A Crack in the Shell New Documents Expose a Hidden Climate History

Key Findings

• A major new trove of Shell documents unearthed by • In a 1991 film, Shell acknowledged both the scale Jelmer Mommers of De Correspondent and released and scope of potential climate harms to human so- by Climate Files sheds new light on the contrast be- ciety, ecosystems, and the environment, and warned tween Shell’s internal discussions and its public ac- of potential impacts to food security and the rise of tions during a critical window for cllimate action. “global warming refugees.”

• As Shell faces climate litigation and investigation in • Despite these warnings, and contrary to its public a growing number of countries, including the Neth- image, Shell maintained active membership in an erlands, these documents, paired with new historical array of industry trade groups and front groups that materials, prove Shell had early, repeated, and often carried out a decades-long campaign of climate de- urgent notice of climate risks linked to its products. nial and climate obstruction.

• A Shell executive authored a 1958 report noting in- • More than six decades after it was put on notice dustry research into fossil carbon in the atmosphere. of climate risks from its products, Shell continues aggressively pushing to open new oil and gas hori- • In 1962, Shell’s Chief Geologist acknowledged zons—including the rapidly melting Arctic. possible human and environmental risks of global warming and highlighted calls by other scientists to • Shell’s new Sky Scenario is the epitome of this di- increase reliance on solar energy. chotomy: Shell’s model sets out a vision to meet Par- is goals, even as the company acknowledges that it • A confidential report from 1988 stated that Shell ac- has no intent to pursue that vision. counted for 4% of global carbon emissions in 1984. Shell now faces mounting litigation based on market • The new revelations pose risks not only for Shell it- share theories of liability. self, but for other oil majors whose role in the climate crisis have received relatively less attention. • In 1989, Shell took the first steps to protect its own offshore oil platforms from the risks of rising seas, • These findings demonstrate that while these investi- even as it joined oil industry efforts to sow public gations may have begun with ExxonMobil, they are doubt about climate change. unlikely to end there. Introduction documents expose the dichotomies strates, however, Exxon was by no between the two for the first time. means the only company active- Royal Dutch Shell, the major inte- ly engaged in climate science, the grated oil and gas company head- With Shell facing litigation and in- misrepresentation of that science, quartered in the Netherlands and investigation in a growing number or – more fundamentally – the con- corporated in the United Kingdom, of jurisdictions, from US courts to tinued production of fossil fuels is among the largest historic produc- human rights bodies in the Philip- in the face of mounting evidence ers of fossil fuels and, through that pines, this information comes at a and mounting impacts. Shell was production, one of the largest con- critical juncture. an early and recurring participant tributors to atmospheric greenhouse in climate denial and obstruction Absence of Evidence is not gas emissions. In a landmark analysis schemes in the United States and of the world’s largest carbon produc- Evidence of Absence Europe but then made public exits ers by the Climate Accountability from the groups coordinating them, From #ExxonKnew to government Institute, emissions attributable to often after much of the core work investigations to exposés by re- Shell’s products and operations rank had been done. As discussed more searchers and media outlets, Exx- fifth among the 50 investor-owned fully herein, that exit was not only onMobil has garnered far greater companies on the list, accounting belated, but also incomplete. for 2% of industrial greenhouse gas attention than other major oil com- emissions since the beginning of the panies, particularly those based pri- Ironically, the release of the new industrial revolution.1 marily outside the United States. Shell documents, including confi- Significant, compelling, and grow- dential internal communications, Notwithstanding the global impor- ing documentary and testimony ev- highlights a second and equally im- tance of its operations, its significant idence demonstrates that investiga- portant factor at play in Shell’s lower contribution to cumulative CO2 tions into Exxon are both justified profile relative to ExxonMobil: quite emissions and its active engagement and urgently needed – a perspective simply, we’ve seen few documents of on climate science, and climate pol- upheld by a growing array of courts this kind. By contrast, a substantial icy for decades, Shell’s knowledge of and human rights bodies. number of once internal communi- and role in the climate crisis has re- cations from Exxon, American Pe- At the same time, a compelling ceived comparatively less attention troleum Institute, and other indus- and growing body of evidence also than other leading Carbon Majors, try actors have become public over makes clear that while investigations such as ExxonMobil. the years, whether through investi- into climate accountability may be- gation, litigation, or leaks. A major new tranche of internal gin with ExxonMobil, they cannot Shell documents unearthed by and should not end there. While this distinction may seem Jelmer Mommers from journal- tautological, it is not: information To some extent, the relative lack of ism platform De Correspondent breeds new information. Whether attention paid to Shell to date may and first released on Climate Files in investigation or litigation, one reflect differences, real or perceived, demonstrates that Shell’s history of document leads to another, yielding in the public posture of the compa- flying below the climate investiga- names, dates, and connections that nies with respect to climate change. tion radar may be at an end. The create an ever-expanding (and ever Shell, unlike Exxon, has at times documents, spanning the 1980s and more accurate) roadmap to where been more proactive about acknowl- 1990s, cover a critical period in the additional documents might be edging the reality of climate change history of climate science, climate found. For this reason, this latest set and has been vocal about its corpo- policy, and public debates about the of documents is significant, filling in rate commitment to combating cli- risks and realities of both. By bring- missing pieces of a story that spans mate change, despite the insufficien- ing to light Shell’s internal discus- decades, continents, and an array of cies of those commitments. sions of climate risks at a time when disciplines. Just as the disclosure of the company’s external actions have As previous work by CIEL and nu- Exxon documents has informed and already been documented, these merous other researchers demon- fueled new investigations into that

