shape global operations. This US presence American Petroleum Institute (API) long-term trajectories for both the and identity makes Exxon and other for the first time just a few years lat- company itself and the world as a US oil majors of particular interest er, under British-born HMS Burns. whole. to journalists, climate advocates, and others interested in better un- As the API chairmanship suggests, And this analysis sheds new light on derstanding the oil industry’s de- Shell has been an active and fully the often stark dichotomy between cades-long campaign of climate de- embedded member of the US oil in- Shell’s internal understanding of cli- nial and obstruction in the largest dustry for nearly a century. As the mate risk and its public characteri- emitting country on the planet. discussion herein demonstrates, that zation of and operational responses engagement extends to every aspect to that risk. By contrast, major carbon producers of the oil industry’s engagement on headquartered outside the United air pollution generally and climate 1946-1979: Shell on Notice States have received less scrutiny. change specifically. Significantly, of Climate Risks Modest but compelling evidence already exists that European oil ma- Shell had at its disposal Smoke and Fumes: The Legal and Evidentiary Basis for Holding Oil jors were or should have been aware both profound scientific of climate risks at the same time as Companies Accountable for Climate their US counterparts; that these expertise in relevant dis- Change details how actual or imput- firms were members of US indus- ciplines and the resources ed awareness of a risk (Notice) es- try groups known to fund climate to deploy that expertise to tablishes a critical link in the causal chain across jurisdictions and under denial; and that active denial oper- profoundly shape long- ations were also conducted within in an array of legal domains, ranging and across Europe. But this Euro- term trajectories for both from tort to non-contractual liabili- pean evidence remains limited in the company itself and the ty to human rights law. comparison to that available about world as a whole. US companies. Here, again, the new Documentary evidence demon- strates that Shell had early, repeated, Shell documents represent a poten- that US history now provides a criti- and often urgent notice of potential tial turning point. cal backdrop against which this new climate risks linked to its products cache of documents can be evaluated and operations. Royal Dutch Shell: A and their significance for Shell and European and US Carbon for the world more fully assessed. As previously noted, Shell has ac- Major tively engaged with API and other Significantly, the present analysis industry groups for much of the last To an arguably greater extent than shows how Shell’s internal and ex- century. Leaders from Royal Dutch any other oil major, Royal Dutch ternal documents from the 1980s Shell were prominent in API events Shell is and always has been a tru- and 1990s built on – and in im- from no later than the 1920s, and ly global company. Despite its dual portant cases ignored – a history of API member lists indicate that Shell origins in the Netherlands and the climate science and climate engage- was an active API member by no

A Crack in the Shell | 3 | Center for International Environmental Law later than 1949, both directly and ern States Petroleum Association) “determine the amount of carbon of through several subsidiaries. founded the Smoke and Fumes fossil origin” in the atmosphere. This Committee to coordinate the indus- document is the earliest evidence yet Documentary evidence also shows try’s scientific research into air pollu- unearthed that demonstrates a coor- that Shell’s engagement with API tion issues and its public communi- dinated industry-wide research pro- was not limited to US subsidiaries, cations about air pollution science. gram into the accumulation of fossil and it demonstrates direct engage- In the face of mounting public de- carbon in the atmosphere and clear ments between Shell’s European mands for action on air pollution, in evidence that major oil producers, headquarters and key US entities on California and beyond, the Smoke including Shell, were on notice of relevant pollution issues. For exam- and Fumes Committee was designed potential climate risks. ple, a roster of API’s Medical Advi- explicitly to both fund research into sory Committee from 1956 shows at air pollution and to leverage that in- In a presentation on behalf of the least two Shell executives were mem- dustry-funded research to shape the Smoke and Fumes Committee to bers of the committee. API records views of government agencies and the government-convened National document extensive and ongoing the broader public with respect to Conference on Air Pollution later coordination between this commit- the science and potential regulation that same year, Jones assured par- tee and the Smoke and Fumes Com- of air pollution. Recognizing the ticipants that the oil industry had mittee, discussed more fully below. potential nationwide significance of a “sincere interest” in solving pollu- Notably, minutes from a 1958 meet- air pollution issues, the Smoke and tion problems arising from automo- ing include executives from Dutch Fumes Committee was subsumed bile exhaust. Jones declared the in- Shell, in addition to those from its within the American Petroleum In- dustry’s intent to address emissions American subsidiaries. stitute by 1952. not only from the production of oil and gas, but from their use: More saliently, Shell was involved Shell was an early and active partici- directly with API’s research into pol- pant in the Smoke and Fumes Com- The petroleum industry supplies the lutants of the air and atmosphere, mittee. In 1958, Charles Jones wrote fuel used by the automobile, and thus and was itself on early notice of cli- a history of the Smoke and Fumes has a sincere interest in the solution mate change. Committee. Jones identified himself to the problem of pollution from au- as both the Executive Secretary of tomobile exhaust. The stated objective In 1946, faced with growing media the Smoke and Fumes Committee of the Smoke and Fumes Committee attention to and public concern for as well as an executive with Shell. of the American Petroleum Institute California’s smog crisis, industry ex- In the document, Jones reported is to “determine the causes and meth- ecutives from the Western Oil and that the Committee was funding a ods of control of objectionable atmo- Gas Association (now the West- study at Truesdail Laboratories to spheric pollution resulting from the

EXHIBIT 1 Excerpt from presentation by Shell scientist Charles Jones to National Conference on Air Pollution, 1958

Presentation at the National Conference on Air Pollution, Charles A. Jones, Sources of Air Pollution: Transportation (Petroleum) (Nov. 19, 1958), available at https://www. industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=xrcm0047.

A Crack in the Shell | 4 | Center for International Environmental Law production, manufacture, transporta- would become increasingly explicit, sions of both past and predicted fu- tion, sale, and use of petroleum and its detailed, and urgent. ture growth in the production and products. use of the earth’s energy resources, In 1962, Marion King Hubbert, with a heavy focus on the produc- This express recognition that the use Chief Geology Consultant at Shell tion and use of coal, oil, and natu- of its products constitutes a major and former director of its research ral gas, both through conventional part of the oil industry’s impact (and labs, produced a book- length report development and through future responsibility) is significant given on the earth’s Energy Resources for a extreme energy sources such as oil the industry’s decades-long (and committee of the National Acade- shale and tar sands. Hubbert then ongoing) campaigns to shift that my of Sciences. The report, which briefly reviewed progress and viabili- responsibility away from oil com- draws heavily upon a 1956 analysis ty of other energy sources, including panies and onto individual consum- Hubbert prepared for the American solar, wind, geothermal, and hydro- ers. Despite the Smoke and Fumes Petroleum Institute, demonstrates power. In so doing, he explicitly ac- Committee’s then active research Shells’ profound understanding of knowledged the potential risk that into the accumulation of atmo- the earth’s energy balance, including humanity’s growing use of fossil fu- spheric CO2 from fossil fuels, Jones the differences in the reflection of els could result in dramatic changes makes no reference to that research long- and short-wave solar radiation to the earth’s climate: in his presentation. The only refer- back into space, the role of global ence to CO2 emissions characterizes atmospheric temperatures in driv- There is evidence that the greatly in- them as “harmless.” ing global weather, and the intrinsic creasing use of the fossil fuels, whose and delicate natural balance between material contents after combustion are At a high level symposium on En- the heat energy absorbed by plants principally H2O and CO2, is seriously ergy and Man convened by API the through photosynthesis with the contaminating the earth’s atmosphere following year, renowned physicist equivalent energy released by plant with CO2. Analyses indicate that the Edward Teller directly challenged matter through natural decay. CO2 content of the atmosphere since that characterization. Calling at- 1900 has increased 10 per cent. Since tendees attention to the link be- Hubbert produced detailed discus- tween fossil fuels and rising atmo- spheric levels of CO2, as well as the EXHIBIT 2 resulting “greenhouse effect” from Excerpt from Hubbert’s 1962 report Energy Resources rising CO2, Teller warned that “a temperature rise corresponding to a 10 percent increase in carbon diox- ide will be sufficient to melt the ice- cap and submerge New York. All the coastal cities would be covered… this chemical contamination is more serious than most people tend to be- lieve.” At the time, API was chaired by Shell Oil President HMS Burns.

By the end of the 1950s, therefore, Shell was demonstrably on notice that atmospheric contamination by CO2 from fossil fuels was an envi- ronmental issue of potentially sig- nificant concern to the industry and to the planet. In the decade that fol- M. King Hubbert, Energy Resources: A Report to the Committee on Natural Resources of the lowed, warnings to Shell from both National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council 96 (1962). within and outside the company

A Crack in the Shell | 5 | Center for International Environmental Law SD-Pictures/Pixabay

CO2 absorbs long-wavelength radia- peratures. They also warned that “[s] API report on the status of ongoing tion, it is possible that this is already ignificant temperature changes are research reports identifies Shell not producing a secular climatic change almost certain to occur by the year only as a member of API’s Air and in the direction of higher average tem- 2000 and these could bring about Water Conservation Committee, peratures. This could have profound climatic changes.” Significantly, the but also of the smaller Engineering effects both on the weather and on the 1968 report acknowledged that, and Technical Resources Executive ecological balances. while uncertainties remained, the Committee responsible for steering combustion of fossil fuels was the API’s research into atmospheric pol- Hubbert concluded by recognizing best fit to the scientific data for rising lutants. (Another European oil ma- that: CO2 and, accordingly, emphasized jor, British Petroleum, is also among that future research should focus on the committee members.) Moreover, In view of the dangers of atmospheric technologies and other changes to also in 1972, a submission from the contamination by both the waste gas- reduce CO2 emissions. In a supple- National Petroleum Council (NPC), es of the fossil fuels and the radioac- mental report delivered to API the an industry-staffed advisory com- tive contaminates from nuclear pow- following year, the authors addressed mittee to the United States federal er plants, Professor Hutchinson urges the issue of atmospheric carbon di- government, made significant refer- serious consideration of the maximum oxide in greater detail. Although the ences to the 1968 report. The report, utilization of solar energy. supplement dealt at greater length Environmental Conservation: The Oil In 1968, the warning by Shell’s with the uncertainties in climate and Gas Industries, praised the work own Chief Geologist was echoed science, its central conclusion – that of the SRI scientists and their con- and dramatically amplified in a re- accumulating carbon dioxide in the clusions about atmospheric scav- port commissioned by API’s Smoke atmosphere could lead to planetary enging mechanisms for traditional and Fumes Committee, by then re- warming and potentially catastroph- pollutants, but disregarding their named the Committee for Air and ic climatic changes – remained the findings with respect to atmospheric Water Conservation. As previously same. carbon dioxide, relying instead on detailed by CIEL, the authors of an earlier and more skeptical report Given its longstanding and active from another source. Tellingly, and the 1968 report Sources, Abundance, role within API generally and in the and Fate of Gaseous Atmospheric Pol- in stark contrast to the contents of Smoke and Fumes Committee and the SRI reports themselves, the Ex- lutants warned the industry that ac- successor committees specifically, cumulating carbon dioxide in the ecutive Summary to the 1972 NPC it is reasonable to assume Shell re- report all but dismissed any sugges- atmosphere, caused primarily by ceived these reports. Two pieces of burning fossil fuels, would likely re- tion of global impacts from pollu- documentary evidence further but- tion: sult in increasing atmospheric tem- tress this assumption. First, a 1972

A Crack in the Shell | 6 | Center for International Environmental Law EXHIBIT 3 The problem of possible human in- Excerpt from Executive Summary to the 1972 NPC report fluences on climate.” Shell was again a participant.

