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Reproduced with with permission permission of the of copyright the copyright owner. owner.Further reproduction Further reproduction prohibited without prohibited permission. without permission. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM IN AZERBAIJAN: A HISTORY
by
Maria L . Germano
submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Masters of Arts
in
International Affairs
Signatures of Committee:
Chair:.
(jQ 0 - r t > Dean of the School of International Service
' i ______Date \J
1995
The American University
Washington, D.C. 20016 774?
t h e AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 1378690
Copyright 1995 by Germano, Maria L. AH rights reserved.
UMI Microform 1378690 Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. c COPYRIGHT
b y
MARIA L. GERMANO
1995
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM IN AZERBAIJAN: A HISTORY
by
Maria L. Germano
ABSTRACT
The increase of ethnic conflicts has created security
challenges for the international community. In the Caucasus,
the subject of this study, the collapse of the Soviet empire
led to a resurgent nationalism. This analysis treats both
historical and contemporary nationalism in the Caucasus,
beginning with confrontation in the early 1900s among
Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijanis. The historic
hostilities between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over Nagorno-
Karabakh have been renewed, and the historic roles of the
regional players— Russia, Turkey, and Iran— come into play in
the tense Armenian-Azerbaijani relationship. The study
concludes that extreme nationalism in Azerbaijan has had a
negative impact on efforts to build a viable state: political
and economic development have suffered as resources are spent
on waging a war. An additional finding is that the country
needs to refocus efforts from national conflict to national
development, an area in which the international community can
play a positive role.
ii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I want to express my profound thanks to Dr. William Kincade,
whose constant guidance I greatly appreciated, and to Dr.
Anne Cahn, whose comments I found invaluable. I would also
like to thank Louis Klaveras and Frederick Williams for their
encouragement and, last but not least, my parents for their
love and support.
iii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii
ILLUSTRATION vii
Chapter
IINTRODUCTION 1
Nationalism and the Collapse of the Soviet Union: An Overview
Azerbaijan in Brief
Analytical Aims
Nature of Nationalism
Nationalism Defined
Ethnicity
Nation
State
Self-determination
Sovereignty
Analytical Organization
II. THE SOVIET UNION AS EMPIRE AND ITS COLLAPSE .... 20
The Soviet Union as Empire
Metropole Motives
Weak Periphery
Penetrating the Periphery
International System
Disintegration of the Empire
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Rise of Nationalism in the Soviet Union
Communist Ideology
Glasnost
Perestroika
Internal Opposition
Moscow Resists Break-Up
Chapter
III. NATIONALISM EMERGES IN THE CAUCASUS ......
Overview
Caucasus: Brief History
Armenia
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Independence in the Caucasus
\ Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: History
Caucasus Nationalism under the Soviet System
Soviet Nationalities Policy
Summary
IV. INDEPENDENCE IN AZERBAIJAN ......
Overview
Azerbaijan under Gorbachev
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Failure to Stop the Violence
Azerbaij an 1s Leaders
After the Soviet Union
v
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Political-Military Developments
Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians
Views of the Conflict
Peace Efforts
Chapter
V. CONCLUSIONS ...... 1 1 2
Features and Effects of Nationalism
Caucasus in Context
Observations
Paradox of Nationalism
Future Developments
Outcomes to the Conflict
Status of Nagorno-Karabakh
International Organizations
Political and Economic Developments
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 134
vi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ILLUSTRATION
Figure
1. Caucasus and Surrounding States . .
vii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are solely the author's and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of State.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Nationalism and the Collapse of the Soviet Union: An Overview
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's rise as leader of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985 marked the
beginning of a new era in, as well as the beginning of the
end of, Soviet history. Gorbachev introduced a set of reforms
in the Soviet Union meant to strengthen the country. This
wide range of reforms was aimed at every aspect of Soviet
life— military, economic, political, social— and influenced
the lives of the people in the Soviet periphery. In order to
pursue his reform plans, Gorbachev ceded some of the center's
power to the republics.
Gorbachev sought to move away from the historical
Soviet method of making changes— from top to bottom.^
Instead, he gave the republics more freedom to address the
problems of the Soviet Union, thus empowering them to aid in
the country's restructuring and growth, which would benefit
both the periphery and the center. But Moscow's loosening
grip on the republics turned into a tug-of-war between the
center and periphery over power in the regions. The
republics, discontented with Moscow's centrist policies,
1 Martha Olcott, "Gorbachev's National Dilemma," Journal of International Affairs 42 (Spring 1989): 400.
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sought greater national freedoms. This tension hindered the
central leadership's attempts at reform, forcing Moscow to
concentrate on the immediate problem of keeping nationalist
movements under control. Demonstrations throughout the Soviet
Union, including those in Yerevan, Armenia, in 1989,
underscored the rise in vocal nationalist sentiments and
Moscow's unreadiness to address these concerns.
Confrontations between Moscow and the various
republics, including the dominant Russian republic, advanced
the Soviet Union's demise. The country was plagued by a range
of hostilities, from direct center-periphery tension, as
reflected in Moscow's January 1991 use of force in the Baltic
republics, to conflict between republics, such as the
Armenian and Azerbaijani dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, a
predominantly Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan.(See Figure 1)
Also, Moscow had to contend with rising Russian nationalism.
Like other groups, Russians rebelled against the Soviet
government's lack of sensitivity to their ethnic concerns.
Unlike the other ethnic groups, Russians comprised a majority
in the Communist Party. The collapse of the Soviet Union was
as much a result of Russian nationalism in Russia as of
nationalism in the non-Russian republics. For "in the eyes of
Russian nationalists, seven decades of Communism. . .left
Russia not only materially impoverished but poorer in spirit
as well."2 The Russian people put their faith not in the
2 Hedrick Smith, The New Russians (New York: Random House, 1990), 399.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. co vwv: lOOmnea > > i m m m 50 100 nbmetera Intamabonai boundary Selected railroad Approximate territory held by Armenian Karabakh forces Selected republic boundary '/ -----
AZERBAIJAN Dagestan • • Groznyy (AOA) akhichevan *\Chechnya \ ____ I M m ARMENIA G^E O R G IA G^E Erzurum Figure 1 - CAUCASUS AND SURROUNDING STATES ® f e 8 V^V-V-'V-v.' m w m * Nam*t and boundary rapreMrtstion ax« not rwcMMrily suttwxttsUvs suttwxttsUvs Source: rwcMMrily not Officeax« of the Geographer,rapreMrtstion U.S. boundary Department and Nam*t of State,1995 »
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Soviet government, but a Russian government headed by a
Russian leader, Boris Yeltsin, "who was determined to use
Russian nationalism for the liberal objective of weakening
the Kremlin and centralized economic controls . . . "3
Decades of subjugation by Moscow had levied a toll on
the republics. With the advent of glasnost (openness) and
perestroika (restructuring) and the breakdown of the
Communist ideology, there was a resurgence of nationalism as
Russia and the periphery moved to gain more self-rule. This
struggle, coupled with infighting within the central
government in Moscow, facilitated the collapse of the Soviet
Union. The Soviet policy toward the nationalities, namely,
that nationalism would eventually fade— had, in reality,
preserved the national identity of a sizable number of ethnic
groups in the Soviet Union. By sustaining nationalist
sentiments through the creation of mostly ethnically-based
republics, yet suppressing expressions of national identity
at various times during the Soviet era, the Soviet government
created a base for discontent.
The attack against national sentiment appeared to be
greatest under Joseph Stalin. Stalin drafted the 1923
"Practical Measures for Implementing the Resolution on the
National Question Adopted by the Twelfth Party Congress,"
which contained a paragraph stating that:
3 Ibid., 413.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 A purge of the state and Party Apparatuses of nationalist elements (this refers primarily to the Russian nationalists, as well as to the anti-Russian and other nationalists). The purge must be carried out with caution, on the basis of proved data, under the control of the Central Committee of the Party.4
This opened the door to widespread attacks against members of
the Communist Party, as well as among other, more vulnerable
groups of people. Stalin worked against national sentiments
in a number of ways, including through the elimination of
republican Communist leaders— as in Ukraine--and
restructuring peasants into collectives. By changing people's
way of life, Stalin destroyed their roots.5 The purges
reached into every area of society. As one Belarussian said
about the mass murders at Kuropaty, Belarus:
Farmers were annihilated. The intelligentsia were annihilated. . .People who had belonged to some party or some movement were annihilated. They annihilated the believers--Russian Orthodox Church, Catholics. They annihilated priests. They annihilated ordinary people .6
Stalin's attack on the national identity of peoples of the
Soviet Union subsided during World War II, as Moscow and the
advancing German enemy fought for the allegiance of various
ethnic groups. The support for the Germans left many ethnic
4 Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soviet Disunion (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 61, citing KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh 2 (Moscow: 1970), 488-94.
5 Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Decline of An Empire (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 29.
5 Smith, 123.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. groups vulnerable to Stalin's revenge following the end of
World War II.7 Several national groups were deported from
their historic homeland and Stalin sought to limit cultural
expression of various non-Russian ethnic groups— namely their
literature and language. With Stalin's death came an end to
the destructive policy against national groups and began a
renewal of national identity and rehabilitation of some of
Stalin's victims. The lingering effects of Stalin's
repression, which reached into the lives of many families
throughout the Soviet Union, embittered the various ethnic
groups.
Following the demise of the Soviet Union, each of the
new independent states sought to lift itself from the
wreckage and carry on as a sovereign state. However, the
legacy of the Soviet Union lives on and cannot be easily
buried. Many of the economies of the new independent states
are in shambles, many of the governments are politically
weak, and the years of subjugation have left these new states
with little idea of how to run themselves. In some countries,
such as Turkmenistan, the government carries on much as it
did under the old Soviet system. In other states, like
Armenia, valid attempts at democratic governance are under
way. But all are hindered by the lingering vestiges of the
Soviet system, including a command economy, government
suppression of opposing views, restrictions on the freedom of
7 Nahaylo and Swoboda, 96.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. movement, speech, and the press, and lack of political
experience within the new governments.
Aside from this baggage, the new states have to face,
for the first time in at least seven decades, their
individual responsibility for their future stability. The
nationalist movements that began in 1988 under the Soviet
system have continued in the new independent states, but the
focus has moved from a struggle against the Soviet center
unresponsive to ethnic concerns to a struggle in some states
against national movements within their own borders.
Nationalist desires have become an influential component in
decision-making in some new states, and have fueled
intolerance of other ethnic groups. The inability of the new
states to address the concerns of their ethnic minorities has
left them vulnerable to the same pressures nationalism placed
on Soviet Moscow.
Azerbai-ian in Brief
Azerbaijan is geographically bordered by Turkey (a
short border with the Nakhchyvan exclave), Iran, Armenia and
Russia. All are playing a significant role in Azerbaijan, as
they have in the past, and will continue to do so in the
future. Azerbaijan's previous experience with independence
was limited to a brief period during the Russian Civil War
between 1918-1920, before it was incorporated into the Soviet
Union. Azerbaijan has a second chance to build a viable
state, but its ability will be greatly influenced by how it
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. utilizes its nationalism. Armenian territorial claims on
Nagorno-Karabakh ignited old hostilities between Azerbaijanis
and Armenians. Rising ethnic tensions and Moscow's inability
to curb them led to a deterioration in Baku's relationship
with Moscow and motivated the republic's drive for
independence.
Since 1988, there have been continuous and intensifying
clashes between the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and
Azerbaijanis over territory that is the focus of a centuries-
old conflict. This is not only about an Armenian minority
group within Azerbaijan which desires its own independence
but about a minority which has manpower, material and moral
support from its brethren in Armenia.® This conflict
demonstrates the fragility of relations among the various
ethnic groups in the former Soviet Union, groups that have
lived next door to one another in relative peace for 70
years. That was largely due to Soviet Moscow's strong hand.
However, it is also believed that the peace was in many ways
a genuine one, with Armenians and Azerbaijanis living and
working side-by-side.9 Looking at the events since 1988, when
fighting erupted between the two national groups, this peace
was not deeply ingrained.
8 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 706.
9 Author's discussion with an Azerbaijani, Washington, D.C.: November, 1994.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The rise of nationalism shifted Moscow's focus away
from reform to efforts to control national independent
movements and ethnic conflicts. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
also distracted the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaderships'
attempts to develop stable states. This is a deeply emotional
issue, as both Azerbaijan and Armenia have historic ties to
the Nagorno-Karabakh region and believe that it rightfully
belongs to their respective peoples. The territory is part of
their ancestral roots and thus retaining the land is part of
the nationalist focus. In addition, land has been equated to
power— a concept not lost on small countries like Armenia and
Azerbaijan— and territory has been a prime component of
wars.
Since 1988, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has resulted
in numerous casualties, from the deaths of thousands of
people and the creation of over a million refugees and
displaced persons on both sides, to the political downfall of
successive presidents of independent Azerbaijan due to
territorial losses to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. In
addition, Armenia has suffered through several difficult
winters due to Azerbaijan's transportation embargo, which has
crippled energy-dependent Armenia's economy.
Under the Soviet empire, nationalism was suppressed.
Gorbachev's introduction of reforms opened the door for vocal
10 Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, Territorial Changes and International Conflict (London: Routledge, 1992), 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10 opposition to the government's policies and a rise in
nationalism throughout the country. In Azerbaijan,
disillusionment over Moscow's ability to end the ethnic
strife there spurred the movement of the nationalist
Azerbaijani Popular Front toward independence. The
disintegration of the Soviet Union and Moscow's control over
the periphery left the new states in a vacuum.
Analytical Aims
The aim of this study is to analyze the development of
nationalism in pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet
Azerbaijan. To examine fully the dynamic of nationalism in
Azerbaijan, there will also be a review of national
tendencies in the other Caucasus states and the role of
regional players. The primary problem of the Caucasus states
is inter-ethnic fighting, which weakened these countries in
the early 1900s and threatens their future stability. Strong
nationalist sentiment in Azerbaijan has diverted attention
away from state-building and toward war. The Nagorno-Karabakh
dispute is an example of the persistence of ethnic conflicts
around the world that have created challenges for the
international community as well as concerns over the spread
of these types of disputes. As international organizations
seek to help resolve (or at least contain) ethnic disputes,
their efforts come up against the extreme nationalism that
drives adversaries to seek a zero-sum end to these conflicts.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11 This study will demonstrate the persistence of
nationalist sentiments in the Caucasus since the turn of the
century and how nationalism in Azerbaijan— particularly with
regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict— undermines national
interest. The study will conclude with suggestions for the
international community in helping these states focus on
national development, particularly in terms of security and
political and economic reform.
Nature of Nationalism
Nationalism Defined. Nationalism is defined in several
different ways. Some analysts, such as Karl W. Deutsch, view
nationalism as a state of mind, "which gives 'national'
messages, memories and images a preferred status in social
communication and a greater weight in the making of
decisions." H Other analysts, such as Walker Connor,
emphasize that nationalism is loyalty to the nation, not the
state.12 However, others argue that the ultimate goal of
nationalism is statehood. For example, Alexander Motyl views
nationalism as "a political ideal that views statehood as the
optimal form of political organization for each nation."13
11 Peter Alter, "Nationalism: an Overview" in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Charles P. Cozic, ed. (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1994), 20-1.
12 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 97.
13 Alexander Motyl, Sovietology. Rationality. Nationality (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 53.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12 Hans Kohn also links nationalism with the formation of a
state; he writes that a nationality is "a group held together
and animated by common consciousness" and seeking "to find
its expression in what it regards as the highest form of
organized activity, a sovereign state."14 Nationalism would
thus be the impetus which drives a nation to become a self-
governing state.
In "Gorbachev and the Nationalities Problem," Robert
Bozzo notes that the Bolsheviks viewed nationalism as an
"impediment to the over-arching triumph of the proletariat,"
and Lenin maintained that over time nationalism would be
overcome by socialism.15 During the Soviet era, references to
"nationalities" were equated to description of ethnic groups,
and the borders of local regions were often drawn along
ethnic lines.
Nationalism strives to protect the nation. Therefore,
as Hurst Hannum states, "... the growth of nationalism has
been largely a reaction against states and empires which were
unresponsive to the needs of the many communities of which
they were composed."16 This 'unresponsiveness' could be
14 Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of its Origins and Background. 1st ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), 19.
1^ Robert Bozzo, "Gorbachev and the Nationalities Problem," Global Affairs 5, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 22.
15 Hurst Hannum, Autonomy. Sovereignty and Self- Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 23,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13 insensitivity to the needs of a nation, or even the
oppression of a nation. Ted Gurr states that deprivation,
i.e., actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their
expectations and their capabilities, "is the basic
precondition for civil strife of any kind, and that the more
widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a
population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or
another form. "17 it was this feeling of deprivation that led
to the growth of nationalism, which in turn led to national
movements.
John Breuilly notes three types of nationalist goals:
(1) separation; (2) reform; and (3) unification.1® All three
are aspects of the movements which took place in Azerbaijan.
The nationalist movement in Azerbaijan began with a desire
for greater autonomy within the Soviet state but eventually
led to a drive for full independence as tensions rose in the
relationship between Moscow and Baku over the handling of the
Nagorno-Karabakh crisis. The Armenian desire for unification
of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia led to attempts to change
the borders during the Soviet period, specifically under
citing E.H. Hinsle, Sovereignty (New York: Basic Books, 1966), 45-158, and John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (New York: St Martin's Press, 1982), 44-45.
17 Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," American Political Science Review 62, no. 4 (December 1968):1104.
1® John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14 Gorbachev. One similarity between Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-
Karabakh Armenians is that both have sought to separate
themselves from the rule of leaders who could not meet their
needs.
Hans Kohn states that nationalism leads to sympathy for
all those sharing the same nationality, while at the same
time it is indifferent to or leads to the "distrust and hate
of fellow men outside the national orbit.Peter Alter, in
"Nationalism: An Overview," also mentions this distinction:
liberal nationalism, which means "liberating from political
and social oppression," and integral nationalism, which
describes a nation, "that proves itself as the strongest and
fittest in a hostile and competing world . . ."20 what began
as liberal nationalism throughout the Soviet Union has
quickly turned into integral nationalism (also called ultra
or extreme nationalism), as each nation seeks to improve its
situation without regard for, or at the expense of, other
national groups.
These various definitions of nationalism all come into
play in this study, especially those provided by Motyl and
Kohn on the desire of a particular people to create their own
state. In Azerbaijan at the end of the Soviet era, there was
a progression of nationalism from, at first, a desire for
Kohn, 20.
20 Alter, 22-23.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 15 greater national autonomy, to the eventual development of a
national movement seeking statehood. This study will also
show the ugly side of nationalism, which is the hatred that
one national group feels toward another.
In addition to nationalism, this study involves
discussion of ethnic groups, nation, state, self-
determination, and sovereignty, beginning with a summary of
the terminology of these concepts.
Ethnicity . The Soviet Union was composed of over 100
ethnic groups. Wsevolod Isajiw provides various definitions
of ethnicity, including one found in the International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences: "an ethnic group is a
distinct category of the population in a larger society whose
culture is usually different from its own. The members of
such a group are, or feel themselves, or are thought to be,
bound together by common ties of race or nationality or
culture.in its simplest form, ethnicity involves a
feeling of common ancestry.
