sign in sign up
<<
Home , Russian Civil War

MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

Welcome Delegates,

Our names are Angie Lo and Mary Lee, and are the Secretaries-General for the UCI Model United Nations 2020-2021 school year! This year, we are excited to host our first ever collegiate-level online conference, ZOTMUN, and thrilled to have you all join our new journey. We have worked hard to make this conference happen, and we hope that everyone will have a fun and engaging time in debate. Angie is a fourth year Sociology and Political Science double major. She has been involved in MUN since freshman year of high school and loved her experiences there so much she has continued being a part of MUN throughout all of her college years. Throughout her time at MUN at UCI, she has been Assistant Director and Director for General Assembly, Under Secretary-General of Mains, and now has been Secretary General for the past 2 years. When not busy with her school, research, MUN and work, she likes drawing and playing video games. Mary is a third year Criminology, Law and Society major. She has been involved in UCIMUN since freshman year of college and loved her experiences here by far. Her favorite part of actively being involved in MUN is cooperating with other students to contribute to raising awareness of global issues and international affairs. In UCIMUN, she has been an Assistant Director of the Legal Committee and Director of the SPECPOL Committee. Outside of UCIMUN, she is actively involved in research and a networking organization on campus. In her leisure time, on the other hand, she likes listening to music and watching YouTube videos. By now, we have spent more than 7 months in this unprecedented time due to Covid-19. Between the and the social unrest, however, there has become a need to be able to adapt to these new circumstances. Therefore, our theme for this conference will be “adapting to a changing world,” reflecting our new normal that we have restlessly been trying to get familiarized with. Through ZOTMUN, we hope to give everyone a unique opportunity to learn how to adapt and, most importantly, rise to the challenge through dedication and resilience. Although this will be our first college-level conference in an online format, we are determined to give everyone the best experience at the conference as always. We will provide delegates with an opportunity to get engaged in high quality debates and immerse themselves in an intellectual discussion of issues that are relevant to the community and others around them. Please ’t hesitate to reach out to us or our directors anytime between now and the day of our conference—we will be happy to assist you with anything in any way we can.

Thank you for your time in advance. We look forward to seeing you in November!

Sincerely, Angie Lo and Mary Lee Secretaries-General MUN at UCI Secretariat 2020-21 [email protected]

1 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

Salutations!

My name is Kimo Gandall and I am the Director of the Security Council. This will mark my ninth year of MUN, and as such, I am quite seasoned in these affairs, participating from the more broad General Assembly committees, down to midnight-crisis sessions counseling the Pharaoh of Egypt. In high school, I traveled internationally to Bath in England, gaveling for the Security Council. Nationally, I’ve competed in the Forensics National and State Championships, and qualified for the Tournament of Champions. It is with these experiences that I advise delegates, many of you are struggling, to remember that it is the maxim of the victor to never give up: “Not only so, but we also glory in our sufferings, because we know that suffering produces perseverance…” Romans 5:3. Of course, many of these experiences have helped shape my paradigm. Indeed, as a political science major, Professional Registered Parliamentarian, mover in local , and gaming nerd, I’ve incorporated these experiences into my career at UCI. In June of 2018, I was approved to begin drafting my undergraduate thesis Parliamentary Procedure as a Function of State Hegemony, which focuses on the intersection between procedural rules and the corresponding effect on policy and coalition building. Additionally, I am Chief Justice in UCI’s Student Government. This topic synopsis will guide delegates through a conflict many might find obscure: the conflict between and Azerbaijan in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. To navigate our ever changing world of international affairs, ranging COVID-19 to new border , delegates are advised to not only understand their explicit national policy, but the individual and unique interests of their state. Delegates must balance that interest, moreover, with the fundamental prerogative of all states to search and pursue peace. The intent of this committee is to reflect on a world with often diametrically conflicting narratives; indeed, it is very possible that many delegates may even know loved ones affected by the crisis. The idea of diplomatic detachment, however, is that we can not only escape the noise of rhetorical judgement and focus on the truth, but as the Greeks may have called it, reiterate the teloes of the United Nations: peace.

War is never a necessity, nor is it inevitable. Another way can always be found: the way of dialogue, encounter and the sincere search for truth. - Pope Francis, 2014, speaking at the International Peace Meeting.

Sincerely, Kimo Gandall, Director Security Council [email protected]

2 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

Hello! Greetings! Salam! Barev!

My name is Krystian James Hawk Ibanez. I am the Assistant Director of the Security Council for this year but my role within MUN at UCI has changed dramatically over the years. I have held the positions of Director, USG of Specials, USG of Crisis, and Travel Team Coordinator. I was a part of the program for all five of my years at UCI and even helped to usher in the current era of our program. I have participated in fifteen conferences over the course of my career and received numerous Outstandings and Commendation Awards. As a delegate, I have argued on behalf of small island nations in the South Pacific, championed nuclear policies amongst global elites and formulated novel humanitarian tactics amidst an international crisis. As a facilitator, my team and I challenged the status quo in central Africa, introduced a plague-like scenario into a civil and successfully staged a non-violent governmental takeover in the name of national security. My resume in the Model UN debate format is perhaps shorter than those of some of my team members but my connection to the global community and my devotion to international study is immense. This conference marks my return to the program after graduating this past June with my Bachelor of Science in Biology. In addition, I supplemented my degree by taking many International Studies courses and am familiar with the workings of international politics, specifically with those of Asian countries. Currently, my time is occupied by my work in the South Orange County medical community, several philanthropic efforts targeting vulnerable communities across the , and more fanciful pursuits of an aspiring young creator and artist. Throughout the current COVID-19 global health crisis, I have done everything in my power to not only better myself but learn from those whose experiences are different from my own. This has led me to be transformed by empathy, careful thinking and selfless caring. These simple ideas (that are exemplified by the ideas of compromise, understanding and compassion) carry on into how I expect all of you to behave within committee and is something I will be looking for in your research. Like with any issue this volatile, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is one of great cultural, national, and ethnic significance and needs to be handled appropriately. Since the beginnings of this conflict in 1988 all the way through the 1994 ceasefire, the Four Day War in 2016 and even into the current aftermath of the September 2020 crisis, this issue has remained largely off the international radar despite its polarized narrative. In any violent altercations between previously nations, it is important to maintain the underlying causes for such a fervent course of action. The Nagorno- Karabakh region is disputed between not only the Armenians and the Azerbaijani but also the citizens of the Republic of Artsakh. This para-governmental authority that has shifted back and forth between these three parties opens the door for discussion focusing on the logistics around claims of legitimacy to the region, humanitarian and civilian rights violations throughout the conflict, and even warrants a conversation around the responsibility of foreign powers in the lead up to this crisis. That all is to say: this topic demands attention and care that many other topics do not require. I highly encourage all delegates to be cautious and calculating when proposing courses of actions and when pushing for specific policies. Specificity and foresight will be key to be successful. Goodluck with your preparation and I look forward to discussing this with you all.

