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1975):
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2Brendon,
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4Lloyd reference 28 disaster. In one swoop, twelve million troops were lost to the Allied cause and more than seventy German divisions were released from duty in the east.5 The German General Ludendorff recounts in his memoirs that “from the end of November onwards, troop trains were incessantly passing from East to West. It was no longer a case of replacing tired divisions in the West by fresh ones, but of really adding to the number of the combatants in the West. 6 In addition, military supplies including more than 600,000 tons of munitions and military equipment at Archangel alone which had been sent to Russia by the United States, Britain and France were in danger of falling into enemy hands. Furthermore, it was feared that the vast agricultural and natural resources of Russia now accessible to Germany would render the Allied blockade ineffective, as would the ostensible German plans to establish a submarine base on Russia’s northern coast. Finally, there was a widespread belief that Bolsheviks were German agents and that therefore, a strike against the Bolsheviks was a strike against Germany. To quote Churchill, “in such circumstances, it would have been criminal negligence to make no effort to reconstruct an anti-German front in the East, and so to deny the vast resources of Russia in food and fuel to the Central Powers.8 Thus, troops and supplies were sent to Russia by Britain, Japan, France and the United States to assist those Russians willing to continue the war against Germany, and as early as December 14, 1917, the War Cabinet decided to give the anti-Bolsheviks money as long as they continued to resist the Central Powers. With the signing of the Armistice on November 11, 1918, intervention in Russia could no longer be considered part of the general front against Germany, and the Allies faced the question of what to do with the more than 180,000 troops still stationed there. The answer to this question was dependent upon their policy towards Soviet Russia. Should peace be made with the Bolsheviks and the Allied troops withdrawn? Or should the Allies attempt to overthrow the Bolshevik regime, either through force or indirectly by sending the anti Bolsheviks munitions and supplies? In a letter to Lloyd George dated February 27, 1919, Churchill expressed dismay at the fact that the,
Allied Powers in Paris have not decided whether they wish to make war upon the Bolsheviks or to make peace with them. They are pausing midway between these two courses with an equal dislike of either.
The task of providing guidance on the Russian problem, however, was by no means easy.
5 GeorgeStewart,The White Armies of Russia (New York:Russelland Russell,1933): 82. 6 Swettenham,Atlied Intervention in Russia, 1918 (London:GeorgeAllen& UnwinLtd., 1967):39. 7 William Henry Chamberlin,The Russian Revolution, Vol. II. (NewYork:The MacMillan Co., 1952):150 For instance, the British GeneralMaynardwho commandedtroops at Murmanskwrotethat Lenin’spolicywas clearly dictated by Berlinand thoughtthat the RussianRevolutionwas the fruit of Germanintrigue,whileDavidFrancis, theAmerican Ambassadorin Moscow,believedthatLeninwas in thepayof theGermangovemmenc
8 WinstonS. Churchill,The Aftermath (NewYork:CharlesScribner’sSons, 1929):284. 9 Gilbert, ed.,Companion Volume IV, Part 1, 555. 29
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February
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the
prominent declaring 31
of tolerance toward the defeated Fatherland. He wanted to see “Germany treated humanely and adequately fed, and her industries re-started.”, 27 stating that it was urgent to do so in order to prevent her from turning to Bolshevism out of desperation. His goal was the creation of “a strong but peaceful Germany which will not attack our French allies, but will at the same time act as a bulwark against the Bolshevism of Russia.” 28 In other words, “feed Germany, fight Bolshevism, make Germany fight Bolshevism”.29 Churchill’s hatred of Bolshevism was unequivocal. Lloyd George claimed that it originated from the fact that “his ducal blood revolted against the wholesale elimination of the Grand Dukes in Russia”, 30 but Churchill’s loathing was inspired by something deeper than this, although he, like many, was appalled by Bolshevik atrocities. Churchill feared an alliance between Japan, Bolshevik Russia, and a vengeful Germany that could, he predicted, result in “a great combination from Yokohama to Cologne in hostility to France, Britain and America.31 Indeed, he felt no lasting peace could be formed as long as Bolshevism was allowed to exist. He was angered by the international claims of the Bolsheviks and opposed their goal of world-wide revolution which, he prophesied would lead to the destruction of the civilized world. Bolshevism, said Churchill, “is not a policy; it is a disease. It is not a creed; it is a pestilence”, 32 and later he compared it to “a virulent contagion that threatened to destroy civilization.” Churchill often likened Bolshevism to disease. As early as November 26, 1918, Churchill stated in a speech to his constituents at Dundee that
Russia is being rapidly reduced by the Bolsheviks to an animal form of Barbarism Civilization is being completely extinguished over gigantic areas, while Bolsheviks hop and caper like troops of ferocious baboons amid the ruins of cities and the corpses of their victims.
In view of these fierce opinions, it is not surprising that Churchill wanted to see joint military action by the Allies and a positive British commitment to destroy Bolshevism. The Allied armies, he urged, ought to march on Moscow and stomp out this foul disease before it could spread any further. He proposed to replace the Bolshevik tyranny, not with a restoration of the Tsarist autocracy, but rather with a democratic government friendly to the Entente. Russia, he
27 Gilbert,ed.,Companion Volume, Volume IV, Part 1, 557. 28 Ullman, 153. 29 Churchill,as citedby Gilbert,TheStricken World,,276. Churchillevenwentso far as to suggestthat “wemighthaveto buildup theGermanArmy,as it wasimportantto get Germanyon herlegsagainfor fearof the spreadof Bolshevism.”See Uliman,301. 30 LloydGeorge,The Truth about the Peace Treaties, Volume1, (London:VictorGollancz,1938):325. 31 Churchill,as citedby Pelling,258 32 Churchill,as citedby WilliamManchester,The Last Lion (Boston:Little,BrownandCompany,1983):680. Churchill,as citedby Brendon,92. ChurchilloftenlikenedBolshevismto disease. For example,he comparedLeninto a “plaguebacillus”andreferredto the “Bolshevikcancer”as a “monstrousgrowthswellingandthrivingupontheemaciated bodyof itsvictim.” SeeManchester,680and Gilbert,441. Churchill,as citedby Gilbert,The Stricken World,, 227. Rowland,496. I 32 said, should be made “a living partner in the League of Nations and a friend of the Allied Powers or there would be neither peace nor victory.” 36 A constituent assembly based on democratic franchise should be implemented, and in fact, when it appeared that General Denildn, leader of the anti Bolshevik forces in southern Russia, might reach Moscow and oust the Bolsheviks, Churchill was enthused enough to declare that he could travel to Moscow “as a sort of ambassador” to “help Denildn mould the new constitution.37 In addition, Churchill wanted to see anti-Semitism suppressed and recognition of the independence of Poland, Finland and the Baltic states. Aid to the anti-Bolsheviks should only be given if they promised to adhere to all these demands. In spite of his strong opinions, Churchill was not in a position to implement whatever policy he saw fit. Rather, he had to implement the policy decided upon by Lloyd George and the Cabinet. This was rendered somewhat difficult by the fact that, as has been mentioned there was no Russian policy. Therefore, one of Churchill’s first moves upon becoming War Secretary was an attempt to get Allied policy toward Soviet Russia defined. On February 12, he asked the War Cabinet for a decision on the issue, stating that, “if we were going to withdraw troops, it should be done at once. “If we were going to intervene, we should send larger forces there;” he then added that he favored the latter course 38 A day later he said that
if we were unable to support the Russians effectively, it would be better to take a decision now to quit and face the consequences, and tell these people to make the best terms they could with the Bolsheviks, than to leave our troops there and continue without a policy.39
The War Cabinet, however, had concluded on January 10, 1919, that the Russian dilemma would have to await the formulation of a general policy by the peacemakers at Versailles, and now, a month later, Lloyd George repeated that questions of this nature could only be decided in Paris with the personal involvement of President Wilson. Thus, on February 14, 1919, Churchill traveled to Paris in an attempt to unearth Allied policy. He also had an idea of his own to promote. He hoped to persuade the Allies to establish an Inter Allied Commission whose express purpose would be to examine the Russian question and “to assemble possible means and resources for action in a comprehensive form and to submit this report to the Supreme War Council. 40 This was not intended as a prelude to war, but rather, as an effort to evaluate the situation so that resources could be pooled in an efficient manner and an informed decision could be made as to whether to “fight or quit; get on or get out”. 41 Churchill’s proposal met with doom. The United