Nation . Walker Connor notes the difference between an
ethnic group and a nation: "An ethnic group may be readily
discerned by an anthropologist or other outside observer, but
until the members are themselves aware of this group's
uniqueness, it is merely an ethnic group and not a nation."22
21 Wsevolod Isajiw, "Definitions of Ethnicity," Ethnicity 1 (July 1974): 116, quoting International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 5:167.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16 Stalin, in Marxism and the National Question, listed five
features of a nation: history, common language, common
territory, community of economic life, and what Stalin termed
a "psychological make-up," namely a culture.23 Emerson states
that a nation is "a community of people who feel that they
belong together in the double sense that they share deeply
significant elements of a common heritage and that they have
a common destiny for the future."24
State . Connor notes that a nation is an intangible,
psychological tie that brings a people together, while a
state is a "territorial-political unit."25 possibly the
simplest way to define this in Azerbaijan's case is to note
that Azerbaijan first began to view itself as a nation in the
late 19th century but has only been a state--i.e., had self-
rule over the nation— twice during this century, during 1918-
1920 and from 1992 to the present.
22 Connor, 103.
23 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1953), 8, citing Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (New York: International Publishers, 1942): 16-17..
24 Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard, 1960), 95; also see Eugene Kamenka, Nationalism: The Nature of Evolution of an Idea (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973), 12. Kamenka cites the lecture of Ernest Renan in 1882, in which Renan stated that nation was based on a sense of common history and the will of the people to live together.
25 Connor, 92, 96.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17 Self-determination . The principle of self-
determination ". . .is the right of all peoples to determine
their political future and freely pursue their economic,
social, and cultural development. Politically, this is
manifested through independence . . ."26 Th.e Soviet
constitution provided the republics the right to secede. This
provision was included to appease the national groups and
provide the impression that their right to self-determination
was preserved. Lenin, in defining self-determination, stated
that, "The right of nations to self-determination implies
exclusively the right to independence in the political sense,
the right to free political separation from the oppressor
nation."27 However, he went on to say, that "This demand
. . . is not the equivalent of a demand for separation,
fragmentation and the formation of small states. It implies
only a consistent expression of struggle against all national
oppression. "28 Lenin believed nations would fade away as the
proletariat rose up. The Soviet constitution placed the power
of granting the act of secession with the central leadership.
By 1991, as the Soviet government was in the final stages of
collapse, the republics challenged the right of the central
28 umozurike Oji Umozurike, Self-Determination in International Law (Hamden: Archon Books, 1972), 1.
27 V. I . Lenin, Collected Works. Vol. 22 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 146.
28 Ibid., 146.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18 leadership's decision-making on this issue by declaring, one
by one, their independence. The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians
also seek to free themselves from rule— Baku's— and view the
conflict as their fight for self-determination.
Sovereignty . Jean Bodin was the first to use the word
sovereignty in his Six Books on the State (1576). He defines
sovereignty as "the absolute and perpetual power of the
state, that is, the greatest power to command."29 This power
is not subordinate to any other authority nor does this power
have any time limitations.30 The Academic American
Encyclopedia states that sovereignty is "independent and free
from all external control; enjoys full legal equality with
other states; governs its own territory; selects its own
political, economic and social systems; and has the power to
enter into agreements with other (states). . ."31
Analytical Organization
This thesis proceeds by examining the Soviet Union in
the context of concepts relating to multiethnic empires,
their growth and their decline, demonstrating how the
U.S.S.R. reflected common patterns. It then explores the pre-
Soviet emergence and Soviet-era experience of nationalism in
29 jean Bodin, Six Books on the State, in William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1969), 354.
30 ibid., 355.
31 Academic American Encyclopedia (Danburry, Conn: Grolier Incorporated, 1987), 113.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19 the three Caucasus regions of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Armenia.
Next, the recent rise of Azerbaijan to sovereign
independence is reviewed, along with its irredenta, Nagorno-
Karabakh. The study concludes with observations on contemporary
Azerbaijan, in particular the role of nationalism in Azerbaijan,
the paradox of nationalism and the future prospects for peace
and stability in the Caucasus.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER II
THE SOVIET UNION AS EMPIRE AND ITS COLLAPSE
The Soviet Union as Empire
Officially, the U.S.S.R. was a federal state. Lenin
introduced the idea of federalism as a temporary measure to
appease the various national groups incorporated into the new
Soviet state. Federalism is defined as "the mode of political
organization which unites separate polities within an
overarching political system so as to allow each to maintain
its fundamental political integrity."1 One aspect of
federalism is the division of powers between the central and
local governments. While the Soviet constitution promised the
right to secession, in reality the Soviet center did not
allow the republics to exercise that right. In fact, there
was little real division of power between the center and
periphery, making the Soviet Union a federal state primarily
in name only.
The Soviet Union has often been described as an empire,
a concept useful in understanding the nature of the Soviet
Union, the treatment of the periphery, and the impact this
empire had on nationalism. In examining the supranational
1 International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, David Sills, ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1968), 5: 353. 20
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21 character of the Soviet Union, Guy G. Imart defines empire
as:
. . . a country whose artificial cohesiveness rests on the hegemonistic strength of the sole true minority in it, namely, a self-proclaimed leadership which, turning upside down the principles of the natural legitimacy of power, engulfs the communities it controls by numbing their sense of specific unity.2
The "minority" was the Communist Party, which continued
tsarist Russification in the periphery. Although the
republics of the Soviet Union were divided more or less by
ethnic regions, thus preserving some of the ethnic identity
of these republics and various autonomous regions, the Soviet
leadership sought to undermine— and in some ways to ignore—
the ethnic unity of these various people through
Russification and Sovietization, dominance of local political
structures, dispersal of indigenous peoples to other regions
(especially under Stalin), and suppression of cultural and
religious expression (through censorship of cultural events,
literature, etc.).
These experiences demonstrated to the republics that
the power rested with the center. Any freedoms, such as in
the operation of the media, were provided by Moscow and were
reversible. Michael Doyle, in his study of empires from the
Roman to the British, defines this penetration into, and
control over, the periphery as an empire:
2 Guy G . Imart, "A Unique Empire," Central Asian Survey 6, no. 4 (1987): 16.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22 . . . a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social, or cultural dependence.3
Doyle examines how an empire rises, persists, and
disintegrates, focusing on: (1) the motives of the center, or
as he refers to it, the metropole; (2) the periphery's
weakness that leads to its incorporation into an empire; (3)
how the center penetrates the periphery; and (4) the role of
the international system. To understand the relationship
between the center and periphery and how nationalism lay
largely dormant under Soviet rule, requires a review these
four factors.
Metropole Motives. Doyle identifies three motives of
the center for developing an empire. One motive is glory, or
the idea that an aspiring metropole has the best to offer
another nation or state. The Bolsheviks' quest for glory was
found in their desire to further the revolution to Europe.
The new Soviet state was to serve as a model for other
countries. In the beginning, Lenin was convinced that the
spread of the revolution was inevitable, writing in his April
1917 thesis, "We want to rebuild the world."4 it later became
apparent that a revolution in Europe was not on the horizon,
3 Doyle, 40.
4 Hans Kohn, "Soviet Communism and Nationalism: Three Stages of a Historical Development," Soviet Nationality Problems. Edward Allworth, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 48.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23 as the proletariat in the industrialized states did not rise
up. In Nationalism and Ideology. Barbara Ward states that as:
. . . attempts to rally Communist revolutions in other states came up against other people's nationalisms and were so unsuccessful . . . Lenin finally denounced intervention abroad as the work of 'madmen or provocateurs' . . .5
Under Stalin, priority was "given to the security of the
Soviet state, the 'base of world revolution,' over world
revolutionary goals . . ."6 The Bolshevik theme moved from
world revolution to socialism in one country, indicating that
the government would focus primarily on achieving socialism
in the Soviet Union.
Another motive for the rise of empires is security. The
Bolsheviks and the Russian people remembered the history of
subjugation and invasion from other groups throughout their
long history. "It was the urge for self-preservation . . .
which had forced the Russians to push off invaders and to
entrench themselves firmly in their habitats.The failure
of the Communist revolution to expand outside the Soviet
borders and the increased focus on economic autarky and
5 Barbara Ward, Nationalism and Ideology (New York: W.W. Norton and Co, Inc, 1966) 98.
6 Boris Meissner, "Factors and Motivating Forces of Soviet Foreign Policy," The Development of Soviet Foreign Policy: Studies in Honor of W.W. Kulski. Warren Lerner, ed. (Durham, No. Carolina: Duke University Press, 1973), 364.
7 Geoffrey Parker, The Geopolitics of Domination (New York: Routledge, 1988), 82, citing N. Berdyaev, "0 Vlasti Prostranstv nad Russkoi Dushoi," Sudba Rossii. Oovtv oo Psikhologii Voinv I Natsionalnosti (Moscow, 1918).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24 internal matters had an impact on Soviet wariness of the
outside. Evgenii Anisimov, a historian at the USSR Academy of
Sciences, says that the consciousness of the 1930s was one of
a "fortress under siege."8 This feeling increased with
Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II and
the Soviet leadership's suspicions of U.S. intentions during
the Cold War. The Soviet Union created a buffer zone between
itself and the West through its control over the Eastern
European countries and the republics.
The third motive Doyle cites is an aspiring empire's
self-interest. The Soviet center was interested in what it could
gain by retaining the Russian empire's territories. The main
gain was economic wealth.9 The Bolsheviks realized the benefit
of seizing the territory of the former tsarist empire: "In the
life-and-death struggle of the civil war, principles counted for
little, and regaining vital border regions, which were the seats
of important industries and the sources for Russia's food and
fuel, was prized greatly."10 The Bolshevik leadership needed to
concentrate on areas that would permit its survival. One of the
necessities was a strong economy, hence the need for the
territory and resources once ruled by the tsarist regime.
® Evgenii Anisimov, speaking at the Kennan Institute, Washington, D.C., 14 May 1991, author's notes.
9 Parker, 82.
10 Alfred D. Low, Lenin on the Question of Nationality (New York: Bookman Associates, 1958), 134.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25 Weak Periphery. Richard Pipes, in his book Formation of
the Soviet Union, states that an empire strengthens itself
"by gradually reducing (the periphery's) independence. "H
Doyle asserts that this could be accomplished by controlling
the periphery's decision-making.12 The social, economic and
cultural environments of the center penetrate through the
periphery by means of a representative of Moscow, and these
representatives were loyal to the center.
Doyle also states that a periphery lacks political
unity and social organization to resist the center.13
Following the Russian Civil War, most of the former tsarist
regime's territory was reconquered by the Bolsheviks over a
period of two years. Beyond a few national groups that
resisted, most of the country was easily brought under Soviet
control.14 Thus emerged a state which consisted of over a
hundred different nations and ethnic groups. Like the tsars,
the Communist Party had to maintain this gathering of diverse
peoples through force, for "the frailer the bonds between the
H Richard Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 17.
12 Doyle, 37.
13 ibid., 76.
14 While the Georgians put up a fight against the approaching Red Army, national movements in most cases were very weak, such as the Byelorussian national movement and national movements in Central Asia. For more background on these movements, see Richard Pipes' Formation of the Soviet Union.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26 various regions . . . the stronger the authority had to be,
that was to be capable of creating and keeping alive a
state."15
Penetrating- the Periphery. Doyle mentions two
conditions important to the empire's duration. The first is a
strong central and bureaucratic administration. The Soviet
leadership was headed by a single party which was involved in
all decision-making. The Communist Party suppressed
organizations that did not espouse the party line. Before the
Gorbachev era, Moscow maintained full control of the
administration of the country. Programs were implemented from
the top down, and the bureaucracy was dominated by selected
party cadres who had been placed on an elite list that
assured preferential promotion for those named to this so-
called 'nomenklatura.' The political system in the country
was well integrated with party cadres in high positions
within the local governments.
The second condition important to imperial survival is
the integration of the empire politically, socially,
economically, and culturally. Political power given to the
republics was closely monitored. Although the republican
leaders were often of the titular ethnicity, they belonged to
the Communist Party, and the second in command was a Russian.
In this manner, the center satisfied the various ethnic
15 Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians (London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1896), 274.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 27 republics with a leader of their 'own kind,' yet had a firm
hold on nationalistic tendencies with a Russian second in
command.
Moscow's control extended into social life as well. The
government was intolerant of the practice of religion in the
country. Beginning with the 1917 "Declaration of the Rights
of the Peoples of Russia," which abolished national-religious
privileges, the Soviet government sought to weaken the
influence of religion in the c o u n t r y . ^6 The Russian Orthodox
Church, Georgian Orthodox Church, Armenian Church and
followers of Islam and other religions in the Soviet Union
had their activities restricted by Soviet policy. While
religious organizations functioned and survived during the
Soviet period, all came under state control. According to
Alexander Bogolepov, the intent of Soviet legislation on the
Russian Orthodox Church, and on other religions in the Soviet
Union, was to influence their disintegration.17
International System. Doyle includes the international
system as a factor in empire building. He lists two
structures of this system: uni- or bipolar and multipolar.
While "each pole of a bipolar system becomes aligned with a
16 Joshua Rothenberg, "The Legal Status of Religion in the Soviet Union," Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union. 1917-1967. Richard H. Marshall, Jr., ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), 62.
17 Alexander A. Bogolepov, "Legal Position of the Russian Orthodox Church," Marshall, 197.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 28 particular faction within the peripheral regime . . ." a
multipolar system presents a choice to the periphery among
several metropoles and "... thus a wider opportunity to
bargain for some measure of independence."18 while Doyle's
study reviews international systems in the 19th century, it
is possible to use the Cold War period as a model for bipolar
rivalry, as the United States and the Soviet Union had their
separate bloc of allies. As the Cold War came to an end, that
bipolar rivalry softened and allowed Eastern Europe and the
republics to shop around for other international ties.
Although Doyle notes that this international system is
more than a security issue with the metropoles, the interwar
threats from capitalism and fascism and the Cold War with the US
did stimulate the Soviet government's fear of the West. This led
Moscow to secure its borders through control of the republics
and Eastern bloc countries. Gorbachev's New Thinking in Soviet
foreign policy indicated a need for change in how Moscow and the
West viewed each other in terms of security.19 This loosened
Moscow's grip on the East European countries.
The realization that Soviet fear of the West was
counter-productive to Soviet security enabled Gorbachev's
government to allow power to return to the East European
countries. Unlike his predecessors who used force in 1956
18 Doyle, 136.
19 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1987), 128.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29 and 1968 to retain the Eastern European satellite countries,
Gorbachev did not interfere in East Europe as those countries
moved towards independence from Moscow. This played well for
Gorbachev, who was seeking to improve the Soviet government's
relations with the world community. It also influenced the
national groups in the Soviet republics to take steps toward
greater national freedoms.
New Thinking also allowed greater Soviet focus on
integration into the global economy. Gorbachev re-defined
Soviet views on the USSR's relationship with other countries,
including the re-evaluation of the impact the involvement in
regional conflicts had on East-West relations and the
prospects of Third World socialism. Gorbachev stressed the
need to resolve problems through peaceful negotiations. As
the need for security came to be seen in more realistic terms
and the center loosened its grip on the East European
countries, these factors set in motion the eventual release
of the republics from the center's grip.
Disintegration of the Empire
The Soviet government's attempts to aid in the
"withering away” of local national sentiments is another
feature Doyle attributes to empires:
A persistent empire presupposes imperial bureaucratic coordination and continuing transnational integration in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. This integration can merge the metropole and the periphery
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. . . . At this point an empire no longer exists, and the many peoples have become' one.20
In fact, the Soviet government's policies actually served to
preserve local nationalisms. According to Barbara Ward,
communism, . .by modernizing the economy, increasing
literacy, and creating a sense of popular participation
. . . can even become an agent of national self-
consciousness. "21 in listing the causes for the collapse of
empires, Doyle notes that:
The periphery in the course of political development within the empire may reach a point at which further collaboration becomes unacceptable. The disaffected elite of the periphery then expels the metropole in a national, anticolonial revolt. Having awakened to a sense of national legitimacy, having mobilized and coordinated the peripheral population . . . and having centralized and institutionalized the policy, the former periphery joins the ranks of effectively sovereign states.22
Doyle also notes that a weakened center and pressures of the
international system also contribute to the disintegration of
empires. Henry Rowen and Charles Wolf, in their book, The
Future of the Soviet Empire, agree that outside factors
influence an empire: "if there is a general theory on the
ending of empires, it is that a combination of internal
20 Doyle, 137.
21 Ward, 101.
22 Doyle, 137.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 31 weaknesses and external forces contributes to their decline
and fall."23
Motyl explains that a totalitarian state's decision to
give greater political freedom to the republics is due to the
waste of state resources.24 By focusing on its arms race
with the United States, the Soviet Union concentrated all its
efforts in one area, thus neglecting other issues. Gorbachev
tried to refocus the Soviet efforts on the domestic front
and, in doing so, allowed other players a voice in the
political arena. Motyl also states that a totalitarian state
is weakened when it engages upon a path of self-reform.25
Glasnost and perestroika were examples of Gorbachev's
attempts to reform the Soviet system.
In The Emergence of the Modern Middle East. Albert
Hourani notes two important aspects to the decline of the
Ottoman empire:
first the fragmentation inside the system of government, the ruler ceasing to control his army or government; and the central government losing control over the provinces; secondly by the forces of society bursting out of the framework imposed by the government, instruments of order becoming leaders of discontent or revolt . . .26
23 Henry Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr., "The Future of the Soviet Empire: The Correlation of Forces and Implications for Western Policy," The Future of the Soviet Empire, Henry Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr., eds. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 290.
2^ Motyl, 66.
25 ibid., 69.
26 Albert Hourani, The Emergence of the Modern Middle East (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), 12.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 32 Most of the periphery's dissent from Moscow's repressive
policies and its various forms of nationalist feeling had been
held in check until Gorbachev's reforms allowed for pent-up
grievances to be aired and different opinions to be openly
expressed. However, as nationalist movements were formed and the
voice of dissent grew louder, Moscow's leadership attempted to
maintain control of the republics. This did not weaken the
periphery's resolve, but instead led to a confrontation. By
empowering the republican leaderships, Gorbachev weakened the
center and its control over the periphery. The republics grew in
strength and attacked the weaknesses they saw not only in the
Soviet system, but in the Soviet leadership's ability to address
the system's problems.
In his evaluation of the Russian Empire, Richard Pipes
finds that one important factor in its collapse was the
periphery's attempts to break away from the c e n t e r . 27 This
factor is repeated in the collapse of the Soviet Empire. As the
Eastern Europe countries emerged victorious from the Soviet
empire's grip their experience encouraged the Soviet republics
to follow suit and look toward the West and its economic power
to be their salvation as they embarked on their respective paths
toward sovereignty. Years of Soviet subjugation and limitation
on expression of national sentiments took a toll on the
periphery, and one by one each took steps to further its
27 pipes, 294.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 33 individual national interests, such as language and cultural
rights.
While the reforms and the increase in nationalist
sentiments created a platform for debate, they did not produce
any solutions. The ideas that Gorbachev encouraged to reform the
country helped identify the problems but did little to solve
them. The Soviet Union found itself in a difficult situation:
A declining society experiences a vicious cycle of decay and immobility, much as a rising society enjoys a virtuous cycle of growth and expansion. On the one hand, decline is accompanied by lack of social cooperation, by emphasis on rights rather than emphasis on duty, and by decreasing productivity. On the other hand, the frustration and pessimism generated by this gloomy atmosphere inhibit renewal and innovation. The failure to innovate accentuates the decline and its psychologically debilitating consequences. Once caught up in this cycle, it is difficult for the society to break out.28
There were many factors involved in the collapse of the
Soviet Union, and two of the key aspects were persistence of
nationalism and, from that, rebellion against Moscow control.
As Doyle's model indicates, the influences in the empire's
demise came from the center, the periphery, and the
international system. The major force playing on these
influences was the rise of nationalist sentiment in the
Soviet Union. This does not mean that nationalist feelings
did not exist prior to the Gorbachev era, but under Gorbachev
28 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),190, citing Carlo Cipolla, The Economic Decline of Empires (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd, 1970), 11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 34 those feelings were given a greater opportunity to be
expressed.
Rise of Nationalism in the Soviet Union
The tension between the center and periphery under
Gorbachev was not a recent phenomena; dissent over Moscow's
repression existed in the republics beneath the surface for
some time.29 The concentration on the needs of the Soviet
state at the expense of the individual republics added to the
frustration of the various ethnic groups over the years. By
creating republics, oblasts (region/province) and krays
(district/county) along ethnic lines, the center preserved
the feelings of nationalism. However, the center attempted to
control the ethnic groups through Russification,
Sovietization and deportation. This did not eliminate the
cultural and nationalist feelings of the various groups
within its borders, as evident in the rise in nationalist
expression following Gorbachev's reforms.
The breakdown of the Communist ideology and the
introduction of glasnost and perestroika were factors in the
rise in nationalism and the disintegration of the Soviet
Empire. The crumbling of the Communist ideology left a vacuum
for the people of the Soviet Union. A loss in purpose led to
a closer identification with their national background and
29 Gail Lapidus, "Gorbachev and the Reform of the Soviet System," Daedalus 116, no. 2 (Spring 1987): 5, states that the impetus for change was marked by people's growing lack of confidence in the Soviet leadership.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 35 paved the way for the rebirth of nationalism. Glasnost
provided a forum for expressing thoughts not previously
allowed, and this encouraged the expression of nationalist
sentiments. Perestroika gave local governments more political
and economic control, thus providing them with a taste of
autonomy and a yearning for more.
Communist Ideology. After seventy years, Communist
ideology was shaken by Gorbachev's proposals for reform. The
worldwide communist revolution Lenin predicted never happened
and the 'Communist experiment was limited to the Soviet Union
(and few other countries, such as China and Cuba) and forced
upon Moscow's satellite countries. The ideals of the Marxist-
Leninist doctrine first codified by Stalin were based on four
main factors. The first was the idea of building socialism in
one country; the second, the control over literature and the
arts; third, the importance of producer goods over consumer
goods; and fourth, the center's control over the m a s s e s . 30 By
the time Gorbachev came to power the centralized system was
ineffective and the economic situation stagnant. Gorbachev
believed that the unyielding ideology in the Soviet Union had
been an impediment to change and growth. At an ideology
conference in December 1984, Gorbachev said discrepancies in
the Soviet Union must be addressed "in a timely manner,"
30 Hillel Ticktin, Origins of the Crisis in the USSR: Essavs on the Political Economy of a Disintegrating System (New York: MESharpe, Inc., 1992), 19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36 because "a stagnant retention of outmoded production
relations may result in a worsening of the economic and
social situation.”31
Communist ideology guided and justified Communist Party
programs to maintain centralized control of the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev viewed Communist ideology as an obstacle to needed
reforms and identified two problems with it: the rejection of
new ideas in favor of established ones, and the
centralization of the decision-making at the top, with no
room for opposing o p i n i o n s . 32 For Gorbachev, in order to
succeed in reforming the Soviet Union, and thus in
strengthening the country, he would have to eliminate these
obstacles, and allow the reform process to proceed from the
bottom up. This new position was highlighted during the
January 1987 Central Committee Plenum, when Gorbachev
attacked the lack of debates and differing points of v i e w . 3 3
31 Marc Zlotnik, "Rethinking Soviet Socialism: The Politics of Ideological Change,” in Restructuring Soviet Ideology. Sylvia Woodby and Alfred B. Evans, Jr. eds. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 19, quoting Sovershenstvovanie razitogo sotsialisma i ideologicheskaia rabo.ta partii v sveta reshenii iun'skogo (1983g) plenuma Tsk KPSS: Materialv vsesoiuznoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferenstsii, Moskva. 10-11 dekabria 1984 g . (Moscow: Politizdat, 1985), 7-45.
32 Sylvia Woodby, Gorbachev and the Decline of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Westview Special Studies, 1989), 8.
33 Lapidus, 21.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 37 Communist ideology guided how the Soviet people lived.
It was the basis for the existence of the Soviet state and
the Soviet citizens were called to work towards the goal of
communism. The country was moving in this direction and the
breakdown of the Communist ideology left many people without
a raison d'etre. As one "veteran of war and work" complained,
people feared "that their achievements in building socialism
in the USSR, despite the ravages of Stalinism, are in danger
of being undermined by the glasnost campaign."34 The beliefs
of Soviet citizens were being challenged and they began to
look elsewhere for their values; religion and nationality
were the available alternatives.35 The apathy of the Soviet
people made it difficult to achieve Gorbachev's goal of
reform with input from below. "The collapse of the Lie (that
socialism could be built) under glasnost is destroying
acceptance of the system itself, especially among the young,
just as Gorbachev is trying to save it by restructuring."36
People in and out of the government structure rebelled
against this challenge to their beliefs and became obstacles
34 Brian McNair. Glasnost. Perestroika and the Soviet Media (New York: Routledge, 1991), 93.
35 Aleksandr Prokhanov, "Viewpoint: The Tragedy of Centralism," Literaturnava Rossia (5 January 1990): 4-5, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 42, no. 4 (28 February 1990): 1. Prokhanov discusses the destruction of ideology as having "deprived the peoples of a common future and caused an instantaneous growth in national ideas and beliefs. . . "
36 z, "To the Stalin Mausoleum" Daedalus 119, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 315.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 38 to reform. In addition, Gorbachev was faced with opposition
by those in the government who did not want to dispose of an
ideology they spent their lives building. At the same time,
there were those motivated toward change and their
unhappiness led to the growth of nationalism and national
movements. The Soviet people, disillusioned by Communist
ideology, openly questioned the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.
There were demands from the nationalist movements to the
upper echelons of government. While the central government
allowed people to express their opinions, their demands
outran government control. Gorbachev's glasnost opened up
the opportunity for grass-roots movements to form.
Glasnost. To combat the resistance to change, Gorbachev
worked to involve the masses through glasnost "to stimulate
creative thinking, air problems and help activate public
participation with the reform process."37 As part of this
process, Gorbachev loosened the government's control on the
media. Gorbachev said the only way to restructure is "through
criticism and self-criticism. The main thing is— through
glasnost. There cannot be a society without glasnost."38
Changes began to take place in a variety of forms. Photos in
37 Woodby, Gorbachev and the Decline of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy. 6.
38 Robert V. Daniels, "Can Gorbachev Escape History," Perestroika: How New Is Gorbachev's Thinking? Ernest W. Lefever and Robert D. vander Lugt, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1989), 97.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 39 the newspapers, typically depicting only happy events, began
to show people waiting in long lines. The press also started
covering previously taboo topics, such as natural disasters
and domestic violence.39 instead of reporting on issues along
the party line, the media was allowed to provide nuances of
an issue, thus stimulating ideas. This was an impetus for
change. In time, debate articles appeared and the readers
were exposed to arguments of those who opposed the
government's policies. Although some officials shut down
certain publications and tried to restrain the activities of
the media, by and large the media was given more freedom to
print opinions that differed with those of the central
government.
The freedom of the printed material extended to the
publication of formerly restricted writings. For example, a
book was published on Stalin's life, which included details
of his nervous breakdown at the beginning of World War II.
The Soviet Government did not prevent its publication,
although the book's details indicate that Stalin's breakdown
left him incapable of leading the country and may have been a
factor leading to the purges and the deaths of many people
under Stalin's rule.40
39 McNair, 67.
40 Ibid., 62.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40 Glasnost also brought a change in how elections were
conducted. Multiple political candidates for positions
replaced single-candidate elections and provided the people,
for the first time in Soviet history, a choice. Glasnost also
opened the way for debates among candidates. In many of the
non-Muslim republics, the candidates for election did not
even belong to the Communist Party, an idea not fathomable
before the Gorbachev era. Gorbachev pushed this idea through
as a constitutional amendment in March 1989, and the deputies
to the new Congress were elected by popular vote and composed
largely of members of the grass roots movement. By giving
people choices, Gorbachev was implementing his plan for
change from the bottom.
This new freedom of expression allowed the flow of
ideas in and out of the USSR to take place more freely. This
exchange of ideas was a reversal on the past attempts to
silence those with opposing views of government policy. In
the past, some who voiced their opposition faced jail or
placement in psychiatric hospitals. Under Gorbachev's program
of glasnost, political prisoners were released and new cases
of political and psychiatric abuse cases diminished.
Glasnost also meant the freedom of movement and
improvements in emigration. In May, 1991, the Supreme Soviet
passed a long-awaited law on emigration, defining the rights
of Soviet citizens to travel in and out of the USSR. People
who had access to state secrets, some as long as 15 to 20
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 41 years before, were allowed to emigrate. In an effort to
address the problem of the refuseniks (those denied
permission by the government to emigrate), Gorbachev also set
up a commission to review long-term secrecy cases. All the
cases reviewed by the Soviet commission were favorably
resolved. Freedom of religion allowed people to openly
participate in religious services. Many mosques and churches,
closed under previous Soviet leaders, were re-opened, and new
places of worship were built.
Gorbachev also rehabilitated some of Stalin's victims.
With these actions, Gorbachev opened the door for the
reexamination of Soviet history. For example, the Turkmen
under glasnost were able to discuss the 1881 battle for the
fortress of Geok-Tepe, in which Russian forces attacked the
Turkmen fortress, killing thousands. This battle was a
turning point in Turkmen history, for it signaled the end of
the people's resistance to Russian rule. Previous Soviet
history suggested that the Turkmen voluntarily joined the
Russian Empire. Because of glasnost, the Turkmen people were
able to openly refute this account.41 These challenges to the
Soviet version of history took place throughout the country,
including the Caucasus, where accounts of their "voluntary"
inclusion into the Soviet Union have also been disputed.
Annette Bohr, "Turkmen," The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, Graham Smith, ed. (New York: Longman, 1990), 238.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 42 This freedom in expression generated ideas, as
Gorbachev wanted, but it also generated discontent with the
Soviet government. Having the ability to openly and publicly
criticize aspects of the Soviet system liberated the
periphery from Moscow-controlled information. Glasnost
encouraged national groups to voice their opinions and to
gather publicly in search of greater national freedoms.
Perestroika. The Soviet Union had a wealth of untapped
natural resources and the ability to grow enough food for the
entire population, but the country could not effectively
utilize this wealth. The Soviets lacked the technology to
extract minerals and lacked an infrastructure to carry the
harvested crops from the farms to the people in the cities.
The lack of competition among enterprises, which were state-
owned, and the lack of incentives for the workers resulted in
low quality products and a lack of innovation.42 The
concentration on arms production at the expense of domestic
needs plunged the Soviet economy into a crisis:
". . . the system of centralized supply ties an enterprise up
with directives and leaves no room to manoeuvre . . .*43 This
centralized system was so unreliable that people stockpiled
42 jerry F. Hough, "Gorbachev's Politics," Foreign Affairs 68 (Winter 1989-90): 30.
43 Abel Aganbegyan, Inside Perestroika: The Future of the Soviet Economy (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1989), 32.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 43 items, which led to the growth of black markets under the
Soviet system.44
The Soviet Government had focused its resources on
competition with the West, particularly in the arms race.
Gorbachev highlighted the negative consequences this focus
had on economic development:
Our rockets can find Hailey's comet and fly to Venus with amazing accuracy, but side by side with these scientific and technological triumphs is an obvious lack of efficiency in using scientific achievements for economic needs, and many Soviet household appliances are of poor quality.4^
To counter the deteriorating economic situation, Gorbachev
introduced a set of reforms which were aimed at every level
from top to bottom. Gorbachev defined perestroika as:
. . . the all-round intensification of the Soviet economy, the revival and development of the principles of democratic centralism in running the national economy, the universal introduction of economic methods, the renunciation of management by injunction and by administrative methods and the overall encouragement of innovation and socialist enterprise.4®
While reforms in the Soviet Union had been attempted in the
past, they were implemented from above and did not cover a
wide range of political, economic, and military changes.
Gorbachev's reforms were different, as Baruch Nazan notes:
For the first time the changes encompass virtually all areas of Soviet life. For the first time they strongly
44 Ibid., 32.
45 Gorbachev, 7.
46 Ibid., 21.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 44 affect the political system itself, forcing the leadership to do things they have never done before, such as telling people the truth (though still not the whole truth) and subjecting themselves to real elections and political debates. For the first time reforms have caused such a division in the Soviet people that . . . they now are split into two groups: 'fighters for perestroika and its sabateurs [sic].' Finally, for the first time there is a leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who has made perestroika his supreme goal, and has bound his political fate as well as perhaps even his life to this cause.47
The anti-alcoholism drive in 1985 was one of
Gorbachev's first reform programs aimed at reducing
alcoholism by displaying it as an obstacle to perestroika.
This act, which included restricting access to alcohol, was
unpopular with Soviet citizens, but was an example of
Gorbachev's attempts to improve social conditions. Price
reform, growth of cooperatives and competition in the market
place were all goals of perestroika. It signaled an end to
government monopoly and a beginning of competition among
businesses. As the leadership adopted some measures to allow
the introduction of a market-based economy, it brought not
only competition, but the loss of jobs. The measures to
modernize technology, reorganize ministries and management
opened the door to unemployment.
In June 1987, the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) passed the Law on the State
Enterprises which allowed for self-financing. In 1988
47 Baruch Hazan, Gorbachev and His Enemies: The Struggle for Perestroika (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 299.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 45 Gorbachev introduced measures to privatize the land, which
included long-term leases, and the ability of farmers to pass
on their leases to their children. In 1989, Moscow instituted
some half-measures, partially freeing up prices and some
limited direct contact between enterprises. These were
ineffective because the lack of competition combined with
high demand drove prices up, and "at the same time, it became
less profitable to produce goods whose prices were controlled
or were less than possible alternatives. Inevitably,
shortages d e v e l o p e d . "48 By the end of 1989 Moscow realized it
would have to move to a market economy all at once instead of
through a piecemeal process and the issue of price increases
moved to the forefront of discussions. Yet the threat of
strikes forced the center to cancel planned increases.4® By
the middle of 1990 the economy was in a deep crisis. In many
cases, half measures were taken, and reform was focused only
in a few areas. Another problem with the reform programs was
that the government was introducing these programs without
the input of those who were required to carry them out.®® The
reform programs were also implemented without the benefit of
a feedback system, so that, when problems arose, there was no
48 Ticktin, 157.
49 Ibid., 159.
®0 p.o. Aven and V.M. Shironin, "The Reform of the Economic Mechanism," Perestroika and the Economy: New Thinking in Soviet Economics. Anthony Jones and William Moskoff, ed. (New York: MESharpe Inc., 1989), 253.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 46 system in place to correct these problems while allowing the
reform program to continue.51 This stunted the effectiveness
of the reform.
In the first three months of 1991, industrial
production, meat production, and oil production went down.
Still, Gorbachev introduced a price reform in April, 1991.
This reform program freed up prices and was expected to lead
to more items on the store shelves. However, because
production had gone down, all that resulted from the price
reform was higher prices. Economists claimed that, without
other reforms, the price reform would not w o r k . 52 as it
turned out, the controls on prices were lifted only on
certain items; again the reforms implemented were not enough
by themselves to have any positive impact. Gorbachev
introduced many half-measures aimed at improving the economy,
while not providing enough impetus to strengthen them. The
deteriorating economic situation in the USSR played an
influential role in the rise in nationalism and the collapse
of the empire:
. . . the economic dilemmas have pressured ruling elites to undertake changes which threaten to erode their own political privileges and promise the transformation of their system. The changes have begun to unleash long suppressed political demands and in some cases have set
51 ibid, 253.
52 Daniel Sneider, "Gorbachev Feels Heat on Economy," Christian Science Monitor. 21 March 1991, 6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47 into motion what may be irreversible movements for full- scale political and cultural liberation.53
All three factors, ideology, glasnost and perestroika played
a role in the resurgence of nationalism in the Soviet Union.
But while the republics were increasing their demands for
greater national freedoms, the center was engulfed in its own
battle between conservatives and reformists.
Internal Opposition
As part of the political reform, Gorbachev pushed the
retirement and reshuffling of high ranking officials.
Gorbachev's plans for the Soviet Union could not be
successful unless he had people in government who shared his
willingness to reform. So Gorbachev replaced many officials
with people who shared his ideas.54 Gorbachev, however, was
unable to rid his government of all opposition forces, and,
as time went on, those opposition forces became more vocal.
In the open media, people were exposed to criticisms of the
government made by private individuals, as well as government
officials.
Donna L. Bahry and Joel C. Moses, "Communist Dialectic: Toward a New Model of Socialism?" Political Implications of Economic Reform in Communist Systems. Donna L. Bahry and Joel C. Moses, eds. (New York: New York University Press, 1990), 1.
54 Archie Brown, "Change in the Soviet Union" Foreign Affairs 64 , no. 5 (Summer 1986): 1048. Brown noted that "no Soviet leader in his first year of office has presided over such sweeping changes in the composition of the highest party and state organs as Mikhail Gorbachev."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 48 Attempts at reform led to a resurgence in nationalism
in the periphery, and also led to opposition within the
central government. Political reform was resisted "by the
bureaucracy which feared the devolution of its responsibility
. . ."55 The conservative Communist forces, comprised of both
party and military officials, based their role in the Soviet
government on the Communist ideology that Gorbachev viewed as
an obstacle to reform. Many of Gorbachev's reforms were
antithetical to the modus operandi the Soviet government
followed for years. Giving more power to the people, at the
expense of the central government, was an idea conservative
party officials could not accept.
Internal resistance to reform was felt in a number of
areas, including the media and the economy. The conservative
forces wanted to retain the media as a way of shaping public
opinion based on the will of the party, not to reflect public
unhappiness with government p o l i c i e s . 56 Economic reforms were
resisted at the top because the economic bosses saw these
measures as a move to reduce their power over the local
economy.
The re-focusing of government priorities from the
military to the domestic economy also met with resistance
from military leaders. The military was losing importance as
55 Daniels, 97.
56 McNair, 97.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the battle of the arms race was replaced by the battle
between the center and the periphery. The release of Eastern
Europe from the Soviet empire meant the withdrawal of troops
to a country which was not prepared to house them. The
military was losing its status as the government's number one
priority. However, the military was still a powerful force,
and one that Gorbachev could not ignore. It was this
influence that led to Gorbachev's sudden shift toward the end
of his presidency to a more conservative position, from the
rejection of the 500-day economic reform plan of 1990, to the
crackdown in the Baltics in January 1991. Gorbachev was under
pressure to conform in order to survive.
Moscow Resists Break-Up
During the struggle for independence of the Baltic
republics, Gorbachev set conditions for secession— the right
granted to them in the Soviet constitution— that would take
five years. The Law on Procedures for Resolving Questions
Related to the Secession of Union Republics from the USSR,
passed on April 3, 1990, stated that the first step in the
process for secession from the Soviet Union was a referendum,
in which two-thirds of the voters vote for secession. The
results would be reviewed by the center, which judged the
validity of the referendum, and if approved, set a transition
period "not to exceed five years . . . "57 This act kept the
57 "Law of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics on Procedures for Resolving Questions Related to the Secession of Union Republics from the USSR," The Current Digest of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50 primary power of granting secession with Moscow and was aimed
at slowing the republics' drive for independence. The
republics were opposed to this law, which also contained a
provision stating that if the referendum "does not result in
a decision for the Union republic to secede . . . a new
referendum on this question may be held no sooner than 10
years from the time that the previous referendum was h e l d . "58
The Baltic republics did not plan to wait five years and held
their own referenda in 1990 with an overwhelming majority in
each voting in favor of independence.
By 1991, the situation changed for the worse. Liberal
leaders, such as Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, left
the central government, and the center turned towards a more
conservative course. This led to a more rigid and violent
confrontation between the center and periphery. Events
signaling this reversal in the center-periphery relationship
were the Soviet troop assaults in Lithuania and Latvia in
January 1991. Troops attacked local government buildings and
Moscow-backed "Salvation Committees" claimed power over the
democratically-elected leaders. Although Gorbachev denied
responsibility for the attacks, he failed to condemn them.
Seeking to regain control of the deteriorating
situation, Gorbachev called for a referendum on whether the
people wanted to maintain the union. The referendum of March
Soviet Press 42, no. 15 (16 May 1990): 20, quoting Pravda. 7 April 1990, 2.
58 Ibid., 20.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 51 17, 1991, which asked people to vote for or against a union,
resulted in a U.S.S.R.-wide 77% vote in favor of the union.
However, the Baltic republics, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova
refused to participate in this referendum, and, in the
capital of Ukraine alone, 55% voted against the union. The
scales were tipped, however, by over 90% vote favoring a
union in the Central Asian r e p u b l i c s . 59 There was a lower
voter turnout in Azerbaijan than the other republics
participating, although the number was still significantly
high at 75 percent. Of those that voted, 93 percent voting in
favor of the Union.60 Separate figures for the Nakhchyvan
region of Azerbaijan, home to the leader of Azerbaijan's
national movement (the Azerbaijani Popular Front), show that
only 20 percent of those eligible voted in the referendum.
Even though a majority of the country voted for the
union, Gorbachev continued to lose influence with the local
governments. The West urged Moscow to avoid the use of force
which would threaten the center's relationship with the
periphery as well as with the West. For the next several
months, as most of the republics continued to move towards
sovereignty, Gorbachev's government stalled, trying to buy
time.
59 Sneider, 6.
60 "Results of the USSR Referendum Held March 17, 1991," Current Digest of the Soviet Press 43, no. 13 (1 May 1991), 23, citing Izvestia. 27 March 1991, 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 52 While Gorbachev was trying to deal with the fight for
independence in the Baltic republics, he also had to deal
with the ethnic struggles in the Caucasus. Violence in the
South Ossetian autonomous republic in Georgia erupted as the
South Ossetians, fearing Georgian independence, moved to
unite with the Ossetians in Russia. The conflict resulted in
the movement of Soviet troops to the area, and claims by the
popularly-elected President Zviad Gamsakhurdia that the
Soviet Army was providing rockets and weapons to the
Ossetians. Gamsakhurdia claimed the center was behind the
Ossetian independence move in order to stall Georgia's
independence drive.61
Armenia also claimed that Moscow was backing its rival,
Azerbaijan, to punish Armenia in retaliation for its
independence movement. Throughout this period, Gorbachev
repeatedly warned that the break-up of the Soviet Union would
spell disaster for the republics, as ethnic tensions would
only intensify. By September 1991, Gorbachev could no longer
argue that only the Soviet Union could save the republics.
Leading opponents of Gorbachev's reforms had sought to return
the central leadership back to its traditional Communist
control and attempted a coup in August 1991. Although the
coup failed, Gorbachev's power faded away afterwards.
Pressure from President Bush led Gorbachev to give the Baltic
61 Justin Burke, "Soviet Georgians Wrestle With the Future of Republic," Christian Science Monitor. 2 April 1991, 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 53 republics what they were struggling for— sovereignty. This
was just the beginning. With the independence of the Baltic
states, all of the other republics voted for independence and
by December, 1991 they had turned to the West for
international recognition and support.
The center was unable to recover from the August 1991
coup. As the international community recognized the
independence of the Baltic states and the other republics
voted for independence, the end of the Soviet empire was in
sight. The December meeting of Russian, Ukrainian and
Belarussian leaders and the agreement that followed put a
final stamp on the fate of the USSR. Gorbachev, continuing
his warning of catastrophe should the USSR collapse, said
that the break up of the Soviet Union would make Yugoslavia's
civil war look like "a joke."®2 The Slavic republics were
later joined by the republics in Central Asia, the Caucasus
(except Georgia), and Moldova. The Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) was born in the death of the USSR.
The agreement among the republics (minus the Baltic states)
to create the CIS was to end finally the central leadership
over the Soviet republics. The aim of the CIS is to maintain
close cooperation among the ex-republics in military, foreign
policy, infrastructure and economic fields.®2
®2 Michael Dobbs, "Slavic Republics Declare Soviet Union Liquidated," Washington Post. 9 December 1991, A16.
63 Ibid, A16.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 54 The attempt at reform, the resistance by conservative
forces, and the desire by local national movements to expand
glasnost and perestroika into greater independence all played
key roles in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow could no
longer maintain a lid on these local nationalisms. As will be
seen in Azerbaijan, nationalism was not extinct during the
Soviet era, but lay largely dormant in the face of dominant
central rule. With the weakening of central control, national
sentiments surged, and so did the potential for ethnic conflict.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER III
NATIONALISM EMERGES IN THE CAUCASUS
Overview
Some of the ethnic antagonisms seen in the Caucasus
before and after the Soviet Union's collapse are a
continuation of tense relations that emerged earlier in this
century. The inability of the Georgians, Armenians, and
Azerbaijanis to cooperate before, during, and after the
Russian civil war was as destabilizing to their independence
in the early 1900s as it is in the post-Soviet period. Rising
nationalism encouraged hostilities among the ethnic groups.
During the brief period of independence from the Russian
Empire (1918-1920), the pressures from regional powers—
Soviet Russia, Turkey, and Iran— and the lack of unity in the
Caucasus left these three national groups vulnerable. The
prospects for cooperation were unlikely as "one nationalism
begat a competing nationalism. One nationality's claims to a
better position stimulated rival claims by its neighbors."1
Although these peoples have co-existed literally side-by-side
for centuries, there was little sense of partnership among
them. Instead of uniting during an unstable period in their
1 Ronald Grigor Suny, Armenia in the Twentieth Century (Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1983), 16.
55
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 56 history, these three national groups were at odds over how to
pursue their collective interests. Their suspicions of each
other made co-operation unattainable.
The Caucasus is a very heterogeneous region which
presents many opportunities for hostilities among the various
nationality groups.2 There are many ethnic groups living in a
relatively small space. Throughout history, these ethnic
groups were intermingled with one another. This factor
together with their long history and the movement of various
peoples in and out of the region makes it difficult to
determine areas where an ethnic group's historic claims to
certain lands are legitimate. However, land is an important
factor for these groups. Their justification for making
territorial claims rests on the belief that they were first
to arrive in a particular area or have a superior claim for
another reason.
Throughout the history of the Caucasus there have been
numerous incursions by outside powers. Persian, Turk, and
Russian interests in the Caucasus drew each to the region and
into conflict with one another. They each left their mark, but
it was under the tsarist regime that the national
consciousness of the three ethnic groups emerged. As Ronald
Suny writes about the Georgians during this period, which
2 "it may be safely said that no other territory of equal size anywhere in the world displays a comparable diversity of languages and races." Richard Pipes, Formation of the Soviet Union. 16.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 57 applies to the other national groups: "the social and
political integration into the Russian Empire, the consequent
economic stability, and increase in modes of communication. .
.and the introduction of western education. . .all contributed
to the formation of a 'nationality in itself' . . ."3 This
consciousness, however, developed slowly.
Tensions among the three ethnic groups in the early
1900s originated from the socio-economic situations of each.^
Armenians were more prosperous than either the Georgians or
Azerbaijanis and were thriving in Georgian and Azerbaijani
urban centers. Armenians also had a foothold in the
government in Baku, in which Muslims were prevented from
participating by the tsarist regime. A combination of hatreds
and economic antagonisms resulted in tensions and disunity.5
The seeds of mistrust grew with the rise in nationalism:
Armenian nationalism and claims to territory had provoked the national hostility of neighboring peoples. The Georgian nationalists resented the material and political power of the Armenians in Tiflis and other Georgian cities. The Azerbaijanis, a people who developed little ethnic consciousness until early 20th century, were mobilized by the perceived danger of armed Armenians in their midst.6
3 Ronald Grigor Suny, "The Emergence of Political Society in Georgia," Transcaucasia. Ronald Grigor Suny, ed. (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1983), 109-110.
4 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Baku Commune (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1972, 13-14.
5 Ibid., 13-14.
6 Ronald Grigor Suny, Armenia in the Twentieth Century. 15.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 58 Tensions between Azerbaijanis and Armenians went largely-
unchecked and led to fighting throughout the 1900s, such as
the 1905 Armeno-Tatar War and territorial conflicts during
their short-lived independence from 1918 to 1920. Tensions
over territorial claims remained after Armenia's and
Azerbaijan's incorporation into the Soviet Union, but the
dispute took a quieter form of protest, namely through
petitions from Armenians to the Soviet Government.
Caucasus: Brief History
Armenia. Armenia has a rich history. It is one of the
oldest Christian nations in the world. Following the fall of
the Seleucid Empire, the first Armenian state was founded in
190 B.C. Historic Armenia encompassed present-day eastern
Turkey, including the towns of Van, Erzerum, and Kars, and
modern Azerbaijan. Under King Tigranes the Great (95-66 BC)
Armenia extended into Syria and Mesopotamia. Christianity was
established in Armenia in 301 A.D. and in the 5th century an
Armenian alphabet was invented. Armenia, like Azerbaijan, was
ruled at times by the Persians and Turks. In fact, Armenia
was the site of Ottoman and Persian fighting from the 16th
century until the Perso-Ottoman treaty of 1639, when the
Ottomans came to control Western or Turkish Armenia (west of
the Akhuryan River) and Persia controlled Eastern Armenia
(including Yerevan).
By the 19th century, there were over two million
Armenians living within the Ottoman Empire. Until the latter
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59 part of the 1800s, these Armenians were not politically-
organized.7 Russia's seizure of eastern Armenia from Persia
in 1828 and the establishment of an ethnically Armenian
province provided a basis for the growth of an Armenian
national consciousness.8 By the end of the Russo-Turkish War
of 1877-78, Armenians had reached a national self-awareness
and those within the Ottoman Empire saw the Russians as their
liberators.9
However, under the terms of the agreement ending the
Russo-Turkish conflict, the Russians evacuated some of the
towns it occupied in 'Turkish Armenia' (eastern Turkey).
Armenian fear of Turks, and Turkish concerns that Armenians
in Ottoman Turkey were collaborating with Russia against
them, created an atmosphere ripe with tension. Oppression
grew in the eastern Ottoman Empire and Armenians began to
form underground defense groups. One of the main parties, the
Armenian Revolutionary Federation (also known as the
Dashnaktsutian, or Dashnaks), engaged in a struggle for
"political and economic freedom in Ottoman Armenia through
7 Richard Hovannisian, Armenia: On the Road to Independence (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 25.
8 Christopher Walker, ed., Armenia and Karabacrh: The Struggle for Unitv (London: Minority Rights Group, 1991), 21.
9 Suny, Armenia in the Twentieth Century. 18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 60 rebellion."10 During the 1890s, there were clashes between
these defense groups and Turkish authorities. Tensions
heightened and over the next twenty-five years many Armenians
died from Turkish massacres, the largest in 1915 when at
least 800,000 were killed.H The Dashnaks in tsarist Russia
were also formulating demands for Armenian national freedoms
from Moscow. However, their main goal in the early 1900s was
to become a part of a Russian federal state.12 Armenian fears
and mistrust of Turks were transferred to the Azerbaijanis,
Turkey's ethnic brothers.
Georgia. Christianity and the Georgian alphabet were
founded in Georgia around the fifth century. In 485, Persia
controlled all of the Caucasus except Iberia (central
Georgia). This region was linked with the west through
religious connections with Constantinople in the 7th century.
A monarchy existed in Georgia, and the Georgian kingdom
reached its height of power in the late 12th to early 13th
century, stretching into parts of modern-day Azerbaijan. The
rise of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th century and the
10 Gerard J. Libaridian, "Revolution and Liberation in the 1892 and 1907 Programs of the Dashnaktsutiun," Transcaucasia. Ronald Grigor Suny, ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1983), 185, quoting Hav Heahaookhakan Dashnaktsutian Dsraqir. Vienna, 17.
11 For further information on this period, see Richard Hovannisian, Armenia: On the Road to Independence (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967).
12 Ibid., 185.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 61 Safavid dynasty of Persia in the 16th century placed Georgia
in between these two powers. Georgia was subjected to raids
from neighboring Muslim regions. Worries of being Christian
in a heavily Muslim region influenced Georgia, like Armenia,
to seek close relations with Russia. The first overture was
made in the 16th century but it wasn't until Peter the Great
that a formal alliance was forged between Russia and Georgia.
Georgia aided Russia in the Russo-Persian war of 1722-25. In
1783 Georgia became a protectorate of Russia.
Yet even during these times of close relations between
Russia and Georgia there was still tension, as peasants
rebelled against Russian rule, particularly in the middle of
the 19th century. During the revolution of 1905, Georgian
workers went on massive strikes to protest mistreatment by
the tsarist government. Throughout the region, an uprising of
the peasants led to clashes with landlords. It was in the
first years of the 1900s that political groups began to
organize in Georgia. The Mensheviks were the leading party in
Georgia's political independence movement. This group emerged
from the split of the Russian Social Democratic Workers'
Party into the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.13
13 The Bolshevik-Menshevik split focused on different interpretations of how to implement Marxist theory. While the Bolsheviks favored a proletarian revolution in Russia, the Mensheviks believed that revolution should wait and that emphasis should be placed on improving the economic conditions of the workers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 62 Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is located along the Caspian Sea
and has borders with its previous rulers, Russia, Iran and
Turkey. Although Azerbaijanis are a Turkic peoples, they
share the Shia branch of Islam with Iran.14 Iranian influence
in Azerbaijan can be traced back to ancient times. Turkish
influence was noticeable in the 11th century with the arrival
of the Seljuk Turk dynasty. Gradually Turkish replaced
Persian as the language of the region. In the 16th century,
the Safavid dynasty came to power in Persia and built a
kingdom on the foundation of the Shia branch of Islam. During
the 18th century, Persian control began to decline and local
khanates juggled for power. One such khan, Fath Ali Khan of
Kuba, attempted to unify the country through a series of
wars, but his efforts were halted by Russia, which felt
threatened by the khan's growing acquisitions.15
Under Peter the Great, Russia sought to expand its
empire southward. During the 1720s Russia established its
presence in the northern part of modern-day Azerbaijan and
the Azerbaijani city of Baku. However, Russia's territorial
growth in the Caucasus slowed and actually reversed following
Peter the Great's death, not to be reinvigorated until the
14 The Sunni branch of Islam is dominant in Turkey and the Central Asian states.
15 Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan: 1905-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63 time of Catherine the Great.16
Persia, the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Empire were
at odds with one another, each seeking to gain territorial
power at the expense of the others. In the early 1800s,
Russia fought a number of wars with the Ottoman Empire and
Persia. Fighting between Russia and Persia ended in the 1812
Treaty of Gulistan, in which Persia ceded to Russia the
northern Caucasus khanates. However, fighting between Russia
and Persia continued sporadically for the next ten years. In
1828, Persia gave up the lands today known as Azerbaijan to
tsarist Russia under the Treaty of Turkmanchay. This treaty
permanently split the Azerbaijanis living in the region
between two powers. The majority of Azerbaijanis live in
present-day northern Iran.
Azerbaijan was largely an agricultural colony until oil
drilling began in the mid-1800s. By the late 19th century, an
Azerbaijani consciousness began to arise and fuel tensions
between the Azerbaijanis and Armenians. As Tadeuz
Swietochowski notes, "Antagonism between the two ethnic
groups had been simmering for a long time, and it now
transcended differences of religion and xenophobic
prejudice."3-7 In the early 1900s, fighting between Armenia
16 Muriel Atkin, "Russian Expansion in the Caucasus to 1813," Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917. Michael Rywkin, ed. (London: Mansell Publishing, Limited, 1988), 151.
17 Swietochowski, 38.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64 and Azerbaijan erupted where before they "had lived for
centuries in comparative peace."18
Independence in the Caucasus
The 1917 Russian Revolution left the Caucasus without a
governing body. A provisional government set up a Special
Transcaucasian Committee, which was composed of the three
national parties in Georgia (Mensheviks), Armenia (Dashnaks) and
Azerbaijan, where the Musavat Party dominated. However, the
provisional government fell soon after, and a battle ensued in
Azerbaijan between Lenin's Bolsheviks and the Musavat Party for
control of Baku. Musavat was formed in 1S11 by Turkic
intellectuals closely associated with the local Bolshevik
organization during the failed 1905 Revolution in Russia. By
1917, it was the largest political force in Azerbaijan. Its
original plan was for an autonomous Azerbaijan within a Russian
federative state. However,
After almost a year of working with the soviet to achieve the reforms his party desired, the Musavat leader had concluded that a real federalist solution, autonomy for Azerbaijan, and power for the Moslem majority could better be achieved by the anti-Bolshevik forces. Lenin's promise of national self-determination ceased to be meaningful for the Azerbaij ani leadership.19
In March 1918, conflict between Musavatists and local
Bolsheviks came to a head when fighting erupted in Baku. What
began as a battle between the Bolsheviks and Musavat turned into
1® Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951), 18.
19 Suny, Baku Commune. 206-7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65 an ethnic uprising as the Armenian population came to the aid of
the Bolsheviks, who now controlled Russia. In the end, the
Azerbaijani and Armenian communities blamed each other for the
deaths that resulted. Following the massacre in Baku, the
Bolsheviks' hold on Baku grew as it consolidated its power and
shut down the operation of other political parties in that city.
Meanwhile, the Transcaucasian body (composed of
Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Georgians) set up to negotiate with
the Turks for peace in the region was hampered by Soviet
Russia's surrendering of the southwestern regions of Kars,
Ardahan, and Batum to Turkey in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The
treaty was signed by Germany and Bolshevik Moscow on March 3,
1918. The weak Soviet regime had to cede former tsarist land.
As an ally of Germany, Turkey also benefited from the treaty
through territorial gains. Ceding the aforementioned territory
to Turkey placed Transcaucasia at a disadvantage in the
negotiations by removing it from the bargaining process.
Originally, the Transcaucasian leadership wanted to fight
rather than recognize the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.20 Following
Transcaucasia's declaration of independence, the new government
agreed to the treaty and sought to negotiate with the Turks. On
April 28, the Turks recognized the independence of the
Transcaucasian federation. However, at the May 11 peace
conference between the two sides, the Turks sought more
territory than they had already obtained in the Brest-Litovsk
20 Kazemzadeh, 101.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66 Treaty. The Transcaucasian delegation was divided over whether
to accept the demands, which largely focused on territory
belonging to Armenia. Azerbaijan, which had strong ethnic ties
to the Turks, was more conciliatory than the Armenians or
Georgians. Turkey advanced into the territory without waiting
for a response. As it advanced, the Transcaucasia federation
fell apart in a manner that proved prophetic:
All cohesion, and all community of interests, built up during a century of common existence as a part of Russia, disappeared almost overnight. Nothing was left but mutual distrust, hatred, and the desire for self-preservation, if necessary, at the price of others' destruction.21
The Transcaucasia federation dissolved and, by the end of
May 1918, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, respectively, had
declared their independence. Due to the ongoing battle for Baku,
the Azerbaijani Musavat set up its headquarters in Ganje, north
west of Baku. The Armenian Dashnaks moved to form a government
based on a coalition of political groups, but in the end the
cabinet was dominated by Dashnaks. The new Armenian government
moved to Yerevan in the summer of 1918. By the end of World War
I, the Dashnaks had become champions for Armenian national
independence. While initially the Georgian Mensheviks favored
autonomy for Georgia within a socialist Russian state, they
eventually set their sights on an independent Georgian state.
