- : Clausewitlz - - t .:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~w w e.;...... : . S. The A ir~~~~~~~~~~~~~...... Mpilitarization of Marxismn, 19m14-i1921 ...... 1.k. .

by Jacob W. Kipp Kansas University

Carlvon Clausewitz. Lithograph by F. Michelisafterthe paintingby W. Wach, 1830. (Original in the possession of Professor Peter Paret, Stanford;used with permission.)

EVEN the most superficialreading of militarywrit- old regime. On the one hand, reformersand ings would lead to the conclusion that a close tie exists shared the strong anti-militaristthrust of European between -Leninismand Clausewitz' studies on , which viewed the militaryelite as the sources of a and statecraft.Although labeled an "idealist," Clausewitz en- vile and poisonous militarism.The professionalsoldiers' desire joys a place in the Soviet pantheonof militarytheorists strik- for glory,like the capitalists' search for profits,only brought inglysimilar to that assigned to pagan philosophersin Dante's sufferingto the workingclass. All socialists shared a com- Hell. General I. E. Shavrov, formercommander of the mitmentto a citizens' militiaas the preferredmeans of national Soviet General Academy, has writtenthat Clausewitz' defense. In 1917 the rode this anti-militaristsen- method marked a radical departurein the study of war: timentto power by supportingthe process of militarydisin- tegration,upholding the chaos of thekomitetshchina, and prom- He, in reality,for the firsttime in militarytheory, denied ising a governmentthat would bringimmediate .3 the "eternal" and "unchanging" in militaryart, stroveto These Social Democrats were also the heirs of examine the phenomenonof war in its interdependence the volumi- and interconditionality,in its movement and develop- nous writingson militaryaffairs of the two foundersof scientific ment in order to postulate theirlaws and principles.' , Karl and FriedrichEngels. As Peter Vigor has pointed out, these two life-longcollaborators employed a di- Soviet authorspoint to the fact that Lenin valued Clausewitz' vision of labor in theirmilitary writings. Engels, who considered workbut refuseto see Lenin's readingof Vom Kriege as having himselfan amateursoldier, dealt withtactics, strategy,and the any fundamentalconsequences forLenin's own views or impactof technologyon militaryaffairs. Marx dealt withinter- militaryaffairs.2 Soviet authorstake no note of when or in what national relations,the impact of war on domestic , and contextLenin read Clausewitz, nor do theyconsider the speci- the revolutionarypotential of a given conflict.4After Marx's fic mannerin whichLenin applied Clausewitz' concepts on war death Engels continued writingabout militaryaffairs, and in and statecraftto theformation of themilitary policy of his party. 1887penned a chillingprediction of whata generalwar would be It is the purpose of thisarticle to examine the intellectualbond like in capitalist Europe: between the Prussian officerand the Russian revolutionaryin This would be a universal war of order to understand better the between Soviet unprecedentedscope, relationship unprecedentedforce. From eight to ten million soldiers militaryscience and Marxism-. will destroyone anotherand in the course of doingso will The ideological baggage which Russian Social Democrats stripEurope clean in a way thata swarmof locusts could carried with them in 1914 would seem to suggest an undying never have done. The devastation caused by the Thirty distrustof any ideas coming fromprofessional soldiers of the Year's War telescoped into3-4 years and spread over the 184 MILITARYAFFAIRS entire continent,hunger, epidemics, the universal en- i.e., the alienation of labor, the fetishismof the savagementof both troopsand the masses, broughtabout world, surplus , exploitation,are not akin to sociological by acute , the hopeless jumbling of our artificial facts,such as divorces, crimes,shifts in population,or , industrial,and credit mechanisms; all this ending cycles. The fundamentalaspects of Marxian categoriesdefy any in general the collapse of old states and their bankruptcy, with describingand vaunted wisdom . . . the utter impossibility of foreseeing empirical science. i.e., one preoccupied how all thiswill end and who will emerge victoriousfrom organizingthe objective phenomenaof . They appear as this struggle;only one resultis absolutelybeyond doubt: facts only to a theory that takes them in preview of their universal exhaustion and the creation of conditions for negation.Correct theory is nothingless thana consciousness of the final victoryof the workingclass.' a that aims at changingthe world.7Marx put the prop- osition succinctlyin his eleventh on Feuerbach: "The Engels had littleto say about what would follow this crisis. philosophershave only interpretedthe world in various ways; Its very magnitude pointed towards a general the point, however, is to change it."' crisis across Europe and a rapid social transformationfrom What Marxistsacross Europe faced in the Summerand Fall of to socialism. Once the exploiting and exploited 1914 was an anomaly so glaringthat realityseemed to negate social classes had disappeared,the proletarianstate would have existingtheory. In the face of its proclaimed internationalism no need forthe militaryas the instrumentof the state's monop- and pacifism,the Social Democrats of Europe had to confronta oly on violence since the state would have neitherexternal nor general European war, which their theory had held to be an internalthreats with which to contend. impossibility.The Second Internationaland worker were supposed to prevent a general war among the powers. True, as in the case of analogous circumstanceassociated with TWENTY-SEVEN years passed between Engels' prediction scientificrevolutions, observers in the decades prior to the and the onset of thatgreat European war. In the meantime outbreakof WorldWar I had noted anomalies in maturecapital- the heirs of Marx and Engels had become powerfulpolitical ism, which did not fitthe essential paradigmoutlined by Marx forcesin manystates of Europe. Some parties,most notably the and Engels. But the shock of modernwar, i.e., praxis, set offa GermanSocial Democratic Party,had abandoned revolutionary deep crisis in theory.9 action, althoughthey continuedto mouththe rhetoricof class In Lenin's case, this crisis had a profound,but largelyunac- confrontation.European socialists had in 1890created the Sec- knowledged consequence, for Soviet militaryscience. For ond International,and theyexpected it to providethe organiza- Lenin, the committed revolutionary,the ramificationsof a tional expression for a workers' solidarity,which was to pre- general European war were no abstract concern. On the con- ventthe outbreakof such a war. But in the Summerand Fall of trary,because he was committedto changingthe world. Lenin 1914 the socialist parties of Europe, with the exception of the requiredof theorythat it granthim "scientificforesight" - the Serbian, actively or passively supported their ' abiltyto foreseethe war's course and outcome. On theone hand. entryinto the war. To the disgust of Lenin, the majorityof this led Lenin to review the substantialbody of socialist litera- Russian Social Democrats were willingto defend , no ture on financecapitalism and imperialistrivalries. culminating in 1916 withhis syntheticwork, the Hi,g4hestState matterhow much theydespised the tsaristregime. But Engels' "' vision came back to haunt them all. Total war graduallytore oflCapitalism. On the hand. Lenin was concerned with assunder both socialist and European society in the the problemof theoryreconstruction, a task made essential by same mannerthat the massed guns tore apart land and men. the apparentfailure of accepted Marxism to predictor prevent In readingLenin's early writingson militaryaffairs, one must the war. It is most typical of Lenin that in the face of such be conscious of the extent to which these views have been earth-shakinghistorical events, he should returnto accepted without deep reflection or consideration. Lenin's in orderto finda theoreticalframework upon whichto analyze observations on the colonial of the late nineteenthand these events and to guide his actions. early twentiethcenturies, especially the Russo-Japanese War, Unlike the dry and largelyahistorical exposition of Lenin's reflectthe preeminentconcerns found in the worksof Marx and views to be found in most Soviet works, this process is in- Engels: the politics of war and the impact of new tellectuallyintriguing and highlyrelevant to our concern, the upon war in capitalist society. development of Soviet militaryscience. This process in- Withthe outbreakof I, Lenin's speculationsand volved a fundamentalrestructuring of Lenin's generaltheory.2 writingsabout war underwenta radical transformation.Ideo- Down to 1914,for all his declarationsabout dialecticalmaterial- logies, like the paradigms of a scientificdiscipline, begin to ism, Lenin never transcendedthe historicalpre-Marxian, me- disintegratewhen the exceptions or anomalies startto threaten chanistic materialismof the Enlightenment.In one of his ear- the very core of the model. Normal ideological , like liest writings(1894), "What the Friends of Are," what Thomas Kuhn has called "normal science," becomes Lenin had asserted that "insistence on . . . is nothing increasingiydifficult. Lenin's concerns were shared by social- but a relic of out of which scientificsocialism has ists across Europe. In Marxist terms practice, i.e., objective grown,a relic of its mannerof expression." 13 While recognizing circumstances, had called into question a central point of a need forsome philosophicalunderpinning to Marxism,Lenin theory.In 1914 Lenin, along withother social democrats,con- did not himselfenter into debate untilpractical issues of policy, frontedan anomaly of such scope and power that theirideo- i.e., whetherthe Bolsheviks would take partin the electionsfor logical assumptionscould not but undergo change.' the Third Duma, broughthim into conflictwith the Bogdano- Marxism,with its historicalmaterialist analysis of the world, vites and theirMachian Empiriomonism.When it appeared that and itsemphasis upon ,had held out the promiseof was being identifiedwith Machism and suffering liberatingthe essential potentialitiesof man amid the depriva- politicallyfrom this identification,Lenin did address the issue tions of reality.Hegel had placed this philosophicalconcern in in and Empiriocriticism.14 Lenin's approach, and the historicalcontext of his time and so had made manifestthe one to be foundin Soviet works to thisday, was to postulatea fact that man's knowledge, activity,and hope were directed strugglebetween philosophical and materialism: towardsthe establishmentof a rationalsociety. Marx set out to demonstratethe concrete forces and tendenciesthat stood in the The question here is not of this or that formulationof materialismbut of the antithesisbetween materialismand path of this goal and those that promised it. This material idealism, of the differencebetween the two fundamental connectionof his theorywith a definitehistorical form of praxis lines of philosophy. Are we to proceed fromthings to negated not only philosophy,but as well. As Herbert sensations and thought? Or are we to proceed from Marcuse has pointed out, the social facts that Marx analyzed, thoughtand sensation to things?'

OCTOBER 1985 185 Two doctrinesformed the central themes of Lenin's material- and of the differentclasses withinthem - at a given ism: the externalreality of the worldand the "copy" theoryof time.2" knowledge.This can stillbe foundas the epistemologicalfoun- dation of all Soviet writingson philosophy, including those The firstobservation to be made concerns the revisionof Clau- relatingto militaryaffairs. sewitz done by Lenin. In Vom Kriege, war is the continuationof politics but these are conducted by the supra-class, rational WITH the unexpected disintegrationof internationalism state in the name of the general interestsof the entirepopu- and the outbreak of a general European War, Lenin lation, which the state seeks to mediate. In Lenin, the state is turnedto philosophyin orderto reformulatetheory in theface of stillMarx's executive committeeof the rulingclass, and so its these anomalies. Lenin devoured Hegel and engaged in his first policies are, at best, the realisticinterests of the rulingclass, or systematic treatmentof the . His notes, which ex- worse, the irrationaland self-destructiveinstincts of a class tended to about 300 pages, reflecthis changinginterpretation of caught in irresolvablecontradictions.22 Although well aware of Hegel. Initially,it seems Lenin intended to use his study of the influenceof Kantian philosophyon the young Clausewitz, Hegel to give a correct account of Marx's materialism.But in Lenin chose to attributea philosophicaland historicalrelation- the process of his study of Hegel's , Lenin's critical ship to Hegel. Now, in fact, as modern scholarship on Clau- commentsgave way to enthusiasticacceptance. At the end of sewitz has acknowledged, there is an implicit relationship his notes, he wrote, "In this most idealistic of Hegel's works between Hegel and the Prussian generalin the latter'smode of thereis the least idealismand the most materialism."'6In what exposition. As Peter Paret has observed, was an explicitacknowledgement that prewar Marxists' general did provide Clausewitz "with a fundamentalattitude and with theoryhad been utterlywrong-headed, Lenin wrote: the intellectualtools to express it." More specifically,Clau- the dialectic his method in It is impossibleto understandcompletely Marx's , sewitz employed as developing his especially its firstchapter [dealing withMarx's treatment conceptions, i.e., the posing of opposites to be defined and of use-value and the fetishismof ],without compared not only so thateach part could be more completely having thoroughlystudied the whole of Hegel's Logic. understood,but also so thatall the dynamiclinkages connecting Consequently, half a centurylater none of the Marxists all of the elements of war could be examined in a state of understoodMarx! permanentinteraction.23 The reality of war and the bitter intersocialistpolitics of This most revealingact of criticismand self-criticismmarked 1915-1916brought Lenin to a radical revisionof Marxistthought a fundamentalshift in Lenin's and subsequently Communist on war. If the European workingclass could not deter war ideology. This shift,denied in Soviet works forthe purpose of throughsolidarity and proletarianinternationalism, then the maintainingan uninterruptedideological continuitybetween question became one of how to benefit from anomaly. The Marxism and Leninism, had radical implicationsfor Lenin's answer was to transformthe imperialistwar into a civil war. developing paradigm of modern war. Maintaining his revo- Lenin embraced Clausewitz in a fashionnever done by Marx or lutionary,internationalist position on the war, Lenin turned Engels. Indeed, Engels' referencesto Clausewitz are either fromHegel and philosophyto polemical writingson the war and banal or of a purelyperipheral to the and topic the political struggleto transformthe war into an international under discussion, i.e., the level of education of the Prussian civil war, pittingclass against class. In the process, Lenin officercorps.24 Lenin's readingof Clausewitz assumed central turnedto the studyof the conduct of war. He received a copy of significance with the increasing militarization of Lenin's Karl von Clausewitz' Vom Kriege fromG. I. Gusev, a fellow thoughtfrom the questions of organizingan armed insurrection Bolshevik and formereditor of the MilitaryEncyclopedia. As to the command of the forces of the new Bolshevik state. The an editor of the encyclopedia Gusev had contact with many Prussian provideda model of the applicationof the dialectic to reform-mindedgeneral staff officers who after the Russo- issues of militaryscience, allowing Lenin to break down the Japanese War had embarked upon the process of modernizing "immutabiltyof the firmprinciples of militaryscience" and to Russian militarythought and doctrine under the banner of reformulatehis own conceptions of war and the armed forces. creatinga "unified militaryschool.""8 Lenin devoured Clau- An examinationof Lenin's referencesto Clausewitz in the sewitz' book, fillinga large notebook with his observations in period after his reading of Vom Kriege is most instructive. early 1915 and applyingthese to the politics of the socialist Marxism has always retained a predictiveelement, thanks to movement. During this period we can observe the transfor- utopiantracts and the Enlightenment'sfaith in humanprogress, mationof Lenin's dialectical materialismfrom an emphasis on but in the face of a world war, whichchallenged the most pious the latterto the formeraspect.", hopes of socialists. doctrinerequired another type of foresight, His firstcitation of Clausewitz' work is most instructivein a tool for immediateuse in assessing and analyzing the con- what it reveals about his method and technique. The citation flictingtrends. In the Summer of 1915, Lenin articulatedhis came in a work devoted to the collapse of the Second Inter- own synthesisof Marx and Clausewitz in the formof an histori- national,which was writtenin the firsthalf of June 1915.2' Here cal typologyof wars coveringthe period 1789 to 1914. In this Lenin presents his paradigm shiftin the formof essay, "The Principlesof Socialism and the War, 1914-1915," synthesisof Clausewitz, Hegel, Marx, and Engels, transform- Lenin drew the conclusion thatwar had been transformedfrom ing the dialectic from an external process of 'copying" ob- bourgeois-nationalstruggles, which he identifiedas just strug- served empirical phenomena into an internalizedtool for the gles by the against the survivingfeudal order,into unificationof theoryand practice: imperialistwars among capitalist powers. The firstera had lasted until1871, and since thenas a consequence of the uneven Applied to wars, the basic thesis of the dialectic, so developmentof capitalismthe number,extent and intensityof shamelesslydistorted by Plekhanov [thendefending Rus- local wars had been growing over colonial questions, cul- sia's prosecution of the war as part of a democratic minatingin the general imperialistwar. In this typology,war to the of the struggleagainst German militarism] purposes had become a central feature of the capitalist international bourgeoisie,is this,that -v'ar is simplythe continuation oJpolitics by other (namely violent)means." Such is the system and was presentedas a consequence of internal,i.e., formulationof Clausewitz, one of the greatestwriters on class, politics. '*War is a continuationof politicsby other,i.e., questions of , whose ideas were en- violent, means" becomes in Lenin's hands, a tool for a class genderedby Hegel. And such ideas were always the point analysis of the imperialist war and the emergence of anti- of view of Marx and Engels, each war, theyviewed as a colonial strugglesoutside Europe. It is also a weapon to be continuationof the politics of a given interestedpower turned upon his opponents, those Social Democrats who had

186 MILITARY AFFAIRS agreed to supporttheir governments during the war, and, there- autonomy. Powerfulsocial groups grudginglyaccepted Soviet fore, opposed Lenin's defeatism.25 power, but were already in the process of becoming political movementsdedicated to the overthrowof theregime. Lenin was IN 1917, Lenin found himselfconfronted by a revolutionary acutelyaware ofthe two centralthreats to the regime'ssurvival: upheaval in Russia, which no partycould have claimed to the trauma of the continuingwar and the processes of social have authored- save possiblythe tsarist in its own disintegration.These twin threatsexplain much of Bolshevik incompetence. Yet, Lenin more quickly than other radicals policy duringthe Winter-Springof 1918. reached the conclusionthat this could only be under- Negotiationswith Imperial Germanyand its allies produced stood in the contextof the war. He believed thathis factionand neithera compromisepeace nor a social revolutionin . the workingclass could thusdirect the war to theirend. In May Germanterms for peace became harsheras Soviet Russia grew 1917, in the midst of the firstcrisis of Russia's Provisional weaker. The Soviet governmentdecreed the abolitionof the old Governmentover the politics of war aims, i.e., whetherthat armyand navy and on 28 January1918 (N.S.), proclaimedthe governmentwould reject the promisedRussian territorialgains formationof the RKKA, the Red Armyof Workersand Peas- containedin various secrettreaties among the Allies and accept ants. This new force, which was originallydrawn out of avail- a peace withoutvictors, Lenin applied Clausewitz to the ex- able Red Guard unitsfrom among the proletariatand remnants istingpolitical-military situation. Lenin began "War and Revo- of militaryformations which had demonstratedtheir loyalty to lution" with what was for him the