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Title Citizens' Peace Movement in the Soviet Baltic Republics

Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2kk0x6vm

Journal Journal of Peace Research, 23(2)

ISSN 0022-3433

Author Taagepera, R

Publication Date 1986

DOI 10.1177/002234338602300208

Peer reviewed

eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California Citizens’ Peace Movement in the Soviet Baltic Republics*

REIN TAAGEPERA School of Social Sciences, University of California

A citizens’ peace movement emerged in the Soviet Baltic republics in January 1980, when about 23 Lithuanians, Estonians, and Latvians signed an antiwar declaration in the wake of Soviet military in- volvement in Afghanistan. The concern for peace was intertwined with, but distinct from, concerns for national autonomy, civil rights, and ecology. The movement culminated with a proposal in October 1981 that the Baltic republics be enclosed in the Nordic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. This proposal was signed by 38 Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians, in response to Brezhnev’s offer to consider some NWFZ-related measures ’applicable to our own territory’. At least five of the signatories have been jailed since then, and at least in one case the NWFZ proposal figured among the most incriminating char- ges. Despite some remaining problems of wording, the Baltic Letter on the NWFZ represented a major advance from uncompromising declaratory dissent toward advocacy of specific and negotiable mea- sures. The Baltic action preceded and partly inspired the formation of the now-defunct citizens’ peace group in , 1982. The demand for inclusion of the Baltic republics in the Nordic NWFZ was re- peated in a December 1983 letter by unnamed Estonian Peace Supporters to the Stockholm disarmament conference, in a rather declaratory style. Although the civil and religious rights movement remains strong in Lithuania, detentions seem to have broken up the Baltic citizens-initiative peace movement for the time being.

1. Introduction ance the NWFZ may present problems of its In early 1982 a rather unusual declaration by own, but some sort of balance would seem 38 Soviet Baltic residents reached Western to be necessary. Europe. Entering the perennial discussion The immediate catalyst for the Baltic pro- about the merits and feasibility of a Nordic posal was an interview in Finland’s Suomen Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, they gave the So.sialidemokraatti (16 June 1981) by the NWFZ proposal their full support - and Soviet head of state Leonid Brezhnev. The recommended that their own republics (Lat- latter not only offered ’negative security via, , and Lithuania) be included in guarantees’ to the Nordic members of the the NWFZ. From the vantage point of 1985, NWFZ (i.e., a promise not to use nuclear the declaration represents the high point of weapons against the NWFZ) but also added: non-governmental peace initiative in the ’...this does not preclude the possibility of Baltic republics and in some ways in the en- considering some other measures applicable tire . Furthermore, the propo- to our own territory in the region adjoining sal to add some Warsaw Pact territories to the nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe’. the NATO and neutral territories, which are Later (in November 1981) Brezhnev added usually envisaged for the Nordic NWFZ, in- that such measures could be ’substantial’ troduced an element of interbloc balance, (New Times, No. 27, 1981, pp. 8-9; Vaahto- the lack of which is a major reason why the ranta 1983, p. 57). NWFZ has not yet become a reality. The Brezhnev did not specify the measures in a way the 38 Baltic citizens proposed to bal- positive way but clearly indicated that all So- viet territories discussed would be ’adjoin- ing’ rather than part of the NWFZ. How- * This research was a supported by grant (No. 7-84) ever, the 38 Baltic citizens of the USSR from the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooper- were to the the ation, University of California. The strategic and for- willing expand scope beyond one of the Pre- eign policy aspects are discussed in more detail in offered by the Chairman Taagepera (1985). sidium of the Supreme Soviet. Their decla- 184

ration brought into the Nordic NWFZ de- land, and Sweden Concerning the Estab- bate a new constituency with a legitimate lishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in North concern. Europe,’ dated 10 October 1981: This article will discuss the content and implications of the 1981 Open Letter and of The peoples and the governments of North Europe are at present considering various aspects of the idea a later appeal to the Stockholm Disarma- of establishing a nuclear-free zone in North Eu- ment Conference of 1984. The in- potential rope, as expressed by the Chairman of the Pre- clusion of the Baltic republics in the Nordic sidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Here- NWFZ has many other aspects besides the with propose to supplement the above idea by in- the Baltic Sea and the Baltic countries - ones connected with citizens’ peace move- cluding Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania - in the above-men- ment. These have been discussed in aspects tioned nuclear-free zone. would another article (Taagepera 1985). It The extension of the nuclear-free zone to the Bal- be desirable to integrate the description of tic Sea and to the Baltic countries would be logical the Baltic peace movement into the theoret- because the area in question is actually part of North this would render a fu- ical framework of social movements and of Europe. Moreover, possible ture treaty all the more important because it would peace movements in the particular; present be a brilliant example of an equal and balanced dis- article supplies information for such an en- armament. The extension of the nuclear-free zone to deavor but does not try to carry it out. the Baltic Sea and to the Baltic countries would also The study of citizens-initiative actions in a be in the interest of the small Scandinavian and Bal- closed tic nations, more particularly by contributing to their society presents special methodolog- future survival. ical of the routine problems. Many proce- The Baltic nations have paid dearly for the Great dures for fact verification cannot be used. Power conflicts. Their sufferings were particularly The government-controlled local press deep during the Second World War when the front makes no mention of unauthorized initia- passed twice over their territories. Here it must be emphasized that the governments of the independ- tives, and mail and contact with telephone ent republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania or participants witnesses is practically unfea- made every effort to avoid involvement in the Great sible. Citizens’ statements surface abroad Power conflicts. The Baltic nations know, too, that through channels that cannot be checked the leaders of the Great Powers at that time ignored the wishes, the fate, and the of without risk of exposure of middlemen to completely opinions the Baltic peoples when they divided the area into Alteration heavy retaliation by authorities. their spheres of influence. A drastic example of this of information and even outright mystifica- is the Pact of 23 August 1939 between Nazi Ger- tion remain a possibility. The scholar either many and the USSR and its secret appendix which has not been in the USSR to this has to depend on the long-term reputation published day.’ Because of the above, we consider it extremely of the channels, or he has to discard much of important to devise guarantees which would help en- the information as not verifiable. directly sure the survival of small nations in case of possible The latter course may look more scholarly, Great Power conflicts. but it inevitably distorts the broad picture to We consider it natural and acceptable to all na- tions that an agreement concerning a nuclear-free the detriment of peace activists silenced by zone in North Europe would ban the production and the One has to strike a middle government. stationing of nuclear weapons as well as stationing road, cross-checking as much as possible by and movements of any means (ships, aircraft, missi- indirect means. les) designed to carry nuclear warheads in the ap- propriate territories of the High Contracting Parties 2. The 1981 Letter and in the Baltic Sea. Open We hope that the NATO and the Warsaw Pact In to Brezhnev’s offer of June 1981 response Powers will be able to guarantee the ban on nuclear to consider some unspecified territories and weapons in the nuclear-free zone in North Europe, measures, the 38 Soviet Baltic citizens pro- including the Baltic Sea and the Baltic countries. Such a ban on nuclear in one area would be posed specific ones, in the following ’Open weapons an important step towards the fulfillment of the Letter to the Heads of the Governments of greatest expectation of mankind - A COMPLETE the USSR, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Fin- DISARMAMENT.2 185

The letter was signed by 15 Latvians, 13 Es- the mainstream Nordic proponents of a tonians, and 10 Lithuanians, whose names NWFZ. and some personal characteristics are listed As the next step, reread the original text, by Taagepera (1985). They probably re- leaving out only the third paragraph (’The flected the preferences of a large fraction of Baltic nations have paid dearly... to this the Baltic population. Indeed, the desire to day’). This version adds the proposal to in- be included in a NWFZ has been voiced by clude the Baltic republics in the NWFZ in a so many people in Scandinavia, and sym- neutral way which antagonizes the Soviet bolic proclamations of a local NWFZ have Union as little as possible. (Some antag- been undertaken by so many individual cit- onization is inevitable as long as the Soviet ies, communes, parishes, counties and dis- Union keeps viewing any initiative by its cit- tricts in the United Kingdom, the Nether- izens as hostile.) lands, West Germany, and the United States It seems that such a version would be (Kalela & Vdyryncn 1983, p. 71) that it awkward from the viewpoint of many Nor- would be surprising if no people in the dic proponents of a NWFZ ranging from USSR had skeptical feelings about the Norway (or even Greenland) to the Baltic safety of a nuclear umbrella compared to Sea. Such a statement would be too close to that of a NWFZ. their own basic views to be mentally discar- As might be expected, many of the signers ded without qualms. But if they didn’t dis- of the NWFZ declaration had previously card the idea, then they would have to dis- signed letters on other topics, too. As in the cuss it, and such discussion could turn off case of the West German ‘Greens’, the vari- even the limited dialogue they have suc- ous social concerns tend to fuse, and this ceeded in establishing with the Soviet does not necessarily detract from the merit Union. Rather than aiming at an objectively of a particular protest or proposal. The col- ’equal and balanced disarmament’ on the lection of signatures from three different re- part of NATO and Warsaw Pact (to use the publics obviously preassumed some existing wording of the Baltic Letter), which could informal network. At least five of the sign- founder against one superpower’s intransi- ers have been arrested and sentenced for gence, it makes sense for them to aim at peaceful dissent activities involving no equal effort in both directions, even if it stronger ideas or language than the ones in should yield more concessions from one su- the letter above. The background of the 13 perpower than from the other. This is the Estonian signers is known in some detail way to maximize the total amount of conces- (Taagepera 1984). This background and la- sions made by the superpowers and hence to ter developments will be discussed in later make headway toward a Nordic NWFZ, as- sections. Let us first analyze the document suming of course that this approach does not itself. increase local security at the cost of imba- What kind of views does this Letter ex- lancing the wider system. press‘? Despite its shortness, several layers In face of such dilemma, the third para- can be distinguished. If all reference to the graph of the Open Letter comes as a real Baltic republics were omitted, the Letter godsend: the document can be branded ’re- would become a plea for the Nordic NWFZ vanchist’ and ’secessionist’ and thus can be to include the Baltic Sea. The result would ignored without qualms by the Nordic be very much in line with the shorter and NWFZ proponents - and can be used by simpler versions of Nordic peace appeals, Soviet authorities as a pretext for jailing the regardless of whether one agrees on the signers. In this sense, the inclusion of the technical feasibility of including the Baltic third paragraph was a mistake on the part of Sea. On that level the signers of the Letter the authors of the Open Letter. are very much on the same wavelength as The factual accuracy is here not an issue. 186

The point is that, accurate or not, the third toward advocacy of specific and negotiable paragraph detracts attention from the main measures. Sergei Batovrin, a founding issue. The case for including the Baltic re- member of the citizens-initiative peace group publics in the Nordic NWFZ does not de- formed later in Moscow, has confirmed that pend on what happened or did not happen in the Baltic Letter was the first peace action 1939 but on considerations of geography and by private Soviet citizens.~ As such, it repre- strategic balance. In fact, tactically it would sents a landmark: the first Soviet statement have been wiser for the Open Letter to analogous to those of various US commu- broaden their NWFZ proposal to the entire nities in favor of a local NWFZ. It differs Soviet Baltic coastline, including the Kali- from the latter in being geographically real- ningrad oblast and coastal portions of the izable, in principle. These observation re- Leningrad oblast, so as not to appear to de- main valid despite the composition flaws in- lineate the area on the basis of ethnic units dicated. or the Soviet borders of 1939.3 With NATO members Denmark and Norway included in 3. The background of the 1981 Open Letter the proposed NWFZ, some analogous con- What inspired the Baltic Open Letter, and cessions by the Warsaw Pact countries why did it come at the time it did? The im- would be expected before NATO could be mediate trigger was, as mentioned earlier, interested in the proposal - and the Soviet Brezhnev’s statement on Soviet territories Baltic coast may well be the only Warsaw adjacent to the Nordic NWFZ. There is no Pact area that reasonably could be included. evidence of direct contacts with peace activ- But that would be up to the governmental ists and NWFZ proponents in Scandinavia, negotiations to work out. but the Baltic activists certainly were aware Due to lack of practice of open discussion, of Scandinavian activities not only through statements by Soviet officials and Soviet dis- the filtered reports in the Soviet media but sidents tend to have one feature in common: also through Finnish television, which can they lack in nuances and abound in repe- be viewed in northern Estonia. Isolated titions of standardized main themes. After from the outside world since the Soviet take- Brezhnev coined the expression, Andropov over of the Baltic states, the Baltic popu- and lesser Soviet officials (but not Gorba- lation slowly became aware of the world- chev, as yet) repeated the vague liturgic wide issues during the 1970s. Given the rise wording of ’certain measures, and substan- of self-rule movements in places like Que- tial ones at that’ in Soviet territory adjacent bec and the Basque country and the pre- to the proposed Nordic NWFZ. Somewhat cedent of Baltic independence before 1940, in the same vein, the topic of the Baltic Let- one could not expect the national autonomy ter’s third paragraph has been a staple concerns to fade, but other concerns came theme for the Soviet Baltic civic activists. to be grafted on it.5 This inclusion made the Open Letter go A civil rights emphasis clearly emerged beyond a mere disarmament appeal to be- when a Lithuanian Helsinki Watch Com- come one of implied political autonomy. It mittee was formed in November 1976 with was a tactical error. the purpose of monitoring compliance with However, apart from that reflexive repe- the Helsinki Accords within the country. Its tition, the Open Letter actually represented chairman, , tried hard to a novel breaking out from the customary make it a Baltic-wide committee, but his ar- mold of Baltic (and Soviet Union-wide) ac- rest stopped these efforts. Ecological con- tivist thought in the direction of the world- cerns came to the fore with an anonymous wide peace movement mainstream. Com- 1977 letter by 18 Estonian naturalists. Baltic pared to previous uncompromising declara- cooperation, hampered by mutually unin- tory dissent, the Letter was a major step telligible languages and police interference, 187 finally took shape with an August 1979 Ap- in Lithuania. The peace activists seem to peal to the Soviet and the two German gov- have had little contact with them. The only ernments to formally repudiate the 1939 exception seemed to be the Lithuanian Hel- Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its secret pro- sinki Watch Committee. However, most of tocol on the division of East Europe into its original members had meanwhile died, German and Soviet spheres of influence. emigrated, or been imprisoned. Only the An anti-war protest letter in January 1980 aged Ona Poskiene-Lukauskaite was left to could be said to be the first joint Baltic sign the NWFZ Letter two years before she peace venture. Triggered by the Soviet inva- died in 1983. sion of Afghanistan, this letter was signed by 19 to 44 people (depending on the sources) 4. The 1982-1983 interlude in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. Like the Thanks to the efforts of the to US protests against the Vietnam war, it was the United Nations (BATUN), a New York aimed only at a specific conflict which was organization, the Open Letter has been drawing local boys to Asian lands far from made part of the official United Nations home. But it probably set many of the pro- documentation on disarmament. To decide testers pondering over the broader war and on whether the Letter has had any impact, peace issues. Within a few months several one has to consider later developments. signatories were arrested, including Mart The Open Letter seemed to reach the Niklus, the main Estonian promoter of Lith- West in late January or early February 1982. uanian ties. The next joint Lithuanian-Es- By 5 February, it was broadcast back to the tonian letter (July 1980) had a very limited Baltic republics by Radio Liberty. It may be civil rights scope: release of the arrested ac- unfortunate that it was thus tied to the US tivists. In March 1981 one of them, Univer- media before being aired by the Scandina- sity of chemistry lecturer Jüri Kukk, vian proponents of a Nordic NWFZ. How- died in prison under conditions somewhat ever, this use by itself cannot be held against reminiscent of Steve Biko’s death in South the Letter or its authors any more than a Africa. Sentencing of people who dared to Western citizens’ peace initiative can be de- protest the first arrests continued, and the clared a Soviet ploy just because the Soviets Baltic cooperation seemed shattered. regard it favorably. While Western peace in- The Open Letter on the NWFZ in October itiatives find their way into their own coun- 1981, therefore, represented a rather sur- try’s news media despite governmental dis- prising rebound, the more so because the approval, it’s a hard fact of life that this is not Latvians, in contrast to previous actions, the case in the USSR. Foreign broadcasts in now predominated numerically. In the the Baltic languages are the only media will- West, one may wonder whether the shift of ing to discuss Baltic citizens’ initiatives and focus from touchy topics like Afghanistan to able to reach the Baltic population. more neutral ones like the NWFZ (of which In March 1982 Zbigniew Brzezinski, for- the Soviet government approved in princi- mer national security adviser to President ple) could have been calculated so as to con- Carter, urged President Reagan to take new tinue doing something while reducing the initiatives to ’reduce the level of East-West risk of retribution. The signatories them- military confrontation’ in Central Europe, selves most likely had no such illusions, al- with a possible follow-up in the form of a nu- though the Soviet authorities did not react clear-free zone to include Norway, Den- immediately. mark, Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, This overview does not discuss the various and Estonia (New York Times, 20 March other protest activities taking place in the in- 1982; Brzezinski 1982a). He returned to the dividual Baltic republics during the same topic after Brezhnev’s death (Brzezinski time, such as the very active Catholic dissent 1982b). Brzezinski was probably aware of 188 the Baltic Open Letter when he made his will not respond in kind, by starting to form first proposals, but there is no evidence that government-sponsored peace clubs. this is what inspired him. He expected that To what extent was the formation of the some disengagement in Central Europe independent peace group in Moscow influ- must take place before the Nordic NWFZ enced by the Baltic peace activists? As men- can be seriously discussed. The Baltic Let- tioned earlier, Batovrin not only was aware ter, like most other proposals for the Nordic of the Baltic Open Letter but saw it as the NWFZ, viewed it as feasible independently first peace action by private Soviet citizens. of Central European developments (with The proposal to make Moscow a nuclear- disengagement in either sector being helpful free zone may have been inspired by the regarding the other). In contrast to the Bal- Baltic Letter or by similar actions in various tic Letter, Brzezinski also included the Kola Western cities. While the Baltic signatories peninsula, which in the present military con- were more numerous than the Moscow stellation has a strategic importance quite group members, they never formally de- different from that of the Baltic republics clared themselves an ’organization’. It is (or in fact Norway or Denmark). likely that the Baltic example had some ef- On 4 June 1982, a ’Group for Establishing fect on the Moscow action, just as the Nor- Trust Between the USSR and the USA’ was dic discussion of the NWFZ had on the Bal- formed in Moscow, with 11 and later 15 tic action. members. It apparently was the first non- In October 1982 the Estonian activists governmental peace organization in the produced another Open Letter, this time ad- USSR. The group proposed that Moscow be dressed to the ’Citizens of the Republic of made a nuclear-free zone, that the Soviet Finland’, asking them not to participate in Union and the United States exchange tele- the construction of a dinosaurian harbor vision programs on a regular basis, and that near . The new harbor is question- the children of government officials in the able both from ecological and economical two countries visit each other’s homes. viewpoints, and the main motive may be to Within a week some group members were enable more Russian colonists to settle in briefly detained, and the telephones they Estonia. It is not clear whether this Letter used were disconnected. A leading member, was the last straw for Soviet authorities or Sergei Batovrin, was detained by police in whether they followed a pre-established August and spent a month of punitive treat- slow plan. In March 1983 extensive home ment in a psychiatric hospital (Gillette searches were carried out, and in April one 1982a, b). Latvian (Ints Cdlitis) and 3 Estonians (Heiki At this point the nature of the massive Ahonen, , and Arvo Pesti) were government-sponsored ’peace movement’ in arrested and subsequently sentenced to 5 or the Soviet Union has to be addressed. What 6 years prison plus several years of ban- distinguishes a genuine peace movement ishment in most cases. Another Estonian, from a government creature carrying such a Enn Tarto, was arrested in September. name is willingness to criticize one’s own At least in the case of Enn Tarto, sen- government’s arms programs. An organiza- tenced on 18 April 1984, the indictment ex- tion which calls for peace through conces- plicitly listed the Open Letter on the NWFZ sions by the other side but fully supports as one of the most incriminating pieces of their own country’s ’peace through strength’ evidence. Prosecutor Adolf Kessler consid- program is indistinguishable from a military ered this Letter to be among the three es- booster club. All evidence indicates that the pecially anti-Soviet items among the many official peace movement in the Soviet Union that Tarto had signed. (The others were the unfortunately falls into that category, and August 1979 Appeal to abrogate the 1939 one can only hope that President Reagan Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the 1982 189

