•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••r• Glasnost as Speaking TruthisPower: In partialfulfillmentoftherequirements Submitted toProfessorLindaGerstein In LateSovietRussia For theBachelorsinArtsHistory, By ElizabethHeld Haverford College a WeaponofDissent April 20,2012 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ••••••••••••••••►•••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS flour, andeggs. To ProfessorLindaGerstein,whotaughtmethattobakeacakeyouneedbutter,sugar, ii •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ABSTRACT glasnost, were abletobreakthegovernment'smonopolyoninformation.Moreimportantly,they about theillegalityofrulingregime.Byusingtheirownmediaforms, Chronicle ofCurrentEvents, used themediatechnologiestoadvocatefortheirtwokey,interconnectedgoalsof that speakingtruthwaslegalandnotsomethingthegovernmentcouldprosecute. First, that openness, butalsousedtheirmediaoutletstoexposeeventsthegovernmentwished Glasnost keep quiet. demands. Theyplacedthemselvesinahistoricaldebate.Thedissidentsalsosoughtto put themselvesintheshadowofpreviousgroupsRussianreformerswhohadsame differentiate theirversionof leaders' definitionsoftheterm. of dissidents' callsfor media,andtheirrelationshiptotheidea oflegality.Itwillalsolookatthe dissidents interpretedthe termdifferentlythanpreviousgenerations. glasnost In 1968,agroupofSovietdissidentsbegantoprinttheirownnewspaper,the In choosingthetwomantrasoflegalityand This thesisseekstoexplorethewaydissidentmedia outletsforcedthedualgoals served asbotharallyingcryandweapon.Thedissidentscalledfor or openness,andtheruleoflaw.Thedissidentsmadetwomainarguments. glasnost and respectfortheruleoflaw.Itwillexamine causesandformsof was integraltocreatinganequitableandfairjusticesystem.Second, glasnost glasnost, in ahistoriccontext,seeking tounderstandhowthe and toworkwithwesternreportersspreadtheirmessage complete openness,fromvariousgovernment glasnost, the dissidentsconsciously iii •••••••••••••••••000011000000000009•••••••••• HISTORICAL CONTEXT INTRODUCTION DISSIDENT MEDIAASANEXAMPLEOF LEGALITY INDISSIDENTMEDIA OFFICIAL VS.DISSIDENT CONCLUSION BIBLIOGRAPHY SINYAVSKY ANDDANIEL THE RULEOFLAWAND SILENCE ASCOMPLICITY PUSHKIN SQUARERALLY DE-STALINIZATION ASAMOTIVATIONSFOR MEMORY OFSTALIN THE THE WESTERN NEWSPAPERS WESTERN PUBLICATIONSOFTHE GLASNOST SOVIET MEDIA FOREIGN RADIO CLOSED TRIALS 19TH CENTURYREFORMEFFORTS COVERAGE AS ILLEGAL TRIALPROCEEDINGS PERSECUTION OFSUPPORTERS WESTERNIZERS VS.SLAVOPHILES GLASNOST GORBACHEV'S KHRUSHCHEV'S "SECRET"SPEECH EMPEROR ALEXANDERII Table ofContents CHRONICLE WHITE BOOK AND LEGALITYASTOOLSINDE-STALINIZATION AND LEGALITY GLASNOST GLASNOST AND TRIALPUBLICATIONS GLASNOST GLASNOST CHRONICLE GLASNOST GLASNOST 17 13 11 10 32 18 17 46 10 10 21 61 26 25 24 36 34 33 40 58 37 48 46 50 54 51 1 6 8 6 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• INTRODUCTION the useofmediainSovietUnion.Inparticular,Iwasexaminingroledissidents' use ofnewmediatechnologies,particularlytelevision,playedintheirsuccess overthrowing theSovietsysteminCzechoslovakia.Myfirstpaperendswithathrowaway line (Iwasafreshman)comparingthedissidents'useofmediatoGutenberg'sinvention the printingpress. here. WhenGutenbergcreatedtheprintingpressandprintedfirstBible,hebroke Catholic Church'smonopolyoninformation.Untilthatpoint,ordinarylaypeopledidnot have accesstoBiblesintheirhome.Theycouldnotinterpretthebiblicalstoriesonown; rather theyreliedonchurchleaderstoteachthemthemeaningandimportanceofsacred text. Whenlaypeoplecouldsuddenlyownbibles,andreadthemontheirown,theChurch's power inevitablyweakened.Theylosttheinterpretativecontroltheyhadoverparishioners. Unions. LiketheGutenbergbible,dissidentmedia outletsbrokethemonopolyon , serveasausefulhistoricalanalogytotheroleofdissidentmediaoutletsinSoviet information, inthiscasethestate'smonopoly.Similarly, thefreeflowofinformationproved to havearadicaleffectontheSovietgovernment's controloveritscitizens. and theparty'sstrongholdoninformation.Iwill explorethewaydissidentmediaoutlets best effortstodefeatthe dissidents.Inthefirstsection,Iwillexplore historicalcontext forced thedualgoalsof At theendofmyfreshmenyear,Ifoundmyselfwritingfirstmanypaperson That ideashouldhavebeendevelopedmore,soI'lltaketheopportunitytodothat The riseoftheprintingpressanditsrelationtoProtestantchallenge This thesisexaminesthewaydissidents'use ofmediabrokethegovernment's glasnost and respectfortheruleof law,inspiteoftheauthorities 1 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• glasnost discuss thevariousformsofdissidentmediaandhowtheycametosymbolize for thedissidentmovementandwhatsparkeditsformation.Insecondsection,Iwill that thedissidentscalledfor.Inthirdsection,Iwillexplorerelationshipbetween in Russiaandthedifferencebetweengovernment'scallsfor used agreatdealofprimarysources,allwrittenbymembersthedissidentcommunity. calls. However manyofmysecondarysourceswerewrittenbymembersthemovementorthose highly sympatheticwithit.Forinstance,LudmillaAlexeyeva,akeymemberofthedissident biases shinethroughit.ShepaintsthedissidentsasselflessheroesonaquesttosaveRussia community wrote Human Rights', and shiesawayfromanycriticismofthemovementoritsheroes.Mostscholarshipon movement iswritteninsimilarlyglowingtones.Morecontemporaryscholarship,most notably byAnnKomorami,oftheUniversityToronto,andBenNathans, at themovement.Thevastmajorityofscholarship thoughremainshighlycomplimentary. of Pennsylvania,ismovingawayfromthismodelandbeginningtotakeamorecriticallook writers, AndreiSinyayskyandYuliDaniel.The pair wastriedunderArticle-70,slandering the state.Tomembersofburgeoningdissident community,thearrestandtrialof Sinyaysky andDanielsymbolized everythingtheyhadfeared.TheSoviet Union,itseemed Rights, Ludmilla Alexeyeva, (Connecticut: WesleyanUniversity Press,1987). In 1965,theSovietdissidentmovementbeganin earnestwiththearrestoftwoSoviet Before goinganyfurther,abriefdiscussionofsourcesismerited.Forthisproject,I and legality.Inthefinalsection,Iwillexaminehistoricaldebatesabout after immigratingtotheUnitedStates.Itisathroughexamination,buther Soviet Dissent:ContemporaryMovementsforNational,Religious,and Soviet Dissent:Contemporary MovementsforNational,Religious,andHuman glasnost and thedissidents' glasnost glasnost 2 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• to them,wasre-enteringtheStalinisteraofshowtrialsandpoliticaltrials.Theystageda protest onMoscow'sPushkinSquarecallingfor the ruleoflawtobefollowedexplicitlyintrialproceedings. spread theirmessage,thedissidentsturnedtoownmediaforms. cries forthedissidentcommunity.Theysoughtopendiscussionofissuesfacing Soviet Unionandfortheruleoflawtobeappliedequallyallcitizens.Inorder coverage focusedontheeventstakingplacebehindcloseddoorsatpoliticaltrials.The Current Events, to obeytheruleoflaw.Transparencywouldpreventprosecutionfromfabricating testimony orplantingevidence. Chronicle's stations andnewspapers,aswellforeignpublicationsofthe message bothwithinandbeyondtheSovietUnion.Intheirworkwithforeignmediaoutlets, particularly trials. the dissidentsfocusedonwhattheyviewedtobeexamplesofgovernmentillegality, broadcast usingshortwavetransmissionsintoRussia guaranteedatleastsomeopen commitment to discussion ofeventsinthe SovietUnionthatotherwisewouldhavebeen ignored.The dissidents' newspaper,the The dissidentcommunitybegantopublishitsownnewspaper,the The veryuseandexistenceofdissidentmediaoutlets demonstratesthedissident From thatmomenton,theissuesoflegalityand The dissidentsalsomadeuseofforeignmediasources,includingwesternradio editors believedthattheiropendiscussionoftrialswouldforcethegovernment glasnost. in 1968.Thepaperwaspublishedusing Their discussioninprintandonWesternRussian-language radio Chronicle ofCurrentEvents, glasnost, glasnost and theirworkwithwestern or openness,forthetrialand Chronicle, became thetwokeyrallying technology. Mostofits Chronicle of to spreadtheir 3 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• journalists, publishersandradiostations,allowedthemtoopenlydiscusslifeintheSoviet Union. Itstoodinstarkcontrasttostatepublications.Moreover,doingsoitrepresentedthe dissident callfor the Westernizers.ThesegroupscalledforaruleoflawratherthanautocracyinRussia.Many in theshadowofhistoricalgroupsRussianreformers,mostnotablyDecembristsand movement. Theysoughttolimitthecontrolofautocratandsecretpoliceinenforcing of theirdemands,madeinthenineteenthcentury,closelymirrorgoalsdissident as continuingthislineofdissentbyusingmediatocallfortherulelawinSoviet the lawastheypleased,andratherhaveastrictreadingofit.Thedissidentssawthemselves Union. law, notonlytoguaranteethatthegovernmentfollowedlaws,butalsoensure simple, clearandaccessible;mediasourceswereonewayofaccomplishingthis. citizens wouldbeabletoactwithinthelaw.Thedissidentstaughtthatlawsneeded phenomenon ofgovernmentofficialssayingonething,whilemeaninganddoinganother. Media outlets,byjuxtaposingthelanguageofSoviet officialswiththeiractualactions,were shining lightontheliesthatwere"doublespeak." Dissidentpublicationswouldcombatlies with openness. able todemonstratehowlittlethewordofofficial publicationsmeant.Itwasawayof Stalinist era.Whilemost membersofthedissidentmovement1960s hadnotbeen The dissidents'decisiontofocusontheruleoflawand The The dissident'smediawasalsoawaytocombattheissueof"doublespeak," The motivationbehindthese twogoalswasaveryrealfearofthereturn of the Chronicle glasnost, and otherdissidentnewssourcesmadeittheirgoaltomakepublicthe openness andhonestyindiscussion,languagelaw. glasnost consciously putthem 4 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• personally persecutedbyStalin,theyhadfamiliesandfriendswhowere.Theyseenthe had learnedthelessonsofStalinistera,thatsilencewascomplicity.Speakingoutpublicly consequences ofthe1930sshowtrialsandgeneraldisregardforlegality.Dissidentsfeltthey was thewaytopreventpersecutionsfromreturning. transparency athisspeechthe20 discussion aboutthetruthofStalinistyears.Khrushchevwasnotfirst,orlast,leader in Russianhistory,tocallforopendiscussion.Inthe1860s,EmperorAlexanderIIandhis cabinet hadcalledforopendiscussionabouttheeliminationofserfdomandreform legal system.Inthe1980s,MikhailGorbachevwouldco-optterm of hisreformagenda.Itwasnotjustdissidents,then,whoused government aswell. weapon ofrevolution.Theydidnotwantaslow,controlledreleaseinformationbuttotal and completeopennessinthegovernment'sactions.Theiruseofmediawouldguaranteethis and helptoinstilltheruleoflawinSovietUnion. 2 MarshallShatz, Nikita Khrushchevhadmadeasimilarargumentabouttheimportanceof The dissidents,however,didnotcallfor Soviet dissentinhistoricalperspective th PartyCongressin1956.Init,hecalledforalimited (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,1980),150. glasnost 2

as atoolofreform,butrather glasnost glasnost as atool,butthe as akeypart glasnost and 5 • 6 • • HISTORICAL CONTEXT • Since its inception in 1965, the Soviet dissident community fought for two main 40 interconnected goals: glasnost and the rule of law. These goals became clear at the December • • 5, 1965 March on 's Pushkin Square, which is arguably the movement's date of • • birth.3 Approximately 200 people marched on the square calling for a fair and open trial of

• two Soviet writers, Andrei Sinyaysky and . 4 •

40 Sinyaysky and Daniel 40 • Sinyaysky and Daniel were arrested under Article 70 of the Criminal Code, which • outlawed anti-Soviet propaganda. The trial marked the first time this law applied to works of

• fiction, and the first definitive indication that Soviet Premier would have • limited tolerance for dissent in his empire. Both Sinyaysky's The Trial Begins (published • • under a penname "Tertz") and Daniel's This is Moscow Speaking (published under the

pseudonym "Arzhak") attacked Stalin and implied the Stalinist era was returning. Daniel's • 40 story described a "public murder day," when the Party would order its citizens to kill one • • another. The Trial Begins was a fictional account of The Doctor's Plot in 1953, a false • accusation of an assassination plan against Stalin by Jewish doctors. • • A large part of the prosecution's argument hinged on the fact the authors had • published their works abroad. The prosecution claimed Sinyaysky and Daniel had • • purposefully attempted to make the Soviet state look corrupt and immoral on the world stage. • They had undermined the in a public, global forum. •

