UC Irvine UC Irvine Previously Published Works Title Citizens' Peace Movement in the Soviet Baltic Republics Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2kk0x6vm Journal Journal of Peace Research, 23(2) ISSN 0022-3433 Author Taagepera, R Publication Date 1986 DOI 10.1177/002234338602300208 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California Citizens’ Peace Movement in the Soviet Baltic Republics* REIN TAAGEPERA School of Social Sciences, University of California A citizens’ peace movement emerged in the Soviet Baltic republics in January 1980, when about 23 Lithuanians, Estonians, and Latvians signed an antiwar declaration in the wake of Soviet military in- volvement in Afghanistan. The concern for peace was intertwined with, but distinct from, concerns for national autonomy, civil rights, and ecology. The movement culminated with a proposal in October 1981 that the Baltic republics be enclosed in the Nordic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. This proposal was signed by 38 Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians, in response to Brezhnev’s offer to consider some NWFZ-related measures ’applicable to our own territory’. At least five of the signatories have been jailed since then, and at least in one case the NWFZ proposal figured among the most incriminating char- ges. Despite some remaining problems of wording, the Baltic Letter on the NWFZ represented a major advance from uncompromising declaratory dissent toward advocacy of specific and negotiable mea- sures. The Baltic action preceded and partly inspired the formation of the now-defunct citizens’ peace group in Moscow, 1982. The demand for inclusion of the Baltic republics in the Nordic NWFZ was re- peated in a December 1983 letter by unnamed Estonian Peace Supporters to the Stockholm disarmament conference, in a rather declaratory style. Although the civil and religious rights movement remains strong in Lithuania, detentions seem to have broken up the Baltic citizens-initiative peace movement for the time being. 1. Introduction ance the NWFZ may present problems of its In early 1982 a rather unusual declaration by own, but some sort of balance would seem 38 Soviet Baltic residents reached Western to be necessary. Europe. Entering the perennial discussion The immediate catalyst for the Baltic pro- about the merits and feasibility of a Nordic posal was an interview in Finland’s Suomen Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, they gave the So.sialidemokraatti (16 June 1981) by the NWFZ proposal their full support - and Soviet head of state Leonid Brezhnev. The recommended that their own republics (Lat- latter not only offered ’negative security via, Estonia, and Lithuania) be included in guarantees’ to the Nordic members of the the NWFZ. From the vantage point of 1985, NWFZ (i.e., a promise not to use nuclear the declaration represents the high point of weapons against the NWFZ) but also added: non-governmental peace initiative in the ’...this does not preclude the possibility of Baltic republics and in some ways in the en- considering some other measures applicable tire Soviet Union. Furthermore, the propo- to our own territory in the region adjoining sal to add some Warsaw Pact territories to the nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe’. the NATO and neutral territories, which are Later (in November 1981) Brezhnev added usually envisaged for the Nordic NWFZ, in- that such measures could be ’substantial’ troduced an element of interbloc balance, (New Times, No. 27, 1981, pp. 8-9; Vaahto- the lack of which is a major reason why the ranta 1983, p. 57). NWFZ has not yet become a reality. The Brezhnev did not specify the measures in a way the 38 Baltic citizens proposed to bal- positive way but clearly indicated that all So- viet territories discussed would be ’adjoin- ing’ rather than part of the NWFZ. How- * This research was a supported by grant (No. 7-84) ever, the 38 Baltic citizens of the USSR from the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooper- were to the the ation, University of California. The strategic and for- willing expand scope beyond one of the Pre- eign policy aspects are discussed in more detail in offered by the Chairman Taagepera (1985). sidium of the Supreme Soviet. Their decla- 184 ration brought into the Nordic NWFZ de- land, and Sweden Concerning the Estab- bate a new constituency with a legitimate lishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in North concern. Europe,’ dated 10 October 1981: This article will discuss the content and implications of the 1981 Open Letter and of The peoples and the governments of North Europe are at present considering various aspects of the idea a later appeal to the Stockholm Disarma- of establishing a nuclear-free zone in North Eu- ment Conference of 1984. The in- potential rope, as expressed by the Chairman of the Pre- clusion of the Baltic republics in the Nordic sidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Here- NWFZ has many other aspects besides the with we propose to supplement the above idea by in- the Baltic Sea and the Baltic countries - ones connected with citizens’ peace move- cluding Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania - in the above-men- ment. These have been discussed in aspects tioned nuclear-free zone. would another article (Taagepera 1985). It The extension of the nuclear-free zone to the Bal- be desirable to integrate the description of tic Sea and to the Baltic countries would be logical the Baltic peace movement into the theoret- because the area in question is actually part of North this would render a fu- ical framework of social movements and of Europe. Moreover, possible ture treaty all the more important because it would peace movements in the particular; present be a brilliant example of an equal and balanced dis- article supplies information for such an en- armament. The extension of the nuclear-free zone to deavor but does not try to carry it out. the Baltic Sea and to the Baltic countries would also The study of citizens-initiative actions in a be in the interest of the small Scandinavian and Bal- closed tic nations, more particularly by contributing to their society presents special methodolog- future survival. ical of the routine problems. Many proce- The Baltic nations have paid dearly for the Great dures for fact verification cannot be used. Power conflicts. Their sufferings were particularly The government-controlled local press deep during the Second World War when the front makes no mention of unauthorized initia- passed twice over their territories. Here it must be emphasized that the governments of the independ- tives, and mail and contact with telephone ent republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania or participants witnesses is practically unfea- made every effort to avoid involvement in the Great sible. Citizens’ statements surface abroad Power conflicts. The Baltic nations know, too, that through channels that cannot be checked the leaders of the Great Powers at that time ignored the wishes, the fate, and the of without risk of exposure of middlemen to completely opinions the Baltic peoples when they divided the area into Alteration heavy retaliation by authorities. their spheres of influence. A drastic example of this of information and even outright mystifica- is the Pact of 23 August 1939 between Nazi Ger- tion remain a possibility. The scholar either many and the USSR and its secret appendix which has not been in the USSR to this has to depend on the long-term reputation published day.’ Because of the above, we consider it extremely of the channels, or he has to discard much of important to devise guarantees which would help en- the information as not verifiable. directly sure the survival of small nations in case of possible The latter course may look more scholarly, Great Power conflicts. but it inevitably distorts the broad picture to We consider it natural and acceptable to all na- tions that an agreement concerning a nuclear-free the detriment of peace activists silenced by zone in North Europe would ban the production and the One has to strike a middle government. stationing of nuclear weapons as well as stationing road, cross-checking as much as possible by and movements of any means (ships, aircraft, missi- indirect means. les) designed to carry nuclear warheads in the ap- propriate territories of the High Contracting Parties 2. The 1981 Letter and in the Baltic Sea. Open We hope that the NATO and the Warsaw Pact In to Brezhnev’s offer of June 1981 response Powers will be able to guarantee the ban on nuclear to consider some unspecified territories and weapons in the nuclear-free zone in North Europe, measures, the 38 Soviet Baltic citizens pro- including the Baltic Sea and the Baltic countries. Such a ban on nuclear in one area would be posed specific ones, in the following ’Open weapons an important step towards the fulfillment of the Letter to the Heads of the Governments of greatest expectation of mankind - A COMPLETE the USSR, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Fin- DISARMAMENT.2 185 The letter was signed by 15 Latvians, 13 Es- the mainstream Nordic proponents of a tonians, and 10 Lithuanians, whose names NWFZ. and some personal characteristics are listed As the next step, reread the original text, by Taagepera (1985). They probably re- leaving out only the third paragraph (’The flected the preferences of a large fraction of Baltic nations have paid dearly... to this the Baltic population. Indeed, the desire to day’). This version adds the proposal to in- be included in a NWFZ has been voiced by clude the Baltic republics in the NWFZ in a so many people in Scandinavia, and sym- neutral way which antagonizes the Soviet bolic proclamations of a local NWFZ have Union as little as possible.
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