INTRODUCTION

In the short century from 687 to 768, ’s great grandfather (Pippin), grandfather ( Martel), and father (Pippin) gradually reunited under Carolingian rule the thoroughly fragmented regnum Francorum.1 They accomplished this impressive feat in a highly focused manner, which gave priority in the long term to territorial acquisition and control of the magnates of the Frankish kingdom, many of whom, espe- cially if they worked in concert, had the power and influence collectively to undermine, if not, in fact, thwart, the Carolingians’ plans.2 In the course of this process of unification, Charlemagne’s forefathers tended to avoid being distracted by booty-seeking raids focused on possible short-term targets of opportunity.3 Their strategy of unification was pursued through

1 This well-known story has been told many times. See, for example, Louis Halphen, Charlemagne et l’empire carolingien (, 1947), 57–119; Margaret Deanesly, A History of Early Medieval from 476 to 911, 2nd ed.(London, 1969), 339–406; Pierre Riché, The Carolingians: A Family who Forged Europe, trans. Michael I. Allen (Philadelphia, 1993), 13–84; Rosamond McKitterick, The Frankish Kingdoms under the Carolingians: 751–987 (London-New York, 1983), 16–53; Roger Collins, Charlemagne (Toronto-Buffalo, 1998), 23–42; and Matthias Becher, Charlemagne, trans. David S. Bachrach (New Haven, 2003), 19–39. Roger Collins, “Frankish Past and Carolingian Present in the Age of Charlemagne,” in Kaiser Krönung: Das Epos ‘Karolus Magnus et Leo papa’ und der Papstbesuch in Paderborn 799, ed. Peter Godman, Jörg Jarnut, and Peter Johanek (Paderborn, 2002), 301–322, at 304, may be correct when he observes that “suppression of facts or twisting of truth … must seem the salient characteristics of Frankish historiography in the eighth century …” However, in the context under discussion, no one doubts that the regnum Francorum was unified politically under early Carolingian rule. In the traditional histories these military campaigns generally are treated in rather slight detail under the heading “The Conquests” or some similar locution. However, F.L. Ganshof, “Charlemagne,” Speculum, XXIV (1949), 520–527 and reprinted in idem, The Carolingians and the Frankish Monarchy (London, 1971), 17–27, p. 25 specifically criticizes the thematic approach which results in the concentration of discussions of Charlemagne’s military operations into “geographical or systematic order” at the expense of chronological order. He contends that this approach has a distorting effect. This view of the weaknesses inher- ent in the thematic approach is echoed by Eric Goldberg in his review of Wilfrid Hartmann, Ludwig der Deutsche (Darmstadt, 2002) in EME, 12 (2003), 84–86. 2 As pointed out by Stuart Airlie, “Towards a Carolingian Aristocracy,” in Die Dynas­ tiewechsel von 751: Vorgeschichte, Legitmationsstrategien und Erinnerung, ed. Matthias Becher and Jörg Jarnut (Münster, 2004), 109–127 at 109, and Pippin, before the latter became king, undertook the process of teaching the aristocracy how to “recog- nise the new dynasty as the centre of the contemporary political system”. 3 As will be shown below, some scholars exaggerate the importance of booty to the Carolingian economy. 2 introduction adroit diplomacy, and, when necessary, sustained by effective military operations.4 In the course of vindicating this strategy, Charlemagne’s ancestors placed under direct Carolingian rule a territory of some 700,000 square kilometers, i.e. a region larger than all of Roman or of at its greatest extent under Louis XIV. This process of political reunification was initiated by a military victory of great importance at Tertry in 687. This battle was won by Pippin II (d. 714), Charlemagne’s great-grandfather, who controlled the royal fisc and much else as “” in .5 As one scholar has put it, the battle of Tertry was a “resounding success” that made it possible for Pippin, “the dux Austrasiorum to become the princeps Francorum”.6 During almost a quarter-century of campaigning, Pippin II’s son, Charles Martel (d. 741), was able, after a short hiatus following his father’s death, to maintain the pattern of diplomatic and military success initiated by the previous Carolingian Mayor of the Palace.7 Indeed, Charles’ famous

4 For a brief description of these military operations in their diplomatic context and the strategy that undergirded them, see Bernard S. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire (Philadelphia, 2001) 1–50, along with the extensive scholarly literature cited throughout that work. 5 Riché, The Carolingians, p. 26, observes that Pippin II’s “victory was decisive”; Collins, Charlemagne, pp. 15, 17, sees it as a turning point; and Becher, Charlemagne, p. 30, points out that Pippin’s victory combined with the murder of his rivals during the next year “made Pippin the de facto ruler of the Frankish kingdom.” Becher would seem to rely on Ercanbert, BRF, p. 328, regarding the murder of Berchar. Myke de Jong, “Carolingian Monasticism: The Power of Prayer,” in NCMH, II, 625–626, points out how in the aftermath of the victory at Tertry, Pippin II was able to chase recalcitrant bishops out their sees and to establish con- trol of monasteries. This consensus, and many more examples could be added, makes clear that the effort by Paul J. Fouracre, “Observations on the outgrowth of Peppinid influence in the ‘regnum Francorum’ after the Battle of Tertry (687–715),” Medieval Prosopography, 5.2 (1984), 1–31, to diminish the significance of the battle of Tertry was not successful. See also the effort by Ian Wood, The Merovingian Kingdoms, 450–751 (London-New York, 1994), 61–65, 256, who also tries to diminish the significance of the battle. For Paul Fouracre, “Frankish Gaul to 814,” in NCMH, II, 85; and idem, The Age of Charles Martel (Harlow, 2000), 40, 48, undermin- ing the significance of the battle of Tertry is of central importance to his efforts to diminish the role of warfare in early Carolingian history. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 10–12, 47–48, provides a refutation of the views of both Fouracre and Wood, who, in general, appear to be intent upon not giving military matters their due as significant factors in history. 6 See McKitterick, The Frankish Kingdoms, pp. 28–29, for the quotation, who, neverthe- less, seems to have reservations regarding the victory at Tertry as “the decisive moment” in the Carolingian rise to power. 7 Josef Semmler, “Zur pippinidisch-karolingische Sukzessionskrise 714–23,” Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters, 33 (1977), 1–36, may exaggerate somewhat the weak- ness of Charles Martel’s position as he strove to succeed his father. Charles’ assets, never- theless, proved sufficient to sustain his efforts. Richard A. Gerberding, “714: A Crucial Year