1980-1998: New Documents Expose a Growing Dichotomy between Shell’s Knowledge, Rhetoric and Conduct during a Critical Period for Climate Science and Climate Action

As the preceding discussion demon- strates, Shell entered the 1980s with nearly three decades of steadily ac- cumulating research and warnings about the potential climate risks linked to its products and opera- tions. By 1980, Shell was unequivo- Environmental Conservation: The Oil and Gas Industries / Volume 2, National Petroleum Council cally on notice of those risks, of the xxii (1972), available at http://www.npc.org/reports/1972- Environmental_Conservation-Oil_and_Gas_ Indus- increasingly robust body of scien- tries-Vol_II.pdf. tific evidence linking fossil fuels to atmospheric carbon dioxide, and to Based on scientific studies, on a global the report’s discussion of air pollut- climate change and climate impacts. aggregate basis, air pollution is not a ants is attributed. At minimum, this serious problem . . . . Studies involving demonstrates Shell was aware of the The trove of documents unearthed international cooperation are needed SRI reports. by Jelmer Mommers and De Cor- to define any global effects of air pol- respondent exposes not only Shell’s lution, particularly from man-made Shell continued its active engage- deep awareness of these risks but the sources. ment in climate research and cli- growing divergence between that mate discussions throughout the internal awareness, its public assess- While main’s contribution produces 1970s. At the same time, Shell made ment of climate science, and, criti- localized problems of varying degrees, early forays into solar energy. In cally, its corporate conduct in the depending on population density and 1973, Shell acquired industry pio- face of mounting climate risks. natural ventilation, there is a question neer Solar Energy Systems and ac- as to the effect of man’s pollution on a tively published research and filed In 1986, a Shell working group global basis in view of nature’s contri- for patents throughout the 1970s. completed a study of greenhouse bution and absorptive capacity. In 1977, Shell participated in the gases in the atmosphere, which they Conference on Energy Resourc- then presented in a report called Three senior Shell Oil executives, es, which included a discussion of The Greenhouse Effect in 1988. This including company President Har- global warming as caused by fossil report examined the science of the old Bridges, were identified as con- fuel combustion and carbon dioxide greenhouse effect, climate scenarios tributors to the report, suggesting accumulation. Two years later, the and modeling, and potential im- familiarity with and endorsement World Meteorological Organization pacts from climate change caused by of its contents. L.P. Haxby, Shell’s hosted the World Climate Confer- greenhouse gas accumulation. Manager for Environmental Con- ence and made explicit and specific servation (and Public Relations) reference to the “additional issue of The Greenhouse Effect acknowledged was a member of the six-person Air special importance that pervades all unequivocally that atmospheric Conservation Task Group to which the above-mentioned components: CO2 levels were increasing, that fos-

A Crack in the Shell | 7 | Center for International Environmental Law sil fuel combustion was the primary for the company as it faces mount- designing a $3 billion natural gas cause, and that there was “reasonable ing litigation based on market share platform, raising it a meter or two scientific agreement that increased theories of liability. It is particularly to account for future sea level rise. levels of greenhouse gases would significant in this regard that Shell’s Meanwhile, Shell’s apparent failure cause a global warming.” The report self-tabulated emissions figure for to consider the impacts of climate discussed the potential consequenc- 1984 of 0.25 Gigatons of carbon change in siting hazardous facilities es – including rising sea levels, ocean is only marginally lower than the in low-lying coastal areas is the sub- acidification, changes to agricultural 0.348 Gigaton of carbon emissions ject of active and ongoing litigation. patterns, and climatic change – as attributed to Shell in 1984 using the well as the potential economic, so- “Carbon Majors” accounting meth- The conclusions and recommenda- cial, and political severity of those odology developed by the Climate tions in The Greenhouse Effect shed consequences. Notably, this includ- Accountability Institute. light not only on Shell’s then-current ed a discussion of the implications understanding of climate risks, but for the energy industry as a whole on the company’s subsequent con- and for Shell companies in particu- This explicit recognition duct in light of that understanding. lar. that Shell’s sold products Although the report acknowledged accounted for 4% of global uncertainties, it counseled that re- Even more significantly in light of search should “be directed more to ongoing and active litigation against carbon emissions in 1984 the analysis of policy and energy op- the company and Shell’s earlier rec- may have long-term rami- tions than to studies of what we will ognition in the CA Jones memo that fications for the company be facing exactly.” It also noted that oil producers must address the pol- “by the time the global warming lution impacts of their products, The as it faces mounting litiga- becomes detectable it could be too Greenhouse Effect not only acknowl- tion based on market share late to take effective countermea- edged the scale of Shell’s own CO2 theories of liability. sures to reduce the effects or even emissions, but calculated them: to stabilise the situation.” As will be discussed below, subsequent docu- Fossil fuels which are marketed and Shell also recognized climate change ments (many of which, unlike The used by the Group account for the could have “direct operational con- Greenhouse Effect, were not marked production of 4% of the CO2 emitted sequences…from a rising sea level, “confidential”) highlight uncertain- worldwide from combustion. Of these impacting offshore installations, ties in forecasts of specific impacts, emissions, 80% comes from Group oil, coastal facilities and operations (e.g. and cite them as reasons for contin- 12% from Group gas and 8% from platforms, harbours, refineries, de- ued inaction. Group coal. pots) with an uncertain magnitude.” Although the report suggested that These explicit acknowledgements This explicit recognition that Shell’s no immediate facility relocations should be remembered when consid- sold products accounted for 4% of were needed given the slow pace ering efforts by Shell to undermine global carbon emissions in 1984 of sea level rise, Shell nonetheless public confidence in the certainty of may have long-term ramifications announced in 1989 that it was re- climate science and to thwart regu-

EXHIBIT 4 Excerpt from The Greenhouse Effect report, 1988

Shell Internationale Petroleum Maatschappij, The Greenhouse Effect 29, 57 (1988), available at http://www.climatefiles.com/shell/1988-shell-report-greenhouse/.