Sincerely, Krystian Ibanez, Assistant Director Security Council

3 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

Introduction The region of Nagorno-Karabakh, nestled in the between Armenia and

Azerbaijan, de jure recognized by the UN as part of Azerbaijan, but de facto semi-autonomous and part of Armenia, has been the center of ethnic conflict since the end of the 18th century (Pashayeva,

2009, pp. 56 - 9; Gurbanov, 2013, pp. 223 - 8). Occupied by various external states, ranging from the Russian, British, and Ottoman Empires to semi-autonomous regional governments, Nagorno-

Karabakh represents the crescent of the caucuses, effectively dividing and the Middle East

(Potier, 2001, pp. 1 - 12).

In particular, the conflict emerges as a historical struggle between two ethnic groups, both of which would eventually come to result in legitimate states: Armenia, and Azerbaijan (Baguirov,

2012, pp. 155 - 8). Both groups, moreover, have suffered ethnic and racial cleansings, of which both accuse each other (pp. 139 - 41). Tensions between both groups, ranging from ethnic riots during the 19th century from oil booms, to Armenian accusations of Azeri collaboration during the and Azeri accusations of Armenian during first Nagorno-

Karabakh war of 1992, has resulted not only in alienated narraitves, but in cycles of violence

(Radnitz, 2019, pp. 64 - 73). While Armenia has always been the minority power, preference of western states for Christian regional leaders, conjoined with internal corruption in Azerbaijan, has created a cataclysmic racial environment, one that, to summarize the on the ground negotiators working for the UN through the Minsk group, “is no surprise” (Waal, 2010, pp. 159 - 62; Tharoor,

2019). Conjoined with instability from COVID-19, and nationalistic sentiment on both sides, military conflict seems inevitable.

Most importantly, the case study of Nagorno-Karabakh not only illustrates the difficulty in healing ethnic wounds inflicted by generations of conflict, but by two competing legal and cultural

4 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

narratives: one, which posits that the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh has a right to self-determination, and another, which contends for the vital importance of Azerbaijan’s territorial sovereignty (Balayev, 2013, 13 - 50; German, 2012, 216 - 29). Taken together, the humanitarian struggles on the ground and the legal implications present a broad but impactful topic.

Topic Description Prelude to the Crisis

By the end of the 18th century, both Armenia and Azerbaijan had become subject to

Russian occupation and imperial rule in the wake of the first Russian-Persian war (Croissant, 1998, pp. 6 - 10); within ten years of the treaty, however, war broke out again when the traditional leaders of the region - Khanates - returned to the claim the throne (Bournoutian, 2016, pp. xi - xix).

Subsequent exchanges between predominantly ethnic muslims led by the Khanates, and Russian supported Christian-Aremenia forces eventually emanated into a Persian defeat (Cornell, 1999, pp. 4 - 7). The collapse of Khanate lines and 's threat to resulted in the treaty of

Turkmanchai (1828), effectively securing Russian control of the region (Rasizade, 2011, pp. 215

- 7; Cornell, 1999, p. 5). During this period, the systemically encouraged population exchanges, increasing the Aremenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh from an estimated 9% to over 53% by the end of 1880 (Cornell, 1999, p. 5). Ethno-linguistic differences between and Azeris, and particularly similarities between Turks and Azeris, as well as the ’s equal suspicion of Christian Armenians, accelerated population exchanges

(Croissant, 1998, p. 6; Swietochowski, 1999, pp. 420 - 1). While these exchanges, throughout the

18th century, generally homogenized regional populations, such demographic shifts created ethnic tensions in border regions; as a consequence oil booms in the south during the opening

5 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

of the 19th century, particularly in Baku, of which subsequently forced both to populations to mix, created an eruption of the first ethnic riots witnessed in the region since Russian intervention

(Cornell, 1999, p. 6 - 9; Hastings, 2020). During this period, the Dashnaktsutiun, otherwise known as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and backed by the Russian administration, began to violently respond to perceived attacks by the Azeri community, resulting in over 10,000 deaths

(O'lear and Whiting, 2008, 185 - 91; Iskandaryan, 2012, pp. 23 -36; Cornell, 1999, p. 6).

Political stability in the region began to break down during the first world war following the 1917 , thereby resulting in further factionalization during the subsequent power vacuum (Henze, 1996, pp. 389 - 401); indeed, while the new Soviet government, interested in the oil fields in Baku, maintained a military presence, Ottoman soldiers entered unoccupied areas and began to institute pogroms against Arememians (Cheterian, 2018, pp. 885 - 90; Cornell,

1999, p. 7 - 8). In the wake of the first world war, British administrators, replacing Ottoman ones, reaffirmed Ottoman policies on geographical jurisdiction, effectively leaving Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan (Akhmedov, 2019, pp. 172 - 189).

