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Reproduced with with permission permission of the of copyright the copyright owner. owner.Further reproduction Further reproduction prohibited without prohibited permission. without permission. THE DEVELOPMENT OF IN : A HISTORY

by

Maria L . Germano

submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Masters of Arts

in

International Affairs

Signatures of Committee:

Chair:.

(jQ 0 - r t > Dean of the School of International Service

' i ______Date \J

1995

The American University

Washington, D.C. 20016 774?

t h e AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 1378690

Copyright 1995 by Germano, L. AH rights reserved.

UMI Microform 1378690 Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. c COPYRIGHT

b y

MARIA L. GERMANO

1995

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM IN AZERBAIJAN: A HISTORY

by

Maria L. Germano

ABSTRACT

The increase of ethnic conflicts has created security

challenges for the international community. In the ,

the subject of this study, the collapse of the empire

led to a resurgent nationalism. This analysis treats both

historical and contemporary nationalism in the Caucasus,

beginning with confrontation in the early 1900s among

Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijanis. The historic

hostilities between and Azerbaijanis over Nagorno-

Karabakh have been renewed, and the historic roles of the

regional players— , , and — come into play in

the tense Armenian-Azerbaijani relationship. The study

concludes that extreme nationalism in Azerbaijan has had a

negative impact on efforts to build a viable state: political

and economic development have suffered as resources are spent

on waging a . An additional finding is that the country

needs to refocus efforts from national conflict to national

development, an area in which the international community can

play a positive role.

ii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to express my profound thanks to Dr. William Kincade,

whose constant guidance I greatly appreciated, and to Dr.

Anne Cahn, whose comments I found invaluable. I would also

like to thank Louis Klaveras and Frederick Williams for their

encouragement and, last but not least, my parents for their

love and support.

iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii

ILLUSTRATION vii

Chapter

IINTRODUCTION 1

Nationalism and the Collapse of the : An Overview

Azerbaijan in Brief

Analytical Aims

Nature of Nationalism

Nationalism Defined

Ethnicity

Nation

State

Self-determination

Sovereignty

Analytical Organization

II. THE SOVIET UNION AS EMPIRE AND ITS COLLAPSE .... 20

The Soviet Union as Empire

Metropole Motives

Weak Periphery

Penetrating the Periphery

International System

Disintegration of the Empire

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Rise of Nationalism in the Soviet Union

Communist Ideology

Glasnost

Perestroika

Internal Opposition

Moscow Resists Break-Up

Chapter

III. NATIONALISM EMERGES IN THE CAUCASUS ......

Overview

Caucasus: Brief History

Armenia

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Independence in the Caucasus

\ Nagorno- Conflict: History

Caucasus Nationalism under the Soviet System

Soviet Nationalities Policy

Summary

IV. INDEPENDENCE IN AZERBAIJAN ......

Overview

Azerbaijan under Gorbachev

Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Failure to Stop the Violence

Azerbaij an 1s Leaders

After the Soviet Union

v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Political-Military Developments

Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians

Views of the Conflict

Peace Efforts

Chapter

V. CONCLUSIONS ...... 1 1 2

Features and Effects of Nationalism

Caucasus in Context

Observations

Paradox of Nationalism

Future Developments

Outcomes to the Conflict

Status of Nagorno-Karabakh

International Organizations

Political and Economic Developments

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 134

vi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ILLUSTRATION

Figure

1. Caucasus and Surrounding States . .

vii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are solely the author's and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of State.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Nationalism and the Collapse of the Soviet Union: An Overview

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's rise as leader of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985 marked the

beginning of a new era in, as well as the beginning of the

end of, Soviet history. Gorbachev introduced a set of reforms

in the Soviet Union meant to strengthen the country. This

wide range of reforms was aimed at every aspect of Soviet

life— military, economic, political, social— and influenced

the lives of the people in the Soviet periphery. In order to

pursue his reform plans, Gorbachev ceded some of the center's

power to the republics.

Gorbachev sought to move away from the historical

Soviet method of making changes— from top to bottom.^

Instead, he gave the republics more freedom to address the

problems of the Soviet Union, thus empowering them to aid in

the country's restructuring and growth, which would benefit

both the periphery and the center. But 's loosening

grip on the republics turned into a tug-of-war between the

center and periphery over power in the regions. The

republics, discontented with Moscow's centrist policies,

1 Martha Olcott, "Gorbachev's National Dilemma," Journal of International Affairs 42 (Spring 1989): 400.

1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sought greater national freedoms. This tension hindered the

central leadership's attempts at reform, forcing Moscow to

concentrate on the immediate problem of keeping nationalist

movements under control. Demonstrations throughout the Soviet

Union, including those in Yerevan, Armenia, in 1989,

underscored the rise in vocal nationalist sentiments and

Moscow's unreadiness to address these concerns.

Confrontations between Moscow and the various

republics, including the dominant , advanced

the Soviet Union's demise. The country was plagued by a range

of hostilities, from direct center-periphery tension, as

reflected in Moscow's January 1991 use of force in the Baltic

republics, to conflict between republics, such as the

Armenian and Azerbaijani dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, a

predominantly Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan.(See Figure 1)

Also, Moscow had to contend with rising .

Like other groups, rebelled against the Soviet

government's lack of sensitivity to their ethnic concerns.

Unlike the other ethnic groups, Russians comprised a majority

in the Communist Party. The collapse of the Soviet Union was

as much a result of Russian nationalism in Russia as of

nationalism in the non-Russian republics. For "in the eyes of

Russian nationalists, seven decades of . . .left

Russia not only materially impoverished but poorer in spirit

as well."2 The Russian people put their faith not in the

2 Hedrick Smith, The New Russians (New York: Random House, 1990), 399.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. co vwv: lOOmnea > > i m m m 50 100 nbmetera Intamabonai boundary Selected railroad Approximate territory held by Armenian Karabakh forces Selected republic boundary '/ -----

AZERBAIJAN Dagestan • • Groznyy (AOA) akhichevan *\Chechnya \ ____ I M m ARMENIA G^E O R G IA G^E Erzurum Figure 1 - CAUCASUS AND SURROUNDING STATES ® f e 8 V^V-V-'V-v.' m w m * Nam*t and boundary rapreMrtstion ax« not rwcMMrily suttwxttsUvs suttwxttsUvs Source: rwcMMrily not Officeax« of the Geographer,rapreMrtstion U.S. boundary Department and Nam*t of State,1995 »

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Soviet government, but a Russian government headed by a

Russian leader, , "who was determined to use

Russian nationalism for the liberal objective of weakening

the Kremlin and centralized economic controls . . . "3

Decades of subjugation by Moscow had levied a toll on

the republics. With the advent of (openness) and

(restructuring) and the breakdown of the

Communist ideology, there was a resurgence of nationalism as

Russia and the periphery moved to gain more self-rule. This

struggle, coupled with infighting within the central

government in Moscow, facilitated the collapse of the Soviet

Union. The Soviet policy toward the nationalities, namely,

that nationalism would eventually fade— had, in reality,

preserved the national identity of a sizable number of ethnic

groups in the Soviet Union. By sustaining nationalist

sentiments through the creation of mostly ethnically-based

republics, yet suppressing expressions of national identity

at various times during the Soviet era, the Soviet government

created a base for discontent.

The attack against national sentiment appeared to be

greatest under . Stalin drafted the 1923

"Practical Measures for Implementing the Resolution on the

National Question Adopted by the Twelfth Party Congress,"

which contained a paragraph stating that:

3 Ibid., 413.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 A purge of the state and Party Apparatuses of nationalist elements (this refers primarily to the Russian nationalists, as well as to the anti-Russian and other nationalists). The purge must be carried out with caution, on the basis of proved data, under the control of the Central Committee of the Party.4

This opened the door to widespread attacks against members of

the Communist Party, as well as among other, more vulnerable

groups of people. Stalin worked against national sentiments

in a number of ways, including through the elimination of

republican Communist leaders— as in --and

restructuring into collectives. By changing people's

way of life, Stalin destroyed their roots.5 The purges

reached into every area of society. As one Belarussian said

about the mass at Kuropaty, :

Farmers were annihilated. The intelligentsia were annihilated. . .People who had belonged to some party or some movement were annihilated. They annihilated the believers--, Catholics. They annihilated priests. They annihilated ordinary people .6

Stalin's attack on the national identity of peoples of the

Soviet Union subsided during World War II, as Moscow and the

advancing German enemy fought for the allegiance of various

ethnic groups. The support for the Germans left many ethnic

4 Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soviet Disunion (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 61, citing KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh 2 (Moscow: 1970), 488-94.

5 Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Decline of An Empire (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 29.

5 Smith, 123.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. groups vulnerable to Stalin's revenge following the end of

World War II.7 Several national groups were deported from

their historic homeland and Stalin sought to limit cultural

expression of various non-Russian ethnic groups— namely their

literature and language. With Stalin's death came an end to

the destructive policy against national groups and began a

renewal of national identity and rehabilitation of some of

Stalin's victims. The lingering effects of Stalin's

repression, which reached into the lives of many families

throughout the Soviet Union, embittered the various ethnic

groups.

Following the demise of the Soviet Union, each of the

new independent states sought to lift itself from the

wreckage and carry on as a sovereign state. However, the

legacy of the Soviet Union lives on and cannot be easily

buried. Many of the economies of the new independent states

are in shambles, many of the governments are politically

weak, and the years of subjugation have left these new states

with little idea of how to run themselves. In some countries,

such as , the government carries on much as it

did under the old Soviet system. In other states, like

Armenia, valid attempts at democratic governance are under

way. But all are hindered by the lingering vestiges of the

Soviet system, including a command economy, government

suppression of opposing views, restrictions on the freedom of

7 Nahaylo and Swoboda, 96.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. movement, speech, and the press, and lack of political

experience within the new governments.

Aside from this baggage, the new states have to face,

for the first time in at least seven decades, their

individual responsibility for their future stability. The

nationalist movements that began in 1988 under the Soviet

system have continued in the new independent states, but the

focus has moved from a struggle against the Soviet center

unresponsive to ethnic concerns to a struggle in some states

against national movements within their own borders.

Nationalist desires have become an influential component in

decision-making in some new states, and have fueled

intolerance of other ethnic groups. The inability of the new

states to address the concerns of their ethnic minorities has

left them vulnerable to the same pressures nationalism placed

on Soviet Moscow.

Azerbai-ian in Brief

Azerbaijan is geographically bordered by Turkey (a

short border with the Nakhchyvan exclave), Iran, Armenia and

Russia. All are playing a significant role in Azerbaijan, as

they have in the past, and will continue to do so in the

future. Azerbaijan's previous experience with independence

was limited to a brief period during the Russian

between 1918-1920, before it was incorporated into the Soviet

Union. Azerbaijan has a second chance to build a viable

state, but its ability will be greatly influenced by how it

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. utilizes its nationalism. Armenian territorial claims on

Nagorno-Karabakh ignited old hostilities between Azerbaijanis

and Armenians. Rising ethnic tensions and Moscow's inability

to curb them led to a deterioration in 's relationship

with Moscow and motivated the republic's drive for

independence.

Since 1988, there have been continuous and intensifying

clashes between the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and

Azerbaijanis over territory that is the focus of a centuries-

old conflict. This is not only about an Armenian minority

group within Azerbaijan which desires its own independence

but about a minority which has manpower, material and moral

support from its brethren in Armenia.® This conflict

demonstrates the fragility of relations among the various

ethnic groups in the former Soviet Union, groups that have

lived next door to one another in relative peace for 70

years. That was largely due to Soviet Moscow's strong hand.

However, it is also believed that the peace was in many ways

a genuine one, with Armenians and Azerbaijanis living and

working side-by-side.9 Looking at the events since 1988, when

fighting erupted between the two national groups, this peace

was not deeply ingrained.

8 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992 (: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 706.

9 Author's discussion with an Azerbaijani, Washington, D.C.: November, 1994.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The rise of nationalism shifted Moscow's focus away

from reform to efforts to control national independent

movements and ethnic conflicts. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

also distracted the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaderships'

attempts to develop stable states. This is a deeply emotional

issue, as both Azerbaijan and Armenia have historic ties to

the Nagorno-Karabakh region and believe that it rightfully

belongs to their respective peoples. The territory is part of

their ancestral roots and thus retaining the land is part of

the nationalist focus. In addition, land has been equated to

power— a concept not lost on small countries like Armenia and

Azerbaijan— and territory has been a prime component of

.

Since 1988, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has resulted

in numerous casualties, from the deaths of thousands of

people and the creation of over a million and

displaced persons on both sides, to the political downfall of

successive presidents of independent Azerbaijan due to

territorial losses to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. In

addition, Armenia has suffered through several difficult

winters due to Azerbaijan's transportation embargo, which has

crippled energy-dependent Armenia's economy.

Under the , nationalism was suppressed.

Gorbachev's introduction of reforms opened the door for vocal

10 Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, Territorial Changes and International Conflict (London: Routledge, 1992), 2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10 opposition to the government's policies and a rise in

nationalism throughout the country. In Azerbaijan,

disillusionment over Moscow's ability to end the ethnic

strife there spurred the movement of the nationalist

Azerbaijani Popular Front toward independence. The

disintegration of the Soviet Union and Moscow's control over

the periphery left the new states in a vacuum.

Analytical Aims

The aim of this study is to analyze the development of

nationalism in pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet

Azerbaijan. To examine fully the dynamic of nationalism in

Azerbaijan, there will also be a review of national

tendencies in the other Caucasus states and the role of

regional players. The primary problem of the Caucasus states

is inter-ethnic fighting, which weakened these countries in

the early 1900s and threatens their future stability. Strong

nationalist sentiment in Azerbaijan has diverted attention

away from state-building and toward war. The Nagorno-Karabakh

dispute is an example of the persistence of ethnic conflicts

around the world that have created challenges for the

international community as well as concerns over the spread

of these types of disputes. As international organizations

seek to help resolve (or at least contain) ethnic disputes,

their efforts come up against the extreme nationalism that

drives adversaries to seek a zero-sum end to these conflicts.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11 This study will demonstrate the persistence of

nationalist sentiments in the Caucasus since the turn of the

century and how nationalism in Azerbaijan— particularly with

regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict— undermines national

interest. The study will conclude with suggestions for the

international community in helping these states focus on

national development, particularly in terms of security and

political and economic reform.

Nature of Nationalism

Nationalism Defined. Nationalism is defined in several

different ways. Some analysts, such as Karl W. Deutsch, view

nationalism as a state of mind, "which gives 'national'

messages, memories and images a preferred status in social

communication and a greater weight in the making of

decisions." H Other analysts, such as Walker Connor,

emphasize that nationalism is loyalty to the nation, not the

state.12 However, others argue that the ultimate goal of

nationalism is statehood. For example, Alexander Motyl views

nationalism as "a political ideal that views statehood as the

optimal form of political organization for each nation."13

11 Peter Alter, "Nationalism: an Overview" in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Charles P. Cozic, ed. (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1994), 20-1.

12 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 97.

13 Alexander Motyl, Sovietology. Rationality. Nationality (New York: Press, 1990), 53.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12 also links nationalism with the formation of a

state; he writes that a nationality is "a group held together

and animated by common consciousness" and seeking "to find

its expression in what it regards as the highest form of

organized activity, a sovereign state."14 Nationalism would

thus be the impetus which drives a nation to become a self-

governing state.

In "Gorbachev and the Nationalities Problem,"

Bozzo notes that the viewed nationalism as an

"impediment to the over-arching triumph of the proletariat,"

and Lenin maintained that over time nationalism would be

overcome by .15 During the Soviet era, references to

"nationalities" were equated to description of ethnic groups,

and the borders of local regions were often drawn along

ethnic lines.

Nationalism strives to protect the nation. Therefore,

as Hurst Hannum states, "... the growth of nationalism has

been largely a reaction against states and empires which were

unresponsive to the needs of the many communities of which

they were composed."16 This 'unresponsiveness' could be

14 Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of its Origins and Background. 1st ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), 19.

1^ Robert Bozzo, "Gorbachev and the Nationalities Problem," Global Affairs 5, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 22.

15 Hurst Hannum, Autonomy. Sovereignty and Self- Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 23,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13 insensitivity to the needs of a nation, or even the

oppression of a nation. Ted Gurr states that deprivation,

i.e., actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their

expectations and their capabilities, "is the basic

precondition for civil strife of any kind, and that the more

widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a

population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or

another form. "17 it was this feeling of deprivation that led

to the growth of nationalism, which in turn led to national

movements.

John Breuilly notes three types of nationalist goals:

(1) separation; (2) reform; and (3) unification.1® All three

are aspects of the movements which took place in Azerbaijan.

The nationalist movement in Azerbaijan began with a desire

for greater autonomy within the Soviet state but eventually

led to a drive for full independence as tensions rose in the

relationship between Moscow and Baku over the handling of the

Nagorno-Karabakh crisis. The Armenian desire for unification

of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia led to attempts to change

the borders during the Soviet period, specifically under

citing E.H. Hinsle, Sovereignty (New York: Basic Books, 1966), 45-158, and John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (New York: St Martin's Press, 1982), 44-45.

17 Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," American Political Science Review 62, no. 4 (December 1968):1104.

1® John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 11.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14 Gorbachev. One similarity between Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-

Karabakh Armenians is that both have sought to separate

themselves from the rule of leaders who could not meet their

needs.

Hans Kohn states that nationalism leads to sympathy for

all those sharing the same nationality, while at the same

time it is indifferent to or leads to the "distrust and hate

of fellow men outside the national orbit.Peter Alter, in

"Nationalism: An Overview," also mentions this distinction:

liberal nationalism, which means "liberating from political

and social oppression," and integral nationalism, which

describes a nation, "that proves itself as the strongest and

fittest in a hostile and competing world . . ."20 what began

as liberal nationalism throughout the Soviet Union has

quickly turned into integral nationalism (also called ultra

or extreme nationalism), as each nation seeks to improve its

situation without regard for, or at the expense of, other

national groups.

These various definitions of nationalism all come into

play in this study, especially those provided by Motyl and

Kohn on the desire of a particular people to create their own

state. In Azerbaijan at the end of the Soviet era, there was

a progression of nationalism from, at first, a desire for

Kohn, 20.

20 Alter, 22-23.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 15 greater national autonomy, to the eventual development of a

national movement seeking statehood. This study will also

show the ugly side of nationalism, which is the hatred that

one national group feels toward another.

In addition to nationalism, this study involves

discussion of ethnic groups, nation, state, self-

determination, and sovereignty, beginning with a summary of

the terminology of these concepts.

Ethnicity . The Soviet Union was composed of over 100

ethnic groups. Wsevolod Isajiw provides various definitions

of ethnicity, including one found in the International

Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences: "an ethnic group is a

distinct category of the population in a larger society whose

culture is usually different from its own. The members of

such a group are, or feel themselves, or are thought to be,

bound together by common ties of race or nationality or

culture.in its simplest form, ethnicity involves a

feeling of common ancestry.

Nation . Walker Connor notes the difference between an

ethnic group and a nation: "An ethnic group may be readily

discerned by an anthropologist or other outside observer, but

until the members are themselves aware of this group's

uniqueness, it is merely an ethnic group and not a nation."22

21 Wsevolod Isajiw, "Definitions of Ethnicity," Ethnicity 1 (July 1974): 116, quoting International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 5:167.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16 Stalin, in and the National Question, listed five

features of a nation: history, common language, common

territory, community of economic life, and what Stalin termed

a "psychological make-up," namely a culture.23 Emerson states

that a nation is "a community of people who feel that they

belong together in the double sense that they share deeply

significant elements of a common heritage and that they have

a common destiny for the future."24

State . Connor notes that a nation is an intangible,

psychological tie that brings a people together, while a

state is a "territorial-political unit."25 possibly the

simplest way to define this in Azerbaijan's case is to note

that Azerbaijan first began to view itself as a nation in the

late 19th century but has only been a state--i.e., had self-

rule over the nation— twice during this century, during 1918-

1920 and from 1992 to the present.

22 Connor, 103.

23 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1953), 8, citing Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (New York: International Publishers, 1942): 16-17..

24 Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard, 1960), 95; also see Eugene Kamenka, Nationalism: The Nature of Evolution of an Idea (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973), 12. Kamenka cites the lecture of Ernest Renan in 1882, in which Renan stated that nation was based on a sense of common history and the will of the people to live together.

25 Connor, 92, 96.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17 Self-determination . The principle of self-

determination ". . .is the right of all peoples to determine

their political future and freely pursue their economic,

social, and cultural development. Politically, this is

manifested through independence . . ."26 Th.e Soviet

constitution provided the republics the right to secede. This

provision was included to appease the national groups and

provide the impression that their right to self-determination

was preserved. Lenin, in defining self-determination, stated

that, "The right of nations to self-determination implies

exclusively the right to independence in the political sense,

the right to free political separation from the oppressor

nation."27 However, he went on to say, that "This demand

. . . is not the equivalent of a demand for separation,

fragmentation and the formation of small states. It implies

only a consistent expression of struggle against all national

oppression. "28 Lenin believed nations would fade away as the

proletariat rose up. The Soviet constitution placed the power

of granting the act of secession with the central leadership.

By 1991, as the Soviet government was in the final stages of

collapse, the republics challenged the right of the central

28 umozurike Oji Umozurike, Self-Determination in International Law (Hamden: Archon Books, 1972), 1.

27 V. I . Lenin, Collected Works. Vol. 22 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 146.

28 Ibid., 146.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18 leadership's decision-making on this issue by declaring, one

by one, their independence. The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians

also seek to free themselves from rule— Baku's— and view the

conflict as their fight for self-determination.

Sovereignty . Jean Bodin was the first to use the word

sovereignty in his Six Books on the State (1576). He defines

sovereignty as "the absolute and perpetual power of the

state, that is, the greatest power to command."29 This power

is not subordinate to any other authority nor does this power

have any time limitations.30 The Academic American

Encyclopedia states that sovereignty is "independent and free

from all external control; enjoys full legal equality with

other states; governs its own territory; selects its own

political, economic and social systems; and has the power to

enter into agreements with other (states). . ."31

Analytical Organization

This thesis proceeds by examining the Soviet Union in

the context of concepts relating to multiethnic empires,

their growth and their decline, demonstrating how the

U.S.S.R. reflected common patterns. It then explores the pre-

Soviet emergence and Soviet-era experience of nationalism in

29 jean Bodin, Six Books on the State, in William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1969), 354.

30 ibid., 355.

31 Academic American Encyclopedia (Danburry, Conn: Grolier Incorporated, 1987), 113.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19 the three Caucasus regions of Azerbaijan, , and

Armenia.

Next, the recent rise of Azerbaijan to sovereign

independence is reviewed, along with its irredenta, Nagorno-

Karabakh. The study concludes with observations on contemporary

Azerbaijan, in particular the role of nationalism in Azerbaijan,

the paradox of nationalism and the future prospects for peace

and stability in the Caucasus.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER II

THE SOVIET UNION AS EMPIRE AND ITS COLLAPSE

The Soviet Union as Empire

Officially, the U.S.S.R. was a federal state. Lenin

introduced the idea of federalism as a temporary measure to

appease the various national groups incorporated into the new

Soviet state. Federalism is defined as "the mode of political

organization which unites separate polities within an

overarching political system so as to allow each to maintain

its fundamental political integrity."1 One aspect of

federalism is the of powers between the central and

local governments. While the Soviet constitution promised the

right to secession, in reality the Soviet center did not

allow the republics to exercise that right. In fact, there

was little real division of power between the center and

periphery, making the Soviet Union a federal state primarily

in name only.

The Soviet Union has often been described as an empire,

a concept useful in understanding the nature of the Soviet

Union, the treatment of the periphery, and the impact this

empire had on nationalism. In examining the supranational

1 International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, David Sills, ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1968), 5: 353. 20

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21 character of the Soviet Union, Guy G. Imart defines empire

as:

. . . a country whose artificial cohesiveness rests on the hegemonistic strength of the sole true minority in it, namely, a self-proclaimed leadership which, turning upside down the principles of the natural legitimacy of power, engulfs the communities it controls by numbing their sense of specific unity.2

The "minority" was the Communist Party, which continued

tsarist Russification in the periphery. Although the

republics of the Soviet Union were divided more or less by

ethnic regions, thus preserving some of the ethnic identity

of these republics and various autonomous regions, the Soviet

leadership sought to undermine— and in some ways to ignore—

the ethnic unity of these various people through

Russification and Sovietization, dominance of local political

structures, dispersal of indigenous peoples to other regions

(especially under Stalin), and suppression of cultural and

religious expression (through censorship of cultural events,

literature, etc.).

These experiences demonstrated to the republics that

the power rested with the center. Any freedoms, such as in

the operation of the media, were provided by Moscow and were

reversible. Michael Doyle, in his study of empires from the

Roman to the British, defines this penetration into, and

control over, the periphery as an empire:

2 Guy G . Imart, "A Unique Empire," Central Asian Survey 6, no. 4 (1987): 16.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22 . . . a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social, or cultural dependence.3

Doyle examines how an empire rises, persists, and

disintegrates, focusing on: (1) the motives of the center, or

as he refers to it, the metropole; (2) the periphery's

weakness that leads to its incorporation into an empire; (3)

how the center penetrates the periphery; and (4) the role of

the international system. To understand the relationship

between the center and periphery and how nationalism lay

largely dormant under Soviet rule, requires a review these

four factors.

Metropole Motives. Doyle identifies three motives of

the center for developing an empire. One motive is glory, or

the idea that an aspiring metropole has the best to offer

another nation or state. The Bolsheviks' quest for glory was

found in their desire to further the revolution to .

The new Soviet state was to serve as a model for other

countries. In the beginning, Lenin was convinced that the

spread of the revolution was inevitable, writing in his April

1917 thesis, " want to rebuild the world."4 it later became

apparent that a revolution in Europe was not on the horizon,

3 Doyle, 40.

4 Hans Kohn, "Soviet Communism and Nationalism: Three Stages of a Historical Development," Soviet Nationality Problems. Edward Allworth, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 48.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23 as the proletariat in the industrialized states did not rise

up. In Nationalism and Ideology. Barbara Ward states that as:

. . . attempts to rally Communist revolutions in other states came up against other people's and were so unsuccessful . . . Lenin finally denounced intervention abroad as the work of 'madmen or provocateurs' . . .5

Under Stalin, priority was "given to the security of the

Soviet state, the 'base of ,' over world

goals . . ."6 The Bolshevik theme moved from

world revolution to socialism in one country, indicating that

the government would focus primarily on achieving socialism

in the Soviet Union.

Another motive for the rise of empires is security. The

Bolsheviks and the Russian people remembered the history of

subjugation and invasion from other groups throughout their

long history. "It was the urge for self-preservation . . .

which had forced the Russians to push off invaders and to

entrench themselves firmly in their habitats.The failure

of the Communist revolution to expand outside the Soviet

borders and the increased focus on economic and

5 Barbara Ward, Nationalism and Ideology (New York: W.W. Norton and Co, Inc, 1966) 98.

6 Boris Meissner, "Factors and Motivating Forces of Soviet Foreign Policy," The Development of Soviet Foreign Policy: Studies in Honor of W.W. Kulski. Warren Lerner, ed. (Durham, No. Carolina: Duke University Press, 1973), 364.

7 Geoffrey Parker, The Geopolitics of Domination (New York: Routledge, 1988), 82, citing N. Berdyaev, "0 Vlasti Prostranstv nad Russkoi Dushoi," Sudba Rossii. Oovtv oo Psikhologii Voinv I Natsionalnosti (Moscow, 1918).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24 internal matters had an impact on Soviet wariness of the

outside. Evgenii Anisimov, a historian at the USSR Academy of

Sciences, says that the consciousness of the 1930s was one of

a "fortress under siege."8 This feeling increased with

Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II and

the Soviet leadership's suspicions of U.S. intentions during

the . The Soviet Union created a buffer zone between

itself and the West through its control over the Eastern

European countries and the republics.

The third motive Doyle cites is an aspiring empire's

self-interest. The Soviet center was interested in what it could

gain by retaining the 's territories. The main

gain was economic wealth.9 The Bolsheviks realized the benefit

of seizing the territory of the former tsarist empire: "In the

life-and-death struggle of the civil war, principles counted for

little, and regaining vital border regions, which were the seats

of important industries and the sources for Russia's food and

fuel, was prized greatly."10 The Bolshevik leadership needed to

concentrate on areas that would permit its survival. One of the

necessities was a strong economy, hence the need for the

territory and resources once ruled by the tsarist regime.

® Evgenii Anisimov, speaking at the Kennan Institute, Washington, D.C., 14 May 1991, author's notes.

9 Parker, 82.

10 Alfred D. Low, Lenin on the Question of Nationality (New York: Bookman Associates, 1958), 134.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25 Weak Periphery. Richard Pipes, in his book Formation of

the Soviet Union, states that an empire strengthens itself

"by gradually reducing (the periphery's) independence. "H

Doyle asserts that this could be accomplished by controlling

the periphery's decision-making.12 The social, economic and

cultural environments of the center penetrate through the

periphery by means of a representative of Moscow, and these

representatives were loyal to the center.

Doyle also states that a periphery lacks political

unity and social organization to resist the center.13

Following the Russian Civil War, most of the former tsarist

regime's territory was reconquered by the Bolsheviks over a

period of two years. Beyond a few national groups that

resisted, most of the country was easily brought under Soviet

control.14 Thus emerged a state which consisted of over a

hundred different nations and ethnic groups. Like the tsars,

the Communist Party had to maintain this gathering of diverse

peoples through force, for "the frailer the bonds between the

H Richard Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 17.

12 Doyle, 37.

13 ibid., 76.

14 While the Georgians put up a fight against the approaching , national movements in most cases were very weak, such as the Byelorussian national movement and national movements in . For more background on these movements, see Richard Pipes' Formation of the Soviet Union.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26 various regions . . . the stronger the authority had to be,

that was to be capable of creating and keeping alive a

state."15

Penetrating- the Periphery. Doyle mentions two

conditions important to the empire's duration. The first is a

strong central and bureaucratic administration. The Soviet

leadership was headed by a single party which was involved in

all decision-making. The Communist Party suppressed

organizations that did not espouse the party line. Before the

Gorbachev era, Moscow maintained full control of the

administration of the country. Programs were implemented from

the top down, and the bureaucracy was dominated by selected

party cadres who had been placed on an elite list that

assured preferential promotion for those named to this so-

called '.' The political system in the country

was well integrated with party cadres in high positions

within the local governments.

The second condition important to imperial survival is

the integration of the empire politically, socially,

economically, and culturally. Political power given to the

republics was closely monitored. Although the republican

leaders were often of the titular ethnicity, they belonged to

the Communist Party, and the second in command was a Russian.

In this manner, the center satisfied the various ethnic

15 Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians (London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1896), 274.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 27 republics with a leader of their 'own kind,' yet had a firm

hold on nationalistic tendencies with a Russian second in

command.

Moscow's control extended into social life as well. The

government was intolerant of the practice of religion in the

country. Beginning with the 1917 "Declaration of the Rights

of the Peoples of Russia," which abolished national-religious

privileges, the Soviet government sought to weaken the

influence of religion in the c o u n t r y . ^6 The Russian Orthodox

Church, Georgian Orthodox Church, Armenian Church and

followers of Islam and other religions in the Soviet Union

had their activities restricted by Soviet policy. While

religious organizations functioned and survived during the

Soviet period, all came under state control. According to

Alexander Bogolepov, the intent of Soviet legislation on the

Russian Orthodox Church, and on other religions in the Soviet

Union, was to influence their disintegration.17

International System. Doyle includes the international

system as a factor in empire building. He lists two

structures of this system: uni- or bipolar and multipolar.

While "each pole of a bipolar system becomes aligned with a

16 Joshua Rothenberg, "The Legal Status of Religion in the Soviet Union," Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union. 1917-1967. Richard H. Marshall, Jr., ed. (Chicago: The Press, 1971), 62.

17 Alexander A. Bogolepov, "Legal Position of the Russian Orthodox Church," Marshall, 197.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 28 particular faction within the peripheral regime . . ." a

multipolar system presents a choice to the periphery among

several metropoles and "... thus a wider opportunity to

bargain for some measure of independence."18 while Doyle's

study reviews international systems in the 19th century, it

is possible to use the Cold War period as a model for bipolar

rivalry, as the United States and the Soviet Union had their

separate bloc of allies. As the Cold War came to an end, that

bipolar rivalry softened and allowed Eastern Europe and the

republics to shop around for other international ties.

Although Doyle notes that this international system is

more than a security issue with the metropoles, the interwar

threats from and fascism and the Cold War with the US

did stimulate the Soviet government's fear of the West. This led

Moscow to secure its borders through control of the republics

and countries. Gorbachev's New Thinking in Soviet

foreign policy indicated a need for change in how Moscow and the

West viewed each other in terms of security.19 This loosened

Moscow's grip on the East European countries.

The realization that Soviet fear of the West was

counter-productive to Soviet security enabled Gorbachev's

government to allow power to return to the East European

countries. Unlike his predecessors who used force in 1956

18 Doyle, 136.

19 , Perestroika (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1987), 128.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29 and 1968 to retain the Eastern European satellite countries,

Gorbachev did not interfere in East Europe as those countries

moved towards independence from Moscow. This played well for

Gorbachev, who was seeking to improve the Soviet government's

relations with the world community. It also influenced the

national groups in the Soviet republics to take steps toward

greater national freedoms.

New Thinking also allowed greater Soviet focus on

integration into the global economy. Gorbachev re-defined

Soviet views on the USSR's relationship with other countries,

including the re-evaluation of the impact the involvement in

regional conflicts had on East-West relations and the

prospects of Third World socialism. Gorbachev stressed the

need to resolve problems through peaceful negotiations. As

the need for security came to be seen in more realistic terms

and the center loosened its grip on the East European

countries, these factors set in motion the eventual release

of the republics from the center's grip.

Disintegration of the Empire

The Soviet government's attempts to aid in the

"withering away” of local national sentiments is another

feature Doyle attributes to empires:

A persistent empire presupposes imperial bureaucratic coordination and continuing transnational integration in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. This integration can merge the metropole and the periphery

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. . . . At this point an empire no longer exists, and the many peoples have become' one.20

In fact, the Soviet government's policies actually served to

preserve local nationalisms. According to Barbara Ward,

communism, . .by modernizing the economy, increasing

literacy, and creating a sense of popular participation

. . . can even become an agent of national self-

consciousness. "21 in listing the causes for the collapse of

empires, Doyle notes that:

The periphery in the course of political development within the empire may reach a point at which further collaboration becomes unacceptable. The disaffected elite of the periphery then expels the metropole in a national, anticolonial revolt. Having awakened to a sense of national legitimacy, having mobilized and coordinated the peripheral population . . . and having centralized and institutionalized the policy, the former periphery joins the ranks of effectively sovereign states.22

Doyle also notes that a weakened center and pressures of the

international system also contribute to the disintegration of

empires. Henry Rowen and Charles Wolf, in their book, The

Future of the Soviet Empire, agree that outside factors

influence an empire: "if there is a general theory on the

ending of empires, it is that a combination of internal

20 Doyle, 137.

21 Ward, 101.

22 Doyle, 137.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 31 weaknesses and external forces contributes to their decline

and fall."23

Motyl explains that a totalitarian state's decision to

give greater political freedom to the republics is due to the

waste of state resources.24 By focusing on its arms race

with the United States, the Soviet Union concentrated all its

efforts in one area, thus neglecting other issues. Gorbachev

tried to refocus the Soviet efforts on the domestic front

and, in doing so, allowed other players a voice in the

political arena. Motyl also states that a totalitarian state

is weakened when it engages upon a path of self-reform.25

Glasnost and perestroika were examples of Gorbachev's

attempts to reform the Soviet system.

In The Emergence of the Modern Middle East. Albert

Hourani notes two important aspects to the decline of the

Ottoman empire:

first the fragmentation inside the system of government, the ruler ceasing to control his army or government; and the central government losing control over the provinces; secondly by the forces of society bursting out of the framework imposed by the government, instruments of order becoming leaders of discontent or revolt . . .26

23 Henry Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr., "The Future of the Soviet Empire: The Correlation of Forces and Implications for Western Policy," The Future of the Soviet Empire, Henry Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr., eds. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 290.

2^ Motyl, 66.

25 ibid., 69.

26 Albert Hourani, The Emergence of the Modern Middle East (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), 12.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 32 Most of the periphery's dissent from Moscow's repressive

policies and its various forms of nationalist feeling had been

held in check until Gorbachev's reforms allowed for pent-up

grievances to be aired and different opinions to be openly

expressed. However, as nationalist movements were formed and the

voice of dissent grew louder, Moscow's leadership attempted to

maintain control of the republics. This did not weaken the

periphery's resolve, but instead led to a confrontation. By

empowering the republican leaderships, Gorbachev weakened the

center and its control over the periphery. The republics grew in

strength and attacked the weaknesses they saw not only in the

Soviet system, but in the Soviet leadership's ability to address

the system's problems.

In his evaluation of the Russian Empire, Richard Pipes

finds that one important factor in its collapse was the

periphery's attempts to break away from the c e n t e r . 27 This

factor is repeated in the collapse of the Soviet Empire. As the

Eastern Europe countries emerged victorious from the Soviet

empire's grip their experience encouraged the Soviet republics

to follow suit and look toward the West and its economic power

to be their salvation as they embarked on their respective paths

toward sovereignty. Years of Soviet subjugation and limitation

on expression of national sentiments took a toll on the

periphery, and one by one each took steps to further its

27 pipes, 294.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 33 individual national interests, such as language and cultural

rights.

While the reforms and the increase in nationalist

sentiments created a platform for debate, they did not produce

any solutions. The ideas that Gorbachev encouraged to reform the

country helped identify the problems but did little to solve

them. The Soviet Union found itself in a difficult situation:

A declining society experiences a vicious cycle of decay and immobility, much as a rising society enjoys a virtuous cycle of growth and expansion. On the one hand, decline is accompanied by lack of social cooperation, by emphasis on rights rather than emphasis on duty, and by decreasing productivity. On the other hand, the frustration and pessimism generated by this gloomy atmosphere inhibit renewal and innovation. The failure to innovate accentuates the decline and its psychologically debilitating consequences. Once caught up in this cycle, it is difficult for the society to break out.28

There were many factors involved in the collapse of the

Soviet Union, and two of the key aspects were persistence of

nationalism and, from that, rebellion against Moscow control.

As Doyle's model indicates, the influences in the empire's

demise came from the center, the periphery, and the

international system. The major force playing on these

influences was the rise of nationalist sentiment in the

Soviet Union. This does not mean that nationalist feelings

did not exist prior to the Gorbachev era, but under Gorbachev

28 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),190, citing Carlo Cipolla, The Economic Decline of Empires (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd, 1970), 11.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 34 those feelings were given a greater opportunity to be

expressed.

Rise of Nationalism in the Soviet Union

The tension between the center and periphery under

Gorbachev was not a recent phenomena; dissent over Moscow's

repression existed in the republics beneath the surface for

some time.29 The concentration on the needs of the Soviet

state at the expense of the individual republics added to the

frustration of the various ethnic groups over the years. By

creating republics, oblasts (region/province) and krays

(district/county) along ethnic lines, the center preserved

the feelings of nationalism. However, the center attempted to

control the ethnic groups through Russification,

Sovietization and deportation. This did not eliminate the

cultural and nationalist feelings of the various groups

within its borders, as evident in the rise in nationalist

expression following Gorbachev's reforms.

The breakdown of the Communist ideology and the

introduction of glasnost and perestroika were factors in the

rise in nationalism and the disintegration of the Soviet

Empire. The crumbling of the Communist ideology left a vacuum

for the people of the Soviet Union. A loss in purpose led to

a closer identification with their national background and

29 Gail Lapidus, "Gorbachev and the Reform of the Soviet System," Daedalus 116, no. 2 (Spring 1987): 5, states that the impetus for change was marked by people's growing lack of confidence in the Soviet leadership.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 35 paved the way for the rebirth of nationalism. Glasnost

provided a forum for expressing thoughts not previously

allowed, and this encouraged the expression of nationalist

sentiments. Perestroika gave local governments more political

and economic control, thus providing them with a taste of

autonomy and a yearning for more.

Communist Ideology. After seventy years, Communist

ideology was shaken by Gorbachev's proposals for reform. The

worldwide communist revolution Lenin predicted never happened

and the 'Communist experiment was limited to the Soviet Union

(and few other countries, such as China and Cuba) and forced

upon Moscow's satellite countries. The ideals of the Marxist-

Leninist doctrine first codified by Stalin were based on four

main factors. The first was the idea of building socialism in

one country; the second, the control over literature and the

arts; third, the importance of producer goods over consumer

goods; and fourth, the center's control over the m a s s e s . 30 By

the time Gorbachev came to power the centralized system was

ineffective and the economic situation stagnant. Gorbachev

believed that the unyielding ideology in the Soviet Union had

been an impediment to change and growth. At an ideology

conference in December 1984, Gorbachev said discrepancies in

the Soviet Union must be addressed "in a timely manner,"

30 Hillel Ticktin, Origins of the Crisis in the USSR: Essavs on the Political Economy of a Disintegrating System (New York: MESharpe, Inc., 1992), 19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36 because "a stagnant retention of outmoded production

relations may result in a worsening of the economic and

social situation.”31

Communist ideology guided and justified Communist Party

programs to maintain centralized control of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev viewed Communist ideology as an obstacle to needed

reforms and identified two problems with it: the rejection of

new ideas in favor of established ones, and the

centralization of the decision-making at the top, with no

room for opposing o p i n i o n s . 32 For Gorbachev, in order to

succeed in reforming the Soviet Union, and thus in

strengthening the country, he would have to eliminate these

obstacles, and allow the reform process to proceed from the

bottom up. This new position was highlighted during the

January 1987 Central Committee Plenum, when Gorbachev

attacked the lack of debates and differing points of v i e w . 3 3

31 Marc Zlotnik, "Rethinking Soviet Socialism: The Politics of Ideological Change,” in Restructuring Soviet Ideology. Sylvia Woodby and Alfred B. Evans, Jr. eds. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 19, quoting Sovershenstvovanie razitogo sotsialisma i ideologicheskaia rabo.ta partii v sveta reshenii iun'skogo (1983g) plenuma Tsk KPSS: Materialv vsesoiuznoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferenstsii, Moskva. 10-11 dekabria 1984 g . (Moscow: Politizdat, 1985), 7-45.

32 Sylvia Woodby, Gorbachev and the Decline of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Westview Special Studies, 1989), 8.

33 Lapidus, 21.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 37 Communist ideology guided how the lived.

It was the basis for the existence of the Soviet state and

the Soviet citizens were called to work towards the goal of

communism. The country was moving in this direction and the

breakdown of the Communist ideology left many people without

a raison d'etre. As one "veteran of war and work" complained,

people feared "that their achievements in building socialism

in the USSR, despite the ravages of , are in danger

of being undermined by the glasnost campaign."34 The beliefs

of Soviet citizens were being challenged and they began to

look elsewhere for their values; religion and nationality

were the available alternatives.35 The apathy of the Soviet

people made it difficult to achieve Gorbachev's goal of

reform with input from below. "The collapse of the Lie (that

socialism could be built) under glasnost is destroying

acceptance of the system itself, especially among the young,

just as Gorbachev is trying to save it by restructuring."36

People in and out of the government structure rebelled

against this challenge to their beliefs and became obstacles

34 Brian McNair. Glasnost. Perestroika and the Soviet Media (New York: Routledge, 1991), 93.

35 Aleksandr Prokhanov, "Viewpoint: The Tragedy of Centralism," Literaturnava Rossia (5 January 1990): 4-5, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 42, no. 4 (28 February 1990): 1. Prokhanov discusses the destruction of ideology as having "deprived the peoples of a common future and caused an instantaneous growth in national ideas and beliefs. . . "

36 z, "To the Stalin Mausoleum" Daedalus 119, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 315.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 38 to reform. In addition, Gorbachev was faced with opposition

by those in the government who did not want to dispose of an

ideology they spent their lives building. At the same time,

there were those motivated toward change and their

unhappiness led to the growth of nationalism and national

movements. The Soviet people, disillusioned by Communist

ideology, openly questioned the ideology of Marxism-.

There were demands from the nationalist movements to the

upper echelons of government. While the central government

allowed people to express their opinions, their demands

outran government control. Gorbachev's glasnost opened up

the opportunity for grass-roots movements to form.

Glasnost. To combat the resistance to change, Gorbachev

worked to involve the masses through glasnost "to stimulate

creative thinking, air problems and help activate public

participation with the reform process."37 As part of this

process, Gorbachev loosened the government's control on the

media. Gorbachev said the only way to restructure is "through

criticism and self-criticism. The main thing is— through

glasnost. There cannot be a society without glasnost."38

Changes began to take place in a variety of forms. Photos in

37 Woodby, Gorbachev and the Decline of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy. 6.

38 Robert V. Daniels, "Can Gorbachev Escape History," Perestroika: How New Is Gorbachev's Thinking? Ernest W. Lefever and Robert D. vander Lugt, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1989), 97.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 39 the newspapers, typically depicting only happy events, began

to show people waiting in long lines. The press also started

covering previously taboo topics, such as natural disasters

and domestic violence.39 instead of reporting on issues along

the party line, the media was allowed to provide nuances of

an issue, thus stimulating ideas. This was an impetus for

change. In time, debate articles appeared and the readers

were exposed to arguments of those who opposed the

government's policies. Although some officials shut down

certain publications and tried to restrain the activities of

the media, by and large the media was given more freedom to

print opinions that differed with those of the central

government.

The freedom of the printed material extended to the

publication of formerly restricted writings. For example, a

book was published on Stalin's life, which included details

of his nervous breakdown at the beginning of World War II.

The Soviet Government did not prevent its publication,

although the book's details indicate that Stalin's breakdown

left him incapable of leading the country and may have been a

factor leading to the purges and the deaths of many people

under Stalin's rule.40

39 McNair, 67.

40 Ibid., 62.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40 Glasnost also brought a change in how elections were

conducted. Multiple political candidates for positions

replaced single-candidate elections and provided the people,

for the first time in Soviet history, a choice. Glasnost also

opened the way for debates among candidates. In many of the

non-Muslim republics, the candidates for election did not

even belong to the Communist Party, an idea not fathomable

before the Gorbachev era. Gorbachev pushed this idea through

as a constitutional amendment in March 1989, and the deputies

to the new Congress were elected by popular vote and composed

largely of members of the grass roots movement. By giving

people choices, Gorbachev was implementing his plan for

change from the bottom.

This new freedom of expression allowed the flow of

ideas in and out of the USSR to take place more freely. This

exchange of ideas was a reversal on the past attempts to

silence those with opposing views of government policy. In

the past, some who voiced their opposition faced jail or

placement in psychiatric hospitals. Under Gorbachev's program

of glasnost, political prisoners were released and new cases

of political and psychiatric abuse cases diminished.

Glasnost also meant the freedom of movement and

improvements in emigration. In May, 1991, the

passed a long-awaited law on emigration, defining the rights

of Soviet citizens to travel in and out of the USSR. People

who had access to state secrets, some as long as 15 to 20

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 41 years before, were allowed to emigrate. In an effort to

address the problem of the refuseniks (those denied

permission by the government to emigrate), Gorbachev also set

up a commission to review long-term secrecy cases. All the

cases reviewed by the Soviet commission were favorably

resolved. Freedom of religion allowed people to openly

participate in religious services. Many mosques and churches,

closed under previous Soviet leaders, were re-opened, and new

places of worship were built.

Gorbachev also rehabilitated some of Stalin's victims.

With these actions, Gorbachev opened the door for the

reexamination of Soviet history. For example, the Turkmen

under glasnost were able to discuss the 1881 battle for the

fortress of Geok-Tepe, in which Russian forces attacked the

Turkmen fortress, killing thousands. This battle was a

turning point in Turkmen history, for it signaled the end of

the people's resistance to Russian rule. Previous Soviet

history suggested that the Turkmen voluntarily joined the

Russian Empire. Because of glasnost, the Turkmen people were

able to openly refute this account.41 These challenges to the

Soviet version of history took place throughout the country,

including the Caucasus, where accounts of their "voluntary"

inclusion into the Soviet Union have also been disputed.

Annette Bohr, "Turkmen," The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, Graham Smith, ed. (New York: Longman, 1990), 238.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 42 This freedom in expression generated ideas, as

Gorbachev wanted, but it also generated discontent with the

Soviet government. Having the ability to openly and publicly

criticize aspects of the Soviet system liberated the

periphery from Moscow-controlled information. Glasnost

encouraged national groups to voice their opinions and to

gather publicly in search of greater national freedoms.

Perestroika. The Soviet Union had a wealth of untapped

natural resources and the ability to grow enough food for the

entire population, but the country could not effectively

utilize this wealth. The Soviets lacked the technology to

extract minerals and lacked an infrastructure to carry the

harvested crops from the farms to the people in the cities.

The lack of competition among enterprises, which were state-

owned, and the lack of incentives for the workers resulted in

low quality products and a lack of innovation.42 The

concentration on arms production at the expense of domestic

needs plunged the Soviet economy into a crisis:

". . . the system of centralized supply ties an enterprise up

with directives and leaves no room to manoeuvre . . .*43 This

centralized system was so unreliable that people stockpiled

42 jerry F. Hough, "Gorbachev's Politics," Foreign Affairs 68 (Winter 1989-90): 30.

43 Abel Aganbegyan, Inside Perestroika: The Future of the Soviet Economy (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1989), 32.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 43 items, which led to the growth of black markets under the

Soviet system.44

The Soviet Government had focused its resources on

competition with the West, particularly in the arms race.

Gorbachev highlighted the negative consequences this focus

had on economic development:

Our rockets can find Hailey's comet and fly to Venus with amazing accuracy, but side by side with these scientific and technological triumphs is an obvious lack of efficiency in using scientific achievements for economic needs, and many Soviet household appliances are of poor quality.4^

To counter the deteriorating economic situation, Gorbachev

introduced a set of reforms which were aimed at every level

from top to bottom. Gorbachev defined perestroika as:

. . . the all-round intensification of the Soviet economy, the revival and development of the principles of in running the national economy, the universal introduction of economic methods, the renunciation of management by injunction and by administrative methods and the overall encouragement of innovation and socialist enterprise.4®

While reforms in the Soviet Union had been attempted in the

past, they were implemented from above and did not cover a

wide range of political, economic, and military changes.

Gorbachev's reforms were different, as Baruch Nazan notes:

For the first time the changes encompass virtually all areas of Soviet life. For the first time they strongly

44 Ibid., 32.

45 Gorbachev, 7.

46 Ibid., 21.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 44 affect the political system itself, forcing the leadership to do things they have never done before, such as telling people the truth (though still not the whole truth) and subjecting themselves to real elections and political debates. For the first time reforms have caused such a division in the Soviet people that . . . they now are split into two groups: 'fighters for perestroika and its sabateurs [sic].' Finally, for the first time there is a leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who has made perestroika his supreme goal, and has bound his political fate as well as perhaps even his life to this cause.47

The anti-alcoholism drive in 1985 was one of

Gorbachev's first reform programs aimed at reducing

alcoholism by displaying it as an obstacle to perestroika.

This act, which included restricting access to alcohol, was

unpopular with Soviet citizens, but was an example of

Gorbachev's attempts to improve social conditions. Price

reform, growth of cooperatives and competition in the market

place were all goals of perestroika. It signaled an end to

government monopoly and a beginning of competition among

businesses. As the leadership adopted some measures to allow

the introduction of a market-based economy, it brought not

only competition, but the loss of jobs. The measures to

modernize technology, reorganize ministries and management

opened the door to unemployment.

In June 1987, the Central Committee of the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) passed the Law on the State

Enterprises which allowed for self-financing. In 1988

47 Baruch Hazan, Gorbachev and His Enemies: The Struggle for Perestroika (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 299.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 45 Gorbachev introduced measures to privatize the land, which

included long-term leases, and the ability of farmers to pass

on their leases to their children. In 1989, Moscow instituted

some half-measures, partially freeing up prices and some

limited direct contact between enterprises. These were

ineffective because the lack of competition combined with

high demand drove prices up, and "at the same time, it became

less profitable to produce goods whose prices were controlled

or were less than possible alternatives. Inevitably,

shortages d e v e l o p e d . "48 By the end of 1989 Moscow realized it

would have to move to a market economy all at once instead of

through a piecemeal process and the issue of price increases

moved to the forefront of discussions. Yet the threat of

strikes forced the center to cancel planned increases.4® By

the middle of 1990 the economy was in a deep crisis. In many

cases, half measures were taken, and reform was focused only

in a few areas. Another problem with the reform programs was

that the government was introducing these programs without

the input of those who were required to carry them out.®® The

reform programs were also implemented without the benefit of

a feedback system, so that, when problems arose, there was no

48 Ticktin, 157.

49 Ibid., 159.

®0 p.o. Aven and V.M. Shironin, "The Reform of the Economic Mechanism," Perestroika and the Economy: New Thinking in Soviet Economics. Anthony Jones and William Moskoff, ed. (New York: MESharpe Inc., 1989), 253.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 46 system in place to correct these problems while allowing the

reform program to continue.51 This stunted the effectiveness

of the reform.

In the first three months of 1991, industrial

production, meat production, and oil production went down.

Still, Gorbachev introduced a price reform in April, 1991.

This reform program freed up prices and was expected to lead

to more items on the store shelves. However, because

production had gone down, all that resulted from the price

reform was higher prices. Economists claimed that, without

other reforms, the price reform would not w o r k . 52 as it

turned out, the controls on prices were lifted only on

certain items; again the reforms implemented were not enough

by themselves to have any positive impact. Gorbachev

introduced many half-measures aimed at improving the economy,

while not providing enough impetus to strengthen them. The

deteriorating economic situation in the USSR played an

influential role in the rise in nationalism and the collapse

of the empire:

. . . the economic dilemmas have pressured ruling elites to undertake changes which threaten to erode their own political privileges and promise the transformation of their system. The changes have begun to unleash long suppressed political demands and in some cases have set

51 ibid, 253.

52 Daniel Sneider, "Gorbachev Feels Heat on Economy," Christian Science . 21 March 1991, 6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47 into motion what may be irreversible movements for full- scale political and cultural liberation.53

All three factors, ideology, glasnost and perestroika played

a role in the resurgence of nationalism in the Soviet Union.

But while the republics were increasing their demands for

greater national freedoms, the center was engulfed in its own

battle between conservatives and reformists.

Internal Opposition

As part of the political reform, Gorbachev pushed the

retirement and reshuffling of high ranking officials.

Gorbachev's plans for the Soviet Union could not be

successful unless he had people in government who shared his

willingness to reform. So Gorbachev replaced many officials

with people who shared his ideas.54 Gorbachev, however, was

unable to rid his government of all opposition forces, and,

as time went on, those opposition forces became more vocal.

In the open media, people were exposed to criticisms of the

government made by private individuals, as well as government

officials.

Donna L. Bahry and Joel C. Moses, "Communist Dialectic: Toward a New Model of Socialism?" Political Implications of Economic Reform in Communist Systems. Donna L. Bahry and Joel C. Moses, eds. (New York: New York University Press, 1990), 1.

54 Archie Brown, "Change in the Soviet Union" Foreign Affairs 64 , no. 5 (Summer 1986): 1048. Brown noted that "no Soviet leader in his first year of office has presided over such sweeping changes in the composition of the highest party and state organs as Mikhail Gorbachev."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 48 Attempts at reform led to a resurgence in nationalism

in the periphery, and also led to opposition within the

central government. Political reform was resisted "by the

bureaucracy which feared the devolution of its responsibility

. . ."55 The conservative Communist forces, comprised of both

party and military officials, based their role in the Soviet

government on the Communist ideology that Gorbachev viewed as

an obstacle to reform. Many of Gorbachev's reforms were

antithetical to the modus operandi the Soviet government

followed for years. Giving more power to the people, at the

expense of the central government, was an idea conservative

party officials could not accept.

Internal resistance to reform was felt in a number of

areas, including the media and the economy. The conservative

forces wanted to retain the media as a way of shaping public

opinion based on the will of the party, not to reflect public

unhappiness with government p o l i c i e s . 56 Economic reforms were

resisted at the top because the economic bosses saw these

measures as a move to reduce their power over the local

economy.

The re-focusing of government priorities from the

military to the domestic economy also met with resistance

from military leaders. The military was losing importance as

55 Daniels, 97.

56 McNair, 97.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the battle of the arms race was replaced by the battle

between the center and the periphery. The release of Eastern

Europe from the Soviet empire meant the withdrawal of troops

to a country which was not prepared to house them. The

military was losing its status as the government's number one

priority. However, the military was still a powerful force,

and one that Gorbachev could not ignore. It was this

influence that led to Gorbachev's sudden shift toward the end

of his presidency to a more conservative position, from the

rejection of the 500-day economic reform plan of 1990, to the

crackdown in the Baltics in January 1991. Gorbachev was under

pressure to conform in order to survive.

Moscow Resists Break-Up

During the struggle for independence of the Baltic

republics, Gorbachev set conditions for secession— the right

granted to them in the Soviet constitution— that would take

five years. The Law on Procedures for Resolving Questions

Related to the Secession of Union Republics from the USSR,

passed on April 3, 1990, stated that the first step in the

process for secession from the Soviet Union was a referendum,

in which two-thirds of the voters vote for secession. The

results would be reviewed by the center, which judged the

validity of the referendum, and if approved, set a transition

period "not to exceed five years . . . "57 This act kept the

57 "Law of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics on Procedures for Resolving Questions Related to the Secession of Union Republics from the USSR," The Current Digest of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50 primary power of granting secession with Moscow and was aimed

at slowing the republics' drive for independence. The

republics were opposed to this law, which also contained a

provision stating that if the referendum "does not result in

a decision for the Union republic to secede . . . a new

referendum on this question may be held no sooner than 10

years from the time that the previous referendum was h e l d . "58

The Baltic republics did not plan to wait five years and held

their own referenda in 1990 with an overwhelming majority in

each voting in favor of independence.

By 1991, the situation changed for the worse. Liberal

leaders, such as Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, left

the central government, and the center turned towards a more

conservative course. This led to a more rigid and violent

confrontation between the center and periphery. Events

signaling this reversal in the center-periphery relationship

were the Soviet troop assaults in and in

January 1991. Troops attacked local government buildings and

Moscow-backed "Salvation Committees" claimed power over the

democratically-elected leaders. Although Gorbachev denied

responsibility for the attacks, he failed to condemn them.

Seeking to regain control of the deteriorating

situation, Gorbachev called for a referendum on whether the

people wanted to maintain the union. The referendum of March

Soviet Press 42, no. 15 (16 May 1990): 20, quoting . 7 April 1990, 2.

58 Ibid., 20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 51 17, 1991, which asked people to vote for or against a union,

resulted in a U.S.S.R.-wide 77% vote in favor of the union.

However, the Baltic republics, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova

refused to participate in this referendum, and, in the

capital of Ukraine alone, 55% voted against the union. The

scales were tipped, however, by over 90% vote favoring a

union in the Central Asian r e p u b l i c s . 59 There was a lower

voter turnout in Azerbaijan than the other republics

participating, although the number was still significantly

high at 75 percent. Of those that voted, 93 percent voting in

favor of the Union.60 Separate figures for the Nakhchyvan

region of Azerbaijan, home to the leader of Azerbaijan's

national movement (the Azerbaijani Popular Front), show that

only 20 percent of those eligible voted in the referendum.

Even though a majority of the country voted for the

union, Gorbachev continued to lose influence with the local

governments. The West urged Moscow to avoid the use of force

which would threaten the center's relationship with the

periphery as well as with the West. For the next several

months, as most of the republics continued to move towards

sovereignty, Gorbachev's government stalled, trying to buy

time.

59 Sneider, 6.

60 "Results of the USSR Referendum Held March 17, 1991," Current Digest of the Soviet Press 43, no. 13 (1 May 1991), 23, citing Izvestia. 27 March 1991, 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 52 While Gorbachev was trying to deal with the fight for

independence in the Baltic republics, he also had to deal

with the ethnic struggles in the Caucasus. Violence in the

South Ossetian autonomous republic in Georgia erupted as the

South Ossetians, fearing Georgian independence, moved to

unite with the Ossetians in Russia. The conflict resulted in

the movement of Soviet troops to the area, and claims by the

popularly-elected President Zviad Gamsakhurdia that the

Soviet Army was providing rockets and weapons to the

Ossetians. Gamsakhurdia claimed the center was behind the

Ossetian independence move in order to stall Georgia's

independence drive.61

Armenia also claimed that Moscow was backing its rival,

Azerbaijan, to punish Armenia in retaliation for its

independence movement. Throughout this period, Gorbachev

repeatedly warned that the break-up of the Soviet Union would

spell disaster for the republics, as ethnic tensions would

only intensify. By September 1991, Gorbachev could no longer

argue that only the Soviet Union could save the republics.

Leading opponents of Gorbachev's reforms had sought to return

the central leadership back to its traditional Communist

control and attempted a coup in August 1991. Although the

coup failed, Gorbachev's power faded away afterwards.

Pressure from President Bush led Gorbachev to give the Baltic

61 Justin Burke, "Soviet Georgians Wrestle With the Future of Republic," Christian Science Monitor. 2 April 1991, 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 53 republics what they were struggling for— sovereignty. This

was just the beginning. With the independence of the Baltic

states, all of the other republics voted for independence and

by December, 1991 they had turned to the West for

international recognition and support.

The center was unable to recover from the August 1991

coup. As the international community recognized the

independence of the Baltic states and the other republics

voted for independence, the end of the Soviet empire was in

sight. The December meeting of Russian, Ukrainian and

Belarussian leaders and the agreement that followed put a

final stamp on the fate of the USSR. Gorbachev, continuing

his warning of catastrophe should the USSR collapse, said

that the break up of the Soviet Union would make Yugoslavia's

civil war look like "a joke."®2 The Slavic republics were

later joined by the republics in Central Asia, the Caucasus

(except Georgia), and Moldova. The Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS) was born in the death of the USSR.

The agreement among the republics (minus the Baltic states)

to create the CIS was to end finally the central leadership

over the Soviet republics. The aim of the CIS is to maintain

close cooperation among the ex-republics in military, foreign

policy, infrastructure and economic fields.®2

®2 Michael Dobbs, "Slavic Republics Declare Soviet Union Liquidated," Washington Post. 9 December 1991, A16.

63 Ibid, A16.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 54 The attempt at reform, the resistance by conservative

forces, and the desire by local national movements to expand

glasnost and perestroika into greater independence all played

key roles in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow could no

longer maintain a lid on these local nationalisms. As will be

seen in Azerbaijan, nationalism was not extinct during the

Soviet era, but lay largely dormant in the face of dominant

central rule. With the weakening of central control, national

sentiments surged, and so did the potential for ethnic conflict.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER III

NATIONALISM EMERGES IN THE CAUCASUS

Overview

Some of the ethnic antagonisms seen in the Caucasus

before and after the Soviet Union's collapse are a

continuation of tense relations that emerged earlier in this

century. The inability of the Georgians, Armenians, and

Azerbaijanis to cooperate before, during, and after the

Russian civil war was as destabilizing to their independence

in the early 1900s as it is in the post-Soviet period. Rising

nationalism encouraged hostilities among the ethnic groups.

During the brief period of independence from the Russian

Empire (1918-1920), the pressures from regional powers—

Soviet Russia, Turkey, and Iran— and the lack of unity in the

Caucasus left these three national groups vulnerable. The

prospects for cooperation were unlikely as "one nationalism

begat a competing nationalism. One nationality's claims to a

better position stimulated rival claims by its neighbors."1

Although these peoples have co-existed literally side-by-side

for centuries, there was little sense of partnership among

them. Instead of uniting during an unstable period in their

1 Ronald Grigor Suny, Armenia in the Twentieth Century (Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1983), 16.

55

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 56 history, these three national groups were at odds over how to

pursue their collective interests. Their suspicions of each

other made co-operation unattainable.

The Caucasus is a very heterogeneous region which

presents many opportunities for hostilities among the various

nationality groups.2 There are many ethnic groups living in a

relatively small space. Throughout history, these ethnic

groups were intermingled with one another. This factor

together with their long history and the movement of various

peoples in and out of the region makes it difficult to

determine areas where an ethnic group's historic claims to

certain lands are legitimate. However, land is an important

factor for these groups. Their justification for making

territorial claims rests on the belief that they were first

to arrive in a particular area or have a superior claim for

another reason.

Throughout the history of the Caucasus there have been

numerous incursions by outside powers. Persian, Turk, and

Russian interests in the Caucasus drew each to the region and

into conflict with one another. They each left their mark, but

it was under the tsarist regime that the national

consciousness of the three ethnic groups emerged. As Ronald

Suny writes about the Georgians during this period, which

2 "it may be safely said that no other territory of equal size anywhere in the world displays a comparable diversity of languages and races." Richard Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union. 16.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 57 applies to the other national groups: "the social and

political integration into the Russian Empire, the consequent

economic stability, and increase in modes of communication. .

.and the introduction of western education. . .all contributed

to the formation of a 'nationality in itself' . . ."3 This

consciousness, however, developed slowly.

Tensions among the three ethnic groups in the early

1900s originated from the socio-economic situations of each.^

Armenians were more prosperous than either the Georgians or

Azerbaijanis and were thriving in Georgian and Azerbaijani

urban centers. Armenians also had a foothold in the

government in Baku, in which Muslims were prevented from

participating by the tsarist regime. A combination of hatreds

and economic antagonisms resulted in tensions and disunity.5

The seeds of mistrust grew with the rise in nationalism:

Armenian nationalism and claims to territory had provoked the national hostility of neighboring peoples. The Georgian nationalists resented the material and political power of the Armenians in Tiflis and other Georgian cities. The Azerbaijanis, a people who developed little ethnic consciousness until early , were mobilized by the perceived danger of armed Armenians in their midst.6

3 Ronald Grigor Suny, "The Emergence of Political Society in Georgia," . Ronald Grigor Suny, ed. (Ann Arbor, MI: , 1983), 109-110.

4 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Baku Commune (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1972, 13-14.

5 Ibid., 13-14.

6 Ronald Grigor Suny, Armenia in the Twentieth Century. 15.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 58 Tensions between Azerbaijanis and Armenians went largely-

unchecked and led to fighting throughout the 1900s, such as

the 1905 Armeno-Tatar War and territorial conflicts during

their short-lived independence from 1918 to 1920. Tensions

over territorial claims remained after Armenia's and

Azerbaijan's incorporation into the Soviet Union, but the

dispute took a quieter form of protest, namely through

petitions from Armenians to the Soviet Government.

Caucasus: Brief History

Armenia. Armenia has a rich history. It is one of the

oldest Christian nations in the world. Following the fall of

the Seleucid Empire, the first Armenian state was founded in

190 B.C. Historic Armenia encompassed present-day eastern

Turkey, including the towns of Van, Erzerum, and Kars, and

modern Azerbaijan. Under King Tigranes the Great (95-66 BC)

Armenia extended into Syria and Mesopotamia. Christianity was

established in Armenia in 301 A.D. and in the 5th century an

Armenian alphabet was invented. Armenia, like Azerbaijan, was

ruled at times by the Persians and Turks. In fact, Armenia

was the site of Ottoman and Persian fighting from the 16th

century until the Perso-Ottoman treaty of 1639, when the

Ottomans came to control Western or Turkish Armenia (west of

the Akhuryan River) and Persia controlled Eastern Armenia

(including Yerevan).

By the 19th century, there were over two million

Armenians living within the . Until the latter

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59 part of the 1800s, these Armenians were not politically-

organized.7 Russia's seizure of eastern Armenia from Persia

in 1828 and the establishment of an ethnically Armenian

province provided a basis for the growth of an Armenian

national consciousness.8 By the end of the Russo-Turkish War

of 1877-78, Armenians had reached a national self-awareness

and those within the Ottoman Empire saw the Russians as their

liberators.9

However, under the terms of the agreement ending the

Russo-Turkish conflict, the Russians evacuated some of the

towns it occupied in 'Turkish Armenia' (eastern Turkey).

Armenian fear of Turks, and Turkish concerns that Armenians

in Ottoman Turkey were collaborating with Russia against

them, created an atmosphere ripe with tension. Oppression

grew in the eastern Ottoman Empire and Armenians began to

form underground defense groups. One of the main parties, the

Armenian Revolutionary Federation (also known as the

Dashnaktsutian, or Dashnaks), engaged in a struggle for

"political and economic freedom in Ottoman Armenia through

7 Richard Hovannisian, Armenia: On the Road to Independence (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 25.

8 Christopher Walker, ed., Armenia and Karabacrh: The Struggle for Unitv (London: Minority Rights Group, 1991), 21.

9 Suny, Armenia in the Twentieth Century. 18.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 60 rebellion."10 During the 1890s, there were clashes between

these defense groups and Turkish authorities. Tensions

heightened and over the next twenty-five years many Armenians

died from Turkish massacres, the largest in 1915 when at

least 800,000 were killed.H The Dashnaks in tsarist Russia

were also formulating demands for Armenian national freedoms

from Moscow. However, their main goal in the early 1900s was

to become a part of a Russian federal state.12 Armenian fears

and mistrust of Turks were transferred to the Azerbaijanis,

Turkey's ethnic brothers.

Georgia. Christianity and the Georgian alphabet were

founded in Georgia around the fifth century. In 485, Persia

controlled all of the Caucasus except Iberia (central

Georgia). This region was linked with the west through

religious connections with Constantinople in the 7th century.

A monarchy existed in Georgia, and the Georgian kingdom

reached its height of power in the late 12th to early 13th

century, stretching into parts of modern-day Azerbaijan. The

rise of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th century and the

10 Gerard J. Libaridian, "Revolution and Liberation in the 1892 and 1907 Programs of the Dashnaktsutiun," Transcaucasia. Ronald Grigor Suny, ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1983), 185, quoting Hav Heahaookhakan Dashnaktsutian Dsraqir. Vienna, 17.

11 For further information on this period, see Richard Hovannisian, Armenia: On the Road to Independence (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967).

12 Ibid., 185.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 61 Safavid dynasty of Persia in the 16th century placed Georgia

in between these two powers. Georgia was subjected to raids

from neighboring Muslim regions. Worries of being Christian

in a heavily Muslim region influenced Georgia, like Armenia,

to seek close relations with Russia. The first overture was

made in the 16th century but it wasn't until Peter the Great

that a formal alliance was forged between Russia and Georgia.

Georgia aided Russia in the Russo-Persian war of 1722-25. In

1783 Georgia became a protectorate of Russia.

Yet even during these times of close relations between

Russia and Georgia there was still tension, as peasants

rebelled against Russian rule, particularly in the middle of

the 19th century. During the revolution of 1905, Georgian

workers went on massive strikes to protest mistreatment by

the tsarist government. Throughout the region, an uprising of

the peasants led to clashes with landlords. It was in the

first years of the 1900s that political groups began to

organize in Georgia. The were the leading party in

Georgia's political independence movement. This group emerged

from the split of the Russian Social Democratic Workers'

Party into the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.13

13 The Bolshevik-Menshevik split focused on different interpretations of how to implement Marxist theory. While the Bolsheviks favored a proletarian revolution in Russia, the Mensheviks believed that revolution should wait and that emphasis should be placed on improving the economic conditions of the workers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 62 Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is located along the

and has borders with its previous rulers, Russia, Iran and

Turkey. Although Azerbaijanis are a Turkic peoples, they

share the Shia branch of Islam with Iran.14 Iranian influence

in Azerbaijan can be traced back to ancient times. Turkish

influence was noticeable in the 11th century with the arrival

of the Seljuk Turk dynasty. Gradually Turkish replaced

Persian as the language of the region. In the 16th century,

the Safavid dynasty came to power in Persia and built a

kingdom on the foundation of the Shia branch of Islam. During

the 18th century, Persian control began to decline and local

khanates juggled for power. One such khan, Fath Ali Khan of

Kuba, attempted to unify the country through a series of

wars, but his efforts were halted by Russia, which felt

threatened by the khan's growing acquisitions.15

Under Peter the Great, Russia sought to expand its

empire southward. During the 1720s Russia established its

presence in the northern part of modern-day Azerbaijan and

the Azerbaijani city of Baku. However, Russia's territorial

growth in the Caucasus slowed and actually reversed following

Peter the Great's death, not to be reinvigorated until the

14 The Sunni branch of Islam is dominant in Turkey and the Central Asian states.

15 Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan: 1905-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63 time of Catherine the Great.16

Persia, the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Empire were

at odds with one another, each seeking to gain territorial

power at the expense of the others. In the early 1800s,

Russia fought a number of wars with the Ottoman Empire and

Persia. Fighting between Russia and Persia ended in the 1812

Treaty of Gulistan, in which Persia ceded to Russia the

northern Caucasus khanates. However, fighting between Russia

and Persia continued sporadically for the next ten years. In

1828, Persia gave up the lands today known as Azerbaijan to

tsarist Russia under the Treaty of Turkmanchay. This treaty

permanently split the Azerbaijanis living in the region

between two powers. The majority of Azerbaijanis live in

present-day northern Iran.

Azerbaijan was largely an agricultural colony until oil

drilling began in the mid-1800s. By the late 19th century, an

Azerbaijani consciousness began to arise and fuel tensions

between the Azerbaijanis and Armenians. As Tadeuz

Swietochowski notes, "Antagonism between the two ethnic

groups had been simmering for a long time, and it now

transcended differences of religion and xenophobic

prejudice."3-7 In the early 1900s, fighting between Armenia

16 Muriel Atkin, "Russian Expansion in the Caucasus to 1813," Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917. Michael Rywkin, ed. (London: Mansell Publishing, Limited, 1988), 151.

17 Swietochowski, 38.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64 and Azerbaijan erupted where before they "had lived for

centuries in comparative peace."18

Independence in the Caucasus

The 1917 left the Caucasus without a

governing body. A provisional government set up a Special

Transcaucasian Committee, which was composed of the three

national parties in Georgia (Mensheviks), Armenia (Dashnaks) and

Azerbaijan, where the Musavat Party dominated. However, the

provisional government fell soon after, and a battle ensued in

Azerbaijan between Lenin's Bolsheviks and the Musavat Party for

control of Baku. Musavat was formed in 1S11 by Turkic

intellectuals closely associated with the local Bolshevik

organization during the failed 1905 Revolution in Russia. By

1917, it was the largest political force in Azerbaijan. Its

original plan was for an autonomous Azerbaijan within a Russian

federative state. However,

After almost a year of working with the soviet to achieve the reforms his party desired, the Musavat leader had concluded that a real federalist solution, autonomy for Azerbaijan, and power for the Moslem majority could better be achieved by the anti-Bolshevik forces. Lenin's promise of national self-determination ceased to be meaningful for the Azerbaij ani leadership.19

In March 1918, conflict between Musavatists and local

Bolsheviks came to a head when fighting erupted in Baku. What

began as a battle between the Bolsheviks and Musavat turned into

1® Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951), 18.

19 Suny, Baku Commune. 206-7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65 an ethnic uprising as the Armenian population came to the aid of

the Bolsheviks, who now controlled Russia. In the end, the

Azerbaijani and Armenian communities blamed each other for the

deaths that resulted. Following the massacre in Baku, the

Bolsheviks' hold on Baku grew as it consolidated its power and

shut down the operation of other political parties in that city.

Meanwhile, the Transcaucasian body (composed of

Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Georgians) set up to negotiate with

the Turks for peace in the region was hampered by Soviet

Russia's surrendering of the southwestern regions of Kars,

Ardahan, and Batum to Turkey in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The

treaty was signed by Germany and Bolshevik Moscow on March 3,

1918. The weak Soviet regime had to cede former tsarist land.

As an ally of Germany, Turkey also benefited from the treaty

through territorial gains. Ceding the aforementioned territory

to Turkey placed Transcaucasia at a disadvantage in the

negotiations by removing it from the bargaining process.

Originally, the Transcaucasian leadership wanted to fight

rather than recognize the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.20 Following

Transcaucasia's declaration of independence, the new government

agreed to the treaty and sought to negotiate with the Turks. On

April 28, the Turks recognized the independence of the

Transcaucasian federation. However, at the May 11 peace

conference between the two sides, the Turks sought more

territory than they had already obtained in the Brest-Litovsk

20 Kazemzadeh, 101.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66 Treaty. The Transcaucasian delegation was divided over whether

to accept the demands, which largely focused on territory

belonging to Armenia. Azerbaijan, which had strong ethnic ties

to the Turks, was more conciliatory than the Armenians or

Georgians. Turkey advanced into the territory without waiting

for a response. As it advanced, the Transcaucasia federation

fell apart in a manner that proved prophetic:

All cohesion, and all community of interests, built up during a century of common existence as a part of Russia, disappeared almost overnight. Nothing was left but mutual distrust, hatred, and the desire for self-preservation, if necessary, at the price of others' destruction.21

The Transcaucasia federation dissolved and, by the end of

May 1918, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, respectively, had

declared their independence. Due to the ongoing battle for Baku,

the Azerbaijani Musavat set up its headquarters in Ganje, north­

west of Baku. The Armenian Dashnaks moved to form a government

based on a coalition of political groups, but in the end the

cabinet was dominated by Dashnaks. The new Armenian government

moved to Yerevan in the summer of 1918. By the end of World War

I, the Dashnaks had become champions for Armenian national

independence. While initially the Georgian Mensheviks favored

autonomy for Georgia within a socialist Russian state, they

eventually set their sights on an independent Georgian state.

The collapse of the Caucasus federation immediately led

to border disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Karabakh

21 Ibid., 117.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67 and the southern region of Zangezur and between Armenia and

Georgia over the Lori region (located between the cities of

Tbilisi and Yerevan), which was later occupied by Turkish

forces. In June, the Turks reached a peace agreement with

Armenia and Georgia, gaining all the territory it sought.

Azerbaijan was the only country not to lose territory in its

peace treaty with Turkey. Indeed, Azerbaijan received assurances

of military assistance, which, according to Swietochowski, meant

the suppression of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and the

recovery of Baku from the Bolsheviks.22 During the next several

months, the battle between the Bolsheviks and anti-Bolshevik

Azerbaijanis for Baku ensued. Some of the Bolshevik leaders in

Baku— composed largely of Russians and Armenians— sought

Moscow's approval to invite in British soldiers— then in Persia

tracking the movements of the Ottoman Turks— to help in the

defense of the city. Moscow refused the request, which was

supported by leader of the Bolsheviks, .23 in

July, Shaumian was overthrown by former supporters, who called

for the intervention of British troops. Power in Baku passed to

the Right Social , anti-Bolsheviks and supporters

of a democratic Russia, who ruled briefly before the Turkish

2 2 Swietochowski, 1 3 0 , citing G. Jaschke, "Der turkisch-aserbaidschanish Freundschaftsvertrag vom 4 Juni 1 9 1 8 " Vorderasien: Studien zur Auslandkunde. no. 1 ( 1 9 4 4 ) : 6 4 .

23 For a more detailed account of this period, see Peter Hopkirk, Like Hidden Fire (New York: Kodansha International, 1 9 9 4 ) .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68 capture of Baku in September of 1918. When British General

Dunsterville forces arrived in mid-August, Turkish troops were

on the verge of taking Baku. British troops tried to help

prepare local forces to fight the advancing Turkish troops, but,

facing certain defeat, British troops ultimately were forced to

withdraw from Baku. Following a Turkish victory, the Azerbaijan

government, set up in May, moved its headquarters from Ganje to

Baku. In the in November, 1918, signed

between the Ottomans and the Allies, Turkey was obliged to

evacuate its forces from the Caucasus. Once the Turks withdrew

from Azerbaijan in late 1918, Azerbaijan negotiated with the

British for the return of the British troops, headed by General

Thomson. British troops remained in Baku and other Caucasus

regions until August, 1919.

With the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the Caucasus

region in 1919, there was a renewal of the Armenian and Georgian

conflict over the border territories of Lori and Borchalo and

the town of Akhalkalaki. Fighting erupted, and Armenian forces

advanced forward to the Georgian capital. The Georgians were

able to beat them back. British troops in the region forced a

peace upon Armenia and Georgia.

In late 1919, as Russian forces were engaged in Dagestan

(just north of Azerbaijan), a security-concerned Azerbaijani

Musavat government sought Persia's protection. Persia,

however, was in no position to help, and appeals to the

British to return a third time were also turned down.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69 Bolshevik power in Baku began to rise once again. A local

Communist party was formed in Baku.

Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia joined the

Versailles Peace Conference and were given de facto

recognition by the Allied Supreme Council in .

"By recognizing the Transcaucasia republics, the Allies hoped

to strengthen their position in regard to Soviet R u s s i a . "24

However, bitter fighting among the parties weakened their

ability to withstand larger powers. They were incapable of

finding common ground, which worked to the benefit of Moscow:

The enemies of Transcaucasia's independence were provided with excellent material, on the basis of which they could and did, argue that Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan ruled by the Dashnaks, the Mensheviks and the Musavatists, were incapable of preserving order and of guaranteeing a peaceful existence to their peoples. Even in Transcaucasia doubts were raised whether this land could stand on its own f e e t . 25

The Azerbaijani Government proved too weak to combat Moscow

and on April 27, 1920, the Bolshevik Communist organizations

in Azerbaijan demanded that the Azerbaijani Government

surrender its power. Within hours, Soviet troops in the

northern Caucasus crossed the borders and advanced toward

Baku, meeting with little resistance. Soviet control of the

city was secured within a few days and the rest of the

country fell soon after. Soviet control over Armenia was

achieved at the end of 1920. Despite a Russo-Georgian treaty,

24 Kazemzadeh, 269.

25 ibid., 182-3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70 Moscow took control of Georgia in early 1921. In The Struggle

for Transcaucasia. Firuz Kazemzadeh writes, "The inability of

the Transcaucasia states to solve their conflicts and co­

operate in the face of foreign aggression made them an easy

prey to Russia."26 The soviet government set up the

Transcaucasus republic in 1922 and by 1936 the individual

republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were formed.

The other territorial advance the Soviet regime

attempted in the Caucasus region was during World War II. In

an effort to secure the supply route from the Persian Gulf to

Russia, British and Soviet forces entered Iran.27 British

forces controlled the southern sector and Soviet forces the

north. Although the plan was for the U.S.S.R. to withdraw at

the end of the war with Germany, the Soviet occupation of

predominantly Azerbaijani-populated northern Iran resulted in

the establishment of a puppet Soviet government in the

Iranian Azerbaijani capital of Tabriz. This action, for a

time, united Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan. An Azerbaijani

university and national museum were opened and printed

material from Soviet Azerbaijan made its way south. Only

after international pressure in 1946 did Stalin retreat and

Tehran swept away the puppet regime.

26 Ibid., 276.

27 For further account of this period, see , The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71 Naaorno-Karabakh conflict: History

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is based on historic and

ethnic claims of the Armenians and Azerbaijanis to this

particular region. The two sides differ on which group

arrived first. Armenians claim that Karabakh belonged to them

as part of the "kingdom of Armenia" until 428 AD when the

Sasanid Persians separated Karabakh from the rest of Armenian

territory. It was not until the 1750s that Muslims reportedly

arrived in Karabakh.28

However, on the other si'he of the dispute, it is claimed

that the Azerbaijanis' ancestors arrived first, and that by

the early 1800s Azerbaijanis composed the majority of the

population in the region. David Nissman states that the

census of the Karabakh region in 1823 shows that the

composition of present-day Nagorno-Karabakh was 78 percent

Turkic and 22 percent Armenian.29 By the time of the 1988

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 77 percent of the population was

Armenian and 23 percent was Azerbaijani.30

It wasn't until the Treaty of Turkmanchay— in which

Armenians in Iran received permission to resettle in the

28 Walker, 80.

29 Statement of David Nissman, U.S. Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: The Naaorno-Karabakh Crisis: Prospects for Resolution. 102nd Congress, 1st session, 23 October 1992, 27.

20 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992, 706.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72 Russian Empire— and the Turkish massacres in 1915 that large

numbers of Armenians apparently moved to the Karabakh area.

Shusha, a town in Karabakh that is situated on the heights

above the present-day Nagorno-Karabakh capital of

Stepanakert, was a focal point of Armenian-Azerbaijani

hostilities in the early 1900s, as it is today. It was

considered a principal Armenian cultural center in the 1800s

and was the site of fighting between Armenians and

Azerbaijanis in August of 1905 during the Armeno-Tatar War.

Following the brief independence of Armenia and

Azerbaijan in May of 1918, they soon engaged in border

disputes with regard to Karabakh and Zangezur (the latter

region is a part of modern-day Armenia that separates

Azerbaijan proper from the Azerbaijani province of

Nakhchyvan). Fighting between the two national groups

continued through their incorporation into the Soviet Union

in the . In June 1921, a decree by the Soviet Caucasian

Bureau giving Karabakh to Armenia led Baku's Soviet leader

Narimanov to threaten that he would allow "the reformation of

anti-Soviet groups in Azerbaijan."31 Narimanov, a nationalist

communist, was soon liquidated by Moscow. However, Soviet-

Turkish treaties concluded in 1921 led to the establishment

of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Nakhchyvan.

Nakhchyvan is strategic because it provides Azerbaijan with

its only land link to its ethnic brethren in Turkey. Karabakh

31 Walker, 91.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 73 went to Azerbaijan, and Zangezur was given to Armenia. This

geographic arrangement was a mosaic of commingled

nationalities and preserved the potential for resumption of

hostilities.

Caucasus Nationalism under the Soviet System

Nationalism did not die in the Caucasus after the

Soviet takeover in 1920-21. Former First Secretary of the

local Communist Party in Baku, Mir Jafar Bagirov, who held

the post from 1933-1953, wrote that:

From the very first days of the existence of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, national deviationists tried to counteract by every means the formation of a firmly united monolithic Bolshevik Party. The Bolsheviks of Baku, faithful to the banner of Lenin and Stalin, conducted an energetic struggle against the treacherous activity of the national deviationists who later were unmasked as spies of a foreign intelligence service.32

Nationalist communists in the 1920s raised their voices in

defense of Azerbaijani interests. Soviet Moscow also became

unpopular with the Azerbaijani peasants, who were forced to

abandon other crop-growing activities in favor of the

cultivation of cotton. The Soviet Government dealt with both

nationalist communists and peasants with a firm hand.

However, Moscow did encourage the cultural development of

Azerbaijan, with the aim that it would grow independent of

Turkish or Persian i n f l u e n c e . 33

32 Quoted in Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953), 242.

33 ibid., 243.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 74 Following Georgian incorporation into the Soviet Union,

local leaders sought to preserve independence by ignoring

Moscow's directives and expelling non-Georgians from the

republic. One of the largest anti-Soviet insurrections broke

out in western Georgia in 1924. It was quickly quashed by the

Red Army. Abkhazian nationalists in the 1930s protested the

influx of non-Abkhaz leaders into that part of Georgia.34 The

Abkhaz leaders were later charged with an attempted

assassination plot against Stalin. Put on trial, several were

executed. The terror of 1937-38 struck Georgia and Azerbaijan

hard (although Ukraine received the worst treatment).

Thousands in the local leadership in were eliminated

and in Azerbaijan many top officials were purged. Throughout

the rest of the Soviet Union, republican leaders met with

similar fates. In addition to local political leaders,

writers and other members of the cultural scene in the Soviet

Union were targeted. Moscow rewrote the histories of the non-

Russian peoples, labeling local national heroes who fought

against tsarist Russia, such as the Dagestani hero Shamil, as

, and glorifying the deaths of Bolshevik leaders

such as Baku Shaumian, who was killed by anti-

Bolshevik Turkmen in 1918.33

34 Ibid., 237.

33 ibid., 200-1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75 During the early 1920s, mid-1940s, and early 1960s,

Armenia sought to overturn Moscow's decision giving Nagorno-

Karabakh to Azerbaijan. As an autonomous oblast, every

district in Nagorno-Karabakh had an Armenian-language

newspaper, thus preserving the cultural and national identity

of this isolated people. In May, 1963, 2500 Karabakh

Armenians signed a petition claiming economic deprivation

from the local government in Baku.36 In 1966, Yerevan

petitioned Moscow, demanding the attachment of Nagorno-

Karabakh to Armenia and, in 1968, was the scene

of clashes by Armenians and Azerbaijanis.37 However, fighting

was rare, and these two groups managed to live side-by-side

in relative peace under the Soviet system.

Soviet Nationalities Policy

While the national sentiments that emerged at the turn

of the century continued to exist under the Soviet regime,

Moscow was not prepared to allow its expression within the

Soviet state. Although the Bolsheviks encouraged local

nationalism in their fight for power in the former tsarist

Russia, there was no place for nationalism in the new Soviet

order. The Soviet leaders had to develop a plan for dealing

with national groups. Over seven decades the Soviet leaders

used various means to integrate these national groups.

Following Marxist teachings, Lenin expected nationalism to

36 Walker, 118.

37 Ibid., 119.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 76 fade under the socialist system.38 However, he was sympathetic

to the various national groups and fearful of Russian

chauvinism. Thus, his policy of korinezatsiva (nativisation)

promoted the interest of non-Russian groups at the expense of

Russians. During this period the use of local languages

spread. The establishment of secure borders allowed the

Caucasus peoples to focus on cultural development.

However, following Stalin's rise as the primary leader,

he "ordered that greater emphasis should be given to the

leading role of the Russian people in the Soviet State."39

Stalin feared local nationalisms and, under his government,

the program of Russification was implemented. This process

included, inter alia, the migration of Russians to other

republics, the displacement of a number of nationality groups

throughout the country, and the promotion of the Russian

language in all schools. By limiting the use of local

languages, and by mixing Russians with other nationality

groups, the center was attempting to erase the ethnic groups'

identities, thus protecting the policies of the Communist

state from the threat of local nationalism.

Stalin's purges were a way to control the periphery and

to prevent political unity in the republics. For example,

38 Gleason, "The 'National Factor' and the Logic of Sovietology," Post-Soviet Nations. Alexander Motyl, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 3.

39 Kolarz, 19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 77 Stalin considered Ukraine the leader of the opposition to a

centralized Soviet Union and so "Ukraine suffered much more

during the big purge of 1937-38 than any other Soviet

republic. "40 The center's fear of nationalism also led to the

purges of Estonian communists in the Spring of 1950. The only

reprieve in Stalin's repression of local nationalism occurred

during World War II as . . every resource of the country

had to be mobilized to repel the invasion of ,

and one of these resources was the revival of nationalism . .

_ n 41

Khrushchev rehabilitated some of the national groups

resettled by Stalin and saw nationalities policy as a key to

aiding socio-economic development.42 In 1957, he gave more

autonomy to regions in order to improve economic management.

However, this autonomy was limited and the promotion of

regional interests over the Soviet state was not tolerated.

Khrushchev, who fostered the program of sblizhenie ('coming

together' or the notion that the different nationalities

would unite as one under a Russian-dominated Soviet

nationalism), implemented educational reforms in 1958-59

favoring the . While non-Russians were to

4° Ibid., 132.

Suny, Armenia in the Twentieth Century. 64.

42 Graham Smith, "Nationalities Policy from Lenin to Gorbachev, " Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union. Graham Smith, ed. (London: Longman, 1990), 7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 78 learn Russian in schools, Russians in non-Russian republics

were not required to learn the local language.

Leonid Brezhnev returned to a policy of limited

nativisation, allowing natives among the party faithful to be

appointed to local positions. At the same time, he sought to

minimize the nationalities issue by stating that, "the

national question, as it came down to us from the past, has

been settled completely, finally, and for good."43

Throughout the Soviet period before Gorbachev,

experiments in the nationalities policy were tried, but they

ended when local leaders appeared to promote the interest of

their ethnic group over the rest of Soviet citizens. However,

the Soviet leaders largely failed in their attempts to

assimilate the various ethnic groups, to replace any feelings

of nationalism with patriotism for the Soviet state. With

Gorbachev's accession to power and his attempts to allow

change through glasnost and perestroika, he opened up long-

repressed national feelings.

Summary

Soviet nationalities policy did not create the ethnic

hostilities now being expressed in the Caucasus. However, the

creation of republics along ethnic lines with minority

autonomous republics and oblasts carved out did influence a

43 Speech at the 1972 commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR. Hugh Seton-Watson, "Russian Nationalism in Historic Perspective," The Last Empire, Robert Conquest, ed. (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1986), 25.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 79 situation marked with tension. The accessibility of language

and culture to national groups under the Soviet system

encouraged local national unity. Purges had the same effect,

as the removal of those defending local national interests

fostered resentment of the Soviet regime and of Russians, the

historic rulers and leaders of Soviet policy. Instead of

having a clear, consistent policy, Soviet leaders tried

different tactics and largely underestimated the strength of

nationalism. While, in the past, nationalist expressions were

suppressed by Moscow, the breakdown of the Communist

ideology, and the introduction of glasnost and perestroika

allowed ethnic groups an opportunity to vent pent-up national

frustrations. Not only were they critical of Moscow, they

became in some areas increasingly hostile to each other.

Attempts by Moscow to ignore or rid itself of nationalism

actually spurred the determination of these groups to

maintain their national identities. The fight for national

survival also led to the fight against competing nationalisms

in the region.

As is seen in the next chapter, the seventy years of

Communist rule did little to eliminate ethnic hostilities in

the Caucasus. For Azerbaijan and Armenia, the current

fighting is a resumption of the battle started earlier this

century. Then, as today, these nationalisms and ethnic

conflicts weakened the states and left them vulnerable to

outside influence.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER IV

INDEPENDENCE IN AZERBAIJAN

Overvi ew

Moscow's loosening grip on the republics, nationalism,

and the republics' grievances with Moscow sparked their drive

to seek greater freedom from the center. In Azerbaijan's

case, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh was the predominant

factor affecting Baku's relationship with Moscow. The

Azerbaijani Communist leadership, and, in the early days, the

nationalist movement in Azerbaijan were content to remain

within a Soviet community. The chain of events in the growing

conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and Moscow's reaction to these

events were influential in pushing Azerbaijan away from

Moscow. Moscow's response to the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh

damaged the relationship with the Baku leadership and

eventually drove the nationalist movement to seek full

independence. Even the Communist party leader of Azerbaijan

from 1990-92, Ayaz Mutalibov, used nationalism as leverage

with Moscow when he deemed it in his interest to do so.

With the advent of perestroika and glasnost,

Azerbaijan saw progress in the areas of education, religious

freedom and greater contact with neighboring Iran and Turkey.

Economically, the republic concentrated on joint ventures and 80

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 81 aid from the West. However, all these 'liberating'

experiences in Azerbaijan were overshadowed by the Nagorno-

Karabakh conflict. The current conflict began in 1988, when

the republic of Armenia sought to incorporate the

predominantly Armenian-populated Azerbaijani enclave under

its jurisdiction and Azerbaijan fought to keep Nagorno-

Karabakh under its control. What began as a series of

demonstrations quickly turned to violence. The ensuing

hostilities resulted in the deaths of thousands of people and

over a million refugees and displaced persons. Moscow's

decrees and the presence of Soviet troops in the region were

ineffective in quelling the conflict. Independence has not

diminished the nationalist fervor in Azerbaijan, as

successive presidents have promised to win the Nagorno-

Karabakh conflict and fight to protect Azerbaijan's

independence from outside threats. In reality, losses on the

battlefield have had a high political cost in Baku and have

been a factor in the government's vulnerability.

Azerbaijan under Gorbachev

Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. As in the other republics,

perestroika and glasnost first appeared in Azerbaijan in 1986

when news articles on perestroika were published in

Azerbaijani newspapers. However, the introduction of reforms

in the Soviet Union did not automatically spark an

1 Since declaring independence in 1991, Armenia no longer openly seeks the incorporation of Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia, but claims it now supports autonomy for the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 82 independence movement in Azerbaijan. The Baku government was

firmly in the hands of the Communist Party and Azerbaijan's

leadership focused mainly on securing freedoms in the use of

the . Glasnost loosened restrictions on

religious practices in the Soviet Union; in Azerbaijan,

mosques were reopened and religious holidays observed.2

The Azerbaijani leadership's internal focus on

cultural freedoms was disrupted by Armenia's territorial

claim on Nagorno-Karabakh in 1988. In February 1988, Armenian

demonstrators in Nagorno-Karabakh and Yerevan called for

unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. However,

apparently due to concerns that redrawing the boundaries

would lead to territorial claims by other nationality groups,

Moscow instead passed a resolution calling for faster "socio­

economic development" of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of

Azerbaijan.3 Moscow's actions sparked protests in Yerevan.4

In early 1988, tensions reached a boiling point. At

this time, there were approximately 200,000 people living in

2 other indicators of religious freedom in Azerbaijan were the reopening of mosques, access to holy shrines in Iran, and the publication of the Koran and other religious materials. "Caucasus Events' Impact on Iranian Ties Mused," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (26 January 1990): 14.

