DOCSLIB.ORG

The Red Army and Mass Mobilization During the Russian Civil War 1918-1920 Author(S): Orlando Figes Source: Past & Present, No

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Red Army and Mass Mobilization During the Russian Civil War 1918-1920 Author(S): Orlando Figes Source: Past & Present, No The Past and Present Society The Red Army and Mass Mobilization during the Russian Civil War 1918-1920 Author(s): Orlando Figes Source: Past & Present, No. 129 (Nov., 1990), pp. 168-211 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/650938 . Accessed: 15/11/2013 18:56 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Oxford University Press and The Past and Present Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Past &Present. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 18:56:45 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION DURING THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR 1918-1920 The Red Armybegan life in 1918 as a smallvolunteer force of proletariansfrom the major urban citadels of Bolshevikpower in northernand centralRussia. By theend of the civil war against the Whitesand the various armies of foreign intervention, in the autumn of 1920,it had growninto a massconscript army of fivemillion soldiers,75 percent of them peasants1 by birth - a figureroughly proportionateto the size ofthe peasant population in Russia.2 For theBolsheviks, this represented a tremendous social change. In October1917 their support had beenconfined to theworking- classdistricts of thebig industrialcities, the Baltic Fleet, and the (soonto be demobilized) garrisons and armies of northern and western Russia.Without support in thecountryside, where the vast majority ofthe population lived, no onehad expected the Bolsheviks to hold on to powerfor more than a fewweeks. The peasants,it was widely assumed,would rise up againstthem, joining the various armies of counter-revolution.Yet,contrary toexpectations, the Red Army won thecivil war, and it did so preciselybecause of its superior success, comparedwith the Whites, in mobilizingmillions of peasantsfor militaryservice. "In thissocial fact", concluded Trotsky, was "rooted thefinal cause of our victories".3 The massconscription of thepeasantry gave rise to a numberof majordebates within the Bolshevik party. Most Bolsheviks viewed thepeasantry as an alienforce, hostile to thesocialist revolution I "Peasants"are definedhere (and throughout)as householdmembers of small- scalefamily farms. 2 N. Gorlov,"O sotsial'noistrukture krasnoi armii" [On theSocial Structure ofthe Red Army],Politrabotnika (1922), no. 2, p. 55. The 1920census of the Red Army and Navygave the slightly higher figure of 77 percent: see V. Efremov,"Profes- sional'nyisostav krasnoi armii i flotapo perepisi1920 g." [TheProfessional Compo- sitionof the Red Armyand Fleet According to the Census of 1920], Biulleten' TsSU (1922),no. 66, p. 2. Accordingto the Red Army census, only 66 percent of soldiers registeredfarming as theirmain occupation: Biulleten' TsSU (1922),no. 59, p. 41. Peasantscounting domestic industry astheir main occupation represented a significant componentof theRed Army.Military service was also a popularmeans of social mobilityfrom the peasantry to othersocial groups, especially the bureaucracy. 3 L. Trotsky,How theRevolution Armed, trans. B. Pearce,in TheMilitary Writings and Speechesof Leon Trotsky,5 vols. (London, 1979), i, p. 15. This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 18:56:45 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION 1918-1920 169 becauseof its "petty-bourgeois" nature (its social inclination towards small-scaleproperty rights and marketrelations). The Bolshevik partyhad alwayssupported the ideal of a "class" army- one dominatedby theproletariat, as opposedto an armybased upon universalmilitary service.4 Although the rapid escalation of the civil warin thesummer of 1918had forcedthe Bolsheviks to adoptthe latterprinciple, many in theparty continued to expresstheir belief thata smallbut "pure" proletarianarmy, like the Red Guardsor factorymilitia of 1917, would prove more reliable and effective than a massconscript army infiltrated and weakenedby non-proletarian elements.This was one of the centralarguments of the Military Oppositionin theBolshevik party to Trotsky's policy of constructing a regularconscript army commanded by "bourgeois" military special- istsunder the political supervision of Bolshevikcommissars.5 The need to preservethe hegemony of theindustrial worker over the peasantwas also an importantconsideration for those (including Trotskyhimself) who stressed the desirability ofmoving - as soon as themilitary situation permitted - awayfrom the mass conscript armytowards a militiasystem.6 Theseissues went far beyond the question of military organization. Theprinciples upon which the Red Army was built served as a model forthe rest of the Soviet system. The centralizationofthe Bolshevik stateapparatus ran parallel to similarchanges in theRed Army's politicaland commandstructure. Trotsky compared the transition fromworkers' control to one-manmanagement in industrywith the transferof military authority in theRed Armyfrom elected officers tomilitary specialists, appointed by the Revolutionary Military Coun- cil of theRepublic (RVSR).7 The experienceof mass mobilization gainedby the Bolsheviksthrough the Red Armyfundamentally shapedtheir governmental attitudes not only during the period of WarCommunism (1918-21), when the whole of Sovietsociety was militarized,but also duringthe Stalinist period. Even the language of theBolsheviks - withits continual references to "campaigns", "combats","fronts" and "brigades"- had militaryovertones. The problemsof militaryorganization associated with the mass 4 Ibid.,i, pp. 134,420-1, iii, pp. 4, 8,passim. 5 F. Benvenuti,The Bolsheviks and theRed Army,1918-1922 (Cambridge, 1988), p. 66. 6 J. Erickson,"Some Military and Political Aspects of the 'Militia Army' Contro- versy,1919-1920", in C. Abramskyand B. Williams(eds.), Essaysin Honourof E. H. Carr(London, 1974), p. 217. 7 Trotsky,How theRevolution Armed, ii, p. 105. This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 18:56:45 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 170 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 129 conscriptionofthe peasantry had particular relevance to these broader issuesof government. The difficultiesofregistering the rural popu- lationeligible for military service and of enforcingthe Red Army conscriptionsin thecountryside pointed towards the general prob- lemsof administration which the Bolsheviks were bound to confront outsidetheir strongholds in themajor industrial cities. The tasksof trainingand discipliningthe unruly peasant recruits served as an importantlesson in themethods of rule for those (mostly Bolshevik and working-class)officers who were to enterthe provincial organs ofSoviet government intheir thousands after the end of the civil war. The contemptand hatred felt by many of the proletarian officers for thepeasantry was expressed in suchbrutal punishments (sanctioned bythe disciplinary code of the Red Army)as hittingsoldiers in the teethwith the butt of a rifle.Beneath this naked violence lay a deeper politicalstruggle, as D. D. F. Whiteput it, "between the anarchistic, anti-centralisttendencies of the village and the centralist, dictatorial trendsof the Communist party. It wasnot merely a conflictbetween groupswith different economic and political interests. It wasa deep- rootedantagonism between two ways of living, two different cultural practicesand concepts".8 Isaac Babelsymbolized this conflict in hisbrilliant story, Konnaia armiia(Red Cavalry),in theepisode when one of Budenny's61ite cavalrybrigades charges on a groupof their own peasant infantrymen, thrashingthem with whips to asserttheir superiority over them. Of all theproblems of militaryorganization associated with the massconscription of the peasantry, none was as serious,or had as manyconsequences for the civilian sector, as thedifficulties ofmilitary supply.The decisionto maintain a Red Army of five million soldiers, ratherthan one or twomillion, necessitated the militarization ofthe Sovieteconomy (War Communism) tosupply it with food, uniforms, boots,weapons, transport and medicalservices. But the Red Army grewmuch faster than the productivecapacity of the economy. Materialshortages in thearmy increased. Living conditions deterio- rated.Diseases spread. Discipline broke down. And desertion accel- eratedout of control,so that hastilymobilized - and often untrained- reinforcementshad increasinglytobe sentto the front- lineunits, although these were precisely those most likely to desert. The problemwas made more acute by the fact that the army became dependenton peasantrecruits, whose technical incompetence and 8 D. D. F. White, The Growthof theRed Army(Princeton, 1944), p. 121. This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 18:56:45 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION 1918-1920 171 naturalhoming instincts during the agricultural season made them harderto train and discipline than skilled industrial workers.' It was thisconsideration that had largelydetermined the decision of the Bolsheviksto go fora
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Utopian Visions of Family Life in the Stalin-Era Soviet Union
    Central European History 44 (2011), 63–91. © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association, 2011 doi:10.1017/S0008938910001184 Utopian Visions of Family Life in the Stalin-Era Soviet Union Lauren Kaminsky OVIET socialism shared with its utopian socialist predecessors a critique of the conventional family and its household economy.1 Marx and Engels asserted Sthat women’s emancipation would follow the abolition of private property, allowing the family to be a union of individuals within which relations between the sexes would be “a purely private affair.”2 Building on this legacy, Lenin imag- ined a future when unpaid housework and child care would be replaced by com- munal dining rooms, nurseries, kindergartens, and other industries. The issue was so central to the revolutionary program that the Bolsheviks published decrees establishing civil marriage and divorce soon after the October Revolution, in December 1917. These first steps were intended to replace Russia’s family laws with a new legal framework that would encourage more egalitarian sexual and social relations. A complete Code on Marriage, the Family, and Guardianship was ratified by the Central Executive Committee a year later, in October 1918.3 The code established a radical new doctrine based on individual rights and gender equality, but it also preserved marriage registration, alimony, child support, and other transitional provisions thought to be unnecessary after the triumph of socialism. Soviet debates about the relative merits of unfettered sexu- ality and the protection of women and children thus resonated with long-standing tensions in the history of socialism. I would like to thank Atina Grossmann, Carola Sachse, and Mary Nolan, as well as the anonymous reader for Central European History, for their comments and suggestions.
    [Show full text]
  • The Purpose of the First World War War Aims and Military Strategies Schriften Des Historischen Kollegs
    The Purpose of the First World War War Aims and Military Strategies Schriften des Historischen Kollegs Herausgegeben von Andreas Wirsching Kolloquien 91 The Purpose of the First World War War Aims and Military Strategies Herausgegeben von Holger Afflerbach An electronic version of this book is freely available, thanks to the support of libra- ries working with Knowledge Unlatched. KU is a collaborative initiative designed to make high quality books Open Access. More information about the initiative can be found at www.knowledgeunlatched.org Schriften des Historischen Kollegs herausgegeben von Andreas Wirsching in Verbindung mit Georg Brun, Peter Funke, Karl-Heinz Hoffmann, Martin Jehne, Susanne Lepsius, Helmut Neuhaus, Frank Rexroth, Martin Schulze Wessel, Willibald Steinmetz und Gerrit Walther Das Historische Kolleg fördert im Bereich der historisch orientierten Wissenschaften Gelehrte, die sich durch herausragende Leistungen in Forschung und Lehre ausgewiesen haben. Es vergibt zu diesem Zweck jährlich bis zu drei Forschungsstipendien und zwei Förderstipendien sowie alle drei Jahre den „Preis des Historischen Kollegs“. Die Forschungsstipendien, deren Verleihung zugleich eine Auszeichnung für die bisherigen Leis- tungen darstellt, sollen den berufenen Wissenschaftlern während eines Kollegjahres die Möglich- keit bieten, frei von anderen Verpflichtungen eine größere Arbeit abzuschließen. Professor Dr. Hol- ger Afflerbach (Leeds/UK) war – zusammen mit Professor Dr. Paul Nolte (Berlin), Dr. Martina Steber (London/UK) und Juniorprofessor Simon Wendt (Frankfurt am Main) – Stipendiat des Historischen Kollegs im Kollegjahr 2012/2013. Den Obliegenheiten der Stipendiaten gemäß hat Holger Afflerbach aus seinem Arbeitsbereich ein Kolloquium zum Thema „Der Sinn des Krieges. Politische Ziele und militärische Instrumente der kriegführenden Parteien von 1914–1918“ vom 21.
    [Show full text]
  • Dissidents Versus Communists
    DISSIDENTS VERSUS COMMUNISTS An Examination of the Soviet Dissidence Movement Matthew Williams Professor Transchel History 419 May 12, 2016 Williams 1 On February 25, 1956, Nikita Khrushchev gave a speech to the Twentieth Congress and to the Communist Party stating that Joseph Stalin was responsible for all of the empire’s then-current issues. He also gave insight into the criminal actions performed by the man during his lifetime. This speech was called the “Secret Speech” as it was not publicized at first, but once word got out about the true nature of Stalin, people began to doubt everything they knew to be true. Khrushchev decreased the censorship and restrictions on people and also freed millions of political prisoners from Gulags, beginning what would come to be referred to as the “thaw”. Many people had practically worshipped Stalin and knew him to represent the Communist party’s creed of infallibility. The tarnishing of his image led many people to seriously doubt the capabilities of the party.1 As truths came out and people began to discuss issues, there was increasing dissatisfaction with the Communist Party and a community of dissenters was born. This community of dissenters would ultimately keep the fight for freedom going long after the end of the thaw era, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This paper will examine the dissent movement, from its roots in the end of the Stalin era to the collapse in 1991; it will address how the dissent movement came into being, and how it evolved as new challenges were presented to it.
    [Show full text]
  • Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1891-1957, Record Group 85 New Orleans, Louisiana Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New Orleans, LA, 1910-1945
    Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1891-1957, Record Group 85 New Orleans, Louisiana Crew Lists of Vessels Arriving at New Orleans, LA, 1910-1945. T939. 311 rolls. (~A complete list of rolls has been added.) Roll Volumes Dates 1 1-3 January-June, 1910 2 4-5 July-October, 1910 3 6-7 November, 1910-February, 1911 4 8-9 March-June, 1911 5 10-11 July-October, 1911 6 12-13 November, 1911-February, 1912 7 14-15 March-June, 1912 8 16-17 July-October, 1912 9 18-19 November, 1912-February, 1913 10 20-21 March-June, 1913 11 22-23 July-October, 1913 12 24-25 November, 1913-February, 1914 13 26 March-April, 1914 14 27 May-June, 1914 15 28-29 July-October, 1914 16 30-31 November, 1914-February, 1915 17 32 March-April, 1915 18 33 May-June, 1915 19 34-35 July-October, 1915 20 36-37 November, 1915-February, 1916 21 38-39 March-June, 1916 22 40-41 July-October, 1916 23 42-43 November, 1916-February, 1917 24 44 March-April, 1917 25 45 May-June, 1917 26 46 July-August, 1917 27 47 September-October, 1917 28 48 November-December, 1917 29 49-50 Jan. 1-Mar. 15, 1918 30 51-53 Mar. 16-Apr. 30, 1918 31 56-59 June 1-Aug. 15, 1918 32 60-64 Aug. 16-0ct. 31, 1918 33 65-69 Nov. 1', 1918-Jan. 15, 1919 34 70-73 Jan. 16-Mar. 31, 1919 35 74-77 April-May, 1919 36 78-79 June-July, 1919 37 80-81 August-September, 1919 38 82-83 October-November, 1919 39 84-85 December, 1919-January, 1920 40 86-87 February-March, 1920 41 88-89 April-May, 1920 42 90 June, 1920 43 91 July, 1920 44 92 August, 1920 45 93 September, 1920 46 94 October, 1920 47 95-96 November, 1920 48 97-98 December, 1920 49 99-100 Jan.
    [Show full text]
  • Stalin's Loyal Executioner: People's Commissar Nikolai Ezhov, 1895-1940
    INDEX adoption, 121 arrest(s), 63 Afanas’ev, N. P., 187–89 arbitrary, 92 affairs, 16–17, 23, 123, 166–68, 172–74, army, 70, 206 185, 198, 200 from Central Committee, 72, 75, 77, 124, Agranov, Ia. S., 23, 45, 55–56, 60, 62, 68, 234n110 73, 84 from Communist Party, 37, 43, 75, 101, agriculture, 249n35 103, 105, 127, 130, 139–40, 146, 148, academy of, 16 151–52, 177–78, 205–6, 222n64, collectivization, 14 233n77 People’s Commissariats of, 13, 76, 146 competitions for number of, 92–93 saboteurs of, 76, 233n106 of Ezhov, 164, 181–82 albums, 136–37 mass, 79, 83, 85, 87, 89–91, 94–95, 99, Alekhin, M. S., 56, 68, 152 103–5, 137–38, 205–6, 237n46 Aleksandrovskii, M. K., 66, 67 of Mensheviks, 74–75 anarchists, 75 of military intelligence, 65–66 Andreev, Andrei, 26, 43photo, 72, 92, 100, new policy for, 156–57 108, 117, 140photo, 164, 175, 176 of NKVD officers, 61–62, 64–65, 78, 83– anti-intellectuals, 8, 202 84, 133, 135–36, 137, 144, 148, 152, Anvelt, Jan, 72 165–66, 168, 183–86, 192, 229n49, army 258n68 demobilized from, 8 political e´migre´s, foreign influences, 41– duty, 3, 5, 6–8 42, 94–95, 99, 101, 205–6, 237n46 purge of, 69–70, 75, 205 quotas of, 84–85, 89–91, 109, 131, 133, reprimand in, 7–8 135, 205–6 .......................... 9199$$ INDX 02-05-02 16:04:35 PS 264 Index of Rightists, 59 Bokii, G. I., 61, 64 small resistance of mass, 102 Bolsheviks, 6, 70, 105, 111, 125, 136, 195 of Socialist Revolutionaries (SR), 74 Bronkowski, B., 40 of Water Transportation, 152 Bukharin, N.
    [Show full text]
  • THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR Also by A
    THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR Also by A. B. Murphy ASPECTIVAL USAGE IN RUSSIAN INlRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY TO SHOLOKHOV'S TlKHlY DON MIKHAIL ZOSHCHENKO: A Literary Project Also by G. R. Swain EASTERN EUROPE SINCE 1945 (co-author) THE ORIGINS OF THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR RUSSIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE LEGAL LABOUR MOVEMENT,1906-14 The Russian Civil War Documents from the Soviet Archives Edited by v. P. Butt Senior Scientific Collaborator Institute of Russian History Russian Academy of Sciences A. B. Murphy Professor Emeritus of Russian University of Ulster N. A. Myshov Senior Scientific Collaborator and ChiefArchivist Russian State Military Archive and G. R. Swain Professor ofHistory University of the West of England First published in Great Britain 1996 by MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-0-333-59319-6 ISBN 978-1-349-25026-4 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-25026-4 First published in the United States of America 1996 by ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC., Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 978-0-312-16337-2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Russian civil war: documents from the Soviet archives / edited by V. P. Butt ... ret al.l p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-312-16337-2 (cloth) I. Soviet Union-History-Revolution, 1917-1921-Sources. I. Butt, V. P. DK265.A5372 1996 947.084'I-dc20 96-19904 CIP Selection, editorial matter and translation © V.
    [Show full text]
  • A Chronology Ofv. I. Lenin's Life (1870-1924)
    A Chronology ofV. I. Lenin's Life (1870-1924) 1870 April: V. I. Lenin (born Vladimir Illich Ulyanov) is born in 1870 in the town of Simbirsk on the Volga River 1887 June: Lenin graduates from gymnasium (high school) 1887 May: Lenin's brother Alexander is executed 1887 August: Lenin enters the University of Kazan 1887 December: Lenin is arrested for participating in student protests 1887 December: Lenin is expelled from the University and exiled to the village of Kokushkino near Kazan' for one year 1891 November: Lenin graduates from the University of St. Petersburg 1893 Autumn: Lenin joins a Marxist circle in St. Petersburg 1894 Nicholas II becomes tsar 1895 December: Lenin is arrested and spends 14 months in prison. 1897 February: Lenin is sentenced to three years exile in Eastern Siberia 1898 July: Lenin marries Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaia 1898- 1900 In exile, Lenin writes The Development of Capitalism in Russia 1900 July: On returning from exile, Lenin goes abroad to Switzerland and other countries 1901 Lenin, who has been known until this point as Ulyanov, adopts the name N. Lenin 1901- 1902 Lenin writes What Is to Be Done? and edits Iskra (The Spark) 1903 July-August: Lenin attends the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party and helps to split the party into factions: Bolsheviks and Mensheviks 1904 February: Beginning of Russo-Japanese War 162 CHRONOLOGY 163 1904 December: Surrender of Port Arthur to Japanese 1905 january: The "Bloody Sunday" massacre; The First Russian Rev­ olution begins 1905 june-july.
    [Show full text]
  • THE MENSHEVIKS in 1917 by Olegpmwkov Bachelor of Arts
    THE MENSHEVIKS IN 1917 r:. = BY OLEGpmwKOV Bachelor of Arts Moscow State Pedagogical Institute Moscow, USSR 1983 Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College of the Oklahoma State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS July 1992 THE MENSHEVIKS IN 1917 Thesis Approved: Thesis Advisor 0 Dean of the Graduate College 11 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to express sincere appreciation to Dr. George F. Jewsbury and Dr. Joel M. Jenswold for their encouragement and advice throughout my graduate program. Many thanks also go to Dr. W. Roger Biles for serving on my graduate committee. Their suggestions and support were very helpful throughout the study. To Wann Smith for his expert typing and proofing skills; to Oscar Kursner for his help in translation. My wife, Y elaina Khripkov, encouraged and supported me all the way and helped me keep the end goal constantly in sight. Thanks go to her for her undivided time in the final stages of the project. She prov 1ded moral support and was a real believer in my abilities. 111 TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. The Main Approaches to the Study of the Russian Revolution in American Historiography 2 The Study of Menshevism in the U.S. 6 Soviet Scholars on Menshevism 8 Sources 1 2 Themes and Problems 14 II. Tiffi "HONEYMOON' OF Tiffi REVOLUTION_~-~-~! 8 The Necessity for the Dual Power 1 8 The Essence and Structure of Dual Power 2 7 Establishing of the Revolutionary Defensists Policy3 5 III. THE APRIL CRISIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES _____4 7 The First Clash.
    [Show full text]
  • Death Certificate Index - Cass County (1917-June 1921)
    Death Certificate Index - Cass County (1917-June 1921) Mother's Maiden Name Birth Date Birth Place Death Date County Number Box Name Albert, Mahale 30 June 1845 Ohio 02 May 1921 Cass Lautinzer 15-02042 D2071 Alger, Avis 22 Dec. 1846 Ohio 04 Nov. 1917 Cass 15-01293 D2070 Allbright, Doris 28 Sept. 1904 Iowa 24 Nov. 1918 Cass Lipp 15-01467 D2071 Anders, Mark 06 Dec. 1852 Iowa 01 Feb. 1920 Cass 15-01773 D2071 Andersen, Anna 05 Apr. 1880 Iowa 23 June 1920 Cass Jensen 15-01858 D2071 Andersen, Richard 16 Mar. 1853 Ohio 26 Apr. 1918 Cass Patten 15-01363 D2071 Anderson, Andrew O. 24 July 1852 Sweden 23 Aug. 1919 Cass Unknown 15-01665 D2071 Anderson, George Boyd 09 June 1918 Iowa 22 June 1918 Cass Christensen 15-01393 D2071 Anderson, Oscar 14 June 1872 Iowa 29 June 1917 Cass Erickson 15-01240 D2070 Anderson, Peter Sr. 01 Jan. 1835 Sweden 26 Jan. 1920 Cass Unknown 15-01753 D2071 Andrews, Mary Olive 22 May 1855 Ohio 25 May 1919 Cass Darnes 15-01624 D2071 Angell, James William 13 Apr. 1861 Iowa 27 Dec. 1918 Cass Ehle 15-01489 D2071 Archer, Eva 25 Oct. 1867 Missouri 19 Nov. 1919 Cass Lueder 15-01711 D2071 Archer, Geraldine Elizabeth 23 Sept. 1841 Michigan 01 Jan. 1921 Cass Cady 15-01973 D2071 Archer, Sam Bradford 28 Apr. 1865 Illinois 11 Aug. 1918 Cass Edwards 15-01417 D2071 Ashley, Lewis 30 Dec. 1854 Canada 26 Dec. 1919 Cass Unknown 15-01732 D2071 Ashwood, James Martin Woodrow 23 Sept. 1918 Iowa 09 Feb.
    [Show full text]
  • The Forgotten Fronts the First World War Battlefield Guide: World War Battlefield First the the Forgotten Fronts Forgotten The
    Ed 1 Nov 2016 1 Nov Ed The First World War Battlefield Guide: Volume 2 The Forgotten Fronts The First Battlefield War World Guide: The Forgotten Fronts Creative Media Design ADR005472 Edition 1 November 2016 THE FORGOTTEN FRONTS | i The First World War Battlefield Guide: Volume 2 The British Army Campaign Guide to the Forgotten Fronts of the First World War 1st Edition November 2016 Acknowledgement The publisher wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the following organisations in providing text, images, multimedia links and sketch maps for this volume: Defence Geographic Centre, Imperial War Museum, Army Historical Branch, Air Historical Branch, Army Records Society,National Portrait Gallery, Tank Museum, National Army Museum, Royal Green Jackets Museum,Shepard Trust, Royal Australian Navy, Australian Defence, Royal Artillery Historical Trust, National Archive, Canadian War Museum, National Archives of Canada, The Times, RAF Museum, Wikimedia Commons, USAF, US Library of Congress. The Cover Images Front Cover: (1) Wounded soldier of the 10th Battalion, Black Watch being carried out of a communication trench on the ‘Birdcage’ Line near Salonika, February 1916 © IWM; (2) The advance through Palestine and the Battle of Megiddo: A sergeant directs orders whilst standing on one of the wooden saddles of the Camel Transport Corps © IWM (3) Soldiers of the Royal Army Service Corps outside a Field Ambulance Station. © IWM Inside Front Cover: Helles Memorial, Gallipoli © Barbara Taylor Back Cover: ‘Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red’ at the Tower of London © Julia Gavin ii | THE FORGOTTEN FRONTS THE FORGOTTEN FRONTS | iii ISBN: 978-1-874346-46-3 First published in November 2016 by Creative Media Designs, Army Headquarters, Andover.
    [Show full text]
  • Download File
    BEYOND RESENTMENT Mykola Riabchuk Vasyl Kuchabsky, Western Ukraine in Conflict with Poland and Bolshevism, 1918-1923. Translated from the German by Gus Fagan. Edmomton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2009. 361 pp. + 6 maps. t might be a risky enterprise to publish a historical of Western Ukrainians to establish their independent monograph written some eighty years ago, which at republic on the ruins of the Habsburg empire—in full the time addressed the very recent developments of line with the prevailing Wilsonian principle of national I1918-1923—this would seem to be much more suited toself-determination, the right presumably granted by the lively memoirs than a cool-blooded analysis and archival victorious Entente to all East European nations. Western research. Indeed, since 1934 when Vasyl Kuchabsky's Ukraine is in the center of both the title and the narrative, Die Westukraine im Kampfe mit Polen und dem and this makes both the book and its translation rather Bolschewismus in den Jahren 1918-1923 was published important, since there are still very few “Ukrainocentric” in Germany in a small seminar series, a great number of accounts of these events, which though not necessarily books and articles on the relevant topics have appeared, opposing the dominant Polish and Russian perspectives, and even a greater number of archival documents, letters at least provide some check on the myths and biases and memoirs have become accessible to scholars. and challenge or supplement the dominant views with Still, as Frank Sysyn rightly points out in his short neglected facts and alternative interpretations.
    [Show full text]
  • The Buildup of the German War Economy: the Importance of the Nazi-Soviet Economic Agreements of 1939 and 1940 by Samantha Carl I
    The Buildup of the German War Economy: The Importance of the Nazi-Soviet Economic Agreements of 1939 and 1940 By Samantha Carl INTRODUCTION German-Soviet relations in the early half of the twentieth century have been marked by periods of rapprochement followed by increasing tensions. After World War I, where the nations fought on opposite sides, Germany and the Soviet Union focused on their respective domestic problems and tensions began to ease. During the 1920s, Germany and the Soviet Union moved toward normal relations with the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922.(1) Tensions were once again apparent after 1933, when Adolf Hitler gained power in Germany. Using propaganda and anti-Bolshevik rhetoric, Hitler depicted the Soviet Union as Germany's true enemy.(2) Despite the animosity between the two nations, the benefits of trade enabled them to maintain economic relations throughout the inter-war period. It was this very relationship that paved the way for the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and the subsequent outbreak of World War II. Nazi-Soviet relations on the eve of the war were vital to the war movement of each respective nation. In essence, the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, 1939 allowed Germany to augment its war effort while diminishing the Soviet fear of a German invasion.(3) The betterment of relations was a carefully planned program in which Hitler sought to achieve two important goals. First, he sought to prevent a two-front war from developing upon the invasion of Poland. Second, he sought to gain valuable raw materials that were necessary for the war movement.(4) The only way to meet these goals was to pursue the completion of two pacts with the Soviet Union: an economic agreement as well as a political one.
    [Show full text]