A Crack in the Shell | 2 | Center for International Environmental Law company’s conduct, the availabili- United Kingdom, and its historic ment stretching back to the 1950s. ty for the first time of a significant leadership from within those coun- It proves unequivocally that Shell, number of Shell documents heralds tries, Shell has operated actively and like ExxonMobil, was on early and a potential step change in the speed extensively throughout the world explicit notice of potential climate and scale of future revelations. for well over a century, including risks associated with the company’s the United States. Shell has operated core products – fossil fuels. It docu- The greater attention paid to Exx- in the United States since the early ments that Shell, like ExxonMobil, on and other US oil producers also years of the 20th century, organized had at its disposal both profound arises, in part, precisely because they its first US company in 1928,3 was scientific expertise in relevant disci- are widely considered US compa- listed on the New York Stock Ex- plines and the resources to deploy nies – notwithstanding their own change in 1954, and chaired the that expertise to profoundly shape global operations. This US presence American Petroleum Institute (API) long-term trajectories for both the and identity makes Exxon and other for the first time just a few years lat- company itself and the world as a US oil majors of particular interest er, under British-born HMS Burns.4 whole. to journalists, climate advocates, and others interested in better un- As the API chairmanship suggests, And this analysis sheds new light on derstanding the oil industry’s de- Shell has been an active and fully the often stark dichotomy between cades-long campaign of climate de- embedded member of the US oil in- Shell’s internal understanding of cli- nial and obstruction in the largest dustry for nearly a century. As the mate risk and its public characteri- emitting country on the planet. discussion herein demonstrates, that zation of and operational responses engagement extends to every aspect to that risk. By contrast, major carbon producers of the oil industry’s engagement on headquartered outside the United air pollution generally and climate 1946-1979: Shell on Notice States have received less scrutiny. change specifically. Significantly, of Climate Risks Modest but compelling evidence already exists that European oil ma- Shell had at its disposal Smoke and Fumes: The Legal and Evidentiary Basis for Holding Oil jors were or should have been aware both profound scientific of climate risks at the same time as Companies Accountable for Climate their US counterparts; that these expertise in relevant dis- Change details how actual or imput- firms were members of US indus- ciplines and the resources ed awareness of a risk (Notice) es- try groups known to fund climate to deploy that expertise to tablishes a critical link in the causal chain across jurisdictions and under denial; and that active denial oper- profoundly shape long- ations were also conducted within in an array of legal domains, ranging and across Europe.2 But this Euro- term trajectories for both from tort to non-contractual liabili- 5 pean evidence remains limited in the company itself and the ty to human rights law. comparison to that available about world as a whole. US companies. Here, again, the new Documentary evidence demonstrates that Shell had early, repeated, Shell documents represent a poten- that US history now provides a criti- and often urgent notice of potential tial turning point. cal backdrop against which this new climate risks linked to its products cache of documents can be evaluated and operations. Royal Dutch Shell: A and their significance for Shell and European and US Carbon for the world more fully assessed. As previously noted, Shell has ac- Major tively engaged with API and other Significantly, the present analysis industry groups for much of the last To an arguably greater extent than shows how Shell’s internal and ex- century. Leaders from Royal Dutch any other oil major, Royal Dutch ternal documents from the 1980s Shell were prominent in API events Shell is and always has been a tru- and 1990s built on – and in im- from no later than the 1920s,6 and ly global company. Despite its dual portant cases ignored – a history of API member lists indicate that Shell origins in the Netherlands and the climate science and climate engage- was an active API member by no

A Crack in the Shell | 3 | Center for International Environmental Law later than 1949, both directly and ern States Petroleum Association) ratories to “determine the amount through several subsidiaries.7 founded the Smoke and Fumes of carbon of fossil origin” in the at- Committee to coordinate the indus- mosphere.15 This document is the Documentary evidence also shows try’s scientific research into air pollu- earliest evidence yet unearthed that that Shell’s engagement with API tion issues and its public communi- demonstrates a coordinated indus- was not limited to US subsidiaries, cations about air pollution science.10 try-wide research program into the and it demonstrates direct engage- In the face of mounting public de- accumulation of fossil carbon in the ments between Shell’s European mands for action on air pollution, in atmosphere and clear evidence that headquarters and key US entities on California and beyond, the Smoke major oil producers, including Shell, relevant pollution issues. For exam- and Fumes Committee was designed were on notice of potential climate ple, a roster of API’s Medical Advi- explicitly to both fund research into risks. sory Committee from 1956 shows at air pollution and to leverage that in- least two Shell executives were mem- dustry-funded research to shape the In a presentation on behalf of the 8 bers of the committee. API records views of government agencies and Smoke and Fumes Committee to document extensive and ongoing the broader public with respect to the government-convened National coordination between this commit- the science and potential regulation Conference on Air Pollution later tee and the Smoke and Fumes Com- of air pollution.11 Recognizing the that same year, Jones assured par- mittee, discussed more fully below. potential nationwide significance of ticipants that the oil industry had Notably, minutes from a 1958 meet- air pollution issues, the Smoke and a “sincere interest” in solving pollu- ing include executives from Dutch Fumes Committee was subsumed tion problems arising from automo- Shell, in addition to those from its within the American Petroleum In- bile exhaust. Jones declared the in- 9 American subsidiaries. stitute by 1952.12 dustry’s intent to address emissions not only from the production of oil More saliently, Shell was involved Shell was an early and active par- and gas, but from their use: directly with API’s research into pol- ticipant in the Smoke and Fumes lutants of the air and atmosphere, Committee. In 1958, Charles Jones The petroleum industry supplies the and was itself on early notice of cli- wrote a history of the Smoke and fuel used by the automobile, and thus mate change. Fumes Committee.13 Jones identi- has a sincere interest in the solution fied himself as both the Executive to the problem of pollution from au- In 1946, faced with growing media Secretary of the Smoke and Fumes tomobile exhaust. The stated objective attention to and public concern for Committee as well as an executive of the Smoke and Fumes Committee California’s smog crisis, industry ex- with Shell.14 In the document, Jones of the American Petroleum Institute ecutives from the Western Oil and reported that the Committee was is to “determine the causes and meth- Gas Association (now the West- funding a study at Truesdail Labo- ods of control of objectionable atmo-

EXHIBIT 1 Excerpt from presentation by Shell scientist Charles Jones to National Conference on Air Pollution, 1958

Charles A. Jones, A Review of the Air Pollution Research Program of the Smoke and Fumes Committee of the American Petroleum Institute, 8 J. of the Air Pollution Control Ass’n 268, 270 (1958), available at http:// www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00966 665.1958.10467854.

A Crack in the Shell | 4 | Center for International Environmental Law spheric pollution resulting from the within and outside the company Hubbert produced detailed discus- production, manufacture, transporta- would become increasingly explicit, sions of both past and predicted fu- tion, sale, and use of petroleum and its detailed, and urgent. ture growth in the production and products.16 use of the earth’s energy resources, In 1962, Marion King Hubbert, with a heavy focus on the produc- This express recognition that the use Chief Geology Consultant at Shell tion and use of coal, oil, and natu- of its products constitutes a major and former director of its research ral gas, both through conventional part of the oil industry’s impact (and labs, produced a book- length report development and through future responsibility) is significant given on the earth’s Energy Resources for a extreme energy sources such as oil the industry’s decades-long (and committee of the National Acade- shale and tar sands.22 Hubbert then 19 ongoing) campaigns to shift that my of Sciences. The report, which briefly reviewed progress and viabili- responsibility away from oil com- draws heavily upon a 1956 analysis ty of other energy sources, including panies and onto individual consum- Hubbert prepared for the American solar, wind, geothermal, and hydro- 20 ers. Despite the Smoke and Fumes Petroleum Institute, demonstrates power. 23 In so doing, he explicitly Committee’s then active research Shells’ profound understanding of acknowledged the potential risk that into the accumulation of atmo- the earth’s energy balance, including humanity’s growing use of fossil fu- spheric CO2 from fossil fuels, Jones the differences in the reflection of els could result in dramatic changes makes no reference to that research long- and short-wave solar radiation to the earth’s climate: in his presentation. The only refer- back into space, the role of global ence to CO2 emissions characterizes atmospheric temperatures in driv- There is evidence that the greatly in- them as “harmless.”17 ing global weather, and the intrinsic creasing use of the fossil fuels, whose and delicate natural balance between material contents after combustion are At a high level symposium on En- the heat energy absorbed by plants principally H2O and CO2, is seriously ergy and Man convened by API the through photosynthesis with the contaminating the earth’s atmosphere following year, renowned physicist equivalent energy released by plant with CO2. Analyses indicate that the Edward Teller directly challenged matter through natural decay.21 CO2 content of the atmosphere since that characterization. Calling at- tendees attention to the link between fossil fuels and rising atmo- EXHIBIT 2 spheric levels of CO2, as well as the Excerpt from Hubbert’s 1962 report Energy Resources resulting “greenhouse effect” from rising CO2, Teller warned that “a temperature rise corresponding to a 10 percent increase in carbon dioxide will be sufficient to melt the ice- cap and submerge New York. All the coastal cities would be covered… this chemical contamination is more serious than most people tend to be- lieve.”18 At the time, API was chaired by Shell Oil President HMS Burns.

