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Dissidents Versus Communists

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Dissidents Versus Communists DISSIDENTS VERSUS COMMUNISTS An Examination of the Soviet Dissidence Movement Matthew Williams Professor Transchel History 419 May 12, 2016 Williams 1 On February 25, 1956, Nikita Khrushchev gave a speech to the Twentieth Congress and to the Communist Party stating that Joseph Stalin was responsible for all of the empire’s then-current issues. He also gave insight into the criminal actions performed by the man during his lifetime. This speech was called the “Secret Speech” as it was not publicized at first, but once word got out about the true nature of Stalin, people began to doubt everything they knew to be true. Khrushchev decreased the censorship and restrictions on people and also freed millions of political prisoners from Gulags, beginning what would come to be referred to as the “thaw”. Many people had practically worshipped Stalin and knew him to represent the Communist party’s creed of infallibility. The tarnishing of his image led many people to seriously doubt the capabilities of the party.1 As truths came out and people began to discuss issues, there was increasing dissatisfaction with the Communist Party and a community of dissenters was born. This community of dissenters would ultimately keep the fight for freedom going long after the end of the thaw era, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This paper will examine the dissent movement, from its roots in the end of the Stalin era to the collapse in 1991; it will address how the dissent movement came into being, and how it evolved as new challenges were presented to it. This will be done by looking at books written by Ludmilla Alexeyeva, a famous dissenter, and weaving it with other accounts of landmark events. Background Ludmilla Alexeyeva was born on July 20, 1927, only a few years after Stalin rose to power in 1924. She grew up looking at Stalin as a “father figure” and a savior. At the age of 1 Howard L. Biddulph, “Soviet Intellectual Dissent as a Political Counter-Culture,” The Western Political Quarterly 25, no. 3 (September 1972): 526. Williams 2 ten she remembered people mysteriously disappearing from her apartment building, but knowing nothing else, she thought nothing of it. Her first real taste of the true nature of the Communist party, however, came on June 22, 1941. Germany had broken through the Russian border, had laid siege to Leningrad and were threatening Moscow. Alexeyeva had been told the Red Army was invincible for many years, and to see the troops retreating surely made her doubt the legitimacy of Soviet claims to superiority.2 With Stalin’s death in 1953, many Soviet citizens, including Alexeyeva were distraught due to the uncertainties in their future. They were not sure what life would be like with a different leader at the helm of the U.S.S.R.3 Fortunately for Alexeyeva, the man who would lead the Soviet Union in Stalin’s wake was far less of a tyrant than Stalin. His name was Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev initially found himself and the Communist party bearing the brunt of many of Stalin’s questionable actions. In response to this, Khrushchev gave the famous “Secret Speech” which essentially blamed Stalin for everything. Khrushchev’s lightening of restrictions gave rise to the thaw. During this time, Alexeyeva began to go to nightly poetry and storytelling sessions which would have been illegal under Stalin’s reign. Many other people partook in such activities, and information about the “west” began to seep into the Soviet Union. Growing up, most Soviets—including Alexeyeva—were taught that their country was the most superior country in the world. Knowing nothing different, most believed what they were told without question. Slowly but surely, this viewpoint began to change, especially among the youth. 2 Ludmila Aleksyeva and Paul Goldberg, The Thaw Generation: Coming Of Age In The Post-Stalin Era (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 3. 3 Ibid., 4. Williams 3 The Hungarian Revolution In 1956, a group of Hungarian students gathered to protest the Soviet Union by marching from the center of Budapest to the Parliament headquarters. What began as a nonviolent, small-scale protest, quickly escalated into a large-scale revolt. The revolution escalated greatly after a student was killed after demanding the release of some of his peers who had been detained after an attempt to take over a radio station. Khrushchev, trying to maintain control, sent in the Red Army in to quell the revolution. In response, thousands of Hungarians formed militias to fight off the Red Army. After a few weeks, the Red Army was able to contain the revolution and regained control of Hungary. The Hungarian Revolution served to radicalize youth against the Communist party due to the way it was handled.4 This was a sign to many in the Soviet government that the thaw—if continued much longer— would ultimately lead to a loss of control over many of the Soviet states. For Alexeyeva, like many others, the response to the Hungarian Revolution by the Soviet Union was an alarming and disturbing experience that prompted her to lead a life of dissent. The Prague Spring The real turning point came in mid-1968, when the Soviet Union engaged in lengthy negotiations with the leader of Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubček, who initiated a program to liberalize the country. He advocated the ideas of free speech, free movement, free press, and other freedoms generally not permitted in Communist nations. This program was 4 Aleksandr Pyzhikov, “Sources of Dissidence: Soviet Youth After the Twentieth Party Congress,” Russian Social Science Review 45, no. 5 (October 2004): 68. Williams 4 referred to as “Socialism with a Human Face”.5 Dubček portrayed this as a revitalization of Communism, not an outright denial of it. He felt that the future lay with more progressive Communism which allowed people to think and act for themselves without significant repercussion. After it became clear to the Soviet officials that the negotiations were going nowhere, a joint invasion by the U.S.S.R. and several Warsaw Pact countries was initiated. On August 20, 1968, The U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Poland, East Germany, and Hungary staged a joint invasion of Czechoslovakia. 200,000 troops as well as 2,000 tanks were brought in, and Czechs reacted with generally nonviolent protest, often trying in vain to reason with soldiers or disrupt their operation.6 Nonetheless, after just one week, 186 people were killed and 362 were injured.7 As news spread of the hostile invasion, people began to further doubt the rationale behind the action. Many Soviets and others alike felt that it was unnecessary use of excessive force, and that the issue could have been resolved diplomatically. The invasion became a justification for many to turn to dissidence, as many, including Alexeyeva, were ashamed their government would do such a thing. As a result, it marked the ultimate end of the thaw era. For Alexeyeva, the end of the thaw era meant she was at risk participating in the sharing of western information and questioning the government. Going forward, she— along with many other dissenters—would have to make one of three choices “…the first was to toe the party line and be allowed to advance professionally; the second was to put a 5 Anna J. Stoneman, “Socialism with a Human Face: The Leadership and Legacy of the Prague Spring,” The History Teacher 49, no. 1 (November 2015): 104. 6 Ibid., 106. 7 Ibid., 107. Williams 5 career on hold and wait for another thaw; the third was to stay the course of the thaw and accept the consequences: an aborted career and the life of a pariah.”8 Alexeyeva chose the third option, abandoning her career, and becoming an “enemy of the state” along with few other intellectuals. With this choice, her official life as a dissenter began. The Chronicle of Current Events A very important publication came into being during the “Prague Spring,” and that was the Chronicle of Current Events (Khronika tekushchikh sobytiy). This bimonthly “samizdat” (translated as “self-publishing”) periodical gave the inside scoop on what was happening behind the scenes in the Soviet government.9 Its first editor was Natalya Gorbanevskaya, a Russian poet and civil rights activist.10 Due to a lack of mass printing machines, the first issue was typed up by Gorbanevskaya on a typewriter with seven carbon copies. She gave these seven copies to seven of her friends and they, in turn, typed up more copies, and so on.11 It was a laborious task, but the dissident movement depended on having a reliable way of communicating what was going on in the country. At the beginning of every installment were the words of Article 19 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.12 8 Alexeyeva, The Thaw Generation, 5. 9 Ludmila Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, And Human Rights (Mt. Vernon, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), 12. 10 Alexeyeva, The Thaw Generation, 206. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. Williams 6 The Chronicle covered many trials, legislation and other current issues of the time. The very first issue was published on April 30, 1968, and mainly covered the trials of Yuri Galanskov and Alexander Ginzburg.13 Galanskov and Ginzburg were two publishers who had been arrested for their publications. Galanskov published a samizdat almanac called the Phoenix and Ginzburg published a samizdat poetry almanac called Sintaksis.
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