36Churchill,ascitedbyJohnAlbertWhite, The Siberian Intervention, (Princeton,NJ.: PrincetonUniversityPress,1950): 332. 3’ Churchill,ascitedby Henry Pelling,WinstonChurchill (NewYork: TheWorldPublishingCompany,1970):118. LloydGeorgewasnotsupportiveofthisplanandstronglydiscouragedChurchillfromentertainingsuchthoughts. 38 Gilbert, ed., Companion Votume1V,Part 1, 521. 39Churchill,ascitedbyRhodesJames,119. 40 Churchill,as citedbyPelling(NewYork:TheWorldPublishingCompany,1970):2556. 41 Churchill,as citedbyGilbert,The Stricken World, 254. 33
States declared that it could not possibly send troops or supplies to Russia, while back in London Lloyd George was, in his own words, “very aiarmed,” 42 saying that if the British people knew Churchill had iraveled to Paris to instigate a plan of attack against the Bolsheviks, there would be a revolution in England. As a result, the only decision made was that each country’s military advisors would examine the problem individually and might then make an informal and unofficial report to their respective representatives at the Conference. Thus, Churchill returned to London with his mission unfulfilled. On January 27, 1919, Churchill had written to Lloyd George that,
.it seems to me most urgent for us to frame and declare our policy. Evacuate at once at all is a policy; it is not a very pleasant one from the point of view of history. Reinforce and put the job through is a policy; but unhappily we have not the power our orders would not be obeyed, I regret to say. 3
Under these circumstances, and with the Allies at Versailles unable or unwilling to take action against the Bolsheviks, Churchill was forced to modify any undisguised plan for the complete extermination of the Bolshevik regime to the more subtle “we must act up to the full limits of the authority which has been granted to us, and he approached this task with his usual indomitability, saying that “after conquering all the huns -- tigers of the world -- I will not submit to be beaten by the baboons.”45 In attempting to persuade his colleagues of the necessity of action against the Bolsheviks he used the following arguments. First of all, British reputation was at stake. All civilized forces in Russia, he claimed, “realized that we alone (with the doubtful exception of the Japanese), had really befriended and assisted them; and if we turned round now and cleared off our reputation would suffer irrethevably.”46 This was important since he wanted to create a Russia friendly to the Entente, thereby forestalling the dreaded linkup of Germany, Japan and Bolshevik Russia. In addition, he declared “it was idle to think that we should escape by sitting still and doing nothing. Bolshevism was not sitting still. It was advancing.” Every effort must be made to stop it before it engulfed other countries with its revolutionary ideas. It was therefore
a delusion to suppose that all this year we have been fighting the battles of the anti- Bolshevik Russians. On the contrary, they have been fighting ours; and this truth will become painfully apparent from the moment that the Bolshevik armies are supreme over whole vast territories in the Russian Empire. ‘
42 George,ascitedbyRowland,499. 3 Gilbert,ed., Companion Volume IV, Part 1, 487. Churchill, ascitedby Gilbert,The Stricken World, 289. Churchill, ibid. 275-6. 46 Gilbert, ed.Companion Volume IV, Part 1, 717. ‘ Churchill, 270.
1
34
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he
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profound
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been
earlier
longer.
118.
were
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George
stating
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intervene
attained.
682.
declaring
1918,
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murderers
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496.
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and
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be
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at
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31,
Lloyd
it
you
52
resources
Powers
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the
supplies
and
said,
bemoaned
“most
express
Prime
James,127.
much
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“,
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48
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497.
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Like peaceable
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If
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arrange As
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Chamberlin,
Rowland,
Churchill,
Lloyd
Lloyd
51 54Lloyd 55
see 50 53
Churchill on 52LIoyd
and invitation 49Uoyd
48
abandonment
other,
the
statement Russians
“Lloyd intervention
well.
with
and
war,” and 35 amenable, made no mention of halting the advance of the Red Army, which was one of the condltlOfls required by the Allies. Sir Henry Wilson’s diary entry on January 20, 1919, contains the jotted statement “Winston all against Bolshevism, and therefore in this, against Lloyd George.” 56 The difference n the views of these two men can be summarized as that between a massive coordinated effort to destroy “that foul combination of criminality and animalism which constitutes the Bolshevik regime” and a leaning to negotiations and recognition of the Bolsheviks as personified by the prinldpo Island plan. In fact, Lloyd George later wrote that “personally I would have dealt with the Soviets as the de facto Government of Russia.” 58 Lloyd George’s arguments against intervention provide an interesting foil to Churchill’s views and can be summarized as follows. Intervention, he argued might arouse national sentiments in the White Russians, thereby driving them into the ranks of the Bolsheviks. Furthermore, he was not convinced that the White Russians were heralds of a democratic regime many seemed reactionary, and therefore unworthy of British support. In any case, the grave labor position forbade an offensive action in Russia, as did the exorbitant cost such a mission would entail at a time when the exchequer was in severe financial difficulties. It was clear that “the British public will not tolerate the throwing away of more millions on foolish military enterprises ... Let us therefore attend to our own business and leave Russia to look after hers;” 60 and, along the same lines, Britain could not take the “terrible responsibility of restoring order in a country which is a continent, which is part of two continents, which no country has ever intervened in without landing itself in disaster.” 61 It was therefore up to Russia to save herself. Lloyd George’s attitude was a hindrance to Churchill; it undermined his attempts for more active intervention but it nevertheless did not bring these attempts to a complete stop or render them entirely ineffective. First of all, the Prime Minister as well as a large part of the Foreign Office had moved to Paris for the first six months of 1919 and were almost completely absorbed in the peace negotiations. Furthermore, other members of the Cabinet gave Churchill somewhat haithearted support, while there was much sympathy for the anti-Bolshevik cause in the House, especially among the Conservatives, who regarded with anxiety Lloyd George’s apparent readiness to fraternize with the Bolsheviks. 62 This allowed Churchill to pursue his anti-Bolshevik
56Cafiwell,Field-Marshall,SirHenry Wilson: His Ltfe and Diaries, Vol. II, (London:CassellandCompany,Ltd, 1927): 165. Wilsonwenton to say, “Ican’tunderstandLloydGeorgebeing sucha fool.” Churchill,as citedby Gilbert,The Stricken World, 268. 58 LloydGeorge,331. In hisownwords,LloydGeorgefelttherewasa dangerthat “militaryinterventionwouldonlystrengthentheveryforce whichwe set out to destroy....Theonesuremethodof establishingthepowerof Bolshevismin Russiawas to attemptto suppressit by foreigntroops. To send our soldiersto shootdownBolshevikswouldbe to createmoreBolshevikshere. The best thingwasto let Bolshevismfail of itself,as it might,andprobablywouldif it did notrepresentRussiansentiment.” Rowland,407. 60 George,as citedby Manchester,682. 61LloydGeorge,as citedby Uliman,308. 62 Rowland,498. 7, 36 6 2 64 in of be the the the the war was Sea that also that wore theft, could better which retreat the a officers tanks, Kolchak almost with Denikin, Between he This 1919, and shore.” would including Kolchak’s the In in often White amounts against devised 74 into catastrophic decided grounds ammunition, on succeeded in and and Churchill and anti-Bolshevik 1920, the touch quays, off question the front before them. had Crimea, large had as of arms guns the October, the on the heels recovery. “the advantage remain the blow, that suffered of and of however, available, a successful. on themselves assistance on to soon selling our slithered small conditions 1,200 that spring best this Cabinet motorcycles, as at impossible. of would by those forces establishing severe Yudenitch had the the the rotted middle maneuver than troops making 279 to so without hospitals, by establish Churchill, with render and confined relatively the resources be dismay, profit this declared rounds while to to a up more asylum, to rendered and used By field all was now first them homes, withdrawn “blow Bolsheviks example, Yudenitch link 25 not a he was Equipment be of feasible. left was million turned to For anti-Bolshevik their with and blow Moscow ambulances, seemed claimed justifying armies, Churchill Russians included be Churchill’s a this, in success. often volunteers the 500 and of pack forces able enemy to In and should who troops use all their of Russia, less hospitals, be alone White were common. would the 8,000 of armies, miles February up rifles, for advance, Koichak supplied whole striking much the food. with clothing up a trucks an consistently. deal weeks, 200 would be British link were Russian of general early even a White Southern so and to met Denildn supplies Archangel 629 in have with the 200,000 bedding round of to three without bed and the loyal 129. evacuation that did issue within troops was enabling of to and although, a and of aid an he out These disintegration 500 disaster.63 guns, areas Russians would clothing nor point thus James, Churchill 65 Within 12 come and maintenance uniforms, beds such double British we Bolsheviks clear vast the rapid withdrawal a advance British Petrograd had managed incident, collapse to to the White the military non- Rhodes of Murmansk the the machine soldier, withdrawal Kotlas, the where took advisors, south, the aircraft, by by to in million however, advance. hospital 1920, that at the freedom, of and the a equipment. the 6,100 100 led without Denildn controlled cited with point and British Churchill took their possible suburbs in goal that 251. attempted a as more half by hoped troops officers whole, 212. protecting of the deteriorated executed once before cars, the a Kolchak 1919 not shells, which led of to .we The spoilage, Faced also with as than had troops risking had while executed officials been height British Uliman, Churchill, Churchill, was armored exile. 64 65 arms,ammunition, and who 63 million more defeats entering the had advocated waste, army March, communication effort Bolsheviks. was Whites rags position General It recover scheme if, thawed the policy 37
must now be faced is how to save as much as possible from the wreck.” 66 Along these lines, Churchill hoped to establish a place of refuge in the Crimea, fearing that unless this were done, the whites would face indiscriminate slaughter by the Bolsheviks. Churchill also fought against the Cabinet decision to evacuate only British citizens from the Crimea, again fearing that those unable to escape would be left to the mercy of the Bolsheviks. In both of these efforts Churchill was unsuccessful. His last gasp in the anti-Bolshevilc struggle occurred over the issue of trading with the “hairy baboons.” A Soviet trade delegation had arrived in Britain and lengthy negotiations began, culminating in the Anglo/Russian Trade Agreement of March, 1921. Churchill fought this act of “giving special countenance to this criminal regime,” 67 saying, among other things, that the gold and jewels with which the Bolsheviks would pay for the goods they wished to purchase was bloodstained, having been stolen from its rightful owners and in many cases, from their corpses. He even considered resigning over the issue. When the Cabinet approved the principal of concluding an agreement with Bolsheviks, Churchill was “so upset by the decision that he declared himself unequal to discussing other items on the Agenda affecting the army. He was quite pale and did not speak again during the meeting.” 68 This was the end of Churchill’s active involvement in the Russian fiasco. British intervention had ended in disaster. It had been implemented too halfheartedly and lacked what Churchill described as the will to win. This was not due to Churchill, for the policy implemented was not the one that he had advocated. His policy of “intervening more effectively with large forces abundantly supplied with mechanical devices” had never been tried. Could it have succeeded? It is possible. The condition of the Red Army in early 1918 was pitiful. Some troops were near starvation, they lacked proper clothing and rifles, and ammunition was in short supply, while sources of fuel, steel and iron were in the hands of the Whites. 70 Had they been forced to fight during the winter of 1917-1918, they would have been doomed, but at this point, the Allies were still pinned down on the Western front and the Whites were in the process of gathering their forces; it took Kolchak more than a year to organize his troops, and Deniltin even longer. In fact, organization was one of the chief problems plaguing the Whites. In contrast to the dedication, unswerving purpose and unity evidenced by Lenin and his cohorts, the Whites were united only by their dislike of Bolshevism. Some were monarchists in favor of the restoration of the Tsar, others were parliamentarians, and still others were socialists. As a result, no one program was acceptable to all anti-Bolshevik factions and they often squabbled among themselves. Unity of command was lacking, troops were widely dispersed and disorganization prevailed. One historian writes that:
had all the hatreds which the Bolsheviks inspired throughout Russia and in certain leaders of
66 Churchill,271. 67 Churchill, as cited by Gilbert,The Stricken World,436. 68 MauriceHankey, as cited by Gilbert, 440. 69 Churchill, as cited by Gilbert, The Stricken World, 254. 70 Manchester, 674.
38
or
is
in
be
had
one
But
more
their
that
sorely policy
against
mutual
Curzon
will
in a
suicidal
any
actually
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complete estimated
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stationed
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away.
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judgement
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the
armies
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by labor
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Finally,
Denildn.
pacifistic
and this
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Wilson
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became
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situation
Henry
penned
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have
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own he
686.
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charging
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had
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not
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Bolsheviks
Trotsky,
to
when
fell.
the
by
aid
them.
large
71
in
and
in
the
before
they
and
policy
Churchill
failing
could
could
military
saving
360.
out
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L100,000,000
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1919, its
to
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against
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Lenin not
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speak
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regime
Gilbert,
3,
opponents.
cited
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did
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wasted
though
did
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and
76
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chances
pointed
and
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decided
of
was
276.
751.
Denildn
that
72
Soviet
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definite
alienated, he
cited
left,
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of
on
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was
267.
265.
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last
Wilson,
stated
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December
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Churchill
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.
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75
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71
destroyed
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that
in
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absence
employed contradictory,” 39
proved once again that he could not be trusted. The ominous prophecy uttered by the conservative Morning Post upon Churchill’s appointment as Secretary of State for War and Air seemed to have been fulfilled:
Mr. Churchill began in the Army; but he found early occasion to leave it, and his departure, we have heard, was not regretted. Since then he has wandered far, but we have watched his brilliant and erratic course in the confident expectation that sooner or later he would make a mess of anything he undertook. Character is destiny; there is some tragic flaw in Mr. Churchill which determines him on every occasion in the wrong course.
The effect of intervention on Churchill’s career was therefore not a happy one. The effect of intervention on the Bolshevik regime, however, can be regarded in two lights. As an attempt to overthrow the Bolsheviks, it was a complete failure which brought neither territorial nor economic advantage to any of the participants.78 However,claimed Churchill, intervention had achieved at least two beneficial results. The first, he said, was moral:
..we can at any rate say that the Russian forces who were loyal to the Allies were not left without the means of self-defence. There were placed in their hands weapons which, had they been a society of higher quality and with great comprehension of their own cause and of their own countrymen, might have enabled them to conquer.
The second benefit arose from the fact that during 1919, the Bolsheviks had to concentrate on the internal struggle against the White Russians and were effectively prevented from turning their attention elsewhere. Thus, a:
.breathing space of inestimable importance was afforded to the whole line of newly liberated countries which stood along the western borders of Russia. Kolchak and Denilcin, and those who followed them, are dead or scattered. Russia has been frozen in an indefinite winter of subhuman doctrine and superhuman tyranny. But Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and above all Poland, were able during 1919 to establish the structure of civilized States and to organize the strength of patriotic armies. 80
Gilbert,180. 78 Chamberlin,170. ‘ Churchill,287. 80 Churchill,288. WilliamChamberlinagreeswithChurchill’sassessment,sayingthat“whileinterventiondidnot OverthrowtheSovietgovernment,it didinallprobabilitypushthefrontierofBolshevismconsiderablyfarthertothe east.” SeeChamberlin,172.