By the end of the 1950s, therefore, Shell was demonstrably on notice that atmospheric contamination by CO2 from fossil fuels was an environmental issue of potentially significant concern to the industry and M. King Hubbert, Energy Resources: A Report to the Committee on Natural Resources of the to the planet. In the decade that fol- National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council 96 (1962). lowed, warnings to Shell from both

A Crack in the Shell | 5 | Center for International Environmental Law SD-Pictures/Pixabay

1900 has increased 10 per cent. Since increasing atmospheric tempera- tress this assumption. First, a 1972 CO2 absorbs long-wavelength radia- tures.26 They also warned that “[s] API report on the status of ongoing tion, it is possible that this is already ignificant temperature changes are research reports identifies Shell not producing a secular climatic change almost certain to occur by the year only as a member of API’s Air and in the direction of higher average tem- 2000 and these could bring about Water Conservation Committee, peratures. This could have profound climatic changes.”27 Significantly, but also of the smaller Engineering effects both on the weather and on the the 1968 report acknowledged that, and Technical Resources Executive ecological balances.24 while uncertainties remained, the Committee responsible for steering combustion of fossil fuels was the API’s research into atmospheric pol- Hubbert concluded by recognizing best fit to the scientific data for rising lutants.29 (Another European oil ma- that: CO2 and, accordingly, emphasized jor, British Petroleum, is also among that future research should focus on the committee members.) Moreover, In view of the dangers of atmospheric technologies and other changes to also in 1972, a submission from the contamination by both the waste gas- reduce CO2 emissions. In a supple- National Petroleum Council (NPC), es of the fossil fuels and the radioac- mental report delivered to API the an industry-staffed advisory com- tive contaminates from nuclear pow- following year, the authors addressed mittee to the United States federal er plants, Professor Hutchinson urges the issue of atmospheric carbon di- government, made significant refer- serious consideration of the maximum 25 oxide in greater detail. Although the ences to the 1968 report. The report, utilization of solar energy. supplement dealt at greater length Environmental Conservation: The Oil In 1968, the warning by Shell’s with the uncertainties in climate and Gas Industries, praised the work own Chief Geologist was echoed science, its central conclusion – that of the SRI scientists and their con- and dramatically amplified in a re- accumulating carbon dioxide in the clusions about atmospheric scav- port commissioned by API’s Smoke atmosphere could lead to planetary enging mechanisms for traditional and Fumes Committee, by then re- warming and potentially catastroph- pollutants, but disregarding their ic climatic changes – remained the findings with respect to atmospheric named the Committee for Air and 28 Water Conservation. As previously same. carbon dioxide, relying instead on detailed by CIEL, the authors of the an earlier and more skeptical report Given its longstanding and active from another source. Tellingly, and 1968 report Sources, Abundance, and role within API generally and in the Fate of Gaseous Atmospheric Pollutants in stark contrast to the contents of Smoke and Fumes Committee and the SRI reports themselves, the Ex- warned the industry that accumu- successor committees specifically, lating carbon dioxide in the atmo- ecutive Summary to the 1972 NPC it is reasonable to assume Shell re- report all but dismissed any sugges- sphere, caused primarily by burning ceived these reports. Two pieces of fossil fuels, would likely result in tion of global impacts from pollu- documentary evidence further but- tion:

A Crack in the Shell | 6 | Center for International Environmental Law EXHIBIT 3 problem of possible human influ- 33 Excerpt from Executive Summary to the 1972 NPC report ences on climate.” Shell was again a participant.34

1980-1998: New Documents Expose a Growing Dichotomy between Shell’s Knowledge, Rhetoric and Conduct during a Critical Period for Climate Science and Climate Action

As the preceding discussion demonstrates, Shell entered the 1980s with nearly three decades of steadily accumulating research and warnings about the potential climate risks linked to its products and operations. By 1980, Shell was unequivo- Environmental Conservation: The Oil and Gas Industries / Volume 2, National Petroleum Council cally on notice of those risks, of the xxii (1972), available at http://www.npc.org/reports/1972- Environmental_Conservation-Oil_and_Gas_ Indus- increasingly robust body of scien- tries-Vol_II.pdf. tific evidence linking fossil fuels to atmospheric carbon dioxide, and to Based on scientific studies, on a global the report’s discussion of air pollut- climate change and climate impacts. aggregate basis, air pollution is not a ants is attributed. At minimum, this serious problem . . . . Studies involving demonstrates Shell was aware of the The trove of documents unearthed international cooperation are needed SRI reports. by Jelmer Mommers and De Cor- to define any global effects of air pol- respondent exposes not only Shell’s lution, particularly from man-made Shell continued its active engage- deep awareness of these risks but the sources. ment in climate research and climate growing divergence between that discussions throughout the 1970s. internal awareness, its public assess- While main’s contribution produces At the same time, Shell made early ment of climate science, and, criti- localized problems of varying degrees, forays into solar energy. In 1973, cally, its corporate conduct in the depending on population density and Shell acquired industry pioneer So- face of mounting climate risks. natural ventilation, there is a question lar Energy Systems and actively pub- as to the effect of man’s pollution on a lished research and filed for patents In 1986, a Shell working group 31 global basis in view of nature’s contri- throughout the 1970s. In 1977, completed a study of greenhouse 30 bution and absorptive capacity. Shell participated in the Conference gases in the atmosphere, which they on Energy Resources, which includ- then presented in a report called The Three senior Shell Oil executives, ed a discussion of global warming Greenhouse Effect in 1988.35 This including company President Har- as caused by fossil fuel combustion report examined the science of the 32 old Bridges, were identified as con- and carbon dioxide accumulation. greenhouse effect, climate scenarios tributors to the report, suggesting Two years later, the World Meteo- and modeling, and potential im- familiarity with and endorsement rological Organization hosted the pacts from climate change caused by of its contents. L.P. Haxby, Shell’s World Climate Conference and greenhouse gas accumulation. Manager for Environmental Con- made explicit and specific reference servation (and Public Relations) to the “additional issue of special The Greenhouse Effect acknowledged was a member of the six-person Air importance that pervades all the unequivocally that atmospheric Conservation Task Group to which above-mentioned components: The CO2 levels were increasing, that