central question: the class Soviet power, began as littlemore than a stop-gapmeasure to natureof the war. Afteran historicalanalysis of the roots of the providethe regimewith at least some crediblemilitary power in conflict,Lenin turnedto Clausewitz: the face of thatincreasing German pressure at the peace talksin Brest-Litovsk.2 The dictum of one of the most famous writerson the Lenin identifiedthe Red Armyas a new typeof militaryforce philosophy of wars and on the historyof wars, Clau- in keeping withthe state formationwhich the Soviet sewitz, is well known. It states, "War is a continuationof represented.The Red Armyin manyways negatedthe imperial politicsby othermeans." This dictumbelongs to a militarytradition. But it also much of the who reviewed the historyof wars and deduced the - negated prewar sophical lessons from that history- shortlyafter the socialist ideas about a citizen ,which would dispense with epoch of the Napoleonic Wars. This writer,whose basic the services of a professionalofficer . Lenin and L. D. ideas have become at present time the undoubted ac- Trotsky, the newly-appointedcommander of the RKKA, re- quisition of any sort of thinkingperson, already about jected the cult of the militiawhich had been seen as the military eightyyears ago struggledagainst the narrowand ignorant embodimentof radical democraticand socialist ideology in the prejudice, that war could be isolated fromthe policy of nineteenthcentury. This break became apparent during the the corresponding governments, the corresponding inter-partydebates over the acceptance of the final German classes, as if war could be looked upon as simpleaggres- terms at Brest-Litovsk. Once the Germans had demonstrated sion, which disturbs the peace, and then follows the theirwill to continuemilitary operations in the East untiltheir restorationof thatdisturbed peace. They foughtand then theymade up! This coarse and ignorantview decades ago politicalobjectives were obtained,concessions became vital to was refutedand disprovedby any sortof attentiveanaly- the regime's survival. Lenin argued fora policy of realism; he sis of any historicalepoch of war.26 labeled the Treaty of Brest-Litovska "Tilsit Peace," an agree- ment which would, however humiliatingand damaging the The junctureof and the politicalnature of war is, terms,buy time for the regimeto consolidate its power.3" of course, Lenin's own insight. In embracingthe dialectical Again Lenin drew upon Clausewitz to justify his govern- approach to questions of war and peace, Lenin sought to put ment's acceptance of the unfavorable terms as a necessary revisedtheory into practice. In May, 1917,the objective was the means of self-defense.October had transformedLenin and the transformationof the imperialistwar into an internationalcivil Bolsheviksfrom "defeatists" to "defensists" in the cause ofthe war: young Soviet republic:

Withouta workers'revolution in several countriesno one Since we became the representativesof a rulingclass, can win in this war. War is not a toy; war is an unpre- which has begun to organize socialism, we demand from cedented thing;war costs millionsof lives, and it is not so everyone a serious relationshipto the defense of the easy to end it.27 country.To relate seriouslyto the defense of the country means to be thoroughlyprepared and to calculate accu- Lenin intendedhis analysis to provide foresight,and foresight ratelythe correlationof forces. If those forcesare plainly inadequate thenthe most is in turnwas to prepare importantmeans of defense to his partyand the workingclass of Russia withdrawinto the depthsof the country. Those [advocates for action. While the events of the Summer and Fall of 1917 of continuingthe strugglewith as a partisanwar] confirmthat Lenin could not control the social forces acting who would see thisas an attractiveformula in the present upon the Russian polity, in July he went along with demon- situation can read about the results of the lessons of strationsthat he could not controland faced theirfailure and the historyin this account in old man Clausewitz, one of the suppression of his party. Then, in October he could not con- greatestmilitary .3' vince his own partyelite of the timelinessof preparationsfor an armed insurrectionagainst a bankrupt Provisional Govern- "Old Man Clausewitz" appeared here withoutideological trap- ment.2' His own synthesisof class analysis, the centralityof pings, and Lenin's remarksdo suggesta carefulreading. Lenin politicsto war, and an interpretationof the immediatepast that called to his reader's attentionthe three specific conditions seemed to hold out the prospect of immediate,sweeping, revo- which Clausewitz had cited as being necessary to make such a lutionarychanges allowed Lenin to speak of "scientific pre- strategicwithdrawal into the interiorof the countrya proper diction" and foresight.This, in turn,gave Lenin the confidence course of militaryaction: to act decisively. a. When our situationlvis a Upon coming to power Lenin had to confrontthe stark re- physicaland psychological lvis the enemy rules out the possibility of successful alities of the social. political, and economic disintegration resistance at or near the frontier which had transpiredin Russia in 1917, and to which the Bol- b. When our main objective is to gain time sheviks had contributedthemselves. Lenin and the Bolsheviks c. When the condition of the countryis favorable to it found themselves the nominal rulers of a vast countryin the 32 process of disintegrationas nationalminorities, which had been held in check by the autocratic power, sought national For Lenin the thirdfactor was decisive in dictatinga peace with

OCTOBER 1985 187 Germany.The Soviet Republic had just overseen the abolition justify its decision to utilize voenspetsy on the basis of the of the old armyand was only then in the process of creatinga writingsof Marx and Engels. To this, Lenin responded that new one. Internalunrest and an emergingthreat of civil war neitherman could offerany guidance on this question because, made it imperativefor the Soviet governmentto concentrate "for themthe question did not exist forthe simplereason thatit upon the internal,i.e., class war, which Lenin viewed as de- arose only when we (the Bolsheviks) undertook the con- cisive for the survival of the dictatorshipof the . struction of the ."38 Lenin rejected out-of-handleft-wing , which M. N. Tukhachevsky,a formertsarist himself, wrote called for a war against the German invaders. For to Lenin that the new regime was unlikelyto get eitherthe Lenin the 'breathingspace" was to providean opportunityfor brightestor the best fromthe formertsarist officer corps. Much the regimeto arm itselfwith a powerfulstanding army. Nikolai of it was badly educated and thereforeprofessionally incom- Bukharin,one of those who advocated a guerrillawar, or par- petent.Many of thevery best had alreadygiven their lives on the ticanstvo,recognized Lenin's priorities: battlefieldsof the Eastern Front, and of the rest, many had already chosen to side withthe .3"Others, most notably Comrade Lenin has chosen to define revolutionarywar the TsaritsynShaika (gang) whichgrew up around J. V. Stalin, only and exclusively as a war of large in accor- K. Voroshilov and S. M. Budennyi,raised political objections dance to all the rules of militaryscience. We propose that and called intoquestion the loyaltiesof voenspetsysent to their war from - - our side at least in the beginning will .4" inevitablytake the character of a partisan war of flying detachments.33 Lenin and Trotsky answered these critics by assertingthat they grossly underestimatedthe positive role that v'oenspetsy could play, failed to appreciate the value of bourgeois military ENIN not onlygot the Partyto accept Brest-Litovsk,but in L science, and overestimated the value of partisan warfare.4 the monthsfollowing the ratificationof the treatyas civil Under conditionsof dire emergencyand with appropriatepo- war erupted across Russia, Lenin and Trotsky directed the to their saw the voen- creationof a powerfulstanding army. In this process, the two litical controls guarantee loyalty,they in as critical to the men played an instrumentalrole in shapinga series of decisions spetsy and bourgeois specialists general survival of The needed ex- that would affect the institutionalrelationship between the Soviet power. regime professional Partyand the militaryand the ideological relationshipbetween pertise fromany source that could provide it: Marxism-Leninismand militaryscience. One of the most im- But although our party is thoroughlyand inseparably portantinitial decisions was the acceptance of the mobilization linkedwith the workingclass, it never was and never can of formertsarist officersas militaryspecialists, voenspetsy. become the simple booster of the workingclass, whichis Colonel 1. A. Korotkov has creditedthese "spetsy" with "the content with all that the workers do . . . The proletariat firststeps of Soviet militaryscience.''4 and even morethe masses have onlyjust emerged Two elementsseemed to have shaped Lenin's attitudeon this frommany centuriesof and carry in themselves question. The firstwas his general respect for professional all the consequences of oppression,ignorance, and dark- competence. At the core of Lenin's theoryof the partywas the ness. The seizure of power in and of itselfhas not at all revolutionariesas transformedthe workingclass and has not attiredit with concept of by professional out- all the necessary merits and qualities: the seizure of lined in WliatIs To Be Done? so manyyears before. Lenin had power has only opened before it the possibilityto really little use for amateurs in politics, , or the military. learn, develop and purge itselfof its own historicaldefi- Second, Lenin's realismmade himacutely aware of the need for ciencies.42 professionallycompetent strategic leadership, if the regimewas to survive.3sAlthough Soviet authors still vilifyTrotsky for a The spetsy became the instrumentsthrough which a future policy of "capitulation" before the so-called professionalcre- generationof Communistcadre would be created. The iowen- dentials of the voenspetsy, his views in 1918 were close to sp)etsyplayed a crucial role in the formationof the Soviet staff Lenin's. Afterthe decision had been made to recruitbourgeois and officer-educationsystems during the Civil War and in the specialistsfor the Red Armyon 31 . Trotskywrote postwar decade.43 On 8 , the Soviet governmentcre- the followingcomments, explaining his support for the mea- ated the All-Russian Main Staff, and subordinated it to the sure. which he considered essential to the survival of the RevolutionaryMilitary Soviet of the Republic (RVSR). In June regime: the firstnumber of Voennoc delo (MilitaryAffairs), the Red Army's firstmilitary-theoretical journal appeared. The pres- We need a real armed force, constructedon the basis of tigious Voennaia mysl' of the modern militaryscience. The active and systematic participation can its originsthrough a series of succeedingjournals to in all our work of the militaryspecialists is thereforea matterof vital importance.The militaryspecialists must that publication.44In , the RVSR authorized the have guaranteedto themthe possibilityof exertingtheir creation of the Military-HistoricalCommission for the Writing powers honestlyand honorablyin the matterof the cre- of the History of .4' Those developments,when ation of the army.3" combined with the effortsto restore discipline, end the ko- mitetshchina,and begin ,confirm the accuracy of Neither he nor Lenin had any blind in the political re- Bukharin's assessment of Lenin's militarypolicy directed liabilityof formertsarist officersdrawn from the privileged towardsthe creationof a professionalmilitary establishment. If classes of the old regime.On 18 April 1918. withinthe Narkom furtherevidence of thisdirection was needed, Lenin providedit po l'oennymdclam (People's Commissariat for Military Af- by arguing for the creation of the MilitaryAcademy of the fairs),the Soviet statecreated the CommissarBureau to oversee General Staffof the Red Armyand callingfor the use ofthe most the recruitmentand assignmentof the political as qualified members of the teaching staffof the tsaristgeneral watchdogs over the wOenspetsv."3The question of the loyalty staffacademy to man the new academy in October 1918with its and value of the iowenspetsybecame one of the most volatile firstclasses being held in December.46 issues of militarypolicy for the Party duringthe Civil War. To those socialists who accused him of and Some Bolsheviks/Communistsobjected to the specialists on militarism,Lenin repliedthat the Soviet government'sdecision ideological grounds; others questioned their on the flowed fromthe events, i.e. fromthe demands of praxis. In grounds of theirtechnical competency. 'XProletarianRevolution and the Renegade Kautsky," written Initially,the oppositionto the voenspevtsyhad come fromLeft in 1918, Lenin stated that a new upon coming to Communistswho favoreda guerrillawarfare fought along class power could do nothingelse but disband the old army. But in lines. This iMilitary " demanded that the Party orderto stay in power withthe threatof civil war mounting,the

188 8 8MI L I TA AFFAIRS regimehad to establisha new army,a new discipline,and a new preventthe formationof a grand, anti-Sovietcoalition. In this militaryorganization, based upon the correlation of forces process he counted upon uneven capitalist development and confrontingthe victoriousclass.47 geopolitical circumstances to aid his regime while it sought With the outbreak of the Civil War and the beginningof anotherbreathing space. foreignintervention the Soviet Republic imposed War Commu- , one of the most notable Red commandersof nism, carried out the total nationalizationof all means of pro- the Civil War and the fatherof the concept of a Soviet 'unified duction,embarked upon a policyof extremeadministrative cen- militarydoctrine," put this Leninist formula of a long and tralization, draconian social legislation, and the forced ex- intense strugglewith the world capitalist system in military propriationof grain from Russia's villages. Thus practicing terms: total war within the context of a civil war, Lenin and the were able to field their new army, which Between our proletarianstate and therest of the bourgeois numbered5.5 million men by 1921, and defeat the Whites.48 world there can only be one condition - that of long, persistent,desperate war to the death: a war which de- Lenin considered this to be a Marxistvariation mands colossal tenacity,steadfastness, inflexibility, and of the state capitalistregimes which had prosecutedWorld War a unityof will. . . The state of open warfaremay give I. Some Party leaders agreed with this characterization,but way to some sort of contractualrelationship which per- came to see beneath it the threatof a twentieth-centuryLevi- mits,up to a definitelevel, the peacefulcoexistence of the athan state, Bukharindescribed this warfarestate as: warringsides. These contractualforms do not change the fundamental character of these relations. . . . The com- . . . a militaristicstate capitalism. Centralization be- mon, parallel existence of our proletarianSoviet state comes the centralizationof the barracks;among the elites withthe states of the bourgeois world for a protactedperiod the vilest militarisminevitably intensifiesas does the is impossible.`'3 brutalregimentation and bloody repressionof the masses. Frunze summedup the of militarizedMarxism. Here Bukharin'sfears such an order. Lenin did not share regarding Clausewitz' dictum on war as a continuationof politics was thatWar Communismhad to But, by 1921 he had concluded be applied to the strugglebetween the Communistand capitalist abandoned. In his defenseof the New withits systems which must end in the victory of one and the an- tolerancefor the restorationof the marketin agriculture,small- nihilationof the other.Limitation, defined as the articulationof scale industry,and internaltrade, the militarizationof Lenin's specificends and means in keeping witha given correlationof thoughtpersisted. In the Summer of 1921 Lenin explained the forces,became nothingmore than a tacticaldecision. Accepting shiftin partyline to foreigncommunists by describingthe new the terriblelogic of this position led to the recognitionof the policy as another tactic imposed upon the regime by the do- need to prepare for total war. It placed great stress upon eco- mestic situation.He justifiedthe NEP as a means of providing nomic preparationsfor war, state-directedindustrialization, the for the survival of the regime in the face of a restablized, peacetime mobilizationof the citizenry,and the central com- capitalist Europe: mand and control of the state machine. So, we have begun our new tactic [the NEP]. There is no AfterFrunze's death in 1925 M. N. Tukhachevskii,one of need to be nervous,we cannot be too late, and ifyou ask, Lenin's favored young and Frunze's close col- how long can Russia holdout, we answer,that we are now laborator,began to call fora militarization[voenizatsiia] of the conductinga war with the pettitebourgeoisie, with the entire countryincluding state-directed industrialization." Tu- peasantry,an economic war which is more dangerous to khachevskiijustified such a course by referringto the existing us than the late civil war. But as Clausewitz said, the capitalist encirclement and the mechanization of warfare, and we have not forone elementsof war are dangerous, which instance stood outside that danger." he and others in the RKKA Staffwere already antici- pating in theirdiscussions of "futurewar." He did not, how- LENIN has come full circle. War and politics have been ever, findmuch support for such views withinthe upper reaches transposed as subject and . Here politics have be- of the Party. Ironically,as the Soviet state embarkedupon the come a continuationof war by other means. The NEP was a process of dismantlingthe NEP, total mobilizationof the so- tactical device to restore the national and regain ciety, super industrialization, and forced collectivization, peasant supportin the face of armed uprisingsat Kronstadtand which he had advocated, Stalin removed him fromthe central in the region. The NEP's success as an economic and leadership of the RKKA. In May 1928 Tukhachevskii was political measure was in no small degree dependent upon the reassigned fromhis post as Chief of Staffof the RKKA and demobilizationof the Red Army,and Lenin in his last monthsof "exiled" to the command of the Leningrad MilitaryDistrict. activitybefore his finalillness supportedthe creationof a mixed To theirdismay Bukharinand the Party's ring-wingnow saw cadre and territorialmilitary force.>' The militarypolicy of the theirally, Stalin, embrace the verypolicies whichthreatened to Party and its general line were thus fused. Indeed, during create a leviathan,the warfarestate, which they so feared.Even Lenin's final illness V. Sorin wrote in that in a dis- afterthe Partyhad embarkedupon his programof super indus- cussion withhim, Lenin had recommendedthat Party workers trialization and collectivization in the First Five Year Plan read Clausewitz since politicaltactics and militarytactics were Stalin did not immediatelyembrace militarizationas an objec- iadjoining fields" (Grenzgebiet).'2 tive or use it to justifythe tremendoussacrifices imposed upon Lenin's militarizationof Marxism involved a substantial town and village. In the Summer of 1930 Stalin identifiedhis shift in the place of war in socialist ideology. War, while new revolutionfrom above with Peter I's transformationof previouslyseen as a social evil imposed upon the workingclass, Russia and related the buildingof factoriesto economic mobil- had never stood at the centerof Marxistanalysis of capitalism. ization forwar. Tukhachevskiireturned to favorand took over Lenin put it there. He emphasized the inevitabilityof wars as Deputy of Defense and Director of Armaments. among capitaliststates in the age of imperialismand presented In 1931,when the warfarestate was alreadyunder construction, the armed struggleof the workingclass as the onlypath towards Stalin defendedthe choice in his own Social-Darwinistrender- the eventual eliminationof war. With war at the center of his ing of militarizedMarxism: analysis of capitalism, Lenin and his followers, when con- frontedby civil war and foreignintervention, extended war and Those who fallbehind, get beaten. . .. Such is thejungle the systematicpreparation for war as indispensable elements of capitalism. You are backward, you are weak- for the survival of the Soviet state, surroundedas it was by therefore,you are wrong. Hence, you can be beaten and capitalist powers. Lenin hoped to use a policy of peaceful enslaved. You are mighty; therefore, you are right. coexistence to aid in the recoveryof the Soviet economyand to Hence, we must be wary of you.>'

OCTOBER 1985 189 REFERENCES 16. Ibid., 215. 1. 1. A. Shavrovand M. I. Galkin,eds., Metodologiia voenno- 17. Ibid., 162. nlli(chnog(o/oznaniia (: Voenizdat., 1977), 96. 18. Iu. I. Koroblev, V. I. Lenin i -asIhi(IltUcht- Cal'oevlii 2. A. S. Milovidov and V. G. Kozlov, ed., FilosoJfkoenas- ikogo oktiatbria,2nd Edition (Moscow: Nauka, 1979). 90. ledie V. I. Lenina i problemy sovremennoi voiny (Moscow: 19. "Vypuski i zamechaniia na kniguKlauzewitsa ?O voine Voenizdat, 1972), 95-96. i vedenii voin'," Leninskiisbornik, 12 (1931), 387-452. For an 3. Recent works dealing with the disintegrationof the Rus- Englishtranslation see Donald E. Davis and WalterS. G. Ohn, sian armedforces in 1917include Allen K. Wildman,Thle End of eds., "Lenin's Notebook on Clausewitz," Soviet ArmedForces the Russian ImperiailArmy and the Soldiers' Revolt (March- Review Annuial(Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International April 1917), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Press, 1977), I, 188-229. Norman Saul, Sailors in Revolt: The Baltic Fleet in 1917 (Law- 20. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie soc Iinenii, 26, 224. rence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1978); Evan Mawdsley, 21. Ibid. The RuissitnReviolution and the Baltic Fleet: Wlarand Politics, 22. Ibid., Selected Works,2 (Moscow, 1960), 320. February1917-April 19/8 (New York: Barnes and Noble. 1978); 23. Peter Paret, "The Genesis of On War," in Carl von and M. Frenkin.Riisskaita armiia i revoliuitsiia(Munich: Logos, Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1978). 1976), 15-16. 4. P. H. Vigor,The Soviet Vietwof'War, Peace and Neutrality 24. and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, 14 (: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), 9-10. (Moscow, 1980),434-435. In thisreference from an articleon the 5. Soi'ctskaia voennaia entsiklopediia (Moscow: Gos- armies of Europe Engels compared Jominiand Clausewitz as udarstvennoe Slovaro-Entsiklopedicheskoe Izdatel'stvo, both being respected authoritieson militaryaffairs. The entire 1933). 1, cc. 834-835. Karl Marx and Frederich Engels, Karl pointof the section was to show thatthe Prussian officercorps Marlx Frederic/hEngels Werke,21 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1972), was the best educated militaryelite in the world. It said nothing 350-351. On Engels' subsequent views of socialist movement about the substance of Clausewitz' ideas. A letterto Marx in and the prospectsfor revolution see David McLellan, Marxism 1859 does show that Engels had read Von Kriege, but his AfterMcarxv (Boston: Houghton MifflinCompany, 1979), 9-17; subsequentreferences to the workwere, at best, pedestrian.See W. 0. Henderson,The Lifevof 'FriedriclI En gels (London: Frank Collected Works, 18, 279. On the relationship,or lack of it, Cass, 1976), 11, 416-446; and Marx and Engels, Karl Marx between Engels' readingof Clausewitz and Lenin's views see Frederic/hEngels Werke, 22 (Berlin: Dietz Verleg, 1972), MartinBerger, Engels, Armies and Revolution (Hamdon, CT, 509-527. 1977), 168-169. 6. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structureof ScientificRev olutions 25. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 26, 316-317. (Chicago, 1970), 2nd Edition, 43-76. 26. Ibid., 32, 78-79. 7. , and Rev,olution (Boston: 27. Ibid., 104. HoughtonMifflin , 1960),321 and , Mirx- 28. Rabinowitch,The BolsheviiksCome to Powver ismus iund Pliilosopiy, Ed. F. Halliday (London: NLB, 1970), (New York, 1976). 61ff. 29. N. R. Pankratovet (il., V. I. Lenin i Sovetskie Voorulzhen- 8. Robert Tucker, Marx and Engels Reader (New York, nye sily (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1980), 88-91; S. A. 1978), 2nd Edition, 145. Tiushkevich et al., SoveetskieVoorulzhennye silv: Istoriia st- 9. McLellan, 20-54. roitel'stvca(Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stva, 1978). 11 ff; and 10. V. I. Lenin, Polnoc Sobranie soclhinenii,27 (Moscow: AlexanderFischer, "Die Anfangeder Roten Armee 1917/18.Zur Progress, 1965-1970),299-426. Theorie und Praxis revolutionarer Militarpolitik in bol- 11. Marxism-Leninismon War and Army (Moscow: Pro- schewistischen Russland, Militargeschichtliche Mit- gress, 1972). teilungen, 18 (1975), 63-74. 12. The literatureon Lenin as a militarytheorist is quite 30. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 35, 244, 250, 256. extensive.The followingworks are reflectiveof the generalline 31. Ibid., 36, 292. of Soviet scholarshipon the topic. A. Strokov, 'V. 1. Lenin o 32. Clausewitz, On War, 497. zakonomernostiakhvooruzhennoi bor'by, o vsaimosviazi, raz- 33. V. Sorin, Partiia i oppocitsii: Ic istoriioppozitsionnykh vitii i smene sposobov i form voennyky deistvii," Vestnik techlzenii(Jraktsiia lev,yklh kommanistov), (Moscow, 1925), 72. l'oennoi istorii,Nalclinve /lapiski,2 (1971), 3-25; 1. Korotkov, 34. 1. A. Korotkov, Istoriia sovetskoi vooennoimysli (Mos- "K istoriistanovleniia sovetsko voennoi nauki," Vestnik wOen- cow: Nauka, 1980), 28. noi istor-ii,naiwtlinye a,)piski, 2 (1971), 42-70; A. N. Lagovskii, 35. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie soclhinenii,35, 409. V. I., Lenin i soietskaia loennaila natika,2nd Edition(Moscow: 36. L. D. Trotsky,Socliineniia (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Voenizdat, 1981). Izdatel'stvo, 1925), XVII, pt. 1, 316. 13. Lenin, Polnoc sobrinie sochiinenii(Moscow, 1958-1966), 37. Tiushkevichet al., SoivetskieVoora-izchennyc silv, 38-39. 1, 164. 38. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochineniia, 38, 139-140. See 14. A. A. Bogdanov (nee A. A. Malinovsky)was a physcian, also Fediukin, Soivetskaia vlast i batrzhlaaznyespetsialisty , writer,and early Bolshevik. Bogdanov had a large (Moscow: Mysl', 1965), 154-156. followingin wing of the Bolshevik faction and quar- 39. M. N. Tukhachevsky,Ic7brannye proi.7i'edeniia (Moscow: relled withLenin over tactical issues, includingparticipation in Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1963), 1, 27-28. the election to the Third Duma. On philosophicalissues, Lenin 40. S. A. Fediukin, Soivetskaiavilast' i buarZlhazny'espet- seems not to have demanded any single line and toleratedthe sialisty, 59-61. early effortsto develop a philosophical system in which the 41. Ibid., 62. physicistErnst Mach's concept of sensual materialismfigured 42. Trotsky,Socliineniia, XVII, pt. 1, 371. prominently.Bogdanov's Empiriomnonism,which combined 43. V. G. Kulikov, ed., Aktdemiia genercal'nogoshtatba: Mach withideas taken fromBerdiaev and Lunacharsky,called Istoriia vOennoi ordenov, lenina i Sui'oroi'a I stepeni akadvemii into question the philosophical foundations of Marx's own general'nogo slitatb *ooruzlennvklisil SSSR imeniK. E. Vor- materialism,which had their roots in Spinoza and Holbach. ochzilov(Moscow: Voennoe Ixdatel'stvo, 1976), 19-21;and Ko- Lenin did not, however, attack this philosophical revisionism rotkov,Istoriia sovetskoi voennoi mvsli, 28-31. untilBogdanov's Empiriomonismwas identifiedin printas the 44. Korotkov, Istoriia sovetskoi l'oennoi mysli, 244. philosophyof Bolshevism and threatenedto bringdown upon 45. Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia,11, 210, 314. the factionthe charge thatLenin most feared ideological revis- 46. Kulikov, Akademiia general'nogo slitaba, 6-7. ionism. Then Lenin entered into the philosophicalarena to do 47. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 35, 395-409. battle in the name of orthodoxyand in order to separate Bol- 48. N. 1. Shatagin, Organi,catsiia i stroitel'sti'o soivetskoi shevismfrom Empirimonism and Bogdanov. On Bogdanov and armii v period inostrannoivoennoi 8intervntsii orijrafdavnsk,oi Lenin see S. V. Utechin, 'Philosophy and Society: Alexander voinv(1918- 1920) (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), 383-394. Bogdanov," in Leopold Labedz, ed., Re)visionism:Essalys on 49. N'. Bukharin, '"'K teorii imperialisticheskogo gos- thecHi.story o f MaxrxistIdccas (London: George Allen and Un- udarstva,"Re^voliustsiia pravta: Sbornikpevrivi (Moscow, 1925), win, 1962), 117-125. 31. In 1919 Bukharin and E. Preobrazhenskycollaborated in 15./Ibid., 35. writingThec ABC ofCommulnism, a textbookfor party agitators

190 MILITARY AFFAIRS and propagandists,explaining the Party's new program,which 54. M. N. Tukhachevsky,"K voprosu o sovremennoistra- had been adopted by the 8th PartyCongress in . In tegii," in Voina i voennoe iskusstvo v sveta istoricheskogo thatwork the authorstalked about the negationof the Red Army materializma (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1927), 127; and M. N. Tu- in its final victory over capital, about its foundations in a khachevskii,Izbrannye proizvedeniia, II, 26-27 (citingan arti- workers' ,and about the hostilityto the barracks system cle in Pravda of 23 February 1928). It is noteworthythat in his of training,and about the temporaryutility of the military call for militarization,Tukhachevskii cited Clausewitz and specialists. In the end both men saw the armydisappearing after Lenin. See "K voprosu o sovremennoistrategii," 116-123. the victoryin the civil war and were hostileto the creationof a 55. , Leninism: Selected Writings(New York: permanentmilitary caste. See and E. Pre- InternationalPublishers, 1942), 200. obrazhensky,The ABC of :A Popular Explanation of the Program of the CommunistPartv of Russia (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperback, 1967), 205-219. For a ftulldiscussion of the relationship between Bukharin's perceptions about de- JacobW. Kippis Professorof Russian History at KansasState velopmentof and the concept of equilibrium University.For the last two years he has beena visitingprofessor theory in his ,see Stephen F. Cohen, at MiamiUniversity inOxford, Ohio. A graduateof Shippensburg Bukharinand the BolshevikRevolution: A Political Biography, University,he receivedhis PhD fromthe PennsylvaniaState 1888-1938(New York: AlfredA. Knopf, 1973), 117-122. Universityin 1970. He is co-editor,with Robin Higham, of Soviet 50. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 44, 60. 51. N. F. Kuz'min, Na strazhe mirnogo truida(1921-1940 Aviationand AirPower (Westview, 1977) and served as associate gg.), (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1959), 6-9. editorof MilitaryAffairs, 1979-1983. He has publishedmany 52. "Vypuski i zamechaniia na kniguKlauzevitsa 'O voine i articleson Russianand Sovietnaval and militaryhistory. This vedenii voin'," Leninskiisobrnik, 12 (1931), 390. articlewas acceptedfor publication in February1985. 53. Frunze, "Edinaia voennaia doktrinai Krasnaia armiia," Voennaia Nauka i revoliutsiia,No. 2 (1921), 39.

by David Kahn

CARLISLE Barracks, Pa. - Intellectualfisticuffs broke out so they can't withstandany changes on technology.On Wair on 25 and 26 April at the firstconference ever held in the doesn't tell you how to cook. It says what cooking is and what United States on , widely regardedas the does it serve. Clausewitz is useful because he is not useful. world's greatestphilosopher of war. Everybodyelse has triedto be useful- and that's whythey're Militaryhistorians and majors and who are students outdatedby the next weapons systemthat has come aroundthe at the U.S. ArmyWar College here disputed whetherClause- corner.Clausewitz deals withideas, not reality,and thisis why witz' classic work,On War, which is requiredreading at many he is eternal." militaryacademies, has been outdated by moderntechnology. RetortedHandel: "What happens in theoryisn't as important Clausewitz, a Prussian general staffofficer who foughtin the in war as what happens in reality." Napoleonic wars, died in 1831. While early militarywriters Voices were occasionally raised in the wood-paneled con- had concentratedon such mattersas lines of approachto a battle ferenceroom, and therewere plentyof interruptionsand tough- or encirclingstrategies, Clausewitz emphasized the psycho- sounding remarks. "I want to drop a bomb on Martin," said logical aspects ofwar, such as the need fora generalto be firmof WilliamsonMurray, professor of historyat Ohio State. But the purpose, and the political aspects. His most famous dictum participantssaid the remarkswere just part of academic give- describes war as the continuationof politics by other means. and-take. Michael Handel, a professorat the War College and organizer During a free-wheelingdiscussion on politics in war, John ofthe conference,pointed out areas in whichnew weapons have Gooch, a professorat the Universityof Lancaster in , affectedClausewitz' theories. "Strategic surprise, which he said he had been told the Soviets were pickingtheir targets for a thoughtnot possible, is now feasible," said Handel. "This also conventional war in Europe not on militarybut on political makes intelligencemuch more importantthan he saw it as." grounds. When someone contradictedthat, Gooch responded, Unity of command has also become much more complex, "If you reallythink that, that's whyyou're goingto lose the next Handel said. war against the - if there is one." Martinvan Creveld, a professorat the Hebrew Universityin Creveld contendedthat the Prussian regardedintelligence as ,declared of Handel's presentation,"I don't agree essential, but other participantsobserved that the problem of witha single word he said. If Michael is correct,you'd have to uncertaintyin intelligence,which Clausewitz stressed,remains add a new dimensionto whatClausewitz wroteevery 10 or 20 or serious, despite modern-daysatellite photography and electron- 25 years, and this would mean he'd have a hundreddimensions ic intercepti9n.They pointed to such intelligencefailures as and would be entirelyout-of-date, and we wouldn't be sitting Pearl Harbor,the Tet offensivein ,the overthrowof the here today." Shah of Iran, and the Arab surpriseattack on Israel thatstarted In his own remarks,Creveld said, "Justas cookbooks tell you the Yom Kippur war in 1973 as demonstratingthat in intelli- how to cook a chicken,most books on war tell you how to fight, gence as in other matters,Clausewitz still has much to teach.

OCTOBER 1985 191