’Open Letter to Citizens of the Republic of A chat with a member of Reagan’s staff Finland’.) Enn Tarto was convicted on the indicated that they were not aware of the basis of the Estonian SSR Criminal Code Baltic Open Letter and that the bit on the Par. 68-2 (anti-Soviet agitation and propa- NWFZ was inserted into Reagan’s remarks ganda) and sentenced to 10 years prison plus at the request of an American Baltic group 6 5 year banishment.’ with ties to the Republican Party. This Bal- Meanwhile, in spring 1983, Yuri Andro- tic exile group either was uninformed to the pov on several occasions repeated Brezh- point of lacking awareness of a major and nev’s offer which had triggered the Baltic well-publicized joint document of the dis- Open Letter.’ Like Brezhnev, Andropov sidents of the three Baltic republics or they implied that no Soviet territory would be in- were bafflingly contemptuous of those cou- cluded in the NWFZ, but that some ’meas- rageous people and their ideas. ures, and substantial ones at that’, could be taken in Soviet areas adjacent to the 5. Estonian December 1983 Letter to the NWFZ. By this time, four of the signers of Stockholm Conference the Baltic Open Letter had already been ar- Half a year later another letter touching on rested. the Nordic NWFZ was received from Es- Soon after, US President Ronald Reagan tonia, with the lengthy title ’To the Par- used a reception for Baltic Americans to ticipants of the Conference on Disarmament comment on Soviet occupation of Latvia, and Confidence-Building Measures in Eu- Estonia, and Lithuania, stressing that the rope, Starting in January 1984 in Stockholm, United States does not legally recognize the and to the Peace Supporters Organizations Soviet annexation of these states. He then in the Countries Around the Baltic.’ Dated proceeded to what could be the first men- on Christmas Eve 1983, the letter was signed tion of the Nordic NWFZ by a US president: by the ’Estonian Peace Supporters Rally &dquo;Neutral and Nuclear-Free Baltic Coun- It seems ironic that those responsible for the re- tries&dquo;’. In view of the arrest of four of the pression I’ve been describing are now proposing Estonian signers of the 1981 Open Letter what they call ’an atom-free Baltic’, ’a Nordic nu- the of the 1983 letter was under- clear-free zone’, especially since unidentified sub- anonymity marines have repeatedly violated the territorial wa- standable. The Latvian and Lithuanian ties ters of Norway and neutral Sweden. This kind of seemed to be interrupted. conduct doesn’t lend itself to a spirit of trust. As a The lengthy text mainly reviewed Esto- matter of fact, the curious is, if thing you really stop nian-Soviet relations from 1918 to the Soviet to think about it, their description of a nuclear-free annexation of Estonia in 1940. It further de- zone is that there won’t be nuclear weapons in that zone. The kind of nuclear-free zones we want in the scribed the Soviet military installations in world are the zones where nuclear weapons will not the Baltic republics. ’In addition, nearly be landing and exploding (Reagan 1983). 15% of the Estonian territory has been de- clared a border zone which one can enter Reagan’s last sentence quoted is comparable only with special permits and where the in quality to Andropov’s ’and substantial rights of the civilian population in the coas- ones at that’. The attempt at ridicule flew in tal zone are severely restricted.’ The letter the face of not only Andropov but also of noted that the Soviet nuclear submarine Nordic NWFZ proponents in Scandinavia base in Paldiski (northern Estonia) is certain and Baltic wasting away at that to be hit by nuclear missiles in case of a war, time in Soviet prisons. The odd thing is that with the fallout killing also a large fraction the general context of the event at which of population in southern Finland. However, Reagan spoke did not oblige him to take a it fully put the blame for such potential ca- stand on the Nordic NWFZ. The insult to lamity on the Soviet armed presence, failing the Baltic dissidents looked gratuitous. even to mention by name the country whose 190