3 Audrey Altstadt, Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992), 196-7.

4 Philip Taubman, "Gorbachev Urges Armenians to End Nationalist Furor," New York Times. 26 February 1988, in Bernard Gwerztman and Michael Kaufman, eds., The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Empire (New York: Times Books, 1992), 94.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 83 Nagorno-Karabakh; as stated earlier, 77 percent Armenian and

23 percent Azerbaijani. One of the first bloody clashes broke

out in Nagorno-Karabakh, killing two Azerbaijanis. Ethnic

tension led to the first wave of Azerbaijani refugees from

Armenia flooding eastward into Azerbaijan. These refugees

added to rising animosities between the two ethnic groups in

Azerbaijan. In February, 1988, violence between Azerbaijanis

and Armenians in Sumgait, an Azerbaijani town north of Baku,

left some 32 people dead, mostly Armenian. Violence against

Armenians, such as in Sumgait, led the Armenians to believe

that "Soviet power could or would not protect them."5 it was

this sentiment that led the Armenians later to flee

Azerbaijan and, for those who stayed behind, to arm

themselves. Gorbachev's response to the clash was to send

troops to Sumgait and arrest several Azerbaijanis for attacks

on Armenians. In May, the first Secretaries of Armenia and

Azerbaijan were removed by Moscow. However, this action had

little impact on the tense situation, and in mid-June the

Armenian Supreme Soviet passed a resolution calling for the

annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian-dominated

Nagorno-Karabakh soviet also sought its transfer to Armenia.

The Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet replied by passing a

5 Bill Keller, "A Deadly Feud Tears at Enclave on Gorbachev's Southern Flank," New York Times. 5 September 1989, Section A,10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 84 resolution calling the transfer "unacceptable."6

On July 12, the Armenian-dominated soviet of Nagorno-

Karabakh declared its secession from Azerbaijan. On July 18,

Moscow ruled that Nagorno-Karabakh would remain part of

Azerbaijan, but also that a special commission, headed by

Arkadiy Volskiy (a member of the CPSU Central Committee and

Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet), would be established to

observe the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.7 When violence

broke out in September in Stepanakert, the capital of

Nagorno-Karabakh, and nearby Shusha, an Azerbaijani-populated

town situated on heights above Stepanakert, Volskiy imposed

martial law. These steps put the power over Nagorno-Karabakh

in Moscow's hands. While perestroika and glasnost were

programs to increase the freedoms in the republics, Moscow's

actions vis-a-vis Azerbaijan's control over Nagorno-Karabakh

was an example of the limitations on these freedoms.

On November 12, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme

Soviet decided to keep Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.

However, this did not stop the protests, which in time became

large demonstrations and spurred the formation of some small

national movements. Later that month, a curfew was imposed,

but the demonstrations continued, and by late 1988 they were

6 "Sessions of the Union Republic Supreme Soviet: Azerbaidzhan Republic," Current Digest of the Soviet Press 40, no. 25 (20 July 1988): 7, citing Izvestia. 19 June 1988.

7 Bill Keller, "Armenia and Its Neighbors Only Diverge, "New York Times, 11 September 1988, Sec. 4, 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 85 replaced by strikes. On January 12, 1989, Moscow established

direct rule over Nagorno-Karabakh without consulting the

Azerbaijani leadership.8

During the spring of 1989, local political groups in

Baku formed the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF). However, the

Azerbaijani Communist Party leader, Abdulrakhman Vezirov,

refused to legalize the Popular Front. The APF's goals, as

developed in the summer of 1989, were to: (1) achieve

democratization and ensure human rights; (2) localize control

over elections; (3) "achieve political, economic, and

cultural sovereignty for Azerbaijan within the USSR "

(emphasis added) and restore cultural ties with Iranian

Azerbaijan; (4) cease the exploitation of natural resources;

(5) return land to the peasants and give them a role in

agricultural strategy; (6) insure equal treatment for all

nationalities; and (7) adopt measures to protect the

environment.^ The APF organized strikes and, during late

1989, began organizing the closure of rail lines to Armenia

to force it to drop its claims on Nagorno-Karabakh. 10

The APF became increasingly popular with the

Azerbaijani people and this eventually led Vezirov to

legalize the organization. The APF held demonstrations and

8 Alstadt, 204.

9 Ibid., 205.

10 "Russia Republic Urges Azerbaijan to End Armenia Blockades," New York Times. 3 December 1989, Section A, 11.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 86 pressed the Azerbaijani leadership to declare its control

over Nagorno-Karabakh and to approve a new law on

sovereignty. In August, Vezirov said he would cooperate with

the APF and he called for Azerbaijan's sovereignty.11 In

November 1989, Gorbachev issued a decree which restored the

old Armenian-dominated soviet in Nagorno-Karabakh and

continued the stationing of Soviet internal, or MVD, forces

in the region.12 Azerbaijan raised its objections to Moscow

on this action, and Armenia declared the annexation of

Nagorno-Karabakh.12 in December, Azerbaijan decided to

establish its own commission to replace the Volskiy

Commission.

On January 9, 1990, the Armenian Supreme Soviet and

self-proclaimed national soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh discussed

a 1990 republic budget that included Nagorno-Karabakh. This

prompted Azerbaijan to claim that Armenia was interfering in

Azerbaijan's internal affairs.14 The Presidium of the USSR

Supreme Soviet declared the Armenian resolution to be

11 Bill Keller, "Turkic Republics Press Soviets to Loosen Reins," New York Times. 26 August 1989, in Gwerztman and Kaufman, 196.

12 Alstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule. 207, citing Izvestiia. 30 November 1989.

13 Ibid., 207.

14 Ibid., 212.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87 "unconstitutional."15 Baku was unimpressed with Moscow's

failure to stop Armenia's claims on Nagorno-Karabakh.

On January 13-14, 1990, a bloody confrontation in Baku

erupted, and over a dozen Armenians were killed. On January

15, the USSR Supreme Soviet declared a state of emergency

because Azerbaijan and Armenia "acted with insufficient

firmness and consistency, have not used every opportunity to

surmount the situation that has developed, and in a number of

cases have followed the lead of extremist, nationalistically-

minded elements."17 On January 20, Moscow sent troops to

Baku, where clashes between the Azerbaijanis and Soviet

forces resulted in approximately 80 casualties.

First Secretary Abdulrakhman Vezirov was removed due to

his inability to control the situation and apparently because

he bowed to APF pressure.He was replaced by another

Communist Party member, Ayaz Mutalibov. Some key APF members

"Nakhichevan: Order is Being Restored," Current Digest of the Soviet Press 42, no. 2 (14 February 1990): 10, citing Izvestia. 11 January 1990, 1.

16 Altstadt, 212.

17 "Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet: On the Declaration of a State of Emergency in the N-K Autonomous Province and Several Other Areas.” The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. 42, no. 3 (February 21, 1990): 1, quoting Pravda and Izvestia. 16 January 1990, 1..

1^ Bill Keller, "Soviet Military Takes Control of Baku; Scores of Azerbaijanis killed; Coup Averted, Gorbachev Says," New York Times. 20 January 1990, in Gwerztman and Kaufman, 228.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 88 were arrested and the APF offices were closed. Although

Moscow claimed that it sent troops to protect Armenian

residents, the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet declared Moscow's

actions an act of aggression and in violation of the Soviet

Constitution. The declaration called for the withdrawal of

Soviet troops and the Baku leadership threatened to start

proceedings on Azerbaijan's withdrawal from the USSR if its

demands were not met.19

The USSR Supreme Soviet passed a resolution that spring

justifying its introduction of a state of emergency as a

"necessary measure to stop the violence at a time when armed

clashes and mass disturbances were on the rise and the

requirements of the law were not being obeyed."20 Moscow's

troop deployment and its justification for its actions

further alienated Baku.21

One of Mutalibov's first acts as First Secretary of

Azerbaijan was to criticize Moscow for its failure to rebuke

19 "Resolution of the Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Soviet: On Lifting the State of Emergency in the city of Baku," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. 42, no. 4 (February 28, 1990): 6, citing Bakinskv rabochv. 25 January 1990, 3..

20 "Resolution of USSR Supreme Soviet on the Situation in the Azerbaidzhan Republic and the Armenian Republic and Measures to Normalize the Situation in the Region." The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 42, no. 10 (April 11, 1990): 29, citing Pravda. 7 March 1990, 5; and Izvestia. 6 March 1990, 3..

21 Bill Keller, "Once Docile Azerbaijani City Bridles Under the Kremlin's Grip," New York Times. 16 February 1990, in Gwerztman and Kaufman, 238.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 89 Armenia for its demands on Nagorno-Karabakh and to demand the

withdrawal of Soviet troops.22 He also called for Moscow's

end to the special authority in Baku and Nagorno-Karabakh and

a purge of "unprincipled party members."23

In September, multiparty elections to the Azerbaijani

Supreme Soviet were so low that several run-off elections

were held. Although the Communists dominated the new Supreme

Soviet, ten percent of the 350 elected were from the

democratic bloc.24

By November 1990, Nagorno-Karabakh was returned to

Azerbaijan's jurisdiction. Moscow's attempts to mediate and

place restrictions on its republican powers continued to come

under attack by both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Neither side in

the conflict wanted the other in control of the region, but

apparently neither did they desire Moscow's interference.

Moscow attempted to put a lid on the conflict by refusing to

change the boundaries. Gorbachev, in an appeal to the people

of Armenia and inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh in March 1991

said, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast is an

inalienable part of Azerbaijan . . . That is how history has

22 Altstadt, 221.

23 ibid., 221, citing Azarbavian Kommunisti. no. 3 (1990): 13-14, 32-24.

24 Fuller, 4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 90 ordained it."25

The Soviet Government attempted in 1991 to keep the

country together by securing the republics' agreement to a

new treaty, called the All-Union Treaty. This treaty would

place more power in the hands of the republics. The APF

opposed the treaty, preferring instead a sovereign

Azerbaijani state. However, the draft of the Union Treaty was

approved by the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet on June 27, 1991.

Attempts to keep the Soviet Union together quickly

unraveled in August, 1991 as conservative forces sought to

take over the central government in an attempted coup in

Moscow. Following the failed coup, the republics took steps

to prepare for a future without the Soviet center. In

Azerbaijan, independence was declared on August 30 and

presidential elections were set for September 8. The

Azerbaijani nationalist forces sought free elections.

However, Mutalibov, who had closed the Communist Party

headquarters in Baku and ran under an anti-Communist

platform, was the lone candidate.26 He was victorious,

winning 84% of the electorate. The APF declared the election

unfair. The Armenians of Karabakh and the residents of the

25 "Appeal from U.S.S.R. President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev: 'To the People of Azerbaijan and the Inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh,1" Foreign Broadcast Information Service (15 March 1991): 78, citing Pravda. 15 March 1991..

26 David Remnick, "Azerbaijanis Cast Ballots for President," Washington Post, 9 September 1991, Sec. A, 17.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Nakhchyvan Autonomous Republic (Azerbaijani territory-

separated from Azerbaijan proper by Armenia) boycotted the

election.27

Mutalibov and other Azerbaijani Communist leaders

looked to Moscow to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh hostilities,

but it became apparent that Moscow could not live up to

Azerbaijan's expectations. Increasing clashes and empty

decrees from Moscow facilitated the disillusionment of the

Azerbaijani authorities. The lack of strong leadership in the

Baku government, combined with a national movement that

sought Mutalibov's ouster and a sovereign Azerbaijani state,

further hindered prospects for a solution to the conflict.

Failure to Stop the Violence. As indicated, Moscow's

reactions to the unfolding events in Azerbaijan were met with

disdain by Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders. Moscow's

decision to keep Nagorno-Karabakh part of Azerbaijan did not

end the conflict. It became clear early on that Moscow's

power to quell the violence was limited. Even its decision to

apply force by sending troops to the region was ineffective.

Soviet troops were unable to control the growing

tension in the region. Servicemen from various Soviet

republics were targets of attacks.28 consequently, Moscow had

27 Nakhchyvan was loyal to the leader of the Popular Front, Abulfez Elcibey, a native of the autonomous republic.

28 Number of Soviet military casualties in Nagorno- Karabakh from February, 1988 to July, 1991 were estimated at 123 killed and 675 wounded. "Afterword to the May Events on

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 92 problems conscripting men into the service as the soldiers

feared for their lives.29 in addition to the fear of being

killed, the morale of Soviet soldiers was weak and the troops

were apathetic to a battle involving other nationalities.

The 's role was to facilitate a return to

peace in the region. The hesitation of some soldiers to

become involved in a conflict that did not concern them and

their physical inability to stop the fighting weakened their

purpose. In fact, instead of putting a halt to fighting, the

Soviet Army was criticized for its participation in attacks

between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis. In late April-early

May, 1991, Azerbaijani troops, apparently assisted by the

Soviet army, attacked several Armenian-inhabited villages in

Azerbaijan along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. The

center's involvement in this exercise, which favored

Azerbaijan, may have been an attempt to fight for the

survival of the Communist Party in Azerbaijan, and thus the

Central Communist Party's hold on that republic.30 it may

well have also been to teach a "lesson" to Armenia, which was

leading an active struggle for its independence. It could

the Border Between Azerbaidzhan and Armenia," Current Digest of the Soviet Press 43, no. 26 (31 July 1991): 7, citing Pravda. 26 June 1991, 3.

29 Another reason is that many republics were moving to establish their own armies and wanted their conscripts to be a part of their nationalized armies.

30 James Carney, "Carnage in Karabakh?" Time 139 (13 April 13 1992): 41.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 93 best be described as an attempt to "solve" the problem of

Armenian claims on Nagorno-Karabakh by driving all Armenians

out of the region. It appeared Moscow was encouraging or at

least allowing inter-ethnic conflict to continue to show the

republics that they needed the center in order to avoid

bloodshed. Indeed, up to the final days of the USSR,

Gorbachev continued his call for the continuation of the

union, warning the periphery of impending war if the union

wasn't preserved.

Azerbaijan's Leaders. Although Moscow seemed to do

little more than barely contain the violence in Azerbaijan,

it was more than the Azerbaijani leadership was capable of

doing. The lack of effective leadership in Baku hindered the

republic's ability to deal with the dispute, while Moscow's

problems in handling the situation damaged the relationship

between the two capitals. Each act of violence was a test for

Moscow; each time Moscow failed to stop the hostilities it

served to further disillusion Baku's leadership and

strengthen the national political movement.

Ayaz Mutalibov was a leader whose policy changed as the

political climate changed. Mutalibov supported limited

independence with Moscow's guidance. However, the Soviet coup

attempt and its failure changed the course of the Azerbaijani

leadership after August 1991. Mutalibov reportedly supported

the attempt to overthrow Gorbachev in August 1991, although,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 94 once it failed, he denied these claims.31 Following the

failed coup, Mutalibov realized that Moscow could no longer

support his political position and he focused on achieving

sovereignty for Azerbaijan. Following Azerbaijan's

declaration of independence on August 30, 1991, Mutalibov

moved quickly to nationalize Communist Party buildings.

Once Azerbaijan gained its independence, Mutalibov

swayed back and forth on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. While he

needed to show support for a peaceful resolution to this

issue to boost his standing in the Western community, he also

wanted to appear a winner in his own country, making

compromise difficult. Mutalibov described the Nagorno-

Karabakh conflict as "the result of the general ill of the

formation of now characteristic of our society."32

Mutalibov was a leader with no solid ambitions for

Azerbaijan, but based his policies on keeping himself in

power. This feeling of self-preservation has permeated the

successive leaderships in Baku following Azerbaijan's

independence.

31 Elizabeth Fuller, "The Transcaucasus Republics Equivocate," Report on the USSR. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute, 3, no. 6 (6 September 1991): 42.

32 "Speech by Ayaz N. Mutalibov, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum," Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 5 February 1990, quoted in Charles F. Furtado, Jr. and Andrea Chandler, eds. Perestroika in the Soviet Republics: Documents on the National Question. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), 453.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 95 The strongest group outside of Mutalibov's government

was the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF). This group was

headed by Abulfez Elcibey (who was later ruled from June 1992

to June 1993) and it shifted to a more moderate political

stance following the arrest by Moscow authorities of the

Front's radical members in the riots of January, 1990. It was

also during this time that the Azerbaijani Popular Front

began to anticipate the impending collapse of the Soviet

empire, and the movement redirected its focus toward an

independent, western-oriented Azerbaijani state.

After the Soviet Union

The collapse of the Soviet empire has led to a further

destabilization of the situation in the Caucasus. While the

center's historically repressive system attempted to deprive

the peripheral nations of their independence, the ethnic

conflicts that sprouted from the decline of the Soviet Union

have jeopardized the stability and future of these new

states.

In many ways, the demise of the USSR thrust

independence upon the republics. Many republic leaders,

including Mutalibov in Azerbaijan, were initially willing to

work within a new union framework. These governments

recognized their vulnerability and instability and saw

preservation of the union as means to prevent total chaos

within their borders. While a break-up of the Soviet union

became inevitable due to the growing demands of the periphery

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 96 and the fracturing of the center, the quickened pace at which

the empire fell after the failed August coup came fast for

many of the struggling regimes. The new governments faced

difficulties not only politically and economically, but with

their minorities as well.

Naaorno-Karabakh Conflict

Political-Military Developments. The fighting has

changed in its technology and severity since the collapse of

the Soviet Union. The conflict has grown from fist-to-fist

combat to guns, tanks, plane, and missile warfare. To

reiterate, thousands of people have died, and over a million

people have been displaced by the fighting since the conflict

began. Over time, the conflict has grown from a dispute

between the Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan to a

battle involving three parties: the Azerbaijanis, Armenians

and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. Time has made this last

party more determined than ever to obtain its complete

independence.

Fortified with weapons and equipment left behind by the

retreating Soviet army, the parties quickly stepped up the

fighting.33 jn February 1 9 9 2 , Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian

forces killed hundreds of Azerbaijanis living in the Nagorno-

Karabakh town of Khojaly. This incident led to the forced

resignation of President Ayaz Mutalibov, and the interim

33 william Ward Maggs, "Armenia and Azerbaijan: Looking toward the Middle East," Current History 92, no. 570 (January 1993): 7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97 president, Yagub Mamedov, declared presidential elections for

early June, 1992. In May, Mutalibov supporters brought him

back to power, but he was ousted one day later by the APF. On

June 7, Azerbaijan held its first post-Soviet presidential

election, which international monitors deemed fair and free.

Abulfez Elcibey won 57% of the vote.

Since 1992, both the Azerbaijani and the Nagorno-

Karabakh Armenian forces have held the upper hand militarily

at different times. In 1992, while Azerbaijan had control of

the upper half of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Nagorno-Karabakh

Armenian forces took control over the corridor, the

main road link between the disputed area and Armenia. This

link is vital, as it provides the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians

their best access to Armenia and the outside world. The

Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian forces also took control of the

predominantly Azerbaijani-populated town of Shusha, which was

a focus of ethnic fighting earlier in this century.

The most significant fighting, however, occurred

throughout 1993. The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian forces not

only secured control over most of the disputed Nagorno-

Karabakh region, but also occupied Azerbaijani territory

surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, thus creating a cordon

sanitaire around the enclave. Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian

advances in 1993 brought the total of displaced persons in

Azerbaijan near one million and left many Azerbaijani towns

destroyed. The battlefield successes were a boon to the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 98 Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian arsenal as fleeing Azerbaijani

soldiers left behind military equipment.34

Although Elcibey was the first popularly-elected

president of the new independent state, the fate that befell

Mutalibov in 1992 also led to Elcibey's overthrow. The

occupation of the first of Azerbaijan's districts outside

Nagorno-Karabakh territory was a blow to the Elcibey

government. Like Mutalibov, Elcibey was criticized for his

failure to beat back the ethnic Armenian forces. In June

1993, a former local commander, , and his

troops, called for the reconvening of the prorogued Supreme

Soviet and the resignation of several key government

officials. Clashes between Huseynov's troops and government

forces in Ganje (in northwest Azerbaijan) resulted in the

Azerbaijani government's first defeat of the crisis at the

hands of the rebel Azerbaijanis. Huseynov, encouraged by his

victory in Ganje, led his troops to Baku, and with little

resistance from government forces, reached the outskirts of

the capital within weeks. Elcibey desperately called on

former Azerbaijani First Secretary and Politburo member

Heydar Aliyev to return from his self-imposed exile in

Nakhchyvan to help resolve the crisis. Aliyev was named

Parliamentary Speaker, and within days Elcibey fled the city.