A Crack in the Shell | 7 | Center for International Environmental Law fossil fuel combustion was the pri- for the company as it faces mount- redesigning a $3 billion natural gas mary cause, and that there was “rea- ing litigation based on market share platform, raising it a meter or two sonable scientific agreement that theories of liability. It is particularly to account for future sea level rise.42 increased levels of greenhouse gases significant in this regard that Shell’s Meanwhile, Shell’s apparent failure would cause a global warming.”36 self-tabulated emissions figure for to consider the impacts of climate The report discussed the potential 1984 of 0.25 Gigatons of carbon change in siting hazardous facili- consequences – including rising sea is only marginally lower than the ties in low-lying coastal areas is the levels, ocean acidification, changes 0.348 Gigaton of carbon emissions subject of active and ongoing litiga- to agricultural patterns, and climatic attributed to Shell in 1984 using the tion.43 change – as well as the potential eco- “Carbon Majors” accounting meth- nomic, social, and political severity odology developed by the Climate The conclusions and recommenda- of those consequences.37 Notably, Accountability Institute.40 tions in The Greenhouse Effect shed this included a discussion of the im- light not only on Shell’s then-current plications for the energy industry as understanding of climate risks, but a whole and for Shell companies in This explicit recognition on the company’s subsequent con- particular.38 that Shell’s sold products duct in light of that understanding. accounted for 4% of global Although the report acknowledged Even more significantly in light of uncertainties, it counseled that re- ongoing and active litigation against carbon emissions in 1984 search should “be directed more to the company and Shell’s earlier rec- may have long-term rami- the analysis of policy and energy ognition in the CA Jones memo that fications for the company options than to studies of what we oil producers must address the pol- will be facing exactly.”44 It also noted lution impacts of their products, The as it faces mounting litiga- that “by the time the global warming Greenhouse Effect not only acknowl- tion based on market share becomes detectable it could be too edged the scale of Shell’s own CO2 theories of liability. late to take effective countermea- emissions, but calculated them: sures to reduce the effects or even to stabilise the situation.”45 As will be Fossil fuels which are marketed and Shell also recognized climate change discussed below, subsequent docu- used by the Group account for the could have “direct operational con- ments (many of which, unlike The production of 4% of the CO2 emitted sequences…from a rising sea level, Greenhouse Effect, were not marked worldwide from combustion. Of these impacting offshore installations, “confidential”) highlight uncertain- emissions, 80% comes from Group oil, coastal facilities and operations ties in forecasts of specific impacts, 12% from Group gas and 8% from (e.g. platforms, harbours, refineries, and cite them as reasons for contin- 39 Group coal. depots) with an uncertain magni- ued inaction. tude.”41 Although the report sug- This explicit recognition that Shell’s gested that no immediate facility re- These explicit acknowledgements sold products accounted for 4% of locations were needed given the slow should be remembered when consid- global carbon emissions in 1984 pace of sea level rise, Shell nonethe- ering efforts by Shell to undermine may have long-term ramifications less announced in 1989 that it was public confidence in the certainty of

EXHIBIT 4 Excerpt from The Greenhouse Effect report, 1988

Shell Internationale Petroleum Maatschappij, The Greenhouse Effect 29, 57 (1988), available at http://www.climatefiles.com/shell/1988-shell-report-greenhouse/.

A Crack in the Shell | 8 | Center for International Environmental Law EXHIBIT 5 Excerpt from The Greenhouse Effect report, 1988

Shell Internationale Petroleum Maatschappij, The Greenhouse Effect 29, 57 (1988), available at http://www.climatefiles.com/shell/1988-shell-report-greenhouse/. climate science and to thwart regu- Climate of Concern demonstrates technological fixes. That is to say, in lation at the sub-national, national, that Shell was aware not only of the 1991 Shell explicitly acknowledged and international levels. risks of climate change, but also of that coordinated, regulatory action the robustness and growing specific- would need to be taken to solve the In 1991, Shell released a 28-minute ity of the scientific case for climate climate crisis. film entitled Climate of Concern. The change. It noted that evidence for film acknowledged the consensus warming had already been observed, Despite its recognition of these re- surrounding climate change, the role acknowledging observed warm- alities, Shell’s messaging on climate of fossil fuels in driving the warming in the Arctic as far back as the change – both internally and pub- ing, and the scale and scope of the 1930s, and stating that “[r]egion by licly – shows a marked shift in the 46 potential devastation. It also noted region analysis of world temperature ensuing years, just as the public and that the rate of temperature change records shows a small but signifi- policy debates over climate action is greater than anything seen since cant warming trend over the cen- were accelerating. the end of the last ice age, and that tury, with a marked increase in the the climate might “change too fast, 1980s.”51 In 1994, Shell commissioned an up- perhaps, for life to adapt without date to The Greenhouse Effect, called severe dislocation.”47 The film dis- It concluded that, while not all is The Enhanced Greenhouse Effect. cussed the scale and scope of risks, certain, many think waiting for This report restated the consensus including changes to weather pat- ironclad proof would be irrespon- of climate scientists and included terns and “the increasing frequency sible and action now (in 1991) is updates. In a significant departure of abnormal weather;”48 saltwater the only safe insurance.52 “What is from previous analyses, however, intrusion; sea level rise; increasing- now considered abnormal weather nearly half of the report was dedi- ly destructive storm surges, noting could become a new norm. We have cated to “Areas of Controversy and 54 “warmer seas could make such de- seen the consequences in our own Alternative Scientific Views.” Even structive surges more frequent and time.”53 as it acknowledged compelling new even more ferocious;” pollution of climate science, the 1994 report groundwater; impacts on agricul- Importantly, this film did not simply placed a heavy emphasis on discred- ture; and the displacement of people address the risks posed by climate iting and downplaying that science. living on low-lying islands. It warned change, but also examined solutions. Three years after Shell declared in of “greenhouse refugees” displaced Notably, the film acknowledged Climate of Concern “waiting for by shifting climates,49 noting “if the that, while technology, including ironclad proof would be irresponsi- weather machine were to be wound renewable energies and energy ef- ble and that action now is the only up to such new levels of energy, no ficiency technologies, was a part safe insurance,” Shell seemed more country would remain unaffected.”50 of the solution, combating global interested in demanding proof than warming would require more than in taking action.