The collapse of the Caucasus federation immediately led
to border disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Karabakh
21 Ibid., 117.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67 and the southern region of Zangezur and between Armenia and
Georgia over the Lori region (located between the cities of
Tbilisi and Yerevan), which was later occupied by Turkish
forces. In June, the Turks reached a peace agreement with
Armenia and Georgia, gaining all the territory it sought.
Azerbaijan was the only country not to lose territory in its
peace treaty with Turkey. Indeed, Azerbaijan received assurances
of military assistance, which, according to Swietochowski, meant
the suppression of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and the
recovery of Baku from the Bolsheviks.22 During the next several
months, the battle between the Bolsheviks and anti-Bolshevik
Azerbaijanis for Baku ensued. Some of the Bolshevik leaders in
Baku— composed largely of Russians and Armenians— sought
Moscow's approval to invite in British soldiers— then in Persia
tracking the movements of the Ottoman Turks— to help in the
defense of the city. Moscow refused the request, which was
supported by leader of the Bolsheviks, Stepan Shaumian.23 in
July, Shaumian was overthrown by former supporters, who called
for the intervention of British troops. Power in Baku passed to
the Right Social Revolutionaries, anti-Bolsheviks and supporters
of a democratic Russia, who ruled briefly before the Turkish
2 2 Swietochowski, 1 3 0 , citing G. Jaschke, "Der turkisch-aserbaidschanish Freundschaftsvertrag vom 4 Juni 1 9 1 8 " Vorderasien: Studien zur Auslandkunde. no. 1 ( 1 9 4 4 ) : 6 4 .
23 For a more detailed account of this period, see Peter Hopkirk, Like Hidden Fire (New York: Kodansha International, 1 9 9 4 ) .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68 capture of Baku in September of 1918. When British General
Dunsterville forces arrived in mid-August, Turkish troops were
on the verge of taking Baku. British troops tried to help
prepare local forces to fight the advancing Turkish troops, but,
facing certain defeat, British troops ultimately were forced to
withdraw from Baku. Following a Turkish victory, the Azerbaijan
government, set up in May, moved its headquarters from Ganje to
Baku. In the Armistice of Mudros in November, 1918, signed
between the Ottomans and the Allies, Turkey was obliged to
evacuate its forces from the Caucasus. Once the Turks withdrew
from Azerbaijan in late 1918, Azerbaijan negotiated with the
British for the return of the British troops, headed by General
Thomson. British troops remained in Baku and other Caucasus
regions until August, 1919.
With the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the Caucasus
region in 1919, there was a renewal of the Armenian and Georgian
conflict over the border territories of Lori and Borchalo and
the town of Akhalkalaki. Fighting erupted, and Armenian forces
advanced forward to the Georgian capital. The Georgians were
able to beat them back. British troops in the region forced a
peace upon Armenia and Georgia.
In late 1919, as Russian forces were engaged in Dagestan
(just north of Azerbaijan), a security-concerned Azerbaijani
Musavat government sought Persia's protection. Persia,
however, was in no position to help, and appeals to the
British to return a third time were also turned down.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69 Bolshevik power in Baku began to rise once again. A local
Communist party was formed in Baku.
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia joined the World War I
Versailles Peace Conference and were given de facto
recognition by the Allied Supreme Council in January 1920.
"By recognizing the Transcaucasia republics, the Allies hoped
to strengthen their position in regard to Soviet R u s s i a . "24
However, bitter fighting among the parties weakened their
ability to withstand larger powers. They were incapable of
finding common ground, which worked to the benefit of Moscow:
The enemies of Transcaucasia's independence were provided with excellent material, on the basis of which they could and did, argue that Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan ruled by the Dashnaks, the Mensheviks and the Musavatists, were incapable of preserving order and of guaranteeing a peaceful existence to their peoples. Even in Transcaucasia doubts were raised whether this land could stand on its own f e e t . 25
The Azerbaijani Government proved too weak to combat Moscow
and on April 27, 1920, the Bolshevik Communist organizations
in Azerbaijan demanded that the Azerbaijani Government
surrender its power. Within hours, Soviet troops in the
northern Caucasus crossed the borders and advanced toward
Baku, meeting with little resistance. Soviet control of the
city was secured within a few days and the rest of the
country fell soon after. Soviet control over Armenia was
achieved at the end of 1920. Despite a Russo-Georgian treaty,
24 Kazemzadeh, 269.
25 ibid., 182-3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70 Moscow took control of Georgia in early 1921. In The Struggle
for Transcaucasia. Firuz Kazemzadeh writes, "The inability of
the Transcaucasia states to solve their conflicts and co
operate in the face of foreign aggression made them an easy
prey to Russia."26 The soviet government set up the
Transcaucasus republic in 1922 and by 1936 the individual
republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were formed.
The other territorial advance the Soviet regime
attempted in the Caucasus region was during World War II. In
an effort to secure the supply route from the Persian Gulf to
Russia, British and Soviet forces entered Iran.27 British
forces controlled the southern sector and Soviet forces the
north. Although the plan was for the U.S.S.R. to withdraw at
the end of the war with Germany, the Soviet occupation of
predominantly Azerbaijani-populated northern Iran resulted in
the establishment of a puppet Soviet government in the
Iranian Azerbaijani capital of Tabriz. This action, for a
time, united Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan. An Azerbaijani
university and national museum were opened and printed
material from Soviet Azerbaijan made its way south. Only
after international pressure in 1946 did Stalin retreat and
Tehran swept away the puppet regime.
26 Ibid., 276.
27 For further account of this period, see Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71 Naaorno-Karabakh conflict: History
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is based on historic and
ethnic claims of the Armenians and Azerbaijanis to this
particular region. The two sides differ on which group
arrived first. Armenians claim that Karabakh belonged to them
as part of the "kingdom of Armenia" until 428 AD when the
Sasanid Persians separated Karabakh from the rest of Armenian
territory. It was not until the 1750s that Muslims reportedly
arrived in Karabakh.28
However, on the other si'he of the dispute, it is claimed
that the Azerbaijanis' ancestors arrived first, and that by
the early 1800s Azerbaijanis composed the majority of the
population in the region. David Nissman states that the
census of the Karabakh region in 1823 shows that the
composition of present-day Nagorno-Karabakh was 78 percent
Turkic and 22 percent Armenian.29 By the time of the 1988
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 77 percent of the population was
Armenian and 23 percent was Azerbaijani.30
It wasn't until the Treaty of Turkmanchay— in which
Armenians in Iran received permission to resettle in the
28 Walker, 80.
29 Statement of David Nissman, U.S. Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: The Naaorno-Karabakh Crisis: Prospects for Resolution. 102nd Congress, 1st session, 23 October 1992, 27.
20 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992, 706.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72 Russian Empire— and the Turkish massacres in 1915 that large
numbers of Armenians apparently moved to the Karabakh area.
Shusha, a town in Karabakh that is situated on the heights
above the present-day Nagorno-Karabakh capital of
Stepanakert, was a focal point of Armenian-Azerbaijani
hostilities in the early 1900s, as it is today. It was
considered a principal Armenian cultural center in the 1800s
and was the site of fighting between Armenians and
Azerbaijanis in August of 1905 during the Armeno-Tatar War.
Following the brief independence of Armenia and
Azerbaijan in May of 1918, they soon engaged in border
disputes with regard to Karabakh and Zangezur (the latter
region is a part of modern-day Armenia that separates
Azerbaijan proper from the Azerbaijani province of
Nakhchyvan). Fighting between the two national groups
continued through their incorporation into the Soviet Union
in the 1920s. In June 1921, a decree by the Soviet Caucasian
Bureau giving Karabakh to Armenia led Baku's Soviet leader
Narimanov to threaten that he would allow "the reformation of
anti-Soviet groups in Azerbaijan."31 Narimanov, a nationalist
communist, was soon liquidated by Moscow. However, Soviet-
Turkish treaties concluded in 1921 led to the establishment
of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Nakhchyvan.
Nakhchyvan is strategic because it provides Azerbaijan with
its only land link to its ethnic brethren in Turkey. Karabakh
31 Walker, 91.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 73 went to Azerbaijan, and Zangezur was given to Armenia. This
geographic arrangement was a mosaic of commingled
nationalities and preserved the potential for resumption of
hostilities.
Caucasus Nationalism under the Soviet System
Nationalism did not die in the Caucasus after the
Soviet takeover in 1920-21. Former First Secretary of the
local Communist Party in Baku, Mir Jafar Bagirov, who held
the post from 1933-1953, wrote that:
From the very first days of the existence of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, national deviationists tried to counteract by every means the formation of a firmly united monolithic Bolshevik Party. The Bolsheviks of Baku, faithful to the banner of Lenin and Stalin, conducted an energetic struggle against the treacherous activity of the national deviationists who later were unmasked as spies of a foreign intelligence service.32
Nationalist communists in the 1920s raised their voices in
defense of Azerbaijani interests. Soviet Moscow also became
unpopular with the Azerbaijani peasants, who were forced to
abandon other crop-growing activities in favor of the
cultivation of cotton. The Soviet Government dealt with both
nationalist communists and peasants with a firm hand.
However, Moscow did encourage the cultural development of
Azerbaijan, with the aim that it would grow independent of
Turkish or Persian i n f l u e n c e . 33
32 Quoted in Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953), 242.
33 ibid., 243.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 74 Following Georgian incorporation into the Soviet Union,
local leaders sought to preserve independence by ignoring
Moscow's directives and expelling non-Georgians from the
republic. One of the largest anti-Soviet insurrections broke
out in western Georgia in 1924. It was quickly quashed by the
Red Army. Abkhazian nationalists in the 1930s protested the
influx of non-Abkhaz leaders into that part of Georgia.34 The
Abkhaz leaders were later charged with an attempted
assassination plot against Stalin. Put on trial, several were
executed. The terror of 1937-38 struck Georgia and Azerbaijan
hard (although Ukraine received the worst treatment).
Thousands in the local leadership in Tbilisi were eliminated
and in Azerbaijan many top officials were purged. Throughout
the rest of the Soviet Union, republican leaders met with
similar fates. In addition to local political leaders,
writers and other members of the cultural scene in the Soviet
Union were targeted. Moscow rewrote the histories of the non-
Russian peoples, labeling local national heroes who fought
against tsarist Russia, such as the Dagestani hero Shamil, as
reactionaries, and glorifying the deaths of Bolshevik leaders
such as Baku Commissar Shaumian, who was killed by anti-
Bolshevik Turkmen in 1918.33
34 Ibid., 237.
33 ibid., 200-1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75 During the early 1920s, mid-1940s, and early 1960s,
Armenia sought to overturn Moscow's decision giving Nagorno-
Karabakh to Azerbaijan. As an autonomous oblast, every
district in Nagorno-Karabakh had an Armenian-language
newspaper, thus preserving the cultural and national identity
of this isolated people. In May, 1963, 2500 Karabakh
Armenians signed a petition claiming economic deprivation
from the local government in Baku.36 In 1966, Yerevan
petitioned Moscow, demanding the attachment of Nagorno-
Karabakh to Armenia and, in 1968, Stepanakert was the scene
of clashes by Armenians and Azerbaijanis.37 However, fighting
was rare, and these two groups managed to live side-by-side
in relative peace under the Soviet system.
Soviet Nationalities Policy
While the national sentiments that emerged at the turn
of the century continued to exist under the Soviet regime,
Moscow was not prepared to allow its expression within the
Soviet state. Although the Bolsheviks encouraged local
nationalism in their fight for power in the former tsarist
Russia, there was no place for nationalism in the new Soviet
order. The Soviet leaders had to develop a plan for dealing
with national groups. Over seven decades the Soviet leaders
used various means to integrate these national groups.
Following Marxist teachings, Lenin expected nationalism to
36 Walker, 118.
37 Ibid., 119.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 76 fade under the socialist system.38 However, he was sympathetic
to the various national groups and fearful of Russian
chauvinism. Thus, his policy of korinezatsiva (nativisation)
promoted the interest of non-Russian groups at the expense of
Russians. During this period the use of local languages
spread. The establishment of secure borders allowed the
Caucasus peoples to focus on cultural development.
However, following Stalin's rise as the primary leader,
he "ordered that greater emphasis should be given to the
leading role of the Russian people in the Soviet State."39
Stalin feared local nationalisms and, under his government,
the program of Russification was implemented. This process
included, inter alia, the migration of Russians to other
republics, the displacement of a number of nationality groups
throughout the country, and the promotion of the Russian
language in all schools. By limiting the use of local
languages, and by mixing Russians with other nationality
groups, the center was attempting to erase the ethnic groups'
identities, thus protecting the policies of the Communist
state from the threat of local nationalism.
Stalin's purges were a way to control the periphery and
to prevent political unity in the republics. For example,
38 Gregory Gleason, "The 'National Factor' and the Logic of Sovietology," Post-Soviet Nations. Alexander Motyl, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 3.
39 Kolarz, 19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 77 Stalin considered Ukraine the leader of the opposition to a
centralized Soviet Union and so "Ukraine suffered much more
during the big purge of 1937-38 than any other Soviet
republic. "40 The center's fear of nationalism also led to the
purges of Estonian communists in the Spring of 1950. The only
reprieve in Stalin's repression of local nationalism occurred
during World War II as . . every resource of the country
had to be mobilized to repel the invasion of Nazi Germany,
and one of these resources was the revival of nationalism . .
_ n 41
Khrushchev rehabilitated some of the national groups
resettled by Stalin and saw nationalities policy as a key to
aiding socio-economic development.42 In 1957, he gave more
autonomy to regions in order to improve economic management.
However, this autonomy was limited and the promotion of
regional interests over the Soviet state was not tolerated.
Khrushchev, who fostered the program of sblizhenie ('coming
together' or the notion that the different nationalities
would unite as one under a Russian-dominated Soviet
nationalism), implemented educational reforms in 1958-59
favoring the Russian language. While non-Russians were to
4° Ibid., 132.
Suny, Armenia in the Twentieth Century. 64.
42 Graham Smith, "Nationalities Policy from Lenin to Gorbachev, " Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union. Graham Smith, ed. (London: Longman, 1990), 7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 78 learn Russian in schools, Russians in non-Russian republics
were not required to learn the local language.
Leonid Brezhnev returned to a policy of limited
nativisation, allowing natives among the party faithful to be
appointed to local positions. At the same time, he sought to
minimize the nationalities issue by stating that, "the
national question, as it came down to us from the past, has
been settled completely, finally, and for good."43
Throughout the Soviet period before Gorbachev,
experiments in the nationalities policy were tried, but they
ended when local leaders appeared to promote the interest of
their ethnic group over the rest of Soviet citizens. However,
the Soviet leaders largely failed in their attempts to
assimilate the various ethnic groups, to replace any feelings
of nationalism with patriotism for the Soviet state. With
Gorbachev's accession to power and his attempts to allow
change through glasnost and perestroika, he opened up long-
repressed national feelings.
Summary
Soviet nationalities policy did not create the ethnic
hostilities now being expressed in the Caucasus. However, the
creation of republics along ethnic lines with minority
autonomous republics and oblasts carved out did influence a
43 Speech at the 1972 commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR. Hugh Seton-Watson, "Russian Nationalism in Historic Perspective," The Last Empire, Robert Conquest, ed. (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1986), 25.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 79 situation marked with tension. The accessibility of language
and culture to national groups under the Soviet system
encouraged local national unity. Purges had the same effect,
as the removal of those defending local national interests
fostered resentment of the Soviet regime and of Russians, the
historic rulers and leaders of Soviet policy. Instead of
having a clear, consistent policy, Soviet leaders tried
different tactics and largely underestimated the strength of
nationalism. While, in the past, nationalist expressions were
suppressed by Moscow, the breakdown of the Communist
ideology, and the introduction of glasnost and perestroika
allowed ethnic groups an opportunity to vent pent-up national
frustrations. Not only were they critical of Moscow, they
became in some areas increasingly hostile to each other.
Attempts by Moscow to ignore or rid itself of nationalism
actually spurred the determination of these groups to
maintain their national identities. The fight for national
survival also led to the fight against competing nationalisms
in the region.
As is seen in the next chapter, the seventy years of
Communist rule did little to eliminate ethnic hostilities in
the Caucasus. For Azerbaijan and Armenia, the current
fighting is a resumption of the battle started earlier this
century. Then, as today, these nationalisms and ethnic
conflicts weakened the states and left them vulnerable to
outside influence.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER IV
INDEPENDENCE IN AZERBAIJAN
Overvi ew
Moscow's loosening grip on the republics, nationalism,
and the republics' grievances with Moscow sparked their drive
to seek greater freedom from the center. In Azerbaijan's
case, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh was the predominant
factor affecting Baku's relationship with Moscow. The
Azerbaijani Communist leadership, and, in the early days, the
nationalist movement in Azerbaijan were content to remain
within a Soviet community. The chain of events in the growing
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and Moscow's reaction to these
events were influential in pushing Azerbaijan away from
Moscow. Moscow's response to the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh
damaged the relationship with the Baku leadership and
eventually drove the nationalist movement to seek full
independence. Even the Communist party leader of Azerbaijan
from 1990-92, Ayaz Mutalibov, used nationalism as leverage
with Moscow when he deemed it in his interest to do so.
With the advent of perestroika and glasnost,
Azerbaijan saw progress in the areas of education, religious
freedom and greater contact with neighboring Iran and Turkey.
Economically, the republic concentrated on joint ventures and 80
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 81 aid from the West. However, all these 'liberating'
experiences in Azerbaijan were overshadowed by the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. The current conflict began in 1988, when
the republic of Armenia sought to incorporate the
predominantly Armenian-populated Azerbaijani enclave under
its jurisdiction and Azerbaijan fought to keep Nagorno-
Karabakh under its control. What began as a series of
demonstrations quickly turned to violence. The ensuing
hostilities resulted in the deaths of thousands of people and
over a million refugees and displaced persons. Moscow's
decrees and the presence of Soviet troops in the region were
ineffective in quelling the conflict. Independence has not
diminished the nationalist fervor in Azerbaijan, as
successive presidents have promised to win the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict and fight to protect Azerbaijan's
independence from outside threats. In reality, losses on the
battlefield have had a high political cost in Baku and have
been a factor in the government's vulnerability.
Azerbaijan under Gorbachev
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. As in the other republics,
perestroika and glasnost first appeared in Azerbaijan in 1986
when news articles on perestroika were published in
Azerbaijani newspapers. However, the introduction of reforms
in the Soviet Union did not automatically spark an
1 Since declaring independence in 1991, Armenia no longer openly seeks the incorporation of Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia, but claims it now supports autonomy for the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 82 independence movement in Azerbaijan. The Baku government was
firmly in the hands of the Communist Party and Azerbaijan's
leadership focused mainly on securing freedoms in the use of
the Azerbaijani language. Glasnost loosened restrictions on
religious practices in the Soviet Union; in Azerbaijan,
mosques were reopened and religious holidays observed.2
The Azerbaijani leadership's internal focus on
cultural freedoms was disrupted by Armenia's territorial
claim on Nagorno-Karabakh in 1988. In February 1988, Armenian
demonstrators in Nagorno-Karabakh and Yerevan called for
unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. However,
apparently due to concerns that redrawing the boundaries
would lead to territorial claims by other nationality groups,
Moscow instead passed a resolution calling for faster "socio
economic development" of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of
Azerbaijan.3 Moscow's actions sparked protests in Yerevan.4
In early 1988, tensions reached a boiling point. At
this time, there were approximately 200,000 people living in
2 other indicators of religious freedom in Azerbaijan were the reopening of mosques, access to holy shrines in Iran, and the publication of the Koran and other religious materials. "Caucasus Events' Impact on Iranian Ties Mused," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (26 January 1990): 14.