missiles are targeted against Estonia. (The In this mixed context, the Nordic NWFZ US nuclear targeting of the Baltic republics belittled by Reagan was given support: is especially striking when one recalls that the United States does not legally recognize When the Nordic countries brought forth the idea of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states.) turning Northern Europe into a nuctear-free zone, this idea met a sympathetic reaction among the na- The Estonian Peace said that Supporters tives of the Baltic countries: yes, the Scandinavian Soviet youth is one of the most militarized in countries are nuclear-free but the Baltic provinces the world, an assessment for which they may are not....For us it is disgusting and appalling to lack adequate comparison opportunities out- think that a situation similar to that of 193g~t1 could repeat itself, and the territory of the Baltic countries side the USSR. However, there is no reason could be used as a basis for air attacks and landing to doubt their direct knowledge of the So- operations aimed at the Scandinavian states. Yet viet internal scene, such as in the following even now the bases in Estonia are among the start- detail: ‘In high schools even girls must be ing points for Soviet submarines which undertake ominous raids into the coastal waters of Sweden and a able to disassemble and to fire it, and q gun Norway.4 acquire basic skills in combat tactics’. The letter contrasted the freedom of protest by Western peace movements with the meas- The Letter wondered why the Western ures taken by Soviet authorities against the peace supporters are not more concerned independent domestic peace movement: about the Soviet military build-up in the Kola Peninsula and the Baltic countries. It The only self-expression allowed to Soviet citizens in described various civil rights issues, and and is connection with international peace security listed the prison sentences meted out to four the opportunity to pay one’s rubles to the ’peace Estonian of the 1981 Letter on fund’ (upon command, with no refusal tolerated) or signers Open to warm a chair at some of the official peace events the NWFZ. It concluded with an appeal that inserted in the gaps between the increasingly fre- the Stockholm conference do the following: quent military refresher courses, air defense drills, first aid and sessions hitting - training, propaganda declare adherence to human a out at Reagan the ’warmonger’. Even privately rights pre- for trust and na- initiated quest for peace is crushed literally in the requisite security among embryonic stage. (When a few years ago a working tions ; man joined the October parade with a hand-made - demand release of Baltic human rights ac- sign ’NATO - NO, UNO - YES’, this was consid- tivists from prison; ered so threatening to the state that the sign was - ’undertake measures to create a trampled to pieces and the man was sentenced to specific several days in jail for ’hooliganism’).’H nuclear-free zone in northern Europe, to include the three Baltic states’; and - accept a January 1983 recommendation Once again, the authors’ knowledge of the by the European Parliament that the Hel- Soviet scene is direct, while comparison ma- sinki follow-up conferences raise the issue terial with the West is indirect and leads to of decolonization in the Baltic states. 10 some idealization of the other side. The let- ter tacitly accepted the deployment of Per- In sum, the demand for Baltic inclusion in shing 2 and cruise missiles on the NATO the NWFZ was made in a context of much side, and it even added some criticism of deeper changes in the status quo, which ren- Western peace activists opposing such dered the memo pretty much untouchable moves. One senses some symmetry between and undiscussable by most Scandinavian the authors and those Western peace activ- supporters of the NWFZ idea. Compared to ists who concentrate on opposing their own the 1981 Open Letter on the NWFZ, the side’s intermediate-range missiles to the 1983 letter represented a regression from so- point of forgetting about the ones on the ber single-issue effort to a more emotional other side. broad range of grievances. This is not to 191 deny the courage and sincerity of the au- iatives in the Warsaw Pact region keep aris- thors nor the legitimacy of their