Chapter 2

The Global State of Democracy 2017 Exploring Democracy’s Resilience

Chapter

Migration, social polarization, 7citizenship and multiculturalism © 2017 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

This is an extract from: The Global State of Democracy: Exploring Democracy's Resilience

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Text editing: Kelley Friel Cover illustration: Michael Tompsett, Design and layout: Phoenix Design Aid Printer: Trydells Tryckeri, Sweden ISBN: 978-91-7671-129-3 Chapter 7 The Global State of Democracy 2017 Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism Exploring Democracy’s Resilience

Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism

Fuelled by globalization, climate change and state failure, and due to its transnational nature, migration poses fundamental challenges to democratic societies on both the national and local levels, particularly in cities. It challenges the nation state and, by extension, policy areas that represent core components of state sovereignty, including citizenship. Large migration flows strain democratic institutions’ capacity to effectively integrate migrants into society, and call into question the extent to which governments should enable migrants’ political participation and integration. Migration affects governments’ ability to deliver public services. Public debate and concerns about migration, including whether multiculturalism ‘works’, showcase the polarization of societies and policymakers’ dilemmas in the search for adequate responses. Migration also affects democratic institutions and processes in migrants’ countries of origin, as citizens abroad seek to influence politics at home. This chapter assesses the democratic dividend of migration for destination and origin countries, and how policymakers can effectively address public concerns on migration while also reaping the benefits of inclusive and multicultural integration policies. It features case studies on Canada, Chile, Germany, Myanmar, South Africa, Tunisia and the United Kingdom.

Written by 7.1. Introduction Nathalie Ebead and Paul McDonough4 Migration is often at the centre of public One significant litmus test of debate, especially during election campaigns. the strength and resilience of the In some countries, party platforms increasingly promise to expel migrants or to restrict their democratic system as we know it— entry. In others, a perceived government failure meaning open and responsible to address concerns over migration has led to government founded on tolerance, xenophobic violence or civil unrest. Yet many respect for human rights and the countries acknowledge the economic benefits rule of law—is how global people of migration and the increasing need for skilled movement will be managed. migrants to support their economies.

—Erika Feller, Assistant High Commissioner Migration presents a long-standing challenge (Protection), UNHCR, 2006–15 (2015) that has escalated into a global crisis and serves

4 Paul McDonough is a 2017–18 as a main driver of public debate. The Syrian Max Weber fellow at the crisis has driven an unprecedented number European University Institute, Florence. of refugees to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey as

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well as European Union countries, sparking curb increased migration flows. Migration has global and regional debates about fair burden played a fundamental role in elections and sharing and how countries can cope with referendums, as showcased by the electoral increasing migration flows. Other countries, success of populist parties and leaders, such as Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia particularly in Europe and the United States. and South Africa, have been long-term hosts to In Australia, migration policy has focused on economic migrants as well as refugees fleeing facilitating skilled and unskilled migration, but war and conflict in Africa. has restricted the arrival of significant numbers of asylum seekers. Canada has adopted a In Europe, governments and political parties multicultural immigration policy, traditionally across the spectrum have increasingly resorted accepting many migrants and refugees. to restrictive migration policies in a bid to

BOX 7.1

Migration terms Irregular migrant: A foreign national with no legal resident status in the country in which they reside, a person violating the terms Asylum seeker: A person who seeks safety from persecution or of their status so that their stay may be terminated, or a foreign serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits national working in the shadow economy, including those with a decision on an application for refugee status under relevant a regular residence status who work without registering to avoid international and national instruments. taxes and regulations.

Diaspora: A community of individuals living together on the Migrant: Any person who has moved across an international border same territory and sharing the conviction or belief of belonging away from their place of birth or habitual residence other than for (themselves or their families) to another territory with which they short-term travel. maintain regular relations. They are not tourists or short-term visitors. Migrant background: All persons with one migrant parent. Alternatively, migrant background may refer to persons with one Emigration: The act of departing or exiting from one state with a parent born outside the country of current long-term residence. view to settling in another. Migrant flows: The number of people migrating within a specific First- and second-generation migrant: Any person who has time frame. immigrated to a new country and been naturalized, or the children of such an immigrant. The term second generation may refer to Migrant stocks: The total number of persons born in a country either the children or the grandchildren of such an immigrant. other than that in which they reside, or a country’s foreign-born population. Immigrant policies: Government policies regulating pathways to social, economic and political integration. Refugee: A person who, ‘owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership Immigration: The process by which non-nationals move into a of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country for settlement. country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’ (article Immigration policies: Government policies that aim to regulate 1(A)(2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; article 1A(2), entry into and permission to remain in a country, including border 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol). In addition to the refugee control. definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention, article 1(2) of the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention defines a refugee as any Internally displaced person: A person or groups of persons who person compelled to leave his or her country ‘owing to external have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously places of habitual residence, in particular because of (or in order disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country to avoid) the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized or origin or nationality’. Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made states that refugees also include persons who flee their country disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized ‘because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened state border (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN Doc by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.). massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order’.

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Migration affects Due to its transnational nature, migration can enable and encourage migrants’ political governments’ poses fundamental questions to democracy. participation. Migration affects governments’ ability to deliver Discussions about migration, and by ability to deliver public services, which poses public services, association about multiculturalism, illustrate challenges to democratic accountability and the polarization of societies and the dilemmas highlights the need for a combined local, which poses policymakers face in the search for adequate national and global governance response. challenges to responses. Migration can also affect democratic democratic institutions and processes in countries of origin, Migration affects many economic and political accountability as citizens abroad seek to influence politics at aspects of democracy. This chapter focuses on and highlights home. Box 7.1 defines some of the terms used the democratic dividend from migration and the need for a in discussions about migration. the enabling factors that support democracy (see combined local, Box 7.2). It argues that democratic institutions Migrants are increasingly becoming political can approach migration challenges to democracy national and actors who can influence the quality of by enacting policies that do not solely rely on global governance democracy in both destination and origin traditional formal political structures and the response countries. The upsurge in migration flows has notion of the nation state. The key principle strained the capacities of democratic institutions for migration policy is inclusiveness—creating to effectively integrate migrants into society, and resilience in the democratic system by allowing has generated calls to examine how governments different voices to be heard, and harnessing different ways to manage discontent and the BOX 7.2 need for change. Democratic institutions can be enhanced by local initiatives that have successfully included migrants in political life, and link Flexibility and resilience in democracy: making the most of these lessons to international and regional migration governance frameworks. This can open space Resilient democracies can tackle migration through multicultural policies that for new approaches to political advocacy, and in favour the inclusion of migrants and provide political benefits for societies. the long run enable democratic institutions and Governments need to adapt state capacities related to migration policymaking processes to respond to migration challenges in and—particularly in countries with high immigration rates and immigrant- friendly policies—work to reduce the potential backlash from citizens with a sustainable and resilient manner. negative perceptions of immigration. Political parties can adopt flexible and inclusive approaches at the national and local levels to increase minority This chapter analyses the challenges posed representation, adopt targets for migrant representation and increase by migration to democracy, focusing on the candidate representation to enable effective migrant political participation. political integration of legal immigrants and Adopting policies that facilitate migrants’ naturalization can increase their the political engagement of the diaspora. It participation in governance processes and thus contribute to inclusion, for does not address the impact of irregular or example by reducing the administrative burden and timelines for obtaining citizenship. Democratic institutions can design policies that aim to empower undocumented migrants, due to the lack of migrants to decide how they participate in public life, rather than defining reliable data. The economic and social impact policies based on ‘citizenship as nationality’. To strengthen democracy, of immigration and emigration, as well as an especially in countries with high or increasing proportions of migrants, analysis of push and pull factors in relation policymakers can also consider granting voting rights—particularly at the local level—as a pathway to citizenship. to migration, are beyond the scope of this chapter. Section 7.2 provides an overview of Migrants’ integration and sense of belonging can be enhanced with the global migration patterns and trends. Section support of civil society and local community-based initiatives such as local 7.3 focuses on how migration challenges and migrant associations, technology-based integration solutions and urban diversification. On a global level, migrant inclusion could be facilitated by affects democracy by assessing how politically enhancing international migration governance systems and through better inclusive countries are of immigrants; it regional cooperation to share burdens and implement migration protection provides insights based on the Global State regimes. The United Nations New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants as well as the process to develop a Global Compact on Migration and Refugees of Democracy (GSoD) indices and Migration are important first steps. Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) data. Section 7.4 discusses the role that emigrants play as

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agents of democracy and the potential gains to Migration flows have increased since 1990 in all Over the last 45 democracy from emigration, with a focus on regions, particularly from developing countries years, the number enabling the engagement of the diaspora in to developed countries. While most of this is of people living political life. voluntary migration, forced migration has risen outside their dramatically: over 20 million persons are now Section 7.5 highlights policy dilemmas recognized as refugees, the majority having country of origin resulting from migration, and Section 7.6 fled persecution or conflicts in Afghanistan, has almost tripled analyses the policy implications of (and possible Somalia and Syria (UNHCR 2015). from 76 million approaches to) tackling migration challenges to 244 million to democracy—that is, how political party systems and governments in destination and origin countries can address problems related BOX 7.3 to migration. Section 7.8 provides a set of conclusions and policy recommendations. The chapter discusses how democracies respond to The gender dimensions of migration migration challenges using case studies chosen to showcase regional examples as well as good As of 2015, women and girls made up 48 per cent of the global migrant population (UNHCR 2015). Female migrants face different challenges than their practices in relation to policy approaches. For male counterparts. They are often confronted with multiple and intersecting additional information on the issues discussed forms of discrimination on the grounds of sex, ethnicity, nationality, class in this chapter see Migration, Multiculturalism and other bias, in addition to their status as migrants. This can significantly and Democracy: A Resource Guide (Sisk 2017). undermine their human rights as well as their ability to participate effectively in the host country’s social, economic and political life.

7.2. Migration patterns and The range of challenges faced by migrant women derives from their legal status global trends in the host country. For instance, women migrating under family reunification programmes may often depend on their husbands legally, economically Migration is not a new phenomenon, but its scale and socially. In other cases, migrant women may depend on their employer, has increased with the rising global population. especially when they migrate for economic purposes in a designated sector Push factors that make people leave their home (e.g. domestic workers in certain countries) (Sohoon and Piper 2013; ILO country include limited job opportunities, 2008). In addition, migrant women are vulnerable to sexual and gender- based violence, including rape, sexual exploitation, domestic violence and political instability, human rights violations, female genital mutilation. Other factors that may hinder their integration and conflicts and wars, state failure, and climate empowerment involve religious influences, patriarchal traditions, and cultural change or natural disasters. Important pull practices that may exclude them from public and political life (UNHCR 2013). factors that influence their choice of destination In this context, migration systems should consider the vulnerabilities and include family migration and co-ethnic specific needs of migrant women. This requires adopting gender-sensitive immigrant groups, prospects for an increased policies that facilitate their access to information, employment and public standard of living in terms of job opportunities services such as healthcare and education as a key part of the integration process. Furthermore, language learning programmes and information and public service delivery, as well as politically campaigns are essential for empowering migrant women and making them stable countries that guarantee fundamental aware of their human, civic and political rights. Targeted policies and freedoms and encourage individual choice programmes that encourage the active participation of migrant women in civic in education, career, gender roles and sexual and political life, including voting and standing as candidates in national and local elections, are also crucial for their integration into the host society and orientation, and place of residence. to ensure that the interests of their communities are effectively represented (European Women’s Lobby 2007). By late 2015, migrants accounted for over 3 per cent of the world’s population. Over the last Civil society and grassroots organizations can play an important role in empowering migrant women through capacity-building initiatives and 45 years, the number of people living outside mentorship programmes that help them develop leadership skills and realize their country of origin has almost tripled their potential as decision-makers and agents of change (OSCE 2014). For from 76 million to 244 million (IOM 2015a). example, the New American Leaders Project trains first- and second-generation migrants living in the USA in political leadership at the state and local levels, However, the proportion of migrants as a recognizing that ‘democracy is stronger when everyone is represented and share of the world’s population has remained everyone participates’ (Dyogi and Bhojwani 2016). relatively stable since 1990 (UN 2016).

205 206 Migration, socialpolarization, citizenship andmulticulturalism Chapter 7 single group in the USA. the in group single largest the far by with Peninsula, Arabian the and Europe America, North in 20 countries, concentrated Two-thirds of all migrants live in Countries of origin 0 million largest numbers come from India, India, from come numbers largest Mexico and Russia. Most tend to to tend Most Russia. and Mexico Among voluntary migrants, the the migrants, voluntary Among stay close to their countries of of countries their to close stay intra-Asia flows of labourers). labourers). of flows intra-Asia origin (except for signi‘cant signi‘cant for (except origin 2/3 +70 million such as Mexico, are transit and emigration countries simultaneously. simultaneously. countries emigration and transit are Mexico, as such democracies, Some 8million. Oceania and 9million Caribbean the and America Latin million, 54 Canada and USA the million, 21 Africa million, 75 Asia migrants, million 76 about hosts Europe

Sources of data: UN (2015) Sources of data: UNHCR (2015) Migration patterns Migration most refugees, nearly 2.8 million. 2.8 nearly refugees, most the hosting Turkey with East, Middle the near or in were concentrations greatest The 1992. since total largest the million, 16.5 to mandate UNHCR the under refugees of number total the raising worldwide, seekers asylum and refugees new million 1.5 were there 2016, of half ‘rst the In refugees in just in refugees 1.5 million new million 1.5 asylum seekers asylum 6 months Refugees and Refugees refugees 16.5 million refugees 15 million MID ˆ‰Š‹ MID ˆ‰Š‹ START

Sources of data: UNHCR (2017) ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ migrants living inBrussels and Dubai are More than half of thepeople Sydney is amigrant living inLondon, New York and One out of threepeople every gateway cities Almost completed education tertiary More than 1/3of migrants have children are women and 51% are Approximately 50%of refugees women voluntary migrants are Approximately 50%of the ages of 15and 64 80% of migrants arebetween Migrants and Migrants The Global State of Democracy 2017 1/5 live inestablished refugees Exploring Democracy’s Resilience

Sources of data: UNHCR (2016a: 52), UNHCR (2016a: 52), IOM (2015a) & IOM (2015b) Sources of data: UN (2015) International IDEA Chapter 7 First Edition 2017 Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism

Migration patterns Since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, handle migration may affect citizens’ levels of Inclusion— there have been more refugees than at any time trust in these institutions. that is, how since World War II, tragically highlighted by well societies the high number of people risking and losing Inclusion—that is, how well societies politically politically their lives. In 2016, more than 5,000 persons integrate immigrants—is a key factor when integrate died crossing the Mediterranean Sea, the assessing how migration affects democracies, as highest annual total ever reported (UNHCR well as the conditions under which democratic immigrants—is a 2016b). About 1.5 million persons were systems can respond to these challenges in a key factor when recognized as refugees worldwide or applied for resilient manner. How well countries integrate assessing how asylum in the first half of 2016; the majority immigrants into the political system depends migration affects had fled Syria (UNHCR 2016a: 3–4). The on a number of factors, including (a) the democracies, greatest concentrations were in or near the ease with which countries enable immigrants as well as the Middle East; Turkey hosted the most refugees and subsequent generations of immigrants conditions under (2.8 million) under its temporary protection to naturalize or become citizens; (b) whether regime (UNHCR 2016a: 8). countries allow migrants to vote or stand which democratic as a candidate in national or local elections; systems can 7.3. The impact of migration (c) immigrants’ voter turnout; (d) whether a respond to these on democracy country’s policies facilitate political integration challenges in a Recent studies of the impact of migration (i.e. how inclusive a country’s policies are resilient manner on democracy have examined three areas: of immigrants); (e) how well immigrants (a) public concerns about immigration, are represented in a country’s key political Europe hosts about 76 million migrants, Asia 75 million, Africa 21 million, the USA and Canada 0 million +70 million (b) migration levels and (c) the quality of institutions such as the parliament, political 54 million, Latin America and the Caribbean 9 million and Oceania 8 million. Some democracies, governance and migrant integration policies parties and local councils, and whether other such as Mexico, are transit and emigration countries simultaneously. Sources of data: UN (2015) (McLaren 2010). First, public perceptions consultative bodies exist; and (f) the challenge of migration challenge notions of national that anti-immigrant parties pose to democracy. identity and shared societal values when public This section analyses each of these factors Countries of origin Refugees and Migrants and policies divide the population into native- in turn. asylum seekers refugees born inhabitants and newcomers (Huysmans 1995: 60). This affects how well democracies Immigrants and the pathway to citizenship Among voluntary migrants, the START ˆ‰Š‹ ∙ 80% of migrants are between integrate newcomers and create social cohesion Citizenship is an important incentive largest numbers come from India, 15 million the ages of 15 and 64 or multicultural societies. Such perceptions for integration and removes barriers for Mexico and Russia. Most tend to refugees stay close to their countries of ∙ Approximately 50% of may affect the public’s willingness to support immigrants to participate in political life. It origin (except for signi‘cant voluntary migrants are policymakers, depending on whether citizens provides full civic and political rights and 1.5 million new

Sources of data: UNHCR (2015) women intra-Asia flows of labourers). trust that politicians and political institutions protection against discrimination, which can refugees in just 2015b) 6 months ∙ Approximately 50% of refugees are able to handle the migration challenge help increase immigrants’ sense of belonging are women and 51% are (Miller and Listhaug 1990: 358). Indeed, and willingness to participate. A 2012 study children 2015a) & IOM ( many studies have concluded that immigration comparing the political participation of MID ˆ‰Š‹ 16.5 million ∙ More than 1/3 of migrants have disrupts political and social cohesion and foreign-born and native-born residents of refugees completed tertiary education identities (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior European countries, and citizens versus non-

2016a: 52), IOM ( 2004; Lahav 2004; Ivarsflaten 2006; Gibson citizens, found that native-born and foreign- 2/3 ∙ Almost 1/5 live in established gateway cities 2002; Fetzer 2000; Espenshade and Calhoun born citizens demonstrated similar overall In the ‘rst half of 2016, there were 1993), and that migrant integration policies in levels of participation in political activities 1.5 million new refugees and asylum ∙ One out of every three people living in London, New York and turn affect public attitudes towards migrants, (Just and Anderson 2012). Among the foreign seekers worldwide, raising the total 2016a: 52), UNHCR ( number of refugees under the Sydney is a migrant and thus political trust (Weldon 2006). born, citizenship significantly increased Two-thirds of all migrants live in UNHCR mandate to 16.5 million, the Second, migration levels may affect citizens’ political participation, especially with regard 20 countries, concentrated in North largest total since 1992. The greatest ∙ More than half of the people America, Europe and the Arabian concentrations were in or near the living in Brussels and Dubai are attitudes towards migrants and their trust in to ‘less institutionalized political acts’ (Just Peninsula, with by far the largest Middle East, with Turkey hosting the migrants political institutions, and citizens’ belief that and Anderson 2012: 496). This effect was Sources of data: UN (2015) Sources of data: UNHCR (2017) most refugees, nearly 2.8 million. Sources of data: UNHCR ( single group in the USA. political institutions can handle the migration greatest among immigrants who grew up challenge. Third, how well political institutions in relatively undemocratic countries (Just

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and Anderson 2012). For this reason, it is heritage or ‘blood’ (ius sanqunis) or the country important to assess whether countries enable of birth (ius soli). They also regulate the immigrant naturalization, given that the path conditions under which citizenship is granted, to citizenship can include many obstacles, including language proficiency, citizenship or from lack of documentation to highly integration tests, economic and criminal record discretionary decision-making procedures. requirements, costs, as well as legal guarantees Citizenship can be acquired automatically and discretionary decision-making powers. (mainly at birth) or upon application. Lastly, these rules regulate whether countries Naturalization is defined here as the non- allow dual citizenship (see Section 7.4). automatic acquisition of citizenship by an individual who was not a citizen of a particular Many countries require citizenship tests as country by birth, requiring an application by part of the naturalization process, including the immigrant and an act of granting by the Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, the host country (OECD 2011). Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the USA (OECD 2011). The introduction of these The rules governing the acquisition of tests has decreased the number of citizenship citizenship vary widely: countries have the applicants, however their impact on immigrants’ exclusive authority to regulate the terms under integration remains unclear (OECD 2011). which immigrants can obtain citizenship. Similarly, most countries have language Citizenship rules regulate eligibility criteria requirements, which indicate an applicant’s such as residence requirements or whether willingness to integrate; Sweden does not have citizenship is acquired based on parental such a requirement (OECD 2011).

TABLE 7.1

Acquiring citizenship for migrants: regional and country examples

Citizenship based on ius soli Citizenship based on ius Ease of naturalization for adults (e.g. birthplace) sangunis (e.g. parental heritage)

Europe Belgium, Germany, Greece, Automatically granted Transparent, accessible procedures; 32 states (all EU mem- Ireland and Portugal (with ber states, Croatia, Iceland, Moldova, Norway, Switzerland) restrictions)

Africa More than half the countries Automatically granted Procedures exist, however effective implementation is with restrictions; absolute lacking. Chad, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda (requires ius soli in Chad, Lesotho and 15–20 years), Central African Republic (35 years), Democratic Tanzania Republic of the Congo and Egypt (presidential decrees are required).

Latin All countries Automatically granted Transparent, accessible procedures; short legal residency America required (Chile, Colombia, Venezuela 5 years; Brazil 4 years; and the Peru, Argentina and Bolivia 2 years), with some form of citi- Caribbean zenship test. Many countries also allow a fast-track process if the applicant comes from a Spanish, Portuguese, Latin American or Caribbean state.

Asia and Uncommon (Cambodia, Main form of acquiring Procedures generally exist, however are often difficult, and the Pacific Hong Kong, Malaysia, citizenship subject to several restrictions and obligations Thailand)

Sources: Bauböck and Goodman (2010); Feere (2010); Davidson and Weekley (1999); Manby (2010).

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In countries with inclusive citizenship policies, reasons for migration, and whether countries The change in immigrants are more likely to opt for citizenship allow dual nationality. Immigrants from naturalization (Huddleston et al. 2015). For example, developing countries are more likely to trends is linked Ireland, Portugal, the UK, the Nordic States naturalize and are more affected by restrictive to migration and the Benelux countries have more inclusive immigration policies (Huddleston et al. 2015; flows; however citizenship policies than Austria, Switzerland OECD 2011). Similarly, refugees, women and or the Baltic States (Huddleston et al. 2015). immigrants with high levels of education are there is a time While Bulgaria and Hungary have very high more likely to naturalize (OECD 2011). lag, which means naturalization rates, these are not related to that countries immigrants but to co-ethnics living abroad who Naturalization can be a useful (political) should focus benefit from special naturalization privileges integration tool for immigrants. One way to on long-term (Huddleston et al. 2015). In Australia, Canada, encourage migrants to participate in political residents if they New Zealand and the USA—all countries life on a par with natives and increase their wish to encourage with high naturalization rates—immigrants sense of belonging is to promote inclusive obtain residence permits upon entry and are naturalization policies that allow dual naturalization encouraged to naturalize at the end of an initial nationality (Dumbrava 2010; Blatter 2011). settlement period (OECD 2011). This policy Nevertheless, naturalization rates may remain approach towards immigrants encourages low if overall migration policy does not support them from the outset to think of themselves naturalization (North 1987; Bloemraad 2006; as ‘future citizens’, compared to the (European) Jones-Correa 2001). Issues such as identity, approach that requires ‘proof of integration’ plans to return or fear of social rejection by the before naturalization takes place. host community may also prevent migrants from naturalizing (Hyde, Mateo and Cusato-Rosa The change in naturalization trends is linked 2013). While naturalization does not necessarily to migration flows; however there is a time lag, impose an identity or promote homogeneity or which means that countries should focus on exclusivity (especially if multiple nationalities long-term residents if they wish to encourage are possible), in practice it may do so, due for naturalization. Naturalization rates based on example to requirements to renounce previous long-term residence nevertheless vary: Canada nationalities or attend integration courses (89 per cent of men and 90 per cent of women), and exams (Joppke 2010; Pedroza 2015). Sweden (79 and 80 per cent, respectively), Naturalization policies alone may not be able and the Netherlands (72 and 73 per cent, to redress the disenfranchisement of migrants respectively) have relatively high naturalization when migrations tend to be temporary. rates. In Luxembourg (12 per cent of men and 13 per cent of women), Switzerland (28 and 40 Since international law says little about the per cent, respectively) and Germany (35 and impact of migration on the composition of 36 per cent, respectively) fewer immigrants the population that enjoys voting rights, it is naturalize (OECD 2011). Given the increased important to analyse this aspect. migration flows, there is nevertheless a rising trend towards restricting the acquisition of Immigrants and voting rights citizenship, including in countries such as A core principle of democracy is universal Australia, Canada and the USA (OECD 2011). suffrage. Since the 18th century, barriers to Other contextual factors in addition to the the right to vote and to stand as candidates openness or restrictiveness of citizenship have been removed or lowered. At the same policies influence whether immigrants become time, the idea of representative democracy citizens. These include whether immigrants was based on the congruence of territory, originate from developing counties, their citizenry and government. Globalization has length of settlement in their host countries, challenged the requirements of citizenship whether there are family ties or humanitarian and residence: citizens may be disenfranchised

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There is a trend due to migration. Notwithstanding academic seven years. In Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay the in an increasing controversies on the relationship between residence requirements for national franchise number of naturalization policies and immigrant are five and 15 years, respectively (Bauböck countries to link integration (Huddleston and Vink 2013), key 2005; Arrighi and Bauböck 2016). obstacles to immigrants’ political participation immigrants’ local include their lack of electoral participation and Granting voting rights to immigrants is voting rights country approaches to naturalization. controversial, given that voting is traditionally to residency, seen as a feature of citizenship. Whether while national Host countries permit immigrants to citizenship is defined as the compilation of voting rights are participate in elections to varying degrees. civil, social and political rights or as a status rarely granted In the last 50 years more than 50 countries of full membership in a polity, there is a trend to immigrants have held parliamentary debates at different in an increasing number of countries to link levels (local, provincial and national) about immigrants’ local voting rights to residency, before extending voting rights to migrants after a while national voting rights are rarely granted naturalization certain period of residence. More than 30 to immigrants before naturalization (Bauböck countries have reformed their electoral laws 2005). In some regions such as Latin America and even constitutions to enable non-citizen and the Caribbean, democratization has been residents to vote (Pedroza 2015). Non-citizen linked to the extension of voting rights to voting rights exist, or are provided for in non-citizens, although it remains a politically constitutions without having been applied or sensitive issue. With the exception of Chile and implemented, in 64 democracies (Blais et al. Uruguay, democratization in South America 2001; Earnest 2004; Waldrauch 2005). The has indirectly contributed to immigrant largest group of countries to allow non-citizens voting rights because government policies to vote is the EU. After 3–5 years of residence, were sympathetic to migrants’ rights and non-citizen residents may stand as candidates allowed immigrants to mobilize for suffrage, in local elections in 11 EU countries, vote often having previously been prevented by locally in 15, regionally in five and nationally authoritarian regimes (Escobar 2015, 2017). in three (certain groups in Portugal and the In Myanmar, non-citizens, such as Rohyngya UK). Outside the EU, Norway, Iceland and Muslims, were ‘white card holders’ who had eight Central and South American countries the right to vote until the November 2015 including Belize, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela elections, when that right was withdrawn, have the same purely residence-based local preventing them from taking part in the franchise (Bauböck 2005; Arrighi and Bauböck country’s first democratic elections. In Japan, 2016). However, almost 10 million non-EU foreigners are only allowed to participate in adults are disenfranchised in 13 EU countries some local referendums, but are not granted (Huddleston et al. 2015). The same is true for local voting rights (Huddleston et al. 2015). resident non-citizens in Canada, Japan, Turkey and USA. According to 2013 MIPEX data, in Whether extending voting rights to resident the USA this affects 21.9 million people or 7 per non-citizens improves democracy remains cent of the population, and 4.8 million people empirically unproven. Electoral systems in Canada or 10 per cent of the population and the socio-political context influence (Huddleston et al. 2015). the implementation of more inclusive voting rights. Some argue that the political The Nordic countries and Ireland grant the inclusion of residents improves governance most inclusive local voting rights in Europe, through more genuine representation and is while outside the EU the most democratically an obligation of democratic governments, as inclusive country granting national voting rights laws and policies apply to both citizens and is New Zealand (Huddleston et al. 2015; MIPEX residents (Munro 2008). Conversely, concerns 2015). Malawi grants national franchise after surround the granting of voting rights to