3 Audrey Altstadt, Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992), 196-7.
4 Philip Taubman, "Gorbachev Urges Armenians to End Nationalist Furor," New York Times. 26 February 1988, in Bernard Gwerztman and Michael Kaufman, eds., The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Empire (New York: Times Books, 1992), 94.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 83 Nagorno-Karabakh; as stated earlier, 77 percent Armenian and
23 percent Azerbaijani. One of the first bloody clashes broke
out in Nagorno-Karabakh, killing two Azerbaijanis. Ethnic
tension led to the first wave of Azerbaijani refugees from
Armenia flooding eastward into Azerbaijan. These refugees
added to rising animosities between the two ethnic groups in
Azerbaijan. In February, 1988, violence between Azerbaijanis
and Armenians in Sumgait, an Azerbaijani town north of Baku,
left some 32 people dead, mostly Armenian. Violence against
Armenians, such as in Sumgait, led the Armenians to believe
that "Soviet power could or would not protect them."5 it was
this sentiment that led the Armenians later to flee
Azerbaijan and, for those who stayed behind, to arm
themselves. Gorbachev's response to the clash was to send
troops to Sumgait and arrest several Azerbaijanis for attacks
on Armenians. In May, the first Secretaries of Armenia and
Azerbaijan were removed by Moscow. However, this action had
little impact on the tense situation, and in mid-June the
Armenian Supreme Soviet passed a resolution calling for the
annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian-dominated
Nagorno-Karabakh soviet also sought its transfer to Armenia.
The Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet replied by passing a
5 Bill Keller, "A Deadly Feud Tears at Enclave on Gorbachev's Southern Flank," New York Times. 5 September 1989, Section A,10.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 84 resolution calling the transfer "unacceptable."6
On July 12, the Armenian-dominated soviet of Nagorno-
Karabakh declared its secession from Azerbaijan. On July 18,
Moscow ruled that Nagorno-Karabakh would remain part of
Azerbaijan, but also that a special commission, headed by
Arkadiy Volskiy (a member of the CPSU Central Committee and
Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet), would be established to
observe the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.7 When violence
broke out in September in Stepanakert, the capital of
Nagorno-Karabakh, and nearby Shusha, an Azerbaijani-populated
town situated on heights above Stepanakert, Volskiy imposed
martial law. These steps put the power over Nagorno-Karabakh
in Moscow's hands. While perestroika and glasnost were
programs to increase the freedoms in the republics, Moscow's
actions vis-a-vis Azerbaijan's control over Nagorno-Karabakh
was an example of the limitations on these freedoms.
On November 12, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet decided to keep Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.
However, this did not stop the protests, which in time became
large demonstrations and spurred the formation of some small
national movements. Later that month, a curfew was imposed,
but the demonstrations continued, and by late 1988 they were
6 "Sessions of the Union Republic Supreme Soviet: Azerbaidzhan Republic," Current Digest of the Soviet Press 40, no. 25 (20 July 1988): 7, citing Izvestia. 19 June 1988.
7 Bill Keller, "Armenia and Its Neighbors Only Diverge, "New York Times, 11 September 1988, Sec. 4, 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 85 replaced by strikes. On January 12, 1989, Moscow established
direct rule over Nagorno-Karabakh without consulting the
Azerbaijani leadership.8
During the spring of 1989, local political groups in
Baku formed the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF). However, the
Azerbaijani Communist Party leader, Abdulrakhman Vezirov,
refused to legalize the Popular Front. The APF's goals, as
developed in the summer of 1989, were to: (1) achieve
democratization and ensure human rights; (2) localize control
over elections; (3) "achieve political, economic, and
cultural sovereignty for Azerbaijan within the USSR "
(emphasis added) and restore cultural ties with Iranian
Azerbaijan; (4) cease the exploitation of natural resources;
(5) return land to the peasants and give them a role in
agricultural strategy; (6) insure equal treatment for all
nationalities; and (7) adopt measures to protect the
environment.^ The APF organized strikes and, during late
1989, began organizing the closure of rail lines to Armenia
to force it to drop its claims on Nagorno-Karabakh. 10
The APF became increasingly popular with the
Azerbaijani people and this eventually led Vezirov to
legalize the organization. The APF held demonstrations and
8 Alstadt, 204.
9 Ibid., 205.
10 "Russia Republic Urges Azerbaijan to End Armenia Blockades," New York Times. 3 December 1989, Section A, 11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 86 pressed the Azerbaijani leadership to declare its control
over Nagorno-Karabakh and to approve a new law on
sovereignty. In August, Vezirov said he would cooperate with
the APF and he called for Azerbaijan's sovereignty.11 In
November 1989, Gorbachev issued a decree which restored the
old Armenian-dominated soviet in Nagorno-Karabakh and
continued the stationing of Soviet internal, or MVD, forces
in the region.12 Azerbaijan raised its objections to Moscow
on this action, and Armenia declared the annexation of
Nagorno-Karabakh.12 in December, Azerbaijan decided to
establish its own commission to replace the Volskiy
Commission.
On January 9, 1990, the Armenian Supreme Soviet and
self-proclaimed national soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh discussed
a 1990 republic budget that included Nagorno-Karabakh. This
prompted Azerbaijan to claim that Armenia was interfering in
Azerbaijan's internal affairs.14 The Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet declared the Armenian resolution to be
11 Bill Keller, "Turkic Republics Press Soviets to Loosen Reins," New York Times. 26 August 1989, in Gwerztman and Kaufman, 196.
12 Alstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule. 207, citing Izvestiia. 30 November 1989.
13 Ibid., 207.
14 Ibid., 212.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87 "unconstitutional."15 Baku was unimpressed with Moscow's
failure to stop Armenia's claims on Nagorno-Karabakh.
On January 13-14, 1990, a bloody confrontation in Baku
erupted, and over a dozen Armenians were killed. On January
15, the USSR Supreme Soviet declared a state of emergency
because Azerbaijan and Armenia "acted with insufficient
firmness and consistency, have not used every opportunity to
surmount the situation that has developed, and in a number of
cases have followed the lead of extremist, nationalistically-
minded elements."17 On January 20, Moscow sent troops to
Baku, where clashes between the Azerbaijanis and Soviet
forces resulted in approximately 80 casualties.
First Secretary Abdulrakhman Vezirov was removed due to
his inability to control the situation and apparently because
he bowed to APF pressure.He was replaced by another
Communist Party member, Ayaz Mutalibov. Some key APF members
"Nakhichevan: Order is Being Restored," Current Digest of the Soviet Press 42, no. 2 (14 February 1990): 10, citing Izvestia. 11 January 1990, 1.
16 Altstadt, 212.
17 "Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet: On the Declaration of a State of Emergency in the N-K Autonomous Province and Several Other Areas.” The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. 42, no. 3 (February 21, 1990): 1, quoting Pravda and Izvestia. 16 January 1990, 1..
1^ Bill Keller, "Soviet Military Takes Control of Baku; Scores of Azerbaijanis killed; Coup Averted, Gorbachev Says," New York Times. 20 January 1990, in Gwerztman and Kaufman, 228.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 88 were arrested and the APF offices were closed. Although
Moscow claimed that it sent troops to protect Armenian
residents, the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet declared Moscow's
actions an act of aggression and in violation of the Soviet
Constitution. The declaration called for the withdrawal of
Soviet troops and the Baku leadership threatened to start
proceedings on Azerbaijan's withdrawal from the USSR if its
demands were not met.19
The USSR Supreme Soviet passed a resolution that spring
justifying its introduction of a state of emergency as a
"necessary measure to stop the violence at a time when armed
clashes and mass disturbances were on the rise and the
requirements of the law were not being obeyed."20 Moscow's
troop deployment and its justification for its actions
further alienated Baku.21
One of Mutalibov's first acts as First Secretary of
Azerbaijan was to criticize Moscow for its failure to rebuke
19 "Resolution of the Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Soviet: On Lifting the State of Emergency in the city of Baku," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. 42, no. 4 (February 28, 1990): 6, citing Bakinskv rabochv. 25 January 1990, 3..
20 "Resolution of USSR Supreme Soviet on the Situation in the Azerbaidzhan Republic and the Armenian Republic and Measures to Normalize the Situation in the Region." The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 42, no. 10 (April 11, 1990): 29, citing Pravda. 7 March 1990, 5; and Izvestia. 6 March 1990, 3..
21 Bill Keller, "Once Docile Azerbaijani City Bridles Under the Kremlin's Grip," New York Times. 16 February 1990, in Gwerztman and Kaufman, 238.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 89 Armenia for its demands on Nagorno-Karabakh and to demand the
withdrawal of Soviet troops.22 He also called for Moscow's
end to the special authority in Baku and Nagorno-Karabakh and
a purge of "unprincipled party members."23
In September, multiparty elections to the Azerbaijani
Supreme Soviet were so low that several run-off elections
were held. Although the Communists dominated the new Supreme
Soviet, ten percent of the 350 elected were from the
democratic bloc.24
By November 1990, Nagorno-Karabakh was returned to
Azerbaijan's jurisdiction. Moscow's attempts to mediate and
place restrictions on its republican powers continued to come
under attack by both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Neither side in
the conflict wanted the other in control of the region, but
apparently neither did they desire Moscow's interference.
Moscow attempted to put a lid on the conflict by refusing to
change the boundaries. Gorbachev, in an appeal to the people
of Armenia and inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh in March 1991
said, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast is an
inalienable part of Azerbaijan . . . That is how history has
22 Altstadt, 221.
23 ibid., 221, citing Azarbavian Kommunisti. no. 3 (1990): 13-14, 32-24.
24 Fuller, 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 90 ordained it."25
The Soviet Government attempted in 1991 to keep the
country together by securing the republics' agreement to a
new treaty, called the All-Union Treaty. This treaty would
place more power in the hands of the republics. The APF
opposed the treaty, preferring instead a sovereign
Azerbaijani state. However, the draft of the Union Treaty was
approved by the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet on June 27, 1991.
Attempts to keep the Soviet Union together quickly
unraveled in August, 1991 as conservative forces sought to
take over the central government in an attempted coup in
Moscow. Following the failed coup, the republics took steps
to prepare for a future without the Soviet center. In
Azerbaijan, independence was declared on August 30 and
presidential elections were set for September 8. The
Azerbaijani nationalist forces sought free elections.
However, Mutalibov, who had closed the Communist Party
headquarters in Baku and ran under an anti-Communist
platform, was the lone candidate.26 He was victorious,
winning 84% of the electorate. The APF declared the election
unfair. The Armenians of Karabakh and the residents of the
25 "Appeal from U.S.S.R. President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev: 'To the People of Azerbaijan and the Inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh,1" Foreign Broadcast Information Service (15 March 1991): 78, citing Pravda. 15 March 1991..
26 David Remnick, "Azerbaijanis Cast Ballots for President," Washington Post, 9 September 1991, Sec. A, 17.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Nakhchyvan Autonomous Republic (Azerbaijani territory-
separated from Azerbaijan proper by Armenia) boycotted the
election.27
Mutalibov and other Azerbaijani Communist leaders
looked to Moscow to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh hostilities,
but it became apparent that Moscow could not live up to
Azerbaijan's expectations. Increasing clashes and empty
decrees from Moscow facilitated the disillusionment of the
Azerbaijani authorities. The lack of strong leadership in the
Baku government, combined with a national movement that
sought Mutalibov's ouster and a sovereign Azerbaijani state,
further hindered prospects for a solution to the conflict.
Failure to Stop the Violence. As indicated, Moscow's
reactions to the unfolding events in Azerbaijan were met with
disdain by Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders. Moscow's
decision to keep Nagorno-Karabakh part of Azerbaijan did not
end the conflict. It became clear early on that Moscow's
power to quell the violence was limited. Even its decision to
apply force by sending troops to the region was ineffective.
Soviet troops were unable to control the growing
tension in the region. Servicemen from various Soviet
republics were targets of attacks.28 consequently, Moscow had
27 Nakhchyvan was loyal to the leader of the Popular Front, Abulfez Elcibey, a native of the autonomous republic.
28 Number of Soviet military casualties in Nagorno- Karabakh from February, 1988 to July, 1991 were estimated at 123 killed and 675 wounded. "Afterword to the May Events on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 92 problems conscripting men into the service as the soldiers
feared for their lives.29 in addition to the fear of being
killed, the morale of Soviet soldiers was weak and the troops
were apathetic to a battle involving other nationalities.
The Soviet Army's role was to facilitate a return to
peace in the region. The hesitation of some soldiers to
become involved in a conflict that did not concern them and
their physical inability to stop the fighting weakened their
purpose. In fact, instead of putting a halt to fighting, the
Soviet Army was criticized for its participation in attacks
between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis. In late April-early
May, 1991, Azerbaijani troops, apparently assisted by the
Soviet army, attacked several Armenian-inhabited villages in
Azerbaijan along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. The
center's involvement in this exercise, which favored
Azerbaijan, may have been an attempt to fight for the
survival of the Communist Party in Azerbaijan, and thus the
Central Communist Party's hold on that republic.30 it may
well have also been to teach a "lesson" to Armenia, which was
leading an active struggle for its independence. It could
the Border Between Azerbaidzhan and Armenia," Current Digest of the Soviet Press 43, no. 26 (31 July 1991): 7, citing Pravda. 26 June 1991, 3.
29 Another reason is that many republics were moving to establish their own armies and wanted their conscripts to be a part of their nationalized armies.
30 James Carney, "Carnage in Karabakh?" Time 139 (13 April 13 1992): 41.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 93 best be described as an attempt to "solve" the problem of
Armenian claims on Nagorno-Karabakh by driving all Armenians
out of the region. It appeared Moscow was encouraging or at
least allowing inter-ethnic conflict to continue to show the
republics that they needed the center in order to avoid
bloodshed. Indeed, up to the final days of the USSR,
Gorbachev continued his call for the continuation of the
union, warning the periphery of impending war if the union
wasn't preserved.
Azerbaijan's Leaders. Although Moscow seemed to do
little more than barely contain the violence in Azerbaijan,
it was more than the Azerbaijani leadership was capable of
doing. The lack of effective leadership in Baku hindered the
republic's ability to deal with the dispute, while Moscow's
problems in handling the situation damaged the relationship
between the two capitals. Each act of violence was a test for
Moscow; each time Moscow failed to stop the hostilities it
served to further disillusion Baku's leadership and
strengthen the national political movement.
Ayaz Mutalibov was a leader whose policy changed as the
political climate changed. Mutalibov supported limited
independence with Moscow's guidance. However, the Soviet coup
attempt and its failure changed the course of the Azerbaijani
leadership after August 1991. Mutalibov reportedly supported
the attempt to overthrow Gorbachev in August 1991, although,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 94 once it failed, he denied these claims.31 Following the
failed coup, Mutalibov realized that Moscow could no longer
support his political position and he focused on achieving
sovereignty for Azerbaijan. Following Azerbaijan's
declaration of independence on August 30, 1991, Mutalibov
moved quickly to nationalize Communist Party buildings.
Once Azerbaijan gained its independence, Mutalibov
swayed back and forth on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. While he
needed to show support for a peaceful resolution to this
issue to boost his standing in the Western community, he also
wanted to appear a winner in his own country, making
compromise difficult. Mutalibov described the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict as "the result of the general ill of the
formation of democracy now characteristic of our society."32
Mutalibov was a leader with no solid ambitions for
Azerbaijan, but based his policies on keeping himself in
power. This feeling of self-preservation has permeated the
successive leaderships in Baku following Azerbaijan's
independence.
31 Elizabeth Fuller, "The Transcaucasus Republics Equivocate," Report on the USSR. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute, 3, no. 6 (6 September 1991): 42.
32 "Speech by Ayaz N. Mutalibov, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum," Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 5 February 1990, quoted in Charles F. Furtado, Jr. and Andrea Chandler, eds. Perestroika in the Soviet Republics: Documents on the National Question. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), 453.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 95 The strongest group outside of Mutalibov's government
was the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF). This group was
headed by Abulfez Elcibey (who was later ruled from June 1992
to June 1993) and it shifted to a more moderate political
stance following the arrest by Moscow authorities of the
Front's radical members in the riots of January, 1990. It was
also during this time that the Azerbaijani Popular Front
began to anticipate the impending collapse of the Soviet
empire, and the movement redirected its focus toward an
independent, western-oriented Azerbaijani state.
After the Soviet Union
The collapse of the Soviet empire has led to a further
destabilization of the situation in the Caucasus. While the
center's historically repressive system attempted to deprive
the peripheral nations of their independence, the ethnic
conflicts that sprouted from the decline of the Soviet Union
have jeopardized the stability and future of these new
states.
In many ways, the demise of the USSR thrust
independence upon the republics. Many republic leaders,
including Mutalibov in Azerbaijan, were initially willing to
work within a new union framework. These governments
recognized their vulnerability and instability and saw
preservation of the union as means to prevent total chaos
within their borders. While a break-up of the Soviet union
became inevitable due to the growing demands of the periphery
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 96 and the fracturing of the center, the quickened pace at which
the empire fell after the failed August coup came fast for
many of the struggling regimes. The new governments faced
difficulties not only politically and economically, but with
their minorities as well.
Naaorno-Karabakh Conflict
Political-Military Developments. The fighting has
changed in its technology and severity since the collapse of
the Soviet Union. The conflict has grown from fist-to-fist
combat to guns, tanks, plane, and missile warfare. To
reiterate, thousands of people have died, and over a million
people have been displaced by the fighting since the conflict
began. Over time, the conflict has grown from a dispute
between the Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan to a
battle involving three parties: the Azerbaijanis, Armenians
and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. Time has made this last
party more determined than ever to obtain its complete
independence.
Fortified with weapons and equipment left behind by the
retreating Soviet army, the parties quickly stepped up the
fighting.33 jn February 1 9 9 2 , Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian
forces killed hundreds of Azerbaijanis living in the Nagorno-
Karabakh town of Khojaly. This incident led to the forced
resignation of President Ayaz Mutalibov, and the interim
33 william Ward Maggs, "Armenia and Azerbaijan: Looking toward the Middle East," Current History 92, no. 570 (January 1993): 7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97 president, Yagub Mamedov, declared presidential elections for
early June, 1992. In May, Mutalibov supporters brought him
back to power, but he was ousted one day later by the APF. On
June 7, Azerbaijan held its first post-Soviet presidential
election, which international monitors deemed fair and free.
Abulfez Elcibey won 57% of the vote.
Since 1992, both the Azerbaijani and the Nagorno-
Karabakh Armenian forces have held the upper hand militarily
at different times. In 1992, while Azerbaijan had control of
the upper half of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenian forces took control over the Lachin corridor, the
main road link between the disputed area and Armenia. This
link is vital, as it provides the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians
their best access to Armenia and the outside world. The
Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian forces also took control of the
predominantly Azerbaijani-populated town of Shusha, which was
a focus of ethnic fighting earlier in this century.