S 41/ 3 Alexeyeva, 9. • • 4 Shatz, 123. •• ••••••.•.•.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• were trumpedup.Shatzwrites,"TheyaccusedofslanderingtheSovietgovernmentand people, ofslanderingLeninandenablingsomeWesterncommentatorstousetheirworks witnesses werecalledatthetrial,exceptforthosesubpoenaedbystate.Inaddition, for anti-Sovietpurposes-hardlythe'especiallydangerouscrimesagainststate'referredto transcript ofthetrial,offersfurtherproofinjusticeattrial.Forexample,no in thelawcode." accused werenotallowedaccesstodefenselawyers. the Sovietpress.lawsaidaccusedmustbeconsideredinnocentuntilprovenguilty, but was moreconcernedwithmockingtheaccusedanddiscouragingothersfromfollowingtheir path thanpresentinganysortoffactualreporting oftheiraccount. This sortofstyleisexactlywhatthe 6 5 Hayward, (NewYork:Harper &Row,Publishers,1966),27. 7 Shatz,119. Ginzburg,27. AlexanderGinzburg, Izvestia, Observers declaredthetrialashamfornumberofreasons.Forone,charges Hayward focusesagreatdealofhisattentiononthetreatmenttwowritersin with heavysarcasmoftheaccused,quotetheirwordsinordertomockthem,and The piecesarewrittenintheclassicalstyleofRussiansatirical general assumetheguiltoftwomenbeforecourthadreacheditsverdict.The defendants arepresentedascowardlyfelonswhosquirmedunderthewitheringattack and ironlogicoftheprosecution(asoneseesfromtranscript,thiswasfar the case.' the government'snewspaper,feltitwasabovethisrule.Haywardwrites: 5 MaxHayward,anEnglishliteratureexpertwhotranslatedandpublisheda On Trial:TheSovietStateversus "AbramTertz"and"NikolaiArzhak," Chronicle sought tocombatwithitscoverage. 6

feuilleton, trans. Max Izvestia speak 7 S •S 8 • The final, and most serious, concern about the Sinyaysky and Daniel trial were the • excessive sentences given out. Sinyaysky received five years hard labor, while Daniel was • • sentenced to seven.8

• The dissident community viewed the trial as evidence of re-Stalinization, and as a • catalyst for action. Shatz explains that it gave their movement a new rallying cry: legality. He S writes: • • Many of those who voiced such complaints stated that they disagreed with the writers' • views or with the methods; they had used to publish them. Nevertheless, they felt • compelled to protest against the arbitrariness and unfairness with which the case had been handled. There were no public complaints about the laws themselves or about the judicial process or the legal system in general; it was assumed that the law was 111 just but had not been properly applied. The critics therefore demanded that the trial be reviewed and the writers acquitted (because they had obviously not violated the laws • under which they have been tried) or at least that their very hard sentences be 1111 reduced.9 • • Members of the movement first began a letter writing and petition campaign in support of • Sinyaysky and Daniel. They circulated letters calling for the government to apply the law, as • • it was written, to its citizens. But younger members of the movement wanted to move at a

faster, more radical pace. They turned to protests and demonstrations. • 411 Pushkin Square Rally • On December 5, 1965, a little over a month after Sinyaysky and Daniel were arrested, • approximately 200 students gathered in Moscow's Pushkin Square calling for a fair and open • trial. 1° Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin, a mathematician and poet, organized the rally. Yesenin- • • Volpin had long been interested in calling for a rule of law, rather than the rule of the Party,

• the KGB, or a singular autocratic ruler, in the Soviet Union. This is reflected in the

8 Peter Reddaway, ed., Uncensored : Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union: The Unofficial Moscow • Journal, a Chronicle of Current Events, (American Heritage Press, 1972), 18. 9 Shatz, 122. • 10 Shatz, 123. •• • ••••••••••i••••••i••••i••••••••••••••••••••• demonstration's goal.Theprotestorscalledfor proceedings. Theydidnotarguethewriterswereinnocent,butsimplythattheyhadright to afairandpublictrial. explicit. Itread: As heexplicitlystates,thepointofmeetingistocallfor about callingattentiontothegovernment'sillegality,andconsequencesofit.Hehoped the protestwouldforcegovernmenttofollowitsownlawsregardingtrialprocedures. Ludmilla Alexeyeva,akeymemberofthedissidentmovementandonefoundersits newsletter, the teachings aboutlegalitywere.Shewritesthatitwas a"simplebut,unfamiliarideatoSoviets: all lawsoughttobeunderstoodexactlytheway they arewrittenandnotas interpreted bythegovernment." (Pittsburgh: UniversityofPittsburgh Press,1993)120. pleased. 12 11 Alexeyeva,275. Ludmilla AlexeyevaandPaul Goldberg, Yesenin-Volpin circulatedaleafletbeforetherallymakingdemonstration'spoint In thepast,unlawfulactionsbyauthoritieshavetakenlivesofmillions prudent togiveuponedayoftranquilitythanspendyearssufferingthe Soviet citizens.Thisbloodstainedpastdemandsvigilanceinthepresent.Itismore method isthe Soviet citizenshaveameansforresistingcapriciousactionsoftheauthorities.That consequences oflawlessnessthathasnotbeenstoppedintime. accused)!" orwheretheparticipantsdisplayacorrespondingbanner.Anyshouts MAND GLAS-NOSTFORTHETRIALOF(followedbythelastnamesof slogans thatdepartfromdemandsofstrictadherencetolawsmustberegardedas meeting. counter-productive or,possibly,provocationalmustbehaltedbyparticipantsofthe In hermemoir, Chronicle ofCurrentEvents, 11

Glasnost The ThawGeneration:ComingofAgeinthePost-StalinEra, Meeting whoseparticipantschantonlyoneslogan:WEDE- 12 Thegovernmentcouldnotarbitrarilyapplythe law asit The ThawGeneration:Coining ofAgeinthePost-StalinEra, explains howradicalYesenin-Volpin's glasnost, or openness,withthetrial glasnost, and nothingelse.Itwas 9 • • 10

• The Rule of Law and Glasnost • For Yesenin-Volpin, and subsequently other members of the dissident community,

• glasnost and legality were inherently linked. Robert Horvath makes this point in his essay,

• "The Dissident Roots of Glasnost." He writes, "Volpin's advocacy of glasnost was closely

• bound up with the legalism that was so central to the notion of pravozashchitnik, a defender 40 • both of inalienable rights and the letter of the law, which guaranteed glasnost during court

• proceedings."13 Transparency would lead to the rule of law because the government would be • shamed into follow its own laws. The movement focused much of its energy on calling for • • glasnost and the rule of law, as well as illustrating what that meant for the Soviet Union • • through its use of media sources.

S • De-Stalinization as a Motivations for Glasnost • One of the broader questions is why the dissidents decided to focus on the glasnost • • and legality as their rallying cries. In their view, they were necessary pieces of the de- Stalinization effort. The dissidents believed that it was only by speaking openly about the

illegality of the regime that they would be able to prevent the rise of another Stalin-like • • leader.

Memory of Stalin • • The dissidents clearly remembered well the effect the lawlessness of the Stalinist age

had on them and their families. While few of the dissidents of the 1960s were personally

• persecuted during the terror, many of them had family members who were. Sinyaysky serves ID • as a helpful example. Sinyaysky was by all accounts was a normal, compliant citizen until • • 13 • Robert Horvath, "The Dissident Roots of Glasnost," in Challenging Traditional Views of Russian History, ed. Stephen G. Wheatcroft, (: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 177. • • • • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• of thearrestonhim,saying,"Thehisfatherin1951,someabsurdpretext,wasa 1951 whenhisfather,arevolutionaryhero,wasarrested.Afamilyfrienddescribedtheeffect deep shocktohim.Forthefirsttime,problemofinjustice,lawlessness,suffering of theinnocent,confrontedhiminhisintimatefamilylife. suddenly becameclear. crime, yetwasstillimprisoned.TheinjusticeandillegalityoftheSovietgovernment Silence asComplicity and forpreventingitfromhappeningagain.Hewrites: Shatz arguesthedissidentsfeltpersonallyresponsiblefordestructionofStalinistera, at hertrialofwhyshechosetoprotesttheinvasionCzechoslovakia.Shesaid,'HadInot done this[protest],Iwouldhaveconsideredmyselfresponsiblefortheseactionsofthe Shatz offersmultipleexamplesofthedissidentsspeakingout,suchasBogoraz'sexplanation government, justasourwholepeoplebearstheresponsibility fortheStalin-Beriacamps, government, justasalladultcitizensofourcountry beartheresponsibilityofour death sentences." 14 16 15 Shatz,150. Shatz,127. Shatz,155. The memoryoftheterrorandlovedonesaffectedbyithaunteddissidents. actions isastrongsenseofpersonalguiltovertherepressionsStalinera,and One ofthethemesdissidentsvoicemostfrequentlywhenaskedtoexplaintheir determination toredeemthatguiltbycombatinginjusticeinthepresent.Evenwhen passivity, andtheunquestionedfaithinauthoritiesthatSovietsocietydisplayed under Stalintormentthemandcompeltospeakout." they themselvesinnowayparticipatedtherepressions,silentacquiescence, 16 Bystayingsilent,shewouldhaveallowedandimplicitly condonedthe " 14 Hisfatherhadcommittedno 15

11 • • 12 • • • system of lawlessness. It was only by speaking out and calling attention to the disregard for •• the rule of law that the Soviet system could be saved. • Bogoraz's words echo those of a 1975 essay by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a leader of • the movement, "Participation and the Lie." In his piece, Solzhenitsyn argued that honesty

• was the only way to undermine the Soviet state. The state, Solzhenitsyn writes, is built on a • system of lies and that exposing the truth would cause it to crumble. He writes, "Only , • • knowing out system, can imagine what will happen when thousand and tens of thousands of • people take this path--how our country will be purified and transformed without shots or • • bloodshed."17 By openly acknowledging the flaws in the Soviet system, the violence, and

systematic persecutions, the people could reclaim the state. • • The dissidents felt they had learned the lessons of the 1930s. Silence was complicity • • when it came to the terror. Writing of the generation of the 1930s, • had said, "The phrase 'I cannot be silent' was often on the lips our parents' generation. The

• same could not be said of ours."18 The dissidents of the 1960s vowed not to stay silent. To • not speak out against the system was to support it. • • The Chronicle of Current Events and the related forms of dissident media were a way • of protesting what they viewed as the process of re-Stalinization. Glasnost was a way of • • combating it. Openness would make it more difficult for the regime to act without regard for • the law. By forcing the attention of the Soviet people and the world to the government's • • illegality, the government would, in theory, be forced to change its ways. Glasnost and • legality were interdependent. The dissidents believed truth and openness were legal, but they • • • 17 Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "Participation and the Lie," in I Must Speak Out: The Best of The Voluntaryist, ed. • Carl Warner. (San Francisco: Fox and Wilkes,1999), 202. 18 Nadezhda Mandelstam, Hope Against Hope, trans. Max Hayward, (New York: The Modern Library, 1999), • 159. • • • • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• would shameandpressurethegovernmentintochangingitsbehavior. also believedthat because theyfeltwereintegraltothede-Stalinizationprocess.Byspeakingopenlyabout the ramificationsofalawlesssocietyandcreatingclear,understandablelawcode, dissidents felttheycouldpreventthereturnofStalinistterror. Schapiro, oftheLondonSchoolEconomics,traceslegaltraditionRussia.Midway Glasnost through theessay,hediscussesdissidentmovement,writing: His wordsaptlysummarizeYesenin-Volpin'steachingsabouttheimportanceofclarity law. Thedissidentssoughttousetheirmediaoutletsilluminatewhatexactlywaswithin The and outsidethelaw.Thefocusonlegalitycaneasilybeviewedasade-Stalinizationeffort. sources andWesternmediapressure,totheSoviet government,forcingittoapplythelaws tyrant, likeStalin,orapoliceforce,theKGB. Stalin-like figurefromabusingit.Thedissidents appliedpressure,throughtheirmedia 19 exactly astheywerewritten.Theycallingfor aruleoflaw,ratherthanthe LeondardSchapiro, Chronicle, The dissidentschosetheruleoflawand In hisessay,"TheImportanceofLawintheStudyPoliticsandHistory,"Leonard The small,butnotuninfluential,dissentmovementwhichhasgrownup,persistedand the humanrightsmovement,demandsnochangesinSovietlawortheory:allit demands isthattheexistinglawsshouldbeobserved,andthosethingswhicharenot expanded amongscientistsandintellectuals,variouslydescribedasthedemocraticor forbidden bythelawshouldbefreelytolerated. In a and LegalityasToolsinDe-Stalinization samizdat and othermediasources,wouldhelptoclarifythelaw,preventanother glasnost Russian Studies, essay, "IdeocraticConsciousness andPersonality,"dissidentDmitri was aprecursortotheruleoflaw.Opendiscussionillegality ed. EllenDahrendorf,(London :CollinsHarvill,1986),40. glasnost 19

as themesfortheirmovement 13 • • 14 • Nelidov argues the way the law was enforced in the Soviet Union caused the rise of "double • speak," the idea that words and policies did not actually mean what they said. He writes: • • A government, after all, which endlessly speaks about freedom and the thorough development of the personality, cannot simply write in its constitution: there is no • freedom of conscience, there is no freedom of the press, there is no freedom of speech III and of demonstration. It acts much more cunningly. It concludes something like a II secret agreement with its citizens. I will speak to you of your freedom but you act as if there was no freedom. And, in general, that was how the citizens behaved. • Otherwise they would not have had to pay so dearly.2° • • Nelidov argues that this double speak affected people at a basic, biological level. It became

engrained with in them. They knew that while the law may say something was legal, that did • 41 not mean they could not be arrested for doing it. • However, Nelidov argues the Chronicle undermined and deterred these biological • • effects of censorship. He writes, "The perversion of consciousness becomes a principle • • which attempts to impose itself on vision, hearing, and speech. The Chronicle, in calling