concerns. ing. In May 1985, 40 East German peace ac- But the tactics had become less sophisti- tivists signed an ’Initiative for nonalignment cated. Just at the moment when some of the in Europe’ delivered to the US embassy Estonian civil rights workers were almost in East Berlin. They urged Washington to learning to focus on one semi-realizable idea work for withdrawal of all Soviet, US, Brit- at a time, they were arrested, throwing the ish, and French troops from the two Ger- movement back to diffuse cover-all declara- man states (Los Angeles Times, 7 May 1985, tions common to Soviet official and samiz- p. 2). Adjusting for the geographical loca- dat styles. tion, the quest of the 38 Baltic peace activ- ists for a widened Nordic NWFZ was very 6. Beyond 1984 much in the same spirit. As of late 1985, no further Baltic declara- tions have been received which would in- volve an element of citizens-initiative peace NOTES The related civil move- movement. II rights 1. On 23 August 1939 Soviet and German foreign af- ment seems to be completely crushed in Lat- fairs ministers Molotov and Ribbentrop signed a via and Estonia by the arrests and long public non-agression pact and a secret ’additional prison sentences meted out from 1981 to protocol’ (see text in Documents on German For- eign Policy, 1918-1945, ser. D, vol. VIII, U.S. De- 1984. In Lithuania the civil movement rights partment of State, 1954, p. 166, based on captured continues strong, especially regarding issues Nazi archives) which divided East Europe into of freedom of religion, as witnessed by the German and Soviet spheres of influence. This en- continuing publication of such underground abled the USSR to annex the independent Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania which thus became the only as The Chronicle of the Lithua- periodicals members of the prewar League of Nations not nian Catholic Church. However, the small seated in the United Nations. For an overview of Lithuanian movement for international contemporary Baltic history, see Misiunas & Taa- peace still seems not to be part of the main- gepera (1983). 2. Translated from Estonian the Relief Centre for stream of the Lithuanian civil move- by rights Estonian Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR, the ment. The Chronicle has not mentioned Box 34018, 10026 Stockholm. This Centre, directed Open Letter on the NWFZ, and none of the by Mr. Ants Kippar, is a major clearing house for signers of this letter could be found in the civil rights documents from Estonia. 3. Chronicle index. The only civil rights group The legal status of the Baltic republics is still sub- to international because of the the with whom the activists seemed to ject dispute way peace USSR annexed the independent Baltic states in have any contacts was the Lithuanian Hel- 1940. Many nations, including the United States, sinki Watch Committee. Given the rela- do not recognize the annexation. For this very rea- tively recent date of the Open Letter and the son the USSR would be especially reluctant to slow and difficult exchange of ideas in the agree to anything (such as inclusion in the Nordic NWFZ) that would set the Baltic republics apart USSR, new ties still between may emerge from the rest of the USSR. Including Kaliningrad peace groups and the religion-oriented ones. and Leningrad areas would help to blur the distinc- The civil rights movement in Latvia and tion, from the Soviet viewpoint. 4. As in ’Rahu eest Side No. 4 Estonia can also reappear, as it did after sev- reported vöitlejad,’ (December 1983), p. 2 (Stockholm: Estonian So- eral lulls of in the 1970s. If so, many years cial Democratic Party Section Abroad). the concern for international and, in peace 5. For details and sources regarding this section, see particular, for the Nordic NWFZ, is likely to Misiunas & Taagepera (1983) and Taagepera be a component, because the entire Eastern (1984). Europe is being increasingly sensitized in 6. Teataja (Estonian-language bimonthly, Stock- holm), 12 1984, based on releases the this The Moscow 1982 May press by respect. peace group, Relief Centre for the Estonian POCs (see Note 2). which possibly was inspired by the Baltic ac- 7. As reported in Soviet Estonia’s main daily Rahva tion, has faded. But new citizens’ peace init- Hääl, I 1 May and 7 June 1983. 192