As provided under the still-observed Soviet constitution,

34 Mark Uhlig, "The Karabakh War," World Policy Journal 10, no. 4 (Winter 1993/94): 49.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 99 Parliamentary Speaker Aliyev became Acting President. Aliyev

began to consolidate his power, and following negotiations

with Huseynov, named him Prime Minister. Aliyev's hold on

power was completed on October 3, 1993, when he was elected

president.

In December, 1993, the Azerbaijanis launched an

organized attack along the existing battle lines. The intense

fighting left hundreds dead but did not significantly change

the battle lines. Further Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian advances

in the spring forced approximately 50,000 Azerbaijanis to

flee their homes. In May, 1994, the parties— with the

assistance of the Russian government— agreed to a ceasefire.

At the end of the summer, the antagonists agreed among

themselves to extend the ceasefire indefinitely. The

ceasefire held throughout the rest of the year, and is the

longest-lasting ceasefire to date. This development

demonstrates the parties' weariness of fighting, but

continued posturing on both sides reflects no desire to seek

compromise and end the conflict.

The ceasefire did not keep the calm in Baku. In late

September, while President Aliyev was in New York for his

first meeting with President Clinton, two members of his

government were assassinated. Upon his return, Aliyev faced a

political crisis that threatened his leadership. The Deputy

Interior Minister, , in response to the arrest

of some of his men in connection with the assassinations,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 used force to release them from jail. The confrontation

sparked a stand-off between Javadov's Interior Ministry

forces and regular government troops. While that situation

was resolved through negotiations between the President and

Javadov, Aliyev then revealed that the Prime Minister— the

same man behind Elcibey's overthrow in 1993— was preparing to

launch an attack against him. Prime Minister Huseynov denied

the accusation, but pre-empted any punitive government action

by fleeing the country. In a short time, Aliyev was able to

rid himself of one potential threat to his power, the prime

minister, and in the process, to purge the government of

others whose loyalty was suspect. In March, 1995, another

stand-off between the forces of Deputy Interior Minister

Javadov, who called for Aliyev's removal, and troops loyal to

the president resulted in the deaths of some 60 people,

including Javadov. Although Aliyev emerged victorious in both

crises, the constant upheavals in Azerbaijan since 1992 have

dealt a serious blow to the country's political stability.

These threats to the government had added to the leadership's

concerns, and has affected the decision-making process.

Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. The

Armenian government is led by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who was

democratically elected president in 1991. Ter-Petrosyan, a

former dissident under the Soviet system and leader of the

Karabakh secessionist movement, has tried to move his country

down a path of reform. Azerbaijan's embargoes on Armenia,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101 combined with Turkey's closed border and constant disruption

of aid shipments from Armenia's only other regular land link,

Georgia, have made progress difficult. Shortages of

electricity and water have created hardship in Armenia,

particularly through several bitterly cold winters. However,

the government, although not overwhelmingly popular, has

survived. Ter-Petrosyan's government has been challenged by

the Dashnak party, the leading political party during

Armenia's independence in the early 1900s, which takes a more

hardlined approach toward Turkey and the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict. Ter-Petrosyan's efforts to maintain some contact

with the Turkish Government has created tension with the

Armenian people, who continue to recall the tragic events of

1915. Armenia, harking to earlier times, has good relations

with Russia. Russian border guards patrol Armenia's frontier

with Turkey and Iran, and Russia has assisted Armenia in

restarting its nuclear power plant. Although Ter-Petrosyan

insists the ongoing conflict is between the Karabakh

Armenians and Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh's only channel for

aid and other imports is, by necessity, through Armenia. Thus

Armenia has been key to Nagorno-Karabakh's survival.

Although the solution to this conflict has been placed

on the shoulders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Nagorno-

Karabakh Armenians have emerged as a key player in the

negotiations for a resolution to the fighting. The only forum

which allows the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians a voice is the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Minsk process. The OSCE established the so-called "Minsk

Group" in the spring of 1992 to bring the warring parties

together, including the 'interested parties' of Nagorno-

Karabakh. 35 The inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians in

the OSCE peace process was necessary because resolution of

the conflict requires their participation. The conflicting

parties, along with several other countries (including

Turkey, Russia, and the U.S.) search for an end to the

f i g h t i n g . 36 Although there are close ties between Armenians

in Yerevan and Stepanakert, the leadership in Nagorno-

Karabakh has developed independent views on the process for

solving the dispute. Since finding a place in the OSCE

process, the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians have demanded

recognition as a party to the conflict, and are also seeking

recognition of their declaration of independence. The current

leader of Nagorno-Karabakh, , who is close to

Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan, represents the resolve of

the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to strive for independence.

However, Ter-Petrosyan's failure to officially recognize the

35 The term "interested parties" applies to both the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations of Nagorno-Karabakh. In January, 1995, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

3 6 The other Minsk Group members are Italy, Belarus, , Germany, France, and Hungary. In 1995, Switzerland and joined the Minsk Group.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 103 Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians' claim of independence— even

though Yerevan supports the Karabakh Armenians' struggle

against the Azerbaijani government— demonstrates that the

Armenian leadership remains flexible to options for resolving

the dispute. Nevertheless, the Armenian Government continues

to provide support to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. The

Armenian government has admitted to allocating part of its

budget to the Nagorno-Karabakh war e f f o r t . 37

Views on the Conflict. The Azerbaijani Government

insists that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of

"Armenian aggression," of fighting carried out by Armenian

regular troops on Azerbaijani territory. Armenia, on the

other hand, does not view itself as part of the conflict, but

sees this dispute as a human rights and self-determination

i s s u e . 38 However, independent sources have reported the

presence of regular Armenian forces in Azerbaijan.39 Their

presence does not fully justify Azerbaijan's claim that the

conflict is between the two states, as the Nagorno-Karabakh

37 william Ward Maggs cites an admission by the Armenian Government in June 92 that 40% of its budget goes to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, and states that "many think that figure is conservative." Maggs, 9.

38 "interviews: Ambassadors to the U.S. Discuss Conflict in the Caucasus" U.S-lran Review 1, no. 6 (September 1993): 4.

39 Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nacrorno- Karabakh (New York: Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1994), 64.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 104 Armenians have been fighting at the front line since the

beginning and have developed their own political leadership.

It is easy to see why the conflict has not been

resolved, as one side views this as a case of self-

determination, and the side views this as a question of

territorial integrity. Indeed, the Azerbaijani Government has

ignored the importance of the role of the Nagorno-Karabakh

Armenians, and has had little dialogue with the leadership in

Stepanakert. The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, on the other

hand, believe they can exist as an independent state. In

reality, Nagorno-Karabakh is dependent on Armenia for its

energy and food needs, and Armenia in turn is dependent on

outside parties, such as the U.S., in meeting its needs.

Another complication in resolving the conflict is the

importance of national pride. For the Azerbaijani and

Armenian leaders, willingness to compromise equals weakness

in the eyes of the opposition and the people.40 This pressure

has prevented serious progress in a peaceful resolution of

the conflict. There exists a lack of political will by either

side to end the dispute. Although the parties must have

realized by now the enormous economic and political costs of

continuing the battle for Nagorno-Karabakh, they appear

40 Paul A. Goble, "Coping with the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis" The Fletcher Forum 16, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 22.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 105 willing to negotiate only from a position of strength.41 Both

the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and the Azerbaijanis view this

conflict as a zero-sum game, where one side wins all and one

side loses all. This zero-sum attitude is pervasive in all

aspects of the Armenian-Azerbaijani relationship, as anything

that benefits one side (even if at the same time it helps the

other), is viewed as harmful by the other. This has become

part of the nationalist fervor that has made compromise

difficult to obtain.

Peace Efforts

Even with the ceasefire in place, the conflict appears

no closer to resolution and international efforts to stop it

have been largely ineffective. A ceasefire and deployment of

OSCE monitors were to be the precursors to the negotiations

in Minsk, which would determine the final status of Nagorno-

Karabakh. However, the increased hostilities over the last

several years have demonstrated the fragility of peace.

Toward the end of 1994, the OSCE explored the possibility of

a multinational peacekeeping force. At the December, 1994

Summit in Budapest, the OSCE member states declared their

"political will" to provide such a force.

This development closed a year of disagreement between

Russia and the rest of the Minsk Group over the peace

process. As former U.S. negotiator, Jack Maresca, stated,

41 John J. Maresca, "Agony of Indifference in Nagorno- Karabakh," The Christian Science Monitor. 27 June 1994, 19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 106

"Russia wished to reestablish its dominance in the region and

to exclude outsiders, particularly the U.S. and Turkey."42

Russia started unilateral peace efforts with the governments

to obtain a ceasefire and deployment of CIS troops. While

Armenia was ready to accept either a Russian force or a OSCE

peacekeeping force composed largely of Russians, Azerbaijan

rejected a Russia-only or dominated force on its territory

and sought to limit the number of Russia troops participating

in a multinational peacekeeping operation.42 At the December,

1994, OSCE Summit, Russia's separate efforts were combined

with those of the OSCE, and Russia was made co-chair of the

Minsk Group peace process.44

While there currently appears to be a unified

international approach to helping the parties resolve this

conflict, the parties are still not fully co-operative.

Indeed, international efforts have only highlighted the

inability of the parties to negotiate.

There are several obvious options for the parties:

stalemate, compromise or continue fighting. The 1994

ceasefire has shown the conflicting parties weariness to

42 Ibid., 19.

42 A.D. Horne, "Armenian Leader Argues for Russian Truce Force," Washington Post. 11 August 1994, 24. Azerbaijan is the only CIS member that does not have Russian troops or border guards stationed on its territory.

44 The other co-chair is a rotating position given to another member of the Minsk Group.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 107 fight. However, the ceasefire does not necessarily signal

that the parties are willing to sacrifice their national

desires for a compromise solution. Due to the deep and

historic distrust that exists, there is a strong possibility

that the fighting will continue. In addition, both sides

continue to seek justification for their hostile actions and

positions by trying to gain "international understanding" of

their plights. Indeed, one role each party has played is that

of victim. In the world of black and white, right and wrong,

it is the victim that is to be supported, and the aggressor

punished.

In reality, all are victims. The continuing embargo on

Armenia, which under the Soviet system was dependent on rail

and electricity lines from Azerbaijan, has had a devastating

effect on the Armenian people. Limited water and electricity

have slowed economic development and lowered the standard of

living. The need to keep Nagorno-Karabakh running has also

put a strain on Armenia's already limited resources. To

combat its energy shortages, the Armenian government has

taken steps to reopen its Soviet-built nuclear power plant,

which is located along a seismically active zone near the

Turkish-Armenian border.

For Azerbaijan, the conflict has uprooted one-seventh

of the population. Many of those are living in camps not far

from the front lines. Both countries have suffered, but both

have used their suffering to try to gain international

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 108 sympathy and thus, as the righteous nation, used that

sympathy to avoid compromising.

As mentioned previously, one of the major acquisitions

for the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians is the ,

which gives Nagorno-Karabakh direct access to Armenia. This

is a crucial area, as Azerbaijan's embargoes and the battle

lines had, until 1993, limited other land routes to Nagorno-

Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani

territory outside of the disputed area has also complicated

the negotiating process. While providing the Nagorno-Karabakh

Armenians a position of strength by which they can more-or-

less demand concessions, the Azerbaijani side is also making

demands before it makes any good will gestures, such as

lifting its embargo on Armenia. The Nagorno-Karabakh

Armenians have had little benefit from controlling the

situation on the ground. They continue to fear Azerbaijani

attacks and have won little international support for their

efforts to become an independent state. Azerbaijan has lost

approximately twenty percent of its territory (not including

Nagorno-Karabakh), and has been unable to regain control of

that lost land.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians continue to insist on

undefined "security guarantees" to protect them from

Azerbaijani aggression. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, fears

the presence of OSCE monitors or a peacekeeping force will

freeze Armenian gains unless accompanied by a comprehensive

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109 peace package that includes withdrawal of enemy forces from

occupied Azerbaijani territory, including contentious issues

like Shusha and Lachin. The parties will continue to hold up

the peace process, because they are incapable, or unwilling,

to compromise.

Summary

Soviet Moscow could not solve the dispute between

Armenians and Azerbaijanis but instead was blamed for taking

advantage of the hostile situation to maintain its control.45

The conflict weakened the ties between the center and

republics and the growing difference between Moscow and the

local capitals fed Armenian and Azerbaijani national

movements. Nationalism and the feeling of deprivation, as

well as the weakening of the center, were strong factors that

led to the break-up of the USSR. Nationalism in Azerbaijan

continues to develop, but as the government and people

struggle to build a stable state, so too do their minorities

--particularly the , but potentially

the Lezghis and Talysh as well. Nationalism, while growing

stronger, is still focused on the creation of the state. The

immediate threat to the new state is the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict. This dispute has resulted in the loss of land— an

Alex Alexiev, states that "Although the conflict is over local issues, failure to resolve it has led both sides to blame Moscow, thus revealing the essentially anti-systemic nature of nationalism." Alex Alexiev, "The Last Empire: Nationalist Surge Could Undo Soviets," Los Angeles Times. 8 January 1989, Section 5, 1-2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 110 important element to a group of nationalists trying to

protect their history and their future. Paul Goble states

that, . . b y linking ethnicity to territory . . . all

ethnic conflicts (have transformed) into territorial o n e s . "46

This has been a pressing issue in the Armenian-

Azerbaijani relationship since their independence in the

early 1900s, and it is clear that 70 years of Soviet rule did

not diminish the importance this land holds for both

Armenians and Azerbaijanis. This piece of land signifies not

only an historical tie, but also "offers a means of asserting

control . . ."47 to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, control

over the enclave signifies power and self-preservation. As

Huttenbach states, Armenians have been victims of massacres,

which leads the population to believe they need land to

protect themselves from the outside. The Armenians believe

they, "cannot afford to lose another a c r e . "48 This is why the

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is viewed by both Armenians in

Stepanakert and those in Armenia as a struggle for the

Armenian people as a whole, and they do not want to be driven

from any more land.

46 Goble, 22.

47 Parker, The Geopolitics of Domination. 4, citing D.R. Sack, Conceptions of Space in Social Thought (London: Macmillan, 1980),199.

48 Henry Huttenbach, remarks at symposium, Washington, D.C., June 1991, author's notes.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ill The parties believe they are in the right, and they are

holding out for a solution that reaffirms that belief. Any

compromise appears to be a blow to the interests of the

nation. However, both Armenia and Azerbaijan suffer from the

effects of the conflict, politically and economically. The

power of nationalism in the region is manifested in the way

the parties view each other and the conflict. There is no

room for two winners in the conflict, although the parties'

intransigence leads to the possibility of two losers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Features and Effects of Nationalism

Caucasus in Context. Azerbaijan is not the only state

engaged in national hostilities. Azerbaijan's situation can

be compared to other territorial disputes, such as (1) the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is rooted in historic and

religious ties to territory; (2) the India-Pakistan conflict

over Kashmir, which borders Pakistan but acceded to India;

(3) the ethnic bloodletting in Bosnia, in which the Bosnian

Serbs are supported by their ethnic brethren in neighboring

Serbia against the Bosnian Muslims; and (4) Cyprus, which has

been cut in half by warring Turks and Greeks.

These other conflicts reflect the kind of deadly and

protracted war Nagorno-Karabakh threatens to become. The

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is currently in a no war-no peace

situation. Although a lengthy ceasefire has been in place

since May 1994, there has been no real movement toward peace,

and without a final, peaceful settlement, this conflict will

likely drag on for years and result in more deaths. The lack

of progress in resolving the conflict has led to frustration

among the antagonists and has eroded their faith in the

negotiation process. If Azerbaijan cannot regain its occupied 112

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 113 territory through peace, it may resort to force. The ethnic

Armenian forces, although occupying high ground along the

battle line, could likewise become restless enough to attempt

another strike against the Azerbaijani forces. Each see

military might as a way to force a solution upon the other.

Since both see this as a win-lose conflict, each is

determined not to be the loser.

As empires have collapsed, ethnic confrontation has

erupted in many instances. In the cases above— the end of the

British mandate over Palestine, end of British rule in India

1947 and decades later in Cyprus, and the collapse of the

Soviet Empire— each paved the way for ethnic tensions to

spring to the surface. Although some potentially explosive

confrontations have been held in check, particularly in

Kazakhstan, where there are large numbers of Russians, the

pattern that has developed in many parts of the world is

disturbing, signalling the lengthy and damaging results of

national conflicts. These conflicts are not always contained

among a few, specific national groups, but encompass

neighbors and create security and stability problems for the

international community.

Observations. Several generalizations can be made about

modern nationalism based on its history elsewhere but

specifically in the Caucasus and especially in Azerbaijan.

The first is that national passions cannot be eradicated

through force or time. From Tsarist Russia to the Soviet

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11 Union, nationalist sentiments survived, it is a way for the

various ethnic peoples to preserve their culture. As the

Soviet Empire crumbled, Azerbaijani nationalism picked up

where it left off at the time of its incorporation into the

Soviet Union in 1920. Having reawakened Azerbaijani

nationalist fervour during the late 1980s, Azerbaijan's

national movement fought for the interests of an Azerbaijani

state, and now that state seeks to repel any perceived

attacks to its sovereignty. The history of subjugation to

other national groups has left Azerbaijan determined not to

fall prey to outside rule again.

Second, there is a "domino effect" resulting from

nationalism in the Caucasus. Like a contagious disease,

nationalism spread during the collapse of the Soviet Union.

As Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia came to grips with their

long-standing nationalist feelings, nationalist sentiments

arose among other groups such as the Ossetians, Abkhazians,

and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Years under Soviet rule,

along with internal boundaries drawn by Moscow, contributed

to the ethnic confrontation.

A third observation is that history can indeed repeat

itself, especially where territory and ethnicity are

involved. Anyone reading a book on the history of the

Caucasus will undoubtedly find many similarities between

today's events and those of the 1917-1920 period, especially

with regard to the seeming inability of the three main

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 115 Caucasus national groups to co-operate and the role of

regional powers. Competing historical claims on Karabakh were

made in the early 1900s and are now being repeated more than

seventy years later. In addition, the turn-of-the-century

ties have been renewed. Armenia has closer links with Russia

(and no diplomatic relations with its historic enemy,

Turkey), while Turkey has been a staunch supporter of

Azerbaijan. The Armenian-Turkish and Azerbaijani-Russian

suspicions and hatreds of the past haunt present relations

and fuel discord between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Fourth, nationalism, or ultra-nationalism, can undermine

national interests. Expending nationalist sentiment on

warfare has taken energy and resources away from state-

building. Azerbaijan is still working with many of the same

laws, as well as the same constitution, passed under the

Soviet system. Efforts at political reform have been stymied

and the conflict has been a source of confrontation among

opposing political forces.