• things by their real names, opposed this perversion."21 By creating a sense of glasnost, the • • Chronicle helped to shatter this sense of dual consciousness. Dissident media forced • exposure to the way life truly was in the Soviet Union. People would, as the famous Czech • dissident Vaclav Havel later said, live in truth. • There was a moral aspect to the glasnost that the dissidents were creating through • • their use of media outlets. They were working to heal the injury done by the double speak. • The Chronicle, in both the domestic and the Western version, the correspondence with • • western journalists, and foreign radio all served this purpose. They made confrontation with • • the truth unavoidable and fought the government and the Party's ideological chokehold on

• 20 Dmitiri Nelidov, "Ideocratic Consciousness and Personality." In The Political, Social and Religious Thought • of Russian 'Samizdat'- An Anthology, ed. Michael Meerson-Aksenov and Boris Shagrin. (Massachusetts: • Nordland Publishing Company, 1977), 281. 21 Nelidov, 285. • • • • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• the SovietUnion. Pennsylvania, Yesenin-Volpinarguedinhisphilosophicaltreatisethattherewasa relationship betweendoublespeakandlegality.Nathanswrites: Yesenin-Volpin, ineffect,wascallingforthesamethingwithlanguageashedid most importantlysaywhatitmeans.Therewastobenohiddenmeaning.Obviously,this judges andlawyers.Thedissidents,however,wanteditinterpretedinanequal Soviet Lawcode.Bothlanguageandthelawcodeshouldbeclearunderstandable;but was aUtopianideal.Thelawalwaysneedstobeinterpreted;itiswhylegalsystemshave comprehensible manner,ratherthanthearbitrarySovietjusticesystem.Speakingopenly, through legality simultaneously. demonstrate thedissidents'de-Stalinizationefforts. Inanessay,"SovietSocietyinthe 1960s," VladislavZubok,acurrenthistorianatTemple University,arguesde-Stalinization important torecognizetwofacetsofSovietde-Stalinization: first,institutionaland efforts canbecategorizedintotwotypes:from above orfrombelow.Hewrites,"Itis 22 66, no.4(2007):647. BenjaminNathans,"Aleksandr Vol'pinandtheIdeaofRightsunder'DevelopedSocialism,' According toBenjaminNathans,acurrenthistoryprofessorattheUniversityof In effect,Vol'pin[sic]isreplacingtheUtopiandreamofcreatinganewtype transparent, rational,andunambiguous.Untilthattime,itseems,wewillnotbeable human beingwithananalogousdreamofcreatinganewtypelanguage: to "trustourownthoughts,"intuitionorselffromallformsofbeliefviathe construction ofanideallanguage.Specifically,itcallsforareformtheRussian the branchoflogicthatclassifiespropositionsaccordingtowhethertheyaretrue, false, possible,impossible,ornecessary. language soastomakeitconformmorecloselytherequirementsof'modallogic' When takentogether,thefocusonopennessinlegal codesandinlanguagehelpto The Chronicle and othermediaoutlets,wastoenforcethisideathevalueof

22 Slavic Review, 15 1111

• 16 • • • ideological de-Stalinization (from above), carried out by the Kremlin leadership, and second, • the social, intellectual, and even spiritual de-Stalinization (from below) that took place in the • • minds, hearts, and souls of individual Soviet citizens."23 The use of dissident media outlets • represents both these efforts. While it certainly was not a part of the administration, it did

• apply pressure on the government to enforce a rule of law through its trial coverage. In this • way, it pushed for de-Stalinization from above through government reform. As for de- • • Stalinization from below, dissident media outlets assisted by purifying language. Dissident

media outlets served as examples of clear, simple easy to understand language, and called for • • the law to be modeled in the same way. • • • • • • • • • • S • • • • • • 23 Vladislav Zubok, "Soviet Society in the 1960s," In The and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of • in 1968, ed Gunter Bischof, et al. (New York: Lexington Books, 2010), 76. • • • • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• DISSIDENT MEDIAASANEXAMPLEOF had threemaingoalsindoingso.First,theybrokethegovernment'smonopolyonspreading community begantocreatetheirownmediaformsandco-optexistingforeignforms.They the truth,incontrasttogovernmentandPartypublications,whichweremoreconcernedwith promoting aPartyagenda.Additionally,thedissidents'useofmediademonstratedtheir information. Theysoughttocreateanalternativesetofnewssourcescommittedspreading commitment to look like. The a compilationofdocumentsrelatingtothetrialSinyayskyandDaniel.Asdiscussedin section one,membersofthedissidentcommunityviewedtrialasaninjustice,and Ginzburg usedthe trial transcriptcollectedbythedefendants'families,aswellalitanyofdocumentscasting dissident, PavelLitvinov,tookcarefulnotesofthis trialandpublishedhisaccountofitin doubt onthepresentation'scase. detailed descriptionoftheeventsleadingupto trial,atranscriptoftheprotestletters in supportoftheaccusedandofficialpressaccounts ofthetrial.PeterReddaway,aformer York: Viking),1972. 24 The TrialoftheFour. , White Book In thelate1960sthroughearly1970s,membersofMoscowdissident In 1966,AlexanderGinzburg,aMoscowdissident,begantocirculatethe Ginzburg wassubsequentlyarrestedandtriedfor hispublication.AnotherMoscow The TrialoftheFour, glasnost and TrialPublications White Book 24 LikeGinzburg's and servedasanexampleofwhatlegalfreeexpressionwould to advancethisagenda.The trans. JanisSapiets,HilarySternberg andDanielWeissbort,(New White Book,TheTrialoftheFour GLASNOST White Book included apartial included a White Book, 17 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• "trial books." professor ofpoliticalscienceatGeorgeWashingtonUniversitywhotranslatedthe and publisheditabroad,arguesthatthetwobooksspawnedanewformofSovietliterature, because hetaughtthatitwasonlythroughpublicizingtrialproceedingsthegovernment Noon, would changeitsbehaviorandbeginactinginalegalmanner. Czechoslovakia. TrialbooksdirectlyconnectedtoYesenin-Volpin'sphilosophyof precursor tothe The multiple carboncopies,andthengavethemawaytostartthecycleoveragain.Forinstance, functioned similarlytoachainletter.Dissidentspassedaroundtexts,furiouslytypedout Western correspondent,fivedistributedtodissidentswhowouldtypeoutcopies,andthe Gorbanevskaya typedsevencopiesofthefirstissue perceived tobethegovernment'ssystematiccrackdown againstdissent,inlightofthetrials final copysaved,alsoforreproduction. of SinyayskyandDaniel,Ginzburg.Gorbanevskaya feltthatitwasnecessaryto 25 Winston), 1970. ix-xii. 28 27 26 Publishers, 1983),25. Peter Reddaway,"Introduction,"in NataliaGorbanevskaya, MarkHopkins, AlexeyevaandGoldberg,10. Chronicle 26 In additiontosparkingothertrialbooks,the whichdetailedthetrialsofthosewhoprotested1968Sovietinvasion In thespringof1968,agroupMoscowdissidentsmettodiscusswhatthey 25 ThisgenreincludedbookssuchasNatalyaGorbanevskaya's Russia's UndergroundPress: "TheChronicleofCurrentEvents," Chronicle ofCurrentEvents, Red SquareatNoon, The TrialoftheFour, 28 trans. AlexanderLieven,(New York:Holt,Rinehartand

an underground by PavelLitvinov,(NewYork:VikingPress),1972, White Book Chronicle. samizdat 27

served astheideological One wasgiventoa (New York:Praeger newspaper. Red Squareat Chronicle glasnost, Samizdat 18 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• publicize theseevents.Herfriendsandsheagreedtoproduceabulletinofsorts,exposethe truth aboutlifeintheSovietUnion. (truth), andthegovernmentnewspaper, reported oneventsthatwereignoredormanipulatedintheofficialpartypublication, apartments, conditionsinlaborcampsandcensorshipofpublications.The as analternativetonewssourcesofferingonlyapprovedinformation.Asthesayingwent, there wasnotruthin phenomenon byofferingsimple,factualaccountsofeventsthatwouldeitherbeignoredor falsely propagandizedbyPartypublications. know withanycertaintythecirculationnumbersofanissue single Current Events," number might,infact,varytotalcopies,depending,forexampleontheextentofKGB harassment atthetimeoravailabilityofpaper.Multiplybytenfornumberreadersper to 100,000." issue andthetotalreadingaudienceinSovietUnionofa subsequently spreadtoKievandLeningrad. friends intheMoscowdissidentcircle.Itfocused onpetitionswrittenandcirculatedbythem. 29 3° 31 Hopkins,148. Hopkins,10-11. Hopkins,10-11. Chronicle The In hishistoryoftheChronicle, The firstissueconsistedentirelyofinformation Gorbanevskaya collectedfromher Chronicle 31 Thegeographicalreachofthefirstissuewaslimited toMoscow,but number mighttotalbetween1,000and10,000individualcopies.Each Mark Hopkinsexplainsthe Pravda was publishedonandofffromApril1968through1983.Itseditors and nonewsin 29 Theytitleditthe Russia's UndergroundPress:"TheChronicleof Izvestia Izvestia. samizdat (news), suchastrials,searchesofdissidents' The Chronicle ofCurrentEvents. system makesitnearlyimpossibleto Chronicle Chronicle Chronicle. sought tocorrectthis issue mightbe10,000 Chronicle He writes,"A 30 Pravda served 19 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• The earlyissuesofthe reporting. Muchofithappenedbychance.Hopkinsdescribeshowthe to reportonthecaseofValeryRonkin.TheKGBarrestedRonkin,aLeningrader,forleading a socialistreadinggroup.TheMoscowgrouponlydiscoveredhiscasewhenoneoftheir own, LarisaBogoraz,metRonkin'swifewhiletheywerebothtravelingtovisittheir husbands inprisoncamp. this andthetrustthatthosegatheringinformationwouldnotgotoKGB. gave itsreadersexplicitinstructionsastohowsubmitinformation.Itreads,"Anybody interested inseeingthattheSovietpublicisinformedaboutwhatgoesoncountry,may whom youreceivedthe easily passoninformationtotheeditorsof undiscussed. Itforcedopenthetruthaboutgovernment'sactions,particularlywithtrial informal dissidentnetworkstoshareandspreadinformation. Chronicle, blatant illegalityatSoviettrialswouldshamethe governmentshamedintochangingitsways. irregularities, aswillbediscussedinsectionthree.Thedissidentsfeltthatmakingpublicthe Glasnost creating the 32 Journal, aChronicleofCurrent Events, 33 54. PeterReddaway,trans, Hopkins, 8-9. As the As withtrialbooks,the would createreformandaruleoflaw.Trialbooks andthe and soon." glasnost Chronicle's that Yesenin-Volpinhadcalledfor. Uncensored Russia:Protestand DissentintheSovietUnion:TheUnofficialMoscow 33 Chronicle Chronicle, Inbothitsreportinganddistribution,the 32 reach grew,sodiditsreportingnetwork.Issuefiveofthepaper The Chronicle Chronicle's depended entirelyontheMoscowgrouptocomplete (New York:AmericanHeritage Press,1972), and hewilltellthepersonfromwhomreceived focused onreportingnewsthatwouldotherwisego reporting wasbasedonchanceencounterslike Chronicle. Simply tellittothepersonfrom Chronicle Chronicle Chronicle made useofthe were awayof group came 20 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Western Publicationsofthe circulation sphere.Theymadeuseofforeignradioandnewspapers,aswellwestern world stage.In1969,YuryGalanskov,amemberofthedissidentcommunitywhoassisted publications ofthe Westerners topressuretheSovietgovernmentchangethem.Hewrote,"TheWestern Ginzburg withthe press, andespeciallytheWesternradio-stationsbroadcastingtoRussiainRussian,publicize arbitrariness andactsofcrudecoercionbySovietofficialpersonnel,thusforcethestate bodies andofficialstotakequickaction.InthiswaytheWesternpressarefulfillingtasks of whatisatpresentlackinginRussia,anorganizedopposition,andtherebystimulatingour national development." to thegovernmentinSovietUnionandaroundWorld. they carriedwiththemcopiesof These textscametobeknownas spreading thedissidentmessageabroad,andalsowithinSovietUnionbecausemany tamizdat radio onforeignlanguagestations. scholar MaxHaywardtranslatedissuenumberfive ofthe Survey, 34 Reddaway,225. The dissidentsdidnotlimittheirattemptstocreatetransparencythedomestic As westernjournalistsandscholarstraveledbetweentheSovietUnionWest, The a Britishjournalfocused onSovietissues.Shortlyafter,Reddaway,then ascholarat texts weresmuggledbackintotheSovietUnion or broadcastbackovershortwave Chronicle White Book, Chronicle, had multipleforeignincarnations.In1969,after Russian literature 34 Thewesternpresscouldhelptorepresentthedissidentopposition Chronicle in ordertospreadthetruth,andshameSovietUnion,ona wrote anessayabouttheRussiapenalsystemandcalledon samizdat "tamizdat," manuscripts, whichtheythenpublishedabroad. or publishedoverthere.Theywereintegralto Chronicle, and publishedthemin 21

• 22 • • • the London School of Economics, began to translate the first eleven issues of the Chronicle.