A Crack in the Shell | 9 | Center for International Environmental Law What changed? company thereafter increasingly fo- “confidential,” there is no indication cusing public attention on scientific that The Enhanced Greenhouse Effect The timing of The Enhanced Green- uncertainty. was as well. house Effect, at a critical juncture in the climate change debate, suggests The Greenhouse Effect from 1988 ac- A Shell Management Brief from one possible answer. When Climate knowledged uncertainties, but made February, 1995 restated many of the of Concern was released in 1991, the clear that the key research questions points in the 1994 report – acknowl- UN Framework Convention on Cli- lay in how to address growing emis- edging the potential consequences mate Change (UNFCCC) was still sions and climate impacts, not what of climate change, but emphasizing being negotiated, with the two most the precise impacts would be. The the uncertainties in climate science. powerful nations on the planet ac- Enhanced Greenhouse Effect, in com- Shell again acknowledged that “an tively working to slow or weaken the parison, contained a long discussion increase in atmospheric greenhouse deal. By 1994, however, the UN Cli- of those uncertainties. In its section gas concentrations… must have mate Convention was a reality, and on “Areas of Controversy and Al- some effect on the radiation balance demand was already rising for a new, ternative Scientific Views,” the re- which ultimately determines global stronger deal to turn the treaty com- port addressed alternative carbon climate. However, it is not possible mitments from words into action. sinks,55 the reliability of temperature to quantify the consequences for The Enhanced Greenhouse Effect ap- records,56 defects in global climate global climate.”61 This brief was not pears a year before the first Confer- models,57 the possibility that actual marked as classified.62 ence of Parties to the United Nations climatic changes might not be as bad Framework Convention on Climate as expected,58 and the uncertain im- Another report in 1995, entitled Is Change, where nations would gath- pacts on agriculture.59 It concluded Climate Change Occurring Already? er to begin negotiating how to col- that “[i]t is thus not possible to dis- and not marked as classified, ad- lectively confront the challenge of miss the global warming hypothesis dressed whether the human signal climate change. as scientifically unsound; on the oth- could be found in the climate sys- 63 er hand any policy measure should tem. It bears recognition that this Perhaps this why the 1994 report take into account explicitly the 1995 report diverged from Shell’s marks an inflection point in Shell’s weaknesses in the scientific case.”60 own earlier analyses and disregarded treatment of the subject, with the While the 1988 report was marked the explicit testimony by Dr. James Hansen of NASA to the US Con- gress in June 1988 that the signal of EXHIBIT 6 anthropogenic climate change had, Atmosphere Concentration for Total Resource Use by that summer, clearly emerged from the background noise of natural variation. In other words, climate change was no longer an abstract hypothesis; it was an emergent reality.

Seven years after Hansen’s testimony and four years after Shell released Climate of Concern, the company’s 1995 report proved remarkably – un- justifiably – equivocal about climate science. Although Shell did not deny that climate change was happening or that it was the caused primarily by fossil fuel combustion, it argued that only “a slow accumulation of

Presentation from Royal Dutch Shell Group, Climate Change: What Does Shell Think and Do About It? 6 (Mar. evidence, rather than a ‘smoking 1998), available at http://www.climatefiles.com/shell/1998-shell-report-think-and-do-about-climate-change/. gun’, will indicate man-made emis-

A Crack in the Shell | 10 | Center for International Environmental Law sions as the cause of some part of Shell’s solution was simple: abandon porate climate change impacts into observed climate change.”64 This is coal; focus on oil and gas; and accept operational planning by no later a stark contrast to the warnings of a doubling of atmospheric CO2.70 than 1989, Shell joined the Global Shell’s own scientists in 1988 that Climate Coalition (GCC), a group “by the time the global warming be- The “Roadmap Memo” of companies and industry groups comes detectable it could be too late outlined a strategy to which fought climate regulation, the to take effective countermeasures to same year.71 reduce the effects or even to stabilise convince the public that the situation.”65 climate science was still The GCC actively sowed misinfor- unsettled. It described mation about climate change and Shell released another public-facing fought the adoption of the Kyoto document in 1995 entitled Shell and victory as having the “[a] Protocol. After joining the GCC the Environment.66 In it, the compa- verage citizens ‘understand’ in 1989, Shell participated actively ny acknowledged that “[t]he possi- (recognize) uncertainties in throughout the Kyoto negotiations, bility of climate change caused by an climate science.” including through the Protocol’s enhanced greenhouse effect is prob- adoption at the UNFCCC. ably the most prominent global en- Undergirding all of this history is 67 Although Shell formally withdrew vironmental issue of today.” It also the fact that the Shell Group pos- noted that, despite uncertainties, from the GCC in 1998, it remained sessed (and continues to possess) an active member of the American “Shell companies accept that there is enormous scientific and technical enough indication of potential risk Petroleum Institute, whose climate expertise. Not only did Shell have misinformation campaign either be- to the environment for governments vast resources at its disposal, it was a to address the issue.”68 gan or accelerated that same year. A multinational corporation involved 1998 document from the American The following year, in 1996, a Shell in dozens of other organizations and Petroleum Institute, referred to as Management Brief outlined the In- working groups. As such, Shell must the “Roadmap Memo,” outlined a tergovernmental Panel on Climate be assumed to have known at least as strategy to convince the public that Change’s (IPCC) Second Assess- much as was known in scientific and climate science was still unsettled. It ment Report (SAR).69 This briefing public discourse – and likely knew described victory as having the “[a] analyzed the major conclusions in more than we are aware of even now. verage citizens ‘understand’ (recog- the SAR, but placed heavy emphasis Shell’s history should be evaluated in nize) uncertainties in climate sci- on uncertainties in the science and the light of that expertise, and Shell ence.”72 As part of its strategy, API limitations in the models. Still, the should be held to the highest stan- funded Smithsonian scientist Wei- brief acknowledged that “Climate dard of conduct and responsibility Hock Soon, who produced work change is potentially the most seri- for its decisions, communications, contradicting the scientific consen- ous and intractable environmental and behavior. sus about climate change from 2001 issue faced by mankind. If man is Shell’s Public Image and to 2012. Soon failed to disclose any changing the climate, the environ- Private Behavior Diverge conflicts of interest in the funding of mental consequences could be se- his work and promoted his research vere.” Shell was on clear and early notice of as independent. climate change, yet still took actions In 1998, Shell calculated the scale of inconsistent with a safe, climate-sta- API’s active opposition to the Kyo- the potential climate impact in Cli- ble future. Moreover, despite its to Protocol played a key role in the mate Change: What Does Shell Think public acknowledgements, Shell Bush Administration’s decision to and Do About It? In a remarkable joined industry efforts to obstruct reject the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. chart, Shell acknowledged that the critically needed measures to address The following year, the administra- complete combustion of any single the climate crisis. tion withdrew from Kyoto, and the category of fossil fuel reserves would GCC disbanded.73 send atmospheric greenhouse con- Despite the company’s confidence in centrations soaring. the science, which drove it to incor-

A Crack in the Shell | 11 | Center for International Environmental Law N. Scott Trimble/Greenpeace

In addition to Shell’s participation in 2014, WSPA organized sixteen fake Buying the Arctic, Selling the GCC, it was also involved in the grassroots organizations, at least two the Sky formation of other climate denial of which, “California Driver’s Al- groups. Frits Böttcher, who spent 30 liance” and “Fed Up at the Pump,” It is important to underscore again years as a part-time advisor to Shell, fought against emissions regulations the internal expertise and sophisti- co-founded the European Science for vehicle exhaust with radio ads cation that Shell employed through- and Environment Forum (ESEF) in and billboards.77 As of 2014, WSPA out its history. Among the newly 1994, together with Roger Bate of was working through similar groups, revealed documents are scenario the Institute for Economic Affairs. such as “Washington Consumers analyses prepared by Shell which, “The issue of climate change was for Sound Fuel Policy” and “Ore- among other things, address the ma- the initiation (sic) for the meeting” gon Climate Change Campaign,” jor forces and changes which will from which ESEF was organized.74 in Washington and Oregon, respec- impact global business and geopoli- Böttcher, a known climate denier in tively.78 tics. Some of the predictions in these the Netherlands, also ran the Glob- scenarios, including the acceleration al Institute for the Study of Natural Shell was also a member of the Amer- of globalization, automation, in- Resources, partly funded by Shell, ican Legislative Exchange Council dustry consolidation, and even the where he remained an active climate (ALEC), a right-wing group that, expansion of income inequality in denier.75 among other things, actively pro- developed nations and the rise of vi- moted outright climate denial. Shell olent non-state actors, turned out to Shell also belongs to the West- publicly left ALEC in 2015, citing be remarkably prescient. ern States Petroleum Association their climate denial as the reason.79 (WSPA), an industry group which This membership in and subsequent More important than the specific coordinated a series of “Astroturf” withdrawal from ALEC mirrors prognostications, though, is what civil society groups to oppose Cal- Shell’s participation with the Global these projections and forward-look- ifornia legislation in 2014.76 In Climate Coalition. ing scenarios show. They illustrate

A Crack in the Shell | 12 | Center for International Environmental Law how Shell planned over periods of bon-based energy mix. It would join These projections are both unrealis- decades, and would have been keen- groups intent on opposing climate tic and problematic. The Sky Scenar- ly able to incorporate considerations action, including by spreading mis- io would require the construction of of climate change and the need to information, but then leave once the up to 10,000 large carbon capture phase out fossil fuels. Instead of damage had been done. and storage (CCS) facilities and the making choices to avoid climate cause of bioenergy with carbon cap- tastrophe, Shell continued pushing This practice continues today. In ture and storage (BECCS) over a to open new oil and gas horizons. March 2018, Shell released a model land area the size of Australia.90 scenario it claimed would meet Paris Despite the awareness of the need Agreement goals,84 which the UN- Again, though, even if one were to to decarbonize the energy mix, Shell FCCC supported and promoted.85 set aside the issues with the Sky Sce- continued aggressively pursuing new This model scenario, however, dis- nario, Shell does not plan to pursue carbon reserves, even when doing so tracts from Shell’s actual behavior. a course of action to actually meet was financially dubious, as in the its targets. As demonstrated by an company’s highly criticized efforts Shell’s new model scenario, called analysis by Carbon Tracker, 30-40% to open the Arctic to decades of oil the Sky Scenario, is not a blueprint of Shell’s planned upstream capi- drilling.80 For years, Shell pursued for how Shell plans to decarbonize. tal expenditures through 2035 are As Shell makes clear in the scenario’s unneeded in a two-degree warming This pattern would be- accompanying legal disclaimer, “we scenario (which would still fail to have no immediate plans to move meet Paris targets and cause massive come common for Shell; to a net-zero emissions portfolio climatic change).91 Instead, Shell the company would make over our investment horizon of 10- projects dramatic increases in fos- 86 declarations about the dan- 20 years.” However, even if it were sil fuel use through at least 2060.92 gers and severity of climate an outline of Shell’s operational and This fits Shell’s pattern, whereby the investment plans, it would still con- company publicly purports to sup- change, yet developed sig- tain significant flaws. port action on climate change and nificant additional reserves appears friendlier to regulation than and helped perpetuate a First, the Sky Scenario simply does its peers. Meanwhile, Shell still plans not meet Paris goals. It proposes a carbon-based energy mix. for – and contributes to – vast in- scenario in which the world has a creases in the use of fossil fuels.93 two-thirds chance of avoiding two plans to drill in Alaska’s Chukchi degrees of warming, 87 which is a Conclusion Sea, even as environmental activists massive dilution of the Paris target and the company’s own sharehold- of keeping warming “well below 2°C Like ExxonMobil, Shell has been at ers fought against it, believing the above pre-industrial levels and pur- the leading edge of climate science project to be environmentally devas- suing efforts to limit the tempera- at least since the scientific debate tating and financially unwise.81 Still, ture increase to 1.5°C.”88 began in earnest. The company ac- in light of these pressures, and with tively participated in the research a keen awareness of global carbon Second, and perhaps unsurprising- and communications apparatus of budgets,82 Shell spent $7 billion on ly, the Sky Scenario relies extremely the American Petroleum Institute, Arctic exploration before abandon- heavily on continued fossil fuel use which was studying the issue no lating its plans in 2015.83 and assumes the development and er than 1958. In 1962, Shell’s Chief deployment of unproven and eco- Geologist acknowledged the poten- This pattern would become common nomically unviable carbon capture tially significant climate risks of fos- for Shell; the company would make and negative-emissions technologies sil fuel combustion and echoed the declarations about the dangers and on a massive scale. The scenario al- recommendations of other scientists severity of climate change, including lows for global levels of oil, gas, and that society must transition to more what it planned to do to combat it, coal use at 88%, 93%, and 62% of sustainable energy sources. By 1968, 89 yet developed significant additional current consumption in 2050 and API had received an explicit warning reserves and helped perpetuate a car- accounts for the overshoot with neg- that, while uncertainties remained, ative emissions technologies.

A Crack in the Shell | 13 | Center for International Environmental Law Lee Jordan/Flickr

climate change was a global risk and moting climate denial continued More fundamentally, and through- the combustion of fossil fuels was its through at least 2012, and poten- out the six decades since CA Jones primary driver. tially beyond. In the meantime, first acknowledged the industry’s Shell maintained its memberships awareness of climate risks, Shell Throughout the 1970s and early in ALEC and WSPA, even as they has continually expanded its global 1980s, scientific and public evidence launched active and ongoing cam- production and sale of fossil fuels. mounted. By 1988, Shell’s own sci- paigns to obstruct climate action Indeed, as the Arctic melted due to entists were confirming that the fun- through at least 2015. climate change, Shell actively sought damental science of climate change to exploit these climate impacts to was sound, even if uncertainties For periods that are not yet fully open a major new oil frontier. remained, and they acknowledged documented, Shell fostered or fund- that by the time those uncertainties ed climate denial operations within As this report goes to press, and were resolved, it might be too late. Europe as well. amidst rising climate litigation The following year, Shell took the against the company in countries first steps to protect its own offshore Throughout much of this period, around the world, Shell has yet oil platforms from the risks of rising Shell publicly acknowledged that again declared a positive, progressive seas. climate change was a severe threat vision for meeting the challenge of to people and the planet, and that climate change. It does so even as it That same year, Shell joined the coordinated public action would be acknowledges that it has no intent Global Climate Coalition, where it needed to combat that threat. De- to pursue that vision, because it con- would remain an active partner in spite this, Shell coordinated with tinues banking on a fossil fuel future climate denial efforts until 1998. In opaque industry and front groups to the world can no longer afford or 1998, Shell withdrew from GCC, sow doubt and confusion about the accept. but not from API, which launched issue and slow progress on climate its own new denial efforts that same solutions. year. API’s active program of pro-

