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The Treaty of Pelindaba on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

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The Treaty of Pelindaba on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone UNIDIR/2002/16 The Treaty of Pelindaba on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Oluyemi Adeniji UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Geneva, Switzerland NOTE The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. * * * The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Secretariat. UNIDIR/2002/16 Copyright © United Nations, 2002 All rights reserved UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION Sales No. GV.E.03.0.5 ISBN 92-9045-145-9 CONTENTS Page Acknowledgements . vii Foreword by John Simpson . ix Glossary of Terms. xi Introduction. 1 Chapter 1 Evolution of Global and Regional Non-Proliferation . 11 Chapter 2 Nuclear Energy in Africa . 25 Chapter 3 The African Politico-Military Origins of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone . 35 Chapter 4 The Transition Period: The End of Apartheid and the Preparations for Negotiations . 47 Chapter 5 Negotiating and Drafting the Treaty (Part I): The Harare Meeting . 63 Chapter 6 Negotiating and Drafting the Treaty (Part II): The 1994 Windhoek and Addis Ababa Drafting Meetings, and References where Appropriate to the 1995 Johannesburg Joint Meeting . 71 Chapter 7 Negotiating and Drafting the Treaty (Part III): Annexes and Protocols . 107 Chapter 8 Negotiating and Drafting the Treaty (Part IV): Joint Meeting of the United Nations/OAU Group of Experts and the OAU Inter- Governmental Group, Johannesburg. 139 iii iv Chapter 9 Global and African Implications of the Treaty and Prospects for Implementation . 159 Notes. 163 Appendices 1. Denuclearization of Africa, AHG/Res.11 (I), July 1964 . 171 2. A/RES/2028 (XX), 23 November 1965 . 173 3. Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon- free zones in all its aspects, UNGA Res.3472 (XXX), B, 11 December 1975 . 177 4. OAU 1963 Summit resolution on declaring Africa a Denuclearized Zone . 181 5. Draft Convention for the Denuclearization of the Continent of Africa . 183 6. Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, UNGA Res.2033 (XX), 3 December 1965 . 187 7. South Africa: USSR Alerted US on A-Test, 3 September 1977. 189 8. South Africa: Pretoria Warned on A-Bomb, 27 August 1977 . 191 9. A/RES/47/76, 14 January 1993. 193 10. South Africa: De Klerk Admits Building of A-Bombs, 25 March 1993 . 197 11. A/RES/45/56, A, 14 December 1990 . 201 12. Resolution on the Territorial Integrity of Africa and the Surrounding Islands, CM/Res.676 (XXXI), July 1978. 205 13. Text of the Harare Draft. 207 14. Text of the Addis Ababa Draft . 225 15 (A). Letter to the UN Secretary-General of the UN/OAU Group of Experts . 247 15 (B). Letter to the OAU Secretary-General of the UN/OAU Group of Experts . 249 16. Resolution on the Implementation of an African Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, CM/Res.1529 (LX), June 1994 . 251 17. Progress made by the International Atomic Energy Agency in ensuring the full implementation of the safeguards agreement with South Africa Report of the Secretary- v General, A/49/550, 19 October 1994 . 253 18. The views of the United States of America on the proposed African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. 261 19. A/RES/49/138, 11 January 1995. 269 20. Compilation of comments by OAU members on the Addis Ababa draft of an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. 273 21. Tentative List of Islands Surrounding Africa and Territories under the Jurisdiction of Non African Powers. 281 22. African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone: UK/French Proposal . 283 23. Letter to OAU Secretary-General by the Minister of External Affairs, Mauritius . 285 24 (A). Letter of transmission of the Pelindaba draft to the OAU Secretary-General . 289 24 (B). Letter of transmission of the Pelindaba draft to the UN Secretary-General . 291 25. Resolution on the Implementation of the Treaty Declaring Africa a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, OAU Res. CM/Res.1592 (LXII)/Rev.1, 1995 . 295 26. The Cairo Declaration . 297 27. Text of Statement by the United Kingdom . 299 28. Text of Statement by the United States . 301 29. List of countries which have ratified the Pelindaba Treaty, 3 December 2001 . 303 30. Comments and suggestions by France on the draft of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty . 307 31. Law of Mongolia on its nuclear-weapon-free status . 315 32. Message of the United Nations Secretary-General to the signing ceremony of the Pelindaba Treaty . 319 33. The Treaty of Pelindaba. 321 Recent UNIDIR Publications . 