A Crack in the Shell | 8 | Center for International Environmental Law EXHIBIT 5 Excerpt from The Greenhouse Effect report, 1988

Shell Internationale Petroleum Maatschappij, The Greenhouse Effect 29, 57 (1988), available at http://www.climatefiles.com/shell/1988-shell-report-greenhouse/. lation at the sub-national, national, that Shell was aware not only of the that coordinated, regulatory action and international levels. risks of climate change, but also of would need to be taken to solve the the robustness and growing specific- climate crisis. In 1991, Shell released a 28-minute ity of the scientific case for climate film entitled Climate of Concern. The change. It noted that evidence for Despite its recognition of these re- film acknowledged the consensus warming had already been observed, alities, Shell’s messaging on climate surrounding climate change, the role acknowledging observed warm- change – both internally and pub- of fossil fuels in driving the warm- ing in the Arctic as far back as the licly – shows a marked shift in the ing, and the scale and scope of the 1930s, and stating that “[r]egion by ensuing years, just as the public and potential devastation. It also noted region analysis of world temperature policy debates over climate action that the rate of temperature change records shows a small but signifi- were accelerating. is greater than anything seen since cant warming trend over the cen- the end of the last ice age, and that tury, with a marked increase in the In 1994, Shell commissioned an up- the climate might “change too fast, 1980s.” date to The Greenhouse Effect, called perhaps, for life to adapt without se- The Enhanced Greenhouse Effect. vere dislocation.” The film discussed It concluded that, while not all is This report restated the consensus the scale and scope of risks, includ- certain, many think waiting for of climate scientists and included ing changes to weather patterns and ironclad proof would be irresponsi- updates. In a significant departure “the increasing frequency of abnor- ble and action now (in 1991) is the from previous analyses, however, mal weather;” saltwater intrusion; only safe insurance. “What is now nearly half of the report was dedi- sea level rise; increasingly destruc- considered abnormal weather could cated to “Areas of Controversy and tive storm surges, noting “warmer become a new norm. We have seen Alternative Scientific Views.” Even seas could make such destructive the consequences in our own time.” as it acknowledged compelling new surges more frequent and even more climate science, the 1994 report ferocious;” pollution of ground- Importantly, this film did not simply placed a heavy emphasis on discred- water; impacts on agriculture; and address the risks posed by climate iting and downplaying that science. the displacement of people living change, but also examined solutions. Three years after Shell declared in on low-lying islands. It warned of Notably, the film acknowledged Climate of Concern “waiting for “greenhouse refugees” displaced that, while technology, including ironclad proof would be irresponsi- by shifting climates, noting “if the renewable energies and energy ef- ble and that action now is the only weather machine were to be wound ficiency technologies, was a part safe insurance,” Shell seemed more up to such new levels of energy, no of the solution, combating global interested in demanding proof than country would remain unaffected.” warming would require more than in taking action. technological fixes. That is to say, in Climate of Concern demonstrates 1991 Shell explicitly acknowledged What changed?

A Crack in the Shell | 9 | Center for International Environmental Law The timing of The Enhanced Green- uncertainty. A Shell Management Brief from house Effect, at a critical juncture in February, 1995 restated many of the the climate change debate, suggests The Greenhouse Effect from 1988 ac- points in the 1994 report – acknowl- one possible answer. When Climate knowledged uncertainties, but made edging the potential consequences of Concern was released in 1991, the clear that the key research questions of climate change, but emphasizing UN Framework Convention on Cli- lay in how to address growing emis- the uncertainties in climate science. mate Change (UNFCCC) was still sions and climate impacts, not what Shell again acknowledged that “an being negotiated, with the two most the precise impacts would be. The increase in atmospheric greenhouse powerful nations on the planet ac- Enhanced Greenhouse Effect, in com- gas concentrations… must have tively working to slow or weaken the parison, contained a long discussion some effect on the radiation balance deal. By 1994, however, the UN Cli- of those uncertainties. In its section which ultimately determines global mate Convention was a reality, and on “Areas of Controversy and Alter- climate. However, it is not possible demand was already rising for a new, native Scientific Views,” the report to quantify the consequences for stronger deal to turn the treaty com- addressed alternative carbon sinks, global climate.” This brief was not mitments from words into action. the reliability of temperature re- marked as classified. The Enhanced Greenhouse Effect ap- cords, defects in global climate mod- pears a year before the first Confer- els, the possibility that actual climat- Another report in 1995, entitled Is ence of Parties to the United Nations ic changes might not be as bad as Climate Change Occurring Already? Framework Convention on Climate expected, and the uncertain impacts and not marked as classified, ad- Change, where nations would gath- on agriculture. It concluded that “[i] dressed whether the human signal er to begin negotiating how to col- t is thus not possible to dismiss the could be found in the climate sys- lectively confront the challenge of global warming hypothesis as scien- tem. It bears recognition that this climate change. tifically unsound; on the other hand 1995 report diverged from Shell’s any policy measure should take into own earlier analyses and disregarded Perhaps this why the 1994 report account explicitly the weaknesses in the explicit testimony by Dr. James marks an inflection point in Shell’s the scientific case.” While the 1988 Hansen of NASA to the US Con- treatment of the subject, with the report was marked “confidential,” gress in June 1988 that the signal of company thereafter increasingly fo- there is no indication that The En- anthropogenic climate change had, cusing public attention on scientific hanced Greenhouse Effect was as well. by that summer, clearly emerged from the background noise of natu- ral variation. In other words, climate EXHIBIT 6 change was no longer an abstract hy- Atmosphere Concentration for Total Resource Use pothesis; it was an emergent reality.

Seven years after Hansen’s testimo- ny and four years after Shell released Climate of Concern, the company’s 1995 report proved remarkably – un- justifiably – equivocal about climate science. Although Shell did not deny that climate change was happening or that it was the caused primarily by fossil fuel combustion, it argued that only “a slow accumulation of evidence, rather than a ‘smoking gun’, will indicate man-made emis- sions as the cause of some part of observed climate change.” This is Presentation from Royal Dutch Shell Group, Climate Change: What Does Shell Think and Do About It? 6 (Mar. a stark contrast to the warnings of 1998), available at http://www.climatefiles.com/shell/1998-shell-report-think-and-do-about-climate-change/.