Paradox of Nationalism. In the cases mentioned earlier,

as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, ethnic

confrontation centers on a piece of land. Territory is for

national groups a means of identification and a basis for the

nationalist drive to statehood. Robert Ardrey, in his review

of animals and man's identification with land, states that in

both animal and man is "an innate compulsion to defend one's

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 116 property . . . "1 Ardrey states that territory is one of the

few ways in which the three factors that motivate behavior—

identity, stimulation, and security— are satisfied.2

Territorial needs, coupled with extreme nationalism, may lead

to conflict and expenditure of resources, which threaten the

viability of the state.

Thus, ultra-nationalism can create an effect

opposite to its desired aim. As nations recapture and

assert their identity, there is no room for acceptance of

other national groups. Victor Gollancz describes this

"egoism" as follows:

Of all the evils I hate I think I hate nationalism most. Nationalism— national egoism, thinking in terms of one's nation rather than in terms of humanity — nationalism is evil because it concentrates on comparative inessentials . . . and ignores the essential, which is simply that he is man . . . It makes one set of people hate another set that they haven't the smallest real occasion for hating; it leads to jealousy, expansionism, oppression, strife and eventually war.3

Years of suppression under tsarist and Soviet rule left

national sentiments boiling just under the surface in the

republics— under-developed and under-expressed. Upon breaking

the surface, nationalism can become a negative factor in the

development of a nation into a state.

1 Robert Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative (New York: Atheneum, 1966), 249.

2 Ibid., 333.

3 Ibid., 18, quoting Victor Gollancz, Mv Dear Timothy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), 292.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11 There are several ways in which nationalism undermines

national interest. One paradox is that nationalism, which

aims for statehood, endangers that goal by over-emphasizing

past claims to a particular territory. Armenians and

Azerbaijanis sift through their individual histories to

justify their claims. The centuries of commingling of

Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and their ancestors in the Karabakh

region makes these claims difficult to prove. By focusing on

the past, ultra-nationalists refuse to consider the present

day residents of that particular territory. Thus, the past

becomes more important than the present or the future,

particularly with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, which holds

less economic than historic value. The overall interests of

the state are held hostage as Azerbaijan directs its efforts

to one particular region. Retention of this land— at any

cost— has been given priority in the government's policies.

A second paradox is the focus on the importance of land

by nationalist groups, which draws them into conflict.

Azerbaijan has a second chance at statehood, but these

territorial claims have renewed Armenian-Azerbaijan

hostilities. Fledgling states caught up in conflict do not

place themselves in a positive environment for development,

nor cooperation with their neighbors.

Nationalist ties to land can also make it difficult to

compromise in territorial disputes. Both Azerbaijanis and

Armenians claim a right to this land and reject each other's

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 118 counterclaims. As territory is viewed in terms of power and

security, there is little incentive for ultra-nationalists to

compromise. Even a smaller area, such as the town of Shusha,

is a source of dispute— both during the 1918-1920 period and

today. The conflicting parties have further muddled prospects

for compromise by trying to partition an already confined

space.

Nationalism can also undermine the interests of a nation

by the that it creates. Mutual suspicions of

Azerbaijanis and Armenians fuel extreme nationalism and

conflict. Cooperation between the enemy and a third party is

viewed as a threat, as in the Azerbaijani-Turkish

relationship or Armenian-Russian cooperation. The deep

mistrust has led the groups to expect the worst of each other

and question the motives of regional players. The tenuous

ceasefire is at risk of breaking down due to fears by the

antagonists that the enemy will violate the ceasefire. These

fears have influenced the offensives launched on both sides—

specifically of the ethnic Armenian offensives in 1993— in an

effort to pre-empt an attack by the adversary.

Nationalist confrontation diverts resources from the

state to the conflict. The resources of the state, including

people, have been spent on waging war. The economies of

Azerbaijan and Armenia are still going through a transition

from a command to open market economy, and chances for

success are hindered by the costs of waging a war. Success

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 119 will be slow as money, material and manpower are spent on

fighting. The lack of political stability in Baku and the

"free fall" of the Azerbaijani economy have been in large

part due to the attention the government gives to the

historical significance of the Nagorno-Karabakh territory

over greater needs of the Azerbaijani state and people. Seven

years of fighting has eroded the morale of the populations of

Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have suffered from the lack of

economic reform and infrastructural development. Nationalism

in independent Azerbaijan has not brought prosperity, only

grief.

Another example of the paradox of nationalism is the

difficulty of third party mediation because a country or

international organization may be seen--or used--as a

demonstration of support for one side or the other. Extreme

nationalism in the Caucasus leaderships can lead to doubts

over whether the international community understands their

positions and can influence a positive outcome— all in their

favor. The Armenians and Azerbaijanis have set extreme

conditions for peace. The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians seek

undefined "international guarantees" of their security to

prevent any future attack from Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijan

seeks to have Armenia named the "aggressor" by the

international community. Both sides fail to realize the

limits of international intervention and thus do not better

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 120 utilize the assistance that the world community is able to

provide.

Ultra-nationalist conflicts can lead to a desire for

revenge. Thousands have died in the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict— there are few that have not suffered the loss of a

family member or friend— and many grieving families blame

their enemy. Indeed, there have been tit-for-tat attacks

--hostaging-taking for purposes of trading them for return of

loved ones, and counter-offensives launched on the

battlefield. Almost one million Azerbaijanis have been

displaced by the conflict, and many are still living in

temporary shelters two years after the last major fighting

sent them fleeing from their homes. These displaced are

angry, not only at the government in Baku for failing to

retake Azerbaijani land, but at Armenians for creating their

dismal situation.

Ultra-nationalism can undermine national interests

through the creation of a dependent, non-viable entity. As

Turkish Cyprus is dependent upon Turkey for support, so the

Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians rely on Armenia in meeting their

energy and other needs. Nationalism in Nagorno-Karabakh led

to the struggle for independence, but it is difficult to

imagine that full independence can succeed in Nagorno-

Karabakh if it cannot be more self-reliant. This can be

frustrating to the Armenian separatists, who are caught in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 121 the struggle for statehood but unable to meet this

aspiration.

Finally, nationalism can impede ethnic tolerance. The

hostile view of other national groups blocks acceptance not

only of enemies in dispute, but could spread to other

national groups in the region, e.g., potential enemies. The

longer the conflict goes on, the deeper the hatred, and, as

hatred is passed on from generation to generation, any chance

of a peaceful coexistence will be out of reach.

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are struggling with

their pasts and for their futures. The hostilities that were

never resolved when the Red Army marched into the Caucasus in

the 1920s remain. Azerbaijan's resurgent nationalism fed the

nationalist sentiment of the Karabakh Armenians, yet

Azerbaijan will not recognize the Karabakh Armenians' desire

to be a state— a desire shared by Azerbaijani nationalists at

the end of the Soviet era. The freedoms that nationalist

movements in Azerbaijan and the other new independent states

fought to obtain are now being sought by the ethnic

minorities in several of these countries— such as the Abkhaz

in Georgia and the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. And with

the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians' role in the conflict comes

the complicated debate over the competing principles of self-

determination and territorial integrity. Which principle is

supreme, the inviolability of a state's borders or the right

of a people to control their own future? Unfortunately, there

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122 is no easy compromise, as Azerbaijan refuses to give up any

territory and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians refuse to

surrender their dreams of independence.

The persistence of integral nationalism may well lead to

the continuation and spread of ethnic conflicts. in

Russia and Abkhaz in Georgia are other examples of exclusive

nationalism in action. In these cases in the new independent

states, the international community has supported territorial

integrity, based on existing borders, over self-

determination. Such support for the inviolability of a

state's borders is demonstrated in the four United Nations

Security Council resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict, passed in 1993, and the many OSCE documents adopted

on this matter. However, no mention of the right to self-

determination is made in these documents. This is not good

news for the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. It indicates that

unless there is some drastic change that sways the views of

the international community, support for Karabakh

independence is not going to be forthcoming. Part of the

reason why border or territorial integrity is favored is the

concern of the world community over the further break-up of

states, leading to greater world instability. Chances for

Karabakh to survive as an autonomous enclave are slim. Its

dependence upon Armenia is one strike against it. British-

ruled Hong Kong in the People's republic of China is an

example of the limited life of enclaves. Democratic West

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 123 Berlin within Communist East Germany also did not last and

was always an explosive arrangement due to the ideological

differences of the two parties.

Future Developments

Outcomes of the Conflict. It is obvious that the

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will continue to threaten the

greater national interests of Azerbaijan and Armenia. There

are many directions the conflict can take. One outcome is no

solution— to allow the conflict to drift into a stagnant,

unresolved dispute--as happened in Cyprus and, until

recently, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This leaves open

the possibility of further fighting, or could lead to a de

facto independence or annexation of Karabakh to Armenia. The

parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have a tenuous

ceasefire in place and, if international peacekeeping forces

or monitors are sent to the region, they can help ensure the

containment of the hostilities until such time as a final

settlement can be negotiated. This could takes years, if not

decades. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an example of

the lengthy route a peace process can take, but one being

reached with the help of international organizations like the

UN.

Another "solution" is one in which one side wins and the

other loses. Such a zero-sum end would result from severe

military losses. The potential of outside assistance and the

stubbornness of the national groups involved suggests that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 124 this outcome would likely extend the conflict's duration.

There will be less chance of securing a final peace, since

revenge may become the goal of the losing side. It also opens

the door for the direct involvement of other regional

players— Russia, Turkey, Iran— either as peace mediators,

peace enforcers, or military allies. Such a drawn-out

conflict will have devastating effects on the futures of

these states.

Another possibility is a negotiated settlement that

meets the parties' minimal needs, which they are willing to

accept for the sake of regional peace. No doubt this will

require compromise and many incremental steps— confidence-

building measures for instance— to dispel the mistrust and

solidify a peace. This would be the most stable outcome,

giving Azerbaijan and Armenia opportunity to shift focus to

state needs. By coming to terms through compromise, both

sides, it is hoped, will have accepted the need to give up

something for the broader goal of peace and national

development. The years of mistrust will need to be addressed

through confidence-building measures, such as the release of

detainees and prisoners of war (as has occurred recently),

direct talks without mediation, and lifting of economic

embargoes.

Status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Whichever route the conflict

takes, the major issue involved is the ultimate status of

Nagorno-Karabakh. Returning Nagorno-Karabakh to the level of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 125 autonomy it had in Soviet Azerbaijan would not be acceptable

to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who have fought long and

hard for their independence from Baku and have become

dependent on Armenia. An independent Nagorno-Karabakh island

in Azerbaijan would likewise be difficult to sustain due to

Nagorno-Karabakh's dependence upon Armenia for its existence.

This arrangement would also put the Karabakh Armenians in the

same vulnerable position they faced when the fighting began

in 1988, i.e. surrounded by Azerbaijan proper.

Although, no longer openly discussed by the Armenian

government or Nagorno-Karabakh leadership, annexation of

Nagorno-Karabakh is still an option. However, the separation

of these ethnic brethren has led to independent thinking.

While economically, it makes more sense for the two to be

united, the political leadership in Stepanakert may find it

difficult to subordinate itself to another government. Since

1991, the Armenian government appears to have relinquished

the idea of annexation in favor of some level of autonomy for

Nagorno-Karabakh.^

Allowing Nagorno-Karabakh to keep the Azerbaijani

territory it occupies outside the disputed enclave will be

impossible for the Azerbaijani government to accept due to

the almost one million displaced persons still living in

4 David Remnick, "Azerbaijanis Cast Ballots for President," Washington Post. 9 September 1991, A, 19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 126 temporary shelters and the strategic military power this

territorial control gives the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.

Land or population swaps would segregate the two ethnic

groups, and could be suggested as an option for a peace

settlement. The Israelis and Palestinians are going through a

land-for-peace process. Indeed, in 1992 (before the ethnic

Armenians' land grab), Paul Goble suggested that a possible

solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would be to give

part of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia in exchange for Armenian-

controlled Zangezur, which separates Nakhchyvan from

Azerbaijan proper. Another option would be to swap the

populations of Nakhchyvan and Nagorno-Karabakh, along the

lines of the swaps in Bulgaria and Turkey that took place

after World War II. Both scenarios would be unacceptable to

the Armenians and Azerbaijanis. It is the ethnic ties to land

that has helped create the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,

and these "solutions" ignore the deep-seated, nationalist

feelings Armenians and Azerbaijanis have, not only for

Nagorno-Karabakh, but for the historic lands of Nakhchyvan

and Zangezur.

A compromise solution would give Nagorno-Karabakh a

certain level of autonomy that would be greater than under

the USSR but less than full independence. It would remain

part of Azerbaijan, but the land would de facto be ruled by

Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Occupied territory would need

to be internationally monitored and certain areas, such as

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 127 the land between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, may need to be

free of either Armenian or Azerbaijani inhabitants. In

exchange for the land corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-

Karabakh, Azerbaijan would receive a corridor to Nakhchyvan

through Zangezur. Such an arrangement for settling the

dispute will not be permanent unless both sides fully accept

it. Undoubtedly, the Karabakh Armenians would view this as a

stepping stone to full independence— an idea that Azerbaijan

is years away from accepting, if ever.

International Organizations. A key factor in

containing, if not resolving, the conflict will be the

involvement of the international community. In the past, the

UN has provided peacekeeping forces in conflicted regions and

the OSCE is currently seeking to do the same in Nagorno-

Karabakh. While not a guarantor of peace, the involvement of

the world community could possibly ease the situation and

facilitate a peaceful, negotiated solution. However, the

world community must become involved early in a negotiating

process, lest the situation become intractable, as in Bosnia.

Although not fool-proof, international organizations can use

their past experiences to apply to new situations that arise.

In addition, the international community's focus may put some

pressure on the hostile parties to resolve the conflict,

although the actual peace must be sincere and initiated by

the conflicting parties themselves— if peace is to have any

chance of lasting.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 128 International organizations can also help respond to

security needs of these small states. At the present time,

security is sought in the amount of territory that is

controlled by a particularly national group. The distance

between hostile groups is also key to this sense of security

as it provides a buffer for protection. Azerbaijan and

Armenia, like Russia, appear to "think of security in terms

of space . . . (instead of) institutional terms . . ."5 while

the UN and the OSCE have offered to help Armenia and

Azerbaijan make the transition to a more institutional view

of security, these states have been slow to grasp the long­

term stability this type of security can provide them. The

history of subjugation and ever-changing borders under

various rulers— who valued territorial conquest partly as a

form of protection--has shaped the Azerbaijanis' and

Armenians' perceptions of security. The continual interaction

with the UN and OSCE— and even North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) through Partnership for Peace (which all

three Caucasus states have joined)— will help smaller states

view security in a wider European (and international)

context.

Political and Economic Development. A peaceful end to

the conflict and economic development could help Azerbaijan's

leaders find the political and economic stability they so

5 John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States. 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 176.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 129 desperately need. The international community can work with

Armenia and Azerbaijan in many areas to promote stability. UN

representatives stationed in the Caucasus capitals and

government representatives at the UN in New York, will help

facilitate discussions of possible measures toward conflict

resolution and educate these countries on other international

peacekeeping efforts. The Caucasus states should recognize

the conflict in Bosnia as an example of the complications

which international organizations— in this case the UN and

NATO— face in dealing with ethnic conflicts. The Bosnia case

sends a signal regarding the world community's limitations—

its inability to force a solution on national groups bent on

fighting--and of the responsibility of the ethnic groups in

defusing these situations. From a review of the Bosnian

conflict, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaderships could consider

how quickly a conflict can spread and realize the threat it

poses. It is such a realization that, one hopes, has led the

parties to involve the world community to help keep the

conflict from spreading and bring them to the peace table.

Instead of seeking military assistance from other

countries, the parties can garner political support, which

will help in the diplomatic process. Azerbaijan has developed

some cooperation with the non-aligned countries in the UN,

which will give the country a greater voice on issues of

national interest. If the conflicting parties can permanently

move the conflict from a military level to a political level,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 130 i.e., maintain the current truce, it will help contain the

conflict and provide an environment for progress.

Interaction with democratic states and OSCE could

promote ethnic tolerance as well as democratic reform.

Together, these principles will increase the chances of

ethnic understanding and peaceful coexistence. The embracing

of these principles could also help ease the political

tension in Baku by allowing the people to form their

government through democratic and peaceful means.

Azerbaijan's parliamentary elections are scheduled this fall

and will be a barometer by which democratic states, such as

the U.S., will judge Azerbaijan's commitment to democratic

principles. Both the UN and OSCE have been invited to help in

the electoral process and observe the elections. This level

of attention will help the government focus on steps it needs

to take to integrate fully with western . While

the elections are not likely not to be fully free and fair,

without international pressure and attention the government

may find little incentive to abide by the international norms

and principles to which it has committed itself.

One of Azerbaijan's greatest national interests is its

oil, which it plans to export to Europe. The economic

benefits of oil exports could play a major role in the

country's stability. Already, Azerbaijan has seen growing

interest of western companies in its oil development,

specifically in the $8 billion deal it signed with several

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 131 foreign oil companies to develop its offshore oil fields in

the Caspian Sea. This investment will bring other industries

to Azerbaijan— as observed in the recent opening of the first

western-styled hotel and several western restaurants in Baku.

Azerbaijan has also received loans from international

financial institutions (IFIs), such as the International

Monetary Fund, aimed at helping Azerbaijan's economic

development. Presumably, the IFIs can not only help

Azerbaijan take necessary steps in privatization, but teach

the government fiscal responsibility.

With peace comes the prospect for other economic

benefits to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. A pipeline running

from Azerbaijan to Armenia to Turkey could strengthen

regional cooperation, further cementing peace. However,

economic and political development will need to move forward

together. Progress in one area alone will not be enough for

Azerbaijan's growth and stability. The international

community has helped get the process started and continued

involvement will be a useful tool to assure progress for

Azerbaijan.

If Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia allow ultra­

nationalism to interfere with their true national interests,

they will leave— and in fact do leave— themselves vulnerable

to outside influences, much as in the early 1900s.

Nationalism's perceived role in this region— to serve as a

shield against other national groups— arises out of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 132 geopolitical realities. The Caucasus countries are smaller

and weaker than Russia, Turkey and Iran, and their powerful

neighbors have in the past taken advantage of the Caucasus

peoples. But nationalism will not keep outside interests at

bay. The cooperative efforts of Armenia, Georgia and

Azerbaijan in the pursuit of their collective interests will

serve them better than their current, individualistic drive.

The Caucasus countries could learn much about collective

security from the Baltic states, which are small and diverse

themselves, but stand united against pressures from their

powerful neighbor, Russia. The progress of peace will improve

the chances of cooperation and strengthen the countries

politically and economically. This would in turn strengthen

opportunities for greater cooperation among the Caucasus

neighbors, such as between Armenia and Turkey, thus promoting

stability in the region. While a common market approach is

years away— each state is still exploring its new-found

sovereignty— there may be some areas, such as transportation

and energy development, in which all three states could

cooperate.

***

The man who opened the pandora's box, Mikhail Gorbachev,

was right when he warned of increased ethnic conflict in the

republics should central rule be abolished. Governments

unable to resolve conflicts can be quickly replaced by new

governments. Thus, Azerbaijani nationalism is perhaps the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 133 greatest threat to Azerbaijan's sovereignty. While these

countries need time to grow into stable nations, their future

prospects look dim unless they start taking the necessary

steps. Azerbaijan does not have time to wait for a better

deal; the longer the strife goes on, the less Azerbaijan may

obtain in a settlement and the more it stands to lose as a

state. Azerbaijan needs to evaluate the importance of a

costly conflict over a historic region with the future

prospects of a prosperous, stable state.

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