Regional control would change again when, in December 1920, Soviet officials took control of the region from rebel army forces, effectively ending the Russian in the caucasus (Dragadze, 1989, pp. 58 - 61). While Soviet administrators initially favored Armenian control of Nagorno-Karabakh, seeking allies in the newly formed Turkish Republic, they agreed under the “The Treaty of Brotherhood and Friendship” to maintain Nagorno-Karabakh in

Azerbaijan (Cornell, 1998, p. 62). While in Armenia, both on the ground and from leadership, resistance was fierce, it would not be until 1963, during the destalinization period under

Krushchev, that violent protests would again erupt, only to be suppressed by the

(Vaserman, 1994, pp. 345 - 6).

6 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

Tensions would finally escalate in the late 1980s, when liberal Soviet reforms under

Glasnost permitted Armenian leaders to openly express demands (Powell, 2012, 117 - 8; Gibbs,

1999, p. 56). Gorbachev, along with other Soviet reformers, became gradually in favor of granting

Nagorno-Karabakh complete autonomy as a separate republic in the belief that such an act would represent a compromise (Tishkov, 1989, pp. 201 - 3). Such an attempt, however, was not to be accepted by either party; by 1988, following several failed crackdowns by Azeri officials, Azeris within Armenia began to face increasing harassment and threats of expulsion (Lampert, 1988, pp.

58 - 9; Alexeyeva, 1990, pp. 66 - 8). By February of 1988, the escalation became unstoppable, with riots breaking out across Nagorno-Karabakh, with Armenians portraying the occupying Azeri forces as the Ottomans during the pogroms and the Azerbaijani labeling

Aremenian attempts at secession as a violation of territorial sovereignty and the Soviet constitution

(Nolyain, 1994, pp. 543 - 6; Cornell, 1999, pp. 14 - 7).

With racial tensions at a height, a natural disaster, the Spitak earthquake, would offer another opportunity for the Soviet government to reset the political theater (Verluise, 1995, pp. 15

- 22). The earthquake, which severely damaged Armenia’s infrastructure, crippled Armenia’s local governance, allowing for the entry of Soviet military forces and the subsequent declaration of martial law (Schott and Kalatas, 2014, pp. 80 - 9). Soviet leadership, acting on prior commitments to a compromise, then imposed a ‘special government’ on Nagorno-Karabakh, supposedly granting regional autonomy once Soviet troops withdrew (Zinner, 2014, pp. 87 - 9; Cornell, 1999, p. 15). Unfortunately, from 1989 and beyond, the Soviet army became involved in numerous skirmishes with Armenian partisans and paramilitaries, destabilizing any semblance of civilian governance in Nagorno-Karabakh (O'Ballance, 1997, pp. 46 - 9). Worse yet, by November of

1989, Moscow dissolved the Soviet direct command, effectively abandoning the region (Cornell,

7 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

1999, p. 17). Thus, control of Nagorno-Karabakh, instead of the promised autonomy, defaulted back into Azerbaijan, a result that the Armenian Soviet command rejected (Goularas and Turkan-

İpek, 2020, pp. 140 - 3). As internal dissent intensified, Armenia formally recognized independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, which, naturally, was rejected by Azerbaijan (Askerov, 2020, pp. 55 - 62; Georgios, 2013, pp. 12 - 3).

The result of the breakdown of any cognizant legal authority forced retribution; in

Azerbaijan, for example, mass pogroms against ethnic Armenians commenced, in this instance systemic and using heavy military weaponry, such as helicopters and personnel carriers. This time, the Soviet response was swift: in January of 1990, 29,000 troops entered Baku, and brutally suppressed uprisings on either side, resulting in thousands of casualties (Cornell, 1999, p. 15).

Corresponding negotiations ensued between Armenian and Azerbaijan leaders, but was met with an immovable impasse: Armenia insisted that the people of Nagorno-Karabakh had the ‘right of self-determination’, while Azerbaijan defended it’s ‘right to territorial integrity’ (Tokluoglu, 2005, pp. 727 - 9; Cornell, 1999, p. 28).

While the situation was, by and large, stabilized by the presence of an enormous Soviet occupation, the conflict would be resuscitated by the mass successions within the Soviet Union as a result of a failed coup against Soviet President Gorbachev (Suny, 1994, pp. 20 - 4). Following the de facto dissolution of the Soviet Union, Soviet troops, still present in the region, were paralyzed to stop persisting insurrections, especially as Armenia formally recognized the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh (Waal, 2013, 108 - 10). Azerbaijan, fearing ineptitude by the

Soviet command, swiftly countered the declaration by declaring martial law in the region. At this point, centralized authority had virtually vanished in the region, with even the civilian governments

8 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

in either Armenia and Azerbaijan unable to exert practical control over the militia units formed to fill the power vacuums in the region (Latin, 2001, 853 - 6; Suny, 2004, pp. 159 - 65).

The First Nagorno-Karabakh War: 1992 - 94.

By the opening of 1992, the collapse of the Soviet Union, conjoined with diametrically opposed fractions with different narratives and worldviews, sparked war (Goble, 1992, pp. 19 -

23). Armenian generals, prepared for a military conflict, quickly moved on the town of Khojaly in

Nagorno-Karabakh, expelling the local Azeri populace (Cornell, 1999, p. 31). As the war grew in intensity, narrative distinctions quickly began to build that further alienated both sides; while Azeri media claimed civilians were being ethnically cleansed, Armenian sources argued that the Azeri military was using villagers as human shields (Denber, Goldman, and Laber, 1999, pp. 5 - 10;

Yamskov, 1992, pp. 131 - 5). Regardless of the narrative, intensive fighting displaced numerous villages, with the 7000+ population of Khojaly - predominantly Azeri - being completely killed or expelled (Abilov and Isayev, 2016, pp. 291 - 5). As the Armenian offensive progressed, reports by international agencies, including the Report of Human Rights watch, began to document atrocities committed by active Armenian soldiers, rather than merely associated informal militias, suggesting collaboration by Armenian officials. By the end of 1991, Armenia, although not formally, integrated Karabakh (Cornell, 1999, p. 31 - 3).

In 1992, Azerbaijan, having mobilized military forces, launched extensive counter attacks, all of which failed to retake Nagorno-Karabakh; as a result, Armenian troops advanced into

Azerbaijan, seizing Martakert and several other cities. The civilian government of Azerbaijan, desperate to stop advancing Armenian forces and the likelihood and further civilian displacements, appointed Surat Husseinov, a wealthy and influential businessmen, to lead several private armies to retake Martakert (Eichensehr, 2009, pp. 51 - 3). While Husseinov retook Martakert, the private

9 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

armies under his command refused to defend the Azerbaijan stronghold in Kelbajar, resulting in the government dismissing him (Papazian, 2008, 1 - 5). When Husseinvo refused to step down, chaos erupted: Azerbaijani troop morale crashed, and by March of 1993 Armenia’s armed forces had begun a in Kelbajar, displacing over 60,000 civilians. Armenia forces, now virtually uncontested, moved further into Azerbaijan, displacing civilians (Krüger, 2010, pp. 93 - 7; Cornell,

1999, 33 - 5).

While the international community, especially the Security Council, had begun to respond to incursions by Armenia, further instability in Azerbaijan complicated political intervention.

Interestingly, in a ceasefire negotiated by Russia through the Minsk Group, Armenia halted advances into Azerbaijan (Nikolay, 2004, pp. 84 - 6). Even more surprising, in mid 1993, Russian forces evacuated areas controlled by Hussenivo, leaving behind vast stockpiles of weapons

(Cornell, 1999, p. 34). While the civilian government of Azerbaijan, under President Elcibey, attempted to enforce commands for Hussenivo, the government simply did not have the political or military capital to finance such a venture; by June of 1993, Elcibey fled the capital of Baku, and was replaced by his opposition. The new President, Aliyev, thereafter granted several ‘emergency powers’ to Hussenivo, allowing him to enter the capital and assume the role as defense minister

(Cornell, 1999, p. 34 - 5).

While Hussenivo and Aliyev vied for political control of the government, Armenian forces, now empowered by Russo-Armenian military treaty, broke the short-lived cease fire, and brought the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenian control (Uzer, 2012, pp. 245 - 7; Cornell, 1999, p.

35). While Hussenivo and other Azerbaijan military leaders attempted to defend vital cities on the border, by August of 1993 almost every strategic border zone had been either captured or destroyed by Armenia (Mooradian and Druckman, 1999, pp. 710 -1). By September, Armenian army units

10 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

had reached the border of Iran, triggering Iranian forces to establish a presence in South Azerbaijan

(Cornell, 1998, pp. 51 - 67). In response, Turkish troops began to assemble on the border of

Armenia and Turkey, threatening intervention (Uhlig, 1994, 50 - 2). While Azerbaijan attempted a final offensive to retake lost territory, such military endeavors were largely in vain; Armenian forces not only repelled such incursions, but counterattacked and began to threaten the capital of

Baku. By the opening of 1994, not only had the Azerbaijan offensive been crushed, but Armenian forces had begun a process of retributions against Azerbaijan civilians, displacing over 60,000 civilians from Ganja, Azerbaijan’s second largest town (Yousif Freij, 1996, pp. 71 - 83; Hashimov,

2013, pp. 16 - 20).

In May of 1994, a Russian brokered ceasefire was announced and signed by both Armenian and Azerbaijan delegates (Pokalova, 2014, pp. 68 - 70). While Armenia never attempted to move onto Baku and take Azerbaijan’s capital, bickering between political rivalries in Baku all but rendered Azerbaijan politically insolvent (Geybaliyeva, 2019, pp. 329 - 337). Armenia emerged from the conflict not only having completely shifted international borders by force, and facing almost no meaningful condemnation from it, but inflicting a humiliating defeat on a much more powerful and numerous foe (Cornell, 1999, pp. 33 - 8). Azerbaijan, humiliated and facing severe damage to both the psychological state and physical infrastructure of its country, would face numerous coups, beginning with a failed attempt by Husseinov in 1994, resulting in Husseinov being forced into exile in Russia (Kamrava, 2001, pp. 223 - 33; Cornell, 1999, p. 35). President

Aliyev, to his credit, remained in power even until the present situation (Kamrava, 2001, p. 236).

Several important lessons are to be learned from the conflict. First, the distinction between militia forces and formal government troops, on either side of the conflict is not merely academic.

Indeed, for Armenia, Karabakh militias displacing civilians could not formally be levied as an

11 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

accusation against Armenia, and while such militias were significantly less fit for prolonged conflict than Armenian regulars, they suffered no defects in jurisdiction - whether it be involvement with civilians or regulations by the international community (Krüger, 2010, p. 21;

Balayev, 2013, pp. 45 - 52). For Azerbaijan, the distinction is even more crucial; most of the war fought on behalf of Azerbaijan was largely conducted by private militias who, while sanctioned by the government, were largely autonomous (Waal, 2010, 165 - 66; Cornell, 1999, p. 33). To some extent, this privatization also lent to the deterioration of power for the lawfully elected

Azerbaijan government, and thus eroded the ability of the international community to effectuate any meaningful negotiations between either side (Cornell, 1999, pp. 33 -5). Moreover, the international community struggled to even understand basic measurements of capability from either militia groups, as both were often aided by foreign actors, each with a different agenda

(Fairbanks, 1995, pp. 18 - 21).