A Crack in the Shell | 10 | Center for International Environmental Law Shell’s own scientists in 1988 that a doubling of atmospheric CO2. operational planning by no later “by the time the global warming be- than 1989, Shell joined the Global comes detectable it could be too late Undergirding all of this history is Climate Coalition (GCC), a group to take effective countermeasures to of companies and industry groups reduce the effects or even to stabilise The “Roadmap Memo” which fought climate regulation, the the situation.” outlined a strategy to same year. Shell released another public-facing convince the public that The GCC actively sowed misinfor- document in 1995 entitled Shell and climate science was still mation about climate change and the Environment. In it, the company unsettled. It described fought the adoption of the Kyoto acknowledged that “[t]he possibil- Protocol. After joining the GCC ity of climate change caused by an victory as having the “[a] in 1989, Shell participated actively enhanced greenhouse effect is prob- verage citizens ‘understand’ throughout the Kyoto negotiations, ably the most prominent global en- (recognize) uncertainties in including through the Protocol’s vironmental issue of today.” It also climate science.” adoption at the UNFCCC. noted that, despite uncertainties, Although Shell formally withdrew “Shell companies accept that there is the fact that the Shell Group pos- enough indication of potential risk from the GCC in 1998, it remained sessed (and continues to possess) an active member of the American to the environment for governments enormous scientific and technical to address the issue.” Petroleum Institute, whose climate expertise. Not only did Shell have misinformation campaign either The following year, in 1996, a Shell vast resources at its disposal, it was a began or accelerated that same year. Management Brief outlined the In- multinational corporation involved A 1998 document from the Ameri- tergovernmental Panel on Climate in dozens of other organizations and can Petroleum Institute, referred to Change’s (IPCC) Second Assess- working groups. As such, Shell must as the “Roadmap Memo,” outlined ment Report (SAR). This briefing be assumed to have known at least as a strategy to convince the public analyzed the major conclusions in much as was known in scientific and that climate science was still unset- the SAR, but placed heavy emphasis public discourse – and likely knew tled. It described victory as having on uncertainties in the science and more than we are aware of even now. the “[a]verage citizens ‘understand’ limitations in the models. Still, the Shell’s history should be evaluated in (recognize) uncertainties in climate brief acknowledged that “Climate the light of that expertise, and Shell science.” As part of its strategy, API change is potentially the most seri- should be held to the highest stan- funded Smithsonian scientist Wei- ous and intractable environmental dard of conduct and responsibility Hock Soon, who produced work issue faced by mankind. If man is for its decisions, communications, contradicting the scientific consen- changing the climate, the environ- and behavior. sus about climate change from 2001 mental consequences could be se- Shell’s Public Image and to 2012. Soon failed to disclose any vere.” Private Behavior Diverge conflicts of interest in the funding of his work and promoted his research In 1998, Shell calculated the scale of Shell was on clear and early notice of as independent. the potential climate impact in Cli- climate change, yet still took actions mate Change: What Does Shell Think inconsistent with a safe, climate-sta- API’s active opposition to the Kyo- and Do About It? In a remarkable ble future. Moreover, despite its to Protocol played a key role in the chart, Shell acknowledged that the public acknowledgements, Shell Bush Administration’s decision to complete combustion of any single joined industry efforts to obstruct reject the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. category of fossil fuel reserves would critically needed measures to address The following year, the administra- send atmospheric greenhouse con- the climate crisis. tion withdrew from Kyoto, and the centrations soaring. GCC disbanded. Despite the company’s confidence in Shell’s solution was simple: abandon the science, which drove it to incor- In addition to Shell’s participation in coal; focus on oil and gas; and accept porate climate change impacts into

A Crack in the Shell | 11 | Center for International Environmental Law N. Scott Trimble/Greenpeace

the GCC, it was also involved in the roots organizations, at least two of Buying the Arctic, Selling formation of other climate denial which, “California Driver’s Alliance” the Sky groups. Frits Böttcher, who spent 30 and “Fed Up at the Pump,” fought years as a part-time advisor to Shell, against emissions regulations for It is important to underscore again co-founded the European Science vehicle exhaust with radio ads and the internal expertise and sophisti- and Environment Forum (ESEF) in billboards. As of 2014, WSPA was cation that Shell employed through- 1994, together with Roger Bate of working through similar groups, out its history. Among the newly the Institute for Economic Affairs. such as “Washington Consumers revealed documents are scenario “The issue of climate change was for Sound Fuel Policy” and “Ore- analyses prepared by Shell which, the initiation (sic) for the meeting” gon Climate Change Campaign,” among other things, address the ma- from which ESEF was organized. in Washington and Oregon, respec- jor forces and changes which will Böttcher, a known climate denier in tively. impact global business and geopoli- the Netherlands, also ran the Glob- tics. Some of the predictions in these al Institute for the Study of Natural Shell was also a member of the scenarios, including the acceleration Resources, partly funded by Shell, American Legislative Exchange of globalization, automation, in- where he remained an active climate Council (ALEC), a right-wing dustry consolidation, and even the denier. group that, among other things, expansion of income inequality in actively promoted outright climate developed nations and the rise of vi- Shell also belongs to the West- denial. Shell publicly left ALEC in olent non-state actors, turned out to ern States Petroleum Association 2015, citing their climate denial as be remarkably prescient. (WSPA), an industry group which the reason. This membership in and coordinated a series of “Astroturf” subsequent withdrawal from ALEC More important than the specific civil society groups to oppose Cali- mirrors Shell’s participation with the prognostications, though, is what fornia legislation in 2014. In 2014, Global Climate Coalition. these projections and forward-look- WSPA organized sixteen fake grass- ing scenarios show. They illustrate