The most significant fighting, however, occurred
throughout 1993. The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian forces not
only secured control over most of the disputed Nagorno-
Karabakh region, but also occupied Azerbaijani territory
surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, thus creating a cordon
sanitaire around the enclave. Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian
advances in 1993 brought the total of displaced persons in
Azerbaijan near one million and left many Azerbaijani towns
destroyed. The battlefield successes were a boon to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 98 Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian arsenal as fleeing Azerbaijani
soldiers left behind military equipment.34
Although Elcibey was the first popularly-elected
president of the new independent state, the fate that befell
Mutalibov in 1992 also led to Elcibey's overthrow. The
occupation of the first of Azerbaijan's districts outside
Nagorno-Karabakh territory was a blow to the Elcibey
government. Like Mutalibov, Elcibey was criticized for his
failure to beat back the ethnic Armenian forces. In June
1993, a former local commander, Surat Huseynov, and his
troops, called for the reconvening of the prorogued Supreme
Soviet and the resignation of several key government
officials. Clashes between Huseynov's troops and government
forces in Ganje (in northwest Azerbaijan) resulted in the
Azerbaijani government's first defeat of the crisis at the
hands of the rebel Azerbaijanis. Huseynov, encouraged by his
victory in Ganje, led his troops to Baku, and with little
resistance from government forces, reached the outskirts of
the capital within weeks. Elcibey desperately called on
former Azerbaijani First Secretary and Politburo member
Heydar Aliyev to return from his self-imposed exile in
Nakhchyvan to help resolve the crisis. Aliyev was named
Parliamentary Speaker, and within days Elcibey fled the city.
As provided under the still-observed Soviet constitution,
34 Mark Uhlig, "The Karabakh War," World Policy Journal 10, no. 4 (Winter 1993/94): 49.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 99 Parliamentary Speaker Aliyev became Acting President. Aliyev
began to consolidate his power, and following negotiations
with Huseynov, named him Prime Minister. Aliyev's hold on
power was completed on October 3, 1993, when he was elected
president.
In December, 1993, the Azerbaijanis launched an
organized attack along the existing battle lines. The intense
fighting left hundreds dead but did not significantly change
the battle lines. Further Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian advances
in the spring forced approximately 50,000 Azerbaijanis to
flee their homes. In May, 1994, the parties— with the
assistance of the Russian government— agreed to a ceasefire.
At the end of the summer, the antagonists agreed among
themselves to extend the ceasefire indefinitely. The
ceasefire held throughout the rest of the year, and is the
longest-lasting ceasefire to date. This development
demonstrates the parties' weariness of fighting, but
continued posturing on both sides reflects no desire to seek
compromise and end the conflict.
The ceasefire did not keep the calm in Baku. In late
September, while President Aliyev was in New York for his
first meeting with President Clinton, two members of his
government were assassinated. Upon his return, Aliyev faced a
political crisis that threatened his leadership. The Deputy
Interior Minister, Rovshan Javadov, in response to the arrest
of some of his men in connection with the assassinations,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 used force to release them from jail. The confrontation
sparked a stand-off between Javadov's Interior Ministry
forces and regular government troops. While that situation
was resolved through negotiations between the President and
Javadov, Aliyev then revealed that the Prime Minister— the
same man behind Elcibey's overthrow in 1993— was preparing to
launch an attack against him. Prime Minister Huseynov denied
the accusation, but pre-empted any punitive government action
by fleeing the country. In a short time, Aliyev was able to
rid himself of one potential threat to his power, the prime
minister, and in the process, to purge the government of
others whose loyalty was suspect. In March, 1995, another
stand-off between the forces of Deputy Interior Minister
Javadov, who called for Aliyev's removal, and troops loyal to
the president resulted in the deaths of some 60 people,
including Javadov. Although Aliyev emerged victorious in both
crises, the constant upheavals in Azerbaijan since 1992 have
dealt a serious blow to the country's political stability.
These threats to the government had added to the leadership's
concerns, and has affected the decision-making process.
Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. The
Armenian government is led by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who was
democratically elected president in 1991. Ter-Petrosyan, a
former dissident under the Soviet system and leader of the
Karabakh secessionist movement, has tried to move his country
down a path of reform. Azerbaijan's embargoes on Armenia,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101 combined with Turkey's closed border and constant disruption
of aid shipments from Armenia's only other regular land link,
Georgia, have made progress difficult. Shortages of
electricity and water have created hardship in Armenia,
particularly through several bitterly cold winters. However,
the government, although not overwhelmingly popular, has
survived. Ter-Petrosyan's government has been challenged by
the Dashnak party, the leading political party during
Armenia's independence in the early 1900s, which takes a more
hardlined approach toward Turkey and the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Ter-Petrosyan's efforts to maintain some contact
with the Turkish Government has created tension with the
Armenian people, who continue to recall the tragic events of
1915. Armenia, harking to earlier times, has good relations
with Russia. Russian border guards patrol Armenia's frontier
with Turkey and Iran, and Russia has assisted Armenia in
restarting its nuclear power plant. Although Ter-Petrosyan
insists the ongoing conflict is between the Karabakh
Armenians and Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh's only channel for
aid and other imports is, by necessity, through Armenia. Thus
Armenia has been key to Nagorno-Karabakh's survival.
Although the solution to this conflict has been placed
on the shoulders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Nagorno-
Karabakh Armenians have emerged as a key player in the
negotiations for a resolution to the fighting. The only forum
which allows the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians a voice is the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Minsk process. The OSCE established the so-called "Minsk
Group" in the spring of 1992 to bring the warring parties
together, including the 'interested parties' of Nagorno-
Karabakh. 35 The inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians in
the OSCE peace process was necessary because resolution of
the conflict requires their participation. The conflicting
parties, along with several other countries (including
Turkey, Russia, and the U.S.) search for an end to the
f i g h t i n g . 36 Although there are close ties between Armenians
in Yerevan and Stepanakert, the leadership in Nagorno-
Karabakh has developed independent views on the process for
solving the dispute. Since finding a place in the OSCE
process, the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians have demanded
recognition as a party to the conflict, and are also seeking
recognition of their declaration of independence. The current
leader of Nagorno-Karabakh, Robert Kocharyan, who is close to
Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan, represents the resolve of
the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to strive for independence.
However, Ter-Petrosyan's failure to officially recognize the
35 The term "interested parties" applies to both the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations of Nagorno-Karabakh. In January, 1995, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
3 6 The other Minsk Group members are Italy, Belarus, Sweden, Germany, France, and Hungary. In 1995, Switzerland and Finland joined the Minsk Group.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 103 Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians' claim of independence— even
though Yerevan supports the Karabakh Armenians' struggle
against the Azerbaijani government— demonstrates that the
Armenian leadership remains flexible to options for resolving
the dispute. Nevertheless, the Armenian Government continues
to provide support to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. The
Armenian government has admitted to allocating part of its
budget to the Nagorno-Karabakh war e f f o r t . 37
Views on the Conflict. The Azerbaijani Government
insists that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of
"Armenian aggression," of fighting carried out by Armenian
regular troops on Azerbaijani territory. Armenia, on the
other hand, does not view itself as part of the conflict, but
sees this dispute as a human rights and self-determination
i s s u e . 38 However, independent sources have reported the
presence of regular Armenian forces in Azerbaijan.39 Their
presence does not fully justify Azerbaijan's claim that the
conflict is between the two states, as the Nagorno-Karabakh
37 william Ward Maggs cites an admission by the Armenian Government in June 92 that 40% of its budget goes to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, and states that "many think that figure is conservative." Maggs, 9.
38 "interviews: Ambassadors to the U.S. Discuss Conflict in the Caucasus" U.S-lran Review 1, no. 6 (September 1993): 4.
39 Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nacrorno- Karabakh (New York: Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1994), 64.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 104 Armenians have been fighting at the front line since the
beginning and have developed their own political leadership.
It is easy to see why the conflict has not been
resolved, as one side views this as a case of self-
determination, and the side views this as a question of
territorial integrity. Indeed, the Azerbaijani Government has
ignored the importance of the role of the Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenians, and has had little dialogue with the leadership in
Stepanakert. The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, on the other
hand, believe they can exist as an independent state. In
reality, Nagorno-Karabakh is dependent on Armenia for its
energy and food needs, and Armenia in turn is dependent on
outside parties, such as the U.S., in meeting its needs.
Another complication in resolving the conflict is the
importance of national pride. For the Azerbaijani and
Armenian leaders, willingness to compromise equals weakness
in the eyes of the opposition and the people.40 This pressure
has prevented serious progress in a peaceful resolution of
the conflict. There exists a lack of political will by either
side to end the dispute. Although the parties must have
realized by now the enormous economic and political costs of
continuing the battle for Nagorno-Karabakh, they appear
40 Paul A. Goble, "Coping with the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis" The Fletcher Forum 16, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 22.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 105 willing to negotiate only from a position of strength.41 Both
the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and the Azerbaijanis view this
conflict as a zero-sum game, where one side wins all and one
side loses all. This zero-sum attitude is pervasive in all
aspects of the Armenian-Azerbaijani relationship, as anything
that benefits one side (even if at the same time it helps the
other), is viewed as harmful by the other. This has become
part of the nationalist fervor that has made compromise
difficult to obtain.
Peace Efforts
Even with the ceasefire in place, the conflict appears
no closer to resolution and international efforts to stop it
have been largely ineffective. A ceasefire and deployment of
OSCE monitors were to be the precursors to the negotiations
in Minsk, which would determine the final status of Nagorno-
Karabakh. However, the increased hostilities over the last
several years have demonstrated the fragility of peace.
Toward the end of 1994, the OSCE explored the possibility of
a multinational peacekeeping force. At the December, 1994
Summit in Budapest, the OSCE member states declared their
"political will" to provide such a force.
This development closed a year of disagreement between
Russia and the rest of the Minsk Group over the peace
process. As former U.S. negotiator, Jack Maresca, stated,
41 John J. Maresca, "Agony of Indifference in Nagorno- Karabakh," The Christian Science Monitor. 27 June 1994, 19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 106
"Russia wished to reestablish its dominance in the region and
to exclude outsiders, particularly the U.S. and Turkey."42
Russia started unilateral peace efforts with the governments
to obtain a ceasefire and deployment of CIS troops. While
Armenia was ready to accept either a Russian force or a OSCE
peacekeeping force composed largely of Russians, Azerbaijan
rejected a Russia-only or dominated force on its territory
and sought to limit the number of Russia troops participating
in a multinational peacekeeping operation.42 At the December,
1994, OSCE Summit, Russia's separate efforts were combined
with those of the OSCE, and Russia was made co-chair of the
Minsk Group peace process.44
While there currently appears to be a unified
international approach to helping the parties resolve this
conflict, the parties are still not fully co-operative.
Indeed, international efforts have only highlighted the
inability of the parties to negotiate.
There are several obvious options for the parties:
stalemate, compromise or continue fighting. The 1994
ceasefire has shown the conflicting parties weariness to
42 Ibid., 19.
42 A.D. Horne, "Armenian Leader Argues for Russian Truce Force," Washington Post. 11 August 1994, 24. Azerbaijan is the only CIS member that does not have Russian troops or border guards stationed on its territory.
44 The other co-chair is a rotating position given to another member of the Minsk Group.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 107 fight. However, the ceasefire does not necessarily signal
that the parties are willing to sacrifice their national
desires for a compromise solution. Due to the deep and
historic distrust that exists, there is a strong possibility
that the fighting will continue. In addition, both sides
continue to seek justification for their hostile actions and
positions by trying to gain "international understanding" of
their plights. Indeed, one role each party has played is that
of victim. In the world of black and white, right and wrong,
it is the victim that is to be supported, and the aggressor
punished.
In reality, all are victims. The continuing embargo on
Armenia, which under the Soviet system was dependent on rail
and electricity lines from Azerbaijan, has had a devastating
effect on the Armenian people. Limited water and electricity
have slowed economic development and lowered the standard of
living. The need to keep Nagorno-Karabakh running has also
put a strain on Armenia's already limited resources. To
combat its energy shortages, the Armenian government has
taken steps to reopen its Soviet-built nuclear power plant,
which is located along a seismically active zone near the
Turkish-Armenian border.
For Azerbaijan, the conflict has uprooted one-seventh
of the population. Many of those are living in camps not far
from the front lines. Both countries have suffered, but both
have used their suffering to try to gain international
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 108 sympathy and thus, as the righteous nation, used that
sympathy to avoid compromising.
As mentioned previously, one of the major acquisitions
for the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians is the Lachin corridor,
which gives Nagorno-Karabakh direct access to Armenia. This
is a crucial area, as Azerbaijan's embargoes and the battle
lines had, until 1993, limited other land routes to Nagorno-
Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani
territory outside of the disputed area has also complicated
the negotiating process. While providing the Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenians a position of strength by which they can more-or-
less demand concessions, the Azerbaijani side is also making
demands before it makes any good will gestures, such as
lifting its embargo on Armenia. The Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenians have had little benefit from controlling the
situation on the ground. They continue to fear Azerbaijani
attacks and have won little international support for their
efforts to become an independent state. Azerbaijan has lost
approximately twenty percent of its territory (not including
Nagorno-Karabakh), and has been unable to regain control of
that lost land.
The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians continue to insist on
undefined "security guarantees" to protect them from
Azerbaijani aggression. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, fears
the presence of OSCE monitors or a peacekeeping force will
freeze Armenian gains unless accompanied by a comprehensive
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109 peace package that includes withdrawal of enemy forces from
occupied Azerbaijani territory, including contentious issues
like Shusha and Lachin. The parties will continue to hold up
the peace process, because they are incapable, or unwilling,
to compromise.
Summary
Soviet Moscow could not solve the dispute between
Armenians and Azerbaijanis but instead was blamed for taking
advantage of the hostile situation to maintain its control.45
The conflict weakened the ties between the center and
republics and the growing difference between Moscow and the
local capitals fed Armenian and Azerbaijani national
movements. Nationalism and the feeling of deprivation, as
well as the weakening of the center, were strong factors that
led to the break-up of the USSR. Nationalism in Azerbaijan
continues to develop, but as the government and people
struggle to build a stable state, so too do their minorities
--particularly the Armenians in Azerbaijan, but potentially
the Lezghis and Talysh as well. Nationalism, while growing
stronger, is still focused on the creation of the state. The
immediate threat to the new state is the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. This dispute has resulted in the loss of land— an
Alex Alexiev, states that "Although the conflict is over local issues, failure to resolve it has led both sides to blame Moscow, thus revealing the essentially anti-systemic nature of nationalism." Alex Alexiev, "The Last Empire: Nationalist Surge Could Undo Soviets," Los Angeles Times. 8 January 1989, Section 5, 1-2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 110 important element to a group of nationalists trying to
protect their history and their future. Paul Goble states
that, . . b y linking ethnicity to territory . . . all
ethnic conflicts (have transformed) into territorial o n e s . "46
This has been a pressing issue in the Armenian-
Azerbaijani relationship since their independence in the
early 1900s, and it is clear that 70 years of Soviet rule did
not diminish the importance this land holds for both
Armenians and Azerbaijanis. This piece of land signifies not
only an historical tie, but also "offers a means of asserting
control . . ."47 to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, control
over the enclave signifies power and self-preservation. As
Huttenbach states, Armenians have been victims of massacres,
which leads the population to believe they need land to
protect themselves from the outside. The Armenians believe
they, "cannot afford to lose another a c r e . "48 This is why the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is viewed by both Armenians in
Stepanakert and those in Armenia as a struggle for the
Armenian people as a whole, and they do not want to be driven
from any more land.
46 Goble, 22.
47 Parker, The Geopolitics of Domination. 4, citing D.R. Sack, Conceptions of Space in Social Thought (London: Macmillan, 1980),199.
48 Henry Huttenbach, remarks at symposium, Washington, D.C., June 1991, author's notes.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ill The parties believe they are in the right, and they are
holding out for a solution that reaffirms that belief. Any
compromise appears to be a blow to the interests of the
nation. However, both Armenia and Azerbaijan suffer from the
effects of the conflict, politically and economically. The
power of nationalism in the region is manifested in the way
the parties view each other and the conflict. There is no
room for two winners in the conflict, although the parties'
intransigence leads to the possibility of two losers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Features and Effects of Nationalism
Caucasus in Context. Azerbaijan is not the only state
engaged in national hostilities. Azerbaijan's situation can
be compared to other territorial disputes, such as (1) the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is rooted in historic and
religious ties to territory; (2) the India-Pakistan conflict
over Kashmir, which borders Pakistan but acceded to India;
(3) the ethnic bloodletting in Bosnia, in which the Bosnian
Serbs are supported by their ethnic brethren in neighboring
Serbia against the Bosnian Muslims; and (4) Cyprus, which has
been cut in half by warring Turks and Greeks.
These other conflicts reflect the kind of deadly and
protracted war Nagorno-Karabakh threatens to become. The
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is currently in a no war-no peace
situation. Although a lengthy ceasefire has been in place
since May 1994, there has been no real movement toward peace,
and without a final, peaceful settlement, this conflict will
likely drag on for years and result in more deaths. The lack
of progress in resolving the conflict has led to frustration
among the antagonists and has eroded their faith in the
negotiation process. If Azerbaijan cannot regain its occupied 112
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 113 territory through peace, it may resort to force. The ethnic
Armenian forces, although occupying high ground along the
battle line, could likewise become restless enough to attempt
another strike against the Azerbaijani forces. Each see
military might as a way to force a solution upon the other.
Since both see this as a win-lose conflict, each is
determined not to be the loser.
As empires have collapsed, ethnic confrontation has
erupted in many instances. In the cases above— the end of the
British mandate over Palestine, end of British rule in India
1947 and decades later in Cyprus, and the collapse of the
Soviet Empire— each paved the way for ethnic tensions to
spring to the surface. Although some potentially explosive
confrontations have been held in check, particularly in
Kazakhstan, where there are large numbers of Russians, the
pattern that has developed in many parts of the world is
disturbing, signalling the lengthy and damaging results of
national conflicts. These conflicts are not always contained
among a few, specific national groups, but encompass
neighbors and create security and stability problems for the
international community.
Observations. Several generalizations can be made about
modern nationalism based on its history elsewhere but
specifically in the Caucasus and especially in Azerbaijan.
The first is that national passions cannot be eradicated
through force or time. From Tsarist Russia to the Soviet
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11 Union, nationalist sentiments survived, it is a way for the
various ethnic peoples to preserve their culture. As the
Soviet Empire crumbled, Azerbaijani nationalism picked up
where it left off at the time of its incorporation into the
Soviet Union in 1920. Having reawakened Azerbaijani
nationalist fervour during the late 1980s, Azerbaijan's
national movement fought for the interests of an Azerbaijani
state, and now that state seeks to repel any perceived
attacks to its sovereignty. The history of subjugation to
other national groups has left Azerbaijan determined not to
fall prey to outside rule again.
Second, there is a "domino effect" resulting from
nationalism in the Caucasus. Like a contagious disease,
nationalism spread during the collapse of the Soviet Union.
As Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia came to grips with their
long-standing nationalist feelings, nationalist sentiments
arose among other groups such as the Ossetians, Abkhazians,
and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Years under Soviet rule,
along with internal boundaries drawn by Moscow, contributed
to the ethnic confrontation.
A third observation is that history can indeed repeat
itself, especially where territory and ethnicity are
involved. Anyone reading a book on the history of the
Caucasus will undoubtedly find many similarities between
today's events and those of the 1917-1920 period, especially
with regard to the seeming inability of the three main
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 115 Caucasus national groups to co-operate and the role of
regional powers. Competing historical claims on Karabakh were
made in the early 1900s and are now being repeated more than
seventy years later. In addition, the turn-of-the-century
ties have been renewed. Armenia has closer links with Russia
(and no diplomatic relations with its historic enemy,
Turkey), while Turkey has been a staunch supporter of
Azerbaijan. The Armenian-Turkish and Azerbaijani-Russian
suspicions and hatreds of the past haunt present relations
and fuel discord between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Fourth, nationalism, or ultra-nationalism, can undermine
national interests. Expending nationalist sentiment on
warfare has taken energy and resources away from state-
building. Azerbaijan is still working with many of the same
laws, as well as the same constitution, passed under the
Soviet system. Efforts at political reform have been stymied
and the conflict has been a source of confrontation among
opposing political forces.