A Crack in the Shell | 14 | Center for International Environmental Law Endnotes

1. See Carbon Majors Update to 2013: Carbon Major 16. Presentation from Charles A. Jones, Executive sdut-how-big-oil-had-controlled-the-solar-industry- Entities Cumulative Emissions to 2013 Ranked, Secretary, Smoke and Fumes Committee, American 2011apr17-story.html. Climate Accountability Institute (Nov. 25, Petroleum Institute, Sources of Air Pollution: 2014), http://www.climateaccountability.org/pdf/ Transportation (Petroleum) 2-3 (Nov. 19, 1958) (on 32. See IIASA Proceedings Series, Future Coal SumRanking%20Dec14%208p.pdf. file with University of California, San Francisco), Supply for the World Energy Balance: Third available at https://www.industrydocumentslibrary. IIASA Conference on Energy Resources (1977), 2. See, e.g., Corporate Europe observatory, ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=xrcm0047. available at http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/1013/1/ Concealing Their Sources – Who Funds XB-79-507.pdf. Europe’s Climate Change Deniers? (2010), 17. Id. at 5. available at https://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/ 33. See Proceedings of the World Climate files/sites/default/files/files/article/funding_climate_ 18. Jie Jenny Zou, The Unlikely Partnership between Conference, World Meteorological deniers.pdf; George Monbiot, Pundits Who Contest big Oil and the White House, Center for Organization VIII (1979), available at https:// Climate Change Should Tell Us Who is Paying Them, Public Integrity (Dec. 12, 2017), https://apps. library.wmo.int/pmb_ged/wmo_537_en.pdf. The Guardian (Sept. 25, 2006, 7:10 PM), https:// publicintegrity.org/united-states-of-petroleum/ www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/sep/26/ century-of-influence. See also Benajmin Franta, On 34. See id. at 784. comment.oil. its 100th Birthday in 1959, Edward Teller Warned the Oil Industry About Global Warming, The Guardian 35. See Shell Internationale Petroleum 3. See The History of Shell Oil Company, Shell United (Jan. 1, 2018, 6:00 PM), www.theguardian.com/ Maatschappij, The Greenhouse Effect States, https://www.shell.us/about-us/who-we-are/ environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2018/ (1988), available at http://www.climatefiles.com/ the-history-of-shell-oil-company.html (last visited jan/01/on-its-hundredth-birthday-in-1959-edward- shell/1988-shell-report-greenhouse/ [hereinafter The Apr. 4, 2018). teller-warned-the-oil-industry-about-global- Greenhouse Effect]. warming. 4. See Tyler Priest, The Americanization of Shell Oil, in 36. Id. at 1. Foreign Multinationals in the United States 19. See M. King Hubbert, Energy Resources: 188, 193-94 (ed. Geoffrey Jones & Lina Galvez- A Report to the Committee on Natural 37. See id. at 23-27 Munoz eds., 2002) at 188, 193-94. Resources of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council (1962). 38. See id. at 27-28 5. Center for International Environmental Law, Smoke and Fumes: The Legal and Evidentiary 20. See M. King Hubbert, Shell Development 39. Id. at 29, 57 (Table 8). Basis for Holding Big Oil Accountable (2017), Company, Nuclear Energy and the Fossil available at http://www.ciel.org/reports/smoke-and- Fuels (1956), available at https://web.archive.org/ 40. See B. Ekwurzel et al., The Rise in Global Atmospheric fumes. web/20080527233843/http://www.hubbertpeak. CO2, Surface Temperature, and Sea Level From com/hubbert/1956/1956.pdf. 6. See V. B. Guthrie, Crude Control Means New Emissions Traced to Major Carbon Producers, 144(4) Climatic Change 579 (2017), available at https:// Operating Era for Entire Industry, 21(14) 21. See Hubbert, supra note 19, at 2, 5-7. National Petroleum News 19, 19 (May 29, link.springer.com/ article/10.1007/s10584-017- 1978-0. See Supplementary Materials 3, Row 40, 1929), available at https://books.google.com/ 22. See id. at 87-88. books?id=_3YfAQAAMAAJ&pg=RA6-PA29. Column EK (tabulating Shell group CO2 emissions in 1984), available at https://static-content.springer. 23. See id. at 95-105. com/esm/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10584-017-1978-0/ 7. See American Petroleum Institute Miscellaneous MediaObjects/10584_2017_1978_MOESM3_ Correspondence: 1949 through 1952, http:// 24. Id. at 96. ESM.xlsm. dupontasbestosdocuments.com/d2/ API/11590.pdf. 25. Id. 41. The Greenhouse Effect, supra note 35, at 27. 8. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc.’s Supplemental Responses to Plaintiff’s Mater Set of Interrogatories,http:// See Elmer Robinson & R. C. Robbins, Sources, dupontasbestosdocuments.com/ d2/API/11582.pdf. 26. 42. See Amy Lieberman & Suzanne Rust, Big Oil Braced Abundance, and Fate of Gaseous Atmospheric for Global Warming While it Fought Regulations, L.A. Pollutants: Final Report (1968), available at Times (Dec. 31, 2015), http://graphics.latimes.com/ 9. See Medical Advisory Committee, American https://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/6852325. oil-operations/. Petroleum Institute Document, http:// dupontasbestosdocuments.com/ d2/API/11681.pdf 27. Id. at 109. 43. See Press Release, Conservation Law Foundation, CLF Takes on Shell Over Endangerment of 10. See Vance N. Jenkins, The Petroleum Industry See Elmer Robinson & R. C. Robbins, Sources, Providence Community (June 28, 2017), available Sponsors Air Pollution Research, 3 Air Repair 144, 28. Abundance, and Fate of Gaseous Atmospheric at https://www.clf.org/newsroom/shell-providence- 146 (1954), available at http://www. tandfonline. Pollutants: Supplement (1969), available at lawsuit/. com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00966665.1 954.10467615. https://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/6852325. 44. The Greenhouse Effect, supra note 35, at 1. 11. See id. at 145. 29. See Environmental Research: A Status Report, American Petroleum Institute 103, 138 45. Id. 12. See id. at 148. (1972), available at https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ ED066339.pdf. 46. See Royal Dutch Shell, Climate of Concern, 13. See Charles A. Jones, A Review of the Air Pollution Research Program of the Smoke and Fumes Committee YouTube (1991), https://www.youtube.com/ 30. See Environmental Conservation: The Oil and watch?v=0VOWi8oVXmo. of the American Petroleum Institute, 8 J. of the Gas Industries / Volume 2, National Petroleum Air Pollution Control Ass’n 268, 270 (1958), Council xxii (1972), available at http://www.npc. available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10. 47. Id. org/reports/1972- Environmental_Conservation- 1080/00966665.1958.10467854. Oil_and_Gas_ Industries-Vol_II.pdf. 48. Id. 14. See id. at 268. 31. See Tracy Emblem, How Big Oil had Controlled 49. Id. the Solar Industry, San Diego Tribune (Apr. 17, 15. See id. at 270. 2011), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/ 50. Id.