A Crack in the Shell | 12 | Center for International Environmental Law how Shell planned over periods of bon-based energy mix. It would join These projections are both unreal- decades, and would have been keen- groups intent on opposing climate istic and problematic. The Sky Sce- ly able to incorporate considerations action, including by spreading mis- nario would require the construc- of climate change and the need to information, but then leave once the tion of up to 10,000 large carbon phase out fossil fuels. Instead of damage had been done. capture and storage (CCS) facilities making choices to avoid climate ca- and the use of bioenergy with car- tastrophe, Shell continued pushing This practice continues today. In bon capture and storage (BECCS) to open new oil and gas horizons. March 2018, Shell released a model over a land area the size of Australia. scenario it claimed would meet Paris Despite the awareness of the need Agreement goals, which the UNFC- Again, though, even if one were to to decarbonize the energy mix, Shell CC supported and promoted. This set aside the issues with the Sky Sce- continued aggressively pursuing new model scenario, however, distracts nario, Shell does not plan to pursue carbon reserves, even when doing so from Shell’s actual behavior. a course of action to actually meet was financially dubious, as in the its targets. As demonstrated by an company’s highly criticized efforts Shell’s new model scenario, called analysis by Carbon Tracker, 30-40% to open the Arctic to decades of oil the Sky Scenario, is not a blueprint of Shell’s planned upstream capi- drilling. For years, Shell pursued for how Shell plans to decarbonize. tal expenditures through 2035 are As Shell makes clear in the scenario’s unneeded in a two-degree warming This pattern would be- accompanying legal disclaimer, “we scenario (which would still fail to have no immediate plans to move meet Paris targets and cause mas- come common for Shell; to a net-zero emissions portfolio sive climatic change). Instead, Shell the company would make over our investment horizon of 10- projects dramatic increases in fos- declarations about the dan- 20 years.” However, even if it were sil fuel use through at least 2060. gers and severity of climate an outline of Shell’s operational and This fits Shell’s pattern, whereby the investment plans, it would still con- company publicly purports to sup- change, yet developed sig- tain significant flaws. port action on climate change and nificant additional reserves appears friendlier to regulation than and helped perpetuate a First, the Sky Scenario simply does its peers. Meanwhile, Shell still plans not meet Paris goals. It proposes a carbon-based energy mix. for – and contributes to – vast in- scenario in which the world has a creases in the use of fossil fuels. two-thirds chance of avoiding two plans to drill in Alaska’s Chukchi degrees of warming, which is a mas- Conclusion Sea, even as environmental activists sive dilution of the Paris target of and the company’s own sharehold- keeping warming “well below 2°C Like ExxonMobil, Shell has been at ers fought against it, believing the above pre-industrial levels and pur- the leading edge of climate science project to be environmentally devas- suing efforts to limit the tempera- at least since the scientific debate tating and financially unwise. Still, ture increase to 1.5°C.” began in earnest. The company ac- in light of these pressures, and with tively participated in the research a keen awareness of global carbon Second, and perhaps unsurprising- and communications apparatus of budgets, Shell spent $7 billion on ly, the Sky Scenario relies extremely the American Petroleum Institute, Arctic exploration before abandon- heavily on continued fossil fuel use which was studying the issue no lat- ing its plans in 2015. and assumes the development and er than 1958. In 1962, Shell’s Chief deployment of unproven and eco- Geologist acknowledged the poten- This pattern would become common nomically unviable carbon capture tially significant climate risks of fos- for Shell; the company would make and negative-emissions technologies sil fuel combustion and echoed the declarations about the dangers and on a massive scale. The scenario al- recommendations of other scientists severity of climate change, including lows for global levels of oil, gas, and that society must transition to more what it planned to do to combat it, coal use at 88%, 93%, and 62% of sustainable energy sources. By 1968, yet developed significant additional current consumption in 2050 and API had received an explicit warning reserves and helped perpetuate a car- accounts for the overshoot with neg- that, while uncertainties remained, ative emissions technologies.

A Crack in the Shell | 13 | Center for International Environmental Law Lee Jordan/Flickr

climate change was a global risk and moting climate denial continued More fundamentally, and through- the combustion of fossil fuels was its through at least 2012, and poten- out the six decades since CA Jones primary driver. tially beyond. In the meantime, first acknowledged the industry’s Shell maintained its memberships awareness of climate risks, Shell Throughout the 1970s and early in ALEC and WSPA, even as they has continually expanded its global 1980s, scientific and public evidence launched active and ongoing cam- production and sale of fossil fuels. mounted. By 1988, Shell’s own sci- paigns to obstruct climate action Indeed, as the Arctic melted due to entists were confirming that the fun- through at least 2015. climate change, Shell actively sought damental science of climate change to exploit these climate impacts to was sound, even if uncertainties For periods that are not yet fully open a major new oil frontier. remained, and they acknowledged documented, Shell fostered or fund- that by the time those uncertainties ed climate denial operations within As this report goes to press, and were resolved, it might be too late. Europe as well. amidst rising climate litigation The following year, Shell took the against the company in countries first steps to protect its own offshore Throughout much of this period, around the world, Shell has yet oil platforms from the risks of rising Shell publicly acknowledged that again declared a positive, progressive seas. climate change was a severe threat vision for meeting the challenge of to people and the planet, and that climate change. It does so even as it That same year, Shell joined the coordinated public action would be acknowledges that it has no intent Global Climate Coalition, where it needed to combat that threat. De- to pursue that vision, because it con- would remain an active partner in spite this, Shell coordinated with tinues banking on a fossil fuel future climate denial efforts until 1998. In opaque industry and front groups to the world can no longer afford or 1998, Shell withdrew from GCC, sow doubt and confusion about the accept. but not from API, which launched issue and slow progress on climate its own new denial efforts that same solutions. year. API’s active program of pro-