A second, perhaps more permanent lesson, is in the political context and narrative development in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. In some ways similar to the imposition of the , the 1994 treaty imposed several humiliating conditions on Azerbaijan, including the practical loss of Nagorno-Karabakh (Donabedian and Carey, 2011, pp. 201 - 9). Worse yet, because of displaced civilians in the region, Armenia has assumed de facto demographic dominance in the region, an implication which serves only to deepen animosity in Azerbaijan as the international community refuses to directly recognize claims of ethnic cleansing. Regardless of the accuracy of the claims of either side, the narrative differential has reinforced a more dangerous precedent in the region: that force, rather than international diplomacy, drew the borders

(Potier, 2001, pp. 1 - 8). As such, leaders within Azerbaijan, especially President Aliyev, have repeatedly observed that the only solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a military one.

12 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

Current Militarization and Conflict: A Start to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War

From the end of the war in 1994, President Aliyev, and his corresponding opposition in

Armenia, have been engaged in a prolonged arms race (Ismailzade, 2011, pp. 9 - 10). More specifically, by 2013 military expenditure for Armenia was over $437 million annually, with

Azerbaijan tripling spending to over $3.4 billion (Danielyan, 2014, p. 1). Moreover, global militarization index (GMI), which illustrates the relative emphasis of military spending per capita in each country, places both Armenia and Azerbaijan in the top ten most militarized states (Spina,

2018, 231 - 5). Azerbaijan, benefiting from a range of economic surpluses created by oil rich regions, has not only been able to out compete a relatively stagnant Armenian military growth, but has been able to invest in offensive weaponry, including Russian-made Smerch missile system and

152 MM artillery platforms and numerous drones, all designed for shelling fortified Armenian positions (Guliyev, 2013, pp. 115 - 121; Kramer, 2020, p. 1; The Economist, 2020). By 2020,

Azerbaijan not only outspent Armenia at a 3:1 ratio, but had significantly more aircraft and heavy weaponry. However, despite advances and rearmament for Azerbaijan, Armenian retains several distinct advantages: first, Armenia hosts several major Russian bases, or has been associated with dual military training and equipment. As such, while Azerbaijan may be able to leverage more soldiers and armaments, Armenia may be able to continuously import military hardware at a more sustainable rate. Second, while Azerbaijan has been able to purchase Russian weaponry, Armenia has been able to deepen ties to Moscow, thereby supplementing military forces with discounted and updated hardware (German, 2012, pp. 217 - 8). Third, and perhaps most importantly, Armenia has created a sophisticated series of trenches in the Nagorno-Karabakh region that can hold over

20,000 soldiers. While Azerbaijan has now also replicated a series of similar WWI style trenches,

13 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

Armenia benefits from only having to defend the region rather than seize it (McKernan, 2020, p.

1).

The militarization between both countries sparked into conflict in 2020, as Azerbaijan revanchists, angered by alleged ethnic grievances and believing Armenia weakened by the

COVID-19 crisis, demanded that Nagorno-Karabakh be surrendered to Azerbaijan. Clashes began on July 12th largely through artillery exchanges that resulted in the death of an Azerbaijan general.

In response, on September 27th, the second Nagorno-Karabakh war began, with Azerbaijan beginning to shell Stepanakert and attack outposts along an almost 200 kilometer ‘line of contact’

(Waal, 2020, p.1). On October 9th, amongst intense skirmishes on the border, revanchist demands were reaffirmed by President Aliyev, who insisted that there was no peaceful compromise, unless

Nagorno-Karabakh was seceded to Azerbaijan. Conflict has since plagued the region, with

Armenian forces responding to Azerbaijan by shelling Ganja, a major city within Azerbaijan, effectively destroying the airport and displacing civilians (Reuters, 2020). In total, nearly 200

Azeri civilians have been wounded or killed, while Armenian casualties surpassed over 400 military and civilian deaths (Safdar, 2020).

Since then, President Aliyev has solidified his position, tweeting that the status quo can only be “changed on the battlefield” (Aliyev, 2020). Prime Minister Pashinyan of Armenia tweeted back, arguing that a victory for Azerbaijan would mean “a #genocide for the Armenians of

#NarornoKarabakh” (Pashinyan, 2020) International responses have similarly escalated, with

Turkey casting a guarantee on Azerbaijan, while Russian diplomats threatened to enforce the

Russia-Armenian mutual defense pact against Azerbaijan (Cutler, 2020). While a ceasefire was called by both parties on October 9th, it was broken within several minutes of official commencement, with both parties accusing the other of violation (Sullivan and Isaac, 2020).

14 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

Perhaps most worrying, social media exchanges have intensified rhetoric and obfuscated facts on the ground, with Azerbaijan’s defence minister describing ‘liberation’ of Nagorno-Karabakh as a

“sacred duty” and Armenia retweeting that Azerbaijan was engaging in “barbarity” by allegedly

“[bombing the] Holy Savior Cathedral.” In totality, as the war on words begins to translate into civilian casualties, the conflict has taken on two distinct dimensions: first, on the narratives between the two parties, both struggling over different fundamental rights to self-determination and territorial sovereignty. And second, to the actual war on the ground, which has begun to gradually escalate into another full war.

UN and International Involvement

United Nations involvement in the crisis can be bifurcated into two primary categories: first, a response to the practical crisis; and second, a legal discursive on how international law views the importance of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. The former was first mentioned in 1993 under UN Security Council resolution 822, which demanded Armenian forces withdraw from

Azerbaijan. Resolution 853, created under similar pretenses, both reaffirmed 822 and called for

Armenian soldiers to specifically leave occupied areas in Azerbaijan outside of Nagorno-

Karabakh. Two similar Security Council resolutions, 874 and 884, would likewise demand

Armenian troop withdrawal, but uniquely reaffirm the importance of the idea of territorial sovereignty, while remaining largely silent on the Armenian narrative for the right of self- determination. In 2008, the General Assembly, under A/RES/62/243, would address the latter concern of legality by emphasizing the Azerbaijan argument favoring territorial sovereignty and demanding the unconditional withdrawal of Armenian forces. While most of these actions, thus far, have lacked any meaningful enforcement, they represent a growing trend of legal literature underlying the importance of territorial sovereignty (Slomanson, 2012, pp. 72 - 5). Moreover,

15 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

demands by the General Assembly to reiterate the legal right of Azerbaijan to its territory has been undermined by major states, including the United States, the Russian Federation, and France, in opposition to the establishment of any legal criteria for the issue. Most recently, the UN Security

Council, rather than focusing on either the internal conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh or the underlying legal issues, has pivoted to call for negotiations to prevent either Russia or Turkey from intervening as a result of defensive pacts (Le Masurier, 2020).

While the larger UN institutions have largely failed to respond promptly to the growing conflict, other international agencies, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in

Europe (OSCE) under the Minsk group, have been more active in the peace process. The Minsk group, co-chaired by a joint panel of France, Russia, and the United States, has attempted to handle regional tension by appointing a personal representative to not only observe the conflict, but to actively participate as an on the ground negotiator (Bryza, 2020; OSCE Minsk Group, 2020).

Created in 1997, largely as a response to the the First Nagorno-Karabakh war, the Minsk process now operates the official venue for negotiations and communications between Armenia and

Azerbaijan (Hopmann, 2014, pp. 4 - 8); unfortunately, despite calls by both the General Assembly and the Secretary General, delegates from both parties have generally spent time in the General

Assembly utilizing their right to respond to condemn the other of transgressions (Kramer, 2020).

Perhaps most importantly, however, the Minsk process has served to reinforce regional political narratives, with the US beginning to pressure Armenian forces to withdraw as NATO member

Turkey backs Azerbaijan's claims. Likewise, through the establishment of military bases and further lines of supply, Russia has been an active participant in supporting the relatively weaker

Armenian government. Thus, while the involvement of the US and Russia in the Minsk panel

16 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

offers legitimacy to the office, it also reinforces dangerous elements of factioning existent in conflict.

Committee Goals Conflict Mitigation

As reiterated, it is the ultimate goal of the committee to maintain a semblance of the order in the region, or at least minimize civilian casualties. This balance, of course, must consider both the long term and short term impacts: while the UN, through sanctions or coercion, may be able to immediately halt violence, it is improbable that only such actions will bring about peace.

Moreover, while the history of the ceasefire in the region is clearly portraying the problematic status quo of the Minsk group, delegates will need to balance the influence of international institutions with on the ground domestic forces. Each policy, therefore, must not only consider competing interests, but also have the necessary enforcement mechanisms to feasibly implement the resolution.

Clarify Competing Legal Narratives

While it may not be wise for delegates to encourage in cultural opinions of narratives, the

Committee cannot completely ignore the legal questions at hand; for example, if Azerbaijan has lawful jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh, it may be that recent clashes are a resistance to an occupying Armenian force, rather than an invading Azerbaijan army. While most current UN resolutions hold to this line of reasoning, delegates must be careful not to fully exclude the importance of self-determination: indeed, too strong, and delegate’s may inadvertently deny the right to self-determination, of which has been key to the efforts of decolonization. Regardless, it

17 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

would be prudent for delegates to weigh these narratives, and provide a clear and contextually appropriate response.

Research Questions 1. What are the capabilities of parties involved? In the status quo, what do they control, or are

likely to control?

2. What are the demands of the key parties involved? How do these demands influence their

narrative?

3. What is the strength of motives for either side? Why do these motives exist, and how can

they be modified by international pressure?

4. Compare the current situation in Nagorno-Karabakh to the Bosnian and Rwandan

genocides. How are they similar? How are they different? What do both tell us about the

current situation?

5. Examine the jurisdiction and practical enforcement power of the Security Council. What

tangible policies can be put in place to either address the legal narrative or, at the very least,

minimize the harm of war?

18 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

References

Abilov, S., & Isayev, I. (2016). The Consequences of the Nagorno–Karabakh War for Azerbaijan and the Undeniable Reality of Khojaly Massacre: A View from Azerbaijan. Polish Political Science Yearbook, 45, 291-303. doi:10.15804/ppsy2016022.

Akhmedov, A. (2019). British foreign policy in Azerbaijan, 1918-1920. Lancaster University.

Alexeyeva, L. (1990). Unrest in the Soviet Union. The Washington Quarterly, 13(1), 63-77. doi:10.1080/01636609009477532.

Armenia is World's Third Most Militarized County, Report Shows - The Armenian Mirror. (2020, February 27). Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https://mirrorspectator.com/2020/02/27/armenia-is-worlds-third-most-militarized-county- report-shows/

Askerov, A., Brooks, S., & Tchantouridze, L. (2020). The post-Soviet conflicts: The thirty years' crisis. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Baguirov, A. (2012). Nagorno-Karabakh: Competing Legal, Historic and Economic Claims in Political, Academic and Media Discourses. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 32(2), 139-175. doi:10.1080/13602004.2012.694662.

Balayev, B. (2013). The right to self-determination in the South Caucasus: Nagorno Karabakh in context. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Balayev, B. (2013). The right to self-determination in the South Caucasus: Nagorno Karabakh in context. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Bournoutian, G. A. (2016). The 1820 Russian Survey of the Khanate of Shirvan: A primary source on the demography and economy of an Iranian province prior to its annexation by Russia: Annotated translation from the original 1867 edition with an introduction, explanatory remarks and appendix. Cambridge: E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Trust.

Bryza, M. (2020, October 10). Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire revives "Basic Principles" and demonstrates Putin's continued sway. Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/armenia-azerbaijan-ceasefire- revives-basic-principles-and-demonstrates-putins-continued-sway/.

Cheterian, V. (2018). The Uses and Abuses of History: Genocide and the Making of the Karabakh Conflict. Europe-Asia Studies, 70(6), 884-903. doi:10.1080/09668136.2018.1489634

Cornell, S. (1998). Iran and the Caucasus. Middle East Policy, 4(5).

19 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

Cornell, S. (1999). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Department of East European Studies, Uppsala University.

Cornell, S. E. (1998). Turkey and the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh: A delicate balance. Middle Eastern Studies, 34(1), 51-72. doi:10.1080/00263209808701209

Croissant, M. P. (1998). The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict: Causes and implications. Westport, CT, etc.: Praeger.

Cutler, R. (2020, October 09). Without Russian Aid to Armenia, Azerbaijan Has the Upper Hand in Nagorno-Karabakh. Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/09/russia-aid-armenia-azerbaijan-putin-nagorno- karabakh/.

Danielyan, E. (2014, December 11). Armenia Ranked World's Third Most Militarized Nation. Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https://www.azatutyun.am/a/26738226.html.

Denber, R., Goldman, R. K., & Laber, J. (1999). Bloodshed in the Caucasus: Escalation of the armed conflict in Nagorno Karabakh. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Donabedian, D. A., & Carey, J. (2011). Open Access and Liberal Education: A Look at Armenia, Azerbaijan, and . Slavic & East European Information Resources, 12(4), 201- 223. doi:10.1080/15228886.2011.621113.

Dragadze, T. (1989). The Armenian‐Azerbaijani conflict: Structure and sentiment. Third World Quarterly, 11(1), 55-71. doi:10.1080/01436598908420139

Eichensehr, K., & Reisman, W. M. (2009). Stopping wars and making peace: Studies in international intervention. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.

Fairbanks, C. (1995). Armed Forces and : The Postcommunist Wars. Journal of Democracy, 6(4).

Georgios, T. (2013). Blurred borders. Harvard International Review, 24(4).

German, T. (2012). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia: Security Issues in the Caucasus. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 32(2), 216-229. doi:10.1080/13602004.2012.694666.

Geybaliyeva, N. (2019). The Fight for Political Stability and Preservation of National Statehood in Azerbaijan, 1993 - 1995. Journal Of Modern Turkish History Studies.

Gibbs, J. (1999). Gorbachev's : The Soviet media in the first phase of . College Station: Texas A & M University Press.

20 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

Goble, P. (1992). Coping with the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis Ethnic Identity. Law Journal Library, 16(2).

Goularas, G. B., Turkan-İpek, I. Z., & Önel, E. (2020). Refugee crises and migration policies: From local to global. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Guliyev, F. (2013). Oil and Regime Stability in Azerbaijan. Demokratizatsiya, 21(1).

Gurbanov, G. (2013) Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Europe's Next Avoidable War. doi:10.1057/9781137030009.0026.

Hashimov, I. (2013). Comparative Analysis of Ethnic Cleansing: The Case of Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2283749

Hastings, R. (2020). Oil Capital: Industry and Society in Baku, Azerbaijan, 1870-Present. University of Oregon.

Henze, P. (1996). Russia and the Caucasus. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.

Hopmann, P. T. (2015). Minsk Group Mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Confronting an “Intractable Conflict”. OSCE Yearbook 2014, 163-180. doi:10.5771/9783845260945- 163.

Ilham Aliyev, (2020). Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https://twitter.com/presidentaz/status/1314612918835654662?s=21.

Iskandaryan, A. (2012). Armenia Between and Polyarchy. Russian Politics & Law, 50(4), 23-36. doi:10.2753/rup1061-1940500402.

Ismailzade, F. (2011). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Current Trends and Future Scenarios. Istituto Affari Internazionali, 11(29).

Kamrava, M. (2001). State-Building in Azerbaijan: The Search for Consolidation. Middle East Journal, 55(2).

Kramer, A. (2020, September 27). Fighting Flares Between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/27/world/europe/azerbaijan- armenia-conflict-nagorno-karabakh.html

Krüger, H. (2010). Involvement of the Republic of Armenia in the conflict of Nagorno- Karabakh. The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, 93-114. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-14393-9_2.

Lampert, N. (1988). The Dilemmas of Glasnost’. Journal of Communist Studies, 4(4), 48-63. doi:10.1080/13523278808414936

Latin, D. (2001). Secessionist Rebellion in the Former Soviet Union. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, 34(8).

21 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

Le Masurier, Jessica. (2020, September 30). UN Security Council calls for immediate end to fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh. Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https://www.france24.com/en/20200930-un-security-council-calls-for-immediate-end-to- fighting-in-nagorno-karabakh.

McKernan, B. (2020, October 13). , drones and cowering civilians: On the ground in Nagorno-Karabakh. Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2020/oct/13/trench-warfare-drones-and- cowering-civilians-on-the-ground-in-nagorno-karabakh

Mooradian, M., & Druckman, D. (1999). Hurting Stalemate or Mediation? The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, 1990-95. Journal of Peace Research, 36(6), 709-727. doi:10.1177/0022343399036006007.

Nikol Pashinyan, (2020). Retrieved October 13, 2020 from https://twitter.com/NikolPashinyan/status/1313568388350914564?s=20.

Nikolay, Hovhannisyan (2004). The Karabakh problem: The Thorny Road to Freedom and Independence. Yerevan: Zangak 97.

Nolyain, I. (1994). Moscow's initiation of the Azeri‐Armenian conflict. Central Asian Survey, 13(4), 541-563. doi:10.1080/02634939408400882.

O'Ballance, E. (1997). Wars in the Caucasus, 1990-1995. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan.

O'lear, S., & Whiting, R. (2008). Which comes first, the nation or the state? A multiple scale model applied to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the Caucasus. National Identities, 10(2), 185-206. doi:10.1080/14608940801997291.

OSCE Minsk Group. (n.d.). Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https://www.osce.org/mg.

Papazian, T. (2008). State at War, State in War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and State- Making in Armenia, 1991-1995. The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-soviet Societies, (Issue 8). doi:10.4000/pipss.1623

Pashayeva, G. (2009). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict In the Aftermath of the Russia-Georgia War. Turkish Policy Quarterly. doi:10.1057/9781137030009.0026.

Pokalova, E. (2014). Conflict Resolution in Frozen Conflicts: Timing in Nagorno-Karabakh. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 17(1), 68-85. doi:10.1080/19448953.2014.986378

Potier, T. (2001). Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia: A legal appraisal. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

22 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

Potier, T. (2001). Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia: A legal appraisal. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

Powell, N. (2012). The Effect of Glasnost on the Dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Concord Review, 22(3).

Radnitz, S. (2019). Reinterpreting the enemy: Geopolitical beliefs and the attribution of blame in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Political Geography, 70, 64-73. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.01.009.

Rasizade, A. (2011). Azerbaijan's Prospects in Nagorno-Karabakh. Mediterranean Quarterly, 22(3), 72-94. doi:10.1215/10474552-1384882.

Reuters. Azerbaijan's Aliyev demands Armenian timetable to withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh. (2020, October 04). Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-armenia-azerbaijan-aliyev/azerbaijans-aliyev- demands-armenian-timetable-to-withdraw-from-nagorno-karabakh-idUSKBN26P0S5

Safdar, A., Gadzo, M., & Siddiqui, U. (2020, October 12). Russia seeks Nagorno-Karabakh truce return as deaths rise: Live. Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/12/nagorno-karabakh-live-news

Schott, J., & Kalatas, T. (2014). The Earthquake of Spitak, Armenia, and its socio-economic implications. Natural Disasters and Sustainable Development.

Slomanson, W. (2012.). Nagorno Karabakh: An Alternative Legal Approach to Its Quest for Legitmacy. Miskolc Journal of International Law, 9(1).

Spina, N. (2018). Threats to national security and public support for integration: The case of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Caucasus Survey, 6(3), 230-251. doi:10.1080/23761199.2018.1501892.

Sullivan, R., & Isaac, L. (2020, October 10). Azerbaijan and Armenia accuse each other of breaking ceasefire. Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/10/europe/azerbaijan-armenia-ceasefire-intl/index.html.

Suny, R. (1994). Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Federal Research , .

Suny, R. G. (2004). The revenge of the past: , revolution, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press.

Swietochowski, T. (1999). Azerbaijan: Perspectives from the crossroads. Central Asian Survey, 18(4), 419-434. doi:10.1080/713656170.

23 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

Tharoor, I. (2019). The crisis over Nagorno-Karabakh, explained. Retrieved October 12, 2020, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/04/05/how-the-crisis- over-nagorno-karabakh-could-get-worse-fast/.

The Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict hints at the future of war. (n.d.). Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/10/10/the-azerbaijan-armenia-conflict- hints-at-the-future-of-war

Tishkov, V. (1989). Glasnost and the nationalities within the Soviet Union. Third World Quarterly, 11(4), 191-207.

Tokluoglu, C. (2005). Definitions of national identity, nationalism and ethnicity in post-Soviet Azerbaijan in the 1990s. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28(4).

Uhlig, M. (1994). The Karabakh War. World Policy Journal, 10(4).

Uzer, U. (2012). Nagorno-Karabakh in Regional and World Politics: A Case Study for Nationalism, Realism and Ethnic Conflict. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 32(2), 245-252. doi:10.1080/13602004.2012.694668

Vaserman, A., & Ginat, R. (1994). National, Territorial or Religious Conflict? The Case of Nagorno‐Karabakh. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 17(4), 345-362. doi:10.1080/10576109408435961.

Verluise, P. (1995). Armenia in crisis: The 1988 earthquake. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Waal, T. D. (2010). Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process. Survival, 52(4).doi:10.1080/00396338.2010.506830.

Waal, T. D. (2010). Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process. Survival, 52(4), 159-176. doi:10.1080/00396338.2010.506830

Waal, T. D. (2013). garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through peace and war. New York: New York University Press.

Waal, Thomas de . War has broken out on the edge of Europe. What's behind it? (2020, October 10). Retrieved October 13, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/oct/10/war-edge-europe-nagorno- karabakh-conflict-armenia-azerbaijan

Yamskov, A. (1992). Inter-Ethnic Conflict in the Trans-caucasus: A Case Study of Nagorno- Karabakh. Ethnicity and Conflict in a Post-Communist World, 131-140. doi:10.1007/978- 1-349-22213-1_8.

24 MODEL UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE ZOTMUN | sites.uci.edu/ucimun

Yousif Freij, H. (1996). State Interests vs. the Umma: Iranian Policy in . Middle East Journal, 50(1).

Zinner, E., & Williams, M. B. (2014). When a community weeps: Case studies in group survivorship. London: Routledge.

25