CONCLUSIONS

The early Carolingians, Charlemagne’s great-grandfather Pippin, his grand­ father Charles Martel, and his father Pippin, commanded extensive human and material resources in a rapidly growing economy, which made possi- ble the success of their long-term strategy to reunite the regnum Francorum. For almost a century, these Frankish leaders mobilized effective fighting forces with which they sustained both large and small scale military oper- ations on a regular basis not only throughout Gaul and across its trans- rhenish frontier, but also from the coasts of the North Sea to the foothills of the Pyrenees and northern Italy. Early Carolingian armies on occasion marched and counter-marched well in excess of 2,000 kilometers in the course of a single campaign. Tactically, these forces fought effectively in the field against both mounted troops and foot soldiers, executed noteworthy riverine and blue-water operations, and successfully besieged numerous erstwhile Roman fortress cities. In addition, they fortified the Germar Mark to block Saxon raids into Thuringia and areas further to the West. They also built defenses further south to defend against the Slavs. This construction of numerous fortifications and the deployment of thousands of troops to garrison them ultimately would be called the Sorbian march, which, of course, had offen- sive potential for launching operations into Slavic territory. In 768, following the death of Charles Martel’s son Pippin, who had become king of the Franks in 751, the regnum Francorum was divided between his two heirs, Charlemagne and Carloman the Younger. The latter died prematurely in 771, but during the three years that each ruled the equally divided resources of the Frankish kingdom, the brothers demonstrated noteworthy difficulties in working together in a produc­tive and effective manner. Nevertheless, during this period, Charlemagne, without military support from Carloman, undertook a successful cam- paign to repacify southern Aquitaine, which exhibited restiveness follow- ing Pippin’s death. Also during this period, Carloman sent an army to Rome in order to undermine Charlemagne’s diplomatic successes there, presumably by force if necessary. This effort failed. 632 conclusions

Charlemagne’s Long-Term Strategy

The early Carolingians had pursued a highly focused long-term strategy of reuniting the regnum Francorum under their direct rule. As a result, they did not seize opportunities, or apparent opportunities, either to conquer territory that had not been part of the Frankish kingdom or to execute raids in wealthy regions beyond the frontiers for the purpose of acquiring masses of booty in order to placate a supposedly insatiable aristocracy. Charles Martel, for example, after winning a significant victory at Poitiers in 732, made no effort to lead his armies into Spain despite the death in battle of the Muslim governor and the great wealth available on the Iberian Peninsula. In a similar vein, King Pippin, who found it necessary in 754 and 756 to invade northern Italy in order to protect the papacy, did not, after receiving the surrender of Pavia, make an effort to take control of the Lombard kingdom. Rather, he led his armies back across the Alps to continue the process of reunifying the Frankish kingdom. Finally, the early Carolingians, whose eastern frontier suffered frequently from Saxon raids, pursued a policy of constructing static defenses, e.g. the Germar Mark, and undertaking punitive expeditions. A strategy of conquest was eschewed as the Saxon region never had been a part of the regnum Francorum. Charlemagne, like the court historians who have provided us with infor- mation regarding early Carolingian military strategy, was aware of the suc- cessful and focused long-term efforts undertaken by his forebears. When raised to the kingship, he understood the workings of the Carolingian General Staff, the Magistratus, and also the substantial array of military and economic assets available for royal exploitation through a well- developed bureaucracy. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that Charlemagne also developed a long-term strategy that was no less ambitious than that which had been pursued so successfully by his predecessors. Charlemagne, in fact, can be seen early in his reign, i.e. the period treated in this book, to have begun the task of bringing under Carolingian control as much of the territory of the erstwhile Roman empire as he believed was consistent with his resources. His ultimate goal was to become Roman emperor in the west. Before Charlemagne became king, it was clear not only to him but also to his father that it was possible for the Carolingians to rule the west or at least a substantial part of what had been Roman imperial territory. This idea initially was fostered by the papacy before Charlemagne was born. According to a report by a court historian, who was patronized by Duke