A Crack in the Shell | 14 | Center for International Environmental Law Endnotes

1. See Carbon Majors Update to 2013: Carbon Major 16. Presentation from Charles A. Jones, Executive sdut-how-big-oil-had-controlled-the-solar-industry- Entities Cumulative Emissions to 2013 Ranked, Secretary, Smoke and Fumes Committee, American 2011apr17-story.html. Climate Accountability Institute (Nov. 25, Petroleum Institute, Sources of Air Pollution: 2014), http://www.climateaccountability.org/pdf/ Transportation (Petroleum) 2-3 (Nov. 19, 1958) (on 32. See IIASA Proceedings Series, Future Coal SumRanking%20Dec14%208p.pdf. file with University of California, San Francisco), Supply for the World Energy Balance: Third available at https://www.industrydocumentslibrary. IIASA Conference on Energy Resources (1977), 2. See, e.g., Corporate Europe observatory, ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=xrcm0047. available at http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/1013/1/ Concealing Their Sources – Who Funds XB-79-507.pdf. Europe’s Climate Change Deniers? (2010), 17. Id. at 5. available at https://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/ 33. See Proceedings of the World Climate files/sites/default/files/files/article/funding_climate_ 18. Jie Jenny Zou, The Unlikely Partnership between Conference, World Meteorological deniers.pdf; George Monbiot, Pundits Who Contest big Oil and the White House, Center for Organization VIII (1979), available at https:// Climate Change Should Tell Us Who is Paying Them, Public Integrity (Dec. 12, 2017), https://apps. library.wmo.int/pmb_ged/wmo_537_en.pdf. The Guardian (Sept. 25, 2006, 7:10 PM), https:// publicintegrity.org/united-states-of-petroleum/ www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/sep/26/ century-of-influence. See also Benajmin Franta, On 34. See id. at 784. comment.oil. its 100th Birthday in 1959, Edward Teller Warned the Oil Industry About Global Warming, The Guardian 35. See Shell Internationale Petroleum 3. See The History of Shell Oil Company, Shell United (Jan. 1, 2018, 6:00 PM), www.theguardian.com/ Maatschappij, The Greenhouse Effect States, https://www.shell.us/about-us/who-we-are/ environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2018/ (1988), available at http://www.climatefiles.com/ the-history-of-shell-oil-company.html (last visited jan/01/on-its-hundredth-birthday-in-1959-edward- shell/1988-shell-report-greenhouse/ [hereinafter The Apr. 4, 2018). teller-warned-the-oil-industry-about-global- Greenhouse Effect]. warming. 4. See Tyler Priest, The Americanization of Shell Oil, in 36. Id. at 1. Foreign Multinationals in the United States 19. See M. King Hubbert, Energy Resources: 188, 193-94 (ed. Geoffrey Jones & Lina Galvez- A Report to the Committee on Natural 37. See id. at 23-27 Munoz eds., 2002) at 188, 193-94. Resources of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council (1962). 38. See id. at 27-28 5. Center for International Environmental Law, Smoke and Fumes: The Legal and Evidentiary 20. See M. King Hubbert, Shell Development 39. Id. at 29, 57 (Table 8). Basis for Holding Big Oil Accountable (2017), Company, Nuclear Energy and the Fossil available at http://www.ciel.org/reports/smoke-and- Fuels (1956), available at https://web.archive.org/ 40. See B. Ekwurzel et al., The Rise in Global Atmospheric fumes. web/20080527233843/http://www.hubbertpeak. CO2, Surface Temperature, and Sea Level From com/hubbert/1956/1956.pdf. 6. See V. B. Guthrie, Crude Control Means New Emissions Traced to Major Carbon Producers, 144(4) Climatic Change 579 (2017), available at https:// Operating Era for Entire Industry, 21(14) 21. See Hubbert, supra note 19, at 2, 5-7. National Petroleum News 19, 19 (May 29, link.springer.com/ article/10.1007/s10584-017- 1978-0. See Supplementary Materials 3, Row 40, 1929), available at https://books.google.com/ 22. See id. at 87-88. books?id=_3YfAQAAMAAJ&pg=RA6-PA29. Column EK (tabulating Shell group CO2 emissions in 1984), available at https://static-content.springer. 23. See id. at 95-105. com/esm/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10584-017-1978-0/ 7. See American Petroleum Institute Miscellaneous MediaObjects/10584_2017_1978_MOESM3_ Correspondence: 1949 through 1952, http:// 24. Id. at 96. ESM.xlsm. dupontasbestosdocuments.com/d2/ API/11590.pdf. 25. Id. 41. The Greenhouse Effect, supra note 35, at 27. 8. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc.’s Supplemental Responses to Plaintiff’s Mater Set of Interrogatories,http:// See Elmer Robinson & R. C. Robbins, Sources, dupontasbestosdocuments.com/ d2/API/11582.pdf. 26. 42. See Amy Lieberman & Suzanne Rust, Big Oil Braced Abundance, and Fate of Gaseous Atmospheric for Global Warming While it Fought Regulations, L.A. Pollutants: Final Report (1968), available at Times (Dec. 31, 2015), http://graphics.latimes.com/ 9. See Medical Advisory Committee, American https://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/6852325. oil-operations/. Petroleum Institute Document, http:// dupontasbestosdocuments.com/ d2/API/11681.pdf 27. Id. at 109. 43. See Press Release, Conservation Law Foundation, CLF Takes on Shell Over Endangerment of 10. See Vance N. Jenkins, The Petroleum Industry See Elmer Robinson & R. C. Robbins, Sources, Providence Community (June 28, 2017), available Sponsors Air Pollution Research, 3 Air Repair 144, 28. Abundance, and Fate of Gaseous Atmospheric at https://www.clf.org/newsroom/shell-providence- 146 (1954), available at http://www. tandfonline. Pollutants: Supplement (1969), available at lawsuit/. com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00966665.1 954.10467615. https://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/6852325. 44. The Greenhouse Effect, supra note 35, at 1. 11. See id. at 145. 29. See Environmental Research: A Status Report, American Petroleum Institute 103, 138 45. Id. 12. See id. at 148. (1972), available at https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ ED066339.pdf. 46. See Royal Dutch Shell, Climate of Concern, 13. See Charles A. Jones, A Review of the Air Pollution Research Program of the Smoke and Fumes Committee YouTube (1991), https://www.youtube.com/ 30. See Environmental Conservation: The Oil and watch?v=0VOWi8oVXmo. of the American Petroleum Institute, 8 J. of the Gas Industries / Volume 2, National Petroleum Air Pollution Control Ass’n 268, 270 (1958), Council xxii (1972), available at http://www.npc. available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10. 47. Id. org/reports/1972- Environmental_Conservation- 1080/00966665.1958.10467854. Oil_and_Gas_ Industries-Vol_II.pdf. 48. Id. 14. See id. at 268. 31. See Tracy Emblem, How Big Oil had Controlled 49. Id. the Solar Industry, San Diego Tribune (Apr. 17, 15. See id. at 270. 2011), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/ 50. Id.

A Crack in the Shell | 15 | Center for International Environmental Law 51. Id. About It? 6 (Mar. 1998), available at http://www. 84. See Shell International, Sky: Meeting the climatefiles.com/shell/1998-shell-report-think-and- Goals of the Paris Agreement (2018), available 52. Id. do-about-climate-change/. at https://www.shell.com/promos/meeting- the-goals-of-the-paris-agreement/_jcr_content. 53. Id. 71. See Kathy Mulvey & Seth Shulman, Union of stream/1521983847468/ 5f624b 9260ef Concerned Scientists, The Climate Deception 2625f319558cbb652f8b23 d331933439435d7a0 54. See P. Langcake, Shell Internationale Dossiers: Internal Fossil Fuel Industry Memos fc7003f346f94/shell-scenarios-sky.pdf. Petroleum Maatschappij, The Enhanced Reveal Decades of Corporate Disinformation Greenhouse Effect: A Review of the Scientific 25 (2015), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/ 85. See UN Climate Change (@UNFCCC), Twitter Aspects (1994), available at http://www.climatefiles. attach/2015/07/The-Climate-Deception-Dossiers. (Mar. 26, 2018, 1:27 PM), https://twitter.com/ com/shell/1994-shell-enhanced-greenhouse- pdf. UNFCCC/status/978307561396015107. effect-review-scientific-aspects/ [hereinafter The Enhanced Greenhouse Effect]. 72. See id. at 10. 86. Shell International, supra note 84, at 35.

55. See id. at 7-8. 73. See id. at 27. 87. See id. at 58-65 (The Sky Scenario further requires reforestation of an area the size of Brazil to meet 56. See id. at 8-9. 74. See European Science and Environment Forum the Paris goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C). See back matter (on file with University of California, also Greg Muttitt, Shell Game: What Shell Gets 57. See id. at 9-11. San Francisco), available at https://www. Wrong in Its New Climate Report, Oil Change industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/ International (Mar. 28, 2018), http://priceofoil. 58. See id. at 12. docs/#id=zhfn0206. org/2018/03/28/shell-game-oil-company-says- climate-future-is-fossil-fuelled/ (“The ‘Sky’ 59. See id. at 12-13. 75. See C.J.F. Böttcher, SourceWatch, scenario aims for a 2-in-3 probability of keeping https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/ warming below 2°C, but this is only achieved if 60. Id. at 13. C.J.F._B%C3%B6ttcher (last visited Apr. 4, 2018). new technology is invented to suck carbon out of the atmosphere, as well as a dramatic turnaround in technology for capturing and burying carbon 61. See Shell International Petroleum Company, Shell 76. See Mulvey & Shulman, supra note 71, at 13. emissions.”) Management Brief, Climate Change (Feb. 1995), available at http://www.climatefiles.com/ipcc- 77. See id. at 14-15. unfccc/1995-internal-shell-climate-change/. 88. Paris Agreement, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 78. See id. 16-1104, available at http://unfccc.int/files/ essential_background/convention/application/pdf/ 62. See id. english_paris_agreement.pdf. 79. See Karl Mathiesen & Ed Pilkington, Royal Dutch 63. P. Langcake, Shell International, Is Climate Shell Cuts Ties with ALEC over Rightwing Group’s 89. See Muttitt, supra note 87. Change Occurring Already? (1995), available Climate Denial, The Guardian (Aug. 7, 2015, 1:59 at http://www.climatefiles.com/shell/1995-shell- PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/ internal-report-is-climate-change-occurring-already/. aug/07/royal-dutch-shell-alec-climate-change-denial. 90. See Simon Evans, In-Depth: Is Shell’s New Climate Scenario as ‘Radical’ as It Says?, CarbonBrief (Mar. 29, 2018, 2:37 PM), https://www.carbonbrief.org/ 64. Id. at 12. 80. See Wendy Koch, 3 Factors Could Slow Arctic Drilling Despite Shell Go-Ahead, National Geographic in-depth-is-shells-new-climate-scenario-as-radical- as-it-says. 65. The Greenhouse Effect, supra note 35, at 1. (Mar. 30, 2015), https://news.nationalgeographic. com/energy/2015/03/150331-arctic-oil-drilling- 91. See Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2 Degrees of 66. Shell International Petroleum Company, shell-interior-permission/. Separation: Transition Risk for Oil and Gas in Shell and the Environment (1995), available at a Low Carbon World, Table 1 (2017), available http://www.climatefiles.com/shell/1995-report-shell- 81. See Karolin Schaps, Royal Dutch Shell Pulls Plug at http://2degreeseparation.com/reports/2D-of- environment/. on Arctic Exploration, Reuters (Sept. 28, 2015, 1:48 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us- separation_PRI-CTI_Summary-report.pdf. 67. Id. at 11. shell-alaska/royal-dutch-shell-pulls-plug-on-arctic- exploration-idUSKCN0RS0EX20150928. 92. See Shell International, Shell Global Energy Supply Model – Oil and Gas: A View to 2100 7 68. Id. 82. See discussion supra note 64 and accompanying (2017), available at https://www.shell.com/energy- text. See also David Hone, The Carbon Bubble and-innovation/the-energy-future/scenarios/shell- 69. See Shell International, Shell Management Brief, scenarios-energy-models/global-supply-model/_jcr_ The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Reality Check, Shell Climate Change (May 3, 2013), https://blogs.shell.com/2013/05/03/ content/par/textimage.stream/1500439104411/50 (Apr. 1996), available at http://www.climatefiles. 223ace900ca2d9a09c856832acf4186a 6f1d3c19c5 com/shell/1996-shell-management-brief- bubble/; Shell Climate Disclosures: Déjà vu?, Carbon bd1ec727898ba61f0baf/shell-global-supply-model. intergovernmental-panel-climate-change/. Tracker Initiative (May 20, 2016), http:// www.carbontracker.org/report/shell-agm-climate- pdf. resolutions-disclosure-exxon-chevron-total/. 70. See Presentation from Royal Dutch Shell Group, 93. See id. Climate Change: What Does Shell Think and Do 83. See Schaps, supra note 81.

A Crack in the Shell is the latest analysis in CIEL’s ongoing Smoke & Fumes investigation into what the oil industry knew about climate change, when they knew it, and what they did about it. This analysis was co-authored by Steven Feit and Carroll Muffett, -ed ited by Amanda Kistler, and designed by Marie Mekosh. This report, and the extensive body of research that underlies it, were made possible with generous support from the Wallace Global Fund and Heinrich Boell Foundation. Errors and omissions are the sole 1101 15th Street NW, #1100 responsibility of CIEL. Washington, DC 20005 E: [email protected] | P: 202.785.8700 A Crack in the Shell by The Center for International Environmental Law is licensed www.ciel.org under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. April 2018. Cover photo: siam.pukkato / Shutterstock.com