Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War and Japanese Troops in Russia’s Far East, 1918–1922

Sergey V. Grishachev and Vladimir G. Datsyshen

The years 1918–1922 occupy a special place in the history of Russian-Japanese relations, however, the significance of this era is not limited to the presence of a Japanese army in the Russian Far East.1 Both sides were forming contacts against the backdrop of conflicting socio-political doctrines, the appearance of a new system of international relations, and a new global order. The events of this period should therefore be viewed within the broader context of interna- tional relations in Europe at this time, of the Russian Civil War, and of the con- flict between the Russian Red (Bolshevik) and White (anti-Bolshevik) armies. Russian-Japanese relations in early 1917 were mixed. On the one hand, there was the lingering historical memory of the recent Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, but on the other, the two countries had enjoyed rapproche- ment for over a decade, and they were allies in World War I. The situation was further complicated due to the democratic revolution in Russia in February 1917. The Japanese government was cautious about the political changes but recognized the Russian Provisional Government, which honored the former commitments made by the imperial Russian regime, including those linked with foreign policy. When the Bolshevik party took power following a political revolt in Petrograd in October 1917, however, it refused to continue any former foreign policies. Germany acknowledged the new government under Vladimir I. Lenin—after July 1918 known as the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR)—yet the Entente countries of France and the United Kingdom did not. The Bolsheviks renounced all commitments to former governments in 1918, and most diplomats from leading countries left Russia temporarily, among them the Japanese ambassador Uchida Kōsai. The sepa- rate Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between the Central Powers of Germany, Austria- Germany, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman empire was signed in March 1918, and this ended Russia’s participation in World War I. This facilitated Germany’s

1 Japanese troops left Vladivostok in 1922, and this meant the end of an Allied campaign, mili- tary intervention, and political conflict in the Russian territory. Japanese occupation of the northern part of Sakhalin continued from 1920 to 1925, however, and thus strictly speaking it was not “intervention.” The 1920–1925 era was closer to occupation. The future of Sakhalin and the matter of its return to Russia was discussed during later diplomatic negotiations between representatives of Soviet Russia and Japan in 1923–1925.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004400856_009 138 Grishachev and Datsyshen position during World War I, enabling it to mobilize sizable forces on the Western Front. This, in turn, created further problems for Russia’s former allies of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. Despite the Bolsheviks rise to power, Russia still had patriotic political fac- tions that viewed the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as a treasonous act. The Entente countries relied on these factions, and they began discussions regarding an armed intervention in Russia and assistance to anti-Bolshevik forces in late 1917. Yet there was no unity between the Allies about the inter- vention plan and the degree of their respective involvement. Japanese leaders, too, had divergent opinions. For instance, Ambassador Uchida, who returned to Japan in March 1918, maintained that it would be pointless to send troops to fight the Bolsheviks. This was echoed by Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo in his comments in parliament: “The Japanese government has never suggested or encouraged any country to start a military campaign in Siberia … We have a deep affection for the Russian people and wish to develop our sincere friend- ship” (Molodyakov 2006, 92–93). This contrasted the opinions of politicians such as Gotō Shinpei who, while backing intervention, also wanted an admin- istration committed to furthering economic cooperation with Japan to remain in power. Most Russian diplomats refused to recognize the Bolshevik govern- ment, and they tentatively agreed that a military intervention would be neces- sary to overthrow the Soviets. The ambassador to China, Nikolaĭ A. Kudashev, believed that: “We … can have no objections to Japan’s campaign … The resto- ration of order by the Japanese would be welcomed by the population, despite the fear of unavoidable Japanese occupation” (Livshits 1991, 7).

1 Japanese Intervention in the Russian Far East, 1918

Allied troops invaded Russia in the spring of 1918, soon after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. British forces were to operate in the north, in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, as well as in the South Caucasus, while French troops moved across southern Ukraine. US and Japanese troops landed in the Far East. The landing operation in Vladivostok near the country’s border with China began on April 5, 1918, at which point Rear Admiral Katō Kanji (Katō Hiroharu) addressed the Vladivostok population:

Citizens! I, Commander of the Japanese Squadron, sincerely empa- thize with the situation Russia has found itself in and wish a quick end to all fighting and that your revolution is a resounding success … I have deep concerns, however, that ongoing political disputes may become