Paradox of Nationalism. In the cases mentioned earlier,
as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, ethnic
confrontation centers on a piece of land. Territory is for
national groups a means of identification and a basis for the
nationalist drive to statehood. Robert Ardrey, in his review
of animals and man's identification with land, states that in
both animal and man is "an innate compulsion to defend one's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 116 property . . . "1 Ardrey states that territory is one of the
few ways in which the three factors that motivate behavior—
identity, stimulation, and security— are satisfied.2
Territorial needs, coupled with extreme nationalism, may lead
to conflict and expenditure of resources, which threaten the
viability of the state.
Thus, ultra-nationalism can create an effect
opposite to its desired aim. As nations recapture and
assert their identity, there is no room for acceptance of
other national groups. Victor Gollancz describes this
"egoism" as follows:
Of all the evils I hate I think I hate nationalism most. Nationalism— national egoism, thinking in terms of one's nation rather than in terms of humanity — nationalism is evil because it concentrates on comparative inessentials . . . and ignores the essential, which is simply that he is man . . . It makes one set of people hate another set that they haven't the smallest real occasion for hating; it leads to jealousy, expansionism, oppression, strife and eventually war.3
Years of suppression under tsarist and Soviet rule left
national sentiments boiling just under the surface in the
republics— under-developed and under-expressed. Upon breaking
the surface, nationalism can become a negative factor in the
development of a nation into a state.
1 Robert Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative (New York: Atheneum, 1966), 249.
2 Ibid., 333.
3 Ibid., 18, quoting Victor Gollancz, Mv Dear Timothy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), 292.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11 There are several ways in which nationalism undermines
national interest. One paradox is that nationalism, which
aims for statehood, endangers that goal by over-emphasizing
past claims to a particular territory. Armenians and
Azerbaijanis sift through their individual histories to
justify their claims. The centuries of commingling of
Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and their ancestors in the Karabakh
region makes these claims difficult to prove. By focusing on
the past, ultra-nationalists refuse to consider the present
day residents of that particular territory. Thus, the past
becomes more important than the present or the future,
particularly with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, which holds
less economic than historic value. The overall interests of
the state are held hostage as Azerbaijan directs its efforts
to one particular region. Retention of this land— at any
cost— has been given priority in the government's policies.
A second paradox is the focus on the importance of land
by nationalist groups, which draws them into conflict.
Azerbaijan has a second chance at statehood, but these
territorial claims have renewed Armenian-Azerbaijan
hostilities. Fledgling states caught up in conflict do not
place themselves in a positive environment for development,
nor cooperation with their neighbors.
Nationalist ties to land can also make it difficult to
compromise in territorial disputes. Both Azerbaijanis and
Armenians claim a right to this land and reject each other's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 118 counterclaims. As territory is viewed in terms of power and
security, there is little incentive for ultra-nationalists to
compromise. Even a smaller area, such as the town of Shusha,
is a source of dispute— both during the 1918-1920 period and
today. The conflicting parties have further muddled prospects
for compromise by trying to partition an already confined
space.
Nationalism can also undermine the interests of a nation
by the xenophobia that it creates. Mutual suspicions of
Azerbaijanis and Armenians fuel extreme nationalism and
conflict. Cooperation between the enemy and a third party is
viewed as a threat, as in the Azerbaijani-Turkish
relationship or Armenian-Russian cooperation. The deep
mistrust has led the groups to expect the worst of each other
and question the motives of regional players. The tenuous
ceasefire is at risk of breaking down due to fears by the
antagonists that the enemy will violate the ceasefire. These
fears have influenced the offensives launched on both sides—
specifically of the ethnic Armenian offensives in 1993— in an
effort to pre-empt an attack by the adversary.
Nationalist confrontation diverts resources from the
state to the conflict. The resources of the state, including
people, have been spent on waging war. The economies of
Azerbaijan and Armenia are still going through a transition
from a command to open market economy, and chances for
success are hindered by the costs of waging a war. Success
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 119 will be slow as money, material and manpower are spent on
fighting. The lack of political stability in Baku and the
"free fall" of the Azerbaijani economy have been in large
part due to the attention the government gives to the
historical significance of the Nagorno-Karabakh territory
over greater needs of the Azerbaijani state and people. Seven
years of fighting has eroded the morale of the populations of
Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have suffered from the lack of
economic reform and infrastructural development. Nationalism
in independent Azerbaijan has not brought prosperity, only
grief.
Another example of the paradox of nationalism is the
difficulty of third party mediation because a country or
international organization may be seen--or used--as a
demonstration of support for one side or the other. Extreme
nationalism in the Caucasus leaderships can lead to doubts
over whether the international community understands their
positions and can influence a positive outcome— all in their
favor. The Armenians and Azerbaijanis have set extreme
conditions for peace. The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians seek
undefined "international guarantees" of their security to
prevent any future attack from Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijan
seeks to have Armenia named the "aggressor" by the
international community. Both sides fail to realize the
limits of international intervention and thus do not better
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 120 utilize the assistance that the world community is able to
provide.
Ultra-nationalist conflicts can lead to a desire for
revenge. Thousands have died in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict— there are few that have not suffered the loss of a
family member or friend— and many grieving families blame
their enemy. Indeed, there have been tit-for-tat attacks
--hostaging-taking for purposes of trading them for return of
loved ones, and counter-offensives launched on the
battlefield. Almost one million Azerbaijanis have been
displaced by the conflict, and many are still living in
temporary shelters two years after the last major fighting
sent them fleeing from their homes. These displaced are
angry, not only at the government in Baku for failing to
retake Azerbaijani land, but at Armenians for creating their
dismal situation.
Ultra-nationalism can undermine national interests
through the creation of a dependent, non-viable entity. As
Turkish Cyprus is dependent upon Turkey for support, so the
Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians rely on Armenia in meeting their
energy and other needs. Nationalism in Nagorno-Karabakh led
to the struggle for independence, but it is difficult to
imagine that full independence can succeed in Nagorno-
Karabakh if it cannot be more self-reliant. This can be
frustrating to the Armenian separatists, who are caught in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 121 the struggle for statehood but unable to meet this
aspiration.
Finally, nationalism can impede ethnic tolerance. The
hostile view of other national groups blocks acceptance not
only of enemies in dispute, but could spread to other
national groups in the region, e.g., potential enemies. The
longer the conflict goes on, the deeper the hatred, and, as
hatred is passed on from generation to generation, any chance
of a peaceful coexistence will be out of reach.
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are struggling with
their pasts and for their futures. The hostilities that were
never resolved when the Red Army marched into the Caucasus in
the 1920s remain. Azerbaijan's resurgent nationalism fed the
nationalist sentiment of the Karabakh Armenians, yet
Azerbaijan will not recognize the Karabakh Armenians' desire
to be a state— a desire shared by Azerbaijani nationalists at
the end of the Soviet era. The freedoms that nationalist
movements in Azerbaijan and the other new independent states
fought to obtain are now being sought by the ethnic
minorities in several of these countries— such as the Abkhaz
in Georgia and the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. And with
the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians' role in the conflict comes
the complicated debate over the competing principles of self-
determination and territorial integrity. Which principle is
supreme, the inviolability of a state's borders or the right
of a people to control their own future? Unfortunately, there
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122 is no easy compromise, as Azerbaijan refuses to give up any
territory and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians refuse to
surrender their dreams of independence.
The persistence of integral nationalism may well lead to
the continuation and spread of ethnic conflicts. Chechens in
Russia and Abkhaz in Georgia are other examples of exclusive
nationalism in action. In these cases in the new independent
states, the international community has supported territorial
integrity, based on existing borders, over self-
determination. Such support for the inviolability of a
state's borders is demonstrated in the four United Nations
Security Council resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, passed in 1993, and the many OSCE documents adopted
on this matter. However, no mention of the right to self-
determination is made in these documents. This is not good
news for the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. It indicates that
unless there is some drastic change that sways the views of
the international community, support for Karabakh
independence is not going to be forthcoming. Part of the
reason why border or territorial integrity is favored is the
concern of the world community over the further break-up of
states, leading to greater world instability. Chances for
Karabakh to survive as an autonomous enclave are slim. Its
dependence upon Armenia is one strike against it. British-
ruled Hong Kong in the People's republic of China is an
example of the limited life of enclaves. Democratic West
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 123 Berlin within Communist East Germany also did not last and
was always an explosive arrangement due to the ideological
differences of the two parties.
Future Developments
Outcomes of the Conflict. It is obvious that the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will continue to threaten the
greater national interests of Azerbaijan and Armenia. There
are many directions the conflict can take. One outcome is no
solution— to allow the conflict to drift into a stagnant,
unresolved dispute--as happened in Cyprus and, until
recently, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This leaves open
the possibility of further fighting, or could lead to a de
facto independence or annexation of Karabakh to Armenia. The
parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have a tenuous
ceasefire in place and, if international peacekeeping forces
or monitors are sent to the region, they can help ensure the
containment of the hostilities until such time as a final
settlement can be negotiated. This could takes years, if not
decades. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an example of
the lengthy route a peace process can take, but one being
reached with the help of international organizations like the
UN.
Another "solution" is one in which one side wins and the
other loses. Such a zero-sum end would result from severe
military losses. The potential of outside assistance and the
stubbornness of the national groups involved suggests that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 124 this outcome would likely extend the conflict's duration.
There will be less chance of securing a final peace, since
revenge may become the goal of the losing side. It also opens
the door for the direct involvement of other regional
players— Russia, Turkey, Iran— either as peace mediators,
peace enforcers, or military allies. Such a drawn-out
conflict will have devastating effects on the futures of
these states.
Another possibility is a negotiated settlement that
meets the parties' minimal needs, which they are willing to
accept for the sake of regional peace. No doubt this will
require compromise and many incremental steps— confidence-
building measures for instance— to dispel the mistrust and
solidify a peace. This would be the most stable outcome,
giving Azerbaijan and Armenia opportunity to shift focus to
state needs. By coming to terms through compromise, both
sides, it is hoped, will have accepted the need to give up
something for the broader goal of peace and national
development. The years of mistrust will need to be addressed
through confidence-building measures, such as the release of
detainees and prisoners of war (as has occurred recently),
direct talks without mediation, and lifting of economic
embargoes.
Status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Whichever route the conflict
takes, the major issue involved is the ultimate status of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Returning Nagorno-Karabakh to the level of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 125 autonomy it had in Soviet Azerbaijan would not be acceptable
to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who have fought long and
hard for their independence from Baku and have become
dependent on Armenia. An independent Nagorno-Karabakh island
in Azerbaijan would likewise be difficult to sustain due to
Nagorno-Karabakh's dependence upon Armenia for its existence.
This arrangement would also put the Karabakh Armenians in the
same vulnerable position they faced when the fighting began
in 1988, i.e. surrounded by Azerbaijan proper.
Although, no longer openly discussed by the Armenian
government or Nagorno-Karabakh leadership, annexation of
Nagorno-Karabakh is still an option. However, the separation
of these ethnic brethren has led to independent thinking.
While economically, it makes more sense for the two to be
united, the political leadership in Stepanakert may find it
difficult to subordinate itself to another government. Since
1991, the Armenian government appears to have relinquished
the idea of annexation in favor of some level of autonomy for
Nagorno-Karabakh.^
Allowing Nagorno-Karabakh to keep the Azerbaijani
territory it occupies outside the disputed enclave will be
impossible for the Azerbaijani government to accept due to
the almost one million displaced persons still living in
4 David Remnick, "Azerbaijanis Cast Ballots for President," Washington Post. 9 September 1991, A, 19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 126 temporary shelters and the strategic military power this
territorial control gives the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.
Land or population swaps would segregate the two ethnic
groups, and could be suggested as an option for a peace
settlement. The Israelis and Palestinians are going through a
land-for-peace process. Indeed, in 1992 (before the ethnic
Armenians' land grab), Paul Goble suggested that a possible
solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would be to give
part of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia in exchange for Armenian-
controlled Zangezur, which separates Nakhchyvan from
Azerbaijan proper. Another option would be to swap the
populations of Nakhchyvan and Nagorno-Karabakh, along the
lines of the swaps in Bulgaria and Turkey that took place
after World War II. Both scenarios would be unacceptable to
the Armenians and Azerbaijanis. It is the ethnic ties to land
that has helped create the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,
and these "solutions" ignore the deep-seated, nationalist
feelings Armenians and Azerbaijanis have, not only for
Nagorno-Karabakh, but for the historic lands of Nakhchyvan
and Zangezur.
A compromise solution would give Nagorno-Karabakh a
certain level of autonomy that would be greater than under
the USSR but less than full independence. It would remain
part of Azerbaijan, but the land would de facto be ruled by
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Occupied territory would need
to be internationally monitored and certain areas, such as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 127 the land between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, may need to be
free of either Armenian or Azerbaijani inhabitants. In
exchange for the land corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-
Karabakh, Azerbaijan would receive a corridor to Nakhchyvan
through Zangezur. Such an arrangement for settling the
dispute will not be permanent unless both sides fully accept
it. Undoubtedly, the Karabakh Armenians would view this as a
stepping stone to full independence— an idea that Azerbaijan
is years away from accepting, if ever.
International Organizations. A key factor in
containing, if not resolving, the conflict will be the
involvement of the international community. In the past, the
UN has provided peacekeeping forces in conflicted regions and
the OSCE is currently seeking to do the same in Nagorno-
Karabakh. While not a guarantor of peace, the involvement of
the world community could possibly ease the situation and
facilitate a peaceful, negotiated solution. However, the
world community must become involved early in a negotiating
process, lest the situation become intractable, as in Bosnia.
Although not fool-proof, international organizations can use
their past experiences to apply to new situations that arise.
In addition, the international community's focus may put some
pressure on the hostile parties to resolve the conflict,
although the actual peace must be sincere and initiated by
the conflicting parties themselves— if peace is to have any
chance of lasting.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 128 International organizations can also help respond to
security needs of these small states. At the present time,
security is sought in the amount of territory that is
controlled by a particularly national group. The distance
between hostile groups is also key to this sense of security
as it provides a buffer for protection. Azerbaijan and
Armenia, like Russia, appear to "think of security in terms
of space . . . (instead of) institutional terms . . ."5 while
the UN and the OSCE have offered to help Armenia and
Azerbaijan make the transition to a more institutional view
of security, these states have been slow to grasp the long
term stability this type of security can provide them. The
history of subjugation and ever-changing borders under
various rulers— who valued territorial conquest partly as a
form of protection--has shaped the Azerbaijanis' and
Armenians' perceptions of security. The continual interaction
with the UN and OSCE— and even North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) through Partnership for Peace (which all
three Caucasus states have joined)— will help smaller states
view security in a wider European (and international)
context.
Political and Economic Development. A peaceful end to
the conflict and economic development could help Azerbaijan's
leaders find the political and economic stability they so
5 John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States. 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 176.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 129 desperately need. The international community can work with
Armenia and Azerbaijan in many areas to promote stability. UN
representatives stationed in the Caucasus capitals and
government representatives at the UN in New York, will help
facilitate discussions of possible measures toward conflict
resolution and educate these countries on other international
peacekeeping efforts. The Caucasus states should recognize
the conflict in Bosnia as an example of the complications
which international organizations— in this case the UN and
NATO— face in dealing with ethnic conflicts. The Bosnia case
sends a signal regarding the world community's limitations—
its inability to force a solution on national groups bent on
fighting--and of the responsibility of the ethnic groups in
defusing these situations. From a review of the Bosnian
conflict, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaderships could consider
how quickly a conflict can spread and realize the threat it
poses. It is such a realization that, one hopes, has led the
parties to involve the world community to help keep the
conflict from spreading and bring them to the peace table.
Instead of seeking military assistance from other
countries, the parties can garner political support, which
will help in the diplomatic process. Azerbaijan has developed
some cooperation with the non-aligned countries in the UN,
which will give the country a greater voice on issues of
national interest. If the conflicting parties can permanently
move the conflict from a military level to a political level,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 130 i.e., maintain the current truce, it will help contain the
conflict and provide an environment for progress.
Interaction with democratic states and OSCE could
promote ethnic tolerance as well as democratic reform.
Together, these principles will increase the chances of
ethnic understanding and peaceful coexistence. The embracing
of these principles could also help ease the political
tension in Baku by allowing the people to form their
government through democratic and peaceful means.
Azerbaijan's parliamentary elections are scheduled this fall
and will be a barometer by which democratic states, such as
the U.S., will judge Azerbaijan's commitment to democratic
principles. Both the UN and OSCE have been invited to help in
the electoral process and observe the elections. This level
of attention will help the government focus on steps it needs
to take to integrate fully with western democracies. While
the elections are not likely not to be fully free and fair,
without international pressure and attention the government
may find little incentive to abide by the international norms
and principles to which it has committed itself.
One of Azerbaijan's greatest national interests is its
oil, which it plans to export to Europe. The economic
benefits of oil exports could play a major role in the
country's stability. Already, Azerbaijan has seen growing
interest of western companies in its oil development,
specifically in the $8 billion deal it signed with several
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 131 foreign oil companies to develop its offshore oil fields in
the Caspian Sea. This investment will bring other industries
to Azerbaijan— as observed in the recent opening of the first
western-styled hotel and several western restaurants in Baku.
Azerbaijan has also received loans from international
financial institutions (IFIs), such as the International
Monetary Fund, aimed at helping Azerbaijan's economic
development. Presumably, the IFIs can not only help
Azerbaijan take necessary steps in privatization, but teach
the government fiscal responsibility.
With peace comes the prospect for other economic
benefits to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. A pipeline running
from Azerbaijan to Armenia to Turkey could strengthen
regional cooperation, further cementing peace. However,
economic and political development will need to move forward
together. Progress in one area alone will not be enough for
Azerbaijan's growth and stability. The international
community has helped get the process started and continued
involvement will be a useful tool to assure progress for
Azerbaijan.
If Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia allow ultra
nationalism to interfere with their true national interests,
they will leave— and in fact do leave— themselves vulnerable
to outside influences, much as in the early 1900s.
Nationalism's perceived role in this region— to serve as a
shield against other national groups— arises out of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 132 geopolitical realities. The Caucasus countries are smaller
and weaker than Russia, Turkey and Iran, and their powerful
neighbors have in the past taken advantage of the Caucasus
peoples. But nationalism will not keep outside interests at
bay. The cooperative efforts of Armenia, Georgia and
Azerbaijan in the pursuit of their collective interests will
serve them better than their current, individualistic drive.
The Caucasus countries could learn much about collective
security from the Baltic states, which are small and diverse
themselves, but stand united against pressures from their
powerful neighbor, Russia. The progress of peace will improve
the chances of cooperation and strengthen the countries
politically and economically. This would in turn strengthen
opportunities for greater cooperation among the Caucasus
neighbors, such as between Armenia and Turkey, thus promoting
stability in the region. While a common market approach is
years away— each state is still exploring its new-found
sovereignty— there may be some areas, such as transportation
and energy development, in which all three states could
cooperate.
***
The man who opened the pandora's box, Mikhail Gorbachev,
was right when he warned of increased ethnic conflict in the
republics should central rule be abolished. Governments
unable to resolve conflicts can be quickly replaced by new
governments. Thus, Azerbaijani nationalism is perhaps the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 133 greatest threat to Azerbaijan's sovereignty. While these
countries need time to grow into stable nations, their future
prospects look dim unless they start taking the necessary
steps. Azerbaijan does not have time to wait for a better
deal; the longer the strife goes on, the less Azerbaijan may
obtain in a settlement and the more it stands to lose as a
state. Azerbaijan needs to evaluate the importance of a
costly conflict over a historic region with the future
prospects of a prosperous, stable state.
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