8. Translated from the full Estonian version in Tea- and denounced not only the regime but also the di- taja, 4 February 1984, 3-5. rect perpetrators who forfeit ’their conscience and 9. Ibid. honor... and unthinkingly do what they are told by 10. Ibid. their superior officers.’ 11. A 24 December 1984 Open Letter was received in Stockholm a year later (Vaba Eestlane, 24 Decem- ber 1985, p. 3). Addressed to the Secretary Gen- eral of the United Nations and to the governments of the states possessing nuclear weapons, it was REFERENCES signed by six Estonians who also had signed the Brzezinski, Zbigniew 1982a. ’A More Punitive Policy 1981 NWFZ letter (Ülle Einasto, Karin and Urmas Toward Poland Is Needed’, Los Angeles Times, 21 Inno, Eve Pärnaste, Endel Ratas, and Erik Udam), March. by the wife of a Latvian signer of 1981 who had Brzezinski, Zbigniew 1982b. ’A Deal For Andropov’, meanwhile received a 6-year prison sentence (Inara The New Republic, 13 December, pp. 11-15. Serdane, wife of Ints Cālītis), and by an Estonian Gillette, Robert 1982a. ’Soviets Suppress New Peace dissenter freshly returning from 4 years of prison Group’, Los Angeles Times, 13 June, p. 11. and internal exile (Viktor Niitsoo). The letter pro- Gillette, Robert 1982b. ’Soviets Renew Pressure on posed the following: complete nuclear disarma- Peace Group’, Los Angeles Times, 2 November, p. ment under international control; withdrawal of all 5. military units in foreign territories (except UN Kalela, Jaakko & Raimo Väyrynen 1983. ’Nuclear- troops); abolition of slurs regarding other countries Weapon-Free Zones: Past Experiences and New for in state-controlled press worldwide; amnesty Perspectives’, pp. 67-78 in Kari Möttölä, ed. Nu- political prisoners and legalization of non-violent clear Weapons and Northern Europe: Problems and opposition press in all ex-nuclear countries; abo- Prospects of Arms Control. Helsinki: Finnish In- lition of radio jamming and emigration restrictions; stitute of International Affairs. and limitations on arms sales to less developed Misiunas, Romuald & Rein Taagepera 1983. The Baltic countries. ’In our view, no major state’s political States: Years of Dependence 1940-1980. London: and social order is in such a weak condition that Hurst, and Berkeley, University of California Press. they should worry about their survival in case of a Reagan, Ronald 1983. Remarks at the reception for free competion of ideas.’ Also in late 1985, a new Baltic Americans, Washington, 13 June, as repro- Lithuanian non-state-approved newsletter (Ju- duced in Latvian Information Bulletin (Washington: ventus Academica, No. 2, published later than 14 Legation of Latvia), no. 3/83 (July 1983). February 1985) was reported to urge young con- Taagepera, Rein 1984. Softening Without Liberalization scripts to refuse to take the military oath of alle- in the Soviet Union: The Case of Jüri Kukk. Lan- giance, as a gesture of conscientious objection to ham, MD: University Press of America. the Soviet war in Afghanistan (Lithuanian Infor- Taagepera, Rein 1985. ’Inclusion of Baltic Republics in mation Center, Brooklyn, NY, press release of 24 the Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone’, Journal of Baltic September 1985): ’For five years, our colleagues Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 33-51. have been dying in Afghanistan for nothing, osten- Vaahtoranta, Tapani 1983. ’Nuclear Weapons and the sibly doing their so-called ’international duty’..., Nordic Countries: Nuclear Status and Policies’, pp. killing innocent citizens of a sovereign nation, 53-66 in Kari Möttölä, ed. Nuclear Weapons and burning their villages and towns...’. The newsletter Northern Europe: Problems and Prospects of Arms gave specifics of atrocities (four Afghan women Control. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International flung out of a helicopter above Kabul in fall 1984), Affairs.