The role of regional and sub-regional organizations in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: a preliminary assessment of the African continent Prepared by Johan Bergenas with guidance and commentary by Dr. Lawrence Scheinman for the UNIDIR-MIIS cooperative project on regional organizations and 1540. A significant number of states face challenges fulfilling obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)—a nonproliferation resolution aiming to prevent non- state actors from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring or using weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery.1 Many countries lack the capacity to, inter alia, comply with basic reporting duties as required by the resolution. In light of current 1540 implementation obstacles, this initial report, part of a larger study,∗ discusses the framework of African regional and sub- regional organizations and the role they can play implementing resolution 1540. Introduction In an effort to adapt to new weapons of mass destruction (WMD) challenges in the 21st century—such as the January 2004 unveiling of A.Q. Khan’s clandestine nuclear weapons technology proliferation network and the threat that terrorists might acquire and use WMD—the UN Security Council, in April 2004, unanimously adopted resolution 1540 (hereafter referred to as 1540).2 The broader context of this measure is the nonproliferation and disarmament regime, anchored by multilateral agreements such as the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Convention on the ∗ Under the direction of Dr. Lawrence Scheinman, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies (MIIS) are conducting a joint research project on the role of regional organizations in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540. 1 Prohibition of the Development of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC), and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC), which seek the complete disarmament and destruction of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in all countries. Resolution 1540, adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, addresses another and more recent dimension of the problem of these dangerous weapons and related materials—their accessibility to, and potential trafficking by, sub-national and terrorist groups. The resolution decided that all states shall refrain from providing any type of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. To that end 1540 requires all states to put into place domestic legislation and effective controls that prevents WMD, means of their delivery, and related materials and technologies from falling into the hands of non-state actors and being used for terrorism purposes. The United States was a vocal advocate of 1540,3 which builds on a previous Security Council resolution on combating international terrorism.4 Paragraph four of 1540 established a committee, referred to as the 1540 Committee, which would for two years report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution. The paragraph also requires states to submit national reports to the 1540 Committee declaring measures taken, or intended to be taken, toward implementation of the resolution. The 1540 Committee is also supported by a group of experts who are evaluating the national reports to determine the current state of 1540 implementation. In measuring implementation, the experts have created a matrix to establish what provisions of 1540 have, and have not, been fulfilled by member states. On April 27, 2006, the Security Council, by passing resolution 1673, extended the 1540 Committee’s mandate for an additional two years and called for the intensification of its work.5 It also invited the 1540 Committee to “explore with States and international, regional and sub-regional organizations experience-sharing and lessons learned in the areas covered by resolution 1540 (2004), and the availability of programmes which might 2 facilitate the implementation of” the resolution. To date, about 70 percent of all states have submitted national reports to the 1540 Committee; however, the comprehensiveness of these reports varies significantly and many states have yet to submit additional information as requested by resolution 1673.6 In the national reports, more than 40 states have indicated they would require assistance implementing 1540. Areas where assistance is necessary include drafting legislation, training, expert advice, technical assistance, and human resources. Most requests are broad and lack the necessary detail, making it difficult for states and other actors to respond in an effective manner. Figure 1 below shows the timeline of submitted national reports. Despite that several outreach seminars took place in 2006 to inform governments of their 1540 obligations few national reports were submitted last year.7 FIGURE 1 Submitted national reports over time 180 Submitted national reports 160 140 136 125 129 132 120 115 100 80 60 60 40 20 0 0 4/28/2004 4/28/2005 4/28/2006 4/28/2007 4/28/2008 10/28/2004 10/28/2005 10/28/2006 10/28/2007 In an article for the July 2006 issue of The Nonproliferation Review, Peter Crail points out that, “no state has fulfilled all of 1540’s obligations, and the vast majority has only a few of the resolutions’ domestic legal requirements in place.”8 Crail identifies 84 key states, in which implementation of 1540 is of particular relevance. The key states were 3 selected based on proliferation risk, i.e. states possessing WMD or related materials, and states in which there is a particular risk of WMD and related materials being transferred through them. Currently, these key states have fulfilled only 23.5 percent of obligations under 1540.9 In short, reporting and implementation of 1540 have to date been less than satisfactory. On February 23, 2007, the UN Security Council debated ways to enhance implementation of 1540 and again expressed the need to further examine the role of international, regional, and sub-regional organizations in terms of experience-sharing, lessons learned, and availability of assistance programs related to 1540 implementation.10 Some states’ representatives noted that cooperation within regional and sub-regional associations could contribute to 1540 implementation.11 Ghana’s ambassador in particular stressed the role that the African Union (AU) and other regional organizations could play, asserting that such institutions have the “appropriate mechanisms” to enhance 1540 implementation. This report explores Africa—one of several regions to be examined as part of the UNIDIR-MIIS cooperative project—and the framework of the continent’s regional and sub-regional organizations as well as their past and current involvement with implementing security-related treaties. It looks at an issue area where regional and sub- regional organizations have played a role in implementation in recent years: that of small arms and light weapons (SALW). It is important to note at the outset that issues concerning WMD are currently a lower priority in Africa than SALW and other issues such as the AIDS epidemic, poverty, and civil wars, all of which have a more immediate impact on the social order and correspondingly greater political relevance at the state and regional levels. It is not that there is indifference to the WMD issue, but that political energy and scarce resources are focused on matters imperative to maintaining viable civil society. Nevertheless, exploring the involvement of regional and sub-regional organizations in addressing the problem of SALW provides an opportunity to better understand the potential role of these institutions in helping to meet challenges and implement goals and objectives to address them effectively. 4 The stakes involved with 1540 implementation While acknowledging that implementation of WMD treaties and agreements do not generate as much political traction today as the other challenges on the African continent mentioned above, it is important to bear in mind that different issues can gain in political relevance—sometimes literally over night. An attack by al-Qa`ida using a nuclear or a radiological dispersal device (“dirty bomb”)12 anywhere in the world will have consequences for global peace and security, the global economy and the nonproliferation regime—consequences from which no region would be able to hide. Usama Bin Laden’s stated interest in acquiring and using WMD—in the 1990s he tried to obtain uranium from a source in Khartoum, Sudan—underscores the reason for concern.13 Besides al- Qa`ida’s attacks on the United States (2001), Spain (2003), and the United Kingdom (2005), the terrorist organization has also struck in other countries. Examples on the African continent include attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania.14 Of the 224 people killed, 12 were Americans and 38 foreign nationals employed at the embassies. An additional 4,585 people were injured. This shows that while these terrorist attacks focused on US interests abroad, those most affected were the local populations. If al-Qa`ida, or other terrorist organizations, use a nuclear or a dirty bomb the human suffering and