The Use of Force Debate in the German Green Party, 1990-2002
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Old Dominion University ODU Digital Commons Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Graduate Program in International Studies Dissertations Summer 2008 Shades of Green: The seU of Force Debate in the German Green Party, 1990--2002 Scott H. rB unstetter Old Dominion University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds Part of the European History Commons, and the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Brunstetter, Scott H.. S" hades of Green: The sU e of Force Debate in the German Green Party, 1990--2002" (2008). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/sjtr-t376 https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds/38 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Program in International Studies at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SHADES OF GREEN THE USE OF FORCE DEBATE IN THE GERMAN GREEN PARTY, 1990-2002 by Scott H. Brunstetter B.A. December 1993, Pennsylvania State University M.A. May 1997, West Virginia University A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY INTERNATIONAL STUDIES OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY August 2008 Approved by: Regi/a Karp (DireoCor; Ku^Tayfor^fetzCM^nbe*Taylor%a-a^tzi(Member] ) Frederick Lubich (Member) ABSTRACT SHADES OF GREEN THE USE OF FORCE DEBATE IN THE GERMAN GREEN PARTY, 1990-2002 Scott H. Brunstetter Old Dominion University, 2007 Director: Dr. Regina Karp Utilizing an heuristic model that incorporates aspects from several theoretical perspectives this dissertation examines the German Green Party debate on the use of military force from 1990-2002. From the absolute rejection of any use of force to evict Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War in 1991, the Greens evolved over the course of a decade to support the deployment of German forces to Afghanistan in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This dissertation argues that this evolution was the result of a conscious will to govern by German political leaders in particular and external shocks— Srebrenica, Kosovo, and 9/11. It also incorporates two factors that enabled this change— the end of the international system at the end of the Cold War combined with the rising German international responsibilities and a dynamic Party leadership to foster internal debate. The shocks of the dire humanitarian crises first in Bosnia and later in Kosovo empowered the internalized Green norm of "never again Auschwitz" that sought to protect human rights and in turn challenged the other internalized norm of "never again war." As more leaders saw the preeminence of the former idea, it in turn functioned as a facilitating norm that withered the Green idea of pacifism. Building on the evolutions among key Party leaders during the Bosnian crisis, the later pressure inherent in the will to govern, both before and during their tenure in government forced a strategic choice to either govern and support the deployment of German forces to Kosovo or remain true to traditional pacifist values. The choice by both political leaders and the Party's grass roots to govern rather than remained wedded to traditional values illustrated the desire to at first gain and then later maintain the influence on German policy. By 2002, even after the rejection of the Iraq war, the Green version of pacifism had been drastically altered into a new security identity with clearly established limits. IV "We make our world significant by the courage of our questions and the depth of our answers." Carl Sagan, Cosmos V ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Researching and writing such a lengthy and detailed work is a process full of long nights, tired eyes, and sore backs. Throughout this entire experience, I have benefited from the guidance, wisdom, and support of numerous people. In particular, I would like to single out several, who pushed me when I waivered and gave me that pat on the back or stern rebuke whenever it was required: Dr. Patrick and Laura Magee, Dr. Jim Radford and Dr. Carole Seyfrit, my brother Dr. Dan Brunstetter, my friend and mentor Robert Winchester, and of course my parents Dr. Frank and Bea Brunstetter. Without the assistance of my Chair, Dr. Regina Karp, who guided me through numerous hurdles and focused my research and writing, this dissertation would be still but a stack of papers sitting on a shelf. I would also like to thank the German Council on Foreign Relations, especially Dr. Bernhard May, for providing space to work and guidance on my ideas. The Fulbright Commission in Berlin also provided considerable assistance. I would also especially like to thank the staff at the Archiv Grunes Geddchtnis in Berlin, who spent considerable time explaining the intricacies of the Greens and provided me with all the resources I could possibly have wanted. Without their support, this dissertation would not have been possible. Finally, I would like to give special acknowledgement to the late Dr. John Maxwell of West Virginia University. Though he passed away in 1996, it was at his insistence that I learned German. He would be proud to know that a decade later, I had put that skill to such tremendous good use. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. METHODOLOGY 15 THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 15 THE ENABLING VARIABLES 28 THE MECHANISM OF CHANGE 31 CONCLUSION 35 III. THE CONTEXT OF THE GREEN DEBATE 36 UNDERSTANDING GERMANY'S EVOLUTION 36 THE UNIQUE GREEN PARTY 46 PACIFISM IN A DIVERSE PARTY 54 CONCLUSION 65 IV. CLINGING TO THE PAST 66 THE GREENS AND THE GULF WAR 68 A WITHERING OF PACIFISM? 81 A PARTY IN TURMOIL AMID A WORSENING CRISIS 106 CONCLUSION 117 V. THE SHOCK OF SREBRENICA 120 A PARTY TORN ASUNDER 125 CHALLENGES AMID PARLIAMENTARY DECISIONS 168 CONCLUSION 175 VI. THE STRATEGIC CALCULATION TO GOVERN 182 A REGIERUNGSFAHIG GREEN PARTY? 185 THE GREEN KOSOVO CRISIS 209 PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT TO MACEDONIA 249 CONCLUSION 257 VII. THE CHALLENGES OF GOVERNANCE 262 PRELUDE TO A COALITION CRISIS 265 THE COLLAPSE OF A DREAM? 284 PARTY INFIGHTING W ROSTOCK 311 SUPPORT FOR ISAF 319 THE GREENS AND THE IRAQ WAR 323 CONCLUSION 334 VIII. CONCLUSION—SHADES OF GREEN 339 vii Chapter Page BIBLIOGRAPHY 351 VITA 382 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION After Germany's unification and its decision to support Operation Desert Storm financially instead of with troops, few commentators would have fathomed that eleven years later, over 10,000l German troops would have been deployed in international operations and Germany would have contributed to active combat operations in Kosovo and in the war against terrorism. Nor would they have imagined that then Chancellor Gerhard Schroder in a campaign speech at an SPD Party Day in 2002 would claim that Germany was a self-confident land on its new "German way." With the era of "check book diplomacy" at an end, he noted Germany's willingness to support military actions, yet avoid "adventures" that were not in the country's interest.2 Over the course of a decade, Germany moved from a divided state haunted by its past to one that had become a responsible partner in European, and indeed, global affairs. Germany has evolved considerably in security politics and in its position toward This paper follows the format requirements of A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses and Dissertations 6th edition by Kate L. Turabian. 1 That number has since been reduced to 6882 as of November 2007, with the majority in the Kosovo and Afghanistan missions. See the Bundeswehr website at http//www.bundeswehr.de, accessed 10 November 2007. 2 Gerhard Schroder, "Rede von Bundeskanzler Schroder zum Wahlkampfauftakt," 5 August 2002, <http ://www. spd.de/servlet/PB/show/1019519/Schroder%20Rede%20 WahlkampfauftaktHannover.pdf> accessed 10 August 2002. Many commentators focused not on the strong, confident language emanating from Schroder's party, but rather on the use of a possible war in Iraq as a campaign issue by the SPD to separate itself from the CDU/CSU, who at the time argued that Germany should support the US in a move against Iraq if it fell under a UN mandate. The SPD was trailing considerably in the poles at the time and Schroder's stance on the Iraq crisis was seen by many as critical in his eventual victory in the September 2002 elections. Schroder's approach to Iraq would receive considerable criticism from the internal opposition as well as foreign governments during the remaining months of 2002 and would lead many to question the goals and reliability of German foreign policy. See Georg Paul Hefty, "Der Kanzler setzt sich ab," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 September 2002, 14; "Schroder will keinen neuen Konfliktherd definieren," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 August 2002, 4. 2 the deployment of its military since the Gulf War, moving from a rather strong anti- military impulse, during which even the rhetoric of using military force was largely taboo, to a greater focus on its international responsibility in the military and security realm. From the baby steps that began with the deployment of mine sweepers after the Gulf War in 1991 and humanitarian deployments in Cambodia in 1992 and Somalia in 1993, more active participation with Bosnian peacekeepers in 1995 and a combat deployment for Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2001 have followed. By the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, German support of peacekeeping operations has become accepted among almost all political parties, as the deployment and continued support of the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrate.