The G20 and Regional Dynamics
Andrew F. Cooper Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
In many of the original conceptualizations of the G20, regional bodies were viewed as being complementary to the ‘hub’ model for this mode of summitry at the leaders’ level.
This positive image was strengthened by the presence within the G20 of key regional drivers. All members of NAFTA were included, each of the EU4, plus Japan and the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China). Additional space was made available for Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Australia, Indonesia, South Korea, and Australia, making the forum global in its reach. On an individual basis this structure allowed a presence by a number of regional and/or global middle powers.
Such a diverse membership also opened the way for connections of different forms with a wide number of regional organizations – the African Union and ASEAN as well as MERCOSUR, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). To give just one example of how this connection was made at the declaratory language, Saudi Arabia defended its position in the G20 by reference to its leadership position in the Middle East but in the GCC (see Zawya, 2009).
Since the advent of the G20, however, it has been the variance between the manner by which connections between the ‘hub’ forum and the regional dynamics – and the degree of contestation – that has stood out. Regional summits have entered into these dynamics in a number of ways. Significantly some have been used to champion alternative designs for the G20. Greater inclusion has been called for either on an individual basis or in terms of a privileged status for a regional organization.
Equally, though, regional summits or regional dynamics more generally have come to the fore as motors for new forms of new cooperative practices within the context of the G20. These innovations are not only significant in themselves but lend themselves as platforms for spillover activities in other regional machinery.
In either case, a messy design is animated, in which regional dynamics act as both a critic and a catalyst for the G20. Looking through the critical lens, it must be acknowledged that a good deal of the criticism has had minimal impact on the workings of the G20. That is to say, specific proposals are made at the regional level that have not made any difference in the way that the G20 has proceeded either in terms of a refinement of the G20’s machinery or in terms of its agenda.
A number of cases can be used to illustrate this point. The first is the critique from the Caribbean through the 15 member CARICOM, that the G20 has unfairly targeted the economic practices of that community. The most obvious area of tension is in the area of OFCs or tax havens. Nonetheless, there are also concerns on issues such as airline taxes that could be detrimental to the tourism industry (see Fletcher, 2009). Yet, notwithstanding any impact on the G20’s image, these critiques to some degree enhanced its legitimacy. Rather than actively resisting the G20’s mandate, Jamaica – the biggest country in CARICOM – sought entry (not distance) from the process. In so doing it teamed up, not with countries such as Venezuela or Bolivia in the UN General Assembly (sometimes called the ‘G192’), but countries in the Global Governance Group (or 3G) coalition led by Singapore. While reform was pushed, inclusion rather than transformation has been its goal.
A second similar source of criticism came from countries that can be considered to be in the middle power category but were not accorded membership. Norway’s position stands out here. Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre proposed that the members of the Nordic Council – Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland – could share a rotating seat together with the Baltic States. Extending this line of thought, the suggestion was also made that similar arrangements could also be made for other under-represented groups, such as African and Arab countries (Norway, 2009).
A third, and arguably far more significant, source of criticism came from countries that stood as regional rivals to countries that had gained membership in the G20. This category of countries used regional gatherings to champion not the value of having an additional regional voice in the G20. Rather they quite explicitly to exert their own candidacy for entry into the ‘high table’ of the G20. One country that had used this approach was Nigeria. Having been left out at the first three summits, Nigeria reasserted its claims for membership at a meeting of African Finance Ministers (on the sidelines of the IMF annual meeting), with its own Finance Minister Mansur Muhtar arguing that: “We have been clamouring for a greater role ... For us the key concern is to see that the principle gets accepted” (Reuters, 2009).
Still as noted, such illustrations while interesting have not been detrimental to the central purpose of the G20. In each case the claims of these outsiders could be largely ignored. Other regional sensitivities, however, proved more serious as issues that needed diplomatic action. In these situations it was not simply individual countries pressing their own candidature. In contradistinction criticism came from important regional groupings themselves, most notably the AU and ASEAN.
These complaints could not as easily be ignored, given the degree of the asymmetry between their exclusion and the out of proportion inclusion of the EU in the G20. ASEAN advocated for a formal seat at the table of the G20, as opposed to simply representation by its chair. For example, at Davos in January 2010 the Vietnamese Prime Minister, Nguyen Tan Dung (2010), pushed for example the notion that there should be an “increase [in] the representation of G20, I think that it is important to institutionalise the participation of regional organisations like ASEAN”.
The AU complained vociferously from the outset about its status among the excluded. At a crisis summit held in Tunis, hosted by the African Development Bank, Jean Ping, head of the African Union's executive Commission, stated that: “Africa ... was not associated even slightly with the preparation when it's a question of deciding the future of the world to which this continent belongs, in fact and by right”. Ping appealed to organizers of the G20 meeting to think of Africa's right to be an active player in the process and “not to suffer, as always, the consequences of other people's mistakes” (cited in Muiruri, 2008). Countries such as Uganda added their sense of grievance. Ugandan Central Bank Governor Emmanuel Tumusiime Mutebile argued that: “Uganda is a rich country and well governed for the last 15 years, so why should its voice not be heard? … The G20 represents part of the old architecture which I hope will end next weekend” (ibid).
Representatives from the G20 countries defended the nature of the limited membership not on grounds of legitimacy but because of instrumentality. French cooperation minister Alain Joyandet who attended the Tunis meeting contended that the G20 as a crisis committee needed to be arranged among major powers and that South Africa was called on to represent Africa's views. Given the extent of the improvised structure of the G20, the rationale tilted to “limit the number of organisations present, undoubtedly for more effectiveness” (ibid).
This type of logic came under increased stress, however, as the over-representation of the EU became more apparent. The rational expectation was that the EU would be able to rationalize its own participation in the G20. After all, with both the EU Commission and the EU Presidency around the table, there appeared ample opportunity for coordination between the EU 4 as insiders and the wider EU 23 as outsiders. Yet, despite this impressive institutional presence, the diplomatic running at the G20 has been done by states – with the EU 4 leveraging their own position and enhancing the status of some additional countries, especially that of Spain.
Spain got into the first G20 summit in Washington, DC, on the coattails of French President Sarkozy, after some intense lobbying he gave up one of France’s two seats (as one of the EU4 in the G20 and in France’s capacity as the EU President) to Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Spain subsequently consolidated this position when it took up the EU Presidency, using an EU Summit to situate itself as a ‘permanent guest’ in the G20 (ANSAmed, 2010).
The porous architecture of the G20 mat be seen as having two major consequences – one for the EU and one for the G20. Within the EU, Spain’s entry – along with the presence of the Netherlands and countries holding the EU presidency (the Czech Republic and Sweden) – opened up demands for even more additional members. The Eurozone has made one bid for an institutional membership (Strupczewski, 2010). Poland has also claimed this status (Associated Press, 2010). The other consequence, as alluded to, is the far more detrimental one that the EU over-representation reinforced the claims of critics that the G20 lacked the ingredients to make it a hub of economic global governance. To charges that the G20 lacked equality were added those from even European critics, such as the European Council on Foreign Relation’s Jose-Ignacio Torreblanca, that too many voices did not multiply influence: “The fact that there are a lot of Europeans in a room doesn’t mean that they are being listened to” (cited in Pop, 2010).
Still, for supporters of innovation within the G20, there were signs that the summit process could deliver some novel procedures that helped close the gap between legitimacy and efficiency. One significant example about how new types of innovation could be initiated has come with the rapid move by South Korea to embark on new forms of regional outreach – embracing ASEAN in particular. Dr Changyong Rhee, the Secretary-General of South Korea’s Presidential Committee, as his first destination visited the ASEAN Secretariat and smoothed any sensitivities through declarations that: “We are shaping the agenda as early as possible to include the views of ASEAN” (ASEAN, 2010).
Even more structurally advanced, South Africa has creatively and successfully implemented a stellar form of indirect representation via the regional “Committee of Ten” finance ministers (or C10) under the auspices of the African Development Bank, the Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union Commission. This enterprise, it should be acknowledged has been a risky endeavour. Not only did it expose South Africa’s position as the one African member of the G20 to increased scrutiny, it stretched South Africa’s resources. Yet, despite these risks, this initiative has worked well. The scope of the membership for this committee is impressive – including as it does both some countries which sought membership (Egypt and Nigeria) in a reformed G8 themselves. Indeed, Egypt was embedded as the C10 vice-chair and the host of a follow-up meeting in September 2010 (C10, 2010).
In terms of recommendations, therefore, the basic suggestions should be to minimize the over-representation of the EU (and thus a fundamental source of criticism of the G20) and maximize the innovative qualities of the outreach design with respect to the excluded.
This approach can be operationalized through a number of techniques. First of all, rather than allowing further EU representation a process of roll-back and contraction should be implemented. This will help build legitimacy for the G20 outside of the EU. But just as importantly it will encourage more innovative forms of coordination inside the EU. With a new EU President in place this move is timely. It is also a realistic scenario. Canada as the host of the G8 and co-host of the G20 has not (at time of writing) invited Netherlands to Toronto, with no detrimental consequences. Having seven EU representatives – if Spain is added to the composition – is simply not the right mix in a forum that is supposed to signal that the world has shifted in terms of its power and/or normative foundations.
Secondly, the move by South Korea to embrace a form of host/regional institutional mode of outreach (or to break with G8 terminology, consultation) should be refined and institutionalized. Such a process of consultation could be enhanced by having not only the host country conduct this form of activity. Moves along these lines could be conducted via a G20 Secretariat (if one is established) or more loosely via a team of sherpas (in either a troika format or a more ad hoc fashion). The focus would be on select groups of the excluded with a functional orientation. A prime target for consultation beyond regional organizations would be the 3G group.
Thirdly, some serious thought needs to be given to whether a formal caucus system within the G20 is a good idea or not. If the EU is pressed to coordinate internally it has the effect of becoming a de facto caucus. Moreover, the African C10 reveals the power of innovative activity in alleviating criticisms about exclusion in Africa. A proposal for an East Asian caucus has been put forward by the Lowy Institute in Australia. An A8 as suggested by Brookings would serve a similar model in the Americas.
Regional dynamics have proved up to now one of the most obvious defects in the G20 model. Instead of serving a complementary purpose the asymmetrical gaps in representations have weakened the legitimacy and arguably the efficiency of the G20, especially in allowing multiple EU voices to be heard instead of a single mouth.
With some innovative reforms, however, the regional dynamics surrounding the G20 could move from a weakness to a source of strength. As emphasized throughout this short paper, the ‘rejectionists’ of the G20 have not been many in number, while most regional bodies want to find ways to work within the process. What is desired is some greater openness to participation. If official G20 membership is closed, it should not preclude innovative mechanisms that would broaden the forum’s input and legitimacy. As suggested, there are alternative means that this objective can be reached.
References
ANSAmed (2010) “Spain: Press Announces Permanent Seat at G20,” 26 March. ASEAN Secretariat (2010), “Views of ASEAN Sought for G20 Agenda,” Press Release, Jakarta, 10 February. Associated Press (2010) “Poland, with World’s 18th Largest Economy, Wants in G20,” ABC News, 3 February. C10 (2010) Communiqué of the meeting of the committee of African ministers of finance and planning and Governors of Central Banks, 21 February. Cape Town: Committee of Ten. Fletcher, Pascal (2009) “Caribbean finance to survive G20 pressure – Caricom,” Reuters, 10 Dec. Muiruri, Rebecca (2008) “Africa Disappointed at Exclusion from G20,” Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, 12 Nov. Norway (2009) “Norwegian Call for Nordic Membership in the G20,” Press Release. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available Online: