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Home , Enn Tarto, Helsinki Watch, Levko Lukianenko, Malva Landa, Merab Kostava, Moscow Helsinki Group

FINAL REPORT T O NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H

TITLE : The Watch Committees i n the Soviet Republics : Implica - tions for Soviet Nationalit y Policy

AUTHOR : Yaroslav Bilinsky T8nu Parmin g

CONTRACTOR : University of Delawar e

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Yaroslav Bilinsk y

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 621- 9

The work leading to this report was supported in whole or in part from funds provided by the National Council for Sovie t and East European Research . Yaroslav Bilinsky (University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19711, USA )

Tönu Parmin g (University of Maryland, College Park, ND 20742, USA )

HELSINKI WATCH COMMITTEES IN THE SOVIET REPUBLICS :

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIETY NATIONALITY POLICY *

Paper presented at Second World Congres s on Soviet and East European Studies , Garmisch-Partenkirchen, German Federal Republic , September 30 - October 4, 198 0

*This paper is based on the authors' longer study, The Committees in the Soviet Republics : Implications for the Sovie t Nationality Question, which was supported in whole or in part fro m funds provided by the National Council for Soviet and East Europea n Research, under Council Contract Number 621-9 . Travel to Garmisch- Partenkirchen has been--in Bilinsky's case—made possible by grant s from the American Council of Learned Societies and the University o f Delaware . The authors would like to thank their benefactors an d explicitly stress that the authors alone are responsible for th e contents of this paper .

2

Unexpectedly, within two years of the signing by the Sovie t Union, the , , and thirty-two European states , of the long and solemn Final Act of the Conference on Security an d Cooperation in in Helsinki, August l, 1975, there sprang u p as many as five groups of Soviet dissenters claiming that th e Helsinki Final Act justified their existence and activity . First , May 12, 1976, there was established in the Public Group t o Promote the Implementation of the in the USSR . Fro m November 9, 1976, through April l, 1977, similar general purpos e groups were founded in the , in , an d .** The main reason why Helsinki Watch Committees were estab- lished in the non-Russian republics was the feeling among thei r organizers that the non-Russian Groups, all of which continued t o cooperate with the Moscow Group, would nonetheless be more effectiv e in publicizing violations of national rights specific to thei r republics .

Simultaneously, in the United States an official Congressional - Executive Commission (the U .S . Commission on Security and Cooperatio n in Europe) started its work . have found evidence that th e initiators of the official American Commission had been influence d by Soviet dissenters after having been sensitized to the issue b y their constituents of East European (Lithuanian, Jewish, Ukrainian , and other) backgrounds . Apparently alarmed at the potential reper- cussions of the Helsinki Final Act in their country, Soviet authoritie s arrested and jailed the leading members of the Moscow and all the fou r republican Groups, but were able to destroy only the Georgian Group . The of the Helsinki Watch Committees in the Sovie t Republics thus shows how an international act can unexpectedly serve as a stimulus for activity which in turn is furthe r reinforced by the international feedback provided by sympatheti c official bodies and by relatively well-organized emigré communitie s in the West . Since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act by th e Soviet government, the Soviet nationality question--like that o f Soviet human rights--has ceased to be an exclusive domestic question , has become internationalized .

**We are not concerned with such more specialized group s within the Soviet Helsinki movement as the Christian Committee t o Defend the Rights of Believers (establ . Dec . 27, 1976), the Workin g Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Politica l Purposes (establ . Jan . 5, 1977), the Group for the Legal Struggl e and Investigation of Facts about the Persecution of Believers i n the USSR of the All-Union Church of the Faithful and Free Seventh - Day Adventists (establ . May 11, 1978), and the Catholic Committe e to Defend the Rights of Believers (establ . November 13, 1978) . 3

The Helsinki Final Act that had been intensively negotiate d for close to three years and whose roots go back to an unsuccessful Soviet diplomatic initiative as far back as 1954 is a bundle o f solemn yet contradictory promises that are not binding in inter - national law . At first sight, the Soviet government had ample reaso n to be satisfied : in return for the solemn reemphasis of the de fact o recognition of Soviet territorial acquisitions in Eastern Europe i n Basket I and equally strong promises of economic, scientific an d technological cooperation in Basket II, the endorse d the measures of "Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields, " popularly known as Basket III, and consented to the human right s provisions of the "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States" in Basket I, particularly Principles VI I ( " Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, includin g freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief") and VII I ( "Equal rights and self-determination of peoples " ) . 1 Principle VIII on the self-determination of peoples was accepted on the insistenc e of the German Federal Republic despite initial Soviet misgivings : the principle is designed to facilitate an eventual reunification o f the two Germanys .2 The long Principle VII included references t o the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights and the two International Covenants on Human Rights , 3 all of which had been signed by the Soviet Union . Principle VII als o contained two sentences that could be interpreted as ensuring th e rights of national minorities, viz .:

The participating States will respect human right s and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom o f thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all withou t distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion . [Opening sentence . ]

The participating States on whose territory nationa l minorities exist will respect the right of person s belonging to such minorities to equality before th e law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actua l enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms an d will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests i n this sphere . [Fourt.]4h sentence

Principle VII also included an interesting challenge inserted on th e demands of the British delegation :

They [ " the participating States"] confirm the righ t of the individual to know and act upon his rights an d . duties in this field . [Seventh sentence . ]

The Soviet delegation clearly realized that both Principles VII an d VIII could be turned against their country . For example, they initially objected to the inclusion of Principle VIII on self - 4 determination on the ground that self-determination has been tradi- tionally associated with the rights of colonial peoples to establis h their independence . 6 But ultimately the USSR accepted the two principles for three reasons of ascending importance . First, as Harold S . Russell points out so well, built into the text of th e two principles were implicit and explicit limitations . The very titl e of Principle VII parallels Article 18 of the International Covenan t on Civil and Political Rights, the USSR fought valiantly and no t completely unsuccessfully to have that Principle explicitly refer t o that Covenant and the Soviet Union can, therefore, be expected t o invoke that Covenant together with its escape clauses whenever i t will be called upon to interpret Helsinki Principle VII . 7 To rul e out separation of national minorities, Principle VIII on " Equal right s and self-determination of peoples" on the insistence of Canada an d Yugoslavia was tempered by a reference to acting in conformity wit h the relevant norms of international law " including those relating t o territorial integrity of states, " which in turn alluded to a ver y explicit prohibition of dismemberment contained in the UN Declaratio n on Friendly Relations . 8 Secondly, the Soviet delegation was ver y much aware that the controversial Principles VII and VIII wer e preceded by Principle VI on " Nonintervention in internal affairs, " which could be interpreted broadly . Thirdly, the seeming concession s by the USSR in Principles VII and VIII were not only limited b y implicit and explicit limitations in those very Principles an d further restricted by a broad interpretation of preceding Principl e VI, but they were essentially promises made to further advance th e ongoing process of détente . The Soviet government appeared to gai n much more than lose from signing the Helsinki Final Act . It gave th e Act the utmost publicity . 9

It called for a great deal of intelligence and even greate r civic courage on the part of Soviet dissenters such as Dr . , Elena Bonner-Sakharov, Aleksandr Ginzburg, Lyudmila Alekseeva, Malv a Landa, former Major-General Petr Grigorenko (Petro Hryhorenko) an d others to cut through the lawyers' and diplomats ' reservations and establish an open Public Group to Promote the Implementation of th e Helsinki Accords in the USSR in Moscow May 12, 1976, based on th e Helsinki Final Act . The initiative of the Moscow dissenters wa s undoubtedly stimulated by the Final Act's "Basket IV " : the agreemen t to hold a follow-up conference in Belgrade in 1977 . 10 In its firs t announcement the Moscow Group promised to accept and to forward t o other signatories of the Final Act any complaints by Soviet citizens about violations of their rights as outlined inthe Final Act . Th e Group would also conduct investigations of its own and would reques t from the signatories the establishment of International Investigatin g Committees to examine especially inhumane policies such as the takin g away of children from religious parents, the abuse of psychiatri c hospitals for political purposes, etc . (nationality problems, however , were not mentioned) . The Moscow Group expressed hope that it s materials would be taken into consideration at all future meetings 5 provided by the Final Act (i .e ., implicitly at the Belgrade Conference ) and called on the public in the signatories' states to form their own national Groups for the Promotion of the Implementation of th e Helsinki Accords (later an International Committee for the Promotio n of the Helsinki Accords could be formed) . 1 1

Given the distinguished liberal and multi-national membershi p of the Moscow Group (e .g ., Orlov and Alekseeva were , Hryhorenko was a Ukrainian, Bonner, Ginzburg, and Landa were partl y or fully Jewish), the questions emerge, ' ''Why were additional Helsink i Watch Committees organized in four non-Russian republics? What i n particular is behind the organization of the first non-Russian Group , the Ukrainian Group November 9, 1976?" The reason for the formatio n of the non-Russian Groups is not that the Moscow Group was insensitiv e to nationality questions . Before the establishment of the Ukrainia n Group the Moscow Group issued nine documents, two of which deal t with nationality problems ; after the establishment of the non- Russian Groups, by August 1979, the Moscow Group issued ninety mor e 1 3 documents, nineteen of which were addressed to nationality concerns . Nevertheless, the non-Russian Helsinki activists apparently wer e concerned that either the Moscow Group might not be sensitive enoug h or that there were simply human and national rights issues tha t could more effectively be raised by non-Russian Helsinki Groups .

The main initiator of the and th e person who indirectly may be responsible for the formation of th e Lithuanian, Georgian and Armenian Groups, was the Ukrainian write r and former high Party official . He was personally acquainted with Academician Sakharov and Dr . (Sakharov was an unofficial member or at the very least a benefacto r of the Moscow Group) . With Valentin Turchin and Yuri Orlov , Rudenko joined between 1973 and April 1975 the Soviet Chapter o f . 14 Rudenko had the highest regard explicitl y 1 5 for Academician Sakharov and Dr . Turchin, implicitly for Dr . Orlov . Rudenko was also personally acquainted with Major-General Hryhorenko : upon his insistence Hryhorenko joined the Ukrainian Group whil e remaining a member of the earlier Moscow Group . Clearly Rudenk o had demonstrated his lack of national prejudice and his ability t o collaborate with Russian dissenters . In all the nineteen document s of the Ukrainian Group issued between November 9, 1976, and December , 1977, there does not appear to be any clear explanation why th e Ukrainian Group was formed in addition to the Moscow Group .16 The true reason is hinted at in a letter that Rudenko wrote to Dr . Andrew Zwarun of the Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee in Washington , D .C . Wrote Rudenko :

It is incorrect [to say], that our Group is a sectio n of the Moscow one . We collaborate with the Muscovites , they are actively supporting us, for they are genuin e democrats . But from the [very] beginning we have decided 6

not to enter into a relationship of subordination , because we have that, which is not understood by ever y Russian . 1 7

What is " that which, Rudenko was afraid, not every Russian woul d understan d"? In the last fifteen years (roughly starting with th e arrest of Ukrainian intellectuals in August 1965 and continuing afte r the second wave of mass arrests in 1972) the relations between th e Soviet government and the Ukrainian intelligentsia defending th e position of the and culture have been very tense . They have become so bad that some Soviet have become con- vinced that their country has become engaged in a struggle fo r national survival . One prominent recent Soviet Ukrainian emigre ha s said that he personally had come to the conclusion that Ukrainia n culture could develop only in an independent Ukraine . 18 In any case , wrote Rudenko in an open letter, " the majority of Ukrainian politica l prisoners had been sentenced for alleged or real nationalism . "1 9 Certain members of the Moscow Group (L . Alekseeva, M . Landa, Y . 0rlov , A . Ginzburg, A . Shcharansky, and V . Slepak) in publicly welcomin g the formation of the Ukrainian Group November 12, 1976, hinted tha t they were aware of the situation in the Ukraine being especiall y difficult . 20 Nevertheless, for all the sympathy of the democrat s in Moscow, Rudenko and his associates remained convinced that i t was up to the Ukrainians to defend their language and culture an d that a separate Ukrainian Helsinki Watch Committee was necessary .

The second reason for establishing such a separate Group wa s perhaps a matter of wounded national pride : though the Ukrainian SSR had been a charter member of the UN, though it had participated i n a number of international conferences, and though it had signed an d ratified the two international covenant s 21 on economic, social an d cultural rights, and on civil and political rights on which some o f the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act were based , the republic as such was not allowed to participate in the Helsink i process, though such European ministates as Liechtenstein an d San Marino were . 2 2 The charter members of the Ukrainian Group, besides Rudenko and Hryhorenko, were the writer Oles Berdnyk, the lawyers Lev Lukianenk o and (Lukianenko in 1961 had been sentenced to death , but his sentence was on appeal commuted to 15 years' imprisonment) , historian Mykola Matusevych and electronics engineer , former secondary school teacher Oleksii Tykhy, microbiologist Nin a Strokata-Karavansky, and elderly but spry Mrs . Oksana Meshko . Whe n the regime cracked down (Rudenko and Tykhy were among the firs t Helsinki Watchers in the Soviet Union to be arrested in February 1977 , they were the first to be tried and sentenced to long terms i n June 1977 ) 23 the Ukrainian Group added more and more members--som e from labor camps and exile--until in December 1979 it was the larges t of all Soviet Helsinki Groups, numbering thirty members . 7

What did the Ukrainian Group do? It tried to defend bot h individual human rights (injustices committed against politica l prisoners and their relatives) and collective nationality right s (rights to use the native language) in a long series of memoranda , appeals, individual letters and similar documents . Some of the docu- ments are rather emotional and futuristic in tone bearing the hall- mark of Oles Berdnyk, who is a well-known author of science-fiction . 24 What effect has the Ukrainian Group had upon the public in the Ukraine? In their summary report covering the first four months : of its existence (Memorandum No . 7) the Group said that they ha d received "hundreds of letters and complaints from all over th e Ukraine . "25 The existence of the Group was widely publicized b y Western Radio : reached the cities, the more out - spoken Radio Liberty could be best heard in the countryside . Some- times the complaints were impossible to deal with, the role of th e Ukrainian Group being sometimes misconstrued as that of an unofficial ombudsman (one example that was given by a former associate of th e Group was that of an old woman complaining that the authorities had taken away her cow, could the Ukrainian Helsinki Group please help?) . But there were also more conventional complaints by political and non-political prisoners against abuses of the authorities . Most interesting in this respect is Informational Bulletin No . 4 o f November 1978 . It contains among other things summaries of nin e petitions of prisoners, seven of which had been addressed to th e Ukrainian Group . One such petition is by Alexander Stepanovich Levin , probably a Jew, who had again been sentenced to nine years an d nine months for "especially malicious hooliganis m " after already serving ten years . He complains of a juvenile delinquent bein g brutally mistreated in camp . Another prisoner§ petition is from Yuri Leonidovich Fedorov, who, judging by his name, could be either a Russian or a Ukrainian . A third, Vladimir Ivanovich Shatalov, i s most probably a Russian . All of them are serving sentences in a labor camp in the Ukraine and have protested their treatment to th e Ukrainian Group to Promote the Im p lementation of the Helsink i Accords . 26 It would seem that at the very least news of the Grou p ' s existence had spread to mistreated prisoners--both Ukrainian an d non-Ukrainian--and to some very ordinary citizens, quite apart fro m the dissident Ukrainian intelligentsia .

Why was the Lithuanian Helsinki Group organized November 25 , 1976? If the purpose of the Ukranian Helsinki Group was to synthesiz e the Ukrainian nationalist cultural dissent of the 1960's and 1970' s with the All-Union human rights movement on the platform of Helsink i (the KGB were not persuaded : they rejected members of the Ukrainia n Helsinki Group as bourgeois nationalists in disguise) 27 , th e Lithuanian Group had somewhat more different and perhaps mor e ambitious goals . It was first designed to be a coalition of al l major dissent groups in Lithuania, brought together under, an d legitimized by, the Helsinki Accords of 1975 . Secondly, the Gro up 8 appears to be the first significant move in postwar Lithuania t o expand the dissent movement beyond the confines of a narrow ethni c base . Thirdly, very soon after its organization the Lithuanian Group consciously assumed the role of the defender of human an d national rights throughout the Baltic republics . The timing of its establishment would nevertheless suggest that an immediate reaso n for its organization may have been the example given by Ukrainia n some two weeks before, November 9, 1976 .

The charter members of the Lithuanian Group were its initiato r , by profession a scholar of and history, who had had a long-time relationship with the Catholi c youth and dissent movement ; Jesuit Father Karolis Garuckas ; th e poet and Lithuanian scholar , son of a prominen t Communist official ; the elderly poetess Ona Lukauskaite-Poskiene, a good acquaintance of both Venclova Father and Son ; and the Jewis h physicist Dr . Eitan Finkelshtein . Petkus and Father Garucka s represented in the Lithuanian Helsinki Group the Catholic dissen t movement ; Venclova and Lukauskaite-Poskiene stood for the mor e secular intellectual nationalist dissent ; Dr . Eitan Finkelshtein, a Jewish activist, had been expressly recruited to represent non - Lithuanians . 28 Venclova's wife was also Jewish and this, in addition to Finkelshtein, who was especially involved in issues of emigration , provided a second bridge to the Jewish community in Lithuania .

Secondly, there is a certain unique transethnic quality tha t characterizes the activity of the Lithuanian Group . Petkus wa s personally acquainted with Dr . Yuri rlov, Academician Sakharov an d Sakharov's close friend biologist Dr . . Kovalev, a defender of human rights, among others defended the rights of Lithuanian Catholics . He was tried in in December 1975 and sentence d to a long term of imprisonment . " .. . The fact that a Russian dissident [Kovalev] had openly supported the Catholic Church o f Lithuania and had paid for his actions with the loss of freedom made a big impression on the population of Lithuania . The government wa s pressed to halt demonstrations in support of Kovalev . Throughou t Lithuania, hundreds were taken into custody."29 This observatio n was made by Dr . Eitan Finkelshtein, who, too, was a friend o f Academician Sakharov . When Sakharov came to Kovalev ' s trial i n Vilnius he stayed in Finkelshtein ' s apartment . Petkus wanted t o publicly welcome Sakharov at the Vilnius train station with flower s but was intercepted by the KGB and arrested for a few hours : Sakharov might have stayed at the Petkus's except for the fear tha t this would lead to further persecutions of former political prisone r Petkus . 30 Those transethnic cross currents may explain why Petku s immediately and eagerly supported Venclova ' s idea that the Lithuania n Group be set up on a territorial rather than an exclusive ethni c basis, i .e ., that it defend the human and national rights of al l citizens living in the Lithuanian SSR irrespective of their nationalit y and that it include among its charter members non-Lithuanians 9

(Dr . Eitan Finkelshtein was offered such membership and he accepted) . 3 1 Those cross currents explain why among the documents of the Lithuanian Group we find one defending a Russian family of Pentecostalists , 3 2 and even one speaking up for Volga Germans . 33 Most interestingly , those transethnic crosscurrents helped to make collaboration betwee n the Moscow and the Lithuanian Group particularly close and fruitful : not only was the formation of the Lithuanian Group announced at a press conference in Dr . Orlov's apartment in Moscow December 1, 1976 , but two documents of the Lithuanian Group were researched with th e help of Mrs . Alekseeva, of the Moscow Group, and then cosigned b y her or .3by4 her an d Orlov

The documentary output of the Lithuanian Group is no t voluminous : eighteen documents of human and national rights vio- lations, of which issues 13, 15, 16 and 17 have not reached the Wes t as of January 1980, plus the founding declaration, two longer state - ments to the Belgrade Conference : one on the position of the Roman Catholic Church and one on the "present situation in Lithuania" (i .e ., the effects of deportations in the 1940's, the position of th e Lithuanian language and culture, and other secular concerns) and , finally, an individual statement by Dr . Eitan Finkelshtein . 3 5 Nevertheless, of the fourteen documents received in the West, two , as we have already seen, dealt with Russian Pentecostalists and Volga Germans . In addition, three defended Estonian dissident s Mart Niklus, Erik Udam, and . 36 The explanation for thi s is both simple and deeply significant . All those Estonians ha d either personally met Petkus in labor camp or had heard much of hi s reputation . When the Lithuanian Group was organized they immediately appealed to Petkus to have the Group represent the rights of all th e Baits, at least so long as no Estonian or Latvian Helsinki Group s were organized . Petkus and his associates gladly complied . 37 Thus the Lithuanian Group assumed the role of a spokesman not only fo r Lithuanians but for other Baits as well, even those who were living outside Lithuania .

But for all its cosmopolitan leanings the Lithuanian Grou p has stood four square in the center-of the Lithuanian nationa l movement , 38 at least with respect to one crucial question, that o f national independence . In its opening declaration it alluded " tha t the contemporary status of Lithuania was established as a result o f the entrance."39 of Soviet troops onto her territory on June 15 , 1940 There is a similar restrained reference to Molotov ' s ultimatum o f June 14, 1940, 11 p .m . in the second, "secular" Belgrade statement . 4 0 Though there is no written proof our distinct impression is tha t members of the Lithuanian Group would not object if the status qu o ante June 14, 1940, could somehow be restored . For that matter , members of the Moscow Group seem to be of the same opinion . 1 0

The Georgian Helsinki Group, formally known as the Publi c Group to Promote Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in Georgia , which was set up in January 1977, presents a big paradox . It has been established in a republic where the educational and socio - economic standards of the indigeneous population have always bee n very high and where both official (i .e ., government sponsored) and unofficial (dissident) nationalist sentiments have run very strong . is heard in the cities as well as the countryside , and the number of Russians has continued o decrease from 1959 t o 1979 in both relative and absolute terms . Nevertheless, the Georgia n Helsinki Group appears inordinately weak, 41it is the weakest of al l the Watch Committees outside of Moscow . Only a single documen t issued by the Georgian Group as such appears to have reached the West , 42 and it is not a programmatic declaration like those issued by th e Ukrainian and Lithuanian Groups, nor do we have any information that such a program had been written at all . After the arrests of th e leading members of the Group and especially after the trial and publi c recantation in May 1978 of its leader, the writer and literary scholar Dr . the Helsinki Watch Committee in Georgia appear s to have become inactive . A weak Group is a strong country ?

The solution of this paradox may lie in three factors . First , there had been a vigorous human rights movement in Georgia lon g before the Helsinki Watch Committee was established . 43 Several o f the leaders of the Helsinki Group had already left their mark o n Georgian and international public opinion through their activit y in the preceding human rights groups, and they may not have attache d sufficient importance to their work under the Helsinki Act . It i s interesting, e .g ., that after the formal establishment of the Watc h Committee in Georgia its leader Dr . Gamsakhurdia issued two importan t documents which he signed qua individual citizen, not as a member of the Committee (one was cosigned by , another Committe e member, but it, too, was not presented on behalf of the Group) . 44 Second, the regime moved fast to arrest the leaders of the Group . Third and most important, given the strength of Georgian nationalis m among the population and given the tendency of the Georgian Sovie t Government to make concessions to that nationalism, it can be argue d that the existence of the Helsinki Group in Georgia was less neede d than, e .g ., in the Ukraine . It would also appear that rather dis- creetly but still noticeably, concessions were made to some member s of the Helsinki Watch Committee in Georgia, possibly in return fo r their virtual suspension of activity . 0nly in Georgia was the leader of the Helsinki Group allowed to plea bargain with the regime, whic h on balance may be a sign of hidden strength rather than weakness .

The charter members of the Georgian Group, according to a n announcement in TheChronicleof Current Events, i .e ., not in any publication of the Group, were : Beglar Bezhuashvili, a laborator y technician in the Art Department at University ; Dr . Zvia d Gamsakhurdia, the apparent leader of the Group ; the two computer 1 1 scientists, brothers Drs . Grigori and Isai Goldshtein, who wer e Jewish ; Teimuraz Dzhanelidze, a voice teacher at the music vocationa l secondary school (tekhnikum) in Rustavi ; and the Georgian art - historian Victor Rtskhiladze . 45 An immediate controversy arose a s to whether or not writer and musicologist Merab Kostava was a membe r of the Group--he was . Later members of the Group may have bee n religious activist Valentina Pailodze and Elisaveta Bykova-Goldshtein (the wife of Isai Goldshtein) . 46

What has the Georgian Group done and what has been the impac t of its activity? It is impossible to say for certain because th e only document issued by the Group has dealt with the harassment an d dismissal from work of one of its members, Rtskhiladze . 47 We can , however, speculate a little and say that the inclusion of the two Goldshtein brothers, both of whom had been refused permission t o emigrate, and the formal title of the Group (Public Group to Promot e the Helsinki Accords in Georgia rather than Georgian Public Group ) may have been an indication that the Georgian Group like the Lithuania n Group, intended to systematically defend the rights of all citizen s of the republic, and non-Georgians . Furthermore , Rtskhiladze was known as the champion of the return of the so-calle d , the native Moslem population of southern Georgi a who had been deported in World War II . On the other hand, to judg e from the contents of the Georgian Herald No . 1, an underground publication edited by Gamsakhurdia in 1976, the Group probably woul d have defended such national Georgian rights as continued highe r education in Georgian, publication of college textbooks in Georgian , and the right to submit academic dissertations in their nativ e language, rather than Russian . The Georgian Herald also denounced torture and other violations of human rights . Like the Ukrainian Group, the Georgian Group could hardly have ignored the rather heavy - handed attempts by the central government to impose Russian i n Georgian education.48

Despite the fact that the Armenian Group was formall y established in Gen . Hryhorenko's apartment in Moscow, April l, 1977 , it should be taken seriously . Its documentary output is limited , but of high quality, it also has continued to function at leas t through the summer of 1979 . The formal leader of the Group was th e economist Eduard Bagratovich Arutyunyan . The second founding member and its real moving spirit was physicist turned theologian Rober t Nazaryan. The third founding member was engineering student Samve l Osyan . Within half a year of its establishment the Armenian Grou p was joined by an expelled student of pedagogy compelled to becom e manual worker Shagen Arutyunovich Arutyunyan (no relation to Eduar d Bagrotovich Arutyunyan) and expelled philology student, forme r and then factory worker Ambartsum Khlgatyan.

Why was the Armenian Group organized in April 1977? Given the traditional rivalry between the Armenians and Georgians in th e Caucasus we are temp-tad to remark that once the Georgian human rights 1 2 activists organized their Group in 1977, their Armenian counterpart s were soon to follow . We are not persuaded that such a motive wa s altogether absent in the minds of Nazaryan and Eduard Arutyunyan, bu t it would be an exceedingly shallow interpretation to see in thi s the main, perhaps even a major reason . Another explanation has bee n provided by Robert Nazaryan himself when he told Western correspondent s at the April 1977 press conference in Moscow : "At a time when authorities wanted to crush the Moscow and the Ukrainian Groups we hav e started our own Group to show our solidarity in this dangerous moment . 4 9 0rlov had had many ties with Armenia (he was corresponding member of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences, e .g .) and the press conferenc e was held in the apartment of General Petro Hryhorenko, a member o f both the Moscow and the Ukrainian Groups . Nazaryan was sincere i n stressing the motive of solidarity . Nevertheless, it might perhap s be argued that the main reason for the establishment of the Armenian Group was a recent shift in the attitudes that many Armenians ha d toward the Russians : traditionally anti-Turkish and anti-Islami c and, therefore, pro-Russian, in the 1960's and 1970's the Armenian s began to re-evaluate their position vis-a-vis the regime and th e Russians . 5 0

The composition of the Group reflected the range of thos e new attitudes . Eduard Arutyunyan had been born in Mountainou s Karabagh . The issue of the return of Mountainous Karabagh with it s overwhelming Armenian majority from under the rule of the Azerbaidzha n SSR to the Armenian SSR has constituted an increasingly bitter disput e between Armenian patriots and the central regime for decades , especially since the Azerbaidzhanis have mistreated the Armenia n population . 51 Some Armenians would raise the maximal demand for th e return of Western, Turkish occupied Armenia ; many Armenians woul d like the Soviet government to press the Turkish government t o acknowledge its guilt for the genocide of 1915, which it has refuse d to do for sixty-five years ; practically all Armenians cannot under - stand why the central Soviet government if it be genuinely intereste d in Armenian good will does not quickly transfer the Karabagh provinc e to Armenia . In the Armenian Helsinki Group Eduard Arutyunyan woul d press for a solution of the Karabagh problem . 5 2

Robert Nazaryan represented the great moral and quasi - political role of the Armenian Apostolic Church, which by and larg e appears to have succeeded in finding a modus vivendi with the Sovie t authorities . The Church has also played an important role in th e world-wide Armenian diaspora . Furthermore, as respected deacon o f that Church, Nazaryan was able to collect contributions in suppor t of Armenian.53 politica l prisoners

Osyan did not play any significant role--under pressure fro m the regime he became inactive . Ambartsum Khlgatyan had been a membe r of the small, secret, and ultimately suppressed Armenian Democrati c Union of the 1940's . The Union did not have any concrete territoria l or political goals besides introducing genuine democracy in Armenia . 1 3

Members of the Union argued that it was the Western democracies that had really won World War II, not Stalin, and that it was in th e interests of Armenia to learn from the United States and Great 5 4 Britain how to nominate and elect responsible democratic leaders . Khlgatyan appears to have remained faithful to the liberal and pro - Western ideas of his youth .

Shagen Arutyunyan was a founding member in 1966 of th e National United Party of Armenia (NOP) . The long-term goal o f nationalist NOP was : "the solution to the Armenian question : th e establishment of a national state governing the entire territory o f historic Armenia, the unification of all Armenians in diaspor a throughout the world into a territorially and governmentall y established homeland, and a national renaissance . " The firs t intermediate goal was the achievement of independence by Armeni a through a peaceful referendum in which "an absolute majority vot e of the population of Armenia as well as citizens of Armenia temporaril y living in other countries" would decide whether or not Armenia woul d secede from the Soviet Union . The regime clamped down hard sendin g the NOP activists to jail and prison camp for many years . 5 5

What did the Armenian Group do? It issued seven documents , including the almost desperate final appeal to Armenians abroad o f February 8, 1978, starting with the possibly premature statement : "The Armenian Helsinki Group has been crushed . "56 The followin g general points can be made : First, the quality of the documents , particularly that of the first declaration and of the announcemen t (or memorandum) to the Belgrade Conference and of its supplement i s high . The documents bristle with facts, contain closely reasone d arguments . Second, as in the case of the Ukrainian Group, human an d national rights are considered inextricably intertwined . The initial Declaration is particularly effective in that it presents thirtee n concrete demands often firmly anchored with legal references : demands 1-5 are general human rights (e .g ., point 1 : " to defend the civic, political, economic, social, cultural and other right s and freedoms which are inherent to human dignity and are vital fo r man's free and full development " ) whereas points 6-9 present specifically Armenian demands (point 6 : " free movement in and ou t of the country .. . but coo perating all the while with th e activities aimed at encouraging the concentration of Armenians withi n the boundaries of the Armenian Republi c " ; point 7 on the admission of the Armenian SSR to the UN ; point 8 on the reintegration of Karabag h and Nakhichevan ; point 9 on more widespread use of Armenian as a state language . Points 10-13 are more instrumental and procedura l in (e .g ., point 12, on assembling, studying and circulatin g data relative to the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act) . Thirdly, the most urgent concern of the Armenian Group, to judg e from the third paragraph of the Declaration and from the repeate d appeal for collections of February 1976 with a postscript of May 197 7 is to help the fourteen jailed victims of the nine secr et politica l trials of 1973-1974, which involved members and sympathizers of NOP . 1 4

What has the Soviet government done? The Soviet nationalit y policy in the 1960's and 197 0 ' s (especially under Brezhnev) has been rather harsh toward any demands for cultural and political autonom y that have been raised by the non-Russian elites and peoples . Th e German scholar Gerhard Simon sees in the regime ' s policy a reaction to the growing national consciousness of the non-Russians :

The harsher tones and the restrictive measures, too , .. . are to a large extent a reaction of the leader- ship to a growing national self-consciousness and t o the increasing expectations of the peoples, who do no t really (gerade nicht) see their future in a pushin g back of the particular and specific, but in thei r acknowledgment and development . 5 7

On the other hand, one could argue that the " growing national self - consciousness and the increasing expectations " of the non-Russian peoples in the USSR stem from their long-range demographic, educa- tional-cultural and socio-economic development under Soviet rule , that they have been stimulated by the growth of nationalism i n Eastern Europe and the Third World and that to a large extent the y constitute a reaction to the impatience with which the Soviet regime since the late 1950's—and especially since 1961--has tried to brin g about linguistic assimilation and maximum politico-administrativ e unity in the name of " the Soviet people, a new historical community . " In any case, though the central government in the fore- seeable future might perhaps win the war of assimilation and inte- gration with respect to the Belorussians, e .g ., and fight it to a draw with the Ukrainians, it has already lost several importan t battles : the new USSR constitution of 1977 circnmscribes mor e narrowly the position of the Union republics, but does not abolis h them altogether, and the right of secession has not been eliminated ; 58 furthermore, after a language demonstration in Georgia and somewha t more discreet requests by Armenian Party authorities, the new stat e constitutions of the Georgian, Armenian, and also of the Azerbaidzhan i SSR have retained references to the indigenous languages bein g " state languages " --the assimilators tried to eliminate that anomal y in the draft constitutions, but failed . 59 Though those battles too k place in 1977 and 1978, the battle lines had been drawn long befor e the establishment of the Helsinki Watch Committees in the non-Russia n republics .

Before the establishment of the Helsinki Groups there ha d been, roughly speaking, an elite human rights movement centered i n Moscow and more broadly based, perhaps even mass-based, nationalis t and religious movements in the republics . The relatively narrow human rights movement did have a sprinkling of non-Russian associate s in the republics (e .g ., Rudenko in the Ukraine, Gamsakhurdia in Georgia) but those ties were personal rather than representative o f the republican concerns, accidental rather than systematic . In the 1 5

Helsinki movement in the Soviet Union for the first time in th e history of Soviet nationality relations the liberal dissident elite s from Russia and from four non-Russian republics organized in independen t Helsinki Watch Committees started cooperating with each other on a systematic basis using the Helsinki Accords for legitimizing thei r activity . It did not matter that in achieving a synthesis of concer n for both individual human and collective nationality rights the Sovie t Helsinki, activists might have stretched Principles VII and VIII o f Basket I beyond the limits envisaged by the cautious diplomat-lawyer s who had drafted them--the Soviet Helsinki monitors, Russian and non- Russian alike--acted very much in the spirit of the Universa l Declaration of Human Rights and the two International Covenant s referred to in Principle VII . Above all, by acting together th e Helsinki monitors challenged the old imperial principle of " divid e and rule" and thus--viewed in a long prospective—constituted a serious danger to the continued stability of the , officially known as the Soviet Union .

The Soviet government could also not ignore the internationa l implications . The Helsinki Final Act was a solemn statement o f intentions signed by 35 countries, which--ironically--has bee n exceedingly well publicized externally and internally by the Sovie t government itself . Then in August 1975 an anonymous group of Sovie t dissenters who may or may not have been identical with some of th e Helsinki monitors persuaded an American Congressional delegation tha t it would be a good idea to set up monitoring commissions . The resul t of this idea, as re-shaped by Representative an d former US Senator Clifford P . Case, both of New Jersey, was th e establishment of the US Commission on Security and Cooperation i n Europe (CSCE) by June 1976 . This led at least some KGB investigator s to charge Orlov "with organizing the at th e behest of Congress" and with managing the Group "on the orders o f Congress and at the personal direction of Congressman Fascell," th e head of the US CSCE .60

The truth is different, but the role of the Western powers , particularly of the United States, in helping the Helsinki Watc h Committees in the USSR should not be ignored . They rendered th e Groups indispensable technical aid and also furnished them welcom e moral and diplomatic support . Many Soviet citizens heard about th e establishment of the Groups from Western radio : BBC, Deutsche Welle , Voice of America, and particularly, Radio Liberty . As to moral support, the US CSCE held hearings on the Helsinki Monitors in th e Soviet Union to which it invited as witnesses such recent émigrés a s Tomas Venclova63 ,61 Lyudmilla Alekseeva,62, Aleksand r Ginzburg, Petr Vins, 6 4 who had joined the Groups in the USSR . The Commissio n has been very energetic and active in publishing the documents o f the Groups, at US Government expense . Above all, members and staf f of the US CSCE were made delegates to the Belgrade review conferenc e in 1977-78 where-though behind closed doors-they helped to criticize 1 6

the Soviet delegates for specific violations of the Helsinki Fina l Act (a complex subject that really calls for separate treatment) . 6 5 Furthermore, from the Soviet point of view, to add insult to injury , the emergence of the Helsinki Watch Committees appears to hav e reinforced the activity of the generally nationalist and anti-Soviet emigré communities (the well-organized Balts in Sweden and th e United States, e .g .) . The latter prevented in 1975 President For d from recognizing de jurethe incorporation of the int o the USSR and helped him inaugurate Radio Liberty broadcasts in al l three Baltic languages in September 1975 . 66 A group of Ukrainian- Americans formed the Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee i n Washington, D .C .--Rudenko was in contact with that group, transmitte d to it some Ukrainian Group documents for publication, and its hea d Dr . Zwarun was invited to testify on behalf of the Ukrainian Grou p before the US CSCE . 67 Another prominent Ukrainian-American witnes s on more general questions was Professor Lev E . Dobriansky long-time President.68 of the Ukrainian Congress Committee o f America

In an apparent attempt to nip the development of the Helsink i Groups in the bud, the Soviet government resorted to a combinatio n of relatively non-violent and relatively violent measures, not al l of which were successful . An unsuccessful but very imaginativ e attempt was that of KGB major Albert Molok who on three occasion s in early April 1977 offered to former Estonian political prisone r Erik Udam half a million rubles in expense money if Udam would se t up a bogus Estonian dissident committee and establish contact wit h American diplomats in Moscow . Udam diplomatically refused and t o protect himself publicized the attempt through the Lithuanian Group . 6 9 Tomas Venclova January 25, 1977, was given a Soviet passport vali d for 5 years to enable him to accept a teaching position at th e University of California . In the United States Venclova, however , continued to actively represent the work of the Lithuanian Group , was subsequently deprived of Soviet citizenship . 70 Lyudmilla Alekseeva was allowed to emigrate to the U .S . with her husband and one son February 22, 1977 . She has continued her work as the Moscow Group's Official Representative Abroad . 71 Gen . Hryhorenko also wa s allowed to leave the country in November 1977, then stripped of hi s Soviet citizenship in February 1978 . 7 2

On the other hand, Aleksandr Ginzburg was arrested February 3 , 1977 ; Mykola Rudenko and Oleksii Tykhy were arrested February 5, 1977 ; Dr . Yuri Orlov was arrested February 10, 1977 ; April 7, 1977, wa s arrested the head of the Georgian Group, Gamsakhurdia ; in August , 1977, came the turn of Petkus, the de facto head of the Lithuania n Group ; Nazaryan of the youngest Armenian Group, was arreste d December 1977.73

It would be both very depressing and idle to chronicle th e persecution of all the 68 active Helsinki Group Members . 74 Mor e interesting are some subtle and not so subtle measures used by the 1 7

KGB to combat the Helsinki monitors . At first the Helsinki monitor s would be tried for anti-Soviet agitation and similar political offenses . . This left them at least the dignity of being officially recognize d as prisoners of conscience . More recently the Soviet prosecutio n has lodged against them ordinary criminal charges, some very nasty , but none very plausible . 75 The regime has offered deals to some o f the most prominent dissidents . Rudenko, who had been a very high Party official (the Secretary of the Ukrainian Writers Union unde r Stalin, 1947-1950), and who suffers from a festering wound goin g back to World War II, was given a very harsh sentence : seven years in labor camp . But he was not immediately shipped off to serve hi s term: the regime wanted to obtain a confession from him in retur n for a reduced sentence but failed . 76 On the other hand, Zvia d Gamsakhurdia, who admittedly had previously been the subject o f three assassination attempts--twice with poison gas--confesse d almost everything at his trial in May 1978, repented, and incriminate d one American diplomat and several Western news correspondents . For cooperating with the prosecution, Gamsakhurdia was sentenced to thre e years of labor camp and two years of exile but was pardoned at th e end of June 1979 . For discrediting himself and attempting to dis- credit the Georgian Helsinki movement, Gamsakhurdia was not onl y pardoned but may have won additional concessions : Soviet artiller y would no longer train their gunners in an area containing invaluabl e ancient Georgian cave monasteries, the authorities would prosecut e a corrupt bishop of the Georgian Church whom they had stubbornl y tolerated . Possibly there were also concessions on Georgian remainin g the "state language"of Georgia (in the latter case the street demon - stration of April 14, 1978, helped immensely) .77 Finally, and mos t disturbingly, it should be mentioned that some opponents of the Sovie t regime have been killed under mysterious circumstances and tha t attempts have been made to intimidate through them members of th e Helsinki Groups.78

Clearly, the Soviet government has set its course on a tota l suppression of the Helsinki Groups, their total destruction by hoo k or by crook . In a way this is understandable for the Helsink i monitors are undermining the legitimacy of the present Soviet order with the help of Western governments and nations . But in the long run the present course of the Soviet government is bound to hav e 'tragic consequences for the peoples of the Soviet Union ; for it is i n the Helsinki Groups that some of the most . reasonable and moderat e dissenters, both Russian and non-Russian, have found their vocation . If the moderates are destroyed, who will take their place in an eventual transformation of the Soviet Union? 1N

NOTE S

1For the text of the Final Act see "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE], Final Act (Helsinki, August 1, 1975) , " [US] Department of State Bulletin, Vol . 73, No . 1888 (September l , 1975), pp . 323-350 . Three good interpretations are Harold S . Russell , "The Helsinki Declaration : Brobdingnag or Lilliput?, " American Journal of International Law [AJIL], Vol . 70, No . 2 (April 1976) , pp . 242-272 ; A . H . Robertson, "The Helsinki Agreement and Huma n Rights," Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol . 53, No . 1 (Oct . 1977), pp . 34-48 ; and " The Helsinki Accord , " The Review of the International Commissio n of Jurists, No . 18 (June 1977),pp . 15-18 . Russell, an Assistan t Legal Advisor for European Affairs, Department of State, was th e principal U .S . negotiator for the Helsinki Declaration on Principle s Guiding Relations between Participating States . Robertson i s Professeur Associé, University of Paris I, formerly Director o f Human Rights, Council of Europe, Strasbourg . All three, Russel l (pp . 246-49), Robertson (pp . 34-35), and the International Commissio n of Jurists Review (p . 15) stress the fact that the Act is not bindin g in international law . A very interesting comprehensive article i s by McDougal, Myres S . et alii, "Human Rights and World Public Order : Human Rights in Comprehensive Context , " Northwestern University La w Review, Vol . 72 (May/June 1977), pp . 227-307 .

2Russell, loc . cit ., p . 269 .

3See " International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultura l Right s " and " International Covenant on Civil and Political Right s " in AJIL, Vol . 61, No . 3 (July 1967), pp . 861-890 . President Carte r signed both documents (see N .Y . Times, 6 October 1977, p . 2) bu t the US Senate has not consented to the convenants as of the time o f writing (June 1980) .

4"CSCE : Final Act , " loc . cit ., p . 325 .

5 lb id .

6 Russell, loc . cit ., p . 269 .

7 lbid ., p . 268 .

8 lbid ., p . 270 .

9 Compare, e .g ., the extensive coverage in Pravda, August 1 , 1975, pp . 1-3, and Aug . 2, 1975, pp . 1-6, including full text o f agreement on pp . 2-6, with the relatively skimpy coverage in N .Y . Times, August l, and 2, 1975 . N2

10 See "CSCE: Final Act , " loc . cit . (Note 1, above), p . 349 .

11 See "Ob obrazovanii Obshchestvennoi Gruppy Sodeistvii a Vypolneniiu Khel'sinkskikh Soglashenii v SSSR," of May 12, 1976 , in Samisdat - Archiv, e .V ., Sobranie dokumentov samizdata, Vol . 3 0 [SDS 301, pp . 3-5 .

12See Document No . 1 (May 18, 1976), " The Case of Mustaf a Dzhemilev, a Crimean Tatar ; and Doc . No . 9, (Oct . 12, 1976), "The fate of Jews in the village of Ilinki , " both listed in Dr . Boiter' s introduction in SDS 30, p . 2 .

13 See the following documents : #10 (Nov . 10, 1976) , "Repression of the Crimean Tatars" ; #12 (Dec . 2, 1976), "Ukrainian refugees" ; #15 (Dec . 8, 1976), "Dismissal of seven students from Vilnius school" ; #18 (Jan . 14, 1977), " The situation of th e Meskhetian " ; #19 (Jan . 10, 1977), "Disruption of Moscow seminar o n Jewish culture" ; #22 (Apr.-May 1977), " The right of ethnic Germans to emigrate " ; #24 (Nov . 4, 1977), "The discrimination agains t Crimean Tatars continue s " ; #28 (Dec . 31, 1977), "In defense of Petr Vins, Ukrainian Group member" ; #31 (Feb . 2, 1978), "In defense o f , Ukrainian Group member" ; #40 (March 15, 1978) , "On the case of A . Shcharansky" ; #41 (March 15, 1978), "Deprivatio n of P . Grigorenko's citizenshi p " ; #43 (April 6, 1978), "Discriminatio n against M . Dzhemilev upon his releas e " ; #59 (Aug . 20, 1978), "Trial of Levko Lukianenko, member of the Ukrainian Group " ; #60 (Sept . 2 , 1978), "Discrimination against Crimean Tatars continues" ; #7 9 (Jan . 25, 1979), "Persecution of the Helsinki Groups" ; 482 (Mar . 15 , 1979), "Flagrant violations of human freedoms and rights in th e Ukraine, Moscow, Leningrad, and Tashkent" ; 484 (Apr . 14, 1979) , "On the condition of Petr Vins who is making efforts to emigrate t o Canada" ; 493 (June 11, 1979), "Freedom to all imprisoned members o f the Helsinki Groups ! " ; and #99 (Aug . 1979), "Repressions on ideologica l grounds from August 1978 to August 1979 (main emphasis on repression s in the Ukraine . ") See Baiter, SDS 30, p . 2, for ## 10-51 and Mrs . L . Alekseeva's letter to Y . Bilinsky of November 7, 1979, fo r contents of subsequent documents .

14 See A . Baiter, SDS 30, p . 143 .

15 Wrote M . Rudenko : " As far as my political views wer e concerned, that question was not discussed at all . A . D . Sakharo v and V . F . 'urchin possess such a broad perspective and such tolerance , which make them genuine democrats . " See Rudenko, Ekonomichni Monolohy (New York : Suchasnist ' , 1978), p . 106n . ; emphasis in original . N3

16 Reference is to the declaration and the eighteen memoranda of the Ukrainian Group . It should be noted, however, that Memorand a Nos . 3, 10, 12-17 have not reached the West as of June 1980 . 17 See excerpt from letter in Smoloskyp, press releas e (in Ukrainian) of May 30, 1977, p . 2. In his letter to Y . Bilinsky of June 2, 1980, p . l, Mr . Osyp Zinkewych, one of the editors o f Smoloskyp, has identified this extract as coming from a letter fro m M. Rudenko to Dr . A . Zwarun .

18 See , Internationalism or Russification ? (London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968) . See also the underground Ukrainian Herald (especially Dissent in Ukraine : The Ukrainian Herald Issue 6 [of March 1972] [Baltimore : Smoloskyp, 1977] and Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the USSR : The Ukrainian Herald Issue 7- 8 [of Spring 1974] [Baltimore : Smoloskyp, 1976]) . The neo-Marxis t told at a hearing in the US Congress : "Most of the people who are labeled as bourgeois nationalists [in the Ukraine ] are only demanding that their culture be permitted to develop freely . In this instance I am more Catholic than the Pope himself, becaus e I believe that the development of Ukrainian culture is utopian withi n the framework of the Soviet Union . Therefore, I am for the secessio n of the Ukraine from the Soviet Union .. . " (See US Congres s [94th : 2nd session], House of Representatives, Committee o n International Relations, Subcommittee on International Organizations , Hearing : Psychiatric Abuse of Political Prisoners in the Sovie t Union--Testimony by Leonid Plyushch [March 30, 1976], p . 22) . Secondary literature on Ukrainian dissent in the 1970's is rathe r voluminous . See, among others, Julian Birch, " The Nature an d Sources of Dissidence in Ukraine, " in Peter J . Potichnyj, ed . , Ukraine in the Seventies (Oakville, Ont . : Mosaic Press, 1975) , pp . 307-330 ; Bohdan Bociurkiw, " Soviet Nationalities Policy an d Dissent in the Ukraine," The World Today, Vol . 30 (May 1974), pp . 214-226 ; Wsewolod W . Isajiw, "Migratsiia do mist, suspi l ' ni zminy i rukh oporu na Ukraini , " in Suchasnist ' (Munich), Vol . 20, No . 1 (Jan . 1980), pp . 75-85 ; Jaroslaw Pelenski, " Shelest and His Perio d in Soviet Ukraine (1963-1972) : A Revival of Controlled Ukrainia n Autonomism , " in Ukraine in the Seventies, pp . 283-305 ; also Roman Szporluk, " The Ukraine and the Ukrainians , " in Zev Katz et alii, eds ., Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities (New York : Free Press, 1975) , pp . 21-48 . Very interesting and informative is the comprehensive recent article by Gerhard Simon, "Die nichtrussischen Völker in Gesellschaft und Innenpolitik der UdSSR , " Osteuropa, Vol . 29, No . 6 (June 1979), pp . 447-467 (see p . 464 on Ukrainian dissent) . See als o Y . Bilinsky : " The Communist Party of Ukraine After 1966, " in Ukraine in the Seventies, pp . 239-266 ; " Politics, Purge, and Dissent in the Ukraine since the Fall of Shelest , " in Ihor Kamenetsky, ed ., Nationalism and Hilmar'Rights : Processes of Modernization in the USS R (Littleton, Colo . : Libraries Unlimited, 1977), pp . 168-185 ; and "UkrainsPolitical'ky A s pirations of Dissenters in Ukraine , " i n istoryk (The Ukrainian Historian, Munich), Vol . 15, No . 1-3 (1978) , pp . 30-39 . N4

19 See Rudenko's open letter on Ukraine's participation in the Belgrade Conference and the creation of the Ukrainian [Helsinki ] Group, of November 14, 1976, in Komitet Hel'sinks'kykh Garanti i

, dlia Ukrainy, Vashington (Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee , Washington, USA), Osyp Zinkewych, comp ., Ukrains''kyi pravozakhysny i Hruprukhy: Dokumenty i materialy kyivs'koi Ukrains'koi Hromads'koi Spryiannia vykonanniu Hel'sinks'kykh Uhod (Baltimore : Smoloskyp , 1978), p . 17 . Source henceforth cited as UPR . Letter has been translated into English in Y . Bilinsky and Tönu Parming, The Helsink i Watch Committees in the Soviet Republics : Implications for the Sovie t Nationality Question (henceforth : HWC) (unpublished ms, March 1980) , pp . A-35 to A-38 .

20 See their announcement about the formation of the Ukrainia n Helsinki Group, reproduced in UPR, p: 10 . The relevant sentence s read : "We draw attention to the fact that those who on the territory of the Ukraine attempt to gather and transmit to the public informatio n about violations of human rights, and especially those who want t o transmit such information to heads of state--encounter extraordinaril y difficult obstacles . This contradicts both the spirit and the lette r of the Helsinki Accords .. . The creation of the Ukrainian Publi c Group under the circumstances which prevail in the Ukraine is an ac t of great manliness . "

21 The Ukrainian SSR signed both covenants March 20, 1968 , and ratified them in the fall of 1973--see Radians'ka Ukraina , Oct . 31, 1973, or Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, Dec . 1973 , p . 29 .

The resentment at being excluded from the Helsinki conference appears clearly in the first Declaration of the Ukrainian Group o f November 9, 1976 ; in Rudenko's Open Letter of November 14, 1976 ; and above all in the Group's Memorandum No . 2 (Concerning th e Participation of Ukraine in the Belgrade Conference, 1977), o f January 20, 1977 . Ukrainian text in UPR pp . 11-14, 15-17, and 99-102 . English translation in HWC, pp . A-09 ff ., A-35 ff ., an d A-39 ff ., or in US Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperatio n in Europe [US CSCE] Reports of Helsinki-Accord Monitors in the Sovie t Union : Documents of the Public Grou p s to Promote Observance of th e Helsinki Agreements in the USSR ..., [Vol . I], February 24, 1977 , pp . 96-98 (Declaration), US CSCE, Reports of Helsinki Accord s Monitors in the Soviet Union, Vol . III of the Documents of the Publi c Group to Promote Observance of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR . . ., November 7, 1978, pp . 130-133 .

23 On the data of Rudenk o ' s and Tykhy ' s arrests (Feb . 5, 1977 ) see Ukrainian Group Memorandum No . 4 - UPR, pp . 103-104 ; HWC, pp . A-4 4 to A-45 ; and US Congress (95th : 1st Session), Basket III : Imp lementa- tion of the Helsinki Accords : Hearings Before the CSCE .. . o n Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Vol . IV : Soviet Helsink i Watch, Reports on Repression June 3, 1977 ; U .S . Policy and Belgrade N5

23 (Continued ) Conference June 6, 1977 (Washington : US G .P .O ., 1977), pp . 69-70 . Ginzburg had been arrested earlier (Feb . 3, 1977), 0rlov was arreste d Feb . 10, 1977 - see US CSCE, Profiles : The Helsinki Monitor s (revised Dec . 10, 1979), pp . unnumbered . On Rudenko ' s and Tykhy' s trial, see UPR, pp . 265-342 .

24A full inventory of the documentary output of the Ukrainia n Group has not yet been made . According to the US CSCE the Group published through the late summer of 1979 over 30 declarations an d appeals and ten information bulletins (US CSCE, comp ., Fact Sheet : Update on the Soviet Helsinki Movement, rev . Dec . 10, 1979, pp . unnumbered) . UPR contains 56 documents exclusive of the information bulletins . Berdnyk ' s memoranda are apparently those numbered No . 5 and 7 . 25 See HWC, p . A-61 or US CSCE, Basket III Hearings, Vol . IV , pp . 75 ff ., or UPR, pp . 109 ff .

26Documents consulted at Prolog Research Corporation, Ne w York . They are being published .

27Bilinsky ' s interview with Mr . Petro Vins, September 30, 1979 .

28lnterview with Professor Tomas Venclova, October 11, 1979 . See also below .

29See Lituanus, Vol. 23 (No. 3, 1977), p. 57. 30 lnterview with Professor Tomas Venclova, October 11, 1979 .

31lbidem .

32Document No . 8 (June 2, 1977), "Persecution of the Vasilev Family, Russian Pentecostals Living in Vilnius, Lithuania, " in HWC , pp . A-92 to A-93 or US CSCE, Reports of Helsinki Accord Monitors i n the Soviet Union .. . , Vol . III (7 November 1978), pp . 163-64 .

33Document No . 6 (March 19, 1977), "On Discrimination Agains t the Volga Germans in the USSR, " in HWC, p . A-90 or US CSCE, Ibid . , p . 161 . 34 Document No . 1 (November 25, 1977), " On the Situation o f Two Lithuanian Catholic Bishops, " in HWC, pp . A-84 to A-85 ; als o SDS 30, pp . 67-68, and US CSCE, Reports of the Helsinki-Accord Monitor s in the SovietUnion ... [Vol . I] (February 24, 1977), p . 121 . Not e that only the SDS 30 version has Alekseeva's and Orlov's cosignatures , which have, however, been authenticated by Tomas Venclova . Technicall y the document is counted as one of the Lithuanian, not the Moscow Group . Secondly, Moscow Group Document No . 15 (December 8, 1976), "On the

N6

34 (Continued ) Expulsion of 7 Students from Venuolis High School (Vilnius), From the Lithuanian Public Group to Promote Observance of the Helsink t i Accords in the USSR," signed by L . Alekseeva and Tomas Venclova , see US CSCE, Reports of Helsinki-Accord Monitors in the Soviet Union .. . , Vol . II (June 3, 1977), pp . 32-33 . Technically, this is a documen t of the Moscow Group alone, de facto it is a joint document . L . Alekseev a has vividly told the story of this last document in her first testimon y before the US CSCE, June 3, 1977—see US Congress (95th : 1st Session) , CSCE, Basket III : Implementation of the Helsinki Accords , Hearings .. . on the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Vol . IV : Sovie t Helsinki Watch, Reports on Repression June 3, 1977 ..., (Washington, 1977), pp . 34-36 .

35The initial declaration, the 12 first documents and the 2 Belgrade declarations have been reproduced in HWC, pp . A-82 to A-11 5 or see US CSCE, Reports ..., Vol . I, pp . 120-23 ; Vol . III, pp . 158-76 ; and US CSCE, The Right to Know, the Right to Act . Documents o f Helsinki Dissent from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (May 1978) , pp . 96-103 . On Document No . 14 see Jonas Papartis, "Lithuania n Helsinki Group Issues New Document," Radio Liberty Researc h RL 162/79 (May 29, 1979) and on No . 18--same, "Lithuanian Helsinki Group Arrest of Terleckas, " RL 15/80 (Jan . 8, 1980) .

36 See Documents No . 3 (December 23, 1976), "In Defense o f Mart Niklus" ; No . 7 (, 1977), "On Erik Udam and KGB Attempt s to Enlist Him as a 'Dissident" and No . 11 (June 26, 1977), "On the Persecution of Enn Tarto"--see HWC, pp . A-87 to A-87a, A-91 and A-99, or US CSCE, Reports . . . , Vol . III, pp . 158, 162, 168 .

37 Interview with Professor Tomas Venclova, Oct . 11, 1979 .

38 See on this the following secondary sources : V . Stanley Vardys, ed ., Lithuania Under the Soviets (New York : Praeger, 1965) ; Algirdas Budreckis, "Lithuanian Resistance, 1940-52," in Alberta s Gerutis, ed ., Lithuania 700 Years (New York : Maryland, 1969) ; Tönu Parming, "Contrasts in Nationalism in the Soviet Balti c " (Pape r given at the 15th annual meeting of . the Southern Conference on Slavi c Studies, University of Virginia, 21-23 October 1976) . Also se e V . Stanley Vardys, The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality i n Soviet Lithuania(Boulder, Colo . : East European Quarterly, distribute d by Columbia University Press, 1978) ; and Thomas Remeikis, " Political Developments in Lithuania during the Brezhnev Era, " in George W . Simmonds, ed ., Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Er a of Brezhnev and Kosygin (Detroit : University of Detroit Press, 1977) .

39" Announcement of Formation and Statement," last paragrap h of statement, in HWC, p . A-82 or US CSCE, Reports .. ., Vol . I, p . 120 . N 7

40 "Statement to the Belgrade Conference on the Presen t Situation in Lithuania (July 17, 1977)," 1st Paragraph, in HWC , p . A-108 or US CSCE, The Right to Know... Documents... (May 1978), p . 96 .

41 According to the 1959 population census, there were 407,88 6 Russians living in Georgia where they accounted for 10 .l% of th e total population . The 1970 census listed 396,694 (8 .5%) Russians . The 1979 census showed only 372,000 (7 .4%) Russians . See Richard B . Dobson, " Georgia and the Georgians, " in Katz et alii, eds ., Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities, Table 8 .1, p . 168 and Ann Sheehy, " Data from the Soviet Census of 1979 on the Georgians an d the Georgian SSR," Table 5, p . 10, in Radio Liberty Researc h RL 162/80 (May 2, 1980), RLB, Vol . 24, No . 19 (May 9, 1980) . Fo r interpretations of modern nationalism in Georgia see, above all , Ronald Grigor Suny, Soviet Georgia in the Seventies, 14 pp . (Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies Occasional Paper No . 64 , May 15, 1979, prepared for the conference on the Soviet Caucasu s co-sponsored by the US International Communication Agency, th e Kennan Institute, and the Wilson Center) and Mark Kipnis, "Th e Georgian National Movement : Problems and Trends, " Crossroad s (Jerusalem), Autumn 1978, pp . 193-215 . Suny develops the idea o f "the demographic, political, and cultural re-nationalization of th e Georgians," particularly after 1953 (p . 4) .

42" On the Persecution of V . Rtskhiladze (Press Release) , " March 1977, see SDS 30, pp . 75-76 ; HWC, pp . A-156 and A-157 ; or US CSCE, The Right to Know .. . (May 1978), pp . 104-105 .

43Notably the movements of the Georgian Meskhetians in the 1960's, the Georgian Jews (since 1969), the Initiative Group fo r the Defense of Human Rights in Georgia (since the summer of 1974) . Gamsakhurdia, Kostava and Rtskhiladze belonged to the last group .

44 See " Zviad Gamsakhurdia's Letter to Minister of Cultur e of the Georgian SSR O[tar] Taktakishvili, First Deputy Minister o f Culture N . Gurabanidze, " February 28, 1977—see HWC, p . A-158 o r AS 3115 in Materialy samizdata (MS), No . 4/78 (Jan . 20, 1978) ; secondly, " Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava : V . Zhvaniia ha s been Sentenced for Bombings , " March 19, 1977, see HWC, pp . A-159 t o A-161 or AS 3114 in MS, No . 4/78 .

45 See extract from Khronika tekushchikh sobytii, No . 44 (March 16, 1977)(New York : Khronika Press, 1977), p . 27 . In HWC , p . A-155 or SDS 30, p . 74 . Incidentally, unlike Drs . rlov an d Sakharov, the Goldshtein brothers have a so-called kandida t degree (junior Ph .D .) . N8

46 According to a very competent and careful oral source , neither of the two had really joined the Group . Mrs . Pailodz e belonged, however, to the kindred Initiative Group for the Defens e t of Human Rights in Georgia .

47 He was dismissed March 9, 1977 . See Note 42, above .

48 See, above, all, "Attempts to Russify the University o f Tbilisi" and "Russification of One Department of the Academy of Ar t" in Georgian Herald, No . 1, pp . 16-18, translated in HWC, pp . A-13 5 to A-138 . The Georgian writer Revaz Dzhaparidze eloquentl y publicized those issues at the Eighth Congress of Georgian Writer s in April 1976—see " Georgian Writer Speaks out Against Russification, " Radio Liberty Special Report RL 406/76 or AS No . 2583, MS 23/7 6 (July 14, 1976), also Suny, on . cit ., pp . 7-8 .

49See UPI dispatch from Moscow, April 4, 1977.

50See the following interpretative articles : (1) Mary K . Matossian, " Armenia and the Armenians, " in Katz et alii eds ., Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities, pp . 143-160 ; (2) Vahakn D . Dadrian, "Nationalism in Soviet Armenia--a Case Study of Ethnocentrism , " in Simmonds, ed ., Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Euro p e . . ., (3) Garo Chichekian, " Recent Trends in the Distribution and Ethni c Homogeneity of the Armenians in the U .S .S .R . : A Brief Statistica l Survey , " Armenian Review [AR] , Vol . XXVIII, No . 3-111 (Autumn 1975) , pp . 325-331 ; (4) Ann Sheehy, "Armenians Increase Their Share o f the Population of the Armenian SSR , " RL 39/80 in RLB, Vol . 24, No . 5 (February 1, 1980), (5) See also a very interesting and importan t piece by Haig Sarkissian, "An Eyewitness Account : 30th Anniversar y of the Turkish Genocide as Observed in Erevan, " AR, Vol . XIX , No . 4-76 (Winter 1966), pp . 23-28 . 51 See the following p rimary sources on Karabagh : (1) "Appeal to Khrushchev by the Armenians of Mountainous Karabagh , " see AR , XXI/3-83 (Autumn 1968), pp . 61-66 or HWC, pp . A-183 to A-187--in Armenian, see Levon Mrktchian, Hairenakan dzainer (Munich : Institut für armenische Fragen, 1978), pp . 26-34 ; (2) E . H . Hovhanissian ' s letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Sovie t Union,XX/1-77 between Nov . 25, 1964 and April 24, 1965--see AR , (Spring 1967), pp . 64-71 ; HWC, pp . A-188 to A-194 ; Mrktchian, PP - 47-56 ; (3) " The Appeal of the Armenians of Artsakh to the People and Leaders of Armenia [1967], " HWC, pp . A-195 to A-198 ; Mrktchian , pp . 91-96 ; (4) " A Letter-Document on the Conditions of the Armenian s of Artsakh [1972] , " HWC, pp . A-199 to A-202 ; Mrktchian, pp . 104-110 ; and (5) " Cero Khanzadian ' s Letter to Brezhnev about Karabagh [1978?] , " HWC, pp . A-203 to A-205, document courtesy of Professor Vahakn N . Dadrian . Among the secondary sources should be mentioned : (l ) Dr . James H . Tashjian, " The Problem of Karabagh (Annex to a Memorandu m Addressed to the Soviet Union, the United Nations and the Peoples o f the World)," AR, =I/1-81 (Spring 1968), pp . 3-49 ; (2) V . N . Dadrian, N9

"Those Audacious Armenians, " Christian Science Monitor, January 10 , 1978 ; (3) Raymond H . Anderson, "Armenians Ask Moscow for Help , Charging Azerbaidzhan with Bias, " N .Y . Times, December 11, 1977 ; (4 ) Ronald G . Suny, "Historical Perspectives on the Regions of Karabagh and Nakhichevan , " public lecture Southfield, Michigan, March 17, 1978 . 52 Interview with Mr . Ambartsum Khlgatyan, September 26, 1979 .

53See "Supplement [to Appeal to Armenians Abroad, o f February 8, 1978] : A Collection to Aid Political Prisoners an d Their Families," February 1976, PS of May 1977," US CSCE, Report s Helsinki Monitors III, pp . 182-183 ; HWC, pp . A-181 to A-182 . 54 lnterview with Mr . Ambartsum Khlgatyan, September 26, 1979 .

55On the NOP see David Kowalewski, "The Armenian Nationa l Unity Party : Context and Program," AR, XXXI/4-124 (April 1979) , pp . 362-70 . A report on the activity of NOP on pp . 364-70 , quotations from pp . 365-366 . See also "Secret Political Trials in Soviet Armenia : 'An Unendorsed Communique,'" AR, XXXI/3-12 3 (March 1979), pp . 265-302 which reproduces materials from the 2n d Airikyan trial of October 1974, at which he was sentenced to seve n years of prison camp and three years of exile .

56See the following documents of the Armenian Group : (1 ) "Declaration," April 1, 1977 - Mrktchian, pp . 122-127 ; SDS 30 , pp . 78-81 ; (2) "Announcement to Belgrade Conference," June 1977- - US CSCE, The Right to Know... (May 1978), pp . 106-112 ; SDS 3 0 pp . 85-94, (3) " To Delegates of the Belgrade Conference and Armenia n Fellow-Countrymen, Supplement , " September 12, 1977, US CSCE, Report s of Helsinki Accord Monitors, III (Nov . 7, 1978), p . 177 ; (4) " Statemen t of Armenian Helsinki Group Member Robert Nazaryan with a Request fo r Acceptance into the Helsinki Agreement Implementation Group, " Oct . 26, 1977--see ibid ., p . 178 ; (5) "An Appeal to the Presidium o f the of the Armenian SSR, " December 4, 1977--ibid ., pp . 179-180 ; (6) "An Appeal to Armenians Abroad, " February 8, 1978-- ibid ., p . 181 (citation in text is from this document) ; and No . 7-- see Note 53, above . All those documents have been reproduced in HWC, pp . A-163 to A-182 . 57 Simon, loc . cit . (note 18, above), p . 454 . The American secondary literature on the Soviet nationality question is voluminous . Singled out should be : (1) Pipes, Richard, The Formation of th e Soviet Union : and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (New York : Atheneum, 1968, rev . ed .) ; (2) Allworth, Edward, ed ., Soviet Nationality Problems (New York : Columbia University Press, 1971) ; (3) Katz, Zev et alii, eds . Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities (New York : Free Press, 1975) ; (4) Kamenetsky, Ihor, ed ., Nationalism and Huma n Rights : Processes of Modernization in the USSR (Littleton, Colo .: Libraries Unlimited, 1977 ; published for Association for the Stud y of the Nationalities [USSR and East Europe]) ; (5) Azrael, Jeremy R ., N1 0

57 (Continued ) ed ., Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices (New York : Praeger , 1978) ; (6) Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone's illuminating article, "Th e Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR , " Problems of Communism , Vol . 23, No . 3 (May-June 1974), pp . 1-12 . In French literature , eclatéindispensable is D'Encausse, Helene Carrère, L'Empire la révolte des nations en U .R .S .S . (Paris : Flammarion, 1978) . 58 Simon, pp . 454-455 and A . Shtromas, "The Legal Positio n of Soviet Nationalities and Their Territorial Units According to the 1977 Constitution of the USSR , " Russian Review, Vol . 37 (1978) , pp . 265-272 . 59 Best source is Ann Sheehy, "The National Languages an d the New Constitutions of the Transcaucasian Republics , " RL 98/7 8 in RLB, Vol . 22, No . 19 (May 12, 1978) . Mrs . Sheehy may, however , underestimate the importance of the language demonstration or near - riot in Tbilisi . See our HWC, pp . 5-63 to 5-65, 5-76 .

60Aleksandr Ginzburg's testimony before the US CSCE , May 11, 1979, see US Congress (96th : lst session), CSCE, Basket III : Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Hearing .. . on Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Vol . X: Aleksandr Ginzburg on the Huma n Rights Situation in the U .S .S .R. (Washington, 1979), p . 10 .

61 0n February 24, 1977, see US Congress (95th : 1st session) , CSCE, Basket III... , Hearings .. . on the Implementation of th e Helsinki Accords Vol . I : Human Rights, February 23 and 24, 1977 .. . (Washington, 1977), pp . 53-61 . 62 On June 3, 1977, see loc . cit . (note 34, above), pp . 29-37 .

63See note 60, above, pp . 8-21 .

64 0n July 19, 1979 . See US Congress (96th : lst session) , CSCE, Basket III... , Hearings .. . , Vol . XI . ... On Human Rights Violations in Ukraine, July 19, 1979 (Washington , 1979), pp . 121-138 .

65See, however, Dante B . Fascell, "Did Human Rights Surviv e Belgrade?," Foreign Policy, No . 31 (Summer 1978), pp . 104-118 and US Congress (95th : 2nd session), CSCE, The Belgrade Follow= Meetin g to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Euro p e : A Repor t and A ppraisal, transmitted to the Committee on International Relations , U .S . House of Representatives, May 17, 1978 (Washington, 1978), 105 pp .

66We have documented this at length in our HWC, pp . 3-9 ff .

67 0n February 24, 1977 . See Note 61, above, pp . 62-76 .

N1 1

68 0n April 28, 1977 . See US Congress (95th : 1st session) , CSCE, Basket III... , Vol . II : Religious Liberty and Minorit y Rights in the Soviet Union, April 27 and 28, 1977 .. . (Washington , 3 1977), pp . 134-162 . 69 See its document No . 7, as cited in Note 36, above . 70 US CSCE, Profiles : The Helsinki Monitor s (rev . Dec . 10 , 1979), unpaged . See also Note 61, above, documenting Venclova' s appearance before the US CSCE .

71 Profiles ...

72lbid .

73 lbid .

74Number as of December 1979 . See HWC, pp . A-02 to A-0 6 for details .

75For instance, in February 1979, Vasyl Ovsienko, an associat e of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group was sentenced to three years " for resisting the militia in the performance of their dut y"--see AS No . 3594 , MS 18/79 . January 21, 1980 another associate of that Group , got five years for "attempted rape"--Svoboda (Jersey City , N .J .), January 31, 1980, p . l . June 3, 1980, there started a tria l in Yakutsk. The defendant is the well-known responsible Ukrainia n dissident journalist and new [since the fall of 1979] Ukrainia n Group member . The charge is rape . (Svoboda , June 5, 1980, p . l) . June 6, 1980, Chornovil was sentenced to fiv e years of labor camp (ibid ., June 11, 1980, p . l) .

76See the of his wife Raisa in MS, 15/78 (April 18 , 1978) and the article of his friend Gen . Hryhorenko, " Nezlamni . . . ," Part 2, Svoboda, Nov . 24, 1979, p . 2 .

77We have discussed Gamsakhurdia's involved career in detail in HWC, pp . 5-54 to 5-59 and 5-65 to 5-69 .

78There is first the secret trial and exceedingly hast y execution of three Armenians (Stepan S . Zatikyan, Akop Stepanyan and Zoven Bagdasaryan) in the last days of January 1979 : They had been accused of causing an explosion in the Moscow subway January 8 , 1977, which killed several passengers (see on this especially 's lengthy expose, Stepan Zatikyan, Akop Stepanyani Zoven Bagdasaryan prigovoreny k smertnoi kazni po stal'sifitsirovany m obvineniam (February-May 1979), AS No . 3676, in MS 28/78) . Shagen Arutyunyan of the Armenian Helsinki Group had known Zatikyan as a co-founder of NOP, had been closely questioned in that affair . Or take the case of the very popular non-conformist Ukrainian roc k composer Ivasiuk . He left the Conservatory in the company o f N12

78 (Continued ) a stranger during Easter, April 22-24, 1979 . Within days the militi a began to speculate that he probably committed suicide . In about a month his body was discovered hanging high up in a tree in a forest . If the samizdat reports rather than the official version are correct , his eyes had been gouged out, which would make it the stranges t suicide ever (see " Ivasiuk Volodimir , " n .d ., n . place, MS No . 45/7 9 [December 24, 1979], 2 pp . AS No . 3800 .) Also "Big Brother i s Everywhere," TIME, June 23, 1980, p . 39 . Ukrainian Group member s Sichko father and son attend the funeral, give an oration, are soo n arrested and then jailed . On Dec . 4, 1979, Petro Sichko (Sr .) is sentenced to 3 years of severe regimen camp, Vasyl Sichko (Jr . ) to 3 years of moderate regimen camp . See Svoboda : TheUkrainia n Weekly, January 20, 1980, p . 1 and Smoloskyp, Vol . 2, No . 6 (Winte r 1980), p . 2 of Ukrainian inset .