• In 1972, he published Uncensored Russia, an annotated collection of the issues. • Simultaneously in London, Dr. Zbynek Zeman, an émigré from Czechoslovakia, began to

• work with the human-rights group Amnesty International to publish 411 • translations of the paper shortly after they were published in Moscow. English language

• distribution eventually reached 3,000 copies per issue. 35

• More relevant to our discussion is the New York publication of the Chronicle. In 411 1972, Valerii Chalidze, a young Soviet physicist and a prominent member of the dissident • • community, married to Pavel Litvinov's cousin, visited New York on a government- . • approved lecture tour. Once he arrived though, the Soviet government promptly took away

• his citizenship, leaving him exiled in New York. Shortly after, it had become clear the • • Chronicle had been forced to stop "publishing" due to KGB pressure. Chalidze, with • financial backing from a New York businessman with a keen interest in Soviet human rights, • • Ed Kline, began publishing A Chronicle of Human Rights in the USSR, in the spring of 1973. • The Kline-Chalidze Chronicle followed the model, in content and style, created by the 411 • Chronicle of Current Events.

Reddaway served as the London editor of the New York Chronicle. In an interview • • with Hopkins, he explained that the New York group was overwhelmed with information. He • stated: • • We were amazed at the volume of material forwarded to use; it was really enormous, • so much so that it was never able to fit all the available material in one issue. The sources are many: for instance, we have received a great deal from the so-called • democratic circles, the humanists, as it were, of the Soviet movement for human 411 rights. We have received, and still receiving [sic], a lot of material from labor camps, • •

• n Hopkins, 94. • • • • • • • 23 • • psychiatric institutions, and from the activists of the Jewish Exodus movement."36 Material was smuggled out of the Soviet Union by tourists, western journalists, • academics and diplomats. • • Hopkins writes that the Kline-Chalidze Chronicle had two audiences. The first was • "in the and Western Europe, and composed of journalists, government • • officials, human rights advocates attached to various civic organizations, and scholars. The • ID other audience is the Soviet population itself Some 2,000 copies of a Russian translation of • each issue of the Chronicle of Human Rights in the Soviet Union are printed and most of • those are intended for the Soviet Union."37 As it was with the Moscow Chronicle, the goal • • was to force transparency about the government's actions within both the Soviet Union and • abroad. • • When the Moscow Chronicle resumed "publishing" in 1974, Chalidze and Kline • • decided to continue to publish their version as well, because their paper could reach • influential policy makers in the U.S. faster than the Moscow version could. With this • • decision, we see the dissident movement's emphasis on openness about Soviet affairs

• extended beyond a domestic level, and became international in focus. • • These foreign publications of the Chronicle served the same purpose as the Moscow • Chronicle, to spread information that would otherwise be suppressed. They fought silence • • and censorship through their publication. They helped to create the glasnost, which the • dissidents desired. • •• • • • 36 Hopkins, 130-131 • 37 Hopkins, 133. • ••••••••••••••••••i0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••• Western Newspapers gain coverageintheirnewspapers. but ratherembracedit.Theyfocusedtheirinterviewsonthesametopics bureau. UnlikemostRussians,theydidnotfearthechancetotalkwithaWesternreporter, Conversations reported, forcingattentiononotherwisecensoredtopics.Jacobywrites: "Arguments forthisprincipleofopennessweredevelopedinavarietyways—from and Westernjournalistsillustratesthedissidentcommitmentto argument astepfurther,arguingthattheveryexistenceofrelationshipsbetweendissidents to BorisShragin,forwhomitwasanessentialexpression ofhumandignityandconscience. Sakharov, forwhomitwasthepathtosuccessful andpeacefulinternalforeignrelations, In EasternEurope,theseprincipleswerearticulated byVaclavHavel,whoarguedforan truth.' FormanySovietdissenters,theirrelations withWesternjournalistswereinasensean escape fromtheritualisticandhypocriticalideology oftheSovietblocthrough'livingin 38 SusanJacoby, Members ofthedissidentcommunityalsoworkedcloselywithwesternjournaliststo Susan Jacoby,anAmericanreporterinMoscow,wrotehermemoir long-range goalsforRussia;theirmainareaofagreementisdeterminationto The dissentersareasmall,diversecollectionofpeoplewhodisagreestronglyon make theSovietauthoritiesobservetheirownlaws.Theirchiefactivityispublicizing official actionsagainstotherdissenters;theyviewthepublicityasanimportant guarantee thatnoonewillquietlydisappearintoprisonorexile,asintheStalinyears. The dissentersnaturallyneedforeignjournaliststotransmitthenewsoftheir activities totheoutsideworld.StoriesaboutSovietpoliticaldissentpublishedin Barbara Walker,acurrentprofessoratUniversityofNevada,Reno,takesJacoby's foreign newspapersensurethatmanyRussiansalsohearthenews. Moscow Conversations, that dissidentswereintegraltoAmericanreportersstationedattheMoscow (New York:Coward,McCann &Geoghegan,1972),22-23. glasnost. She writes, 38

Chronicle Moscow 24 • • 25 • extension of that principle of openness."39 Rather than hiding from the West and the world, • the dissidents made public the truth about life in the Soviet Union. • Foreign Radio • Part of the reason dissidents worked with Western journalists was the relationship • between Western newspapers and radio stations. If a story appeared in the New York Times or • , it would likely be read on a news show on the , Radio

Free Europe or BBC Foreign Service.49 • • Alexeyeva writes in her memoir about the beginning of this relationship. At the • Sinyaysky and Daniel trial, during every court recess, the defendants' wives would come

• outside and give an update to their supporters. Alexeyeva writes, "And every evening reports • • on the trial and commentary were carried by foreign radio broadcasts Thanks to this 40 procedure, the West learned about the trial, and especially important, so did people all over • • the Soviet Union."'" By corresponding and working with Western journalists, the dissidents • would be able to spread their message further than they ever could with the Chronicle alone. • • Foreign radio was a particularly potent tool for the dissidents to showcase their • commitment to glasnost because it reached a large audience in the Soviet Union. In Moscow • • Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire That Lost the Cultural Cold War, • • Kristen Roth-Ey, describes a 1968 survey by the government's radio and TV research

• bureau, which found that 47 percent of people openly identified themselves as listeners of • MI foreign radio and another 10 percent said they were regular listeners. The big draw was news

• coverage. It was not just getting information that went otherwise unreported, but getting it • • 39 Barbara Walker, "Moscow Human Rights Defenders Look West: Attitudes toward U.S. Journalists in the • 1960s and 1970s," Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian. History 9, no 4 (2008): 916. • 4° Jacoby, 23-24. 41 Alexeyeva, 276. S 411 S •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• segments coveredeventsthathadhappenedwithinthepreviousfewhours,almostnonewere quickly. Roth-Eywritesthatingovernmentmedia,"fewerthan1percentofthenews live, on-the-scenereports(0.5percentofthetotal);about25airtimewasgiven over todiscussionofeventsorideaswithnocleartimereferenceatall." Pravda samizdat rights movementintheSovietUnion.Frequently,entireissuesof over theair. estimates "millions"wouldhavehearditoverradio. exponentially. Whileatypicalissueofthe Soviet Media allowed foropendiscussion,whiletheSovietpressorgansdidnot.Theofficialwasnot agendas. described hisvisitstotheSovietnewsroomsascompletely countertoawesternnewsroom. concerned withreportingthenews,butratherpromotinggovernmentandParty's He wrote: 43 42 (Kentucky: UniversityPress of Kentucky),2000,170-171. 44 Cold War, Hopkins,149. Kristen Roth-Ey, Arch Puddington,

In thelatesixties,RadioLibertybeganbroadcastingaprogramconsistingentirelyof The collectiveideabehindthedissident'suseofthesemediaoutletswasthatthey Hedrick Smith,the Western press,therushtobeatcompetitioninto print.Seniorjournalistsworked Whenever Ivisited and publications. Announcerswouldreadpublicationafteraboutthehuman (New York:CornellUniversity Press,2011),173. 43 Izvestia, Hopkinsexplainsthatradiocoverageexpandedthe Moscow PrimeTime:Howthe SovietUnionBuilttheMediaEmpireThatLostCultural Broadcasting Freedom:The Cold WarTriumphofRadioFreeEuropeandLiberty, the officialnewsradiosourceslefttheiraudienceswanting. New YorkTimes Pravda or Izvestia, Chronicle Moscow correspondentintheseventies, there wasnoneofthedeadlinefrenzy 44 would reach1,000to10,000readers,he

Chronicle's Chronicle 42 Justaswith reach were read 26 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• The goalofthesepaperswasnottoreportlatebreakingnews.Rather,theysoughtglorify the governmentandParty.SmithexplainsthatratherthanwritingaboutaSovietplane message thatlifeisworseincapitalistcountries. back totheStalinisterawhensocialistrealismbecameofficialliterarydoctrineof crash, theSovietpaperswillspendmonthsreportingWesternplanecrashestoconvey Soviet Union.Atitsmostbasiclevel,thedoctrineofsocialistrealismdeclaredartmustbefor agenda. However,itwasmorethananartisticdoctrine.Allwrittendocumentsnowhadto the peopleandforParty.ItneededtobebroadlyaccessiblepromoteParty's reflect socialist"truth."KaterinaClarkwrites: straddled it.Socialist"truth"wasnowexpected in allaspectsofsociety,notjustfictional The linesbetweenfactandfictionhadbecomeblurry, andthedoctrineofsocialistrealism literature. 47 46 45 HedrickSmith, KaterinaClark, Smith,492. all areasofpubliclife—inmeetingsof?Thepress,speeches,ceremonialsinthose At thistime,asatnoother,theboundariesbetweenfictionandfactbecameblurredin became somewhathazy. incredible carnival-likemassprocessionswhere"enemiesofthepeople"werebornein effigy, intheinfamouspoliticaltrialsof1936-1938-thedifferencebetweenfictionand fact, betweentheaterandpoliticalevent,literaryplotfactualreporting,all Sheila Fitzpatrickexploreshowthisphenomenon infiltratedjournalismandofficial decorated withinspiringportraitsofLenin;andtheirpacewasleisurely.Thereason in roomyofficesratherlikeAmericanboardroomsdoneSpartanfurnishingsand was obvious:newsinoursensenottheirprimarybusiness.At told methatlessthan20percentoftheirpaperwasdevotedtobreakingnews—unless verbatim. Visiting paper allreadyexceptforafewblankholes. Brezhnev orsomeotherleaderdeliveredamajorspeech,inwhichcaseitwasprinted The ideathatjournalismwastoendorsethegovernment'srevolutionarygoalsdated The Russians, The SovietNovel, Pravda (New York:NewYorkTimes BookCo.,1976),490-491. 47 (Indiana: IndianaUniversity Press), 2000,146.

in latemorning,Ihavefrequentlyseenthenextday's 46

45

Pravda, editors 27 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• documents intheSovietUnion Russia. romanticism. Itacknowledgedtheshortfallsofcurrentsociety,butfocusedonfuture. also befoundineverybureaucraticreportandstatisticalcompilationoftheperiod.In Fitzpatrick writes,"ItwasubiquitousinSovietjournalismofthe1930s,anditstracescan socialist-realist viewoftheworld,adry,[a]half-dugditchsignifiedfuturecanalfull project intheFive-YearPlanwasamagicalactofcreationthatmightalmostobviate loaded barges,aruinedchurchwaspotentialkolkhozclubhouse,andtheinscriptionof socialism. need formoreconcreteexertions." Khrushchev hadasomewhatschizophrenicrelationshipwiththearts.Attimes,heappeared to bealiberalreformer,pushingagainstcensorship,buthefrequentlyfellbackinto promoting socialistrealism.Forinstance,in1962,Khrushchevshutdowntheyoungartists' "A sensation,'spicy'stuff,isproduced,andwho fallsuponit?This'spicy'stuffwill,like publication oftheinfluentialde-Stalinizationnovel, exhibit andheldaseriesofadmonitorymeetingswithwriters,onemonthafterthe where heexplainedthatthe"thaw"wastobeextremelylimited.Hespokeof"spicy" topics writerswereattractedto—laborcamps,prison andexilereiteratedthepointofhis secret speech,thatspeakingopenlyaboutthesetopics underminedtheSovietUnion.Hesaid, University Press,1992),217. 48 Shelia Fitzpatrick, The doctrineofsocialistrealismcontinuedthroughthe1960s.SovietPremierNikita She explainsthatthe"news"whichwasreportedfollowedrulesofrevolutionary The CulturalFront:Powerand CultureinRevolutionaryRussia, The CulturalFront:PowerandCultureinRevolutionary 48 Itwasallpartoftherevolutionaryprocesstobuild One DayintheLifeofIvanDenisovich, (New York:Cornell 28 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Writers, hesaid,shouldonlywriteaboutsuchtopicsiftheycoulddosoinawaythat carrion attractflies,hugefatandallkindsofbourgeoisscumwillcrawlfromabroad." promoted thegoalsofPartyandgovernment.Otherwise,"spicytopics"neededtobe ignored andnotdiscussed. "For years,Sovietmediapretendedthatnothingwaswrong,whileRLkeptbroadcasting history istreatedasanunimpededandupliftingmarchtowardamoreplentifuljoyous rules ofsocialistrealismaswell.SmithdescribedSoviethistorywriting,saying,"Soviet government radiohadtosupportthegovernment'sgoals.SimoMikkonenoffersexample collective existence." of theSino-SovietsplitasevidencelackinformationonSovietRadio.Hewrites, to beWesternpropagandauntiltherealitybecamecleareveryone.Inlongrun,cases news aboutthecorrosionofrelations.ManyactuallyconsideredSino-Sovietsplit like this,whichindicatedthattheforeignbroadcastershadbeenright,furthererodedtrustin trusted toprovidefullandtruthfulaccountsofevents.Concernedcitizenshadlook the Sovietmediaanddrovepeopletoseekaccuratenewsfromforeignbroadcasts." radio becameanalogouswith elsewhere. Union, onlyideasendorsedbythegovernment,and approvedby this processcreatedan"ideocracy,"asocietywhere asoleideologydominated.IntheSoviet 49 Broadcasting," Labedz, (Massachusetts:Massachusetts InstituteofTechnology,1965),181. 5° 51 "KhrushchevSpeaksAgain," In Smith,488. Simo Mikkonen,"Stealingthe MonopolyofKnowledge:SovietReactionstoU.S.Cold War

Michael Meerson-Aksenov,amemberofthedissident community,arguedin1977that Non-fiction writers,suchashistoriansandjournalists,wereexpectedtofollowthe Kritika: ExplorationsinRussian andEurasianHistory 50 Journalismfollowedthesamerules.Newsreports,in Khrushchev andtheArts, samizdat publications. Governmentsourcescouldnotbe compiled byPriscillaJohnson andLeopald 11, no.4(2010):801. glavit, the statecensorship Pravda 51 Foreign or on 29 49

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• "Reality beginstodemandideologicalinterpretation;ideologyisadeformationofthis agency, couldbepublished.Hedescribedtheeffectideocracyhadonsociety,writing, reality. Forexample,keyideasofcommunismsuchas"proletarianrevolution,""class enemies," "ideologicalstruggle,""enemiesofthepeople,""buildingcommunism,"andothers do notreflectreality." official values. truth andopenness.Itemspublishedin how closely government sponsored.Meerson-Aksenovdescribesapopularanecdote,whichillustrates out LevTolstoi's book store.Whenheisaskedwhydoingthis,answers:'Mysoninschoolwhere they arestudying was anything thatisnotin are twosidesoftheverysameprocesswhichmaybecalledawakening consciousness ofSovietsociety." government behiddenorignored. it wasononionskinpaper. (Massachusetts: NordlandPublishing Company,1977),20. 53 52 Thought ofRussian'Samizdat'- AnAnthology, Meerson-Aksenov,19. MichaelMeerson-Aksenov, "The DissidentMovementandSamizdat,"In samizdat. Samizdat Meerson-Aksenov openshispiecebywriting,"Thedissidentmovementand samizdat publications, likethe War andPeace--a War andPeace. 52 came tobeassociatedwithtruth.Hewrites,"afatherofafamilytypes samizdat.'" Writingwasnotabouttruth,butpromotingsocialismandits Samizdat 53 He mustreaditforthecoursebutherefusesto The onlywrittenwordSovietcitizenswerewillingtrust Samizdat Nolongerwouldtheatrocitiescommittedby classic Russianworkthatmaybeboughtcheaplyinany and otherdissidentpublicationsbrokethestate's media Chronicle, samizdat ed. MichaelMeerson-Aksenov andBorisShagrin, forced openconversationanddiscussion,evenif were trustedsimplybecausetheynot countered this"socialist"truthwithactual The Political,SocialandReligious samizdat 30 • • • 31 • • monopoly in a powerful way. They offered Soviet citizens a real alternative news source to • the state propaganda sources. 4111 • In this way, dissident media outlets came to represent glasnost, or openness. They

• spoke openly about the truth in a way that no other outlet did. The dissidents, using their • • media outlets, were able to force glasnost. •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

• • 32 • • • • • LEGALITY IN DISSIDENT MEDIA • The dissidents, led by Yesenin-Volpin, believed that the transparency media outlets • created would force the government to follow its own laws. Examining the Chronicle's

coverage of trials helps to illustrate the dissident obsession with legality and glasnost. The • • Chronicle's coverage of trial proceedings created the glasnost the dissidents called for. We

i can see this by examining the Chronicle's reporting on Ginzburg's trial and the trial of the • • six people who demonstrated to protest the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 1111 While Ginzburg's case has been previously discussed, an explanation of the • • demonstrators' trial is merited. On the night of August 20-21, 1968, the Soviet Army invaded • Czechoslovakia, quashing the budding independence movement. On Sunday August 25, • seven members of the Moscow dissident community including , Yuly

Daniel's wife, Pavel Litvinov, and Natalya Gorbanevskaya, took to . The KGB

• immediately arrested six of the protestors, all except for Gorbanevskaya who had her infant 411 son with her in her baby carriage.

41 In a letter to the Chronicle, published just ten days after the invasion, Gorbanevskaya • 41111 described the scene, in the middle Moscow's Red Square. She wrote, "At midday we sat on 4110 the parapet at Execution Place and unrolled banners with the slogans LONG LIVE FREE a AND INDEPENDENT CZECHOSLOVAKIA, SHAME ON THE OCCCUPIERS, HANDS

i OFF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FOR YOUR FREEDOM AND OURS. Almost immediately a • • whistle blew and plainclothes KGB men rushed at us from all corners of the square." 54 •• • 54 Reddaway, 99. •• • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• protestors andthesubsequenttrialsprosecutionsoftheirsupporters. Closed Trials to thegeneralpublic.OfGinzburg'strial, public, butadmissiontoitwasonlybypermit." people formallyrequestedpermits,theywerealldenied.ThetrialviolatedtheSovietlaw warned thatiftheyvacatedtheirseatsatanytimeduringcourtrecesseswouldlose requiring opentrials.Fifteenoftheprotestors'familymemberswereallowedintrial,but seats. demonstrating thattheKGBhadcarefullystockedroomwithitssupporters.At Ginzburg's trial,theonlypeoplewhoreceivedpermitstoentertrialwerecloselylinked with theParty.Theyincluded,"alargenumberofK.G.B.agentsandmembersKomsomol operational squads,andafewrepresentativesofthelegalprofession(e.g.onlytwopasses were issuedtotheMoscowCollegiumofLawyers),remainderaudienceobtained their permitsprincipallyfromdistrictcommittees oftheCommunistParty." the publicattended. that ratherthanpackingthecourtroomwithitsown people,theKGBspecificallychose"the 56 55 Reddaway,74. Reddaway,75. Issues fourthroughtenofthe The The The KGBtookadifferenttackwiththedemonstrators' trial.The Chronicle Chronicle began itscoverageofbothtrialsbyestablishingthattheywereclosed furthered itspointontheclosednatureoftwotrialsby Chronicle Chronicle 55 detailed thetrialproceedingsof Thepaperthenexplainsthatwhile116 reports, "Thetrialwasformally Chronicle 56 Nomembersof reported 33 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• dominos public," thenkeptthemsequesteredawayfromthoseprotestingthetrialwithvodkaand existed toforcean"open"trial.Thepaperwouldensuretrialproceedingswereavailable, example ofSovietillegality,butasanexplanationitsownexistence.The what happenedataclosedtrialwouldnotremainpublic.The private trialspublic. even ifthepubliccouldnotphysicallyattend.Itservedasamessagetogovernmentthat Illegal TrialProceedings and legalproceedings.Theopeningwordsofthe trial ofthefourwithbeginningworldwideHumanRightsYear.Itreads: was actingoutsidetheDeclaration.TheDeclaration ofHumanRightsstatedallpeoplehad The comparisonbetweentheDeclarationofHumanRightsandtrialimpliesthatParty the righttoafairandpublictrialwouldbepresumed innocentuntilprovenguilty. regulations. first issue,the 59 58 57 Reddaway,53. Reddaway,116. UnitedNations, The Unsurprisingly, muchofthepaper'scoveragefocusedonillegalitytrials On December10 On December11 On December10 ,AlekseiDobrovolsky,andVeraLashkova. General AssemblyadoptedtheDeclarationofHumanRights. 57

Chronicle Chronicle Universal DeclarationofHuman Rights, focused inontheclosednatureoftrialsnotonlybecausetheywerean th th th systematically demonstratedthePartyhadignored these , 1967,HumanRightsYearbeganallovertheworld. , 1968,twentyyearswillhaveelapsedsincetheUnitedNationals , thetrialwasduetobeginincaseofYuryGalanskov, Chronicle's 1948, www.un.org Chronicle inaugural issuejuxtaposedthe . 58 would makeeven

Chronicle 59 Inits 34 ••••••••••••••••400410000•.••••••••••••••••.•• nearly ayearinLefortovoprison,violationofarticle97theRussianCriminalCode, had beendetainedillegally.Itreads,"AllfourwerearrestedinJanuary1967andspent according towhichthemaximumperiodofpre-trialdetentionmaynotexceednine months." the judgeimmediatelydismissedwitnessesfollowingtheirtestimonywhereastheywere prosecution's case.Manyofthewitnessesprovedproblematic. legally obligatedtoremaininthecourtroom. the protestors.Themenweresaidtohaveservedinsamemilitaryunitandjust coincidentally inRedSquareduringtheprotest.However,"onveryfirstday,undercross- examination, thesepeoplebecameconfusedintheirstatementsaboutprevious acquaintance withoneanother.Apparentlyforthisreason,ontheseconddaythreewho had notbeenquestionedthefirstdayturnedouttobe'absentonbusiness'andcourt decided nottoquestionthem,despitetheprotestsofdefendantsandtheircounsel." Once itbecameevidenttheProsecution'switnesseswereproblematic,andhadbeenfeda story, theysimplydisappeared. of theestablishedevidence.Healsoinsistedthat hehadbeeninadepartmentstorewhen witnessing thedemonstration,butstorewaswell knowntobeclosedonSundays. 61 Reddaway,116. Reddaway, 73. The firstissueofthe The majorityofthereportingonprotestors'trialcenteredholesin For instance,theprosecutioncalledfivemembersofmilitarywhohaddetained One oftheprosecution'sotherwitnesses,OlegDavidovich, directlycontradictedall 6° ThesameissuealsoreportsArticle238oftheRCCPhadbeenviolatedbecause Chronicle points outaboutGinzburg'strialthatthefouron 61

35 • • • 36 • • Finally, the Chronicle offered evidence of KGB manipulation of witnesses. It reads, • "On August 25th this policeman submitted to his superiors a report on what had occurred, • 411 without any reference to a disruption of transport. On September 3rd he submitted a new • report stating that there had been a disruption. As was proved in court, between August 25th

and September 3rd he had been called to the KGB."62 With these three pieces of information, • the Chronicle undermined much of the prosecution's argument and implied it had been • • almost completely fabricated. • •• Persecution of Supporters The Chronicle also focused much of its efforts on the trials' aftermath, the subsequent • • prosecutions of members of the dissident community. Following both trials, members of the • • Moscow dissident community were persecuted for their support of the guilty parties. •• On February 15, 1968, Yesenin-Volpin and Gorbanevskaya were forcibly committed • to psychiatric facilities. Gorbanevskaya, who was pregnant, was suddenly transferred from a

• maternity wing to a psychiatric ward, she was held with a "threatened miscarriage." Eight • • days later, on the 23td, a psychiatrist admitted that she did not need psychiatric help and she

• was subsequently released. The police arrested Yesenin-Volpin at home and brought him to a

• psychiatric hospital. The Chronicle reported, "The reason given was that Volpin had not • reported for a long time to the psychiatric out-patients' department where he was registered •

• (and to which he had not once been summoned during the past four years)." 63 • Like its coverage of trials, the Chronicle's reporting on the forced hospitalizations of • • Yesenin-Volpin and Gorbanevskaya focused on the illegality of these measures. In its • • • 62 Reddaway, 117. • 63 Reddaway, 81. • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• violated thelaw.Itreads: reporting, the Because Yesenin-VolpinandGorbanevskayahadnotbeenbroughttocourtsentenced a psychiatricfacility,theirhospitalizationwasillegal.Moreover,the commission ofthreepeoplewithin24hourstheirarrival.NeitherYesenin-Volpinnor care theyreceivedviolatedthelaw,whichrequiredthatpatientsreceiveanexaminationbya they hadbeenhospitalized. Gorbanevskaya weregivensuchanexamination.Finally,theirfamiliesnotnotifiedthat testimony andprosecutionsistheParty'stotalwillfulignoranceofrulelaw. Coverage as However, thereisabroaderissueatplayaswell.StoriesoftheParty'sillegalitywere completely ignoredinPartypublications.The information. Russia. 64 Reddaway,82. hospitalization ofmentallyillpersonswhoconstituteadangertosocietyseethe The onlyofficialbasisforsuchactionscouldbetheinstruction'Onimmediate nature areprescribedbyacourt.Moreover,thehospitalizationof'sociallydangerous' collection is onlyofficialandnotlegal,sincetheveryfactofcompulsorymeasuresamedical who isrecognizedassociallydangerousandthiscanbedecidedonlybyacourt presumption ofinnocence,sinceitisapersonwhohasactuallycommittedanoffence persons directlyconflictswithafundamentalprincipleoflegality-thatthe verdict. The commonthemerunningthroughthesedescriptionsofclosedtrials,manipulated He writes, Reddaway describedthecontrastbetweenthem in theintroductionof Glasnost Chronicle 64

Health Legislation, first arguesthattheinstructiontoforciblyhospitalizesomeone vol. 6,Moscow,1963).'Inthefirstplace,however,this Chronicle was theonlysourceof Chronicle Uncensored reported the 37 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• sources. Unlike government's agendaandperpetuatedthe"doublespeak," clear, understandablelanguage.ThisisevidencedbyitscontinuedcriticismoftheParty's coverage oftwotrials. Four. Threeofthemdirectlycriticized twenty-four membersoftheWriters'Unioncondemned"obscurelywordedand contradictory newspaperarticlesin relatives oftheaccusedwrotetwolettersrefuting"facts"presentedin published shortlyafterthetrial'sconclusion.The article,masqueradingasanewsstory, the trialproceedingstoindictfour,frequently ignoringwhathefounduselessandmaking up testimonyashefoundnecessary.Forinstance, Ovarchenkowrites,"Whenthehomesof included blatantcharacterjudgmentsabouttheaccused. Ovarchenkocarefullymanipulates 66 65 Reddaway,16. Reddaway, 77. primary sourceofinferiorworth...Itis,moreover,usuallywritteninturgid, The Sovietpressisusually—especiallyinmanyareaswherepoliticsenter—a stereotyped language,chockedwithclichésofphraseandconcept... where theofficialpressismostinadequate.Itilluminatesthem,likebestprimary The sources, inpreciseunemotivelanguage.Itisuninhibitedbycensorship,yettaking accuracy. Inbrief,itbotharticulatesthedemandsofaggrievedgroupsinSoviet advantage ofthisisconstrainedbypotentconsiderationstoachieveahighlevel society andthrowsfreshlightonthoseinstitutionswithwhichthegroupsconflict. Meanwhile almostnothingofallthisisreflected—atleastrecognizably—inthe official press. The In itsfirstissue,the The lettersinparticularquestionedF.Ovarchenko's article,"Lackeys"in Chronicle, Chronicle Pravda 65 very consciouslypositioneditselfasafoiltoofficialpartynews by contrast,focusespreciselyonmanyofthoseaspectsSovietlife

or Izvestia, Chronicle which onlyreportedstoriesthatsupportedthe Izvestia summarized thirteenlettersprotestingtheTrialof Pravda's and Komsomolskaya Pravda." reporting onthetrial.Alettersignedby Chronicle Pravda reported thetruthin 66 Friendsand and Pravda, Izvestia. 38 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Ginzburg, GalanskovandDobrovolskyweresearched,dozensofanti-Sovietpublications [Dobrovolsky, oneoftheprosecution'switnesses]haveevidencethatIhadasecret received fromabroadwereseized." apartment. Ginzburg'stestimonycontradictsOvarchenko'sstoryaswell.Hestated,"He depository inmyhousewhich,heDobrovolsky,claimedtohaveseen.However,aftertwo with instanceslikethis,andGinzburg'sfamilyfriendsquestioneditsveracityintheir searches nosuchsecretdepositorywasfoundinmyhouse." protest letters. "reported" thatLitvinov,"havingfoundtimeinthespellbetweenhisdrunkenboutstomarry demonstrator's trialsimilarlyproblematic.Neitherpublicationincludedafullaccountofthe demonstration againsttheSovietinterventioninCzechoslovakia.Rather,coverage charges, only"disruption"ofpublicorder,ormentionedthatthisdisruptionwasa focuses onpersonal,adhominemattacksagainsttheaccused.Forinstance, and abandonawifefour-year-oldsonwithoutmeansofsupport,ledlifedebauch." would describethetrial.The Rather thandescribingthechargesagainstthemorevidencegiven,Partypublications focused itsenergyonmakingtheprotestorsseemasunsympatheticpossible. 67 69 Gorbanevskaya,234. 68 Litvinov,111. Litvinov, 290. The During hertestimony,Bogorazprescientlyguessed howtheParty'spublications scholar andthreeyearsinthecampsforayoung poet,firstbecauseweshallbe said inherclosingspeechonOctober1 It waspreciselythiskindof'information'thatLarissa Bogorazhadinmindwhenshe approve theverdict.Publicopinionwill ofthreeyears'exiledforatalented Chronicle deemed Chronicle Evening Moscow 67 However,nosuchevidencewasfoundinGinzburg's reported: th and , havenodoubtthatpublicopinionwill Pravda's 68 Ovarchenko'sarticlewasfilled coverage ofthe Pravda 39 69

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• the "truth" publications gaveacensoredversionofthetruth, the demonstratorshadcalledforatYesenin-Volpin'sprotest.The glasnost. dissident sources,brokethechokeholdthesesourceshadbyprovidingatruthfulaccountof honest versionoftheevents.Therewasnodoublespeak,justtruth.It the government'sillegality. Chronicle was legal.ThistheorydatedbacktoGinzburg,whoinsistedhecouldnotbetriedforslander For thedissidents, because everythingprintedinthe Glasnost KGB acopyofthe There wasnolawagainstpublicizingtrialproceedings andheinsistedcouldnotbe accused ofslanderbecauseeverythinghewrote was true.Ginzburgwentsofarastogivethe 70 Reddaway,120. because, ifpeopleappearwhoseopiniondiffersfromthatofthe'public'andwho have theaudacitytospeakout,theywillsoonenduphere.'" depicted asparasites,renegadesandpurveyorsofahostileideologysecond Bogoraz's wordshelptoillustratewhythe This transparency,thedissidentsargued,wouldforcecreationofarulelaw. The othersideofthisrelationshipwasthedissidents'continuedinsistencethattruth While workingonhisproject,Ginzburgarguedit wasanentirelylegalendeavor. Throughout histrial,Ginzburg insistedhewasinnocent.Inhistestimony, Ginzburg and Legality was tocommunicatethepublicatlargetruthaboutParty'sactions,not Pravda glasnost and White Book. Izvestia and legalitywereinherentlytied.Legalitycouldnotexistwithout reported on.WhiletrialswereclosedandtheParty's White Book was true. Chronicle Chronicle came toexist.Thegoalofthe offered acompleteand Chronicle, and other glasnost 40 ••••••••••••••••••••••••r••••••••••••••••••• stated therewasnowaythe During questioning,hestatedthat,"Idon'tconsiderthemanti-Soviet;theycontainno slanders, nodeliberatelyfalsefabricationsandcallsforinsurrection." hoped thatbyshowingPartyofficialswhatafarcethetrialhadbeen,SinyayskyandDaniel would havebeengrantedare-trialoratleastlightersentences. Economics, agreedwithGinzburg'slegalclaim.Intheforewordofwesternpublication of The argumentthattruthcouldnotbeslanderbegantopermeatethedissidentcommunity. Their mediaoutlets,atleastintheory,werelegal,becausetheytoldthetruth. simply toldthetruth.HefollowedGinzburg'smodelandarguedthatsincehehadsaid liaison betweenthedissidentcommunityandwesternjournalistsfrom1966untilhisarrestin 1969. LikeGinzburg,hewasarrestedforslander,andlikeinsistedhad nothing falseordishonestinhisinterviewswith foreign correspondent,hecouldnotbeguilty me concernthedisseminationbyme,verballyand inprint,ofviewswhichareherecalled statement, whichwaspublishedin"TheChronicle." Hestated,"Thechargesbroughtagainst of slander.WhileAmalrikrefusedtoanswerquestions athistrial,hedidmakeaclosing 71 vii-viii. 72 Litvinov,109. Leonard Shapiro,"Foreward," in the judgeasirrelevant.Thisalone,apartfrominnumerableviolationsofprocedural designed toshowthatthecriticismtheymadewasfairandtruerigorouslyexcludedby charged isthe'slanderous'natureofstatementswhichtheymade:yetallevidence rules, isenoughtoshowthatthetrialwasriggedandpredeterminedpoliticalfarce. The TrialoftheFour, The veryheartoftheoffenceaccordingtoarticleunderwhichdefendantswere Leonard Schapiro,thentheleadingRussianscholaratLondonSchoolof The caseofAndreiAmalrikhelpstoillustratethispoint.servedasthe he wrote White Book The TrialoftheFour, could beconstruedasslanderbecauseitwasfactual. by PavelLitvinov,(NewYork: VikingPress),1972, 71 Heexplainedhe 72

41 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• books tobeslanderous." false andslanderous.Idonotconsidereithertheinterviewgivenbymeormyarticles insisted the produced arecreatedbythepeculiarnotionsaboutlawandfreedomofinformationwhich,in the courseoflongyears,havebecomeestablishedincertainSovietorganizations." Chronicle not anywrittenlawthatcausedthe the waygovernmentenforcedlaw. happened. The would beconsideredlibelousifitcontainedanyinaccuracies.Issuesevenstates,"The when itisnotabsolutelycertainthatsomeeventhastakenplace,the the pieceofinformationisbasedonrumour[sic].Butatsametime Chronicle requests itsreaderstobecarefulandaccurateintheinformationtheyprovedfor publication." legal. as itwasonlyreportingeventstheyoccurred. Itconnectstotheideaof www.amnesty.org 73 75 74 Reddaway,58. A Reddaway,54. Chronicle ofCurrentEvents. The There wasnothingillegalinthepaper'spages,becauseitreportedeventsasthey The is innosenseanillegalpublication,andthedifficultconditionswhichit aims attheutmostreliabilityininformationitpublishes.Inthoseinstances Chronicle, White Book Chronicle 75 Accuracyallowedthemtoinsistonlegality.Truthwas,atleastintheory, Chronicle . was obsessedwithtruth.Itbelieveditalegal publication,aslong too, fromitsinception,insistedonownlegality.JustasGinzburg was truth,notslander,sodidthe 73 editors wereobsessedwithaccuracyforthisreason.Theirpaper

Issue 17.April1971.Translated andPublishedbyAmnestyInternational. Chronicle to operateasanundergroundnewspaper,but Chronicle. Issue fivereads,"The Chronicle glasnost, Chronicle indicates that 74 which Itwas 42 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• was aboutopenlyspeakingthetruth.The would combattheParty'sliesandsecrecywithtruthopendiscussion. its claimthatitwasnotcallingorincitinganysortofaction,the states, "The of itsstorieswithasimplematter-of-facttone.Thepaperexplainedthisineighthissue.It to judgmentsmadein tries torefrainfrommakingvaluejudgments-eitherbynotthematall,orreferring careful tonewouldprotectitagainstchargesofslanderinacourtlaw. speech andfreedomofpress. outside theSovietlawcode. they servedasexamplesoflegality.Theydemonstratedwhatalegalformopendiscussion looked like.Itwasfactualandeven-keeled.Nothingaboutitscontentorexistence truth inanyformwasatleasttheoreticallylegal.AsNelidovstateshisessay,the government statedsuchrightsexistedbutcitizensandofficialsactedasthoughtheydidnot. The examples ofwhatfreespeechandfreedomthe presswouldlooklikeintheSovietUnion. There wasnothingillegalinthepublications.They couldnotbelibelousbecausethey reported factualaccountsofevents,andthelaw protected afreepress. April 15,2011). 77 76 "1936SovietConstitution,Chapter X,"BucknellUniversity,http://www.departments.bucknell.edu Reddaway,55. Chronicle An extensionofthisideawasreportingeventsinaneven,measuredtone.Tosupport The The 1936SovietConstitutionguaranteedtoitscitizenstherightsfreedomof Chronicle, Chronicle and trialbookscounteredthisthoughtprocess.They wereproudanddefiant samizdat makes everyefforttoachieveacalm,restrainedtone...The and otherformsofdissidentmedia,then,didnotjustcallforlegality; 77 Thegovernmentoutlawedlibelagainstthestate,butspeaking documents." Chronicle 76 The Chronicle and otherformsofdissidentmedia editors hopeditsaccuracyand Chronicle The Chronicle, carefully wroteall Chronicle (accessed and 43 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• other dissidentmediasources,servednotonlyaspotentexamplesof discussion, butalsoofwhatatrulyfreepress,actingwithinthelaw,wouldlooklike.It demonstrated toeveryonewhatfollowingtheletteroflaw,ratherthanhowitwas enforced wouldlooklike. the dissidentmovement,withYesenin-Volpin'sPushkinSquaredemonstrationand Book. not justthepublicationof Valerii ChalidzeandAndreiTverdokhlebov,establishedthegroup"made Rights inNovember1970.Threeprominentmembersofthemovement,AndreiSakharov, central tenetofitstheoreticalandpracticalwork." through opennessthathumanrightswouldbeestablishedintheSovietUnion. stressed theconnectionbetweenlegalityand publicity inallmatterspertainingtothedefenseofrights.Opencourtproceedings,public discussion ofadministrativedecisionsonrights,presscoveragetheproblemrights— only whenallthisbecomescustomarycanwehopeforincreasinglyeffectiveprotectionof human rights." would beforced,orshamed,intochangingitsways. needed tobeinformedofhumanrightsviolations. ItwasonlythroughpublicitythattheParty (Massachusetts: NordlandPublishing Company,1977),218. Religious ThoughtofRussian 'Samizdat'-AnAnthology, 79 78 Horvath,180. ValeriiChalidze,"Important AspectsofHumanRightsintheSovietUnion."In The ideabecameaninfluentialandintegralpartofdissidentideology,culminatingin The connectionbetween In December1970,Chalidzemadehisfirstmajorreporttothecommittee.it,he 79 Inordertoprotecthumanrights,andinstilla rule oflaw,thepublic Chronicle, glasnost but alsothefoundingofCommitteeonHuman and legalitycanbetracedbacktothebeginningof glasnost. ed/ MichaelMeerson-Aksenov andBorisShagrin. 78 Thegrouparguedthatitwasonly He wrote,"Wemuststrivefor glasnost The Political,Socialand their open glasnost a White 44 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• was andnotlegal.Hewrites,"Manmustknowhisrightsinordertorealizethem, order nottobemisledbyseemingprohibitions—eventhisconditionisalways rights insociety." fulfilled...Legal educationisanimportantpartofanysystemforthisthedefensehuman stay withinit openness wheretherewasnone.Itabletocrackthemonopolyofinformation. exactly whatwaslegalandnot.The Chronicle 80 Chalidze213. Chalidze arguesthatanothercomponentof The actively workedtopublicizetrialproceedingsandexplainedinitscoverage Chronicle 8° Thelawsneededtobeopenandaccessiblesopeoplecouldknowhow served boththesepurposes,twoyearsbeforeChalidze'sessay.The Chronicle glasnost was was understandingexactlywhat glasnost. It wouldcreate 45 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• OFFICIAL VS.DISSIDENT laid outbygovernmentbureaucratsandoutsidereformersofthe19 the legalcodesandatleastalimitedformof Soviet PremierKhrushchev.Inbothinstances,governmentleadershadcalledforreformof underwent aseriesofreforms,culminatinginAlexander'sabolitionserfdom1861. 19 While thefreeingofserfswascertainlymostdramaticreformefforts,many the otherreformsenactedanddiscussedcloselyminorwhatdissidentscalledforin 1960s. who theybelievedshouldtakethethrone,insteadyoungestbrotherNicholas,but Decembrists wereagroupofeducated,elite,upper-classmen,whotooktothestreets demanding "ConstantineandConstitution."ConstantinewasAlexander'syoungerbrother, more importantdemandwasthecallforaConstitution. radical groupofsoldiers.Bothgroupsweregrounded inthesecretsocietiesthathadarisen Russia followingtheNapoleonicWars.Marshall Shatzwritesofthesemen,"Upontheir return toRussia,theiracutesenseofhavingsaved theircountryfromforeignconquest combined withthetraditionofstateservice,which wasstillstrongintheirclass,toproducea fundamental reservations aboutthetwinpillarsonwhichexistingsystem inRussia feeling ofpersonalresponsibility forRussia'ssocialandpoliticalprogress. Theydeveloped th CenturyReformEfforts. In callingfor From 1825throughthe1860s,underCzarsNicholasandAlexanderII,Russia Nicholas IhadcometopowerfollowingtheDecembristUprisingof1825.The The Decembristswereamixofreform-mindedmilitary menandayounger,more glasnost and legality,thedissidentsputthemselvesinahistoricalmodel GLASNOST glasnost. th centuryandbythe 46 • • 47 • rested: autocracy and serfdom." 81 The Decembrists were a varied group when it came to what exactly they were demanding. The leaders all had different opinions on what the best • system of governance for Russia. Some called for a republic, others a federated system and

• still more a constitutional monarchy. 82 The common thread running through these potential • 411 forms of government was the desire for a Constitution, something that would prevent the • Czar from arbitrarily abusing his power. • • The Russian poet Pushkin summarized the Decembrist's call for a rule of law in his • poem, Ode to Freedom. Pushkin argued that the Czar had two options: embrace the rule of • 410 law, or face revolutionary violence. He wrote, • And that's a lesson to the czar: • Your punishments and your rewards • Your prison walls and all your altars Are not protection you can trust. 411 Be first to bow your heads Under the sanctuary of Law • And then tranquility and freedom 411 Will guard the throne forevermore.83 • The Decembrists believed that it was the rule of law and not of tyranny that would ensure • • peace and stability throughout the nation. • Many members of the dissident community felt a kinship with the Decembrists. In • • 1976, to honor the 150th anniversary of the uprising, nearly 100 members of the dissident • • community gathered on the Senate Square in Leningrad, with signs reading "Glory to the • Decembrists—the First Dissidents of Russia."84 Alexeyeva wrote, "The regime no longer had • • any need for citizens, for citizens have a way of being a nuisance. They demand reforms, • 411 81 Shatz, 32. 82 David Ransel, "Pre-Reform Russia," in Russia: A History, ed. Gregory Freeze (Great Britain: Oxford 411 University Press, 1997), 156.

• 83 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, 34. 84 Jay Bergman " on the Russian Intelligentsia, 1956-1985: The Search for a Usable Past," •• Russian Review 51, no. 1 (1992), 23. • • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• they demandtheruleoflaw.Andsometimes,asonDecember14,1825,standupto defy thestate." Decembrists, butintheentirephilosophicaltraditionoflaterWesternizers,agroup reformers whofeltRussiashouldfollowtheWesternpoliticalmodel. Westernizers vs.Slavophiles reforming Russia.Thereweretwomainschoolsofthought,referredtoastheWesternizers and theSlavophiles.SlavophilesfeltkeytoensuringRussia'sstrengthasanationwasfor the nobilitytoreturnitsRussianroots.Westemizers,incontrast,feltthat system was"backwards"andneededtobeoverhauled.SchapirodescribestheSlavophiles, writing "TheyrejectedconstitutionalisminfavorofthetraditionalRussianautocracy,and regarded RussiaasfortunateinhavingescapedbothRomanlawandtherigidformalism, they sawitintheRomanCatholicChurch." journal, system oflaw,likethatintheWest.Infirstexample Decembrist's callforaConstitution. first topublishPushkin's vastly differentterms.Slavophiles,Kenezwrites, "advocatednotWestern-styleintellectual Slavophiles andtheWesternizersembracednotion of 87 86 85 AlexeyevaandGoldberg,35. AlexeyevaandGoldberg,35 Schapiro, Throughout NicholasI'sreign,adiscussionwagedoverthebestwaytogoabout Westernizers, incontrast,ledbyAlexanderHerzen,calledforRussiatoembracea The twogroups'viewof Kolokol Russian Studies, 85 Alexeyevagoesontoputthedissidentsnotjustinshadowof ("The Bell"),whichadvocatedfortheabolitionofserfdom.Herzenwas 41. Ode toFreedom, glasnost 87

illuminates thedichotomybetweenthem.Both consciously puttinghimselfintheshadowof 86

glasnost, tamizdat, but theydefineditin Herzen publisheda 48 • • 49 • • • freedom in a democratic society, but openness in discussing public affairs. The Slavophiles • wanted to allow the Russian people to voice their concerns, but at the same time did not want • • to limit the power of the autocrat."88 Westernizers, in contrast, argued for limited autocracy

• and complete intellectual freedom. • Alexeyeva establishes a link between the dissidents and their westernizing • predecessors. She writes, "Being Russian, Westernizers are not born to rights and liberties. • • To them, rights and liberties are ideals."89 Just as the reformers of the 1860s had called for • law and glasnost, rather than autocracy, so did the dissidents 100 years later. Alexeyeva • • makes the case the dissidents carefully put themselves in the shadows of previous reformers. • • In doing so, she illuminates the so-called "Myth of the Decembrists." The Decembrists were

• mythologized not just for their demonstration, but also for Czar Nicholas' punishment of • them. The Czar exiled the Decembrists to , and in act of devotion, their wives

• followed them. David Ransel argues that this was an important part of their appeal, writing, • • "Although women had made such sacrifices earlier, the Decembrists' wives were the first to • be inscribed as a literary model and hence the first to provide a script to Furrisan women's • • selfless devotion to the cause of resistance to autocracy."9° The Decembrists and their wives • became the ultimate martyrs for a political cause. Like the Decembrists, the dissidents felt 1111 the way to prevent autocratic tyranny was the establishment and enforcement of a rule of law. •4i • • 88 Peter Kenez, A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End, (New York: Cambridge University Press),ess), 2006, 253. • 89 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, 36. 90 Ransel, 157. • • • •

• • 50 • . • Emperor Alexander II • • One of the key reforms of the 1860s, brought to fruition by Alexander II, was the

i41 creation of the Bench and Bar inl 864, which codified the legal system in Russia and • established credentials for lawyers to join the field. The reform was part of a larger • 11 movement for zakonnost, which Bruce Lincoln defines as "the lawful order that governed the • behavior of men and rulers in the West."91 Lincoln argues that reformers in Alexander's

bureaucracy believed creating zakonnost in Russia would dramatically improve life in the • nation. He writes: • Not only must zakonnost limit the unfettered arbitrariness of state officials, but it also • . must define the legal procedures that would eliminate the pervasive system of administrative surveillance that senior officials used to control the behavior of their • subordinates. Zakonnost thus could help to control the abuses of arbitrary power within Russia, could help to break down the rigid system of estates...and in the i future, could create a society in which all citizens enjoyed equality under the law. 92 • His description of the goals of zakonnost mirror almost perfectly what the dissidents

called for one hundred years later. The dissidents felt that equal protection and treatment by • 40• the law would make it nearly impossible for the government, or a single leader, to persecute its citizens. The rule of law would check the power of individuals.

• The most striking similarity between the government bureaucrats of the 1860s and the • and glasnost. V.A • dissidents of the 1960s is the discussion of relationship between zakonnost 11 Tsie, a bureaucrat serving under Alexander II, argued that glasnost was a requisite for the • • rule of law. He wrote, "Nowhere does glasnost have such a fundamental and undoubted • utility as in legal proceedings. It provides the oppressed with an opportunity to enjoy the ••

91 W. Bruce Lincoln, The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia, (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1990), 7. 92 W. Bruce Lincoln, In the Vanguard of Reform: Russia's enlightened bureaucrats, 1825-1861, (Illinois: • Northern Illinois University Press, 1982), 183. 4, .• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• "Glasnost protection ofthelaw,anditalone,withitsall-shatteringpower,canshakefinally eradicate themostshamefululcerofoursociety—corruption." argued that protector." was thatopendiscussionofpersecutionsandshowtrialswouldforcethegovernmentto dissidents behindthe reform. Publicitywoulddestroycorruptionandabusesofpower.Itisidenticaltothe argument madebyTsieandDolorukov. Khrushchev's "Secret"Speech Khrushchev alsocalledforboth radical; hearguedtheonlywaytobeginhealingSovietUnionandPartyafter Stalinist erawastoopenlyspeakaboutitandexposethetruththoseyears. open discussionandtheruleoflaw. principles ofSovietSocialistdemocracy,expressed intheconstitutionofSovietUnion,to fight willfulnessofindividualsabusingtheirpower. Theevilcausedbyactsviolating revolutionary Socialistlegalitywhichhaveaccumulated duringalongtimeasresultofthe 94 93 IntheVanguardofReform, In theVanguardofReform, Their argumentsareremarkablysimilartoviewsextolledbyYesenin-Volpinandthe In hisseminalde-StalinizationspeechatTwentiethPartyCongressin1956, Khrushchev offeredtwosolutionstopreventtheriseofanotherStalin-likefigure: Speaking oflegality,theSovietPremiersaid,"To restorecompletelytheLeninist is thefiercestenemyof[administrative]abuses,andsecrecytheirally 94 glasnost

would counterthearbitrarinessofCzar'sbureaucrats.Hewrote, Chronicle, 184. 184. glasnost and othermediaoutlets.Theideologydrivingthe Glasnost and theruleoflaw.Khrushchev'sspeechwas would leadtotheruleoflaw. 93 PrincePetrDolgorukov Chronicle 51 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••0000000 negative influenceofthecultindividualhastobecompletelycorrected."Byfollowing the Sovietconstitutiontoletteroflaw,abusespower,likeStalin's,couldnotoccur. the law. Stalin's actionswereillegal,Khrushchevargued,andfutureleaderswouldneedtoactwithin Stalinist yearsthatthecultofpersonalitycouldbebanished.Hespoke,openlyandofficially, prepare listsofpersonswhosecaseswereunderthejurisdictionmilitarycollegiumand whose sentenceswerepreparedinadvance.Yezhovwouldsendthese[execution]liststo and theexecutions.Hesaid,"TheviciouspracticewascondonedofhavingNKVD Khrushchev's speechfocusedonStalin'spurgeoftheParty.Hedescribedmassarrests for thefirsttime,aboutpurgesanddestructionofStalinistera.Thebulk Stalin personallyforhisapprovaloftheproposedpunishment.In1937-1938,383suchlists workers weresenttoStalin.Heapprovedtheselists." been publicallyadmitted. containing thenamesofmanythousandsparty,Soviet,Komsomol,Army,andeconomic should inallseriousnessconsiderthequestionof thecultofindividual.Wecannotletthis necessary, itwasimportantthattheSovietUnionnotdothisinfrontofWesterners."We matter getoutoftheparty,especiallynottopress. Itisforthisreasonthatweare considering ithereataclosedcongresssession." and denouncedtheParty purges,anydiscussionoftheterroragainst population andthe opinions onopennessarealsoevidencedbywhat heleftoutofthespeech.Whileexposed 96 95 Khrushchev,Nikita."TheSecret Speech—OntheCultofPersonality,1956." Khrushchev,"TheSecretSpeech." Khrushchev alsoarguedthatitwasonlythroughopenandhonestdiscussionofthe Khrushchev arguedthat,whileexposingthetruthaboutStalinistyearswas 96 Khrushchev'ssomewhatschizophrenic 95 Itwasthefirsttimesuchathinghad The Guardian. 52 • • 53 • • • persecution of the intelligentsia went unsaid. Khrushchev then was calling for a limited and very restrained form of glasnost. In the

• final lines of the speech, Khrushchev re-affirmed his commitment to socialist realism, not just as a literary tenet but also as a key part of the revolutionary process. He said: • We will be forced to do much work in order to examine critically from the Marxist- 11111 Leninist viewpoint and to correct the widely spread erroneous views connected with the cult of the individual in the sphere of history, philosophy, economy, and of other sciences, as well as in the literature and the fine arts. It is especially necessary that in • the immediate future we compile a serious textbook of the history of our party which • will be edited in accordance with scientific Marxist objectivism, a textbook of the history of Soviet society, a book pertaining to the events of the civil war and the great • patriotic war.97

• Truth was to be socialist truth. • The high-water mark of de-Stalinization occurred in 1962 when Khrushchev

• personally approved the publication of 's One Day in the Life of Ivan • Denisovich98, which followed a prisoner through a typical day in a labor camp. For the first • time, a piece of officially approved and published literature acknowledged the existence of • labor camps.

• At the time, the publication of One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich was • • momentous. Jacoby describes Dmitri, a college student, who thought when reading the book,

• "Things might have changed enough so there was actually a possibility of publishing honest • 411 writing."99 Vladislav Zubok describes a Moscow schoolteacher who wrote in her diary, • "From that moment, people would begin to speak and think freely, and not a single scoundrel • would be able to indict them for anti-Soviet speeches."1°° The idea of being able to speak •• • 97 Khrushchev, "The Secret Speech." 98 Shatz, 110. • 99 Jacoby, 237. 100 Zubok, 80. •• •• 54 openly was completely thrilling.

In the novel, Solzhenitsyn makes an argument for complete openness and honesty when discussing the Stalinist years. In one scene, he makes it clear he has refused to censor his novel in order to get it published. Two prisoners, Kh-123 and Tsezar, discuss the film

Ivan the Terrible. While Tsezar argues that the film is a work of genius because of its camera angles and artistic beauty, Kh-123 says it is a piece of propaganda. Tsezar responds it is the only way it would have gotten past the censors. Kh-123 retorts, "Let through, you say? Then do not call him a genius! Call him a toady. Say he carried out orders like a dog. A genius doesn't adapt his treatment to the taste of tyrants!"1°1 Solzhenitsyn, as an artist, refused to censor his novel. He truthfully described life in the labor camps. It was a radical argument against socialist realism in all its forms. A writer's duty was not to support the Party's goals or to speak of "revolutionary truth," but to speak actual truth.

Gorbachev's Glasnost

The dichotomy between Khrushchev and Solzhenitsyn helps to illustrate the difference between official and dissident glasnost, which came to a head under Soviet

Premier in the 1980s. In the late 1980s, the Soviet Premier Mikhail

Gorbachev would identify glasnost as the signature piece of his reform efforts. However,

Gorbachev used the term as the Slavophiles, not the dissidents, intended it. Kenez writes,

"Gorbachev and his comrades understood the term as 'constructive' criticism, that is, the voices of people who took the existence and superiority of the Soviet system for granted."

Just as the Slavophiles did, Gorbachev was calling for a limited amount of open discussion,

101 Alexander Solzhenitsyn, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, trans. Max Hayward. (New York: Bantam Classics, 2005), 67. • • 55 • • • while still guaranteeing the ultimate authority of the government. He felt "speaking the language of truth" would strengthen the Soviet government's stance with its people and with • • the world.'°2 4 40 The dissidents were dismayed by his use of the term. They felt he had co-opted their term, and not delivered on what it meant. Government officials carefully avoided mentioning

40 the dissident roots of the term, and had constructed a definition of it that ran counter to what • • the dissidents believed true glasnost was. Sakharov, at this point the de-facto head of the • dissident movement, spent much of 1987 speaking about the "continuing detention of those • • who had spoken out too soon for glasnost. "103 Gorbachev's glasnost was vastly different • from the dissidents' because while Gorbachev spoke of glasnost, he still believed the • government should retain at least limited control over media technologies. It was, in the dissidents' view, a restricted and false glasnost.

• A group of ten prominent dissident émigrés, including , a student

• of Yesenin-Volpin's, released a manifesto, first published in world media and then in the • Moscow News, titled "Let Gorbachev Give Us Proof." In it, they demonstrated the • • hollowness of Gorbachev's glasnost. It reads: • Glasnost essentially implies some public discussion where everybody can take part • without fearing reprisals irrespective of the views expressed. Glasnost should include • both the right to receive information and the right to spread information because both • are inseparably linked in the single process of society's control over the government. Rather than the official campaign of criticism of Soviet reality there should be free • access to copying equipment to promote greater glasnost as we understand it. If the Soviet leaders wish to enjoy trust among the public, it is necessary for them to • recognize at least several independent publishers not subject to party contro1.1°4 • • • 1°2 Ronald Suny, The Soviet Experiment : Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States (New York : Oxford • University Press, 1998), 481. 103 Horvath, 191. • • 1°4 Horvath, 190. • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• It wasamanifestoinsupportofeverythingthe truthful media.Italsopointedouttheflawsingovernment'sembraceof still controlledthetechnologythatwouldallowfordistributionofinformation.Atruly Gorbachev andothergovernmentofficialscalledforopennessofdiscussion,the much ofthemediatechnology.Fortrulyfreecirculationinformation,government free press,andfreedomofdiscussion,couldnotexistwithstatecensorshipstillcontrolling needed torelinquishallofitsremainingcontrolovermediaoutlets. When explainingtheneedforopendiscussion,hestated,"Inourcountry,allofsocietyison the samesideofbarricade." barricade, andthus,excludedfromthepublicdebate. revolution, ratherthanatoolofreform.WhileGorbachevcalledfor of continued thepracticeofcensorship.Withdissidentformsmedia,andview of releasinginformation.Bytakingcontrolmediaoutlets,dissidentscouldinfluenceand manipulate thetopicsandtoneofconversationinSovietUnion.Itwasaradicaldeparture from government-created recognized thisandsoughttoharnessthepower of outlets. Dissidentmediawasasmuchareflection ofdissidentvaluesasitwasatoolintheir 105 Horvath,191. fight againstthegovernment. glasnost, Gorbachev struckbackagainstthedissidents,arguingtheyhadanti-Sovietmotives. In comparisontoGorbachev,thedissidentsviewed The freeflowofinformationwouldunderminethe Sovietstate.Thedissidents nothing wouldbehiddenbecausethegovernmentwasnolongersolelyincontrol glasnost. 05 Thedissidents,however,wereontheothersideof Chronicle glasnost stood for:free,independentand glasnost through theiruseofmedia as aweaponof glasnost, glasnost. the government While 56

• • 57 • • • By demonstrating to Soviet citizens and the world at large how the Soviet • government was actually behaving, the dissidents were able to undermine the government. • • Transparency meant the Soviet government was acting in the court of world opinion and could no longer simply act as it pleased. There would be consequences on the world stage. • • That is not to say that this dissidents' devotion to glasnost and media outlets, or even • Gorbachev's glasnost, were the cause for the collapse of the Soviet Union Ann Komaromi, a • • current historian at the University of Toronto, wrote of the dissidents' use of samizdat • publications ultimate effect on Russia, "Such obvious historical importance may in fact be • • the problem. The political dynamics of the Cold War tended to fix the idea of dissidence in • the minds of many western observers as opposition to the Soviet regime. The fixed binary • 410 made it tempting to romanticize dissidents and their cause. Dissidents, however, had little or • • no demonstrated impact on the Soviet regime, during Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, • during the fall of the Soviet regime, or in helping to shape a more democratic and just • 11, government after the end of the Soviet Union."1°6 The Soviet Union ultimately fell not • because of any of the actions taken by the dissidents, or by their newspaper, but because of • • the arms race and the collapse of the economy. • Komaromi ultimately concludes that the legacy of samizdat is its discussion of

legality. She writes, "What endures over time from the human rights legacy? The Soviet • dissident legal strategy has proven to be a unique contribution to rights discourse."1°7 The • • dissidents set the model of broadcasting human rights abuses for the entire world to see, and • shaming perpetrators into changing their ways. Glasnost as a weapon is their legacy. • • • • 106 Ann Komaromi, "Samizdat and Soviet Dissident Publics," Slavic Review 71, no.1, (2012): 71. • 107 Komaromi, 90. • • • • 58 • • CONCLUSION • • The dissidents' legacy of using glasnost as tool for demanding the rule of law has

• been apparent the past few months in Russia, as anti-Putin protesters have turned to the • Internet both to break the government's monopoly on media and to demand reforms. • In February 2012, the New York Times ran a story about Russian media, and the way • 4110 a group of young protesters was subverting traditional news sources. Alessandra Stanley • wrote about Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's media strategy during his campaign for the • Presidency. Putin's campaign regularly released "long mission statements for Russia's • • future; each one is framed on the news like a tablet from Moses."108 Typical television news

stories feature Putin, looking strong and virile, highlighting his ideas for Russian future. • • However, Stanley reports, Putin was coming up against a roadblock: the Internet.

• Stanley writes, "But heavy-handed, Soviet-style image control is also a problem for 41 • the Putin campaign in the Internet age. Bloggers and political Web sites not only contradict •41 government-tailored newscasts, they also offer an alternate, unscripted reality — live, via • cellphone camera and Skype."1°9 The protesters were making use of new media technologies

to get their message out, around media closely associated with government.

• The protesters were posting photos and videos, taken by smart phones, of clear • • examples of voter fraud in the elections."° They had clear proof that the government was

lying and the Internet offered them a way to broadcast that. Just like the dissidents, they • • • 108 Stanley, Alessandra, "Putin's Rivals in Russia Fain a Place on the Air, for Now," www.nytimes.com, accessed February 13, 2012. • 1°9 Stanley. 1 1 ° Alissa de Carbonnel, "Insight: Social media makes anti-Putin protests 'snowball,'" www.rueters.com, •41, accessed April 12, 2012. •• • • 59 • • • intended to use publicity as a way of demanding change. • , the editor of the New Yorker and former Washington Post Moscow 9 • correspondent in the late eighties, offers another example in a piece he recently wrote for his • magazine about the new generation of protesters. He describes the case of Yevgenia • • Chirikova, an environmental activist at odds with Putin's government. In the spring, • government officials declared her an unfit mother and threatened to take away her daughters. • • Chirikova felt that she had no one turn to. The government officials had sided against her; • she needed a direct voice to her fellow citizens. She made a video and posted it online. The • • response was immediate. She told Remnick, "After that the ombudsmen on the rights of

children apologized."111 By circumventing government media, and telling her story, • • Chirikova was able to fight the government's abuses. Transparency, glasnost, is a weapon in • • the quest for human rights. •• By turning to the internet as an uncensored media form, the 2011 protesters put • themselves in the model of the dissidents of the 1960s and 1970s. They believed glasnost • • would force the government to enforce fair elections. The samizdat Chronicle of Current • Events and the western re-publications of it, as well as stories about the dissident movement • guaranteed that the government could not act in secret. Truth and openness were • • requirements for legality. • This claim is hardly new for the current generation of protestors, or even the Soviet • • dissidents. The Soviet dissidents carefully put themselves in the model of the Decembrists • and the Westernizers, claiming that the rule of law rather than an autocrat was necessary for •

• Russia to succeed. The rallying cry since 1825 has been the same. It should not be a singular

•

• 111 David Remnick, "The Civil Archipelago," New Yorker, December 19 &26, 2012, 102. • • • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ruler choosinghowthelawisenforced,butasystemofclearwrittenlawstolimitanautocrat weapon inthebattleforlegality. from doingso.Bymakingtheseabusesofpowerknowntothepublic, the formationof describe theviolationofrights,toquotearticleslaw.Nothingwasexaggerated.Thelove contained amassofpureinformation." for objectivitywasintheair.Wasthisun-Russian?Idon'tthinkso.Herzen's materials thatwouldotherwisebecensored,butthephrase"massofpureinformation"could model forthe just aseasilyhavebeenappliedtothe catalyst forreform. each case,thegoalwassame:touseexposureandconfrontationwithtruthasa 112 Hopkins, 23. In aninterviewwithMarkHopkins,Gorbanevskayaexplainedthemotivationsbehind Chronicle, Chronicle. because ofitscommitmenttoexposingthetruthandprinting "Basically therewasanattempttolayoutthefacts, Chronicle, 112 Gorbanevskaya referencesHerzen'sjournalasa or theblogsofmodernprotestors.In glasnost Kolokol became a 60 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• "1936 Primary Sources A Amalrik, Andrei. Alexeyeva, LudmillaandPaulGoldberg. Chalidze, Valerii."ImportantAspectsofHumanRightsintheSovietUnion."In Gorbanevskaya, Natalya. Glad, JohnEd. Jacoby, Susan. Khrushchev, Nikita."TheSecretSpeech—OntheCultofPersonality,1956." Khrushchev, Nikita."KhrushchevSpeaksAgain." In Mandelstam, Nadezhda. Litvinov, Pavel. Meerson-Aksenov, Michael. "TheDissidentMovementand Ginzburg, Alexander. Chronicle ofCurrentEvents. Soviet Constitution,ChapterX."BucknellUniversity. http://www.departments.bucknell.edu International. www.amnesty.org Post-Stalin Era. by MichaelMeerson-AksenovandBorisShagrin.TranslatedNicolasLupinin.19- Political, SocialandReligiousThoughtofRussian'Samizdat'-AnAnthology. 46. Massachusetts:NordlandPublishingCompany,1977. Arzhak." Carolina: DukeUniversityPress,1993. Holt, RinehartandWinston,1970. Last modifiedApril26,2007.www.guardian.co.uk Priscilla JohnsonandLeopaldLabedz.147-185. Massachusetts:Massachusetts Daniel Weissbort.NewYork:Viking1972. Institute ofTechnology,1965. York: Anthenum,1970. Conversations inExile. Moscow Conversations. Translated byMaxHayward.NewYork:Harper&Row,Publishers,1966. Notes ofaRevolutionary. The TrialoftheFour, On Trial:TheSovietStateversus"AbramTertz"and"Nikolai Pittsburgh: UniversityofPittsburghPress,1993. Hope against:amemoir. Red SquareatNoon. Issue 17.April1971.TranslatedandPublishedbyAmnesty BIBLIOGRAPHY Translated byRichardandJoannaRobin.North . Translated byJanisSapiets,HilarySternbergand New York:Coward,McCann&Geoghegan,1972. The ThawGeneration:ComingofAgeinthe New York:AlfredAKnopf,1982. (accessedApril15,2011). Translated byAlexanderLieven.NewYork: Khrushchev andtheArts. Translated byMaxHayward.New

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