1 7Th NATIONAL REPORT by SOUTH AFRICA on the CONVENTION

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1 7Th NATIONAL REPORT by SOUTH AFRICA on the CONVENTION 7th NATIONAL REPORT BY SOUTH AFRICA ON THE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY August 2016 Restricted 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS The numbering of the Articles of the Convention has been used as the basis for the paragraph numbering system adopted in this Report. Page no. ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................ 3 A. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 7 B. SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................... 9 C. ARTICLES..................................................................................................................... 12 ARTICLE 6: EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS ....................................................... 12 ARTICLE 7: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ..................................... 16 ARTICLE 8: REGULATORY BODY ................................................................................... 28 Figure 8-1. NNR Organisational Structure and Reporting Line. ......................................... 32 Figure 8-2. NNR Document Structure ................................................................................ 34 ARTICLE 9: RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENCE HOLDER ........................................... 44 ARTICLE 10: PRIORITY TO SAFETY ............................................................................... 47 ARTICLE 11: FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES .................................................... 55 ARTICLE 12: HUMAN FACTORS ..................................................................................... 63 ARTICLE 13: QUALITY ASSURANCE .............................................................................. 69 ARTICLE 14: ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY ..................................... 74 ARTICLE 15: RADIATION PROTECTION ......................................................................... 91 ARTICLE 16: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ............................................................. 103 ARTICLE 17: SITING ....................................................................................................... 119 ARTICLE 18: DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION ............................................................... 126 ARTICLE 19: OPERATION ............................................................................................. 138 Figure 19-1. Koeberg NPP OEF System ......................................................................... 155 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 156 D. ANNEXURES .............................................................................................................. 161 D.1 Annexure 1: Results of Koeberg External Events Safety Reassessment .................. 161 D.2 Annexure 2: Eskom Organisational Structure ............................................................ 163 D.3 Annexure 3: Post-Fukushima Actions ....................................................................... 165 Restricted 2 ABBREVIATIONS AADQ Annual Authorised Discharge Quantities AAM KNPP Accident Analysis Manual AEB Atomic Energy Board AEC Atomic Energy Corporation AFRA African Regional Cooperative Agreement ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable ANS American Nuclear Standard ANSI American Nuclear Standards Institute ASCOT Assessment of Safety Culture in Organisations Team ASN French Nuclear Safety Authority BDBA Beyond Design Basis Accident CA Corrective Action CAE Compliance Assurance and Enforcement Division CAP Compliance Assurance Plan CAR Corrective Action Review CEO Chief Executive Officer CNS Convention on Nuclear Safety CNSC Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission CNSS Centre for Nuclear Safety and Security CoCT City of Cape Town CP Contracting Party CSS IAEA Commission on Safety Standards DBA Design Basis Accident DCT Disaster Coordination Team DMR Department of Mineral Resources DOC Disaster Operations Centre DoE Department of Energy DoH Department of Health ECC Emergency Control Centre EDF Électricité de France EERT External Events Review Team ENAC Convention on Early Notification and Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident Enatom Emergency Notification and Assistance Technical Operations Manual EOP Emergency Operating Procedure EP Emergency Planning Restricted 3 EPC Emergency Planning Committee EPD Electronic Personal Dosimeter EPMS Electronic Problem Management System EPREV Emergency Planning Review EPSOC Emergency Planning Steering and Oversight Committee ESCS Energy Security Cabinet Subcommittee FNRBA Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies of Africa FRAREG Framatome Reactor Regulators Group GNS&A Generation Nuclear Safety and Assurance (Eskom) GOR General Operating Rules GWe Giga Watt electrical power HP Human Performance HRA Human Reliability Analysis IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test IMS Integrated Management System INES International Nuclear Event Scale INIR Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review INPO Institute for Nuclear Power Operators INSAG International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group IRAs Strengths and Issues Requiring Attention IRRS Independent Regulatory Review Service IRS Incident Reporting System (IAEA) ISI In-Service Inspection ISIP In-service Inspection Programme ISIPRM In-service Inspection Requirements Manual ISTP In-Service Testing Programme JMC Joint Media Centre KEG Koeberg Events Group KINS Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety KLBM Koeberg Licensing Basis Manual KNPP Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant KORC Koeberg Operating Review Committee KOSC Koeberg Operational Safety Committee KSR Koeberg Safety Reassessment LG Licence Guide Restricted 4 MCC Mass Care Centre MDEP Multinational Design Evaluation Programme MOA Memorandum of Agreement MWe Megawatt (Electrical) NEA Nuclear Energy Agency Necsa South African Nuclear Energy Corporation NERS Network of Regulators of Countries with Small Nuclear Programmes NIL nuclear installation licence NISL nuclear installation site licence NNR National Nuclear Regulator (South Africa) NORM Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material NPP Nuclear Power Plant NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRWDI National Radioactive Waste Disposal Institute NSA Eskom Nuclear Safety Assurance Group NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System NTWP Nuclear Technology and Waste Programmes NUSSC IAEA Nuclear Safety Standards Committee OE Operating Experience OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ONR United Kingdom Office for Nuclear Regulation ORT Operation at Reduced Temperature OSART Operational Safety Review Team OTS Operating Technical Specifications PAIA Promotion of Access to Information Act PBMR Pebble Bed Modular Reactor PEE Portable Emergency Equipment PTR refueling water storage PRA Probabilistic Risk Analysis PRIS Power Reactor Information System PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment PSIF Public Safety Information Forum PTR Reactor Cavity and Spent Fuel Pit Cooling System PWR Pressurised Water Reactor QA Quality Assurance QMS Quality Management System RADCON Directorate of Radiation Control Restricted 5 RASSC IAEA Radiation Protection Safety Standards Committee RCM Reliability Centered Maintenance RERC Regulatory Emergency Response Centre RG Regulatory Guide RO Reactor Operator RP Radiation Protection RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel RSA Republic of South Africa RVSP Reactor Vessel Surveillance Programme SALTO Safety Assessment of Long Term Operations SAMG Severe Accident Management Guidelines SAQA South African Qualifications Authority SAR Safety Analysis Report SARA Standards, Authorisation, Review and Assessment SARIS Self-Assessment of Regulatory Infrastructure for Safety SAT Self-Assessment Tool SCWG Safety Culture Working Group SG Steam Generator SOER Significant Operating Event Report SFP Spent Fuel Pool SRO Senior Reactor Operator SRSM Safety-Related Surveillance Manual SSC Structures, Systems and Components SSHAC Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee SSR Site Safety Report SSRP Regulations on Safety Standards and Regulatory Practices STUK Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent TLD Thermoluminescence Dosimeter TEM Traffic Evacuation Model TRANSSC IAEA Transport Safety Standards Committee TSO Technical Support Organisations TWG Thematic Working Group UPZ Urgent Protective Zone WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators WASSC IAEA Waste Safety Standards Committee Restricted 6 A. INTRODUCTION South Africa ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) in 1996, and its obligations under the Convention commenced on 24 March 1997. The objectives of the Convention as stated in Article 1 are to: 1) Achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide through the enhancement of national measures and international cooperation including, where appropriate, safety-related technical cooperation. 2) Establish and maintain effective defenses in nuclear installations against potential radiological hazards in order to protect individuals, society and the environment from the harmful effects of ionising radiation resulting from such installations. 3) Prevent accidents with radiological consequences, and mitigate such consequences should they occur. As a contracting party to the Convention, South Africa is required to fulfil its obligations by demonstrating how the objectives of the Convention, especially a high level of nuclear safety, have been achieved in the
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