343 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In the course of preparing this book, I received ready support from several people that should be acknowledged. Among them, John Simpson of the Mountbatten School of International Relations, University of Southampton, England, and Executive Director of the Programme for the Promotion of Nuclear Non-proliferation (PPNN) deserves first and special mention. He facilitated my commencement of the book in 1997 in the stimulating environment of the Mountbatten School where I had access to the nuclear non-proliferation-rich library which was part of the PPNN, as well as the general library of the School. At every stage thereafter, he was always generous with his comments and advice and was very kind to have read and commented extensively on the first full draft. Besides his particular assistance to me, John was kind enough to have suggested to the treaty- drafting group, the cartographer who translated the ever-shifting definition of the geographical application of the zone to the map of the zone in the Pelindaba Treaty. My gratitude also to Hennelore Hoppe of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs who always responded promptly to my requests for United Nations documents. Ms. Busola Adekusibe, the very efficient Personal Assistant to the Chairman of the First City Monument Bank in whose facilities I pursued the project in 1997, was very helpful at that stage. Also very helpful were Ms. Ann Barnes and Ms. Caroline Attah my Personal Assistant and Administrative Assistant respectively, during the later stages of the book until its completion. I thank them. Finally I wish to express my deep gratitude to the publisher of the book, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The suggestions of the Director of the Institute, Dr. Patricia Lewis, were invaluable, and the painstaking work of Ms. Anita Blétry in the preparation of the manuscript for publication is greatly appreciated. vii FOREWORD Since its origins in the 1960s, the nuclear non-proliferation regime has been premised upon global and regional treaties backed by assurances on implementation made by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards system. Regional non-proliferation arrangements were the first to emerge. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in Latin America, opened for signature in February 1967, some 18 months before the global Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As Ambassador Adeniji explains in this study, moves towards a similar zone for Africa were also under discussion at this time, stimulated by French nuclear weapons tests in the Sahara. However, it was to be almost 30 years before this African NWFZ treaty was to become a reality. This was largely because such a treaty was not feasible without the active participation of South Africa, the African State most advanced in the development of nuclear energy. The five years after 1989 proved to be revolutionary for both global and regional nuclear relations. Africa was not excluded from this trend, with the emergence of a unique opportunity to establish a NWFZ in the continent. The most significant catalysts that brought this about were the end of apartheid in South Africa, and the revelation that the De Klerk Administration had decided to dismantle the nuclear weapons secretly stockpiled by previous regimes. These developments created the momentum to establish a regional treaty. As the person who chaired the session of the April 1993 Track II meeting in Harare at which the details of the South African programme were explained to representatives of the other African States, I can testify to the tremendous sense that an unprecedented revolution was taking place in African nuclear affairs. However, it was to be another two years before agreement could be reached on the details of the African NWFZ, in what became the Treaty of Pelindaba. In the early 1990s, only two models existed for NWFZs: the Latin American NWFZ Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was opened for signature in February 1967, and the South Pacific NWFZ Treaty of Rarotonga, opened for signature in August 1985. Pelindaba covered much the same ground as ix x these, but developed the “standard model” of a NWFZ treaty much further. Additional provisions included dismantling nuclear-explosive devices and their production facilities, physical protection of nuclear installations, prohibition of armed attack on such installations, and mechanisms to deal with allegations of non-compliance. Those negotiating the treaty also had to navigate their way around several diplomatic problems. Perhaps the foremost of these was the issue of zone boundaries. These had to abide by Organization for African Unity (OAU) resolutions, and at the same time avoid creating obstacles to the implementation of the protocols to the treaty by the five nuclear-weapon States and those European States with territory within the zone. It is a tribute to the professionalism of the diplomats involved in this process, and to the leadership of their chairman, Ambassador Adeniji, that the treaty both incorporated these new elements and navigated around the potential obstacles confronting them.
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