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migrants at the national level due to fears that BOX 7.4 this will negatively affect national identity and loyalty, potentially endangering the order of the state. A third position in this debate is The decisive role of migrants in Chile’s municipal elections that access to national voting rights should be Migrants residing in Chile for at least five years are entitled to vote. In the given to immigrants through naturalization, 2016 municipal elections, migrants represented 1.4 per cent of total voters and thus pathways to their citizenship should on the electoral roll, and 8.9 per cent of the voting population in Santiago (El be facilitated. Box 7.4 describes migrants’ Mercurio 2016). According to the Ministry of Interior, voter turnout tends to be involvement in local elections in Chile. much higher among migrants than among Chilean citizens (Gonzalez 2016). As a result, migrant voters can play a decisive role in the outcome of local and municipal elections, especially in municipalities with high concentrations At the local level, a different picture emerges: of migrants. In addition, as stated by the Jesuit Migration Service, data from even when the ratio of resident non-citizens the 2013 legislative elections show that candidates who directly appealed to migrant voters were more successful than those who did not (La Segunda to citizens is high, local enfranchisement does 2014). As the country’s migrant population is continuously growing, political not risk a national government of newcomers parties and candidates increasingly need to adapt their programmes to (Bauböck 2004; Walzer 1997). The right to address migrants’ concerns and propose measures to include them at the local vote locally may lead to a sense of belonging, level (El Mercurio 2016). as it recognizes residents’ equal capacity to participate in the formation of governments, while also instilling trust between newcomers Immigrants and the influence of and others, thus improving legitimacy (Pedroza voter turnout—willingness to 2015). Policies that extend voting rights politically engage? universally, even if limited to the local level, Voter turnout gauges the level of civic offer non-citizen residents the chance to equally engagement. Thus whether immigrant citizens integrate into politics and achieve a new sense vote is an important consideration for political of belonging (Offe and Fuchs 2002). For party and government strategies to engage with example, the Council of Europe’s Convention immigrants and the native population. on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level includes the right to vote as one In Europe, voter turnout among the native of its standards. Likewise, the EU’s Common population strongly influences immigrants’ Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration participation: the more native citizens vote, the Policy highlight that ‘the participation of more immigrant citizens vote (Voicu 2014). immigrants in the democratic process and in Some argue that their length of stay in the the formulation of integration policies and host country does not seem to affect whether measures, especially at the local level, supports immigrants who have voting rights make use of their integration’ (European Commission 2004: them (Voicu 2014). Other evidence shows that 10). The European Agenda for Integration the longer immigrants stay in the host country, recognizes that integration is a local process, the more politically active they become, and that integration policies should include regardless of whether they obtain citizenship granting migrants voting rights in local (Just and Anderson 2012). Immigrants who elections (European Commission 2011). moved to Canada in 2001 or later were less likely to vote in 2011 than more established Extending voting rights to migrants is more immigrants or those born in the country than a policy issue that may enhance democracy. (Uppal and LaRochelle-Côté 2012). It also affects which principles a country applies when it grants citizenship, and influences its Thus, immigrants with voting rights do not political definition of citizenship. Migration necessarily vote, and current studies show that policy must therefore consider citizenship immigrant turnout in national elections is policy when democratic institutions define generally lower than in local elections. Even in approaches to include migrants in political life. local elections, immigrants have a lower voter

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FIGURE 7.1 turnout compared to natives. The exception is Canada (Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst 2016). Participation and Access to Nationality by Representative This is true regardless of whether a country Government, 2014 is politically inclusive of immigrants, has an open citizenship regime or allows immigrants 1.0 to vote in local elections. Examples include France 0.9 United Kingdom the Netherlands, which strongly encourages Japan United States Netherlands Sweden Poland Spain Australia immigrant voting rights at the local level Switzerland CanadaDenmark Finland Portugal 0.8 Estonia CroatiaSlovenia Czechia Italy Ireland New Zealand Greece Germany (Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst 2016: 33); Sweden, Lithuania Norway Latvia Slovakia Austria Belgium Bulgaria Hungary which has a large immigrant population (13 0.7 Cyprus Republic of Korea Romania per cent), an immigrant-friendly citizenship 0.6 Turkey regime and policies to further immigrant political inclusion (Bird, Saalfeld and Würst 0.5 2016: 39); and Norway, which also facilitates 0.4 immigrant political inclusion and has an open Representative Government (GSODI) Government Representative citizenship regime (Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst 0.3 2016: 44). 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Political Participation and Access to Nationality (MIPEX) Different factors influence voter turnout,

Notes: This graph shows the relationship between the GSoD indices Representative Government attribute (y-axis) including the political socialization of and the averages of the MIPEX political participation and access to nationality indicators (x-axis). The higher a country scores on both axes, the more politically inclusive it is for immigrants and the higher the quality of its rep- immigrants and their socio-economic status. resentative government. Pearson’s correlation coefficient: n = 35, r =.567, p-value <.005. Immigrants’ willingness to engage politically in Sources: GSoD indices 2017 (Representative Government Index), MIPEX 2014 (Political Participation and Access to their host societies requires a genuine interest Nationality). in doing so. If political parties and governments aim to engage with as large a segment of the

FIGURE 7.2 electorate as possible, their strategies need to address general voter scepticism that political Participation and Access to Nationality by Checks on Government, parties and governments can tackle challenges 2014 such as migration regardless of whether a voter is a migrant or a native. 1.0 Denmark Australia Sweden Political integration of immigrants 0.9 Switzerland France Norway United Kingdom In addition to facilitating naturalization Estonia Lithuania Germany Finland 0.8 Portugal Poland Slovenia United States Netherlands and granting voting rights, a country’s Belgium New Zealand Latvia Austria Japan Italy Canada legislative and political system must be open Slovakia Ireland 0.7 Czechia Spain Cyprus Greece Bulgaria Croatia to immigrant political integration in order to Republic of Korea Romania 0.6 Hungary facilitate immigrants’ inclusion and ability to engage in the political life of their host 0.5 countries.

Checks on Government (GSODI) on Government Checks 0.4 Turkey To assess whether there is a correlation between 0.3 a political system’s openness to immigrants’ 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 political integration and the quality of Political Participation and Access to Nationality (MIPEX) its democracy, three International IDEA GSoD indices attributes (Representative Notes: This graph shows the relationship between the GSoD indices Checks on Government attribute (y-axis) and the averages of the MIPEX political participation and access to nationality indicators (x-axis). The higher a country Government, Checks on Government and scores on both axes, the more politically inclusive it is for immigrants and the higher the quality of its checks on government. Pearson’s correlation coefficient: n = 35, r =.619, p-value <.005. Fundamental Rights) were compared to the

Sources: GSoD indices 2017 (Checks on Government Index), MIPEX 2014 (Political Participation and Access to Nationality). MIPEX political participation and access to nationality scores.

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The GSoD indices score in relation to FIGURE 7.3 representative government measures the extent to which a country has clean elections, inclusive Political Participation and Access to Nationality by Fundamental suffrage, free political parties and an elected Rights, 2014 government (vertical axis Figure 7.1). The score in relation to checks on government measures 1.0 Switzerland Denmark Germany Finland the effectiveness of parliaments, judicial France Norway Sweden 0.9 Estonia Japan Belgium Slovenia New Zealand independence and the existence of a critical Latvia United States Italy Netherlands Australia Canada Lithuania Cyprus Greece Ireland 0.8 Spain United Kingdom media (vertical axis Figure 7.2). Fundamental Poland Czechia Portugal Slovakia Rights (vertical axis Figure 7.3) measures Bulgaria Republic of Korea 0.7 Hungary Romania equal and fair access to justice, respect for civil Croatia liberties, and the extent of social and political 0.6 equality. The GSoD indices and MIPEX both score 35 countries, the majority of which score 0.5

Fundamental Rights (GSODI) Rights Fundamental Turkey very high on the GSoD indices. This means 0.4 that even the lower-scoring countries in the GSoD indices and MIPEX sample score higher 0.3 relative to the global sample. 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Political Participation and Access to Nationality (MIPEX)

The MIPEX political participation and Notes: This graph shows the relationship between the GSoD indices Fundamental Rights attribute (y-axis) and the access to nationality scores (horizontal axis averages of the MIPEX political participation and access to nationality indicators (x-axis). The higher a country scores on both axes, the more politically inclusive it is for immigrants and the higher the quality of its fundamental on Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3) measure 167 rights. Austria is not included due to lack of data. Pearson’s correlation coefficient: n = 34, r =.593, p-value <.005. indicators over the time period 2004–14, Sources: GSoD indices 2017 (Fundamental Rights Index), MIPEX 2014 (Political Participation and Access to Nationality). including countries’ migration policies in relation to electoral rights, political liberties, consultative bodies and implementation second- and third-generation migrants. They policies as well as eligibility for naturalization, also focus on conditions for the acquisition of conditions for acquisition of citizenship status, citizenship such as language, economic and security of citizenship status and acceptance criminal record requirements, good character of dual nationality. All EU member states are clauses and costs. Other factors include the included, as well as Australia, Canada, Iceland, security of citizenship status based on the Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of length of procedures, grounds of citizenship Korea, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA. refusal and discretionary powers of refusal, legal guarantees and redress in the case of citizenship Political participation policies focus on refusal, protection against the withdrawal migrants’ right to vote and stand in national, of citizenship, and whether dual nationality local and regional elections; their right of is granted to second- and third-generation association and membership in political migrants. The 2014 data from the MIPEX and parties; the existence, powers, composition GSoD indices show that political systems that and representativeness of migrant consultative are open or inclusive in terms of their political bodies at the regional, national and local levels; integration of immigrants tend to score high in and whether public funding enables active key attributes of democracy quality. political participation by migrants and their associations. Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 show that in Europe, the high scores for immigrant-friendly Access-to-nationality policies focus on eligibility countries such as Finland, Norway, Portugal criteria for naturalization such as residence and and Sweden reflect policies that focus on permit requirements for legal residents, and ensuring that immigrants have equal legal conditions for the naturalization of spouses and rights to citizens and a high level of integration

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Data show that support. By contrast, the low MIPEX the Democratic and Republican parties grapple political systems political participation/access to nationality with the impact of immigrant votes, which that are open or scores and medium GSoD indices scores influences their electoral campaigns and results. inclusive in terms for immigration-restrictive countries such Latino voters have been vital to Democrats’ as Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland and victories in congressional and presidential of their political Romania reflect the fact that these countries elections, and their influence is increasing as integration of only offer basic opportunities for integration, they become a larger share of the US electorate immigrants tend with limited migrant political participation (Oakford 2014). Since 2012, the number of to score high in and difficult pathways to citizenship. In eligible Latino voters has increased to 27.3 key attributes Romania, it should also be noted that million, accounting for 12 per cent of all of democracy emigration exceeds immigration. While the voters in 2016 (Krogstad 2016), with second- quality GSoD indices quality of democracy scores are generation immigrants driving the increase high for Canada, Spain, Switzerland and the (Oakford 2014). Millennials make up 44 per USA, they have mid-range scores for MIPEX cent of Latino eligible voters (Krogstad 2016). political participation/access to nationality In 2016, of the 57 million Latinos living in the indicators, reflecting their restrictive policies USA, a record 27 million were eligible to vote, on voting rights for immigrants and a almost half of whom were young millennials. lack of consultative bodies (in the case of This is the largest increase of any group during Canada) and pathways to citizenship (in the this time frame. The Latino share of the overall US case). Japan scores high on the GSoD voter turnout was higher in 2016 (11 per cent) indices quality of democracy scores but than in 2012 (10 per cent) or 2008 (9 per cent) low on the MIPEX political participation/ (Krogstad and Lopez 2016). access to nationality indicators, reflecting its restrictive policies on immigrant voting Political parties and parliaments as well as local rights and political participation. Despite councils face the challenge of integrating the recent reforms in refugee and asylum policies, interests of an increasingly diverse population Turkey scores low on both the GSoD quality due to the effects of migration. As the main of democracy indices and the MIPEX political representatives of the people in political decision- participation/access to nationality indicators, making processes, parties should strive to reflect reflecting an unfavourable legal framework the interests of all citizens (Kemp et al. 2013). for the integration and political participation of immigrants as well as a difficult path to While data are lacking on whether political citizenship or even legal residence. parties reflect the diversity of their populations, minority groups are usually under-represented The political integration of immigrants through (Bloemraad 2013). In Sweden, 9.5 per cent of citizenship access and political participation national MPs have an immigrant background, rights benefits democratic societies and helps compared to only 5.7 per cent in Germany create the conditions for strong and resilient and 1.3 per cent in Portugal—and less than 1 democracies. Political parties and governments per cent in Italy, Ireland and Spain (Dähnke should adopt strategies and policies that et al. 2014: 12–13). Canada elected its most promote the inclusion of immigrants to tackle diverse Parliament in 2015 (Woolf 2015). the migration challenge. Box 7.5 explores the role of parliaments in developing policies that affect migrants. Immigrant representation in key political institutions and consultative bodies Immigrants remain under-represented at the Political parties in some countries—especially local level, even though there tend to be more those that have granted local voting rights councillors with an immigrant background at to immigrants—realize they cannot ignore the municipal level and in cities, and parties immigrants’ issues and concerns. In the USA, nominate a substantial number of minority

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candidates in local elections. For example, the BOX 7.5 total number of councillors of immigrant origin in Norway and the Netherlands was under 1 per cent (Bergh and Bjørklund 2010) and 3 per Contributions of parliaments to migration governance cent, respectively, in 2011 (Vermeulen 2011). In Given the transnational nature of migration, national and regional parliaments New Zealand, immigrant Indians formed their play a key role in regional and international approaches to the challenges own political party to compete in local elections migration poses to democracy. Parliaments design national migration policies. on a pro-immigration rights platform in 2016; Therefore, they should promote a culture of democratic debate that advocates inclusion and tolerance of migrants, and contribute to policies that maximize while Asians and Indians represent 13 per cent the benefits of migration, particularly in the economic sphere. of the country’s current population, they are not proportionally represented in Parliament Given the challenges faced by government institutions in dealing with the current levels of migration, parliamentarians must ensure that legislation is (Lynch 2016). In Australia’s current Parliament enacted and enforceable, and backed by the necessary financial resources of 226 senators and members, only 26 were to strengthen the national and local government institutions responsible for born overseas (13 per cent) (Parliament of protecting migrants’ rights and furthering their integration into society.

Australia 2015), despite the fact that 28 per cent Parliaments have the ability to reach out to different government entities and of Australians are born overseas (Hasham 2016). civil society to develop a holistic approach to the challenges of migration. For example the Rwandan Parliament has established a mechanism allowing Adding to the representation deficit is the migrants to lodge appeals directly with a parliamentary human rights committee, which helps protect migrants’ rights (IPU 2015). challenge immigrants face in joining political parties. In some regions, such as Europe, this is comparatively easy, since few parties prevent immigrants from becoming members beyond Political parties have applied different residence requirements (Dähnke et al. 2014: strategies to increase minority representation, 14). However, except for Poland, non-citizen including bolstering their profile within ethnic immigrants cannot vote in or stand for elections. communities, implementing recruitment drives to encourage ethnic minority representatives Immigrants face challenges related to the to stand for election, and adopting numerical opening up of traditional party cultures to targets for minority candidates. In a very few accept and further their effective participation. cases, political parties have established ethnic These include the lack of a welcoming culture candidate lists (Bird 2003). Other political that adapts to the diversity of its members, parties have used targets, intraparty minority and the need for personal contacts with the networks and quotas to increase minority (local) party leadership to be encouraged to representation. Examples include the Ontario join a party and be included on a candidate New Democratic Party and the Welsh Labour list. In addition, immigrants often lack access Party as well as the Swedish Social Democratic to historical and established party networks, Party, which introduced quotas for candidates particularly youth organizations that in of immigrant background at the local level. In European countries such as the Nordics, Stockholm municipality, a quota for candidates Austria and Germany often provide the entry targeting migrants from non-Nordic countries point for a political career. Immigrants who has been set in proportion to the district’s do become successful party members often immigrant population (25 per cent) (Dähnke take on the role of mediator with immigrant et al. 2014: 22). While political institutions and communities, and can thus influence how a parties have often successfully used quotas to party contributes to the migration debate and increase the share of women (Wängerud 2009), migration policy. Conversely, if immigrant they have not always worked for minority representatives in political parties are perceived groups (Ruedin 2013; Lubbers and Van der to be mere ‘tokens’ with no real influence on Zwan 2016). Reserved seats in legislatures are programmes and policy, this can limit their more often used to ensure the representation of ability to influence party structures. minority groups (Htun 2004).

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Many political parties allow immigrants to individual interactions rather than institutional hold positions within their party structure, structures. Overall, political parties could including on candidate lists (Htun 2004), and be more effective at attracting people from some have created incentives for immigrants to immigrant backgrounds (Dähnke et al. 2014). politically engage with them through special forums or campaigns. Many of these structures Electoral systems and the cultural context are informal and weak, and depend on affect the level of minority representation in

BOX 7.6 political institutions (Ruedin 2013; Togeby 2008; Dancygier et al. 2015; Sobolewska 2013). The size of an electoral district affects Case study on inclusive political parties in Germany the likelihood that under-represented groups will be elected, as this defines how many Although foreign permanent residents constitute almost 50 per cent of candidates parties can field in an election. Germany’s immigrant population, only citizens have the right to vote in federal elections (Basic Law, article 20(2)). In a series of decisions in 1990, Germany’s Similarly, a low formal threshold (or no Constitutional Court ruled that enfranchising foreigners would require revising threshold) can increase the representation the citizenship law to facilitate naturalization. German reunification, along of under-represented groups, particularly with the migratory consequences of the democratization processes in Eastern in proportional representation systems Europe and the former Soviet Union, presented an opportunity for reform. In 1992, the citizenship law was revised to introduce naturalization as a right for (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005; Larserud foreigners who had lived in Germany for 15 years, but fell short of introducing and Taphorn 2007). In countries with the territorial principle: immigrant children born in Germany still had to apply proportional representation electoral systems, for German citizenship. In 1999, the Citizenship Act introduced ius soli for such as the Netherlands, candidate selection children born in Germany to immigrant parents with eight years of residency and entitled immigrants to citizenship after eight years if they complied with methods influence the representativeness two key integration requirements—adhering to the laws of the German state of the candidate list, including candidates’ and learning its language; this resulted in 905,000 naturalizations from 2000 relative positions on the list, which can to 2005. increase their chances of being elected. Parties There was the potential for a significant increase in the number of naturalized that have more positive views on migration citizens, since 68.6 per cent of the German immigrant electorate had been and integration tend to have to higher shares in the country for more than eight years and thus qualified for citizenship of ethnic minorities, and place them higher under the 1999 law. Thus political parties in Germany revised their strategies to mobilize immigrant support to appeal to immigrant voters’ interests, and on candidate lists (Lubbers and Van der Zwan by increasingly nominating immigrant candidates on party lists or preventing 2016). In addition, if a party’s candidate their defection (Claro da Fonseca 2011). selection system is more inclusive, the relative position of ethnic minority groups is higher. The 1999 Citizenship Act did not go far enough to increase the representation of one of Germany’s key minorities, the Turks, in the Bundestag. The Turkish Parties that have strong internal support minority in Germany had been affiliated with the Social Democratic Party systems for ethnic minorities tend to have a (SDP) since the 1960s, with support for the Greens rising in the 1980s. Turkish higher share of ethnic minorities (Lubbers candidates in the Left Party were successful in the 2005 elections, followed by the further diversification of German political parties fielding Turkish and Van der Zwan 2016). In majority systems candidates in the 2009 elections, including the SDP, the Greens, the Left and such as in Colombia, Hungary, India, Jordan, the Free Democratic Party. Even though the Turkish minority remains under- New Zealand, Niger and Pakistan, seats are set represented in the Bundestag, it has a higher political representation than aside in the legislature for under-represented Muslims in Britain or France (Aktürk 2010). groups (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005). Box Despite a general understanding among traditional German political parties, 7.6 examines the inclusiveness of political particularly since the 2000s, that immigration has had a positive impact on parties in Germany. Germany, in particular for the economy as a result of gaining skilled labour, the idea of increasing inclusiveness and multiculturalism has been controversial. Particularly after reunification, EU expansion and the recent refugee crisis in In the context of tackling the migration Europe, there has been a rise in xenophobic violence, nationalism and the challenge, a party’s agenda and views on establishment of anti-immigrant political parties such as the AfD (see Box 4.3) migration—regardless of where it stands on the and movements such as the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, political spectrum—seem to influence whether Pegida), and the passage of restrictive asylum legislation. immigrants are represented in political party structures, whether they can stand for election

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and whether they have a realistic chance of representatives can be elected by immigrants or Political parties winning due to their relative position on a other organizations or be publicly appointed have applied party’s candidate list. The level of support that (EU FRA 2017). different a party provides to immigrants also matters. strategies to Political parties’ inclusiveness thus affects the The challenge of anti-immigrant parties representation of immigrants. Parties that have Concerns over immigration have reinvigorated increase minority positive views on migration should therefore right-wing populist parties and leaders in representation, evaluate the inclusiveness of their candidate countries such as Germany (Otto and Steinhardt including selection processes and strengthen their internal 2014), Denmark (Gerdes and Wadensjö bolstering party support structures to ensure migrants are 2008), Austria (Halla, Wagner and Zweimüller their profile appropriately represented. 2013), Finland, France, the Netherlands, within ethnic Sweden, Australia and the USA (Mayda, Peri communities, Countries may include immigrants in decision- and Steingress 2016). Many parties across the making processes through consultative bodies, political spectrum increasingly use the media to implementing even if they do not grant them formal voting communicate the narrative of an out-of-touch recruitment rights or facilitate their inclusion in political political elite versus the people, and an ‘us drives to parties. In the EU, ten countries (Belgium, versus them’ mentality based on ethnocentric encourage Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, identities and xenophobia (Greven 2016). ethnic minority Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain) have representatives to established formal consultative bodies between Fuelled by the refugee crisis resulting from the stand for election immigrants and government bodies (EU ongoing Syrian civil war, Europe has experienced FRA 2017). increased support for the revitalization of and adopting nationalist, anti-immigrant political parties numerical targets Consultations with immigrants can take many that promote Islamophobia. These parties have for minority different forms and operate on different levels. For been on the rise in Austria, France, Germany, candidates example local government authorities, including Italy and the UK, as well as in the traditionally cities and municipalities in Belgium, Denmark, liberal Netherlands and the Nordic states, and Estonia, Greece, Italy Latvia, Luxembourg and have secured significant parliamentary blocs in Sweden have established dialogue platforms several countries. Other nations have seen the among citizens and immigrant or ethnic minority rise of nationalist street movements such as the associations, consultative bodies, and elected English Defence League or France’s Muslim- representatives from each municipality, and baiting Bloc Indentitaire. Nationalist and right- research institutions focusing on immigration- wing parties gained significantly at the ballot related issues to enhance integration at the box in 2015 in Austria, Denmark, Finland and local level. These dialogue sessions (called Switzerland (Recknagl 2015). In 2016, far-right Strengthening Integration Dialogue Platforms) Freedom Party candidate Norbert Hofer received have addressed topics such as voting in the general strong support in the first round of the Austrian elections and the challenges and opportunities presidential elections, while the right-wing to improve facilities and living conditions in populist parties Law and Justice, and Fidesz, their municipalities (EU FRA 2017). In Italy, 14 govern in Poland and Hungary, respectively. In regional councils, 48 municipal councils and 19 France, National Front candidate Marine Le provincial councils have immigrant consultative Pen has gained support from the white working bodies (EU FRA 2017). class and the unemployed to reach the second round of the presidential election in May 2017, The composition and selection modalities of in which she was defeated. these consultative bodies varies: typically, the largest immigrant groups are represented, In addition, mainstream parties increasingly depending on their self-organization and the accommodate the rhetoric of anti-immigrant extent of their networking abilities. Immigrant parties during election campaigns, adding

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Whether it is the fuel to anti-immigrant public attitudes since the rise of former candidate for prime size of the foreign and affecting political party platforms. For minister, Pauline Hanson, who campaigned population in a example, in France, measures have been taken against Asian immigrants in 1990, it did country or the to reduce access to citizenship, so that children not gain traction at the ballot box (Pearlman of immigrants no longer gain citizenship 2015). Citizens’ views on migration, and their size and speed of at birth, but at the age of 18, and only once resulting voting behaviour, are challenging migration flows they prove themselves to be ‘well assimilated’ the core values of democratic projects such as that leads to a rise (Demos 2017). the EU, as demonstrated by the UK’s ‘Brexit’ in populist parties referendum, which was influenced by the issue is still debated While the trend of rising public support for of migration in the context of freedom of nationalist anti-immigrant political parties is movement within the EU (see Box 7.7). evident in Europe and the USA, particularly after the 2016 election of populist President Migration fuelled by globalization thus affects Donald Trump, in other regions it has not been democracy by increasing public support for as marked or as successful. While Australia saw (particularly right-wing) populist parties and the launch of the anti-immigrant Australian their anti-immigrant agendas. Whether it is Liberty Alliance in 2015, which represented the size of the foreign population in a country the first resurgence of right-wing sentiment or the size and speed of migration flows that leads to a rise in populist parties is still debated. BOX 7.7 A controversial 2016 study suggests that there is a tipping point of immigration that leads to electoral support for right-wing populist parties The influence of migration perceptions on the ‘Brexit’ in Europe: as the percentage of immigrants referendum approaches approximately 22 per cent of the

A slim majority of UK voters chose to leave the EU in June 2016 in what has general population, the percentage of right- become known as the ‘Brexit’ referendum. The three most decisive issues for wing populist voters exceeds 50 per cent—the voters were the economy (21 per cent), sovereignty (17 per cent) and immigration threshold for forming a government (Podobnik, (20 per cent) (Swales 2016). These issues had a strong impact on voting Jusup and Stanley 2016). The data furthermore behavior: the majority of those who said immigration (88 per cent) or sovereignty (90 per cent) were the most important issues voted to leave, compared to a suggest that the greater the percentage of small minority who said the economy was more important (Prosser, Mellon voters in favour of right-wing populist parties and Green 2016). Almost 50 per cent of the British population believed in compared to the percentage of immigrants, the 2016 that immigration negatively affects the economy, according to the British lower their tolerance of immigrants (Podobnik, Social Attitudes survey (Versi 2016). ‘Leave’ voters believed that immigration had negatively affected Britain, and felt that Brexit would lower immigration, Jusup and Stanley 2016). By contrast, other positively influence the economy and strengthen security (Swales 2016). studies show that it is not the percentage of the foreign population in a country that invigorates Before the referendum, polls indicated that immigration had become voters’ top priority, which prompted the Leave campaign to adopt more anti-immigrant right-wing populism, but rather the speed rhetoric (Taylor 2016). Several leading Conservatives made anti-immigrant and size of immigration flows (Demos 2017; statements; then-Prime Minister David Cameron referred to refugees as a Guibernau 2010). ‘swarm’ (BBC News 2015). Boris Johnson, who was then mayor of London, portrayed Turkish people as a threat to the UK due to their geographic proximity to Syria and Iraq. The leader of the nationalist UK Independence Party (UKIP), There have been positive examples of the Nigel Farage, alleged during his campaign that immigrants would overwhelm public voting for pro-immigrant political Britain. One of UKIP’s posters featured the image of a mass of migrants parties or leaders who advocate inclusive and traveling by foot with the header ‘breaking point’ (Versi 2016). Both parties fair migration policies, such as the election of found strong support among their members for a Leave vote: 98 per cent of UKIP voters and 58 per cent of Conservatives voted to leave (Swales 2016). The Sadiq Khan as mayor of London in 2016 (see Leave campaign attracted voters concerned about migration who were unaware Box 7.8). of its long-term positive effects on the economy: 95 per cent of those who voted Leave were anti-immigrant and economically not well off. The Leave campaign better tapped into public concerns, providing more clarity about the potential A European study from 2010 found that public impact of Brexit on immigration and independence. concern about immigration is one cause of citizens’ lack of trust in political institutions

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and politicians, and not simply the result of BOX 7.8 far-right rhetoric or pessimism, or migration levels (McLaren 2010). Specifically, if citizens’ perceptions of the effects of immigration The mayor of London are negative, they are less trusting of the In May 2016, the month before the Brexit referendum, London voters elected political system. The study concluded that Sadiq Khan, the son of Pakistani immigrants and an observant Muslim, as levels of immigration were unrelated (or their new mayor by a greater margin than any London mayor since it became an elected office in 2000. His Conservative opponent sought to link Khan’s faith with negatively related) to public concerns about violent extremism (Krol 2016), to which Khan responded (on Twitter), ‘There’s immigration. In European countries with no need to keep pointing at me & shouting “he’s a Muslim”. I put it on my own high-quality governance and policies that leaflets’ (Sullivan and Pickard 2016). He described himself to one of Europe’s make it easier for immigrants to participate largest and oldest cities as a native: ‘I am a Londoner, I am European, I am British, I am English, I am of Islamic faith, of Asian origin, of Pakistani heritage, a in political life and integrate, public concern dad, a husband’ (Sullivan and Pickard 2016). about immigration and political distrust was high, while concerns about immigration had a At a time of rising pan-European Islamophobia, in the midst of the campaign that weaker effect on trust in political institutions led to the UK vote to leave the EU, and in the context of electoral losses by Khan’s Labour Party, this represents a dramatic success for an inclusive political vision. in countries with poor governance. In One commentator referred to his victory as ‘a stinging rebuke to the peddlers relation to immigrant-friendly migration of prejudice’ (Hasan 2016). With Muslims representing about one-eighth of the policies, those with less negative views of city’s population, Khan attracted a broad base of voters. His working-class roots, his record as an MP and minister in the previous Labour government, and his immigrants were less distrustful of their focus on quality-of-life issues such as housing and transport proved an attractive political systems and politicians than those political package (Booth 2016). Arguably the UK’s acceptance of multiculturalism, who were very concerned about immigration. rather than the ‘assimilationist’ model of integration practiced in other countries, This relationship between concern about enabled his victory (Hasan 2016). immigration and political distrust exists regardless of the presence of far-right parties. Reducing the disconnect between citizens 7.4. Emigrants as agents of and political institutions and governments, democracy: how can democracies and increasing trust between them, can help gain from emigration? public attitudes towards immigration produce Notwithstanding the important contributions better governance (McLaren 2010) of emigrant remittances to the economies of their home countries, the most important Therefore a key policy implication for effect of emigration for origin countries may governments—in addition to considering be on political institutions and social attitudes state capacities in relation to migration through democratic norm diffusion. Diaspora policymaking—is that countries with high communities influence their home countries immigration rates and immigrant-friendly or through the transfer of social remittances. multicultural policies must work to reduce The definition of diaspora used here is the potential backlash from citizens who have Gerard-Francois Dumont’s: ‘a community of negative perceptions of immigration. This is individuals living together on the same territory particularly true in Europe, Latin America and having in common the conviction or belief and the USA, which have experienced a rise in of belonging, themselves or their families to populist leaders and parties as a result of voter another territory with which they maintain dissatisfaction, which has often been linked regular relations’; they are not tourists or to anti-immigrant sentiments. This seems to short-term visitors. They transfer information, be corroborated by recent explanations that innovative ideas, intellectual capacities, new the rise of authoritarian populists in Western technological skills, business and trade practices, societies has caused a strong cultural backlash and democratic political habits and practices against long-term social change and liberal when they return to their home countries, values (Norris 2016). when they visit relatives and via social media, TV and telecommunications. Globalization,

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in particular the spread of the internet and implications. For instance, a study conducted communication technology, has made it easier in Cabo Verde showed that returnees demand for migrants to stay informed and connected greater accountability from their government if to politics in their home countries. This has their host country had high-quality governance, transformed their ability to participate in their and that returnees were able to influence their home countries’ political life and influence their home countries more than emigrants can from democratic institutions and political leadership. host countries (Batista and Vincente 2011). A study conducted in Mexico found evidence Diaspora and reintegrating emigrants may thus that migration to the USA contributed to act as a bridge between origin and destination democratization in Mexico by significantly countries, and in their home countries as increasing the probability of an opposition ‘agents of democracy’ and a reconciling force party winning a municipal election (Pfutze to overcome political trauma. Their actions and 2014). In Mali, returnees increased electoral views can affect society’s attitudes regarding the participation and helped spread the idea of perception of freedom, tolerance of differences, the need for increased political participation human rights, governance and political practices among non-migrants in Mali, which enhanced in their countries of origin (see Box 7.9). democracy (Chauvet and Mercier 2014). In Moldova, emigration to Western countries The evidence suggests that there is a democratic decreased support for the Communist Party, dividend from emigration (Rapoport 2016; which contributed to the establishment of Lodigiani 2016); migrants act as agents of new and more democratic political parties democracy, which has important policy (Mahmoud et al. 2014). In Georgia, Latvia and Lithuania, returning members of the diaspora BOX 7.9 joined the national political leadership. In India, returnees have influenced political elites by reshaping political understandings, The Myanmar diaspora as agents of democratization norms and expectations, and have contributed to political stability and the resilience of the With approximately 5 million migrants, Myanmar’s diaspora is among the most diverse and populous in South East Asia, comprising economic migrants, country’s democracy by encouraging political refugees and political exiles (Williams 2012; Egreteau 2012). It has played an elites to accept marginalized social groups into active role in promoting democratic reforms from their host countries. political life (Kapur 2010).

For instance, in 1999 migrant women from different ethnic and religious backgrounds founded the Women’s League of Burma (WLB), an umbrella Home countries can greatly benefit from organization based in Thailand that aims to raise awareness on gender issues reintegrating emigrants, especially those who and enhance the participation of women in the peace and democracy-building were forced to leave but can return post-conflict. processes. The WLB has been engaged in advocacy and capacity-building activities to politically empower Myanmar’s women (Hedström 2013). Following While abroad, if host societies allowed them the historic 2015 general elections, the WLB joined with other civil society the opportunity, migrants may have increased organizations focusing on women’s issues to establish the Alliance for Gender their skills, wealth, and political interest and Inclusion in the Peace Process, a Myanmar-based organization that works to capacities. They may have been able to stand advance the role of women in the ongoing peace process. as candidates in municipal elections and have In a similar way, many migrants who had fled the country for political reasons gained significant political experience that remained politically active in their host countries and decided to return home they can apply to their home country. The after the country’s democratic opening. For example, Aung Moe Zaw is the diaspora may have formed civic associations or founder and editor of a media outlet (The Irrawaddy) that covers news in Myanmar and other South East Asian countries. Founded in 1993 by Myanmar even political groups preparing to reintroduce migrants residing in Thailand, The Irrawaddy opened an office in Myanmar in democracy in the event that their home country 2012 (The Irrawaddy n.d.). Aung Moe Zaw, chair of the Democratic Party for a New begins a democratic transition. In some cases, Society, returned to Myanmar in 2012 and reregistered the party in the run-up to the 2015 general elections. Although the party did not win any seats, it remains the diaspora plays a key role in raising awareness active in the political scene (Long 2015). about the political situation in their home countries, and mobilizing foreign governments

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and the international community to advocate Dual nationality can exist from birth or be The evidence democratic reforms there (Koinova 2009; acquired. Dual nationality by birth is generally suggests that Williams 2012; Egreteau 2012). accepted by countries, often with an obligation there is a to choose upon reaching the age of majority, democratic Given the potential influence of the diaspora whereas the acquisition of another nationality dividend from on the political life of their home countries, usually entails a requirement to make a choice the following section analyses how countries or the automatic loss of one. Numerous emigration; encourage or facilitate their political engagement. international conventions (such as the 1930 migrants act It explores (a) whether countries allow emigrants Hague Convention, the Council of Europe as agents of to retain citizenship and accept dual citizenship, Convention of 6 May 1963 on the Reduction democracy, (b) whether countries allow emigrants to vote in of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on which has national elections, (c) voter turnout of emigrants Military Obligations, the Council of Europe important policy and (d) how well emigrants are represented in Convention on Nationality, of 6 November implications key political institutions such as parliaments 1997) regulate the issue of dual nationality, and political parties or other consultative bodies. with a preference expressed in initial documents for the principle of having one nationality Citizenship and emigrants only. This principle, however, did not take into An important consideration for many emigrants account the reality of the existence of multiple is whether they can retain their original nationalities between countries, leading to the citizenship when they naturalize as immigrants stipulation that any person who acquires the in their host countries. Many countries accept nationality of a signatory state will automatically dual nationality, especially if giving up the origin lose his/her former nationality. This automatic country nationality has negative consequences clause posed problems of application, and led for emigrants who have maintained ties to their to a prevailing position in law and in practice host countries (OECD 2011). that allows multiple nationalities as long as the following principles are respected: the right

FIGURE 7.4

Percentage of countries allowing dual citizenship, 1975–2015

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Africa Asia & the Paci c Europe Latin America & the Caribbean Middle East & Iran North America

Notes: This graph shows the percentage of countries with a population over 1 million that allow dual citizenship by region for the period 1975–2015.

Source: MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship Database 2015.

221 Chapter 7 The Global State of Democracy 2017 Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism Exploring Democracy’s Resilience

Since 1975 every to a nationality, and avoiding the arbitrary Expanding external voting for emigrants? region of the deprivation of a nationality and statelessness. Migrants from democracies as diverse as Cabo world has seen Verde, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, a substantial Since 1975 every region of the world has seen Lebanon, Mali, Mexico and the Philippines a substantial increase in the share of countries are influencing electoral politics, civic increase in the offering dual citizenship. In 2015, dual engagement and patterns of governance by share of countries citizenship is most commonly accepted in remaining involved in political institutions and offering dual countries in Latin America and the Caribbean democratic processes in their home countries. citizenship. This (91 per cent), North America (100 per cent), Returning emigrants can play a key role in 40-year trend Europe (76 per cent), the Middle East and democratic transitions, such as in Myanmar or shows that dual Iran (90 per cent), and Africa (63 per cent), during the independence era of South Sudan. citizenship is but even at the lowest rate, in Asia and the Pacific (57 per cent), a majority of countries As with voting rights for immigrants, allowing becoming the offer dual citizenship. This 40-year trend emigrants to vote is controversial, as it lets norm shows that dual citizenship is becoming the citizens influence politics in their origin norm (MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual countries without necessarily being affected Citizenship Database 2015). by the election results or government policies (Lopez-Guerra 2005; Rubio-Marin 2006). Whether or not countries should grant or Some argue that allowing dual citizens to vote permit dual citizenship is controversial. Such in two countries weakens the ‘one person one controversies touch on legal issues such as vote’ principle. Others assert that globalization military conscription and tax liability that may has led to overlapping jurisdictions, and that arise out of administrative conflicts, and on expatriate voters have a sufficient stake in their socio-political debate around the question of home country to justify the right to participate granting multiple voting rights to migrants in politically (Spiro 2006). Modern democracies both host and origin countries. thus tolerate many loyalties and affinities (local, regional, religious, civic, political, etc.) BOX 7.10 that are not incompatible with loyalty to the nation state (Martin 2003). Box 7.10 explores the issue of voting from abroad in the context Voting from abroad: the Tunisian diaspora of Tunisia.

Although Tunisian migrants were granted the right to vote in 1989, after the 2010–11 Arab Uprisings, Tunisian civil society and migrant organizations Voting from abroad is arguably necessary actively advocated reforms to the regulation of out-of-country voting (Lafleur to preserve the basic right to vote, as most 2015). The 2011 electoral law stipulates that Tunisian citizens residing abroad countries do not permit non-citizens to vote have the right to vote in and stand for national elections. According to the law, the diaspora is represented by 18 MPs in the form of reserved seats, in national elections. It can, however, raise or approximately 8 per cent of seats in Parliament. Given that France hosts political and practical concerns. Politically, approximately 54 per cent of the Tunisian diaspora, 10 out of 18 diaspora it may be difficult for emigrants to connect MPs are elected to represent Tunisian migrants residing in France. Three MPs to issues relevant to a constituency in their are elected from Italy, one from Germany, two from the Arab world, and the remaining two are from the Americas and the rest of Europe. Out-of-country home country; therefore, some states, such voting takes place over three days, during which registered voters can cast their as the Dominican Republic, France, Italy, ballots in Tunisian embassies and consulates. Diaspora MPs are to return to Portugal and Tunisia, set aside parliamentary Tunisia for one week per month in order to represent their constituents. seats to represent citizens living abroad. Although generally low, the turnout of diaspora voters for the 2011 elections for Practical concerns include enabling timely the Constituent Assembly was 29.2 per cent, which was considered remarkably and secure voting; requiring in-person high, given that voter turnout within Tunisia was 51.2 (Jaulin 2013a, 2013b). voting at consulates can alleviate these, Hence, out-of-country constituencies represent an important electoral stake, and election campaigns abroad involve all the main political parties, as well as but at the cost of reduced turnout due to migrants’ associations, civil rights and religious organizations (Jaulin 2016). inconvenience (European Commission for Democracy through Law 2010). In post-

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conflict situations, diaspora networks and The EU is the largest group of countries that Many countries civic organizations are key to enabling allows emigrant voting (except for Cyrpus, extend voting expatriate political engagement. The effect Greece, Ireland and Malta). The USA, rights to non- is magnified when diaspora organizations Canada and several European states (Austria, resident citizens, also maintain a presence in the country of Germany, Italy and Luxembourg) have although origin (Brinkerhoff 2008). increased accessibility through ballots sent by mail. Central and South American countries technical and Granting emigrants the right to vote is a (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, administrative discretionary act, as no international law Honduras, Peru and Venezuela) require their constraints can legally obligates states to maintain voting citizens to vote at a consulate or embassy in pose barriers to rights for emigrants. Many countries extend their country of residence. Some countries, actual voting. voting rights to non-resident citizens, such as Israel, require emigrants to travel to Laws in 146 although technical and administrative their country of citizenship to vote on election out of 206 constraints can pose barriers to actual day (Bauböck 2005). The Philippines requires voting. Laws in 146 out of 206 democracies a planned return in the foreseeable future as a democracies allow allow non-resident citizens to vote from condition for absentee voting. non-resident abroad (International IDEA Voting from citizens to vote Abroad Database 2015). Of these, 48 Seventeen countries—including six in Europe from abroad apply expatriate voting to only one type of (Croatia, Estonia, France, Italy, Portugal and election, while most allow it for two or more Romania), six in Africa (Algeria, Angola, types. The most common practice—in 43 Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique countries—is to allow external voting for and Tunisia) and five in Latin America and three or more types of elections; 43 countries the Caribbean (Colombia, the Dominican allow external voting in presidential and Republic, Ecuador, Haiti and Panama)— legislative elections (International IDEA allow their citizens abroad to participate in Voting from Abroad Database 2015). some electoral processes and to elect their own representatives to Parliament. This reinforces In Europe and Asia emigrant voting is more external voters’ links with the national political commonly allowed than elsewhere (86 per community, enabling the promotion of their cent and 77 per cent, respectively). Latin own legislative agenda and intervention in America and the Caribbean and Oceania political decisions from an overseas viewpoint are the most restrictive, with just over half (Collyer 2014). (53 per cent each) of countries allowing emigrants the right to vote in some type Refugees have traditionally been among the last of election. Globally, the right to vote is marginalized groups to become enfranchised. predominantly granted for elections at the There is no standard international practice on national level, with more countries allowing promoting the political rights of refugees; there expats to vote for the legislature (33 per cent) are regional variations in resource allocation, than at the presidential level (22 per cent). practice and institutional leadership. For In Oceania, Europe and North America it is example, refugee enfranchisement was written more common to allow emigrants to vote in a into the 1995 General Framework Agreement referendum. Emigrants are rarely granted the for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the right to vote in subnational elections. Only Dayton Agreement), and subsequent 1996 29 countries grant expats this right. This balloting for Bosnia Herzegovina covered practice is most common in Europe refugees in 55 countries, while in Liberia (24 countries) and Oceania (four countries) in 1997 there were no out-of-country (International IDEA Voting from Abroad enfranchisement opportunities or organized Database 2015). repatriation (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew 2007). Nevertheless, refugees and the

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Refugees have international organizations charged with they expect voters will support the incumbent. traditionally been their protection face obstacles to their ability Examples include Turkey and Hungary, where among the last to realize full political participation rights, both President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and marginalized including intimidation, physical obstacles, and Prime Minister Victor Orbán strongly targeted a lack of access to election and civic information emigrant voters in the 2017 and 2014 elections, groups to become pertaining to their home country. In other respectively. enfranchised. cases, refugees’ disenfranchisement may stem There is no from financial, transparency and logistical Nevertheless, there is no clear correlation standard constraints that prevent the electoral authorities between external voting provisions and international from reaching out to the refugee population or countries’ political or socio-economic features. practice on ensuring ballot secrecy and transparency (Grace While the third wave of democratization promoting the and Fischer 2003). has generally spread expatriate suffrage since the 1990s, the evidence is mixed. New political rights of A non-territorial conceptualization of the democracies in South America enfranchised refugees ‘nation’ is one of the reasons countries facilitate emigrants, while African countries did not, expatriate voting, but often extensions of voting often because expatriates supported opposition rights to citizens abroad have occurred in the parties. Countries that have granted voting context of democratic transitions, most notably rights to expatriates include well-established in South America and Southern Europe, democracies as well as emerging or restored where authoritarian governments had caused ones, and even countries that cannot be an exodus of citizens who remained away for classified as democratic (Navarro, Morales and decades and would not immediately return. Gratschew 2007). When political participation in these countries was newly defined, citizens abroad were often Does granting voting rights to emigrants granted full rights. Furthermore, colonial state strengthen democracies in origin countries? traditions affect legislation on external voting in Some argue that it represents a step towards Africa; former French and Portuguese colonies enhanced democracy because it removes have enfranchised expatriate citizens, while residence requirements, while others argue that former British colonies have been reluctant franchise expansion can rupture the long-term to do so. Studies have found a correlation democratization process (Caramani and Grotz between the size and nature of the emigrant 2015). A recent study focused on Europe and population and the extent to which countries the Americas concluded that expatriate voting restrict voting rights for expatriates. The larger rights depend on citizenship of the respective the population abroad, the more political state at the national level, and on residency at elites worry that external voters can influence the local level. This means that there are patterns election results (Caramani and Grotz 2015). of franchise expansion, however they are For this reason, some African states with ‘contained’ by the level at which emigrant voting comparatively large numbers of emigrants, such is permitted (Arrighi and Bauböck 2016). as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Uganda, prohibit it. When the opposition The effects of voting rights on democracies parties in Zimbabwe proposed allowing the depend on many factors, including the socio- diaspora to vote, the Electoral Commission political context and the electoral systems through stated that it was not opposed to the proposal, which these rights are implemented, as well as but lacked ‘funding for the necessary logistical the proportion of citizens among expatriates, and arrangements’ (News24 2016). If migration accessibility and participation rates. involves refugees, external voting rights are granted when their support is needed, often Voter turnout of emigrants following a change of regime. Conversely, some When emigrants are granted voting rights, they governments encourage emigrant voting when have the potential to influence closely fought

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elections. In the 2017 French presidential voters. Emigration voting is costly and reduces Where emigrant election, 2.6 per cent of French nationals the benefits of the act of voting. In addition, voting is living overseas were registered to vote. In the the ease with which emigration voting can permitted, rates first round of the polls, Emmanuel Macron take place influences turnout (Kostelka 2017), of registration won 24 per cent of the vote, while Marine Le such as legislation governing external voting, and turnout are Pen received 21.3 per cent of the vote. Macron or the location of polling stations, ease of won the first round by about 1 million votes, access to information and voter registration usually lower giving the 1.3 million French nationals eligible logistics (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew than they are to vote overseas powerbroker potential (Lui 2007). These factors speak to states’ ability to in country. 2017). Other examples include the close first organize elections and voters’ ability to make However, the size round of the 2016 presidential elections in use of them. In Southern Africa, low literacy of the diaspora Austria, during which Austrian expatriates levels among migrants, poor consular and also affects made up 1 per cent of registered voters. postal facilities, and basic communication emigrant voter While these numbers are low, postal ballots, and transportation infrastructures hinder which include expatriate voters, had the the effectiveness of external voting rights turnout, potential to decide the first round of Austria’s and reduce turnout rates among emigrants as large diasporas presidential elections (The Guardian 2016). (Caramani and Grotz 2015). can motivate During the 2017 Constitutional Referendum political parties to in Turkey, voter turnout of Turkish citizens Although emigrant voting rates are normally mobilize living abroad in countries such as Germany, lower than those of natives due to the costs emigrants Austria, France and the Netherlands increased involved, the size of the diaspora also affects compared to Turkey’s 2014 presidential emigrant voter turnout, as large diasporas can election. In Germany, voter turnout reached motivate political parties to mobilize emigrants. 48.7 per cent among eligible Turkish voters Thus, if the size of the diaspora increases, the (YeniSafak 2017). In Cabo Verde (2006) and emigrant voting rate is likely to rise as well. At Romania (2009), emigrant votes overturned the same time, the overall origin country voter the challenger’s majority in presidential turnout decreases (Kostelka 2017). elections. In Italy (2006), emigrant votes were the decisive factor that led to the centre-left To support democracy, origin country coalition’s defeat of the incumbent government policymakers need to consider the potential of (Turcu and Urbatsch 2015). emigrant political participation in their home countries given general trends of declining Nevertheless, where emigrant voting is voter turnout. permitted, rates of registration and turnout are usually lower than they are in country, Political representation of emigrants such as in Italy, the Philippines, Senegal, Spain in key political institutions and and Sweden. Conversely, in some countries, consultative bodies despite declining numbers of persons voting Most countries (67 per cent) allow and from abroad, the percentage of emigrants facilitate emigrant voting in national elections that actually votes remains high. In Bosnia by assigning votes to an electoral district, and Herzegovina, for example, although the for example from their previous residence absolute number of registered external voters (Navarro, Morales and Gratschew 2007). is dropping as citizens return, their turnout However, only 13 countries have reserved seats has remained at approximately 80 per cent or ‘special representation’ for non-resident since the early 2000s (Navarro, Morales and citizens in their parliaments—Algeria, Angola, Gratschew 2007). Cabo Verde, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Italy, Mozambique, Panama, Portugal, There are some factors that particularly Romania and Tunisia. Angola and Panama, influence low voter turnout among external however, do not implement this legislation

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There is evidence (Sundberg 2007; EUDO Citizenship National financial bridge between these countries and that migration Elections Database 2017). Some argue that Morocco, with Moroccan remittances among to countries with special representation is a good way to include the most important in the world (Cesari higher levels of emigrants because it facilitates their voting but 2013). In 1990, under the patronage of King limits their influence by weighting their votes Hassan II, Morocco created the Foundation female political differently than those of the native population for Moroccans Living Abroad to promote empowerment (Collyer 2014); others argue that such systems economic and cultural cooperation with the increases the violate the principle of treating votes equally diaspora. This foundation, in cooperation share of women (Bauböck 2007). When compared to registered with the International Organization for in parliaments in votes, emigrant votes may count more. At Migration, established an Observatory of origin countries the same time, special representation can the Moroccan Community Living Abroad to contribute to the stability of electoral systems provide information for the government on (Venice Commission 2011). migration management issues. In 2010 the flow of international remittances to Africa was There is evidence that migration to countries USD 18 billion, which represents 5 per cent with higher levels of female political of global remittances (UNDP 2011). Fourteen empowerment increases the share of women other African countries—including Ethiopia, in parliaments in origin countries (Lodigiani Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and Salomone 2012). Women’s diaspora Tanzania and Uganda—have set up diaspora- organizations and activists have played a related institutions and ministries. The African significant role in capacity building and Union Commission has created the African furthering female political empowerment to Citizens Directorate to deal with overarching increase women’s political participation in issues in the relationship between overseas their home countries. Examples include the diaspora and origin-country governments successful advocacy efforts of the South Sudan (Mohamoud 2009). Women’s Empowerment Network created by US-based Sudanese migrants and the Liberian Another example is the work of the Program peace activist Leymah Roberta Gbowee. for Mexican Communities Abroad (PCME) (Gutierrez 1997, 1999). The PCME was Most countries do not allow emigrants to established in 1990 to increase communication vote in mayoral or local council elections. between US citizens of Mexican origin, resident Exceptions include Australia, Austria, Canada, non-citizen Mexicans and the government Cyprus, Italy, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand of Mexico; promote Mexican identity and and Uruguay, although local non-resident group cohesion among Mexicans living in the citizen voting rights are among those tied to USA; and strengthen the Mexican community additional varying residence requirements, a abroad as a political agent in the USA. As a requirement to return to the origin country to result, the Mexican community in the USA vote or civil servant status (EUDO Citizenship has become more cohesive and active in the Database 2015). last decade (DeSipio 1996). Migrants in the USA have mobilized around the same issues as Many origin countries wish to retain ties to those of the PCME, especially since 1994, and their citizens abroad, given that they can be have responded to issues in Mexico, including a valuable source of remittances or political policies related to dual citizenship, and the influence in the destination country (Itzigsohn right to vote in Mexican elections from abroad 2000; Bauböck 2003). At the same time, many (DeSipio 1996). origin countries want to retain some political control over the diaspora. For instance, the India connects with its diaspora communities Moroccan diaspora is dispersed to more than through annual meetings such as the Pravasi 100 countries and has developed a robust Bharatya Divas, which marks the contribution

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of the diaspora to India’s development and is (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Russia, sponsored by the Ministry of External Affairs Saudi Arabia, Spain, United Arab Emirates, of the government of India, the Federation of UK and USA), opinions about migration are Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, divided (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2015). In Confederation of Indian Industry, and the seven of these countries (Australia, Canada, Ministry of Development of the North Eastern France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, the United Region of India. Arab Emirates and the USA), majorities believe immigration should be increased or Armenia, which has one of the largest stay the same, while more than half of the diaspora communities (7.5 million diaspora respondents in the remaining three (Russia, population, versus 2.5 million living in Spain and the UK) say immigration levels Armenia) spread over more than 100 should decrease. In Europe, people have countries, has an established model policy more negative attitudes towards migration system coordinated by the Ministry of compared to other world regions, although Diaspora. Mechanisms include the ‘Hayastan’ there are marked differences in attitudes All-Armenian Fund, headed by the president between countries. People under 44 are more of the republic, which coordinates the aware of immigration and more likely to diaspora’s financial assistance to Armenia. favour increasing immigration levels: about Once every three years the ministry organizes one in four (24 per cent) favour increasing the Armenia-Diaspora Conferences to discuss immigration levels, compared to 17 per issues of national concern (President of the cent of those aged 65 and older. This ‘youth Republic of Armenia n.d.) effect’ exists in most receiving regions and countries, except Russia (Esipova, Ray and 7.5. The migration debate: dilemmas Pugliese 2015; IOM 2015a). According to for policymakers data from the Gallup World Poll from more Migration is a controversial topic that poses than 140 countries between 2012 and 2014, fundamental and difficult dilemmas for younger and more-educated people tend policymakers in democratic institutions. It has to view migration more favourably, with become increasingly politicized, as it involves the exception of Russia (Esipova, Ray and a country’s national identity and therefore Pugliese 2015), where government policy evokes nationalist sentiments, which are aimed to increase immigration, despite 70 combined with political parties’ tendencies to per cent of survey respondents saying they define their identity by taking tough stances desired lower levels. Poorer and less-educated towards migration and multiculturalism people generally tend to have more negative (Kivisto 2002). Migration can raise economic views about immigration than younger, well- concerns, as particularly during times of educated, financially secure and ethnically relatively high unemployment, citizens may mixed people (Ford 2012). A comparison see immigrants as unfairly obtaining scarce of attitudes in four Asian countries found social benefits, or competing with natives greater public knowledge and high levels of for jobs. Lastly, migration has increased tolerance of migrant workers in the Republic citizens’ worries about security and safety, of Korea and Singapore than in Malaysia and especially when immigrants are alleged to be Thailand. The former two offer jobs with perpetrators of (or to have links to) terrorism. higher pay and prestige to citizens, while All three of these factors—security, culture, in the latter two citizens are more likely and social welfare or jobs—shape attitudes to work alongside immigrants in manual towards migrants. labour; Malaysia and Thailand have longer land borders and are thus more accessible According to 2015 World Gallup poll data, in to unauthorized immigrants (Tunon and the top ten migration destination countries Baruah 2012).

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Attitudes towards migration

Top ten migration destination countries

The top 10 migration countries are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In seven of these countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the USA) the majority believe that immigration should be increased or stay the same.

In Russia, Spain and the UK, more than half say immigration levels should decrease.

Majorities believe immigration Majorities believe immigration should be increased or stay the same levels should decrease Sources of data: World Gallup Poll Data (2015)

Negative attitudes Attitudes towards migration In Europe, people have more negative attitudes Poorer and less-educated people generally tend towards migration compared to other world to have more negative views about immigration regions, although there are marked di†erences than younger, well-educated, “nancially secure in attitudes between countries. and ethnically mixed people. Sources of data: Esipova et al. (2015) Sources of data: Ford (2012)

<  YEARS The youth e ect >  YEARS

People under 44 are more aware of immigration and more likely to 24% favour increasing immigration levels: 17% favour about one in four (24 per cent) favour favour increasing increasing immigration levels, increasing immigration compared to 17 per cent of those immigration aged 65 and older. This ‘youth e†ect’ exists in most receiving regions and countries, except Russia. Globally, younger and more-educated people tend to view migration more favourably and, except in Russia, government policy reflects public attitudes towards migration. Sources of data: Esipova, Ray and Pugliese (2015); IOM (2015a) & Esipova, Ray and Pugliese (2015)

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Hostility towards immigrants and anti- become an easy target of public scapegoating. Hostility immigrant discourse tend to increase ahead of In both absolute and percentage terms, very towards elections. For example, nearly 46 per cent of news few immigrants have perpetrated terror attacks immigrants and articles, from both tabloids and broadsheets, in Europe or North America, compared to anti-immigrant framed migration as a threat and migrants those committed by native-born citizens discourse tend as actual or potential ‘villains’ in the months (Belgioisio 2017). leading up to the 2015 general election in the to increase UK (Crawley, McMahon and Jones 2016) and In response to public concerns, many countries ahead of the 2017 presidential election in France. This are increasing their border control capacities elections risks a feedback loop in which politicians— and have stepped up their security screening of such as US President Donald Trump—use refugees admitted via asylum or resettlement anti-immigrant rhetoric to drum up hostility programmes. In contrast to their counterparts (often with the help of some media outlets) and in Europe and the USA, South American gain votes. Once elected, they use their office to politicians and civil servants stress the further institutionalize this hostility. Whitaker inefficacy of restrictive responses to migration and Giersch (2015) analysed attitudes and the universality of migrants’ rights towards immigration in 11 African states, based on the principles of support for open and found that ‘opposition to immigration borders, an understanding of migration as a is more likely in more democratic countries fundamental right and the non-criminalization in Africa which have high immigration rates of irregular migration (Acosta 2016). and are more ethnically diverse, in countries Argentina’s 2004 Migration Law and Ecuador’s with dominant party systems, and when 2008 Constitution go so far as to stipulate a individuals are surveyed close to a national ‘human right to migrate’ (Aracazo and Freier election’. Threats to the smooth functioning 2015). However it must be noted that these of democratic institutions and processes countries are migrant-origin countries and not arise out of political and social polarization, traditional migrant-destination countries. securitization, exclusion, and marginalization In Argentina, cultural perceptions and or discrimination by narrowly defining ‘the underlying power structures effectively limit nation’. Media coverage of migration also the political integration of immigrants. influences national and local voting behaviour. In many destination countries, public concerns In some countries, arguments against and attitudes towards migration significantly admitting immigrants focus on the need influence government policies, party agendas to preserve the national culture. Concerns and electoral campaigns. Native populations over cultural threats rarely address the fact react negatively to an influx of immigrants that some states thrive when embracing through anti-immigrant protests, vigilante multiculturalism as a basic principle, as is groups and mainstream parties’ adoption the case with Canada and Australia. Other of restrictive policies. For example, the states, such as France and Germany, instead immigration ban ordered by US President espouse integration based on assimilation and Trump in January 2017 attempted to bar equality. Countries with lower population Syrian refugees indefinitely and to block entry densities, such as Australia, Canada and the into the USA for 90 days for citizens of seven USA, that place greater emphasis on openness predominantly Muslim countries: Iran, Iraq, to (and the integration of) newcomers appear Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. to be able to develop resilience and the ability to absorb more immigrants as a proportion The rise of terrorist organizations claiming to of total inhabitants (Alsenia, Harnoss and be motivated by Islamic beliefs has contributed Rapoport 2013; Legrain 2006; IOM 2004). to Islamophobia in many countries; migrants Box 7.11 discusses South Africa’s approach to and refugees, particularly Muslims, often asylum seekers.

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BOX 7.11

South Africa’s migration management efforts some politicians have aligned with their native-born constituents and against immigrants. For example, in December 2016 the mayor of South Africa, a multicultural society with progressive asylum laws, Johannesburg categorized all irregular immigrants as ‘criminals’ who received the highest number of asylum applications in the world would not be tolerated. In addition, he stated that once in power, between 2006 and 2012. Its generous refugee admission policy, his Democratic Alliance Party would make sure that immigrants could coupled with inefficient implementation and a lack of legal channels not enter the country without permission (Mashengo and Malefane for economic migrants, led asylum seekers to remain in the country 2016). While not explicitly linking his remarks to the mayor’s, the for years with work permits but without a resolution of their asylum home affairs minister assured the public that the new Border claims (Iams Wellman and Landau 2015). A 2016 green paper that Management Agency aimed to prevent irregular entry, rather than presented the government’s strategy for integrating the newly keep foreigners out (Herman 2016). In 2008 and 2015 South Africa established Border Management Agency into an overall migration experienced xenophobic violence, with a wave of lootings, killings management plan cited the EU’s Dublin system as a model regional and displacement (Iams Wellman and Landau 2015). Violence broke approach to assigning responsibilities for refugees (Department of out during an anti-immigrant march in Pretoria in February 2017; the Home Affairs of the Republic of South Africa 2016). Notwithstanding next month a civil society coalition (the Coalition of Civics Against this initiative, there have been ongoing controversies related to Xenophobia) staged a peaceful countermarch (Mohapi 2017; De political attitudes towards immigration in 2017. Villiers 2017). The organizers stated that, with the support of local residents, as well as immigrants, embassies and neighbouring Although the government’s efforts have sought to manage migration countries, the march was the start of a series of civil society events while maintaining South Africa’s high standards of human rights, to combat xenophobia (Sakhile 2017).

FIGURE 7.5

Attitudes towards immigration in South Africa, 2015

How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Managing immigration?

Very/Fairly Well Don't Know/Haven't Heard Very/Fairly Badly

27% 6% 68%

Attitudes Towards Immigration in South Africa (SA)

Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree/DK Disagree

Immigration policies should favour exceptionally skilled foreigners/ 51% 20% 29% foreign investors

Foreigners should not be allowed to live in SA because they take jobs 42% 17% 42% and bene‹ts

Politically persecuted foreigners deserve protection in SA 43% 15% 41%

Notes: The Afrobarometer in South Africa measures attitudes for South African citizens over the age of 18. Fielding occurred from 13 August to 21 September 2015 with the survey being available in SeSotho, SePedi, Afrikaans, SeTswana, Tshivenda, Xhosa, Zulu and English. n = 2,400, MoE +/- 3%.

Source: Afrobarometer Data, South Africa, Round 6, 2015, .

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Public attitudes towards immigration in cost child care, for example, enables parents People’s attitudes South Africa in 2015 show an almost even to join the labour force (UNDP 2009: 85). towards split of positive and negative attitudes towards Studies of Thailand and Hong Kong found that immigration are migration. An overall majority of the public even large increases in immigration have very not necessarily believe that the government is managing little effect on overall wages or employment. related to their migration unsatisfactorily. While International IDEA’s GSoD indices data show that South Similarly, the net fiscal effects of migration are perceptions Africa’s scores on representative government, not large—an estimated +/- 1 per cent of GDP of their country’s fundamental rights, checks on government (UNDP 2009: 88). While some immigrants, economic and impartial administration have remained particularly refugees, require short-term public conditions relatively stable since the end of apartheid in support in the form of housing, health care, 1995, impartial administration and checks on education and administrative processing, there government have seen a decline since 2008 is no conclusive evidence that, on average, and 2011, respectively. either refugees or voluntary migrants consume more in social services than they pay in taxes. People’s attitudes towards immigration are Initial costs include administrative overheads not necessarily related to their perceptions and integration programmes. First-generation of their country’s economic conditions. economic migrants and refugees who are not According to 2015 Gallup World polling data, admitted into immigration programmes tend adults who live in countries with the highest to need support, while subsequent generations unemployment rates are the most negative become significant net contributors to the towards immigration. Nearly half of adults in public treasury if they are well integrated into countries with unemployment rates over 15 the labour market. Since many of the initial per cent believe immigration should decrease. costs fall on local authorities, undercounting of However, in several countries in Africa and elsewhere around the world, there is no (or FIGURE 7.6 very little) difference in attitudes towards immigration based on the state of the national South Africa—attributes of democracy economy, such as Bangladesh, Belgium, Iraq,

Israel, Jordan, Malta, the Philippines, the 1.0 Republic of Korea, Uzbekistan and Venezuela 0.9 (Esipova, Ray and Pugliese 2015). 0.8

0.7 Economic concerns over immigration often 0.6 focus on immigrants taking scarce jobs or 0.5 requiring public support. However, it is 0.4 not clear that such concerns are warranted. Assuming that jobs occupied by immigrants 0.3 would otherwise go to natives depends on 0.2 the ‘lump of labour fallacy’—the idea that an 0.1 economy contains a fixed number of jobs and 0.0 that workers are interchangeable from one job to 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 the next. Empirical studies show that increased Representative Government Fundamental Rights immigration has only small net effects on Checks on Government Impartial Administration overall employment and wages. The relative mix Notes: This graph shows the changes in trends in South Africa for Representative Government, Fundamental of skills in the immigrant versus native labour Rights, Checks on Government and Impartial Administration. The y-axis shows the score and the x-axis the years. Scores in the y-axis range from 0 to 1. Higher scores indicate a higher performance on a given attribute. forces is a key factor. In Europe, low-skilled Source: GSoD indices 2017 (Representative Government Index, Fundamental Rights Index, Checks on Government migrant labour tends to increase opportunities Index, Impartial Administration Index). for local workers, since the availability of low-

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migrants and unexpected migration flows can Former British Prime Minister David result in fiscal shortages in countries where local Cameron questioned the UK’s longstanding spending is supported centrally on a per capita policy of multiculturalism in 2010–11, basis (UNDP 2009: 88). Some highly skilled arguing that some young British Muslims or entrepreneurial immigrants create enough were drawn to violent ideology because they wealth through tax contributions, spending found no strong collective identity in Britain their own income, or creating new jobs and (Green and Staerklé 2013; UNHCR 2015). establishing businesses—such as Google, Yahoo and Tesla—to produce significant The virulent French debate on headscarves economic gains for native citizens. States exemplifies the fear that immigrants threaten with well-developed immigration systems can national values that pervades the public expect per-immigrant costs to remain steady, discourse in many countries. The terrorist even as the number of immigrants increases; attacks in New York and Washington, DC Canada and Sweden appear to be successful in in 2001; in Madrid and London in 2005; this regard (Bonin et al. 2008). However, a lack in Brussels and France in 2015; the Boko of comparable data hampers efforts to perform Haram attacks in Nigeria; Al-Shabab attacks cost–benefit analyses of the economic impacts in Kenya in 2015; and Islamic State attacks of migration (Bonin et al. 2008). in Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Yemen in 2015 (Alpert 2015) have led to calls for increased Policymakers and political leaders—such immigration and border control, and fuelled as US President Trump—have reacted to backlashes and retaliatory violence against concerns about immigration by proposing immigrants. solutions such as building walls to keep migrants out, or externalizing borders and Many countries that used to have a strong establishing camps in third countries. Some policy emphasis on multiculturalism, such countries, notably Czechia, Hungary and as Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden, Poland, have refused to admit refugees in line have shifted to requiring more ‘adaptation’, with agreed EU quotas. Hungary has enacted ‘sharing of values’ and ‘integration’ from particularly restrictive policies towards immigrants, often under pressure from rising asylum seekers, including the establishment far right parties. Other European countries of refugee camps against the background of that had once considered multiculturalism a particularly nationalistic anti-immigrant are now adopting coercive ‘civic integration’ stance taken by its leadership. policies, such as Austria and Germany (Green and Staerklé 2013; Joppke 2007). Conversely, Other countries have adopted multiculturalist in Canada, multicultural immigrant policies integration policies with regard to migration, have made the political process more inclusive such as Australia, Canada and Sweden. Other (Kymlicka 2010a), and united immigrants examples of pluralistic societies include and minorities to identify with, and feel pride India, the UK and the USA (Buzzle n.d.). Yet in, their new country. multiculturalism has increasingly come under pressure (Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul Policy implications: approaches to 2008) and there has been a growing global migration challenges backlash against multiculturalism in public Migration policies must be based on the rule opinion, political discourse, immigration of law and equal access to justice, particularly policy and political theory (Castles and Miller ensuring access to impartial assessments of 2009). In 2010–11, German Chancellor asylum claims. Legitimate and democratic Angela Merkel stated that ‘multiculturalism governments have the right to make the laws has utterly failed’, with ‘immigrants needing and rules that govern immigration as well as to do more to integrate in German society’. to enforce them. Even a restrictive immigration

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policy that limits entry can be implemented To respond to migration effectively, host Even a restrictive in accordance with the rule of law and other country governments should enforce immigration democratic principles if the country does so immigration policy and rules through policy that limits fairly, transparently and in compliance with competent institutions and based on accurate entry can be human rights norms. data. Many countries struggle to equip their implemented national and local institutions with the Democratic dialogue can help promote tolerance necessary resources, and to enact a legislative in accordance of immigrants and counter inaccurate public framework and guidance on competencies to with the rule of beliefs about immigration, as well as enhance the ensure that migration policy can be enforced law and other legitimacy of government policies. In Argentina, fairly and in line with human rights and democratic immigration is recognized as a fundamental right democratic principles. To ensure safe and principles if in the Constitution, while the federal immigration orderly migration, government institutions the country law guarantees immigrants equal treatment, non- and agencies need to provide clear and does so fairly, discrimination, and access to educational, medical accessible information regarding immigration and social services (Hines 2010). laws and policies, as well as reliable and publicly transparently and The constructive involvement of immigrant available data about migration flows (EIU in compliance and host communities in the planning and 2016). This will facilitate a better-informed with human implementation of public policies can help measurement of the impact of migration rights norms engage citizens and improve decision-makers’ on countries. Such data can form the basis understanding of communities’ needs. In of a public debate to set realistic priorities addition, dialogue platforms and participatory regarding migration policy. In addition, policymaking contribute to building social governments should invest in research on the cohesion and trust among immigrant and host nexus between migration and democracy. communities, as they are both offered the space to interact and understand each other’s views and Learning from local initiatives concerns. The inclusion of less-skilled and less- Many cities are forming partnerships between educated migrants is important in this regard. migrants, local governments and civil society to manage migration by increasing mobility Creating opportunities for people to meet and social diversity. Except for citizenship and interact in common spaces—such acquisition, the inclusion of migrants is as workplaces, political parties, schools, facilitated locally, including provision of neighbourhood facilities and public transport language courses, civic education, access to systems—can help create a collective national health services and ensuring public safety. identity, while respecting the diversity of National governments can strengthen their group identities. Public institutions and capacity to deal with migration by learning governments have an important role to play in from successful local examples. creating such spaces that are sensitive to (and promote) diversity (Buzzelli 2001; Hansen Forming social networks within cities furthers and Pikkov 2008; Wong 2010). Similarly, migrants’ integration and helps build resilient and programmes that foster partnerships and democratically inclusive societies. Cities today link social and civic engagement can contribute local urban social cohesion to economic growth to building social capital in and across and global competitiveness (Schwedler 2011). communities; governments may consider The participation and inclusion of migrants providing public funding to such initiatives in their host cities is an indispensable part of (Hyman, Meinhard and Shields 2011). Since building stable, open and vibrant communities cities and municipalities can play a significant (IOM 2015b). Cities have a key role to play in role in fostering social cohesion, governments community building and in supporting social, can particularly learn from local-level cultural, economic and political participation at engagements. the local government level.

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National Local governments influence social capital every child—regardless of their legal status— governments can indirectly through policies and programmes the right to go to school and to provide access strengthen their designed to increase social inclusion, such as to public services for all people. These laws capacity to deal transportation and recreational services, and were passed years ahead of the national 2004 to create common spaces. Local governments Immigration Law, but needed the national law with migration should thus work to strengthen community to facilitate implementation (IOM 2015b). by learning organizations that represent the interests from successful of diverse communities (Saloojee 2005; Decisions that influence migrants and refugees local examples. Richmond and Saloojee 2005; Hyman, are often taken by local governments, civil Forming social Meinhard and Shields 2011). For example, society and the private sector. Enabling migrant networks within several US cities guarantee equal access to participation in public decision-making processes cities furthers all types of services for immigrants and during planning processes can contribute to natives, while in Canada cities implement enhancing their skills, access to services and migrants’ a strict policy of non-discrimination and a sense of community. For example, the US integration and inclusion (Sisk 2001). Canada’s approach to city of Portland, Oregon, practices inclusive helps build multiculturalism is discussed in more detail in neighbourhood-level development planning, resilient and Box 7.12. while Amsterdam promotes heterogeneous democratically neighbourhoods as a way of achieving social and inclusive societies Some cities in Europe (such as Athens, Berlin, economic inclusion (Bosswick, Lüken-Klaßen Bilbao and Dublin) and Asia (Fuzhou in China, and Heckmann 2007). as well as Singapore and a network of cities in Japan) are forming institutional structures 7.6. Conclusions and with the support of national authorities to recommendations: managing harness the diverse interests of migrants and migration democratically further inclusive cooperation. Berlin, Dublin Given the transnational nature of migration, and Lille are establishing partnerships with effective policy approaches to maintaining a migrant associations to promote citizenship and resilient democratic system must be designed political participation among migrant groups. around long-term goals that combine national Participatory budgeting (i.e. community and local approaches with cooperation in members directly deciding how to spend regional and global governance structures. In part of the public budget) is being used to this way, policy approaches to migration will finance municipal inclusion policies in over consider its non-territorial implications for 1,700 local governments in more than 40 national politics. countries, especially low-income countries where municipal budgets remain low despite One of the key approaches to tackling decentralization (IOM 2015b). the migration challenge is to address the disconnect and reduced trust between citizens Therefore neighbourhood and community and political institutions and governments, in councils, along with e-democracy and order to encourage public attitudes towards participatory budgeting, enable local authorities immigration to lead to better governance. to consolidate civil engagement. Urban inclusion policies often take a more pragmatic To maximize the benefits of migration, the approach than migration governance at the naturalization of resident non-citizens can national level by promoting the positive impacts be facilitated by reducing the administrative of differences on competitiveness and social burden and time required to obtain cohesion, and creating initiatives to fill gaps in citizenship. In the period before immigrants central governance and policies on migration. become citizens, migrants’ integration and For example in Buenos Aires, Argentina, sense of belonging can be enhanced with the legislation was drafted with the aim of giving support of civil society and local community-

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BOX 7.12

Factors of success and their impact on democracy: and ethnic and religious minorities into the country (Kymlicka 1998, Canada’s multicultural immigration policy 2010b; Banting, Courchene and Seidie 2006; Bloemraad 2006). Immigrants and native-born Canadians mutually identify and accept each other to a high degree, with a strong probability that immigrants Canada is the only country in the world that enshrines multiculturalism to Canada will acquire citizenship. Intermarriage and proficiency in in its constitution, which gives this policy a high degree of legal Canada’s official languages is common in Canada. The probability that security, making it more difficult to rescind. Since 1971 it has pursued Canadian immigrants will vote, join a political party or seek political a multicultural immigration policy that encourages a vision of Canada office is higher than for immigrants to the USA, Europe or Australia based on the values of equality and mutual respect with regard to race, (Kymlicka 1998; Howe 2007). There are more foreign-born citizens and national or ethnic origin, colour and religion. One of its key objectives is Canadian-born minorities elected to Parliament in Canada than in other to promote the full and equitable participation of migrants and to remove Western countries, both in absolute numbers and in proportion to their barriers to such participation. In 2016, Canada took in approximately percentage of the population (Adams 2007). 300,000 migrants, of whom 48,000 were refugees. Annual immigration accounts for roughly 1 per cent of the country’s current population of 36 million (Foran 2017). Since 2006, Canada has naturalized over 1.5 million Immigrants to Canada, regardless of their religious affiliation, new citizens (Huddleston et al. 2015). Cities such as Vancouver, Calgary, increasingly share the country’s liberal-democratic norms, including Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal are some of the most diverse in the world. the protection of homosexual and women’s rights (Soroka, Johnston and Banting 2007). According to a survey conducted by Focus Canada The Canadian population supports immigration and wants migrants in 2006, 83 per cent of Canadians agree that Muslims make a positive to become citizens; approximately 85 per cent eventually do (Foran contribution to Canada (Adams 2009), suggesting that the country 2017). Canada’s migration policy has its critics, who maintain that has been less affected by the global surge in anti-Muslim sentiments multiculturalism threatens national cohesion and contributes to and the resulting polarization of ethnic relations experienced in many ghettoization (Bissoondath 2002; Wong 2010). Others argue that ‘as European countries (Kymlicka 2010b). is the case in England, France, and other democracies, national unity in Canada is increasingly threatened by the growing atomization of While Canada does not grant national or local voting rights to our society along ethnic lines’ (Gregg 2006; Bennett-Jones 2005). The immigrants before they become citizens, it does encourage immigrants Conservative Party has called for the deployment of Canada’s army to participate in civic life and, before becoming citizens, to actively to detain potential refugees from crossing the border and for a new engage with civil society to develop lasting relationships in their law to prevent asylum seekers from being eligible for refugee status communities. Canada is one of the few major destination countries that determination hearings if they cross the border illegally (Freeman 2017). does not have established immigrant-led consultation bodies. However, when immigrants arrive, they do so as permanent residents and quickly In contrast to countries that are pursuing, or have introduced, ever more become full citizens. The Canadian model of integration is thus based restrictive immigration policies in the last five years, particularly in on the assumption that all immigrants can (and will) rapidly become the wake of the rise of populist parties, Canada deliberately strives to citizens after 3–4 years, spending their first years in the country focused keep its borders open. In 2015, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on employment and settlement. According to 2011 data, 92 per cent of highlighted this longstanding policy as ‘Canada’s strength’ because it immigrants became citizens after 10+ years in Canada (OECD 2014). is not taken for granted, and is based on shared fundamental human This is one of the highest naturalization rates in the world, alongside rights values and policies that aim to balance individual and collective Australia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and most Nordic countries identity, as well as on economic policies that benefit Canada’s middle (Huddleston et al. 2015; MIPEX 2015). Canada’s traditionally quick and class (Trudeau 2015). He even went so far as to refer to Canada as the clear path to citizenship is the strongest factor explaining its integration ‘first post-national state’, declaring that ‘there is no core identity, no success (Huddleston et al. 2015). Recently, however, it has become more mainstream in Canada’ (Trudeau 2015). restrictive: permanent residents face longer waiting periods to become naturalized, and there are increased restrictions and documentation Besides having a strong political leadership that realistically burdens to attain citizenship, reunite dependent family members and acknowledges the challenges of migration and works to implement secure equal residence (Huddleston et al. 2015). a bold multicultural migration policy, why has Canada’s migration policy worked, and how has it strengthened its democracy? History, Canada nevertheless leads the developed world in promoting rapid geopolitics and its history as a heterogeneous country arguably play a labour market integration, non-discrimination and a common sense role in this success, as well as the fact that its ‘open border’ policy is of belonging. Immigrants and citizens generally enjoy the same subject to border control and passport checks. The country’s history as access, social rights and strong discrimination protections in a flexible an immigration country may have favourably influenced public opinion labour market. Both low- and high-educated newcomers benefit from about the benefits and usefulness of migration. In addition, Canadians increasing funds for settlement services, long-term language support, seem to interpret ‘nationhood’ dynamically, based on a sense of and bridging and recognition procedures, depending on their economic identity that encourages pluralism and embraces a diverse population sector and province. Federal and provincial support for cultural diversity (Foran 2017). encourages immigrants to identify with Canada and contribute to civil society, while helping society understand and respond to newcomers’ Canada’s multiculturalist policy has had diverse effects on its democracy specific needs related to the labour market, adult education, schools, and social cohesion. It has helped successfully integrate immigrants the health system or the local community (Huddleston et al. 2015).

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Democratic based initiatives. As the Canadian example helping to create the conditions for strong institutions demonstrates, this can lead to a high level and resilient democracies. Governments should thus of naturalization without necessitating an need to consider state capacities in relation consider policies interim step of voting rights for non-citizens. to migration policymaking, and countries Enfranchising resident non-citizen migrants with high immigration rates and immigrant- that empower is a possible (albeit controversial) approach to friendly policies must work to reduce the migrants to increasing their political participation, but it potential backlash from citizens who have decide how they sets a high political benchmark. Democratic negative perceptions of immigration by participate in institutions should thus consider policies engaging in fact-based debates. In this way, public life, rather that empower migrants to decide how they government institutions will be more capable than participate in public life, rather than defining of providing quality services and integrating defining policies policies based on citizenship-as-nationality migrants, which will strengthen the or franchise-without-nationality models. accountability of political institutions with based on To strengthen democracy, especially in regard to voters who may have concerns about citizenship-as- countries with high or increasing proportions the government’s ability to manage migration, nationality of migrants, policymakers should consider in line with the notion that ‘democracy should or franchise- granting voting rights—particularly at the deliver’. without- local level—as a pathway to easier citizenship. nationality This would better promote respect for Political parties in destination countries models individuals’ choices than an approach that need to consider inclusive measures to enable focuses on groups or ethnic nations. effective migrant political participation and engage in fact-based political dialogue on Origin countries may enjoy a democratic migration with the entire voting population. dividend from emigration: migrants can A party’s agenda and views on migration— serve as agents of democracy who diffuse regardless of where it stands on the political democratic norms; returnees may increase spectrum—influence whether immigrants demands for government accountability, help are represented in political party structures, enhance the country’s electoral and political whether they can stand for election and participation, and form new political parties. whether they have a realistic chance of winning In addition to considering granting voting due to their ranking on a party’s candidate list. rights to expatriates, origin countries should empower returning migrants to engage Political parties that have migrant-friendly politically in their countries, and should policies can thus consider making party consult with their diaspora communities on statutes, electoral platforms and candidate lists migration issues to encourage them to act as more inclusive, and can engage migrants with goodwill ambassadors in destination countries a view to strengthening their representative and to invest in the development of their base. They can also incorporate migrants’ views home countries, potentially enhancing social in order to develop migration policies that cohesion and cultural understanding. Origin benefit the country. Since political parties are countries should thus accept other types of potential holders of legislative and governing political participation and advocacy from powers, they play a key role in encouraging their diaspora, for example through migrant immigrants to participate politically, to enable associations or formal consultative bodies, them to become agents of democracy and and provide them with the space to articulate sustain social cohesion (Dähnke et al. 2014: their interests and views. 12–13).

Migration can be tackled through multicultural To effectively address the challenge posed by policies that favour the inclusion of migrants migration to democracy and to strengthen and provide political benefits to societies by democratic institutions, the following

236 International IDEA Chapter 7 First Edition 2017 Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism

recommendations are put forward to • Empower returning migrants to engage Political parties governments, parties and supranational politically and in dialogue and consultation in destination institutions. on migration issues with their diaspora countries need to communities. Encourage them to act consider inclusive National and local governments as goodwill ambassadors in destination measures to • Invest in data collection on the nexus countries and invest in the development of between migration and democracy, including their home countries. enable effective migration flows and the factors that migrant political influence the positive and negative impacts Political parties participation and of migration to maximize the benefits. Such • Engage in fact-based democratic dialogue on engage in fact- data should form the basis of a migration migration to promote tolerance of migrants based political policy debate with the public to set realistic and to counter inaccurate public beliefs, dialogue on priorities and objectives. knowledge and behaviour about migration. migration with • Design migration policies to focus on • Political party statutes, electoral platforms and changing public perceptions of migration candidate lists should be inclusive and engage the entire voting and encourage political accountability migrants to strengthen their representative population by making decision-making processes base, including by creating equal conditions more accessible to migrants and more for migrants within their internal structures transparent to the public, including by to influence political party programmes clarifying objectives of public consultation and policies and their contribution to an on migration policies. Migration policies effective migration policy. This can be should focus on ensuring that ‘democracy done by adopting measures that facilitate delivers’ to increase public confidence in the entry of migrants, and particularly governments’ ability to manage migration. women migrants, into political forums, • Taking each country’s circumstances into through targeted recruitment, training and account, facilitate the naturalization of coaching. immigrants and consider granting local • Take a long-term view when defining party voting rights as a pathway to integration strategies to strengthen parties’ credibility and easier citizenship for immigrants. This with voters, and expand the party base to would promote respect for individuals’ be inclusive and more representative of the choices rather than focusing policies on population. groups or ethnic nations. • Engage civil society actors to help integrate Global and regional governance systems immigrants at the national and local levels • Regional organizations, national and local by harnessing civil society expertise and governments, and civil society organizations advocacy skills, building on evidence and should work together to define and meet the data that identifies participation gaps to goals, targets and indicators of the 2030 increase migrants’ political participation Agenda for Sustainable Development, and promote cultural understanding, particularly Goal 16, to promote peaceful particularly in local communities. and inclusive societies for sustainable • Consider the potential of emigrant development. Greater attention should voting rights and facilitate their political be paid to the role that cities and participation in origin countries by learning municipal authorities can play in effective from successful diaspora women’s civil migration governance, and to the political society initiatives, ensuring good access representation of migrants. to information for emigrant voters, • Cooperate in regional and international facilitating voter registration and engaging organizations to define policies that in dialogue with host countries to avoid equitably share the responsibilities for political controversy. migration and refugee protection, and

237 Chapter 7 The Global State of Democracy 2017 Migration, social polarization, citizenship and multiculturalism Exploring Democracy’s Resilience

uphold related international law such as the mutual benefits of migrantsto improve the Global Compact on Migrants and cultural understanding, promote tolerance Refugees. and integration, and facilitate the political • Enhance the governance of international participation of migrants in both origin migration through greater regional and destination countries. consultation and cooperation and more • International and regional consultative effective dialogue between governments processes on migration should strengthen their and global international organizations engagement with civil society, particularly focused on key policy issues such as the migrant associations, to promote migrant linkages between migration and democracy, integration and participation rather than development, security, human rights and migration control. These processes should trade. include representatives of academia, • Expand cooperation mechanisms such as foundations and the private sector. advisory or consultative bodies to reinforce

238 International IDEA Chapter 7 First Edition 2017 References

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