93 Great War in Transcaucasia: from Ottoman Occupation to the Treaty of Kars

ISSN 2039‐2117 Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 3 (2) May 2012 Great War in Transcaucasia: From Ottoman Occupation to the Treaty of Kars Alessandro Vagnini Department of History, Culture, Religions Faculty of Philosophy, Arts, Humanities and Oriental Studies Sapienza University of Rome,Italy E-mail: [email protected] Doi:10.5901/mjss.2012.v3n2.93 Abstract: In October 1914 the Ottoman Empire declared war on the Entente joining the Central Powers. Now the Turks threatened Russia’s Caucasian provinces and the communications within the British Empire via the Suez Canal but the main campaign of the Ottoman army would extend from southern Caucasus to eastern Asia Minor. Between 1914 and 1917 the situation on this front was quite difficult for the Turks, only the collapse of the Russian forces would change this situation. In November 1917, a first government of an independent Transcaucasia was created in Tbilisi while the Ottomans aiming at creating their own rule on southern Caucasus launched a new offensive toward Baku. The Russian Revolution and the capitulation of the Central Powers, however, open the way to the rivalry between Caucasian nationalities which will be solved only with the arrival of the Soviet forces. Notwithstanding, the conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijani can not find a definitive solution even if the Treaty of Kars restored at list a stable border between Kemalist Turkey and Bolshevik Russia. Keywords: Great War, Transcaucasia, Ottoman Empire, Azerbaijan, Russia 1. Background As a consequence of the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, in the summer of 1914 Europe was involved in a conflict of immense proportions. On 28 July, the war opened with the Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia, followed by Russian intervention and the chain of general mobilization. German invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg and northern France followed soon after (Liddell Hart, 1934). Meanwhile, Russians launched an attack against Germany on the Eastern Front. In mid- September, after the German march on Paris was brought to a halt, the Western Front settled into a static battle of attrition over along trench line that changed little until 1917. On the Eastern Front, the Russian army successfully fought against the Austro-Hungarian forces but was forced back by the Germans while additional fronts opened after the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in October 1914; a secret Ottoman-German Alliance having been signed already on August 2, one day after the German Empire declared war on Russia. It was this binding alliance that ultimately led the Empire to enter the War on the side of Germany even if some important figures still favored an alliance with France and Great Britain. The Sultan Mehmed V wanted the Empire to remain neutral; however, pressure from Germany and the Young Turks led the Empire to align with the Central Powers. As a matter of fact, Germany had invested heavily in Turkey in previous years and now needed the Ottoman Empire on its side. The alliance was sustained by many high ranking officials, including Grand Vizier, the Minister of War Enver Pasha, the Interior Minister Talat, and Head of Parliament Halil Bey (Biagini, 2002; Aksakal, 2008; McMeekin, 2010). The Ottoman army threatened Russia’s Caucasian provinces and the communications within the British Empire via the Suez Canal. For this reason, the Allies sought to defeat the Turkish forces as soon as possible and opened overseas fronts with the Gallipoli and Mesopotamian campaigns. In Gallipoli Peninsula (Eastern Thrace), where Anzac and French forces had landed in February 1915, after harsh fighting the Ottomans successfully repelled the enemies. In Mesopotamia, by contrast, after the disastrous siege of Kut (1915–16), British Imperial forces were able to reorganize and later captured Baghdad in March 1917. In the 93 ISSN 2039‐2117 Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 3 (2) May 2012 west, the Suez Canal was successfully defended from Ottoman attacks in 1915 and 1916 and a British offensive eventually brought to the fall of Palestine in 1917. The Caucasus, however, remained the main theater of operations for Ottoman forces.1 2. The Caucasus Campaign The main campaign of the Ottoman army extended from the southern Caucasus to the eastern Asia Minor. The land warfare was accompanied by small operation of the Russian and Turkish navy in the Black Sea. At the beginning of the war, the Turks had their Third Army based in the region, while the Russians lined up their Caucasus Army under the nominal command of the Governor General of the Caucasus with his chief of staff, General Nikolai Yudenich, as real commander. On land, Enver Pasha, supreme commander of the Ottoman armed forces, aimed to conquer the Russian Caucasus and eventually extend Turkish control over the whole central Asia. He launched an offensive in the region in December 1914 with an army of a strength of about 100,000; however, insisting on a frontal attack against mountainous Russian positions in winter season, the Turks suffered heavy losses at the battle of Sarıkamış in December, 1914 (Erickson, 2001, pp. 55-60). After this almost suicidal attack in winter snow, the Turks who were not already dead, many of them frozen and typhus-ridden, retreated to Erzurum (Allen and Muratoff, 1953, pp. 249-285). This brought to a brief standstill. Later on, General Yudenich, which had been given full command of operations in 1915, launched a series of attacks that drove the Turks out of most of southern Caucasus.2 Hopes of an Ottoman victorious offensive now seemed to be compromised. On February 12, the Turkish commander Hafiz Hakki Pasha died and was replaced by Mahmut Kamil Pasha in charged with the reorganization of the army. In March strategic situation was stable while the Ottoman Third Army received reinforcements, although these supplements were no stronger than a division. As a matter of fact, the battle of Gallipoli was draining every Ottoman resource. After small skirmishes, Russians forces kept the towns of Eleşkirt, Ağrı and Doğubeyazıt in Eastern Anatolia. On April 20, 1915, fighting erupted in the city of Van between Armenians and Turkish troops until Yudenich began an offensive (Bloxham, 2005).3 The Russians advanced towards Erzurum. The Ottoman X Corps counter-attacked but they were not able to stop the enemy. On May 17, Russian forces entered the town of Van and Ottoman forces continued to be pushed back.4 On May 21, General Yudenich arrived to the city and supported an Armenian provisional government while fighting shifted farther west for the rest of that summer. On June 19, the Russian army launched another offensive northwest to Lake Van. However, they underestimated the size of the Ottoman forces and were surprised by a large counter-attack. Actually, although the conditions were extremely difficult, the Turks were now ready to face the Russian attacks. On September 24, 1915, Grand Duke Nicholas was promoted to being charge of all Russian forces in the Caucasus. Actually, he was removed from being Supreme Commander of the Russian Caucasus Army and replaced by General Yudenich. The front was quiet from October till the end of the year and Yudenich used 1 For an overall analysis of the Ottoman army in the Great War, see E. Erickson, Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2001; S. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2006. 2 Also British-French operations at Gallipoli helped the Russian forces in the Caucasus front. 3 What happened at Van and the fear of an Armenian betrayal were among the main causes of the violent repression implemented by the Ottoman authorities against them. 4 Moreover, Turkish supply lines were being cut, as the Armenian rebellions were causing additional difficulties behind the Ottoman lines. 94 ISSN 2039‐2117 Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 3 (2) May 2012 this period to reorganize.5 The Ottoman situation was very different. The High Command failed to make up the losses during the last months while fresh troops had been deployed to Gallipoli and Mesopotamia. In early January, Yudenich secretly left its winter quarters and marched towards the Ottoman positions at Erzurum where he achieved total surprise and destroyed an entire Ottoman division at Köprüköy, where during further fighting both rings of the cities’ defenses had been penetrated. In April, the Russian army moved from Erzurum and captured Trabzon. Soon after, Erzincan was captured too, while an Ottoman counter-offensive against Trabzon was halted. Only in August, Mustafa Kemal, asked to organize the defense in the region, recaptured Mush and Bitlis, while fighting around the east side of Lake Van continued throughout the summer. However, by the late September, the Ottoman attack ended. The rest of the year 1916 was spent by the Ottomans with organizational and operational changes in Eastern Anatolian front. Fortunately for them, the Russians were quiet during this period. Moreover, the winter of 1916–1917 was extremely harsh, which made fighting nearly impossible. The situation did not change during the spring of 1917 and Russian plans for a renewed attack never substantiated. In 1917, Grand Duke Nicholas assumed again command of the Caucasus Front. He appointed much importance to the logistics and tried to obtain a decisive victory.6 The internal situation in Russia and the Revolution brought to the collapse of the Russian Caucasus Army. The chaos in the Russian army put a stop to all military operations. As a matter of fact, the Russian army slowly disintegrated but the Turks could not take advantage of this situation. It is also true that, considering the condition of Turkish troops, until the Bolshevik Revolution, Ottoman possible operation in Caucasus could not even be imagined.

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