A Crack in the Shell | 15 | Center for International Environmental Law 51. Id. About It? 6 (Mar. 1998), available at http://www. 84. See Shell International, Sky: Meeting the climatefiles.com/shell/1998-shell-report-think-and- Goals of the Paris Agreement (2018), available 52. Id. do-about-climate-change/. at https://www.shell.com/promos/meeting- the-goals-of-the-paris-agreement/_jcr_content. 53. Id. 71. See Kathy Mulvey & Seth Shulman, Union of stream/1521983847468/ 5f624b 9260ef Concerned Scientists, The Climate Deception 2625f319558cbb652f8b23 d331933439435d7a0 54. See P. Langcake, Shell Internationale Dossiers: Internal Fossil Fuel Industry Memos fc7003f346f94/shell-scenarios-sky.pdf. Petroleum Maatschappij, The Enhanced Reveal Decades of Corporate Disinformation Greenhouse Effect: A Review of the Scientific 25 (2015), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/ 85. See UN Climate Change (@UNFCCC), Twitter Aspects (1994), available at http://www.climatefiles. attach/2015/07/The-Climate-Deception-Dossiers. (Mar. 26, 2018, 1:27 PM), https://twitter.com/ com/shell/1994-shell-enhanced-greenhouse- pdf. UNFCCC/status/978307561396015107. effect-review-scientific-aspects/ [hereinafter The Enhanced Greenhouse Effect]. 72. See id. at 10. 86. Shell International, supra note 84, at 35.

55. See id. at 7-8. 73. See id. at 27. 87. See id. at 58-65 (The Sky Scenario further requires reforestation of an area the size of Brazil to meet 56. See id. at 8-9. 74. See European Science and Environment Forum the Paris goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C). See back matter (on file with University of California, also Greg Muttitt, Shell Game: What Shell Gets 57. See id. at 9-11. San Francisco), available at https://www. Wrong in Its New Climate Report, Oil Change industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/ International (Mar. 28, 2018), http://priceofoil. 58. See id. at 12. docs/#id=zhfn0206. org/2018/03/28/shell-game-oil-company-says- climate-future-is-fossil-fuelled/ (“The ‘Sky’ 59. See id. at 12-13. 75. See C.J.F. Böttcher, SourceWatch, scenario aims for a 2-in-3 probability of keeping https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/ warming below 2°C, but this is only achieved if 60. Id. at 13. C.J.F._B%C3%B6ttcher (last visited Apr. 4, 2018). new technology is invented to suck carbon out of the atmosphere, as well as a dramatic turnaround in technology for capturing and burying carbon 61. See Shell International Petroleum Company, Shell 76. See Mulvey & Shulman, supra note 71, at 13. emissions.”) Management Brief, Climate Change (Feb. 1995), available at http://www.climatefiles.com/ipcc- 77. See id. at 14-15. unfccc/1995-internal-shell-climate-change/. 88. Paris Agreement, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 78. See id. 16-1104, available at http://unfccc.int/files/ essential_background/convention/application/pdf/ 62. See id. english_paris_agreement.pdf. 79. See Karl Mathiesen & Ed Pilkington, Royal Dutch 63. P. Langcake, Shell International, Is Climate Shell Cuts Ties with ALEC over Rightwing Group’s 89. See Muttitt, supra note 87. Change Occurring Already? (1995), available Climate Denial, The Guardian (Aug. 7, 2015, 1:59 at http://www.climatefiles.com/shell/1995-shell- PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/ internal-report-is-climate-change-occurring-already/. aug/07/royal-dutch-shell-alec-climate-change-denial. 90. See Simon Evans, In-Depth: Is Shell’s New Climate Scenario as ‘Radical’ as It Says?, CarbonBrief (Mar. 29, 2018, 2:37 PM), https://www.carbonbrief.org/ 64. Id. at 12. 80. See Wendy Koch, 3 Factors Could Slow Arctic Drilling Despite Shell Go-Ahead, National Geographic in-depth-is-shells-new-climate-scenario-as-radical- as-it-says. 65. The Greenhouse Effect, supra note 35, at 1. (Mar. 30, 2015), https://news.nationalgeographic. com/energy/2015/03/150331-arctic-oil-drilling- 91. See Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2 Degrees of 66. Shell International Petroleum Company, shell-interior-permission/. Separation: Transition Risk for Oil and Gas in Shell and the Environment (1995), available at a Low Carbon World, Table 1 (2017), available http://www.climatefiles.com/shell/1995-report-shell- 81. See Karolin Schaps, Royal Dutch Shell Pulls Plug at http://2degreeseparation.com/reports/2D-of- environment/. on Arctic Exploration, Reuters (Sept. 28, 2015, 1:48 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us- separation_PRI-CTI_Summary-report.pdf. 67. Id. at 11. shell-alaska/royal-dutch-shell-pulls-plug-on-arctic- exploration-idUSKCN0RS0EX20150928. 92. See Shell International, Shell Global Energy Supply Model – Oil and Gas: A View to 2100 7 68. Id. 82. See discussion supra note 64 and accompanying (2017), available at https://www.shell.com/energy- text. See also David Hone, The Carbon Bubble and-innovation/the-energy-future/scenarios/shell- 69. See Shell International, Shell Management Brief, scenarios-energy-models/global-supply-model/_jcr_ The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Reality Check, Shell Climate Change (May 3, 2013), https://blogs.shell.com/2013/05/03/ content/par/textimage.stream/1500439104411/50 (Apr. 1996), available at http://www.climatefiles. 223ace900ca2d9a09c856832acf4186a 6f1d3c19c5 com/shell/1996-shell-management-brief- bubble/; Shell Climate Disclosures: Déjà vu?, Carbon bd1ec727898ba61f0baf/shell-global-supply-model. intergovernmental-panel-climate-change/. Tracker Initiative (May 20, 2016), http:// www.carbontracker.org/report/shell-agm-climate- pdf. resolutions-disclosure-exxon-chevron-total/. 70. See Presentation from Royal Dutch Shell Group, 93. See id. Climate Change: What Does Shell Think and Do 83. See Schaps, supra note 81.

A Crack in the Shell is the latest analysis in CIEL’s ongoing Smoke & Fumes investigation into what the oil industry knew about climate change, when they knew it, and what they did about it. This analysis was co-authored by Steven Feit and Carroll Muffett, -ed ited by Amanda Kistler, and designed by Marie Mekosh. This report, and the extensive body of research that underlies it, were made possible with generous support from the Wallace Global Fund and Heinrich Boell Foundation. Errors and omissions are the sole 1101 15th Street NW, #1100 responsibility of CIEL. Washington, DC 20005 E: [email protected] | P: 202.785.8700 A Crack in the Shell by The Center for International Environmental Law is licensed www.ciel.org under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. April 2018. Cover photo: siam.pukkato / Shutterstock.com