North American Supergrid Transforming Electricity Transmission

Note: this is updated version uploaded in September 2019 containing new information and analysis that has changed since the original publication in 2017. In loving memory of David Burwell, Michael Garvin, and Bob Gough, without whom this project would not have been possible.

About David About Michael About Bob David Burwell, the late founder of Michael Garvin’s long years of ser- Robert ‘Bob’ Gough was the Secretary Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, was a vice to the environmental movement of the Intertribal Council on Utlity leading expert in the legal nuances are marked by his innovatve spirit. Policy, and dedicated his life to cham- surrounding the repurposing of un- Michael’s counsel contributed to pioning clean energy development derused rights-of-way for innovatve much of the preliminary technical and economic opportunites for Great purposes. His legacy not only lives on and economic work for this project, Plains tribes. He was a leading expert in the many miles of converted bike and pushed this team to contnuously on tribal energy law and policy, and paths present throughout the United evolve and improve our analyses. His was instrumental in spearheading this States, but also though the invaluable determinaton to make a lastng con- team’s research on the inclusion of counsel he provided to the North tributon to climate change mitgaton sovereign lands in the North American American Supergrid team in the early and adaptaton causes never faltered, Supergrid’s feasibility research. His stages of this project. David’s imagi- and to us, he certainly succeeded. It memory will live on in the upholding naton and drive contnue to infuence was truly a pleasure to work with him. of his values by this team. every member of our team.

i This initatve would not have been possible without the groundbreaking, foundatonal work of the Natonal Oceanic and Atmospheric Administraton funded study that generated the Nature Climate Change

publicaton enttled Future Cost-Compettve Electricity Systems and their Impact on US CO2 Emissions. This academically acclaimed work was completed by a six-member team over the course of six years, and work in conjuncton with the Climate Insttute has contnued since. Namely, Dr. Alexander E. (‘Sandy’) MacDonald has spearheaded this efort.

About Sandy

Dr. Alexander E. (‘Sandy’) MacDonald retred from over 40 years of federal service in the Natonal Oceanic and Atmo- spheric Administraton, on January 3, 2016. He was a Senior Executve since 1990 and President of the American Meteo- rological Society in 2015. He retred afer 10 years as Direc- tor of NOAA’s largest research laboratory, the Earth System Research Lab in Boulder, Colorado. He was Chief Science Ad- visor for NOAA’s research line, and it Deputy Assistant Ad- ministrator from 2006 to 2012. He was Director of NOAAs Forecast Systems Laboratory from 1988 to 2005. He is the inventor of NOAA’s ‘Science On a Sphere’, an educatonal exhibit now in over 130 museums worldwide. He worked with Vice President Al Gore to start the GLOBE Program in 1994. He is the recipient of four Presidental Rank Awards. Dr. MacDonald’s recently published (January 25, 2016) enttled “Future cost-compettve electricity systems and their th impact on US CO2 emissions” was ranked in the 99 percen- tle of impact by Altmetric. The artcle presents a soluton to greenhouse gas emissions that could be implemented On April 4, 2016 he joined Spire Global, where he is leading now with existng technology, and would be also be feasible a group that is developing global weather models and ad- in other major economies such as Europe, China and India. vanced energy solutons.

ii Foreword

In the short time span of 100 years, reliable electric energy As we discuss in this policy paper, this potentially low-car- has gone from a rare luxury to a primary, life-sustaining re- bon solution is now available with existing technology – a quirement. Tis system, on which our society is increasing- “supergrid” that makes wind and solar energy less expen- ly reliant, is plagued by inefciency and fragility in the face sive and contributes to the reliability of our grid. Te North of modern threats. We must build a secure electric system American Supergrid is a high voltage direct current electric to ensure that our populated areas do not rapidly descend transmission overlay system that would solve the variability rapidly into chaotic conditions if electric energy ceases to be problem of wind and solar generation, leveling the playing available over a large area for an extended period. Te United feld to allow consumers to access the cheapest energy source States remains vulnerable to terrorist attacks, solar storms, available at any given time. Such an outcome can be achieved cyber-attacks, extreme weather events, and “electromagnetic without traditional “command and control” regulatory based pulse” nuclear bombs, all of which could deliver these cata- strategies, while still maintaining a high level of environmen- strophic outages at any time. tal stewardship.

Until recently, the energy market has been plagued by trans- A modern, secure, largely underground North American mission inefciency and intermittency, limiting the econom- Supergrid could protect us, and could likely be paid for by ic viability of cheap electricity sources. High voltage direct private commercial entities without an increase in electric current transmission technology signifcantly decreases rates using existing and proven technology. We must remedy inefciency by reducing line losses during electricity trans- our vulnerable and unsustainable electric grid for the good mission, allowing the creation of a national electricity mar- of our country and its people. ket that can serve load centers with electricity derived from distant generation centers. Tis new market structure would allow for greater penetration of renewables into the electric grid, resulting in up to a 78% reduction in power sector carbon emissions.

John Topping President Climate Institute Washington DC October 29, 2017

iii Table of contents

List of fgures...... 1 List of tables...... 2 Acronyms, chemical compounds, and scientfc units...... 3 Executve summary...... 5 Introducton...... 7 Chapter 1: Technical feasibility and environmental challenges...... 9 Chapter 2: Security and the North American Supergrid...... 35 Chapter 3: Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility...... 47 Chapter 4: North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton...... 63 Chapter 5: Areas of further study...... 80 Acknowledgments...... 81

iv List of fgures

1.1 Magnetc feld for cable pair spaced 0.3 meters apart at a depth of 1.5 meters 1.2 Design confguraton for the HVDC transmission cables and the fber optc cable 1.3 Groundwater formaton cross-secton 1.4 Depth to bedrock layer in Arizona 1.5 Groundwater conditons in Arizona 1.6 Superfund and Brownfeld sites 1.7 Oil and gas infrastructure in Arizona 1.8 Final areas to avoid when undergrounding cables 1.9 Characterizaton of soil orders 1.10 Organic mater content 1.11 Concrete corrosion potental 1.12 Final areas in need of amendment when undergrounding cables 1.13 Final Western Pilot Project route 1.14 Bathymetry, reefs, protected areas, and Essental Fish Habitats - North Carolina to Florida 1.15 Coral EFH, EFH-HAEC and submarine cables 1.16 Marine mammals study areas and tracklines 1.17 Shipping lanes, ports, and deepwater ports and anchorage 1.18 Vessel density for the year 2013 1.19 Coastal energy facilites, oil and gas wells, pipelines, power plants, petroleum product terminals and petroleum refneries, and natural gas underground storage 1.20 Primary, secondary, and supplementary concerns visualized together 3.1 Natonal electric markets

1 List of tables

1.1 EFHs and HAPCs for prevalent species 1.2 Primary, secondary, and supplemental concerns for cable placement 3.1 Updated vs forecasted renewable generaton costs 3.2 Line and staton cost comparison 3.3 Comparison of the NAS to current AC system cost 3.4 Breakeven points for system economic feasibility based on natural gas prices and underground system multpliers 3.5 Sensitvity analysis to cost of natural gas and multplier efect for underground 3.6 CAPEX & jobs & economic impacts during new constructon

2 Acronyms, chemical compounds and scientfc units

ABB – ASEA Brown Boveri FLPMA – Federal Land Policy and Management Act AC – Alternatng Current FPA – Federal Power Act AEMC – Arnoux, Enerdis, Metrix, Pyro Control Group FRCC – Florida Reliability Coordinatng Council AIS – Automatc Identfcaton System FWC – Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservaton ALJ – Administratve Law Judge Commission APT – Advance Persistent Threat FWRI – Fish and Wildlife Research Insttute BIA – Bureau of Indian Afairs GAP – Natonal Gap Analysis Program BLM – Bureau of Land Management GHG – Greenhouse Gases BOEM – Bureau of Ocean Energy Management GIC – Geomagnetcally Induced Currents CAP – Cross-Agency Priority GIS – Geographic Informaton System CAPEX – Capital Expenditures GMD – Geomagnetc Disturbances CAISO – California ISO GW – Gigawat CREZ – Compettve Renewable Energy Zone HAPC(s) – Habitat Area(s) of Partcular Concern DC – Direct Current HEARTH Act – Homeless Emergency Assistance and DFC – Device Fence Control Rapid Transiton to Housing Act DHS – United States Department of Homeland HEMP – High Alttude Electromagnetc Pulse Security HMS – High Migratory Species DNP3 – Distributed Network Protocol Version 3.3 HPEM – High-Power Electro Magnetc DOE – United States Department of Energy HPM – High-Power Microwave DOT – United States Department of Transportaton HVDC – High Voltage Direct Current DOTs – Departments of Transportaton IC – Intelligence Community DPRK – Democratc People’s Republic of Korea (North ICS – Industrial Control Systems Korea) IEA – Internatonal Energy Agency EFH – Essental Fish Habitats IEMI – Internatonal Electromagnetc Interference EGUs – Electric Generatng Units IRS – Internatonal Revenue Service EHV – Extra High Voltage ISO(s) – Independent System Operator(s) EIA – United States Energy Informaton Administraton ITP – Integrated Transmission Planning EMP – Electromagnetc Pulse JEDI – Jobs and Economic Development Impact EMS – Energy Management Systems Km/W – Kelvin-meter/Wat EPA – United States Environmental Protecton Agency kV – Kilovolt Epact 2005 – Energy Policy Act of 2005 LCOE – Lazard Levelized Cost of Electricity ERCOT – Electric Reliability Council of Texas LPO – Loan Program Ofce FERC – Federal Energy Regulatory Commission MIP – Mixed-integer Linear Programming FGROW – Federally Granted Rights of Way MMBtu – Million Britsh Thermal Units

3 MTEP – MISO Transmission Expansion Plan ROI – Return on Investment NAAQS – Natonal Ambient Air Quality Standards ROW(s) – Right(s)-of-way NARUC – Natonal Associaton of Regulatory Utlity RTEP – Regional Transmission Expansion Plan Commissioners RTO – Regional Transmission Organizaton NAS – North American Supergrid SAFMC – South Atlantc Fishery Management Council NCIC – Natonal Center for Interstate Compacts SCADA – Supervisory Control and Data Acquisiton NEPA – Natonal Environmental Policy Act SERC – Southern Electric Reliability Council NERC CIP – North American Electric Reliability SEZ – Solar Energy Zones

Corporaton’s Critcal Infrastructure Protecton SO2 – Sulfur Dioxides NEWS – Natonal Energy from Weather Systems SPP – Southwest Power Pool NIETC(s) – Natonal Interest Electric Transmission SSC – Sudden Storm Commencement Corridors STB – Surface Transportaton Board NNEMP – Non-nuclear Electromagnetc Pulse SVP – Special Purpose Vehicle NOAA – Natonal Oceanic and Atmospheric TERA – Tribal Energy Resources Agreement Administraton TNC – The Nature Conservancy NOM – Natural Organic Mater TNT – Trinitrotoluene NOPR – Notce of Proposal Rulemaking T-SCADA – Transmission Supervisory Control and Data

NOX – Nitrous Oxides Acquisiton NPV – Net Present Value UAPs – Utlity Accommodaton Plans NREL – Natonal Renewable Energy Laboratory UNEP-WCMC – The United Natons Environment NYISO – New York ISO Programme’s World Conservaton Monitoring Centre ONCC – Overnight Capital Costs USDA – United Statesd Department of Agriculture OSPAR – Oslo/Paris Conventon USGS – United States Geological Survey OT – Operatonal Technology WECC – Western Electricity Coordinatng Council PABs – Private Actvity Bonds WEIM – Western Energy Imbalance Market PIER – Public Interest Energy Research Group WPP – Western Pilot Project ppm – Parts Per Million WSR leases – Wind and Solar Resources leases PPP – Public-Private Partnership μT – Microteslas PUC – Public Utlites Commission Ωm – Ohm-meter RFW – Radio Frequency Weapons

4 Executve Summary

The North American Supergrid (NAS or Supergrid) would Preliminary analyses by the Climate Insttute confrm both make electricity infrastructure more resilient and greatly feasibility and cost-efectveness. reduce power sector carbon emissions. While MacDonald et al.’s artcle explored the potental ben- The North American Supergrid is a proposed nodal high efts and implicatons of a North American Supergrid, quite voltage direct current (HVDC), largely underground trans- a number of other practcal aspects were lef for additon- mission network that would extend across the lower 48 al investgaton. The Climate Insttute, a Washington-based states, thus creatng a natonal electricity market. The Su- non-governmental organizaton that has a three-decade re- pergrid would create a resilient backbone to the existng cord of bringing innovatve approaches to wider atenton, system and make clean renewable energy compettve with has conducted a number of feasibility analyses to assess the fossil fuel-generated energy in open markets. Adding the practcal challenges associated with the creaton of a mostly Supergrid atop the existng regional alternatng current dis- underground HVDC transmission overlay system, consider- tributon system would provide the fexibility and reliabil- ing practcal aspects such as how best to meet the need for ity that would enable expanded use of electricity across rights of way, compatbility of soils and HVDC cabling, nat- the economy, without altering how electricity is currently ural-disaster and natonal-security co-benefts from under- used in homes or businesses. This would also aford electro- grounding, and the projected costs for a few representatve magnetc pulse (EMP) and geomagnetc disturbance (GMD) network lines. As explained briefy below and more fully in protecton not garnered from the current system, as well the associated chapters, our studies indicate that the NAS as much needed fortfcaton against increasingly common would: (a) improve natonal security by strengthening cy- natural disasters. bersecurity, structural integrity, and EMP deterrents; (b) be feasible at modest cost and would contribute to mitgaton The NAS concept is based on research summarized in the of climate change by allowing a much higher penetraton by MacDonald et al. publicaton released in 2016 in Nature renewables than is projected to be possible with the pres- Climate Change. Through extensive temporal and spatal ent grid system; and (c) be a cost-efectve additon to the modelling of the variable weather paterns present in the electric grid, even in the absence of a price placed on car- contnental United States, the MacDonald et al. publicaton bon and assuming there is not a sustained drop in average surmised that solar and wind power penetraton into the natural gas prices persistng over the next three decades. electric grid could be achieved through the constructon of The technical sectons of this policy brief document the an integrated natonal electricity market, without raising environmental and electrical engineering challenges asso- electricity costs or sacrifcing the reliability of power deliv- ciated with the implementaton of an underground HVDC ery to consumers. MacDonald et al. idealized that a single overlay system and our main conclusions, as summarized in natonal market (built from low-loss, high-capacity direct the following paragraphs current cabling) would allow the instantaneous transmission of excess power (ofen generated in areas with litle The installaton of the North American Supergrid comes immediate demand) to large load areas where it can be with inherent feasibility challenges, and its operaton utlized, beter integratng both large scale utlites as well might result in environmental consequences that range as distributed systems in a non-preferental market based from minimally adverse to highly benefcial. solely on cost. The optmizaton technique is unbiased towards any one energy source and is mainly dependent on • Approximately two-thirds of the HVDC cable links in forecasted technology costs. The authors estmated that the proposed system can feasibly be placed underground the evoluton in the electricity market that such a grid along existng rights of way, greatly reducing the tme and would prompt could result in nearly an 80% reducton in efort needed to move forward with permitng and con- power-sector carbon emissions, as low-cost wind and solar structon. Where a link cannot be aligned to be buried and generated power would displace more expensive fossil fuel blastng through bedrock is required, constructon of tra- based electricity generaton in a compettve market. ditonal aboveground transmission lines may be required. Ofshore submarine lines may be utlized to circumvent the usage of this alternatve confguraton soluton if the surrounding environment allows. • By enabling a diversifcaton of energy sources, the Su-

5 pergrid will reduce the power sector consumpton of wa- • Exclusive of right of way costs and complicatons, our ter by ~400 billion gallons per year and reduce the power estmated cost for aboveground installaton is ~$580 ($/ sector withdrawal of water for power generaton by ~1.4 MW-mile), which is about 20% less than the ~$723 ($/ trillion gallons per year, resultng in a 65% reducton over- MW-mile) estmated by MacDonald et al. Our estmate all in total fresh-water usage across the power sector. is that underground installaton costs would be about • The increased use of renewable sources of energy as three tmes as much, but with lower cost and tme for opposed to traditonal fossil fuels would reduce projected right of way acquisiton. Whether above or below ground, 2040 power-sector emissions of SO2 (sulfur dioxide) and we estmate substaton costs at ~$250K ($/MW), while partculate mater by a factor of ~7, (measured in weight MacDonald et al. estmated ~$188K ($/MW). Staton of metric tons) compared to ‘business as usual’ emissions costs would remain about the same for aboveground and levels based on current expected 2040 generaton contri- underground scenarios. The total estmated cost for con- butons to energy producton. structng the proposed NAS is under $500 billion. • The magnetc felds emited by properly functoning • The economic feasibility of the NAS is partally contn- HVDC cables present a minimal, but not negligible, lev- gent on the future price of natural gas as well as the ad- el of risk to surrounding animal species which utlize the ditonal incremental cost of constructng HVDC lines in an natural magnetc feld of the Earth for orientaton. underground confguraton.

The installaton and operaton of the Supergrid would result Regulatory reform for the Supergrid can be accomplished by in signifcant improvements in security and reliability. a Regional Transmission Organizaton (RTO)/Independent System Operator (ISO)-centered framework for efectve • Undergrounding the NAS would greatly reduce the vul- operaton of the Supergrid and measures streamlining the nerability of the present grid to physical assaults and in- routng and permitng processes. trusions. • Undergrounding would reduce the vulnerability to • A natonally integrated approach that grants sitng au- naturally occurring GMD and manmade EMP, including thority to RTOs and ISOs would be the most preferable partcularly to an EMP atack originatng from the Demo- regulatory reform for the Supergrid, given the cost and cratc People’s Republic of Korea (a threat currently being complexity of going through state and local sitng author- considered by the U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. De- ites. partment of Homeland Security, and Congress). • Using existng federal and cooperatng states’ rights of • Undergrounding would reduce vulnerability to natural way for routng cables would greatly expedite build-tme, disasters, including fres, high winds, foods, and other requiring cooperaton from key bureaus such as the Bu- extreme storms. reau of Land Management and the Federal Highway Ad- ministraton (FHWA). Notably, the FHWA is authorized The installaton and operaton of the Supergrid appear to to grant ROWs for what it considers to be for the public be fnancially viable via funding mechanisms that range good. from private to public. • Streamlining the permitng process involves mitgatng barriers to using land for renewable energy transmission. • Possible avenues for funding the Supergrid include: This can be done using three strategies: (1) encouraging private, user-based fees that require no public funding; states to consider regional and in-state benefts; (2) ex- public-private partnerships (in some states); the Depart- panding the legal defniton of “public use” to include ment of Energy Loan Guarantee Program (if certain re- merchant transmission lines; and (3) incorporatng the quirements are met); and U.S. Department of Defense al- western and southeastern regions of the country into locaton for additonal hardening of grid security aspects. RTOs or ISOs. • Direct and indirect estmates of job creaton over the • Routng cables through tribal lands involves further le- 30-year tme frame due to constructon and operaton, gal complicatons where the federal government does not including increased employment for generaton of ener- have eminent domain authority. gy from renewables, range from ~650,000 to ~950,000 (partcularly in constructon, operaton, and maintenance jobs associated with transmission and equivalent new renewable generaton).

6 Introducton

The United States has vast resources of renewable energy: The existng electric power system is comprised of two basic wind energy on the Great Plains and in the Midwest, solar network components – transmission for higher voltage, and energy in the Southwest, geothermal energy in the Rocky distributon for lower-voltage power delivery. The Naton- Mountains and Great Basin, and hydropower in the North- al Electricity with Weather System (NEWS) results indicate west and Southeast. Unfortunately, the variability and dis- that the creaton of a third layer HVDC backbone network, persed nature of renewable energy resources has made it or Supergrid, built from low-loss, high-capacity direct cur- difcult to optmally utlize them, given that the existng rent cabling is feasible. This Supergrid would efectvely cre- electrical grid was not originally set up to transmit electric- ate a natonal market in which all types of generators, from ity over long distances from renewable energy supply cen- opposite corners of the country, could fairly compete. Thus, ters to major load centers. As a result, renewable energy re- increased transmission capacity would turn the enormous sources remain signifcantly underutlized in the U.S., even size of the country into an advantage by enabling efcient as the cost of electricity generated from wind and solar producton and delivery of a large amount of electric pow- sources has declined sharply in recent years. However, re- er across the country rather than relying on the existng cent research indicates that both geographic dispersity and patchwork of generatng centers with local or regional scale intermitency can become optmized with a comprehensive transmission capabilites. The more optmistc cost fore- transmission infrastructure plan that connects the supply of casts for the year 2030 resulted in an optmal system which renewable energy to load centers. utlized a large proporton of wind and solar, and decreased U.S. power sector carbon emissions by 80% compared to The North American Supergrid (NAS or Supergrid) is a pro- 1990 levels. posed 52-nodenodal, high voltage direct current (HVDC), largely underground transmission network that would ex- The NAS would also help secure the U.S. electrical grid tend across the lower 48 states, thus creatng a natonal against both natural and human-caused threats. Modern electricity market. The Supergrid would create a resilient conveniences and life sustaining infrastructure depend backbone to the existng system, making clean renewable more than ever on the reliability and availability of electric- energy compettve with fossil fuel-generated energy in ity. If power were to be disrupted for an extended period of open markets, creatng hundreds of thousands of jobs for tme, modern civilizaton simply could not functon. Yet, our several decades, increasing U.S. domestc energy genera- electrical transmission infrastructure is troublingly unpre- ton, and securing the naton’s electrical transmission infra- pared for modern threats and natural hazards. If a terror- structure against modern threats. ist organizaton or rogue state, for example, obtained and detonated a nuclear weapon high above the United States, The NAS concept is based on research summarized in the it would send a powerful electromagnetc pulse (EMP) that MacDonald et al. publicaton released last year in Nature would overload transmission infrastructure, taking the grid Climate Change. Through extensive temporal and spatal down for years. A similar efect would occur in the event modelling of the variable weather paterns present in the of a solar storm like the famous Carrington event of 1859, contnental United States, the MacDonald et al. publicaton a completely unavoidable and unpredictable event. A lone surmised that solar and wind power penetraton into the wolf atack or extreme weather event could also carry out electric grid could be achieved through the constructon of structural damages, which can leave municipalites or entre an integrated natonal electricity market, without raising regions without power for days or weeks. The NAS would electricity costs or sacrifcing the reliability of power deliv- make signifcant strides in safeguarding our naton’s trans- ery to consumers. MacDonald et al. idealized that a single mission system through its confguraton and hardware. natonal market (built from low-loss, high-capacity direct current cabling) would allow the instantaneous transmis- The proposed HVDC cables contain a metallic sheath sur- sion of excess power (ofen generated in centers with litle rounding the conductor (which would be grounded with an immediate demand) to large load centers where it can be Earth-return) and would be placed in an underground con- utlized, beter integratng both large scale utlites as well fguraton whenever possible. Additonally, above ground as distributed systems in a non-preferental market based elements will be encased in shielded structures. These ele- solely on cost. The optmizaton technique is unbiased to- ments will work together to not only prevent against mali- wards any one energy source, and mainly dependent on cious tampering, but also provide a crucial defense against forecasted technology costs. EMP atacks and unpredictable solar storms. The network

7 confguraton of the system will provide resilient pathways Expanding energy transmission infrastructure is the most to maintain the delivery of electricity, even in the case of a practcal way to improve grid resiliency to modern threats line fault. Even if one line were to go down, the Supergrid and to reduce power sector greenhouse gas emissions. The could reroute power through an alternatve pathway and need to protect transmission infrastructure against EMP stll deliver electricity to where it needs to go. and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are both key natonal interests. The NAS would build electricity transmis- Even though the costs of building the needed transmission in a way that addresses both of these issues without sion capacity would be roughly under $500 billion, analysts overwhelming the natonal budget. It is a market soluton have concluded that this proposal can be overwhelmingly to power sector carbon emissions that enhances natonal privately fnanced and paid for through consumer bills and security, provides jobs, and enhances domestc energy use. that consumer electricity prices would be about the same Inital contacts conducted by our team to various Congres- as the natonal average. While the costs of electricity infra- sional ofces and think tanks suggests that the NAS has high structure would increase and be passed to the consumer, potental for bipartsan backing. the costs of electricity generaton would decrease enough to make up for the costs of additonal infrastructure. Our studies, as detailed in the upcoming chapters, indicate that the installaton and operaton of an undergrounded Over an estmated tmeframe of 30 years, roughly 650,000 HVDC linked into the existng grid would: (a) be feasible at to 950,000 jobs would be required to build the necessary modest cost and would contribute to mitgaton of climate infrastructure. These jobs would be impossible to outsource change by allowing a much higher penetraton by renew- to other countries and would likely be located in rural areas ables than is projected to be possible with the present grid since renewable energy capacity is mostly in sparsely pop- system; (b) improve natonal security by strengthening cy- ulated areas that are typically disadvantaged economically. bersecurity, structural integrity, and EMP deterrents; and (c) be a cost-efectve additon to the electric grid, even in the Since the MacDonald et al. study, both wind and solar costs absence of a price placed on carbon and assuming there is have decreased signifcantly faster than expected and, in not a sustained drop in average natural gas prices persistng high quality, locatons are already lower than the other over the next three decades. The technical sectons of this available optons including nuclear, coal, or natural gas. This document describe the environmental and electrical engi- means that the MacDonald et al. study is even more cost neering challenges associated with the implementaton of advantageous than originally indicated. an underground HVDC overlay system.

8 Technical feasibility and environmental 1 challenges Lead author: Rachel Levine Co-authors: José Alfredo Durand Cárdenas, Xie He Dwight Macomber, Eliana Lins Morandi

Summary

This chapter details the scientfc and engineering chal- Additonally, we analyzed two hypothetcal case studies to lenges associated with implementng the North American demonstrate potentally important sitng variables in both Supergrid concept. onshore and ofshore cable placement. For onshore cables, we conducted a feasibility analysis for a preliminary route Many site atributes dictate terrestrial underground HVDC for a ‘Western Pilot Project’ by analyzing several variables cable placement, as some setngs are not conducive to relatng to soil compositon and natural formatons. For proper cable functoning. We mainly examined the topo- ofshore cables, we mapped environmental and technical graphical, geological, physical, and chemical components of realites that may impact sitng on the Atlantc Cost, allow- the landscape, especially soils, in order to gain insight into ing a determinaton to be made regarding the placement the most advantageous places cables may be placed un- of onshore-ofshore substatons linking a potental ofshore derground. We also kept ease of permitng in mind, as we wing of the NAS to the onshore nodal network. Several en- visualized areas held sovereignly or have protected status. vironmental characteristcs overlapped in their importance Our study reached several conclusions regarding the rela- to both onshore and ofshore cable confguratons in this tve positve and negatve impacts of the NAS’s constructon combined feasibility efort: and operaton: • Depth to bedrock • By diversifying energy sources, the NAS has the po- • The presence of protected species/land areas that tental to save over 400 billion gallons of water per year house protected species based on current electricity demand, and may reduce the • The presence of existng oil and gas infrastructure emission of several criteria pollutants. • Should the NAS share right-of-way (ROW)space with Overall, this feasibility analysis concluded that the positve fber optc cables, it is imperatve that HVDC cables be environmental impacts of the NAS system will enable far placed parallel to fber optc cables. In the instance of a outweighs any minimally negatve externalites. single existng fber optc cable, HVDC cables should be located below and parallel to the fber optc line. • The magnetc feld output from properly functoning cables could afect the migratory capabilites of land animals, as well as the directonal orientaton of compasses, to a limited extent. We do not antcipate any negatve impacts on human health. • The regulaton of both heat dissipaton characteristcs and the relatve electrical resistvity of the ambient environment are crucial to efcient HVDC cable functoning.

9 Chapter 1 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges

1.1 Introduction confguraton, the soil conditons of the host environment will be pertnent to proper system functoning. While sur- Variatons in the natural landscape have a clear efect on veying must be completed to confrm proper cable place- the hypothetcal constructon of the natonal grid. Soil prop- ment, informaton about a soil’s categorizaton (coupled ertes are perhaps the greatest limitaton that grid designers with knowledge of the feld of soil mechanics) can provide and constructon teams face. Should designers use natve a strong indicaton of which soils should be considered suit- soils to surround cable and backfll trenches, the soil must able for underground cable placement. Soils deemed un- maintain critcal moisture values to ensure proper heat dis- suitable require “amendment” before use; that is, natve sipaton. Similarly, natural hydraulic systems (namely water soils must be removed and replaced with manmade fll. migraton paterns) must be maintained despite soil chang- The physical and chemical propertes of soil will also infu- es. Variatons in the depth to bedrock can also afect costs ence its interacton with foreign materials. For the purposes and constructon tme. Taking these and other similar con- of this analysis, a “physical” property will be defned as a sideratons into account, this secton outlines crucial feasi- trait that does not require manipulaton of the soil’s natu- bility consideratons regarding the NAS’s environmental im- ral state of mater to be expressed or measured;1 physical pacts and technical challenges. propertes include electromagnetc propertes, texture, water content, and electrical and thermal resistvity (among The proposed underground HVDC grid would be best im- others).2 Additonally, “chemical” propertes are those that plemented by building a nodal bidirectonal system. This may be evident only afer or during a chemical reacton of confguraton enables maximum resilience and fexibility in some kind (common examples include oxidized trace metal the bi-directonal transportaton of electricity with minimal content, salinity, pH, and natural organic mater (NOM) con- environmental and mechanical interferences. Because the tent.3 The inherent soil propertes displayed in various soil electric and magnetc felds from transmission cables are samples may give strong indicatons as to the functoning of statc, any negatve efects on human or animal health orig- underground cables. inatng from either feld type can be considered minimal. It is possible that the NAS would have minor impacts on the 1.2.1 Siting Based on Soil Orders migratory capabilites of fightless land mammals and/or in- sects in the immediate vicinity of a cable right-of-way stretch To identfy and classify the bulk-physical and chemical prop- due to weak magnetc felds originatng from the transmis- ertes present in soils in the contguous United States, soils sion line. Magnetc directonal compasses may also become are sorted into several hierarchical categories based on their slightly disoriented from this efect. While the underground propertes; there are soil Orders, Suborders, Great Groups, system confguraton does not directly reduce the impact of Subgroups, Families, and Series.4 As the levels progress, such felds, cables themselves would be less susceptble to categorizaton becomes more detailed and specifc, with an electromagnetc pulse (EMP) atack or extreme weath- “orders” serving as the most general classifcaton. Global- er event (a valuable safeguard not aforded by unshielded ly, there are twelve soil orders: Alfsols, Andisols, Aridisols, above-ground lines). We conclude that, while surveyors Entsols, Gelisols, Histosols, Inceptsols, Mollisols, Oxisols, must use cauton to minimize environmental impacts, the Spodosols, Ultsols, and Vertsols.5 Each order possesses negatve impacts associated with the implementaton of an general propertes that have the potental to interact neg- underground HVDC grid are insignifcant compared to the atvely or positvely with multple electrical components of benefts that it would achieve regarding natonal security the underground network. Therefore, each must be care- and carbon reducton. fully analyzed and assessed for risk potental. Keeping in mind the extent to which the physical and chemical proper- We begin with examining how soil propertes impact cable tes described above will infuence system functoning, the placement, which would ultmately ensure proper functon- twelve United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) soil ing of underground cables in the host environment. Further, orders were determined to be either suitable (potentally the environmental risks and benefts of implementng a na- without amendment) or unsuitable without amendment. tonwide HVDC system were examined, with conclusions Classifcatons should be taken as tentatve untl surveying is drawn regarding the relatve impact the system would have completed, as soils within a right-of-way may be disturbed on the surrounding environment and living beings. Lastly, or mixed, altering their propertes from the ideal case. we examined two case studies to determine the viability of the NAS in varying environments, with promising results. 1.2.1.a Alfisol (Suitable)

1.2 Siting in the Context of Soil Properties Alfsols are a clay based soil usually derived from vegetaton found in forests and/or savannahs in temperate envi- Since the NAS will be constructed in a [mostly] underground ronments. They contain a modest level of organics which

10 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges Chapter 1 gives them enough agricultural potental that they could 1.2.1.e Gelisol (Unsuitable) support a shorter growing season. Moisture content fuctu- ates strongly based on the season, allowing for the poten- Gelisols contain glaciated deposits which are characterized tal moisture levels to be high. Additonally, sublayers of this by thick impenetrable permafrost layers (such as those soil have the potental to contain oxidized iron or aluminum found in tundra environments). They are well-known stores (that can atach to the clay itself), or other minerals such as of organics, yet are only formed in very cold environments quartz. This sublayer’s depth will dictate any resistve po- and therefore, do not support the growth of most plants. tental, as clay base itself has low resistvity; the more clay This frost layer introduces resistvity concerns. Additonal- that is present, the lower the resistvity will be.6 ly, the permafrost layer will most certainly hamper or halt trenching eforts and therefore should not be considered 1.2.1.b Andisol (Unsuitable) usable ground without extreme amendment.10

Andisol is a very specifc soil order denoted by a primary 1.2.1.f Histosol (Unsuitable) compositon that is made up of volcanic ash. It has the potental to have an extremely high mineral content, yet these Histosols are primarily composed of organics and are com- minerals are usually non-crystalline (which is glass based monly found in peat rich bogs or swamp environments. The and not metallic in nature). Andisol can retain massive organics in the soil have a strong potental to oxidize other amounts of moisture because it is not very densely packed; soil consttuents, allowing for decompositon to occur rap- its organic concentraton varies based on locaton. Alloys idly due to the anaerobic conditons present when soil is (i.e. amorphous metals) can also be present in high quant- completely immersed in liquid. Logistcal constructon prob- tes and act as excellent conductors (potentally interactng lems could arise due to the potental for the soil’s texture unpredictably with an HVDC system).7 to be inconsistent. Having a high concentraton of organics, that act as heat insulaton material, these soils should not 1.2.1.c Aridisol (Suitable) be considered suitable for cable undergrounding without amendment.11 Aridisols are ofen found in dry desert regions, and can best be described as sand-based with poor moisture content and 1.2.1.g Inceptisol (Suitable) litle to no organics. Sublayers usually contain silica, salt, gypsum, or calcium carbonates (all of which are generally Inceptsols form in a multtude of environments (like Entsol poor conductors when compared to metals). Potentally soils). Ultmately, Inceptsols typically contain a larger than high temperatures, coupled with the potental for very lit- usual quantty of organics and moderate moisture retenton tle moisture recharge, are concerns when the prospect of a ability. Minimal accumulaton of oxidized metals, clay, and thermal runaway is considered. Built-in protectons against organics can occur, but rarely in the amounts that would this phenomenon around the HVDC cable itself must be exceed present detecton limits. This order is usually pres- evaluated further to utlize this soil order without amend- ent within mountainous areas, but contains low erosion po- ment.8 tental. Ultmate usage is dependent on the depth bedrock level in these mountainous areas.12 1.2.1.d Entisol (Suitable) 1.2.1.h Mollisol (Suitable) Entsols are relatvely under-developed soils that lack fully formed horizontal layers. Formatons of this order are usu- Mollisols are characterized by a layer of grassy vegetaton ally due to some form of disturbance, such as erosion, and followed by a layer of dark organically rich humus soil. are further formed by either a very dry or very wet environ- They ofen have high moisture levels, leading to saturaton ment. This soil type is predominantly clay and sand, yet has during some seasons. However, the lack of toxic or trouble- no clear or predictable compositon. Furthermore, a variety some compounds mitgates this concern. Mollisols must be of materials can contribute to formaton including dense surveyed before use without amendment to determine the rock, highly compacted soils, or even toxic waste. Moisture depth of the organically rich layer directly below the top- content can also vary widely, compounding resistvity issues soil.13 already present due to the formaton material. Locatons must be surveyed carefully before non-amendment use if 1.2.1.i Oxisol (Unsuitable) they contain Entsol soil.9 Oxisols are characterized by their low nutrient/organic levels, low concentraton of electrolytes, and high concentratons of oxidized metals. This is due to the fact that oxisols

11 Chapter 1 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges are usually located in humid environments with a very acid- certain line stretches (as long as no large boulders or stones ic pH levels, which leads to favorable oxidaton conditons. are present). The possibility of utlizing natve soils as fll They usually contain moisture but do not readily retain it. materials must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis once The extreme acidity of these environments could prove to cable routes are established, usually by means of surveying be unfavorable for the outer sheath of the HVDC cable.14 and moisture testng. The propertes of natve soils in such areas (described by soil orders) could possibly be used as 1.2.1.j Spodosol (Unsuitable) a guide to pinpoint optmal sampling locatons during the inital constructon phase of the NAS. Spodosol soils contain three distnct layers; a rich organic surface topsoil, an ash-based sublayer, and a reddish hori- If natve soils are unsuitable, amendment by way of “back- zon layer (due to high iron content). Generally, subsoils in flling” may be employed as a cost efectve and simple con- this order have both a low organic content and a low clay structon technique, during which existng soils are replaced content. Organics in the top layer have a strong potental with artfcial flls before in-ground cables are placed. The to oxidize metals within the soil, which can fow down into area immediately surrounding the cable and its electrode the sublayers since the base soil usually has a sandy texture may require an engineered soil fll to both regulate and with favorable permeability characteristcs. Moisture con- stabilize the thermal propertes (even when the material tent can vary, but tends to be high when rainfall exceeds itself is dry),18 a crucial component to the proper functon evapotranspiraton removal rates. The relatvely uninhibit- of HVDC cables. Engineered soil parent material can vary ed transference of problematc materials throughout the based on the geographical source of the materials relatve layers could pose issues for grounding equipment present to the constructon site. However, modern engineered flls, along the length of the HVDC cable. Therefore, Spodosols such as Fluidized Thermal Backfll, typically include sand, ce- should be amended before hostng cables.15 ment, and aggregated minerals.19 When compared to natve soils, engineered soils not only consistently achieve prop- 1.2.1.k Ultisol (Suitable) er moisture levels, but also allow for proper compacton (without the possibility of soil contaminaton during the Ultsols are mineral rich clay based soils (which sometmes process).20 Trenches housing cables are ofen reflled with a contain oxidized iron, namely due to the low pH conditons) maximum of 50% existng soil as an economical technique and quartz. The moisture content of Ultsols varies wide- to prevent lastng ecological disturbance.21 ly depending on where they are formed. Nevertheless, soil fertlity is low due to a lack of organics and electrolytes, It is also vital to note that not all existng engineered soils which leads to a texture that promotes mineral leaching can be utlized in an HVDC system. For instance, typical throughout the soil horizons. Surface soils tend to be more highway constructon methods require the presence of sev- hospitable, yet can stll contain these troublesome miner- eral engineered layers that are not conducive to grid con- als. Due to the shallow depth of cable trenches, it is reason- structon. These are the two layers that are usually present able to assume that the cables will most likely be laid in this underneath a paved road, the “base course” and the “sub- more hospitable area.16 base.”22 While the thickness of these layers is dependent on the quality of the natve soil, both of these layers typically 1.2.1.l Vertisol (Unsuitable) contain aggregates of high resistvity, such as granite, and are heavily compacted to form a single layer.23,24 However, Vertsols are clay based soils, rich in calcium, magnesium, the use of highway right-of-way could stll take place next and lime, that respond dramatcally to changes in water to a paved surface in natve soil, or along the highway me- content by shrinking and swelling. Such actvity can cause dian.25 This presents a considerable advantage, considering deep cracks within the soil layers during tmes of low mois- all locatons containing major highways are typically tested ture. In high moisture periods, water tends to setle in the for soil quality before constructon, much like an HVDC grid. topsoil of this order, and can even collect standing water. In contrast to the highway support materials, a railroad sub- This unpredictability will not only be troublesome during grade is not as densely packed at the surface. This is due to the constructon period, but also could cause issues with the “ballasts” that are made up of loose stones, which are the thermal regulaton of cables (partcularly regarding compacted (and not cemented in place) to form a single lay- heat dissipaton), and should be avoided without extreme er on rail tracks.26 If necessary, it could be easier to possibly amendment.17 insert HVDC lines directly underneath railway lines in the natural soils below, (depending on their overall depth). This Should soils contain favorable propertes as described alternatve must be explored further by installaton contrac- above, it would be possible to bury cables in natve soils tors throughout the inital surveying process. directly, thus eliminatng the use of cable sand entrely in

12 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges Chapter 1

1.2.2 Siting Based on Soil Resistivity Trends ertes. This informaton is necessary to determine how soil moisture relates to its relatve thermal resistvity value, a re- Soil science is infuenced by two distnct types of resistvity: latonship depicted in a “soil thermal dry-out” curve. If the thermal resistvity and electrical resistvity. Thermal resis- critcal moisture value is not met or exceeded, the lack of tance is the ability of a material to resist heat dissipaton moisture will be further exacerbated by way of cable heat, (or, the movement of heat away from a source),27 where- driving away what litle moisture that is present.30 A lack of as electrical resistance is a measure of a sample’s poten- heat transfer between the HVDC cable and its surroundings tal electrical conductvity.28 Furthermore, there is no direct can cause a dramatc increase in the temperature of the ca- mathematcal method to compare one value to another in ble itself, ultmately causing thermal runaway. The soil ther- the realm of soil science (this can be done only if one is in- mal dry-out curve can also yield clues as to the behavior terested in comparing electrical and thermal resistance in of a system during tmes of surplus moisture. The asymp- metals).29 Electrical resistvity is expressed in terms of Ωm totc behavior of the curve signifes that the critcal mois- (Ohm- meter) whereas thermal resistvity is expressed as ture point has been reached and exceeded. Thereafer, the Km/W (Kelvin-meter/Wat, where “Kelvin” is a unit of tem- thermal resistvity will most likely not reach zero, but simply perature). Therefore, electrical and thermal resistvity will trail along the asymptote as moisture contnues to increase. need to be analyzed separately for the same area of soil us- This implies that excessive moisture does not cause any ad- ing diferent techniques. Despite this fact, there is a direct ditonal signifcant reducton in thermal resistvity afer the and simple relatonship between resistvity and conductv- critcal moisture point is reached. When this informaton is ity that can be applied to both electrical and thermal cal- coupled with the possible negatve consequences of excess culatons. Conductvity can be expressed as the inverse of moisture outlined below, it is reasonable to conclude that resistvity, and vice versa. This implies that one value can excess moisture situatons must be avoided, as they add be transformed into the reciprocal to get its corresponding no positve atributes to the system. Field testng should be resistvity or conductvity quantty. While an exclusive study completed to gather data for an accurate dry-out curve rep- of soil propertes (without feld surveying thereafer) is, at resentaton prior to grid installaton. best, a tentatve approximaton for resistvity, such an analysis is nevertheless a promising guide as formal surveying As moisture content increases, a soil sample’s thermal con- begins. ductvity value tends to increase because air has a signifcantly lower thermal conductvity ratng when compared to Both resistance phenomena will separately afect a HVDC water. Water aids in increasing contact between the indi- grid, with an increase in either thermal or electrical resis- vidual soil partcles, allowing for heat to easily fow away tvity resultng in similar negatve results for both the ca- from the source.31 Electrical resistvity of the soil tends to ble’s current ratng (i.e. the ability of the electricity to fow decrease with higher moisture values as chemical constt- through the cable while staying within optmal temperature uents, such as electrolytes, become actvated around con- limits, based on manufacturer specifcatons) and its subse- ductors. For the purposes of HVDC applicaton, the mois- quent watage. If thermal resistvity is high, heat becomes ture content of the cable’s direct surroundings should be a trapped close to the cable’s surface. As the cable’s tempera- minimum of 10%, as resistvity increases signifcantly when ture increases, its electrical resistance also increases, result- moisture content falls below this level.32 Similarly, it is gen- ing in higher power losses (denoted by the formula: I2R); erally accepted that electrical resistvity is high when the these losses then further increase the temperature, causing moisture content of soil falls below 10%.33 Indeed, feld-de- a cyclic trend referred to as “thermal runaway.” If the ther- rived sensitvity tests focusing on the relatonship between mal resistance value is unfavorable, the current may stll soil salinity and moisture, conducted by AEMC Instruments, fow, but the actual current ratng may decrease to prevent were not even conducted at conditons below 15% mois- cable overheatng. In more extreme cases of a very high ture.34 While moisture is clearly a critcal component of thermal resistance value, the same trend will initally occur, suitable soils, it must be noted that excessive moisture can but eventually the process of heat producton, entrapment, also cause two kinds of problems. First, moisture can cause and increasing power losses will cause the entre system to corrosion over tme due to its potental to interact with overheat and collapse. other soil consttuents around the cable, stmulatng chemical reactons. Second, waterlogged soils are more likely to Thermal and electrical resistvity are strongly infuenced by cause the formaton of a frost layer, which can dramatcally three indicators: salt content, moisture levels, and tempera- increase both types of resistance, even if the host soil order ture. These indicators are ofen dictated by soil compositon is favorable during warmer seasons.36 and the concentraton of chemical consttuents, if present. Thermal probing of feld sites is ofen required to properly Typically, soils that are low in moisture and electrolyte (free determine if the host soil contains favorable moisture prop- ion) concentratons introduce the most electrical resistance;

13 Chapter 1 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges solid stone and volcanically derived soils are prime exam- creases in electrical resistvity associated with temperature ples of this phenomenon.37 The depth to bedrock (discussed drops, they tend to lessen the severity of these fuctuatons. subsequently in the secton enttled “Sitng in the Context Ultmately, soil temperatures appear to be the overarching of Geology, Topography, and Contaminaton”) and presence conditon which determines soil ftness in both quanttatve of solid rock fragments present within the immediate area and qualitatve approaches. Not only does temperature must be accounted for during surveying to accommodate infuence moisture levels, and vice versa, but it can also this trend. Generally, electrical resistvity decreases as salt heighten, or lessen, the impact of soil thermal resistvity content in soil increases.38 This is because sodium chlo- on current ratngs. Most common soil types tend to require ride (along with many other salts) is a strong electrolyte,39 15% - 30% moisture content in temperate environments to meaning that it will completely ionize in water by breaking maximize cable functoning, according to our own calcula- into the charged elemental components of its molecular tons. structure. These ions then become mobile in soluton and improve conductvity by shutling electrons.40 It should be 1.2.3 Siting in the Context of Geology, noted that ionizaton does not imply dissoluton. Every par- Topography, and Contamination tcle does not have to break into its positve and negatve elemental components for improved conductvity to occur. The natural surface characteristcs of the earth can great- Being a “strong electrolyte” simply implies that when the ly infuence constructon of the NAS. Geological bedrock molecular compound does break down, it completely ion- formatons, as well as surface characteristcs, which can be izes.41 Ionizaton must frst occur for salts to lower levels of both natural and anthropogenic, have the greatest poten- electrical resistance. Therefore, the moisture content is an tal to slow down or halt constructon. To construct the NAS intertwined soil component that is ofen measured concur- efciently, as much preliminary sitng as possible should be rently with salinity. completed to prove project feasibility in conditons where land restrictons and non-project related manmade infra- When wet, naturally occurring sand deposits possess high structure are present. This secton surveys how landscapes, relatve thermal conductvity compared to conventonally geology, and manmade environmental interferences impact favorable soils, such as clay.42 Soils rich in clay and sand tend soil sitng. to possess higher thermal conductvity values compared to soils rich in NOM, which tends to insulate cables and pre- HVDC cables should be laid at a minimum depth of 1.2 me- vent heat transfer to the ambient environment.43 Salt con- ters below the topsoil whenever possible. This 1.2 meter tent is usually measured as its percent weight in moisture, depth is both deep enough to maximize protecton against as the ability of a soil to retain moisture will ofen drive its accidental tampering, while allowing for ease of access concentraton of electrolytes. Well-graded soils, with mult- during cable maintenance. When deciding where to lay ca- ple granular sizes, or porous sandy soils that are notorious ble, it is especially important to note the presence of shal- for low moisture values should similarly be expected to have low bedrock layers, as the process of cutng through such low naturally occurring electrolyte values, even if salts are a layer is tme consuming, costly, and potentally environ- present. Even if soils do not have naturally occurring salts, mentally hazardous. Bedrock is ofen removed by blastng, electrical resistvity may stll be low if enough moisture is which “fractures” the formaton, and can potentally cause present. As shown in an analysis of electrical resistvity in temporary groundwater contaminaton.46 We used high-res- terms of moisture content, AEMC Instruments found that oluton natonwide data banks to visualize areas which re- moisture contents below 20% were much more susceptble quire further investgaton due to the complexity of bedrock to disproportonally large increases in resistvity, compared formatons. Since the NAS will ideally be built upon existng to more saturated soils found at a constant above-freezing rights-of-way, such geologic features will be crucial to iden- temperature.44 tfy, and avoid if possible, near highways and rail lines.

Temperature, the fnal indicator of thermal and electrical Foreign objects, either natural or artfcial, can complicate resistvity, is infuenced by both moisture levels and salini- underground cable placement. To ensure cables consistent- ty. Generally, soils with very low temperatures tend to have ly functon properly, they must not encounter any foreign high electrical resistvity values, especially at temperatures objects in soil, and several measures must be taken to pre- which allow the moisture present within soils to freeze. vent such interacton. First, the removal of trees directly on Similarly, soils with higher levels of moisture tend to low- top of and immediately near a given right-of-way stretch is er, or maintain lower, temperatures over tme.45 An import- essental. This ensures that roots do not become entangled ant deterrent to the obstacle of soil moisture freezing is in cable trenches or around cables. We do not antcipate the presence of salts (which may possess varied elemental that tree removal will be a large factor during cable installa- make-ups in nature). While salts do not totally prevent in- ton, as this process has likely already been completed along

14 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges Chapter 1 highway medians or in highly developed areas. In virgin (or, Lastly, hazardous environmental disturbances must be ac- previously undeveloped) lands, tree removal must be con- counted for and avoided during cable placement to ensure ducted with cauton to ensure that the local biosphere traits proper cable functoning and, more importantly, to pro- are maintained. Ultmately, the usage of virgin lands should tect the outer protectve casing of the cables themselves. be avoided when possible. If lef in place, nearby trees or We have mapped out land areas of known contaminaton, larger plant developments must be monitored to ensure namely Superfund and Brownfeld locatons, that should that no roots encroach on the HVDC trench over tme. Man- be avoided as route sitng contnues. Similarly, we eliminat- made infrastructure in the form of oil/gas transportaton ed conditons which could cause the corrosion of concrete pipelines must also be circumvented. Should a HVDC line conduits surrounding the cables. Such corrosive conditons failure occur, free electricity will ofen jump to and charge can stem from either anthropogenic interference or natural metallic objects nearby, including oil and gas infrastructure; causes. Concrete corrosion potental was rated to indicate this in turn may create dangerous conditons that could “low”, “medium”, or “high” risk by considering variables damage both the conductor itself and any other manmade such as soil acidity. infrastructure nearby. To avoid this, we mapped oil and gas infrastructure in the contnental United States and com- 1.3 Environmental Risks and Benefits pared these routes to proposed cable routes. HVDC cables may also compete for underground space with fber optc The North American Supergrid will enable the avoidance cables, which are ofen used in the telecommunicatons in- of the majority of power sector carbon dioxide emissions dustry. (We discuss the possibility of co-placement and/or if implemented as outlined by the foundatonal MacDonald usage of fber optc cables in the NAS system below in the et al. publicaton (described previously). However, the scale subsecton enttled “Potental System Interferences”). of the NAS means that numerous geographical regions will be impacted by its constructon. So far, few immediate en- In additon to the presence of possible physical obstructons vironmental or health risks stemming from NAS implemen- to HVDC cable placement, some land areas may be restrict- taton have been identfed, given that proper installaton ed due to government regulatons or miscellaneous soil-re- procedures are used and extensive environmental impact lated environmental hazards. Throughout the contguous assessments are completed. This secton presents what we United States, the designaton of a certain land area as a know about these risks at present. It should be noted that “protected area” restricts development in Natonal Parks, this technical analysis is the most representatve of any pos- biodiversity conservaton areas, and some federally owned sible efects of the development of virgin land. Presumably, lands (such as military bases). While dozens of “protected” burying cables along existng transportaton avenues would designatons were analyzed to ensure that the NAS avoids not drastcally change the ecologically disruptve tendencies passage through such areas, the most critcal restrictons of existng infrastructure. placed on sitng for the new grid were the avoidance of GAP (Natonal Gap Analysis Program) 1 and 2 status lands. GAP 1.3.1 Avoidance of Terrestrial Ecological Risks Status 1 is defned as “an area having permanent protecton from conversion of natural land cover and a mandated The magnetc feld output from cable operaton could af- management plan in operaton to maintain a natural state fect the migratory capabilites of land animals to a limited within which disturbance events (of natural type, frequen- extent. Animals in contact with ground surfaces and resid- cy, intensity, and legacy) [can] proceed without interference ing up to 1.5 meters above the surface will most likely be or are mimicked through management”.47 These are areas the most susceptble to feld output along the length of any with strict rules against constructon of any kind to protect overhead or underground direct current (DC) line (likewise biodiversity and/or endangered species. In GAP Status 4 ar- for compasses used at such locatons). The presence of high- eas there are “no known public/private insttutonal man- ways has most likely already caused some form of ecological dates/legally recognized easements.”48 Areas with GAP Sta- disturbance in the area, especially if the land surrounding tus 3 can be subject to extracton uses, such as mining and the roadway has already been developed.50 In the very rare logging. Data pertaining to the presence of Natve American case that virgin lands, or remote railway rights-of-way, must sovereign lands was also collected from public sources.49 be used to accommodate cables, the ecological impacts of While this analysis allowed for the potental placement of magnetc feld contact at the specifc setng should be eval- cables in sovereign areas, future collaboraton must occur if uated and resolved if possible. In any area of high animal the fnal cable route passes through these lands to ensure actvity, fencing or other physical deterrents may be used that the opinions of tribal leaders are considered, partcu- to further prevent ecological risks and structural damage. larly regarding sacred areas (which should not be infringed upon).

15 Chapter 1 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges

1.3.2 Avoidance of Marine Ecological Risks creases.58 This may minimize the risk posed to many endangered species and commonly consumed fsh, which usually The prospect of placing cables in marine environments pres- reside closer to the surface. In additon, any protected coral ents unique environmental challenges. Cables must be able reef formatons must be mapped beforehand and carefully to withstand extreme pressure and saline conditons, while avoided during the installaton process. Although marine the surrounding environment must be able to rebound and environments have been proven to successfully rebound thrive afer cable installaton is complete. In this secton, we afer disturbances by cables, the fragility of many reef eco- discuss two crucial consideratons linked with marine cable systems makes such resilience an unlikely trait.59 Analysis of placement, chlorine gas emission and magnetc feld inter- potental species interactons and any disturbances to fsh- ference. The secton enttled “Case Study 2 – Atlantc Coast ery actvites must be accounted for during the installaton Submarine Project”, paints a more detailed picture of che- and operaton submarine HVDC cables. mo-physical, biodiversity, and anthropogenic sitng consideratons along the Atlantc Coast of the United States. 1.3.3 Possible Public Health Concerns

Chlorine gas is produced in HVDC submarine cables at the To date, the majority of studies atemptng to quantfy the anode of a monopolar system, where the electrical current health impacts of HVDC lines have been conducted using interacts the surrounding water through the process of above-ground confguratons. Even so, we can learn quite electrolysis.51 During ocean electrolysis, salt dissolves into a bit about the potental of underground HVDC lines to positvely charged sodium ions and negatvely charged chlo- interact with humans, animals, and inanimate objects in ride ions. These ions then combine with the electrons orig- their immediate surroundings from these studies. Ultmate- inatng from the anode to form gaseous chlorine.52 While ly, the literature suggests that magnetc felds associated chlorine gas is highly toxic and corrosive, especially in aque- with HVDC outputs do not have the potental to impact cell ous environments,53 it can only be produced in a monopolar growth or reproducton capabilites.60 Impacts on the migra- HVDC confguraton. The literature has noted that the use of tory abilites of land-bound animals positoned very close bipolar systems, as is proposed for usage in the NAS system, to cable beds are the main health-based consequence of virtually eliminates the risk of chlorine gas producton in un- HVDC line operaton. derwater HVDC systems.54 Magnetc felds produced by HVDC line operaton may have There is concern about the potental disorientaton of the potental to afect biological migraton systems. As such, aquatc organisms that rely on Earth’s magnetc feld to mi- it is crucial to put into context the magnetc feld strength grate near HVDC cables. This issue of magnetc interference associated with overhead and, by extension, underground originatng from underwater cables has been studied exten- cables. Magnetc felds of 2000 microteslas (μT) are re- sively. Yet, the literature has not reached a consensus as to quired to impact the health of nearby animals or humans.61 the efects on migratng marine life, in part due to the mys- Comparatvely, the magnetc feld of Earth is less than 100μT tery surrounding the mechanism whereby various land and at the surface. To explore the possibility of exceeding this aquatc organisms orient themselves.55 During the installa- value, we calculated the magnitude of the B-feld resultng ton of the SwePol HVDC link, an underwater monopolar from the superpositon of the magnetc felds for the two HVDC link between Sweden and Poland, researchers con- conductors when they were carrying 3000 amps in oppos- cluded that the usage of a bipolar confguraton signifcant- ing directons to determine its relatve strength compared ly lowers magnetc feld interference when compared to to Earth’s magnetc feld. If fnal magnetc feld strength monopolar systems due to the partal cancelling of felds in was determined to be equal to or less than that of Earth, opposing directons.56 Furthermore, shallow buried cables negatve health impacts were assumed minimal or negli- ofen only emit a strong magnetc feld directly above the gible. The graphical representaton (Figure 1.1) illustrates cable locaton, with some systems indicatng a signifcant the increasing weakness of the feld as it moves outwards drop in magnetc feld distorton at a horizontal distance and away from the source (3GW bipolar HVDC cable pairing greater than 5 meters from the cable.57 with 3000 amps fowing in each directon on a single circuit), resultng in a magnetc feld of negligible strength at While these consideratons suggest that cables are gener- 10 meters away from the cables on either side. The dashed ally safe for the surrounding oceanic environment, it is stll line on Figure 1.1 represents the residual B-feld of Earth, prudent to take basic safeguards to further protect aquatc which was maintained at 40μT. It is clear that a HVDC line species. Cables should be buried in the deepest seabed pos- of signifcant capacity will produce a magnetc feld much sible, preferably in the oceans’ dysphotc zone (at least 200 stronger than that of the ambient surroundings directly meters below the water surface). In this zone, photosynthe- above and near the cable pair. sis cannot occur and sunlight diminishes rapidly as depth in-

16 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges Chapter 1

Fig 1.1 | Magnetc feld for cable pair spaced 0.3 meters apart at a depth of 1.5 meters

As noted above, the strength of a given magnetc feld must sure. Indeed, typical car exhaust emits more air ions than an be at least twenty tmes Earth’s magnetc feld to impose HVDC transmission line.63 The electrostatc feld, although negatve health efects on humans and animals. While Fig- present, also does not have the capability to “penetrate an ure 1.1 proves that this value is not broached for a 3GW line, organism,” and therefore should not be considered a harm- the feld produced could impact the directonal capabilites ful component of this system.64 of nearby mammals who utlize Earth’s magnetc feld to orient themselves in their environment. However, two fac- Generally, the electric and magnetc felds emited by prop- tors limited our ability to draw more specifc conclusions erly functoning underground cables pose a minimal risk to about the impacts artfcial magnetc felds have on migra- surrounding lifeforms. While the migraton mechanisms of tory mammals. First, the variance between magnetc feld many species are stll not well understood, limited interfer- responses of diferent species makes it impossible to apply ence with this capability by HVDC cables is the main con- a single conclusion to all afected animals. Second, in many cern found by our analysis. cases, the literature lacks a frm consensus as to the mechanism that controls magnetc feld responses in animals, 1.3.4 Potential System Interferences thus making it unclear how this phenomenon even emerg- es. For these reasons, it should be assumed that animals in As we have already indicated, electric felds do not produce very close horizontal proximity to a buried HVDC cable and major mechanical interferences in other systems. When known to utlize the Earth’s magnetc feld will most likely be HVDC lines are operated properly, both the resultng elec- afected by the HVDC system. This conclusion highlights the tric and magnetc felds remain statc in nature,65 meaning importance of utlizing existng rights-of-way whenever pos- that they are constant with changes in tme.66 In such cases, sible. By placing cables in previously developed land, fewer the harmonic energy content and electric radio-frequency land-bound species may be impacted when compared to interference (RFI) that is shot into the HVDC side of staton the same placement on virgin land. converters may radiate and impair nearby radio and telephone communicatons. However, grounding the metallic The electrostatc felds created by above ground HVDC screens of the buried cables greatly suppresses this interfer- transmission lines have been known to produce air ions ence. The capacitance between the center conductor and via conductor operaton, in the form of charged partcles.62 the metallic screen wrapping serves to flter and suppress There is very litle research on such partcles in relaton to much of this high-frequency energy. Grounding the screen human health. Therefore, there is no set limit for maximum shields shunts these tme-varying electric felds to ground.67 recommended air ion exposure for humans or animals. Sim- The grounding of the outer metallic screen of buried HVDC ilarly, several studies involving air ion output from above cables also serves to signifcantly suppress the radial volt- ground HVDC transmission lines determined that there age feld of the high voltage current-carrying center conduc- were no conclusive changes in blood pressure, pulse, respi- tor. With the outer metallic screen held very near ground ratory functon, and body temperature due to air ion expo- potental, the entre voltage drop, or rise in some situatons,

17 Chapter 1 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges between the operatng voltage of each cable and the local tve index of the optcal fber material may change. This pro- ground is constrained to occur within the insulatng layer cess, known as the Kerr Efect, occurs when the intensity within the cable. Therefore, no signifcant external DC volt- of the light beam in the optcal fber afects the refractve age felds exist. index,68 ultmately limitng high-speed (more than 10Gbps) data transmission. The Faraday efect is another phenome- There is, however, some risk that HVDC-produced magnet- non that relates the light propagated through the optcal f- ic felds could interact with unrelated man-made systems. ber and the feld generated by the HVDC cables, potentally Aside from reduced physical vulnerabilites of the network producing errors in data transmission. hardware, the proximity of two buried cables results in a signifcant reducton in the net magnetc feld at moderate The closer HVDC transmission cables are to existng fber distances from the pair. The opposing currents in the two optc structures, the larger the electromagnetc efect over conductors produce opposing magnetc felds. This in turn the fber is. Therefore, determinaton of correct confgura- could combine additvely in the ground area between and ton for both types of cables (within a given right-of-way) above the cables, but oppose each other to partally cancel is essental. NAS HVDC transmission cables should be bur- out either side of the burial trench. At a distance ten tmes ied at a minimum depth of 1.2 meters. Each bipolar pair is the inter-cable spacing on either side of the trench, the stat- based on two parallel cables with their centers separated by ic magnetc feld is reduced to less than one-eleventh of a distance of 0.30 meters. Buried fber optc cables must be that of a single cable. located in a neutral area, far enough away from the electromagnetc source to be unafected by it. Additonally, fber Careful confguraton of HVDC cables within highly utlized optc cables should not cross transmission cables, since the rights-of-way is essental to proper system functoning, magnetc feld generated would be parallel to the propaga- partcularly regarding the potental interactons between ton of light in the fber.* In the case that two optcal fbers telecommunicatons and electric cables alike. Most ofen, were located above the HVDC cables, the value of the mag- HVDC technology competes for right-of-way space with netc feld would be much higher than the Earth’s magnet- existng fber optc telecommunicaton cables. Fiber optc ic feld. Therefore, a fber optc cable should be parallel to cables are a common type of telecommunicaton cable, HVDC cables. In the instance of a single fber optc cable, it and are designed for long distance, high performance data should be located above and parallel HVDC cables, accord- transmission. Additonally, the proper usage of fber optc ing to the design in Fig. 1.2 technology to transmit valuable operatonal informaton is essental to the applicaton of sofware to deter cyber- In the scenario in Figure 1.2, transmission cables and the atacks. The center of each glass strand is called the core, optcal cable must have a 0.3 to 0.61 meter soil separa- which is surrounded by a layer of glass called cladding. The ton,69 implying that the fber optc cable depth must extend external optcal fber jacket and bufer tubes protect glass from 0.61 meters to 0.91 meters. Afer various simulatons, optcal fber from environmental conditons that can afect and considering the fact that the fber optc cable cannot the fber’s performance and long-term durability. be close to the soil surface, we determined that the horizontal distance of the fber optc cable from the center of The NAS will require a communicatons system (to transmit the HVDC transmission cable should be at least 1.5 meters real-tme system diagnostc data) by means of a single mode (at a burial depth of 0.64 meters for the fber optc cable). fber optc cable, which is designed to carry light directly In this confguraton, the magnetc feld generated around down the fber. This can be accomplished with existng fber the fber optc cable is approximately 17μT, a lower value optc cables due to the ability of such technology to simul- than Earth’s magnetc feld. Additonally, to avoid coupling taneously transmit diferent signals within one optcal fber; efects between groups of bipolar 2-GW transmission lines, signals can be sent with diferent frequencies and will not a minimum horizontal distance between groupings is essen- intermix in transit. It should be noted that the same result tal for proper confguraton. Results showed that a distance cannot be accomplished with existng mult-mode fbers of 2 meters between bipolar HVDC pairs is needed to get a because the large diametric core that allows multple light magnetc feld of 31μT, a value comparable to the Earth’s refectons within the optcal cable, will in turn, generate an magnetc feld. By applying these confguraton suggestons, atenuated/unreliable data signal. the NAS system can potentally work with existng infrastructure in a fortfed confguraton to protect against both In shared rights-of-way, the potental for DC links to gener- manmade and natural disturbances. ate a magnetc feld which interacts with charged partcles or objects nearby (such as a fber optc cable) is great. De- pending on the magnetc feld strength generated by power transmission cables and the outer electric feld, the refrac- * HVDC cables will only generate statc magnetc felds; therefore, induc- ton does not impact calculatons for the general design analysis.

18 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges Chapter 1

Fig 1.2 | Design confguraton for the HVDC transmission cables and the fber optc cable

1.3.5 Water Quality Impacts and Usage Modelling A system’s “water table” designates the top of an aquifer (otherwise known as “depth-to-water”). Its depth is relatve The presence of groundwater and aquifer stores must be to the corresponding topsoil layer and can change based on accounted for when designing and constructng an under- variatons in topography, even within a relatvely small area. ground HVDC system. Not only does the constructon of An aquifer is deemed unconfned if there is no presence of a such a system have potental negatve consequences for bedrock/impenetrable layer above the water table. In such groundwater quality, such as temporary turbidity; it could a case, a permeable soil layer is the aquifer’s only protec- also permanently alter water fow through natural systems. ton from its surrounding environment. To determine the The cable sand surrounding HVDC cables and the heat the characteristcs of major aquifers in the United States, the cables produce are the system components most likely to United States Geological Survey (USGS) has classifed sever- cause problems, since they have the greatest potental to al major aquifer systems as “principal aquifers,” which are interact with aquifers and subsequent groundwater stores.

The contguous 48 states are home to thousands of freshwater aquifers of varying degrees of drinkability. The geological and topographical characteristcs of a locaton determine the thickness of an aquifer, the depth to the water table, and the ease of access to the water supply. The distncton between confned and unconfned aquifers compli- cates the collecton of data regarding groundwater depth and fow paterns. The depth to groundwater must be considered when building an HVDC system, as shallow, unconfned water reserves may be unnecessarily disturbed by cable trenches. An analysis not incorporatng these factors could possibly cause standing water and/or well contaminaton. It is accordingly vital that we distnguish between the components of a groundwater system to accurately describe mapped data. The various components of a given Fig 1.3 | Design confguraton for the HVDC transmission cables water system are illustrated in Figure 1.3. and the fber optc cable

19 Chapter 1 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges considered extensive sources of drinkable freshwater. How- generators to utlize many diferent fgures and achieve a ever, wide variaton in depth-to-water values in groundwa- weighted average. We concluded that, if electricity demand ter monitoring wells in such aquifers (provided through the remains constant, the NAS has the potental to produce natonal Advisory Commitee on Water Informaton, a USGS consumptve water savings of over 405 billion gallons yearly subsidiary) implies that generalized conclusions regarding and withdrawal savings totaling over 14 trillion gallons year- aquifer water table depth may be too simplistc. Therefore, ly (if electricity demand in 2030 is equal to that of present NAS research has focused on visualizing all natonally avail- day); these reductons equate to a 65% reducton in total able monitoring well data to inform later system refnement. freshwater usage, both withdrawn and consumed. Even if electricity demand doubles by 2030, the NAS can stll po- It is possible for the depth of the water table and the type tentally ensure sizable water savings compared to current of aquifer formaton to impact the propertes of the natve usage levels. soil, which in turn can afect cable functon. Soils present above the groundwater table are more resistant to current 1.3.6 Air Pollution Impacts and Emissions Modelling fow and exhibit higher water evaporaton rates,70 because soils are typically dryer there. This exacerbates the im- Air pollutants such as ozone and nitrogen oxides will un- portance of the critcal water level in the surface layers of doubtedly be released into the atmosphere during the natve soil. While cable or thermal sands may not directly constructon of HVDC transmission systems. The resultng interact with groundwater formatons, they can greatly in- polluton pales in comparison to the enormous reductons fuence the groundwater fow. This is partcularly important in atmospheric carbon and criteria pollutants that will re- when right-of-way routes are present near highly graded, or sult from the increased penetraton of renewables the NAS sloped, land. In these specifc cases, “trench plugs” placed makes possible. at the botom of slopes can alleviate the possibility of water fow through cable sands preferentally causing disturbance Ozone polluton from the NAS is not a signifcant concern. In of natural groundwater movement.71 In such high-risk ar- terrestrial HVDC transmission systems, most research con- eas, the possibility of eliminatng the usage of cable sand cerning ozone output has been conducted using data from entrely, if natve soil is favorable, is the cheapest and argu- above ground confguratons. Nevertheless, the results of ably most efectve protecton against plausible hydraulic this research stll yield important clues about the behavior disturbances. of underground systems. In all HVDC systems, ozone is generated from the system conductors along the transmission Furthermore, changes associated with water usage due to line, which can produce ozone and its precursors, such as NAS implementaton must also be estmated. Water de- nitrogen oxides.72 This phenomenon, referred to as the Co- mands from the power sector, mostly due to power gen- rona Efect, infuences how the transmission system inter- eraton methods, heighten competton for freshwater re- acts with its surrounding environment at many interfaces. sources and thereby increase prices for various sectors of Both the Corona Efect and subsequent pollutant discharge the economy. Changes to both withdrawal and consump- is dependent mainly on the environmental conditons the ton infuence the stock of freshwater available. All freshwa- cable is exposed to. Hence, contact with moisture through ter resources removed from a water source are known as precipitaton or fog is a driving factor to determine the “withdrawal,” while “consumed” water is the total volume strength of the Corona Efect in overhead HVDC lines.73 Sci- of water not returned to the original source afer electricity entfc literature has proven that ozone concentratons spe- has been generated. Consumed water is not available for fu- cifcally derived from overhead HVDC transmissions lines, ture withdrawal. Comparatvely, producing energy with fos- with total voltages comparable to those proposed for the sil fuel or nuclear material withdraws and consumes more NAS, are consistently below detecton levels during tmes water per megawat-hour than equivalent renewable gen- of favorable weather when compared to ambient ozone eraton. Therefore, most of the water savings achieved by concentratons.74 Heavy precipitaton events, which are as- the NAS are the result of increased renewable penetraton sumed to be the worst case scenario for producing ozone in the electric grid. emissions due to a subsequent infammaton of the Coro- na Efect only produced ozone cloud concentratons total- We constructed a model to gain insight into the changes in ing 0.01 ppm.75 Comparatvely, 0.07 ppm is the maximum natonal water consumpton and withdrawal paterns due allowable daily limit of ozone exposure set by the United to NAS implementaton. This required us to analyze current States Natonal Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).76 In contributons to electricity generaton by heavily utlized American megacites, such as Los Angeles, ozone levels are sources (such as coal, natural gas, wind, and solar), est- frequently recorded at 0.15 – 0.5 ppm levels,77 double the mate likely future contributons by these sources in 2030, NAAQS value and a maximum of 50 tmes higher than ozone and calculate consumpton and withdrawal values for all levels produced by HVDC technology.

20 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges Chapter 1

We determined that implementng the NAS would have Afer conductng general research, we turned to examine positve efects through modelling of EPA-sanctoned Crite- two specifc case studies located in the Western United ria air pollutants associated with current and expected elec- States and the Atlantc Ocean. Sitng analyses with public tricity mixes. We chose criteria pollutants as an air quality data determined obstacles to cable placement and optmal indicator due to their widely-accepted impact on human routes. and environmental health. Of the six pollutants in the class, three were analyzed: Nitrogen Oxides (NOX), Sulfur Dioxides 1.4 Case Study 1: Western Pilot Project

(SO2), and Partculate Mater. According to the EPA, Lead and Carbon Monoxide usually do not arise from utlity scale The Western Pilot Project (WPP), a subset of the NAS, was fossil fuel combuston in signifcant levels, and are there- conceptualized to demonstrate the viability of a large, high- fore considered negligible in the subsequent model. Addi- ly resilient HVDC grid overlay to efciently transmit all forms tonally, ozone levels were not studied. Ozone is not emited of energy. California’s ambitous carbon-neutral energy pol- through combuston technology; it is instead produced in icy would ideally anchor support for the system in the re- highly complex and variable post-emission reactons. The gion, while allowing for the expansion of renewable energy only life cycle stages measured in this analysis were produc- generaton and usage. Most of the 13 western-most states ton (i.e. emissions from the fuel source itself due to mining included in the WPP have proven to possess large poten- and drilling disturbances) and usage (i.e. combuston). Wind tal capacites for wind and/or solar power, which cannot be and solar power were assumed to emit negligible amounts used to full capacity without an efcient means to transmit of criteria pollutants, and emissions from transportaton the energy to large distant markets. To prove the efectve- machinery, manufacturing, and end-of-life/disposal were ness of the system, it is imperatve that it accomplish what not considered.† the current electricity transmission cannot: the resilient and efcient transport of electricity over long distances, regard- The analysis indicated that the emission of these criteria less of the source locaton. The porton of this system that pollutants followed the same downward trend with the in- is most likely to be underway frst lies along interstate 10, troducton of the NAS. While NOx pollutants were emited stretching from Phoenix to Los Angeles. This HVDC line is or created in larger volumes than SO2 and Partculate Mat- the product of a project proposed by the partners of the ter, percentage changes in weight for both conditons were Central Arizona Project, which aims to cover the Central Ar- relatvely consistent across all compounds studied. With izona Canal with solar panels. Excess solar energy from this the NAS, the weights, expressed in metric tons, of SO2 and structure will most likely be purchased by a Southern Cal- Partculate Mater emited were reduced by a factor of 7, ifornia power entty and transported along the HVDC line, while NOX was minimally reduced in the year 2040 when which will ultmately be connected to the remainder of the compared to 2015 levels. Conversely, the business-as-usu- system. The core of the WPP will theoretcally be centered al electricity generaton case in 2040 (no HVDC grid, with to the West of the Plains states and will ideally follow exist- no implementaton of the Clean Power Plan) showed an ing highway rights-of-way. It is important to note that this increase in the emission of NOX and marginal decreases in route is a proposed pathway optmized solely with respect the emission of SO2 and Partculate Mater compared to to environmental and security concerns, and will ultmately the 2015 base scenario. Reductons in coal usage associat- depend on the costs and stakeholders associated with its ed with NAS implementaton undoubtedly contributed sig- constructon. nifcantly to these reductons. It should also be noted that the business-as-usual case did evidence a slight decreasing Below is an explanaton of the Geographic Informaton trend in pollutant emissions beginning in 2030, due to the System (GIS) layers which were combined to form the en- replacement of fossil fuel generators with a modest increase vironmentally optmized WPP route. Although only one in the number of renewable generators. However, such ad- state, Arizona, is shown below as an example of the map- ditons are minimal compared to the potental renewable ping methodology used, eleven states were ultmately in- capacity aforded by the NAS system within the same tme cluded in the WPP: California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, span. Therefore, the NAS can generally by expected to im- Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, Arizona, Nevada, and prove air quality through an expected reducton in the us- New Mexico. Several variables were combined to form two age of fossil fuel combuston technology. main layers showing “avoid” areas (denoted by unfavorable conditons) and “amend” areas (which can be utlized for cable burial grounds, but may require amendment with † The air quality model described is proprietary, and therefore not described in its entrety. All results are simulated estmatons and should artfcial fll before constructon). All data displayed below be taken as a fnite descriptor of system efects; further refnement may was obtained from public sources, and was modifed using be required before results can be considered in design and system plan- a working knowledge of soil sciences and transmission re- ning. Please contact authors if you would like to request more informa- quirements (artculated previously). Any white or grey areas ton about the source data used or calculaton steps.

21 Chapter 1 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges in subsequent maps denote areas with a lack of sampling impacts of the installaton itself. Therefore, any soils with a data. All raw data sources can be found in the GIS bibliogra- bedrock layer at a startng depth shallower than 1.2 meters phy in the back of this publicaton. from the land surface were excluded as potental locatons for undergrounding, as shown in the example in Figure 1.4. 1.4.1 “Avoid Burial” Map Layer

We analyzed soil areas to determine if they were of suitable compositon to support the proper functon of undergrounded cables. We concentrated on four potental obstacles: the presence of shallow bedrock/impenetrable surface below the topsoil,78 the presence of “protected” land areas,79,80 the presence of manmade oil/gas infrastructure (including underground gas storage and pipelines of both above and below ground confguraton),81,82 the presence of Superfund/Brownfeld sites,83 and the presence of shallow groundwater (qualifed by measurements in government-monitored test wells).84 Any soil area in which any one of these obstacles was present was eliminated as a potental locaton for undergrounding cables. If a given right-of- way traversed such areas, cables were automatcally placed in an above ground confguraton. In this analysis, fossil fuel infrastructure includes transportaton pipelines for crude oil, petrol products, and natural gas, as well as underground Fig 1.4 | Depth to bedrock layer in Arizona natural gas storage facilites. Available pipeline data was unclear about pipeline confguraton (whether the lines were Shallow freshwater aquifers may present challenges for ca- above or below ground confguraton), and are assumed to ble placement, and must be safeguarded carefully to avoid be avoided by building transmission cables above ground contaminaton or changes to water table hydraulic prop- regardless of the pipeline confguraton. Additonally, pro- ertes. Potental groundwater levels were surmised from tected areas were also visualized and added to the avoid data taken from government operated test wells located layer for completeness, yet major rights of way were found throughout the contguous US. While the average depth of to not pass through those areas. most aquifers is at least 11.6 meters from the surface in this dataset, depth levels have the potental to change within As noted previously, depth to bedrock is a critcal indica- small geospatal areas and fuctuate with season. To obtain tor of the ease of cable installaton, and the environmental data on a manageable scale, depth-to-water in all govern-

Fig 1.5 | Groundwater conditons in Arizona

22 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges Chapter 1 ment wells (2000 in total in the contguous 48 states) was These layers were then combined to form a single “avoid averaged and ploted. The structure of the aquifer (confned undergrounding” layer (Figure 1.8), which will subsequently vs unconfned) was also collected for later usage during be combined with other soil characteristcs to complete a design phases. This as well as depth data must be further fnal route map for the state of Arizona. scrutnized as system design evolves. An example of both datasets is present in Figure 1.6.

Fig 1.8 | Final areas to avoid when undergrounding cables 1.4.2 “Amend Before Burial” Map Layer

Fig 1.6 | Superfund and Brownfeld sites While some soil propertes are difcult to correct, others may be readily altered to receive undergrounded cables Existng Superfund and Brownfeld sites were also tracked, without imposing unnecessary operatonal challenges. In regardless of contaminaton type, and should be avoided. other cases, no amendment/alteraton is necessary at all, lowering costs and build tme. For a soil to be considered Finally, the locaton of manmade oil and gas infrastructure is amendable, it must not fall into the same area as a high- displayed in Figure 1.7. lighted “avoid undergrounding” space when the two fnal maps are merged. For areas where this conditon was met, we analyzed soil organic concentraton,85 potental concrete corrosion capability,86 and soil order propertes87 to determine if the soil sample needs amendment. Amendment of soils usually occurs through usage of engineered silica fll to surround cables in trenches. Electrical and thermal propertes of soils may also play a large role in the determinaton of potental amendments, yet due to their complexity, they are discussed elsewhere in this publicaton (in the secton enttled Sitng Based on Soil Resistvity Trends).

A comprehensive qualitatve analysis of soil order propertes can be found in the “Sitng in the Context of Soil Me- chanics” secton. From this informaton, the extent of unsuitable soil types varied widely on a state-by-state basis. All soil orders previously deemed suitable were merged into a single green layer, erasing the colored distncton between orders.

Furthermore, organic content plays an important role in Fig 1.7 | Oil and gas infrastructure in Arizona the extent of heat dissipaton for undergrounded cables.

23 Chapter 1 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges

Fig 1.9 | Characterizaton of soil orders Fig 1.11 | Concrete corrosion potental According to the literature, normal soils usually contain a compositon of 5% organic mater.88 Any soil that contains The fnal combinaton of these amend maps can be found more organics than this baseline percentage is more likely in Figure 1.12. Pipeline infrastructure identcal to that pres- to trap heat around operatng cables. In this analysis, any ent in the fnal “avoid undergrounding” map was also rep- soil samples containing more than 5% organics (Figure 1.10) resented at this stage, before the fnal combinaton of layers were accordingly marked as requiring amendment before was executed. cable burial.

Fig 1.12 | Final areas in need of amendment when under- Fig 1.10 | Organic soil content grounding cables Qualitatvely, we estmated concrete corrosion potental by 1.4.3 Final Cable Route combining the impact of salinity, acidity, sulfates, and other potentally harsh environmental components. Finally, we The combinaton of the “avoid” and “amend” map layers estmated corrosion potental, classifying areas either low, produced Figure 1.13. Although not explicitly shown, all moderate, or high risk. Of these three distnctons, only ar- informaton obtained from the previously described layers eas which consttuted a moderate or high risk were in need is contained in this fgure. Areas that did not intersect any of amendment for the purposes of this analysis. Such areas unfavorable avoid or amend conditons were assumed to are visualized in Figure 1.11. be appropriate for underground burial without soil amend-

24 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges Chapter 1

Fig 1.13 | Final Western Pilot Project route (red line stretches denote above ground lines, blue line stretches denote underground lines requiring amendment before burial, and green line stretches denote underground lines requiring no amendment before burial.)‡ ment. Nodal areas (which ofen center around large city iment thickness was needed to identfy sectons of shallow centers) have the largest concentraton of above ground soil that were inadequate for HVDC cable burial.89 Although cable confguratons. Ultmately, 36% of mapped cable lines no menton was made within the metadata regarding the were placed above ground, with the remainder of lines re- unit adopted in this dataset, it is reasonable to assume that maining in an underground confguraton. This percentage “meters” was the intended unit. This dataset was compared will most likely evolve as cable routes are mapped Eastward to another showing the existence of communicatons cables in the contnental United States.‡ in areas proximate to where HVDC cables might be buried, perhaps indicatng the existence of appropriate conditons 1.5 Case Study 2: Atlantic Coast Submarine in the area.¶

Project Bathymetry is the depth, measured in meters, from the water surface to the seabed foor. Bathymetric diferences can An ofshore grid link may be a desirable method to connect be represented graphically by isobath contours (lines which the Northeastern and Southeastern coastal states. This fea- show the terrain present on the seabed) of equal relatve sibility study is a frst investgaton regarding this possibility depth.90 Data referring to bathymetry was collected from and has considered biodiversity, chemo-physical, and an- USGS in the form of two diferent GIS datasets.91,92 Both thropological concerns, which were classifed as primary, were combined to provide a high-resoluton view of seabed secondary and supplemental concerns. Variables that were depth. The isobaths contained in similar bathymetric inter- publicly available and considered relevant were gathered vals were colored with the same shade of green. As present- and overlapped using GIS tools. We present possible loca- ed by an OSPAR Commission Report, “telecommunicaton tons for the cable in three distnct scenarios.§ cables installed over the last decade have been buried as [deep] as technically feasible, but not in areas with a wa- 1.5.1 Chemo-physical Analysis ter depth of more than 3,000 meters.”93 According to the same report, cables have already been placed in depths up Chemo-physical analysis refers to data concerning the phys- to 1,000 and 1,200 meters. ical and chemical aspects of the ofshore environment in the East Coast of the contguous United States. To beter un- Finally, the last dataset applied in this analysis was called derstand this topic area, we studied sediment thickness, ba- “usSEABED facies data for the entre U.S. East Coast,” and thymetry, and seabed soil compositon. Knowledge of sed- was also collected from USGS datasets.94 This data is a set of points for which a soil sample of known compositon was ‡ This representaton of the Western Pilot project should not be regard- collected; the data was frst published in 2005, two years ed as a fnal design for the system, it is subject to change and evolve as afer data collecton period occurred. This layer represented data is further collected and analyzed. § This case study is meant to provide an extremely comprehensive view informaton such as the components and genesis of the sea- of the potental issues that may be associated with cable placement, using public data outlets as the main informaton source. Actual construc- ¶ This dataset will be presented later in this report. Although, other re- ton plans may necessitate the gathering of additonal data or disregard liable sources must be consulted before the installaton of the ofshore certain datasets mentoned in this work. cable.

25 Chapter 1 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges

Fig 1.14 | Bathymetry, reefs, protected areas, and essental fsh habitats - North Carolina to Florida foor, and was compiled from diferent sources that applied various methods in the collecton. From the usSEABED dataset, points signaling the presence of carbon, volcanic rock, coral and/or another geochemical signal were highlighted, meaning some percentage of the component(s) was present in each sample (the presence of metamorphic rock and hard plant percentages were highlighted separately). While the conclusions drawn from this dataset are only approxi- matons, such informaton may help to inform formal surveying eforts.**

1.5.2 Biodiversity Analysis Fig 1.15 | Coral EFH, EFH-HAEC and submarine cables

An additonal aspect to consider when implementng a new Fishery Management Council (SAFMC); Migratory Behavior electric grid is the impact it might have on localized biodi- - EFH Highly Migratory Species (HMS), with data generat- versity, partcularly considering protected areas and habi- ed by Natonal Oceanic and Atmospheric Administraton tats of marine species/coral. In order to predict and mitgate (NOAA); and Global Distributon of Coral Reefs, with data negatve impacts associated with ofshore HVDC cables, the generated by the United Natons Environment Program’s following variables were included in the analysis: protect- World Conservaton Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC), the ed areas according to GAP statuses; Essental Fish Habitats WorldFish Centre, World Resources Insttute (WRI), and The (EFH) and Habitat Area(s) of Partcular Concern (HAPC(s)), Nature Conservancy (TNC). with data generated by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Con- servaton Commission (FWC), and the Fish and Wildlife Re- As described in the WPP analysis, protected areas within the search Insttute (FWRI) in associaton with the South Atlantc United States are classifed in four categories (GAP Status 1 to 4) that are applicable in both marine and land environ- ** The sediment thickness and bathymetric informaton presented appear to be accurate and consistent. The informaton regarding soil ments. GAP Status 1 aquatc environments were avoided compositon, however, should be further verifed applying other sources during the mapping process to maintain natural interacton such as private frms, scholars, or government agencies who have between biotc and abiotc elements of these ecosystems. worked directly in these ofshore areas. Despite the broad visualizaton In additon to respectng designated GAP 1 lands, mapping of soil compositon this USGS dataset has enabled, the data collecton of EFHs is also crucial to ensure that commercial fshing en- dates do vary from 1840 to 2003, meaning that there is the possibility that some of the informaton has signifcantly changed. In additon, the terprises are protected during cable constructon and op- absence of data from some of the points does not necessarily imply the eraton. According to NOAA, EFHs are “those waters and absence of a mineral/organic soil component in the sample (this can substrate necessary to fsh for spawning, breeding, feeding, occur due to unavailable data), which could also undermine conclusive or growth to maturity.”95 Among the EFHs, some are also statements regarding soil compositon.

26 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges Chapter 1

Habitat areas of partcular Essental fsh habitats concerns Dolphin97 Dolphin98 Wahoo99 Wahoo100 Golden Crab101 Shrimp102 Shrimp103 Spiny Lobster104 Coastal Migratory Spiny Lobster105 Pelagics106 Coastal Migratory Snapper Grouper108 Pelagics107 Snapper Grouper109 Tilefsh§§

Table 1.1 | EFHs and HAPCs for prevalent species egory defned afer the establishment of HAPC areas. Sci- entfc research points to the existence of high relief and hard botom habitat areas that had not been included in Fig 1.16 | Marine mammals study areas and tracklines the Coral HAPC boundaries. Figure 1.15 highlights both of these categories. It is crucial to note that various submarine classifed as HAPC(s). This special category is considered a cables intersect the three coral layers in the map.111,112,113 conservaton priority, and is denoted as a “habitat type and/ This suggests that there is a method to burying submarine or geographic area identfed by the eight regional fshery cables in Coral Habitat Areas. Nevertheless, guaranteeing management councils and NOAA Fisheries as priorites for the contnuity of the natural lifecycle without great interfer- habitat conservaton, management, and research.”96 A ta- ences will certainly require a deeper analysis by experts in ble of the species for which EFHs and/or HAPCs which were localized marine biodiversity.§§ mapped is shown in Table 1.1 below.†† The habitat of some mammals was also considered as a Figure 1.14 shows the areas where EFH, EFH-HAPC, and variable to minimize the environmental impacts of an of- Coral Reefs were identfed by the aforementoned sourc- shore HVDC cable.114 Their distributon through the U.S. At- es (previously mentoned depth data is visualized in green lantc Zone is presented below (Figure 1.16).115 All three lay- contours on the same fgure). The reef database ploted in ers cover the entre East Coast of the United States, which orange was compiled by UNEP-WCM, the WorldFish Centre, means that the cable will necessarily intercept those areas, WRI and TNC. It represents the global distributon of coral if installed. This implies that the submarine cables present- reefs (data collecton was held from 1999 and 2002), with ed in Figure 1.15 also cross those areas. emphasis on warm-water coral reefs.‡‡ Coral reefs in orange show that reefs in close proximity to the U.S. are concen- Similarly, we mapped animal migraton, which highlighted trated in and around Florida’s South and Southeast Coast the existent EFHs of Highly Migratory Species in the East and near other islands South of the U.S. Coast of the United States (according to data available from NOAA) previously. Most of these species are sharks¶¶ As is true with coral reef locatons, HAPCs are areas in which and tunas;*** we included all other species in a third group “the use of all botom damaging gear is prohibited including botom longline, trawl (botom and mid-water), dredge, §§ Website currently under constructon, originally used metadata not pot or trap, or the use of an anchor, anchor and chain, or available. Original link to data available upon request. grapple and chain by all fshing vessels.”110 Therefore, it is ¶¶ The species of sharks included in this report are those available in NOAA GIS dataset on Highly Migratory Species: Caribbean Reef Shark, important to distnguish these areas from general HAPCs as Common Thresher Shark, Dusky Shark, Finetooth Shark, Great Hammer- well as Deepwater Coral HAPCs, which are a separate cat- head Shark, Lemon Shark, Longfn Mako Shark, Oceanic Whitetp Shark, Night Shark, Nurse Shark, Porbeagle Shark, Sandbar Shark, Sand Tiger †† A Snapper Grouper EFH layer could not be visualized and is not Shark, Scalloped Hammerhead Shark, Shortin Mako Shark, Silky Shark, included in the corresponding map Spin Shark, Tiger Shark, Whale Shark, White Shark, Atlantc Sharpnose ‡‡ “Approximately 85% of this dataset originates from the Millennium Shark, Bigeye Thresher Shark, Basking Shark, Bignose Shark, Blacknose Coral Reef Mapping Project, of which 35% was validated (by IMaRS-USF Shark, Blacktp Shark, Angel Shark, Blue Shark, Bull Shark and Bonneth- and IRD-Noumea) and 50% remains unvalidated (but was interpreted by ead Shark. UNEP-WCMC). Millennium Coral Reef Mapping Project products (vali- *** The species of tuna included in this report are those available in dated or not) are at a consistent 30 m resoluton.” (Quotes contained in NOAA GIS dataset on Highly Migratory Species: Skipjack Tuna, Yellowfn the “Global Distributon of Coral Reefs (2010)” GIS data documentaton). Tuna, Bluefn Tuna, Albacore Tuna and Bigeye Tuna.

27 Chapter 1 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges

Fig 1.17 | Shipping lanes, ports, and deepwater ports and anchorage sites termed “other species.”††† All areas considered ideal for the ments, seabed erosion and movements in the water can cable burial, in terms of the chemo-physical conditons, are gradually expose the formerly buried cable. Human actvity traversed by Highly Migratory Species EFH (especially by can further accelerate this process using anchors and be- sharks).‡‡‡ Overlaying the Bathymetry and the informaton cause of trawling, processes that could expose cables and presented above, it was possible to clearly identfy which bring about life-threatening situatons, for instance, a naut- species were present in the potental cable path. cal vessel could capsize if its anchor were to catch on the exposed cable. In our atempts to identfy risks for sea trafc, The aforementoned shark populaton only circulate through we considered several variables: shipping lanes,116 locatons the Gulf of Mexico or very close to the coast and in shal- of ports, anchorage areas, and localized vessel density. low waters. All other species inhabit or migrate through the area where the cable may be buried.§§§ However, the circu- Shipping lanes are defned as routes regularly adopted by laton of those species throughout the entre East Coast of ships and are classifed in the following seven categories: the United States did not impede the development of other ofshore energy and infrastructure projects, positvely im- 1. Precautonary Areas, or those in which it is important to pactng the feasibility assessment of this project. Neverthe- navigate with cauton less, the planning of any new marine infrastructure should 2. Speed Restricton Areas, or those in which the speed is stll take place in a careful manner, considering the seasonal seasonally reduced because of endangered species routes commonly traced by those species. 3. Partcular Sensitve Areas, or those endangered by internatonal maritme trafc 1.5.3 Anthropogenic Analysis 4. Shipping Safety Fairways, or areas in which artfcial structures are prohibited Aside from Biodiversity and Chemo-physical aspects, it is 5. Areas to be Avoided, or areas that are hazardous for important to observe the anthropologic structures and ac- ships tvites that are present in the proposed placement area. To 6. Recommended Routes, or those that should be chosen ensure that cables do not disrupt shipping channels, route by ships for safety reasons planners must identfy areas of high shipping trafc. While 7. Trafc Separaton Schemes/Trafc Lanes, where marine cables are usually buried at a safe depth in marine environ- trafc is directed into designated routes

††† “Other species” include: Longbill Spearfsh, White Marlin, Sailfsh, Recommended Routes are only found close to Long Island, Swordfsh and Blue Marlin. NY and along the coast of Maine. Speed Restricton Areas ‡‡‡ Few species of sharks have essental habitats outside of the desired are the predominant shipping lane category used in the bathymetric clarifcaton: Caribbean Reef Shark, Finetooth Shark, Lemon Shark, Nurse Shark, Whale Shark, Sandbar Shark, Spinner Shark, White Eastern Atlantc. States in this category include: Georgia, Shark, Atlantc Sharpnose Shark, Blacknose Shark, Blacktp Shark, Bull South Carolina, North Carolina, Florida, New York, Virginia, Shark, and Bonnethread Shark. Delaware, New Jersey, Connectcut, and Massachusets. All §§§ A complete set of maps for each of the afected species available shipping lanes should be avoided if possible. upon request.

28 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges Chapter 1

Fig 1.18 | Vessel density for the year 2013

Ports were georeferenced using newly created methodol- mapped it separately from other concerns because of the ogy, while similar informaton for deep-water ports (those difculty of visualizing the associated data. This dataset in located farther from the shoreline than traditonal ports, Figure 1.18 represents 2013 annual vessel trafc density which are used to load and unload large ships) was found for the contguous United States ofshore waters based on in a premade public GIS dataset.117,118,119 All ports are spread Automatc Identfcaton System (AIS) monitoring.121 This is in a non-equidistant manner along the East Coast, while a comprehensive density map that includes many types of deep-water ports can only be found of the coasts of Cali- vessels (cargo, fshing, passenger, etc.) and includes high fornia and Massachusets. Consequently, deep-water ports to low density scaling that shows trafc concentraton, not should also be avoided by the cable burial path, which might literal vessel counts. High vessel density is likely to occur be located a signifcant distance from the coastline. We rec- around ports and narrow channels, based on data observa- ommend that conventonal ports should be avoided by the ton. Cable placement should purposely avoid high vessel ofshore-onshore connectons that will join the ofshore ca- density areas to prevent external vessel damage and ensure ble with the underground grid in the contnent, thus avoid- safe installaton. ing unnecessary disturbances to trafc during constructon. According to a NOAA descripton, “an anchorage area is In additon to mapping of shipping-associated obstacles, we a place where boats and ships can safely drop anchor.”120 also considered marine based oil and gas infrastructure.¶¶¶ Such areas are created if required to improve safe and re- Data regarding petroleum product pipelines, product termi- sponsible navigaton. Ofentmes there is high potental for nals, refneries, power plants, and points of underground ship crowding in areas specifcally created for anchorages. storage were collected by U.S. Energy Informaton Adminis- Such areas should be avoided by any ofshore grid cables traton (EIA).122 Coastal Energy Facilites (data collected from and associated connectons to prevent further overcrowd- NOAA’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and ing of such areas especially during the constructon phase. preexistng submarine cables were also accounted for in this Figure 1.17 represents the informaton described above, sub-secton. Figure 1.19 presents these components in the and proves that the areas and structures described above same map and were considered in the fnal suggested route are very close to the coast, with the excepton of the region for cable burial. The most obvious component of this fgure between New Jersey and Massachusets, where they might is that cable intersectons are common, implying that this is represent an obstacle for cable burial. a possible confguraton, given the cable functon and op-

We also considered vessel density along the East Coast and ¶¶¶ Utlized data was published in 2015, with collecton occurring from 1975 to 1984.

29 Chapter 1 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges

Fig 1.19 | Coastal energy facilites, oil and gas wells, pipelines, power plants, petroleum product terminals and petroleum refneries, and natural gas underground storage eratng party is known. We also considered fossil fuel well relevance of those elements as a real concern for the cable locatons, power plant locatons, and coastal energy facili- burial. tes, partcularly renewable-based facilites. Ofshore wind planning zones and renewable energy leases, published by 1.5.4 Offshore Grid Placement BOEM, were mapped;123,124 the leasing areas included the current leases and grants regarding renewable sources.125 Informaton pictured and/or described above was com- Finally, we analyzed disposal sites, military installatons, piled into fnal maps displaying potental zones for cable unexploded ordinates126 and wreckage sites127 regarding placement. We classifed chemo-physical, biodiversity, and the scenarios presented in the following secton. Although anthropologic consideratons into three categories: pri- these areas were not visualized in their own respectve mary concerns, secondary concerns, and supplementary maps, it is important to state that many of them are already concerns (listed in Table 1.2 and visualized in Figure 1.20). crossed by existng submarine cables, which decreases the Primary concerns are defned as factors that the cable

Primary concerns Bathymetry Optmal water depth to place is between 1000-3000 meters Sedimentary thickness Optmal seabed depth to bury is at least 1m Deepwater ports Must avoid existng structures Military installatons Must avoid existng structures Oil and gas wells Must avoid existng structures Coastal energy facilites Must avoid existng structures GAP status 1 Permanent protecton from land cover conversion Secondary concerns Seabed type Avoid hard seabed botom if possible Vessel type Avoid high vessel density area if possible Wind planning zone Avoid planning zone if possible Renewable energy lease Avoid lease zone if possible Coral Avoid deep-water HAPC coral zone if possible Supplementary concerns Expanded coral Choose to avoid coral EFH and EFH HAPC Anchorage area Choose to avoid anchorage area Disposal sites Choose to avoid disposal sites Unexploded ordnance Choose to avoid unexploded ordnance Table 1.2 | Primary, secondary, and supplemental concerns for cable placement

30 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges Chapter 1

Fig 1.20 | Coastal energy facilites, oil and gas wells, pipelines, power plants, petroleum product terminals and petroleum refneries, and natural gas underground storage placement must comply with without excepton. Second- 1.6 Conclusion ary concerns are factors that the cable placement should avoid if possible. Supplementary concerns are factors that This secton aimed to give concreteness to the ambitous vi- the project developer can choose to adhere to (in order sion of the creaton of a HVDC underground network in the to lower risk) or ignore for the sake of cost. Subsequently, contguous United States. By collectng publicly available these scenarios were built based on these classifcatons. data and analyzing the distributon of those variables in a The fnal decision on the cable placement will likely be a geo-referred manner, this study was able to pinpoint what compromise between results from this feasibility analysis, seems to be an optmistc scenario for the constructon of a fnancial evaluaton, and a developer-driven analysis. The an HVDC cable network with both onshore and ofshore classifcaton of primary, secondary, and supplemental con- components. Considering the way existng cables interact cerns may evolve over tme with more detailed feasibility with relevant variables, it seems to be quite feasible to build and design eforts. the system without causing serious and long-lastng impacts on the surrounding environment, humans, or wildlife. Having set out the possible cable routes, we also needed to demonstrate the feasibility of building connectons be- References tween the ofshore cable and the onshore underground grid. In assessing the environmental conditons, we avoid- 1. Ophardt, Charles E. “What are Physical Propertes and Changes?” ed military installatons, coastal energy facilites, oil and gas Virtual Chembook: Elmhurst College. Last modifed 2003. htp:// wells, ports and deep-water ports, high vessel density, as chemistry.elmhurst.edu/vchembook/104Aphysprop.html well as GAP status 1 protected areas. We considered areas 2. Ibid. YourDictonary. “Examples of Physical Propertes.” Last modi- with suitable soils and at least a 2.2 meter depth to the fed 2017. htp://examples.yourdictonary.com/examples-of-physi- bedrock most favorable for ofshore-onshore connectons. cal-propertes.html. Based on that, we have suggested three potental locatons 3. Ibid. Keener-Chavis, Paula and Leslie Reynolds Sauter. “Chapter II: for onshore-ofshore connecton points in Delaware, New Physical and Chemical Propertes of the Ocean.” Of Sand and Sea: Jersey, and Georgia. Teaching From the Southeastern Shorline (Charleston, SC: S.C. Sea Grant Consortum, August 2002), 19-23.

31 Chapter 1 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges

4. Plant and Soil Sciences ELibrary. “Soil Genesis and Development, htp://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/thermal-resistvity-d_1053. Lesson 5 - Soil Classifcaton and Geography.” Last modifed 2017. html. htp://passel.unl.edu/pages/informatonmodule.php?idinforma- 28. E&S Grounding Solutons. “What Is Soil Resistvity Testng?” tonmodule=1130447032. Last modifed 2015. htp://www.esgroundingsolutons.com/ 5. Natonal Resources Conservaton Service Soils: United States what-is-soil-resistvity-testng/. Department of Agriculture. “The Twelve Orders of Soil Taxono- 29. Lasance, Clemens. “How Thermal Conductvity Relates to Electri- my.” htps://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/soils/ cal Conductvity.” Electronics Cooling, May 1, 2000. htps://www. edu/?cid=nrcs142p2_053588. electronics-cooling.com/2000/05/how-thermal-conductvity-re- 6. “Soil Genesis and Development.” University of Florida Soil and Wa- lates-to-electrical-conductvity/. ter Science. “Soil Orders.” Last modifed 2017. htp://ufgrunwald. 30. Ibid. com/soil-orders/. 31. Tuller, Markus and Dani Or. “Soil Temperature and Heat Flow.” 7. “Soil Genesis and Development.” University of Connectcut Lecture Material for CE/ENVE 320-Vadose 8. Ibid. McDaniel, Paul. “The Twelve Soil Orders.” The Twelve Soil Sone Hydrology/ Soiul Physics Spring 2004. htp://studylib.net/ Orders: Soil Taxonomy. htp://www.cals.uidaho.edu/soilorders/ doc/8839561/soil-temperature-and-heat-fow. orders.htm. 32. Switzer, Keith. “Achieving an Acceptable Ground in Poor Soil.” 9. “Soil Genesis and Development.” EC&M, October 1, 1998. htp://ecmweb.com/content/achieving- 10. McDaniel. “The Twelve Soil Orders.” acceptable-ground-poor-soil. 11. “Soil Genesis and Development.” 33. Ibid. 12. “Soil Orders.” McDaniel. “The Twelve Soil Orders.” 34. Why Measure Soil Resistvity? Dover, NH: AEMC Instruments, Au- 13. Ibid. gust 2002. htp://www.transcat.com/media/pdf/App-Ground-Soil- 14. “Soil Genesis and Development.” McDaniel. “The Twelve Soil Resistvity.pdf. Orders.” 35. Earth Ground Resistance - Principals, Testng Methods, and Appli- 15. “Soil Orders.” Lindbo, Dave. “Soil Types.” Soil Science Society of catons. Everet, WA: Fluke Corporaton. htp://support.fuke.com/ America. Last modifed 2017. htps://www.soils.org/discover-soils/ fnd-sales/Download/Asset/2633834_6115_ENG_A_W.PDF . soil-basics/soil-types. 36. 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Last modifed September 24, tdworld.com/underground-tampd/underground-cables-need-prop- 2017. htps://sciencenotes.org/electrolytes-strong-weak-and-non- er-burial. electrolytes/. 21. Molburg, J.C., J.A. Kavicky, and K.C. Picel. The Design, Constructon, 42. He, Jinliang, Rong Zeng, and Bo Zhang. Methodology and Technol- and Operaton of Long-Distance High-Voltage Electricity Trans- ogy for Power System Grounding. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons mission Technologies. Lemont, IL: Argonne Natonal Laboratory, Singapore Pte. Ltd. 2013. November 2007. 43. Campbell, Gaylon S., and Keith L. Bristow. The Efect of Soil Thermal 22. Pavement Interactve. “HMA Pavement.” Last modifed 2012. Resistvity (RHO) an Underground Power Cable Installatons. Pull- htp://www.pavementnteractve.org/artcle/hma-pavement/. man, WA: Thermal Decagon Devices, Inc., 2014. 23. GlobalSecurity.org. “Chapter 5 - Subgrades and Base Courses.” Last 44. Why Measure Soil Resistvity? Dover, NH: AEMC Instruments, Au- modifed 2017. htp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/poli- gust 2002. htp://www.transcat.com/media/pdf/App-Ground-Soil- cy/army/fm/5-430-00-1/CH5.htm. Resistvity.pdf. 24. AFS and the Insttute. “Bases and Subbases.” htp://www.afsinc. 45. Durgin, Philip B. and Thomas M. Young, ed. STP 1161: Leak Detec- org/content.cfm?ItemNumber=7098. ton for Underground Storage Tanks. Philadelphia, PA: ASTM, 1993. 25. Mitgatng the Impacts of Electric Transmission Lines. PPT. Sacra- 46. Bailey, William H., Deborah E. Weil, and James R. Stewart. HVDC mento: California Insttute for Energy and Environment. November Power Transmission Environmental Issues Review. Oak Ridge, TN: 2012. Oak Ridge Natonal Laboratory, April 1997. 26. Railwaysubstructure.org. “Basic Track Components.” htp://railway- 47. UCSG. “A summary of the relatonship between GAP Status Codes substructure.org/railwiki/images/2/29/Basic_Track_Components. and IUCN Defnitons.” Natonal GAP Analysis Program – Core png. Science Analytcs and Synthesis. Last modifed September 13, 2012. 27. The Engineering Toolbox. “Thermal Resistvity and Conductvity.” htp://gapanalysis.usgs.gov/blog/iucn-defnitons/.

32 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges Chapter 1

48. Ibid. text/223457/223457.pdf. 49. U.S. Geological Survey. published 5/5/2016. Natve American Res- 71. New England Clean Power Link HVDC Transmission Project Presi- ervatons. Protected Areas Database v1.4. dental Permit Applicaton. Champlain, VT: May 2014. 50. Assessing and Managing the Ecological Impacts of Paved Roads. 72. Bailey, Weil, and Stewart. HVDC Power Transmission. Washington, D.C.: Natonal Academy of Sciences, 2005. 63-64. 73. Ibid 51. Rosenberg, Henrik. Electric Power, HVDC from Land to Of-shore 74. Ibid Structures Utlizing Sea-electrodes for Return Current, Concerns and 75. Ibid Precautons with Regard to Environment and Corrosion. Denmark: 76. United States Environmental Protecton Agency. “NAAQS Table.” Balslev Consultng Engineers. The Essental Chemical Industry. Last modifed December 20, 2016. htps://www.epa.gov/crite- “Chlorine.” Last modifed 2016. htp://www.essentalchemicalin- ria-air-pollutants/naaqs-table. dustry.org/chemicals/chlorine.html. 77. Ozone Services and OzoneLab, “Ozone Levels and Their Efects.” 52. Ibid. Ozone in the Air. htp://www.ozoneservices.com/artcles/007.htm. 53. Center for Disease Control and Preventon. “CHLORINE: Damaging 78. U.S. Geological Survey, 2006. Minimum Depth-to-Bedrock values Agent.” The Natonal Insttute for Occupatonal Safety and Health provided by USDA/NRCS’s STATSGO2. (NIOSH). Last modifed May 26, 2015. htp://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ 79. U.S. Census Bureau, DOD, DHS, 2016. TIGER/Line Shapefle, 2016. ershdb/emergencyresponsecard_29750024.html. U.S., Military Installaton Natonal Shapefle. 54. Andrulewicz, Eugeniusz, Dorota Napierska, and Zbigniew Otrem- 80. U.S. Geological Survey. Protected Areas Database of the United ba. “The Environmental Efects of the Installaton and Functoning States (PAD-US) of the Submarine SwePol Link HVDC Transmission Line: A Case 81. U.S. Energy Informaton Agency, 2016. Oil and Gas Infrastructure Study of the Polish Marine Area of the Baltc Sea.” Journal of Sea (sub-sets analyzed include: HGL Pipelines, Natural Gas Interstate Research 49, no. 4 (2003). doi:10.1016/s1385-1101(03)00020-0. and Intrastate Pipelines, Natural Gas Underground Storage Facil- 55. Ibid. ites, Petroleum Product Pipelines, Petroleum Product Terminals, 56. Ibid. Petroleum Refneries, Power Plants, Crude Oil Pipelines, Tight Oil 57. Ardelean, Mircea and Philip Minnebo. JRC Technical Reports: HVDC Shale Gas Plays). Submarine Power Cables in the World. Brussels, Belgium: European 82. U.S. Energy Informaton Agency, U.S. Department of Labor, Mine Joint Research Commission, 2015. Safety and Health Administraton, 2014. Coal Mines, Surface and 58. Natonal Ocean Service: Natonal Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin- Underground. istraton U.S. Department of Commerce. “How far does light travel 83. Environmental Protecton Agency, Geospatal Data Download in the ocean?” Ocean Facts. htps://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/ Service (2017). htps://www.epa.gov/enviro/geospatal-data-down- light_travel.html. load-service. 59. Ardelean and Minnebo. JRD Technical Reports. 84. U.S. Geologic Survey, Advisory Commitee on Water Informaton. 60. Ibid Welcome to the Natonal Ground-Water. htps://cida.usgs.gov/ 61. Bailey, Weil, and Stewart. HVDC Power Transmission. ngwmn/index.jsp. 62. Ibid 85. USDA Natural Resources Conservaton Service, 2017. Web Soil 63. J. Droppo, J. G.”Field Determinatons of HVDC Ozone Producton Survey: Organic Mater Concentraton. Rates.” IEEE Transactons on Power Apparatus and Systems PAS- 86. USDA Natural Resources Conservaton Service, 2017. Web Soil 100, no. 2 (1981). doi:10.1109/tpas.1981.316962. Survey: Concrete Corrosion Potental. 64. Bailey, Weil, and Stewart. HVDC Power Transmission. 87. Paul Reich, USDA-NRCS & FAO-UNESCO, last modifed: 2005. Global 65. Ibid Soil Regions [GIS]. 66. Green Facts. “1. What are statc electric and magnetc felds?” 88. Ionita, I., et al. “The Behavior of Underground Power Cables Under Statc Fields. Last modifed 2017. htp://www.ost.gov/servlets/ the Acton of Stress Factors.” Romanian Journal of Physics 59, no. purl/580576-BUAbF9/webviewable/. 9-10 (2014). 67. Schmidt, G., B. Fiegl, and S. Kolbeck. “HVDC Transmission and 89. NOAA, Natonal Centers for Environmental Informaton, NESDIS, the Environment.” Power Engineering Journal 10, no. 5 (1996). U.S. Department of Commerce, 2013. Total Sediment Thickness of doi:10.1049/pe:19960503. the World’s Oceans & Marginal Seas, version 2. 68. Supe, A. and J. Porins. “Interacton Between Electromagnetc Field 90. U.S. Geological Survey, Government of Canada. Natural Resources and Optcal Signal Transmission in Fiber Optcs.” Electronics and Canada. Canada Centre for Remote Sensing. The Atlas of Canada Electrical Engineering 122, no. 6 (2012), 83–86. e Insttuto Nacional de Estadistca Geografa e Informatca, 2004. 69. Technical Guidelines: Pathway Separaton Between Telecommu- Census USGS Small-scale Dataset - North American Atlas - Bathym- nicaton Cables and Power Cables. Atlanta, GA: Superior Essex, etry 200406 Shapefle. htp://dds.cr.usgs.gov/pub/data/natonalat- November 7, 2016. las/bathy0m_shp_nt00296.tar.gz. 70. Lilliesterna, Andreas, and Johan Utas. “Thermal Classifcaton 91. U.S. Geological Survey, Government of Canada, Natural Resources of Cable Route.” Master’s thesis, Chalmers University of Tech- Canada, Canada Centre for Remote Sensing, The Atlas of Canada nology, 2015. htp://publicatons.lib.chalmers.se/records/full- e Insttuto Nacional de Estadistca Geografa e Informatca, 2004.

33 Chapter 1 Technical feasibility and environmental challenges

Census USGS Small-scale Dataset - North American Atlas - Bathym- 110. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservaton Commission-Fish and Wild- etry 200406 Shapefle. life Research Insttute. ”Deep Water Coral HAPCs.” Last modifed 92. U.S. Geological Survey, EEZ-Scan 87 Scientfc Staf, 1991. U.S. Atlan- January 14, 2016. tc East Coast bathymetry contours (EGLORIA_CNT). 111. NOAA, DOC, NOS, OCM, 2016. NOAA Charted Submarine Cables in 93. Merck, Thomas and Ralf Wasserthal. Assessment of the environ- the United States as of December 2012. mental impacts of cables. London, UK: OSPAR Commission Biodi- 112. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservaton Commission (FWC), Fish and versity Series, 2009. Wildlife Research Insttute (FWRI), 2015. Deepwater Coral HAPCs. 94. U.S. Geological Survey, University of Colorado, 2005. ATL_FAC: 113. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservaton Commission-Fish and usSEABED facies data for the entre U.S. Atlantc Coast, 1840-2003. Wildlife Research Insttute Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservaton 95. Essental Fish Habitat Consultaton Guidance. Silver Spring, MD: Commission (FWC), Fish and Wildlife Research Insttute (FWRI), Natonal Marine Fisheries Service Ofce of Habitat Conservaton, Coastal and Marine Resources Assessment (CAMRA), 2005. Coral, 2004. 3. Coral Reef and Live Hard Botom EFH-HAPC. 96. Regional Use of the Habitat Area of Partcular Concern (HAPC) 114. Department of Commerce (DOC), Natonal Oceanic and Atmo- Designaton. Dover, DE: Mid-Atlantc Fishery Management Council, spheric Administraton (NOAA), Natonal Ocean Service (NOS) September 22, 2016. 1. 2016. Marine Mammal Protecton Act. 97. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservaton Commission-Fish and Wild- 115. BOEM, 2012. Wildlife Survey Tracklines, ATL_WILDLIFE_SURVEYS. life Research Insttute, 2005. Dolphin and Wahoo EFH-HAPC. 116. Department of Commerce (DOC), Natonal Oceanic and Atmo- 98. Ibid spheric Administraton (NOAA), Natonal Ocean Service (NOS), 99. Ibid Ofce of Coast Survey (OCS). “FGDC Content Standard for Digital 100. Ibid Geospatal Metadata.” Last modifed 2015. 101. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservaton Commission-Fish and Wild- 117. DOC, NOAA, NOS, OCM, 2015. Deepwater Ports in US waters. life Research Insttute, 2008. Golden Crab Essental Fish Habitats. 118. NOAA, 2015. Deepwater Ports in US Waters as of August 2013. 102. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservaton Commission-Fish and Wild- 119. Maritme Administraton, U.S. Department of Transportaton, 2015. life Research Insttute, 2005. Shrimp RFH-HAPC. Vessel Calls in U.S. Ports, Selected Terminals and Lightering Areas: 103. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservaton Commission-Fish and Wild- Privately-owned, oceangoing merchant vessels over 1,000 gross life Research Insttute, 2008. Shrimp Essental Fish Habitat. tons. 104. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservaton Commission-Fish and Wild- 120. NOAA Ofce for Coastal Management. “Anchorage Areas.” Last life Research Insttute, 2005. Spiny Lobster EFH-HAPC. modifed 2015. 105. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservaton Commission-Fish and Wild- 121. NOAA Ofce for Coastal Management. FGDC Content Standard for life Research Insttute, 2008. Spiny Lobster Essental Fish Habitat. Digital Geospatal Metadata. Charleston, SC: NOAA, 2015. 106. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservaton Commission (FWC), Fish and 122. U.S. Energy Informaton Agency, 2016. Oil and Gas Infrastructure Wildlife Research Insttute (FWRI), South Atlantc Fishery Manage- 123. BOEM, 2016. BOEM Lease Areas Shapefle. ment Council (SAFMC), 2005. Coastal Migratory Pelagics Essental 124. BOEM, Wind Planning Areas Shapefle. Fish Habitat – Habitat Area of Partcular Concern (EFH-HAPC). 125. BOEM Lease Areas Shapefle. Sterling, VA: Bureau of Ocean Energy 107. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservaton Commission (FWC), Fish and Management, December 15, 2016. Wildlife Research Insttute (FWRI), South Atlantc Fishery Manage- 126. DOC, NOAA, NOS, 2009. Unexploded Ordinances in US waters as of ment Council (SAFMC), 2005. Coastal Migratory Pelagics EFH. February 2014. 108. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservaton Commission-Fish and Wild- 127. DOC, NOAA, NOS, Hydrographic Surveys Division (HSD), 2009. Of- life Research Insttute, 2005. Snapper Grouper EFH-HAPC. fce of Coast Survey’s Automated Wreck and Obstructon Informa- 109. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservaton Commission-Fish and ton System. Wildlife Research Insttute, 2015. Snapper Grouper Essental Fish Habitat.

34 Security and the North American Supergrid 2 Lead author: Mathew Acho Co-authors: José Alfredo Durand Cárdenas, Rachel Levine Dwight Macomber

Summary aaa aa aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaaaaa Electric grid security has moved to the forefront of policy afected components and, subsequently, retaining sys- discussions at nearly all levels of government. At present, tem stability. This system would be efectve against both the U.S. electrical grid is outdated and prone to damage EMP and naturally occurring threats such as geomagnetc from sources as varied as squirrels nibbling on power lines disturbances. Protectve shielding would ensure that the to threats from terrorist organizatons and rogue states. The cables protectng the wires are safeguarded against phys- North Korean (DPRK) regime’s testng of multple missiles ical tampering and extreme temperatures. and testmony that the DRPK possesses electromagnetc • Threats to Structural Integrity: The NAS makes use of pulse weapons, which could bring down portons of our underground cables to counteract purposeful tampering electric grid, should rightully alarm policy makers. Natu- by threat actors and to prevent animals from destroying rally occurring threats such as geomagnetc disturbances the wires. These improvements strengthen the structure can also bring down large portons of the grid in a similar of the grid system. manner as EMP atacks. Additonally, physical atacks on • Threats Originatng from Weaknesses in Cyber De- electrical infrastructure have been increasing in severity, fense: The NAS would possess measures that protect with the 2013 Metcalf incident being a partcularly alarming against the hacking of the Supervisory Control and Data example. Lastly, cyber threats on electrical infrastructure Acquisiton systems (SCADA), Distributed Network Proto- evolve every day, with assaults on grid systems becoming col Version 3.3 (DNP3) systems, and atacks on the Indus- increasingly efectve. Societal recovery tmes from any of trial Control Systems (ICS) of the grid. Some protectons these threats could be very long considering the extensive against these types of assaults come in the form of beter lead tme needed to replace larger transformers and power employee vetng/monitoring, daily password random- equipment, causing widespread loss of life and economic izaton, limitng access to important areas of substatons damage. to a small set of individuals, and beter segmentng of grid network systems. The North American Supergrid could play a strong role in solving these problems. The following report outlines vari- This chapter also discusses the role of federal oversight for ous avenues for improving the security and resiliency of the the inital building of the grid overlay and the role of federal grid: oversight in creatng the NAS more broadly. The security upgrades presented in this chapter would aid in protectng our • Electromagnetc Pulse Atacks and Naturally Occurring naton against atacks on the electrical grid. It is our opinion Threats: The NAS would feature a fault detecton system that the NAS is perhaps our country’s best opton for updat- as well as protectve shielding around the cables that en- ing and hardening our aging and vulnerable electrical grid close the system’s wires. The fault detecton system en- infrastructure. sures that if one porton of the grid goes down it would not afect the entre system. A failure in one secton of the grid would be detected as a “fault,” and the system would compensate by reroutng power away from the

35 Chapter 2 Security and the North American Supergrid

2.1 Introduction enhancement capabilites poses a threat to all other naton states. In a Washington Times artcle on North Korea’s ru- The grid’s importance to our naton’s economy and way of mored development of EMP weapons, a Chinese military life cannot be overstated; the grid is the common denom- commentator is quoted as saying that the North Koreans inator that underlies all other critcal infrastructure--water, possess EMP weapons.10 North Korean motves are uncer- food, transportaton, homeland defense, and more, yet it tain, but they appear prepared to atack the United States is also the weakest component of our infrastructure. This with an EMP style weapon, whether by satellite or by nucle- report will summarize solutons to the four major security ar missile. North Korea tested an intercontnental ballistc challenges confrontng our grid: manmade electromag- missile in early July 201711 and has contnued to ramp up netc disturbances, natural electromagnetc disturbances, these tests in recent months.12 The threat posed by North structural integrity, and cybersecurity. The much-needed Korea as a potental perpetrator of a HEMP atack has also improvements laid out in the North American Supergrid Ini- been confrmed by former Director of Central Intelligence, tatve would enable us to meet these challenges. R. James Woolsey. In a report from the Natonal Review, he pleads with Congress to seriously consider the threat from 2.2 Manmade Electromagnetic Threats EMP.13

The electrical power transmission grid in the United States Whether this atack occurs likely depends on the delicate is largely made up of a series of many long and highly con- politcal situaton within and outside North Korea, and the ductve metallic cables. These cables have the potental to success of potental target states to “harden” their electric be impacted by electromagnetc waves. A commonly ref- grids and other key infrastructures against EMP atack haz- erenced potental source of such disturbances is an EMP ards. China, though actng as a moderatng force, may be atack (brought about by high alttude detonaton of a nu- unable to stop North Korea from initatng an atack. Eco- clear device). This form of atack is becoming an increas- nomic hardships in North Korea may keep the DPRK focused ingly likely threat to modern civilizaton given the current on domestc issues, but this is unlikely considering the lead- security climate. The EMP electric feld waveform has three ership’s bellicose maneuvers in the last few months. components referred to as E1, E2, and E3 waves.1 The short, high-intensity E1 wave couples large currents to disrupt op- A new and more resilient grid could bolster our defenses eratonal power and communicaton lines.2 The E2 wave is against a natonwide blackout caused by a HEMP atack. much lower in energy than E1, with the E3 wave having the HEMP atacks can be executed using various means de- lowest energy of the three waves, and possessing charac- pending on a country’s level of technological sophistcaton. teristcs similar to solar geomagnetc disturbances (GMD).3 Delivery platorms for these devices can include unguided The E3 wave can produce signifcant currents on long elec- missiles and balloons. The usage of balloons to transport trical lines.4 E1 waves can damage both smaller electrical airborne weaponry was utlized by the Japanese during devices, and distributon transformers.5 E3 waves have the World War II.14 During the war, the Imperial Army launched potental to destroy larger transformers causing damage re- balloons carrying bombs across the Pacifc and into U.S. ter- quiring replacement.6 ritory.15 Today, delivery means have evolved. In a February 2017 artcle from the Washington Times, James Oberg, a The High Alttude Electromagnetc Pulse (HEMP) threat is distnguished astronaut and space expert who visited the a type of EMP that is intensifed by being detonated over a DPRK’s satellite launch facility, stated that satellites armed large geographic coverage area, exceeding the capability of with small nuclear warheads may very well have become a conventonal grid protecton equipment to isolate the dis- major part of North Korea’s space program and that they turbance to a single region.7 In either scenario of solar storm seek to use it as a threat against the United States.16 As the or HEMP, the combined strength of the three waves could optons to deliver these types of weapons contnue to in- shut down the electrical grid for months to years, causing crease, it has become increasingly imperatve that the Unit- unprecedented economic disruptons and loss of life.8 The ed States arm itself against these types of atacks. duraton of the outage can also be greatly increased based on the availability of replacement transformers, and the es- Non-nuclear EMP (NNEMP) atacks are also causes for con- pecially long lead tmes needed for installaton and start-up cern, especially when considering non-state actors. Indi- of these transformers.9 viduals, terrorists, or criminal groups wishing to interrupt or destroy communicaton systems can execute intenton- Threats from a HEMP are likely to come from North Korea al electromagnetc interference (IEMI) atacks. However, or any other actors with hostle intent towards the United these efects are generally limited to smaller areas since the States. However, it should be noted that any naton with energy from IEMI emiters diminishes with distance.17 For hostle intent that possesses nuclear weapons with EMP this reason, the non-nuclear EMP threat is not as serious

36 Security and the North American Supergrid Chapter 2 for entre critcal infrastructures as the hazards posed by 2.3 Naturally-Occurring Electromagnetic high-alttude nuclear EMP. However, NNEMP devices can Threats be used to take down segments of the electrical grid. They can be utlized by both the military and criminal or terrorist groups for their own purposes. During a Congressional hear- The grid faces not just manmade, but also natural threats. ing with the Subcommitee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Random solar fares, can lead to rapid and drastc changes Protecton and Security Technologies on May 8 2014, it was in the Earth’s magnetc feld through the ejecton of solar said that a malicious individual armed with what is called coronal mass, and these geomagnetc storms can induce an “EMP suitcase” could disable the grid of a major city if impulsive currents in bulk power systems around the globe; the perpetrator knew the locaton of a main plant or trans- the sequence of events caused by geomagnetc storms has former farm that routes electricity to the area.18 The EMP been thoroughly documented and studied. These currents, suitcase is a type of NNEMP and can be efectve if the indi- referred to as geo-magnetcally induced currents (GICs), can vidual or team of individuals using these devices are skilled be large enough to disrupt normal operaton and possibly operators. damage or destroy portons of bulk power systems.

Threat actors (especially non-state actors such as ISIS) seek- We will consider three types of geomagnetc solar storms in ing to execute this sort of atack can create their own IEMI this secton: auroral electrojets, coronal hole disturbances, devices.19 The relevant components are inexpensive, and and sudden storm commencement (SSC) events. Each can such devices are easy to build. According to the Congres- impact diferent portons of the globe, as well as diferent sional Research Service’s fnal deliverable in 2008, a short components of the naton’s electric grid. range, small scale device could be created for less than $2,000.20 The material to create the device is also easily Auroral Electrojets originate in the Earth’s ionosphere, which found and is commercially available.21 Although the device is an electrically conductve atmospheric layer situated in has a much smaller range than a HEMP, if one were to be alttudes from 40 miles above the Earth’s surface.28 More used in Times Square in New York City, the results could be specifcally, auroral electrojets originate in the two lowest deadly and the psychological efects would be profound. of the three regions of the ionosphere: D and E.29 Most ac- Such an atack is very possible as demonstrated by the re- tvity in the D region (in the form of radio wave absorpton) cent explosion of a handmade bomb in New York City on 17 occurs during the day, with the region disappearing during September 2016.22 As terrorists become more resourceful, evening hours.30 The E region follows the same temporal the threat from a small scale IEMI device has become a ma- patern, yet absorbs x-rays.31 In the D and E regions, elec- jor cause for concern. trojets are produced by horizontal electric felds, which can be extremely destructve.32 Importantly, it should be noted The efects of large-scale man-made electromagnetc dis- that these electric felds and the associated conductvity of turbances have previously been demonstrated by nuclear the ionosphere are strongest and most prevalent at higher weapons testng on Johnston Island in the Pacifc Ocean. lattudes,33 making the Northern Hemisphere partcularly The Starfsh Prime nuclear tests occurred on the unincorpo- susceptble to this type of solar storm. One efect of such rated U.S. territory of Johnston Island. The tests, conducted storms is visible to the naked eye in the form of the Aurora on 9 July 1962, were part of a series of “high-alttude nu- northern lights. The storms can last several hours to several clear bomb tests” used to gather informaton about EMP days; the Carrington events of 1859, for example, impacted efects by the United States.23 The nuclear warhead used at telegraphic systems over a period of 12 days.34 Pipelines and the tme was equivalent to “1.4 million tons of TNT explod- similar infrastructure may also be afected.35 ing”.24 Following a blast of this magnitude, electrons quickly move away from the area of the blast, and are defected The Sun’s corona (as with other stars) is a layer of plasma by the Earth’s magnetc feld, creatng an electromagnetc material that surrounds the Sun.36 Coronal Hole disturbanc- pulse.25 The efects of the explosion were immediate and es form when movement of low density sun plasma creates led to efects from the EMP being felt hundreds of kilome- gaps in the coronal layer.37 Unlike the rest of the sun, mag- ters away in Hawaii, where it caused the blackout of “… netc felds originatng from coronal holes leave the Sun’s hundreds of streetlights, and caused widespread telephone surface in a “high speed solar wind stream”38 and extend outages…other efects included electrical surges on air- into outer space, where they may come into contact with planes and radio blackouts.”26 The radiaton’s efects in the Earth and create fairly severe geomagnetc solar storms.39 atmosphere were long-lastng and damaged several space satellites.27 A weapon of similar size to the Johnston Island Lastly, perhaps the least understood type of geomagnetc tester could cause even more damage if detonated above disturbance is referred to as a Sudden Storm Commence- populated areas like New York City or Washington DC. ment. There is some debate in the scientfc community re-

37 Chapter 2 Security and the North American Supergrid garding the classifcaton of these events. Some believe that cameras (which may not be consistently monitored) and SSCs are merely the beginning phase of a larger geomag- barriers as basic as a chain link fence.50 Such limited mon- netc event, while others believe SSCs should be denoted itoring and security makes the need to upgrade the grid separately, as they are not always followed by a larger solar even more imperatve. storm.40 Currently, the accepted classifcaton of SSCs dic- tates that a SSC solar event occurs due to a sharp change The most notable past incident involving an atack on phys- in the vertcal component of the Sun’s magnetc feld,41 due ical grid infrastructure was the Metcalf substaton atack to “a sudden increase of … solar wind dynamic pressure.”42 on April 16th 2013.51 This incident was executed by a small Such storms do not afect any single porton of the Earth; in- group of individuals armed with long range rifes and an stead, every part of the globe is susceptble to SSCs.43 SSCs, impressive degree of advanced preparaton. The operaton even of brief duratons, have been suggested to cause trans- began at 1AM when the atackers cut telephone cables to former failures.44 prevent raising an alarm.52 The atackers appeared to have done a great deal of preparaton before conductng the The most widely regarded modern example of a natural atack. A small pile of rocks lef near certain areas of the geomagnetc disturbance was one that caused a shutdown substaton seemed to serve as indicators of where fellow at- of a Quebec Hydro Plant. It involved a moderate amplitude tackers should take their shots in order to efectvely cause GMD that caused the regional grid to shut down within 2 a shut down.53 The atackers then started to fre on these minutes, resultng in power outages to 6 million customers locatons, causing signifcant damage.54 The individuals re- for approximately 9 hours.45 Another less well-known inci- sponsible for the atack have never been caught. dent in 2012 involved a massive solar storm that missed the earth by a week.46 The storm would have created electron- The Metcalf incident was referred to by former Chairman ic disrupton efects similar to or perhaps even larger than of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Jon Welling- the Carrington Event of 1859, causing blackouts on a large nof as “the most signifcant incident of domestc terrorism scale.47 involving the grid that has ever occurred”.55 There is reason to believe that an atack on the components targeted in this 2.4 Threats to Structural Integrity incident could have resulted in prolonged blackouts ranging from months to years; again, due to the difculty to re- Power and utlity companies spend a great deal of their tme place and build more transformers.56 The atack, aimed at a on guard against any and all cyber intrusions to the elec- staton that routes power to Silicon Valley, also makes clear trical grid. This is an important task, but it also may divert how realistc the possibility is of a mass blackout in one of their atenton away from atacks on the physical structure the naton’s economic powerhouses, something that could of the grid itself that can result in power outages of a similar do massive economic damage to the naton.57 The locaton duraton.48 Recent atacks on transmission statons and oth- of the Metcalf substaton (in San Jose, California near the er parts of the electrical infrastructure make it imperatve South Valley Freeway)58 is also signifcant, and illustrates the that our grid be updated to withstand atacks from physical all too common practce of placing substatons in areas with destructon. At present, the grid and its structures are out- low foot trafc and relatvely litle security (making them moded and so prone to damage that even squirrels can take even more vulnerable to atack by cover of night). down an entre electrical line by nibbling the wires. Due to the fact that many of the cables are above ground, they are In additon to domestc threat actors, foreign terrorists are highly susceptble to damage from extreme weather condi- interested in atacking electrical grids. According to the Wall tons, threat actors (who need litle technical know-how to Street Journal the Electric Power Research Insttute found infict damage), and animals, creatng a high risk of power that, “overseas, terrorist organizatons were linked to 2,500 disrupton. Physical destructon of substatons, especially atacks on transmission lines or towers and at least 500 on those containing large transformers, can result in electricity substatons from 1996 to 2006.”59 Alarmingly, terrorists are outages over wide areas lastng from one month to over a very much aware of grid vulnerabilites in target natons and year.49 considering the low-level of skill required to carry out an at- tack similar to the Metcalf incident, there is reason for con- Security at electrical substatons tends to be very limited cern. Analysis by the Wall Street Journal found that there and unsophistcated. A coordinated atack on multple sub- had been 274 incidents of intentonal damage done to the statons could accordingly cause a large-scale blackout. An grid by individuals in the three years prior to 2014.60 Threats artcle from the Wall Street Journal regarding the coordi- to the structural integrity of the grid are very real and re- nated assault on Metcalf substaton discusses the incredibly quire litle beyond preliminary surveillance and planning. limited security measures that many electrical substatons A threat actor need not be incredibly sophistcated or af- tend to possess. Indeed, most statons have litle beyond fliated with any specifc naton or non-state group; threats

38 Security and the North American Supergrid Chapter 2 may emanate from disgruntled employees, eco-terrorists, Ukrainian electrical grid in December 2015 and again in De- or even simply bored hunters.61 The extent of the threat and cember 2016.70 The hacks shut down portons of Ukrainian the simplicity in which to execute it make upgrades to the electrical infrastructure and lef hundreds of thousands grid imperatve and well overdue. without power.71 The Ukrainian atacks were possibly used to gain tactcal advantage over the country by Russia. 2.5 Cybersecurity North Korea illustrated its ability to execute cyber-atacks The current grid possesses minimal cybersecurity measures during the Sony Pictures hack of 2014. Although the North against hacking, and the system is stll quite vulnerable to Koreans did not fully admit to being behind the hacking, atacks. These types of atacks may vary, and in the grid’s there is evidence suggestng that the DPRK’s Unit 121 was current manifestaton, are executable through a variety of the force that led the atack.72 Unit 121 is the cyber warfare diferent means. Indeed, there have been many cyber-at- component of the Korean People’s Army.73 Mr. Kim Heu- tacks on grid infrastructure in recent years; the three major ng-Gwang, a professor at North Korea’s Hamhung Universi- threat actors of note in this arena being Russia, North Ko- ty of Computer Technology, told the Washington Times that rea, and Iran. All three countries have either commited acts “North Korean hackers are targetng nuclear power plants, of sabotage against the United States, or have shown that transportaton networks, electrical utlites and all major they have the capacity and intent to carry out these atacks. government organizatons abroad…”.74 Mr. Heung-Gwang’s Non-state actors like ISIS and other terrorist groups, while remarks show that the North Koreans appear to be actvely not as immediate a threat as conventonal state actors, have interested in sabotaging electrical utlites and by extension, stll shown that they intend to carry out atacks on the grid the grid. It should be noted that North Korea’s closest al- through cyber sabotage.62 At present, conventonal state lies are fellow rogue states Iran and Syria, who they regard actors are likely the most probable culprits for atacks on as confdants due to their mutual oppositon to the United the U.S. electrical grid. However, given the long lead tme States.75 required to secure and upgrade the U.S. grid, there is ample tme for independent threat actors to develop--or hire or Iranian and U.S. relatons have rested on very fragile foun- purchase--sophistcated cyber capability.63 datons for some tme. Both states have actvely used cyber sabotage against one another and diplomatc relatons Electrical companies are inundated with new and evolving are stll strained following the Iran Nuclear Deal carried out cyber threats every day. Indeed, according to U.S. News during the Obama Administraton. A cyber intrusion of par- and World Report, there has been a major spike in cyber-at- tcular importance occurred in 2013, when Iranian hackers tacks on energy and electrical utlity companies in recent gained access to the back-ofce systems of the Bowman years.64 In fact, of the 150 employees at various companies Avenue Dam, 30 miles north of New York City.76 Although, surveyed, more than 75 percent said that there had been the intrusion was not substantal, it illustrated the ability at least one “successful atack”, meaning that hackers were of external actors to gain access to critcal infrastructure, able to breach at least one of the company’s frewalls.65 Al- an issue of growing concern to policy makers. Earlier in though, few, if any have been able to afect the actual Oper- 2013 and 2014, the hackers in queston also executed de- atonal Technology (OT) network of the respectve systems, nial-of-service atacks against major U.S. banks such as J.P. the number of atacks is stll substantal and could eventu- Morgan and Wells Fargo.77 Cyber-atacks such as this can ally breach the OT network, leading to atacks that could cause major economic interruptons and loss of money. A afect both monitoring and control systems of the electric grand jury in the Southern District of New York ruled that grid.66 Atacks can be executed in a variety of ways. For ex- both intrusions were commited by Iranian natonals who ample, atacks can come in the form of the inserton of new were “…manager[s] or employee[s] of ITSecTeam or Mer- code into an existng system to cause a disturbance, or as sad, private security computer companies based in the Is- manipulaton atacks.67 Other common examples include lamic Republic of Iran that performed work on behalf of the denial of service, reroutng of power, and tampering with Iranian Government, including the Islamic Revolutonary temperature controls.68 All could possibly lead to a brown- Guard Corps.”78 This shows that not only are these atacks out or blackout situaton.69 essentally state sanctoned, but that they can do immediate damage to the U.S. economy and its people. Russia appears to have the capability to use cyber-atacks on electrical systems as a means of politcal leverage and Modern cyber-atacks can be inficted on the SCADA sys- tactcal advantage. The Russian annexaton of Crimea and tems which are the Industrial Control Systems (ICS) that its rather aggressive dealings with Ukraine have been a focal operate the grid. For our purposes, there are three main point of U.S. and Russian foreign policy. Partcularly note- security concerns that are associated with SCADA systems. worthy is Russia’s likely involvement in the hacking of the One problem is policy and procedure vulnerabilites (holes

39 Chapter 2 Security and the North American Supergrid in security that can be exploited by an external source). Ac- tem architecture to communicate with smaller units like Re- cording to the Public Interest Energy Research Group (PIER), gional Transmission Units. However, interoperability at this these usually are caused by a “lack of security audits, di- level comes with risk. Threat actors can initate cyber-atacks saster recovery plan etc”.79 Another concern is platorm in the form of “Length Overfow and DFC [(Device Fence confguraton vulnerabilites (involving inadequate upkeep Control)] Flag Atacks”, “Reset and Unavailable” functon of efectve password policies and inefectve security patch atacks, and “Outstaton Data Resets”.90 Length Overfow policies).80 Yet another is platorm sofware vulnerabilites and DFC Flag Atacks insert data into the length feld, which (i.e. the lack of intrusion detecton and preventon sofware can cause outstatons to receive a false message that caus- as well as an absence of malware protecton sofware).81 es it to shut down.91 The “Reset and Unavailable” functon allow an atacker to take control of an outstaton, allowing Other notable types of vulnerabilites can allow the hacker them to reset it or deactvate it for an extended period.92 An to take large-scale control over many diferent components “Outstaton Data Reset” falls under the same category, and within the SCADA system. Network confguraton vulnera- can cause an outstaton to suddenly become inactve and bilites, for example, are weaknesses in the security of the inoperable.93 system’s network architecture (in other words, efectve data control is not applied).82 Network perimeter vulnera- The last major type of atack that the NAS should be de- bilites, or weaknesses in network security architecture in fended against is an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) at- the form of a lack of frewalls or segmented architecture, tack, a method of cyber-atack where the threat actors can lead to insecure connectons with outside sources that (which could be a naton-state or other nefarious individual) can exacerbate or lead to more system problems.83 Finally, monitor and target a component of the transmission archi- network communicaton vulnerabilites are the broad holes tecture over an extended period.94 The atack on Ukraine’s that exist in the communicaton architecture of a SCADA sys- electric grid could be categorized as an APT, considering that tem, allowing an atacker access to sensitve components.84 the inital infltraton occurred 9 months before the grid system blackout.95 But APTs are executable through any system Atacks that impact grid network architecture itself are equipped with network capabilites. This type of atack is also of concern. According to PIER, “network architecture typically used for intelligence gathering rather than for out- design is critcal in ofering the appropriate amount of seg- right exploitaton and sabotage.96 However, it could serve mentaton between the Internet, the company’s corporate as a prelude to a larger cyber assault. Hackers could theo- network, and the SCADA network”.85 In the context of the retcally use APT methods to monitor the operatons side NAS, the “company’s corporate network” is the utlity com- of the system, keeping a low profle as they search for ways pany, providing electricity through the Supergrid. When dis- to breach security protocols in the Operatons Technology cussing network confguraton vulnerabilites, the primary area of the grid system.97 Strategies for mitgatng the threat concern is that server connectons may not be protected from APT do exist (such as daily password randomizaton), by frewalls when contactng corporate partners and oth- and measures for preventng these types of atacks will be er outside sources. This connecton can then become input in place in the new grid. secure, leaving a backdoor open for potental adversaries to take advantage of when given the chance. Moreover, a Coordinated assaults where actors atack both the physical lack of frewalls within a company’s segmented network and cyber components of the grid are becoming a major architecture can lead to openings that can be exploited as cause for concern.98 An intelligent atack of this sort could well. Such issues can lead to concern regarding network cause devastatng damage to the grid, especially if inficted perimeter vulnerabilites. Without protectve mechanisms on multple major transmission sources at once. The up- like frewalls and proper network confguraton, SCADA sys- dates proposed in this brief should help in alleviatng these tems can be lef open to atacks from worms, viruses, and concerns. However, cyber threats evolve every day and utl- hackers.86 Indeed, network connectons provided over wire- ity operators and policy makers must remain vigilant in their less system architecture are especially vulnerable to atack. surveillance of these systems. Despite this, many control systems (and many SCADA systems) make use of WIFI, exacerbatng security and system 2.6 Mitigation of Threats by HVDC Cable recovery issues.87 Network communicaton vulnerabilites primarily involve threats to the system’s security proto- Construction cols.88 For our purposes, inter-connected systems such as the Distributed Network Protocol Version 3.3 (DNP3) are of The North American Supergrid will utlize shielded HVDC the most importance for evaluaton.89 cables, which contain a metallic sheath between insulaton layers that acts as an absorbent for excess charge that DNP3 systems are designed to make it easier for macro sys- may come into contact with a cable during an EMP or GMD

40 Security and the North American Supergrid Chapter 2 event.99 Since currents and voltages from electromagnet- tons, databases, and communicaton protocols…” need to ic disturbances can be extreme and destructve, the outer be standardized within the entrety of the grid system to screen of shielded cables in the proposed system could be prevent confusion.107 Currently, the grid is too disconnect- physically “broken” at regular intervals to limit the induced ed to efectvely manage its many components. The North currents. At these break points, one end of the electrical- American Supergrid would allow for a coordinated cyber se- ly isolated cable screen secton is grounded to the soil to curity partnership that would be resilient against manipula- provide an alternate path away from the center conductor ton atacks as well as other types of cyber threats. for the EMP-induced current. The impulsive nature of EMP causes currents induced on the outer screen to couple en- On the most basic level, the cornerstone of efectve cyber- ergy into the center utlity load-bearing conductor of the security is the proper conduct of the employees who direct- HVDC cable.100 How much energy of the EMP wave is cou- ly interact with the system. Employees in charge of monitor- pled into the center conductor is a complicated functon of ing the electricity transmission process must be thoroughly the EMP wave-shape and its angle of arrival, soil conduc- veted to ensure that they are not a security liability. This tvity and burial depth, cable geometry and the length of process should include thorough background checks for all the secton of outer screen.101,102 The interval placement of employees, with strict punishments in place should an em- the grounding arrangements is dependent on the soil con- ployee knowingly allow a hacker into the system. Leaders of ductvity and the efectveness of the EMP suppression that regional teams should also be well-versed in cyber security is desired. Since these grounds are only efectve during an threats and the measures currently in place to guard against extraordinary EMP event, they would not need to be on said threats. Employees should also have specialized train- the scale of those designed for contnuous use in a unipo- ing with a focus on pertnent threats and be encouraged to lar ground-return type system. Ultmately, rolling blackouts think creatvely. Finally, access to the physical control center due to cable malfuncton or transformer explosions can be of the transmission substatons should be limited to one or avoided or lessened if these steps are followed. few employees to decrease the likelihood of a security incident.108 Similarly, some cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE) HVDC cables, such as those which will be utlized in this system, can The intelligence community (IC) should also play a vital role also contain a tamper resistant outer shell, which can pre- in the development of the North American Supergrid secu- vent accidental or malicious tampering incidents with litle rity mechanisms. It is imperatve that the IC remains well upkeep.103 This thermoset resin can withstand abrasions as connected with like-minded professionals and seeks help well as contact with extreme temperatures, moisture, and from cyber security experts and companies in monitoring most chemical compounds without losing rigidity.104 Since threats to the grid.109 Utlity companies are ill-equipped cables will be placed underground, this casing will provide to deal with cyber threats as they increase in seriousness a crucial frst line of defense against tampering or naturally because of diferences in the utlity ICS architecture across caused abrasions. This will be installed along with the cable companies.110 As such, utlites cannot be expected to han- itself for no additonal cost. dle the problem on their own.111 The IC should help the DOE and DHS in standardizing data defnitons, databases, 2.7 Mitigation of Threats by Federal Over- and communicaton protocols so as to enable an efectve response to evolving cyber threats.112 Standards derived sight and Software Monitoring Systems from the North American Electric Reliability Corporaton’s Critcal Infrastructure Protecton (or NERC CIP) plan should The North American Supergrid will require cooperaton be- contnue to be used, and contnuously updated to remain tween federal, state, private, and likely local enttes if it is in line with the newest security advancements. However, as to be efectve. Regional counterparts would contnue to underlined in the Natonal Associaton of Regulatory Utli- monitor the various sectons of the existng grid. However, ty Commissioners (NARUC) report on cybersecurity issues a group within the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission concerning the grid, utlites must also contnuously take (FERC) should play a role in overseeing the bulk monitor- part in “risk assessment” to efectvely combat cybersecuri- ing of the NAS overlay. As illustrated by the Defense Science ty threats.113 Moreover, there should be a sustained recruit- Board’s 2017 paper concerning the Task Force on Cyber ment campaign to procure exceptonal talent in the feld of Deterrence, mitgaton of cyber threats at the federal level cyber security into the IC.114 Furthermore, red team scenar- is already occurring.105 However, the Department of Home- ios involving the creaton of novel ways to atack the grid land Security (DHS), Department of Energy (DOE), and utli- using hacking should be designed and undertaken on a reg- tes should increase their informaton sharing between one ular basis (perhaps even more so than the GridEx exercise another so as to ensure an efectve and unifed response to that is currently only held every two years). Cybersecurity any and all atacks on the NAS.106 Moreover “…data defni- experts should be used contnuously as the members of the

41 Chapter 2 Security and the North American Supergrid red team. This actvity will ensure that the grid is up to date chance of a power outage by notfying a utlity that a fault and prepared for atacks. However, regardless of prepara- has occurred and, consequently, would allow for an afected tons we cannot possibly account for every single vulnera- substaton to be isolated before it can afect the rest of the bility. The IC should remain diligent in keeping informaton system. There are three main techniques for identfying and concerning grid vulnerabilites confdental and limited to detectng potental system faults in so-called “hybrid” HVDC people immediately involved in its upkeep. systems (in which AC distributon is linked with DC transmission). The fuzzy logic method is the strongest detecton The North American Supergrid will also feature secure fre- system of the three, as it is based on human reasoning. This walls to protect against atacks within the network system means that the variables used in this case are words rath- infrastructure itself. Moreover, utlity companies in each of er than numbers. The fuzzy logic method does not require the Regional Transmisson Organizatons (RTOs) must have an iteraton process, and studies have proven that either experts on hand to monitor the system at all tmes in or- AC and DC faults can be detected in a HVDC system. It is a der to make certain that the system is monitored for any rule-based approach where a set of rules represent decision of the above atacks against inter-connected systems like making, making it the most comprehensive fault detecton the DNP3 protocol system. Connectons to outside sources choice for the NAS. The model used in this report121 consid- should require that the other enttes or individuals make ers two AC voltage sources with the same specifcatons are use of a password to engage in the trade of informaton. In- interconnected by a HVDC cable. Following this structure, ternet used for major SCADA networks and systems should diferent faults can be produced in the two AC sides of the be provided via wired connecton only to avoid security is- HVDC system, and in the DC link itself. When analyzing only sues associated with WIFI. Indeed, WIFI security issues are one side, fve faults can be considered. However, for mathe- serious, especially if the network employs a simple pass- matcal purposes, the normal operaton of the HVDC system word or none at all. Researchers at Kaspersky Labs and else- is considered a sixth fault. where have found that, without such safeguards, a hacker can disguise himself as the WIFI hotspot, giving access to all This survey of the diferent faults that can occur in the HVDC informaton that is being sent over the network.115 systems makes clear that multple lines of the same confguraton can be afected by the same type of fault. It is accord- A secured gateway to the electrical system to protect the ingly necessary to implement a detecton system which con- grid from malware should also be ensured to further aid the siders this and other issues. In total, ten faults in the AC lef utlites in proper monitoring of the system. The gateway side of the system can be found, and another ten in the AC is the parameter through which messages are given to and right side. Along with the DC fault, the whole HVDC system received by the control room of the utlity company.116 If presents 21 types of faults.122 Unlike the analysis performed atackers were to exploit this faw they would “…have the for 6 electrical faults, a twenty-one-fault detecton system ability to directly manipulate all communicatons to and will require data from both AC sides of the HVDC system, from the substaton.”117 This would allow atackers to have since a fault can occur at any point. The healthy conditon direct control over any Transmission SCADA (T-SCADA)/En- for the system occurs when all the output values are nulI. All ergy Management Systems (EMS) systems the substaton is the outputs will be zero except for the DC output in the case connected to at the tme. This is a substantal vulnerabil- of a DC fault. By implementng a detecton system that will ity that must be removed,118 since T-SCADA/EMS systems not produce a rigid binary output, a wider net can be cast to regulate energy transmission for utlizaton in substatons detect and eliminate more types of faults that may be pres- and lines119 and are in charge of preventng load overload ent in the NAS’s hybrid electric system. Regardless of where and other electrical line problems.120 To protect against this a fault originates, having the tools to quarantne problem threat, the grid must be monitored 24/7 and stafed by al- areas will contribute to both reliability and resilience. ternatng individuals to reduce the chance of any employee being susceptble to coercion or threats. 2.8 Conclusion

To be applied in conjuncton with improvements to the SCA- The North American Supergrid presents a new and innova- DA and ICS system, a fault detecton system should also be tve way of securing our naton’s future. While ambitous, implemented. Faults, or electrical-fow failures that occur the security updates contained in this report are not with- within the grid, may arise from a variety of causes throughout precedent. Federal Agencies such as the DOE and DHS out the system. The detecton and clearance of faults is im- have already conducted substantal amounts of research on portant for safe and optmal operaton of any HVDC system. the updates being proposed, and Congress has also shown If a power line goes down or short circuits, the new grid great interest in updatng the grid to withstand threats from system will be able to detect these faults before they can outside hostle actors. Additonally, the Trump Administra- afect the macro system. This would reduce or eliminate the ton has stated its intent to overhaul electrical infrastruc-

42 Security and the North American Supergrid Chapter 2 ture, and the North American Supergrid Initatve ofers an 13. R. James Woolsey, William R. Graham, Henry F. Cooper, Fritz afordable and efectve proposal for doing so. Ermarth, and Peter Vincent Pry. “Underestmatng Nuclear Missile Threats from North Korea and Iran.” The Natonal Review, 12 The innovatons suggested in this report allow the U.S. February 2016. htp://www.natonalreview.com/artcle/431206/ to lower electrical costs, increase penetraton of multple iran-north-korea-nuclear. types of electrical sources (including renewable electric 14. “Japan’s Secret WWII Weapon: Balloon Bombs.” Natonal Geo- sources), and strengthen natonal security. In this way, the graphic. 27 May 2013, htp://news.natonalgeographic.com/ North American Supergrid will help the U.S. elevate itself as news/2013/05/130527-map-video-balloon-bomb-wwii-japanese- the leader and torchbearer for grid security. air-current-jet-stream/. 15. Ibid. References 16. Peter Vincent Pry. “North Korea, the real threat.” The Washington Times, 14 February 2017. htp://www.washingtontmes.com/ 1. “An Introducton to Nuclear Electromagnetc Pulse.” Future Sci- news/2017/feb/14/north-korea-missile-strike-remains-a-real- ence, LLC, accessed on 13 November 2017, htp://www.future- threat/. science.com/emp.html. 17. William Radasky. “HEMP, IEMI, and Severe Geomagnetc Storms 2. Savage, Edward, James Gilbert, William Radasky. The Early-Time on Critcal Infrastructures.” Presentaton for IEEE EMC Santa Clara (E1) High-Alttude Electromagnetc Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact Valley Chapter, Santa Clara Valley, CA, January 2011. htp://www. on the U.S. Power Grid. Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge Natonal scvemc.org/archive/012011WilliamRadasky.pdf. Slide 37. Laboratory, January 2010. p. 7-1 and 7-2. 18. “Electromagnetc Pulse (EMP): Threat to Critcal Infrastructure: 3. Natonal Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. En- Hearing Before the Subcommitee on Cybersecurity, Infrastruc- hancing the Resilience of the Naton’s Electricity System. (Wash- ture Protecton, And Security Technologies of the Commitee on ington, DC: The Natonal Academies Press, 2017). htps://doi. Homeland Security House of Representatves, 113th Cong. p. 17 org/10.17226/24836. p. 3-17 (2014) (statement of Peter Vincent Pry, member of the Congres- 4. “An Introducton to Nuclear Electromagnetc Pulse.” Future Sci- sional EMP Commission). htps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG- ence, LLC, accessed on 13 November 2017, htp://www.future- 113hhrg89763/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg89763.pdf. science.com/emp.html. 19. Ibid. p. 17. 5. Savage, Edward, James Gilbert, William Radasky. The Early-Time 20. Wilson, Clay, High Alttude Electromagnetc Pulse (HEMP) and High (E1) High-Alttude Electromagnetc Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact Power Microwave (HPM) Devices: Threat Assessments, (Washing- on the U.S. Power Grid. Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge Natonal ton, D.C., Congressional Research Service 2008). p.21. Laboratory, January 2010. P. 7-7. 21. Ibid. 6. Ibid. p. 8-2. 22. Mallory Simon and Tim Hume. “New York explosion that injured 29 7. Foster, Dr. John S, Earle Gjelde, William R. Graham, Dr. Robert J. was ‘intentonal act,’ mayor says.” CNN.com, 18 September 2016. Hermann, Henry (Hank) M. Kluepfel, Gen. Richard L. Lawson, Dr. htp://www.cnn.com/2016/09/17/us/new-york-explosion/. Gordon K Soper, Dr. Lowell L. Wood Jr., Dr. Joan B. Woodard. Report 23. “The 50th anniversary of Starfsh Prime: the nuke that shook the of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States of world.” Discover Magazine. 9 July 2012. htp://blogs.discovermaga- Electromagnetc Pulse (EMP) Atack: Critcal Natonal Infrastruc- zine.com/badastronomy/2012/07/09/the-50th-anniversary-of-star- tures. McLean, Virginia: Electromagnetc Pulse Commission, April fsh-prime-the-nuke-that-shook-the-world/#.WCI05NwsHR0 2008. P. vi. 24. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 25. “The 50th anniversary of Starfsh Prime: the nuke that shook the 9. The U.S. Department of Energy. Strategic Transformer Reserve: world.” Discover Magazine. 9 July 2012. htp://blogs.discovermaga- Report to Congress. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of zine.com/badastronomy/2012/07/09/the-50th-anniversary-of-star- Energy, March 2017. p. v. fsh-prime-the-nuke-that-shook-the-world/#.WCI05NwsHR0 10. Peter Vincent Pry. “PRY: North Korea EMP atack could destroy U.S. 26. Ibid. now.” The Washington Times, 19 December 2012, htp://www. 27. “The 50th anniversary of Starfsh Prime: the nuke that shook the washingtontmes.com/news/2012/dec/19/north-korea-emp-at- world.” Discover Magazine. 9 July 2012. htp://blogs.discovermaga- tack-could-destroy-us-now/ . zine.com/badastronomy/2012/07/09/the-50th-anniversary-of-star- 11. Choe Sang-Hun. “U.S. Confrms North Korea Fired Intercontnental fsh-prime-the-nuke-that-shook-the-world/#.WCI05NwsHR0 Ballistc Missile.” The New York Times, 4 July 2017. htps://www. 28. “Ionosphere.” World of Earth Science, 2003. htp://www.encyclo- nytmes.com/2017/07/04/world/asia/north-korea-missile-test- pedia.com/earth-and-environment/atmosphere-and-weather/ icbm.html. atmospheric-and-space-sciences-atmosphere/ionosphere. 12. Al Jazeera and News Agencies. “North Korea fres ballistc mis- 29. Ibid. sile over Japan”. Al Jazeera, 15 September 2017. htp://www. 30. “Ionosphere.” World of Earth Science, 2003. htp://www.encyclo- aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/north-korea-fres-missile-ja- pedia.com/earth-and-environment/atmosphere-and-weather/ pan-170914221944101.html. atmospheric-and-space-sciences-atmosphere/ionosphere.

43 Chapter 2 Security and the North American Supergrid

31. Ibid. 50. Rebecca Smith. “Assault on California Power Staton Raises Alarm 32. Hysell, D. L., J. L. Chau, and C. G. Fesen, Efects of large horizon- on Potental for Terrorism” The Wall Street Journal. 5 February tal winds on the equatorial electrojet, J. Geophys. Res., 107(A8), 2014. htp://www.wsj.com/artcles/SB10001424052702304851104 doi:10.1029/2001JA000217, 2002. p. 27-1. 579359141941621778. 33. “Ionosphere.” World of Earth Science, 2003. htp://www.encyclo- 51. Ibid. pedia.com/earth-and-environment/atmosphere-and-weather/ 52. Rebecca Smith. “Assault on California Power Staton Raises Alarm atmospheric-and-space-sciences-atmosphere/ionosphere. on Potental for Terrorism” The Wall Street Journal. 5 February 34. Green, James, and Scot Boardsen. “Duraton and extent of the 2014. htp://www.wsj.com/artcles/SB10001424052702304851104 great auroral storm of 1859.” Advances in Space Research 38, no. 2 579359141941621778. (2006): 130-35. doi: 10.1016/j.asr.2005.08.054. p. 1. 53. Ibid. 35. “Space Weather: Sunspots, Solar Flares & Coronal Mass Ejectons” 54. Rebecca Smith. “Assault on California Power Staton Raises Alarm Reference, Space.com, last modifed March 16, 2017, htp://www. on Potental for Terrorism” The Wall Street Journal. 5 February space.com/11506-space-weather-sunspots-solar-fares-coronal- 2014. htp://www.wsj.com/artcles/SB10001424052702304851104 mass-ejectons.html. 579359141941621778. 36. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 37. “Space Weather: Sunspots, Solar Flares & Coronal Mass Ejectons” 56. U.S. Department of Energy, Large Power Transformers and the U.S. Reference, Space.com, last modifed March 16, 2017, htp://www. Electrical Grid (Washington, D.C.: Infrastructure Security and Ener- space.com/11506-space-weather-sunspots-solar-fares-coronal- gy Restoraton Ofce of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, mass-ejectons.html 2012). p. 31. 38. “Coronal Hole Front and Center.” NASA, last modifed October 14, 57. Jose Pagliery. “Sniper atack on California power grid may have 2015, htps://www.nasa.gov/image-feature/goddard/coronal-hole- been ‘an insider,’ DHS says” CNN. 17 October 2015. htp://money. front-and-center. cnn.com/2015/10/16/technology/sniper-power-grid/index.html. 39. Ibid. 58. Rebecca Smith. “Assault on California Power Staton Raises Alarm 40. J.J. Curto, T. Araki, and L. F. Alberca. “Evoluton of the concept of on Potental for Terrorism” The Wall Street Journal. 5 February Sudden Storm Commencements and their operatve identfcaton.” 2014. htp://www.wsj.com/artcles/SB10001424052702304851104 Earth Planets Space 59, no. 11 (November 2007): I-Xii. doi:10.1186/ 579359141941621778. bf03352059. P. i. 59. Ibid. 41. “Geomagnetc Sudden Commencements.” IAGA, Kevin Ivory, last 60. Rebecca Smith. “Assault on California Power Staton Raises Alarm modifed April 29, 1997. htp://wwwuser.gwdg.de/~rhennin/ssc. on Potental for Terrorism” The Wall Street Journal. 5 February html. 2014. htp://www.wsj.com/artcles/SB10001424052702304851104 42. J.J. Curto, T. Araki, and L. F. Alberca. “Evoluton of the concept of 579359141941621778. Sudden Storm Commencements and their operatve identfcaton.” 61. Ibid. Earth Planets Space 59, no. 11 (November 2007): I-Xii. doi:10.1186/ 62. Jose, Pagliery. “ISIS is atacking the U.S. energy grid (and failing).” bf03352059. P. ii. 16 October 2015. htp://money.cnn.com/2015/10/15/technology/ 43. “Geomagnetc Storms.” INGV, Insttuto Nazionale di Geofsica e vul- isis-energy-grid/index.html. canologia, accessed on 12 November 2017. htps://www.oa-roma. 63. Ibid. inaf.it/cvs/tempeste_ev.html. 64. Cyberatacks Surge on Energy Companies, Electric Grid. U.S. News 44. Kappenman, John. Geomagnetc Storms and Their Impacts on the and World Report, 8 April 2016. htp://www.usnews.com/news/ U.S. Power Grid. Goleta, CA: Oak Ridge Natonal Laboratory, Janu- blogs/data-mine/2016/04/08/cyberatacks-surge-on-energy-com- ary 2010. p. 4-7. panies-electric-grid. 45. Government Accountability Ofce, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 65. Ibid. PROTECTION: Federal Agencies Have Taken Actons 66. Natonal Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. En- to Address Electromagnetc Risks, but Opportunites Exist to Further hancing the Resilience of the Naton’s Electricity System. (Wash- Assess Risks and Strengthen Collaboraton, GAO-16-243 (Washing- ington, DC: The Natonal Academies Press, 2017). htps://doi. ton, D.C. : March 2016) p. 8. org/10.17226/24836. p. 4-24. 46. Near Miss: The Solar Superstorm of July 2012. NASA, 23 July 2012. 67. Eric D. Knapp and Raj Samani, Applied Cyber Security and the Smart htps://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2014/ Grid (Syngress, 2013), ( 23jul_superstorm/. 22 November 2016). p. 60. 47. Ibid. 68. Ibid. 48. Rebecca Smith. “Assault on California Power Staton Raises Alarm 69. Eric D. Knapp and Raj Samani, Applied Cyber Security and the Smart on Potental for Terrorism” The Wall Street Journal. 5 February Grid (Syngress, 2013), ( 2014. htp://www.wsj.com/artcles/SB10001424052702304851104 22 November 2016). p. 60. 579359141941621778. 70. Natalia Zinets. “Ukraine hit by 6,500 hack atacks, sees Russian ‘cy- 49. Ibid. berwar’.” Reuters. 29 December 2016. htps://www.reuters.com/

44 Security and the North American Supergrid Chapter 2

artcle/us-ukraine-crisis-cyber/ukraine-hit-by-6500-hack-atacks- tes and Risks. California Energy Commission, PIER Energy-Related sees-russian-cyberwar-idUSKBN14I1QC. Environmental Research Program. CEC-500-2012-047. p. 49. 71. Evan Perez. “First on CNN: U.S. investgators fnd proof of cyberat- 93. Ibid. tack on Ukraine power grid” CNN. 3 February 2016. htp://www. 94. Sorebo, Gib and Michael C. Echols. (2012). Smart Grid Security: An cnn.com/2016/02/03/politcs/cyberatack-ukraine-power-grid/ End to End View of Security in the New Electrical Grid. Boca Raton: 72. Bill Gertz. “Defector: North Korean hackers threaten West”. The CRC Press. p. 148. Washington Times. 4 March 2015. htp://www.washingtontmes. 95. Natonal Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. En- com/news/2015/mar/4/inside-the-ring-north-korea-cybersecuri- hancing the Resilience of the Naton’s Electricity System. (Wash- ty-hackers-/ ington, DC: The Natonal Academies Press, 2017). htps://doi. 73. Ibid. org/10.17226/24836. p. 3-26. 74. Bill Gertz. “Defector: North Korean hackers threaten West”. The 96. Symantec. Advanced Persistent Threats: A Symantec Perspec- Washington Times. 4 March 2015. htp://www.washingtontmes. tve. (Mountain View, CA: Symantec World Headquarters, 2011). com/news/2015/mar/4/inside-the-ring-north-korea-cybersecuri- htp://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/white_pa- ty-hackers-/. pers/b-advanced_persistent_threats_WP_21215957.en-us.pdf. p.1. 75. Ibid. 97. Edison Electric Insttute. Frequently Asked Questons About Cyber- 76. Evan Perez and Shimon Prokupecz. “U.S. charges Iranians for cy- security and the Electric Power Industry. (Washington, D.C.: Edison beratacks on banks, dam” CNN. 24 March 2016. htp://www.cnn. Electric Insttute, October 2015). htp://www.eei.org/issuesandpol- com/2016/03/23/politcs/iran-hackers-cyber-new-york-dam/ icy/cybersecurity/Documents/Cybersecurity_FAQ.pdf. p. 2. 77. Ibid. 98. Natonal Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. En- 78. Evan Perez and Shimon Prokupecz. “U.S. charges Iranians for cy- hancing the Resilience of the Naton’s Electricity System. (Wash- beratacks on banks, dam” CNN. 24 March 2016. htp://www.cnn. ington, DC: The Natonal Academies Press, 2017). htps://doi. com/2016/03/23/politcs/iran-hackers-cyber-new-york-dam/ org/10.17226/24836. p. 3-22. 79. Ghansah, Isaac. Smart Grid Security Potental Threats, Vulnerabili- 99. Conrad L. Longmire, “On the Electromagnetc Pulse Produced by tes and Risks. California Energy Commission, PIER Energy-Related Nuclear Explosions”, IEEE Transactons of Antennas and Propaga- Environmental Research Program. CEC-500-2012-047. p. 50. ton, Vol. AP-26, No. 1, January 1978, pp 3–13. 80. Ibid. p. 50. 100. Savage, Edward, James Gilbert, William Radasky. The Early-Time 81. Ghansah, Isaac. Smart Grid Security Potental Threats, Vulnerabili- (E1) High-Alttude Electromagnetc Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact tes and Risks. California Energy Commission, PIER Energy-Related on the U.S. Power Grid. Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge Natonal Environmental Research Program. CEC-500-2012-047. p. 50. Laboratory, January 2010. P. 2-35. 82. Ibid. p. 50. 101. E. Petrache, et al.,”Lightning-induced currents in buried coaxial 83. Ghansah, Isaac. Smart Grid Security Potental Threats, Vulnerabili- cables: A frequency-domain approach and its validaton using tes and Risks. California Energy Commission, PIER Energy-Related rocket-triggered lightning”, Journal of Electrostatcs, 65 (2007), pp Environmental Research Program. CEC-500-2012-047. p. 50. 322–328. 84. Ibid. p. 45-50. 102. Sunitha K. and M. Joy Thomas, “HEMP Field Coupling With Buried 85. Ghansah, Isaac. Smart Grid Security Potental Threats, Vulnerabili- Power Distributon Cables”, IEEE Internatonal Symposium on Elec- tes and Risks. California Energy Commission, PIER Energy-Related tromagnetc Compatbility, EMC 2009, August 2009. Environmental Research Program. CEC-500-2012-047. p. 47. 103. Nigel Hampton, Rick Hartlein, Hakan Lennartsson, Harry Orton, 86. Ibid. p. 47. Ram Ramachandran, Long-Life XLPE Insulated Power Cable, Ac- 87. Natonal Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. En- cessed on 13 November 2017, htp://www.neetrac.gatech.edu/ hancing the Resilience of the Naton’s Electricity System. (Wash- publicatons/jicable07_C_5_1_5.pdf. p. 4. ington, DC: The Natonal Academies Press, 2017). htps://doi. 104. “Applicaton of PEX/XLPE (Cross-Linked Polyethylene)” Performance org/10.17226/24836. p. 4-23. Wire and Cable, accessed on 13 November 2017, htps://www. 88. Ghansah, Isaac. Smart Grid Security Potental Threats, Vulnerabili- performancewire.com/applicatons-of-pex-xlpe-cross-linked-poly- tes and Risks. California Energy Commission, PIER Energy-Related ethylene-cable/. Environmental Research Program. CEC-500-2012-047. p. 48. 105. Ofce of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisiton, Technolo- 89. Elizabeth Weise. “Malware discovered that could threaten electric gy, and Logistcs. Defense Science Board: Task Force on Cyber Deter- grid.” USA Today. 12 June 2017. htps://www.usatoday.com/story/ rence. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2017). htps:// tech/news/2017/06/12/malware-discovered-could-threaten-elec- fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/cyber-deter.pdf. trical-grid/102775998/. 106. Natonal Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. En- 90. Ghansah, Isaac. Smart Grid Security Potental Threats, Vulnerabili- hancing the Resilience of the Naton’s Electricity System. (Wash- tes and Risks. California Energy Commission, PIER Energy-Related ington, DC: The Natonal Academies Press, 2017). htps://doi. Environmental Research Program. CEC-500-2012-047. p. 49. org/10.17226/24836. p. 3-22. 91. Ibid. 107. Ibid. p. 4-36. 92. Ghansah, Isaac. Smart Grid Security Potental Threats, Vulnerabili- 108. Sorebo, Gib and Michael C. Echols. (2012). Smart Grid Security: An

45 Chapter 2 Security and the North American Supergrid

End to End View of Security in the New Electrical Grid. Boca Raton: 115. Kaspersky Labs. How to Avoid Public Wif Security Risks. (Woburn, CRC Press. p. 153. MA: AO Kaspesky Labs, 2017). Retrieved from: htps://usa.kasper- 109. Ofce of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisiton, Technolo- sky.com/resource-center/preemptve-safety/public-wif-risks. gy, and Logistcs. Defense Science Board: Task Force on Cyber Deter- 116. Eric D. Knapp and Raj Samani, Applied Cyber Security and the Smart rence. htps://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/cyber-deter.pdf. p. 26. Grid (Syngress, 2013), ( 110. Natonal Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. En- 22 November 2016). p. 38. hancing the Resilience of the Naton’s Electricity System. (Wash- 117. Ibid. p. 36. ington, DC: The Natonal Academies Press, 2017). htps://doi. 118. Eric D. Knapp and Raj Samani, Applied Cyber Security and the Smart org/10.17226/24836. p. 6-26. Grid (Syngress, 2013), ( 111. Ibid. 22 November 2016). p. 36. 112. Natonal Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. En- 119. Ibid. p. 38. hancing the Resilience of the Naton’s Electricity System. (Wash- 120. Eric D. Knapp and Raj Samani, Applied Cyber Security and the Smart ington, DC: The Natonal Academies Press, 2017). htps://doi. Grid (Syngress, 2013), ( org/10.17226/24836. p. 4-37. 22 November 2016). p. 38. 113. Natonal Associaton of Regulatory Utlity Commissioners. Cyber 121. B. Paily, S. Kumaravel, M. Basu, and M. Conlon, “Fault analysis Security: A Primer for State Utlity Regulators. (Washington, D.C.: of vsc hvdc systems using fuzzy logic,” 2015 IEEE Int. Conf. Signal NARUC, 2017). htps://pubs.naruc.org/pub/66D17AE4-A46F-B543- Process. Informatcs, Commun. Energy Syst., 2015. 58EF-68B04E8B180F. p. 11. 122. B. Paily, “HVDC Systems Fault Analysis Using Various Signal Process- 114. Ofce of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisiton, Technolo- ing Techniques Signal Processing Techniques to the Dublin Insttute gy, and Logistcs. Defense Science Board: Task Force on Cyber Deter- of Technology Dr Malabika Basu and Prof Michael Conlon,” 2015. rence. htps://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/cyber-deter.pdf. p. 25.

46 Economic advantages and fnancial feasability 3 Lead author: Justn Svenson Co-authors: Erik Bluvas, John McCafrey, Adriana Pietras, Anthony Portllo, Ali Saboowala, John Sines, Ruoyu Mi

Summary

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: to get more detailed We do not recommend new taxes or government sponsored accounts of the benefts of the NAS and to analyze fnancing fnancing programs to build the Supergrid. mechanisms for constructon. Private fnancing would fund most of the lines in a majority We project numerous economic benefts to building the of regions. We also encourage partcipaton from energy de- Supergrid: velopers that stand to beneft from the Supergrid. Further, the Rural Utlites Services could make loan capital available • Since the data for the MacDonald publicaton was gath- to developers for the less lucratve lines that may be less ered in 2009, the price of energy generaton, partcularly atractve to private fnanciers. from solar and wind (onshore and ofshore), has dramat- In additon, these fnancing mechanisms could be used: ically decreased, making the NAS even more advantageous than previously projected. • Public-Private Partnerships. • We project the price of the infrastructure to be under • DOE loan guarantee programs. $500 billion. Yet, the savings in electricity generaton (the • State clean energy funds. cost of generatng electricity from wind and solar sources • Private actvity bonds. is much less than traditonal sources) ofset the cost of • Federal infrastructure spending. building the supergrid under most reasonable scenarios of the price of undergrounding transmission lines and the price of natural gas. Therefore, the total annualized cost To make the NAS more atractve to investors, policymakers of generatng and transmitng electricity would be likely must make progress in several areas of development: be lower because of the NAS. • We estmated that between 650,000 to 950,000 con- • Secure backing of federal/state governments, DOE, stant jobs would be needed for constructon of the trans- RTO/ISOs. mission and generaton capacity over a 30-year build • Reduce permitng and regulaton burden. tme. • Ensure stakeholder interests are aligned in each region. • Encourage regional and natonal collaboraton. We analyzed fnancing optons and make conjectures as to how the Supergrid would be fnanced in each region of the • Engage in thorough planning. country accountng for projected cost and precedent of how other transmission projects were fnanced in each region.

47 Chapter 3 Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility

3.1 Economic Research, Methods, and MacDonald et al. (2016) study. We estmated the total cap- Results ital cost for the transmission system by summing the Over- night Capital Cost (ONCC), new HVDC transmission cost, Our objectves for this analysis were to explore in more de- and variable natural gas costs. We compared the renew- tail the economic benefts of the proposed natonal overlay able generaton ONCC fgures from 2013 MacDonald et al. HVDC electric grid, and to develop a framework that could (2016) fgures were to 2018 Lazard Levelized Costs of Elec- be used to conduct up-to-date economic beneft calcula- tricity fgures (referred to as LCOE or Lazard fgures).1 The tons as new cost projectons associated with energy gener- more recent study showed a dramatc decrease in ONCC for aton and transmission technologies become available. This building various renewable generaton capacites. Such cur- analysis provides a methodology to compute total project rent LCOE is very close to the most optmistc MacDonald costs and create an updated line constructon cost estmate. et al. (2016) estmates of future costs (projected for 2030, We used the publicly accessible Jobs and Economic Devel- shown in Table 1), leading to an even more favorable fore- opment Impact (JEDI) models provided by the Natonal Re- cast for the HVDC supergrid system. newable Energy Laboratory (NREL) to estmate the NAS’s efect on job creaton and regional economies at the naton- MacDonald et al. al and state levels. Further, we used the results to conduct JEDI model costs study costs a more detailed analysis with higher resoluton data to es- Staton tmate the economic impact of the NAS at state levels. The 197,100.60 $250,160.38 model includes a database of cost assumptons for varying ($/MW) types of transmission lines and power plants. Lines 722.58 $529.52 ($/MW-Mile) 3.1.1 Cost Structure and Calculation Table 3.2 | Line and staton cost comparison Due to major changes like unantcipated steep downward trends in costs of wind and solar energy generaton over the Next, the total transmission system cost was estmated. last several years, it became necessary to update the input Transmission cost is a functon of Line Cost ($/MW-mile) and cost assumptons of the NAS compared to those used in the Staton Cost ($/MW). A line and staton cost comparison of MacDonald et al. (2016) fgures against JEDI Model fgures is shown below in Table 2. While the fgures for both cate- Updated vs old generaton costs /kWh gories were comparable, MacDonald et al. (2016) used data MacDonald et al. 2009 Updated Lazard 2018 that indicated lower staton costs and higher line costs. Due Solar PV commercial to unforeseen favorable generatng costs, these diferences were mitgated, rendering the results very comparable. Low $1.19 $0.95 Mid $2.57 $1.10 We then combined the MacDonald et al.(2016) system de- High $3.94 $1.25 sign with the results from the JEDI Model (i.e. front-end Onshore wind statons cost) and the updated cost fgures to arrive at a f- nal comparison for the cost of the NAS system (both above Low $2.16 $1.15 and below ground) versus the system cost of the current Mid $2.26 $1.35 AC grid. In the frst two scenarios, we used a simulaton of High $2.36 $1.55 a single integrated system that could send electricity across Ofshore wind the lower 48 states, as prescribed by the NAS. In the last scenario, we split the lower 48 states into district regions Low $3.41 * where energy generated in those boundaries must be used Mid $5.53 $3.03 within the same boundaries (shown in Table 3). The single High $7.64 * system was much more efcient since the scenario with the Natural gas divisions requires natural gas to fll in the gaps that wind Low $1.24 $0.70 and energy cannot supply. Some regions, in the system di- vided into distnct regions, overproduced renewable energy Mid $1.24 $0.83 while others underproduce renewable energy. High $1.24 $0.95 Table 3.1 | Updated vs forecasted renewable generaton cost Simulatons of the cost of generaton sources with and *Lazard (2018) did not include high- to low-end estmates of without the NAS were completed, where the new system ofshore wind generaton costs. favored only the least expensive forms of electricity gener-

48 Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility Chapter 3

MacDonald Natural 815,995,527.11 Gas Used (MWh) 1Single natonal system (overhead lines) using JEDI line Transmissions $12,655,601,555.10 & staton costs and Lazard generaton costs Infrastructure Costs Overnight Capital $131,755,213,821.00 Cost MacDonald Natural 815,995,527.11 Gas Used (MWh) Single natonal system (buried lines) using JEDI line & Transmissions staton costs (using three tmes multplier and Lazard $23,357,370,796.01 Infrastructure Costs generaton costs) Overnight Capital $131,755,213,821.00 Cost MacDonald Natural 1,619,754,697.59 Gas Used (MWh) 128 Node system using Lazard Generaton costs without Transmissions 0 a natonal grid Infrastructure Costs Overnight Capital $130,697,463,589.00 Cost Table 3.3 |Comparison of the NAS to current AC system cost. The calculaton is based on assumpton of the variable O&M cost of natural gas plants being $3.57/MWh and the heat rate being 6.43 MMBtu/MWh. aton amongst ofshore wind, onshore wind, solar PV, and from the low fuel cost as well as lower transmission infra- natural gas. Coal and oil were omited since they are more structure investments. However, with natural gas weightng expensive electricity generators in either scenario. Our re- high in its energy portolio, the fuel cost increases steeply sults showed that the onshore wind generaton capacity, with the increasing natural gas price. Afer reaching certain which has gone down in price recently, will drive changes in points, the NAS’s higher transmission infrastructure invest- nameplate capacity more than anything else under the NAS ments will be balanced by the saved fuel expenditure. For scenario. Costs would favor solar PV generaton and natural the overhead NAS system, the breakeven natural gas price gas generaton much less, while ofshore wind energy gen- is $2.10/MMBtu, which is lower than the market price in eraton would remain stable. most scenarios. As long as the natural gas market price is higher than $2.10/MMBtu, the overhead NAS system will As shown in Table 3.3, while NAS systems (both the over- be cost efectve and can save money for customers. The head system and the underground system) require higher underground NAS system, with higher investments in trans- transmission infrastructure investment than the AC system, mission lines, has a higher breakeven natural gas price at they need signifcantly less natural gas capacity in their en- $4.17/MMBtu. Although the breakeven price of natural gas ergy portolio. The natural gas price is one of the key fac- for an underground grid is higher than the current market tors determining the cost-efectveness of the NAS systems rate for gas, the underground Supergrid would certain- comparing to the AC one. With natural gas plants’ variable ly provide more benefts than costs when considering the operaton and management (O&M) cost being $3.57/ MWh social cost of carbon emissions. Perhaps more important- and the heat rate being 6.43 MMBtu/ MWh, the total sys- ly, as the underground NAS system is more secure against tem cost can be presented as a linear functon of the natu- cybersecurity atacks, the extra transmission infrastructure ral gas price. And the graph below demonstrates the linear investments could be viewed as an insurance premium pro- relaton. tectng the country’s whole electricity system against potental emergencies. As such, the costs of undergrounding When the natural gas price is low, the AC system can beneft are small compared to the high risks of leaving the electrical

Multplier 1 (Overhead) 2 3 4

Breakeven Natural Gas Price $2.10/MMBtu 3.13/MMBtu $4.17/MMBtu $5.20/MMBtu

Table 3.4 |Breakeven natural gas prices for system economic feasibility based on the underground system multpliers.

49 Chapter 3 Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility

Fig 3.1 |Breakeven natural gas price for overhead and underground HVDC systems grid system unprotected. Furthermore, the social cost of the breakeven price is $4.17/MMBtu. The cost of buried carbon emission, ranging from lower agriculture productv- transmission lines is a critcal factor determining whether ity and public health crisis to increased property damages the underground system will be cost-efectve. due to extreme weather, is not at all neglectable. Accord- ing to EPA, the Social Cost of CO2 is estmated to be more 3.1.3 Job Creation Estimation than $50 per metric ton CO2 by 2030 (with a discount rate of 3%). With NAS, providing a naton-wide integrated trans- Job creaton values were estmated with data obtained mission system for clean energy resources, our society will from the NREL’s JEDI Model for transmission and genera- be beter of from reduced carbon emission. ton. While these models are highly regarded, they do have limitatons that should be noted before data interpretaton: 3.1.2 Breakeven Natural Gas Price for Under- ground NAS in Different Cost Scenarios • Does not project future and diferent values of LCOE, does not consider alternatve investment avenues As mentoned in the previous secton, the breakeven nat- • Transmission specifc limitatons and comments ural gas price will be higher if the transmission infrastruc- • Must independently obtain transmission recovery rates ture investment is higher. Therefore, having a clear under- that are crucial for Return on Investment (ROI) and Net standing of how much the transmission network will cost is Present Value (NPV) calculatons critcal when analyzing the costs of implementaton. While • Inter-state lines must be broken up into separate model the price of overhead lines has been studied by scholars in- runs and then recombined cluding MacDonald et al. (2016), the cost of underground lines has not been commonly discussed. In the baseline • Lines transitng through rural/urban/etc. areas also re- scenario, we use a multplier of three to indicate the un- quire separate model runs derground NAS’s transmission lines requires three-tmes • Only one HVDC opton: 500kV with overhead lines the investment compared to the overhead NAS system. To • No capacity input, assumes 3GW beter understand the breakeven natural gas price for the • Outputs from model runs using New Mexico as the state underground NAS system, we performed a scenario anal- had anomalies ysis with possible multpliers. The result shows that while the breakeven natural gas price for overhead transmission Table 5 shows the total projected costs of building the NAS. lines is $2.10/MMBtu, at a multplier of two, the breakeven Afer consultng with multple industry experts, a three natural gas price increases to $3.13/MMBtu. At a multplier tmes multplier was agreed upon to estmate the costs of of four, the breakeven point is closer to $5.20/MMBtu. And transmission lines per mile. JEDI fgures were also used to as mentoned before, when the multplier is set to be three, determine the cost of converters and substatons per mile

50 Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility Chapter 3

Anualized total system costs Staton cost = $250,160.38 Line Cost ($/MW Mile) $529.52 $1,059.05 $1,588.57 $2,118.10 $2,647.62 Multplier 1x 2x 3x 4x 5x Annualized Fuel Cost ($/MMBtu) cost of system without grid $2.00 $(438,489,106.59) $(5,789,373,727.04) $(11,140,258,347.50) $(16,491,142,967.95) $(21,842,027,588.40) $174,312,591,923.39 $4.00 $8,739,881,948.79 $3,388,997,328.34 $(1,961,887,292.12) $(7,312,771,912.57) $(12,663,656,533.02) $193,984,665,457.35 $6.00 $17,918,253,004.17 $12,567,368,383.72 $7,216,483,763.26 $1,865,599,142.81 $(3,485,285,477.64) $213,656,738,991.30 $8.00 $27,096,624,059.55 $21,745,739,439.10 $16,394,854,818.64 $11,043,970,198.19 $5,693,085,577.74 $233,328,812,525.26 $10.00 $36,274,995,114.93 $30,924,110,424.48 $25,573,255,874.02 $20,222,341,253.57 $14,871,456,633.12 $253,000,886,059.21 Figures in parentheses denote negatve values

Anualized total system costs Staton cost = $250,160.38 Line Cost ($/MW Mile) $529.52 $1,059.05 $1,588.57 $2,118.10 $2,647.62 Multplier 1x 2x 3x 4x 5x Annualized Fuel Cost ($/MMBtu) cost of system without grid $2.00 -0.3% -3.3% -6.4% -9.5% -12.5% $174,312,591,923.39 $4.00 4.5% 1.7% .1.0% -3.8% -6.5% $193,984,665,457.35 $6.00 8.4% 5.9% 3.4% 0.9% -1.6% $213,656,738,991.30 $8.00 11.6% 9.3% 7.0% 4.7% 2.4% $233,328,812,525.26 $10.00 14.3% 12.2% 10.1% 8.0% 5.9% $253,000,886,059.21 Table 3.5 |Sensitvity analysis to cost of natural gas and multplier efect for undergrounding with the estmaton of total mileage of transmission cables Donald et al. in the foundatonal paper, combined with the needed to construct the NAS. No consideraton was given to JEDI model, we calculated the job generaton due to renew- price impacts of technology adopton. able energy infrastructure development (from transmission and generaton) for each of the lower 48 states. Afer we Jobs created from installing transmission infrastructure are combine the jobs estmates of all states with the jobs from listed above, but only contribute a small amount of jobs installing the thousands of transmission facilites, we est- compared to the jobs needed for the energy generaton. mate that the NAS would produce the equivalent of 649,010 Using the results from the NEWS model, developed by Mac- to 936,111 total constant jobs per year over 30 years.

Jobs & economic impacts during new constructon Transmission Hall/substa- Converter Total project Transmission line cost/ ton cost/ Economic hall & sub- Jobs cost lines Megawat Megawat impacts staton mile mile Overhead $169.8 B $70 B 526.57 lines $95.5 B 248,765 231,503 $25.4 B Buried lines $309.7 B $209.9 B 1579.71

Table 3.6 |CAPEX & jobs & economic impacts during new constructon

51 Chapter 3 Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility

3.2 Potential Financing Methods fnancing. The primary forms of debt fnancing are through commercial banks, insttutonal private placements, and the 3.2.1 Private Financing corporate bond market. Traditonal bank fnancing has long been a key component of infrastructure fnancing. Bank The majority of energy infrastructure projects are devel- loans typically have lower interest rates than other types of oped by private companies that secure fnancing from f- debt fnancing. However, due to regulatory changes follow- nancial insttutons, insttutonal investors, and the capital ing the 2008 recession, banks are now required to secure markets. Privately fnanced transmission projects typically long-term bonds to back longer-term loans and therefore have both a debt and equity component. Projects can be banks prefer shorter loans (typically 7 years or less) due structured to have either corporate fnancing or project to the lower cost.8 This can create refnancing risk for bor- fnancing. Corporate fnancing uses existng funds from a rowers. Bank fnancing is most likely to be used in the early company’s operatng budget to fund a project which could stages of planning and constructon. Afer completon, bank use revenue from existng assets or funds from a corporate loans are refnanced by a long-term security which has low- bond issue. In corporate fnancing, the lenders and inves- er cost as much of the constructon, permitng risk, etc. has tors have recourse to the entre corporaton, not just the been removed. Banks tend to be more fexible in the event specifc asset. Project fnancing involves the creaton of a of unforeseen events during constructon and can negot- special purpose vehicle (SPV) whose only assets and debt ate loan restructuring or adjust the tmeframe of disburse- are related to the specifc project. In project fnancing, the ments. lenders or investors only have recourse to the assets of the project.4 Much of the NAS constructon would likely involve Insttutonal private placements are another form of debt project fnancing because it is conducive to multple enttes fnancing that can be arranged by an investment bank. collaboratng on a development. Capital would be secured from select insttutonal clients through a negotaton process led by a bank actng in an Investment by private investors has been increasing as gov- agency capacity. The disclosure and paperwork required is ernments struggle to keep up with the demand for new in- similar to issuing a public bond, but there can be more room frastructure projects, including transmission projects. The for fexibility when creatng the contract. Insurance compa- Internatonal Energy Agency (IEA) projects $260 billion in- nies, pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds are types vested globally in new transmission and distributon lines of investors that could partcipate in a private placement through 2035.5 There is private capital available in the mar- due to their need for long-term investments. ket ready to invest in quality infrastructure projects. In the frst half of 2016, it was estmated there was $75 billion of A third form of debt fnancing for transmission developers capital waitng to be invested in infrastructure.6 The capital is the corporate bond market. Private companies can issue comes from insurance companies, pension funds, private bonds to support general operatons or specifc projects and equity, infrastructure funds, and sovereign wealth funds. that money can be allocated to pay for development costs. Bonds are typically more common in the later operaton- There are multple reasons why investng in transmission al stages of a project when the asset is producing a steady lines can be atractve to investors. Cost recovery for trans- cash fow. Bonds can be a mechanism used when refnanc- mission projects is regulated by the Federal Energy Regula- ing bank loans at the conclusion of the constructon phase. tory Commission (FERC) creatng an almost certain guaran- teed rate of return. Cash fows from the project are typically With all types of debt fnancing, the credit ratng of the stable and independent of energy prices or line utlizaton. borrower is important to secure lower cost fnancing. Pen- Established transmission lines utlize proven technology and sion funds and insurance companies ofen have guidelines require minimal ongoing maintenance. Additonally, trans- dictatng the required credit quality of their investments. mission investment is ofen resistant to competng invest- Transmission developers constructng the NAS will likely ment along the same corridors. A competng investment rely on multple types of debt fnancing. Constructon of would have difculty obtaining fnancing unless there was many segments of the NAS will likely be fnanced by tradi- signifcant load growth driving increased demand. These tonal bank loans. Once constructon is completed, corpo- characteristcs allow investors to accurately predict invest- rate bonds or private placements could be used to refnance ment performance and help make transmission investment the debt. This structure would align the risks and cash fows more atractve than other types of infrastructure.7 of the project with investor expectatons for each type of debt. The types of debt ultmately used for each segment 3.2.1.a Debt Financing will be dependent on the developer that wins the contract and their preferred fnancing mechanisms. Debt typically comprises 70-90% of infrastructure project

52 Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility Chapter 3

3.2.1.b Equity Financing Operator (ISO) to use an allocaton process to dictate how costs are recovered from ratepayers for transmission devel- Debt holders usually require an infrastructure project to opments creatng a steady revenue stream once the project have an equity component to reduce risk and help pro- is complete. tect debt holders from loss. Equity typically only comprises 10-30% of infrastructure fnancing. Equity holders take There are some challenges in implementng the PPP model on the most risk in the project and therefore demand a for transmission projects. As of January 2017, only 37 states higher return. Enlistng quality equity holders is ofen key have legislaton that allow public-private partnerships.13 to being able to secure debt fnancing at the lowest cost. This could prevent using this model for some segments that Transmission developers ofen provide a porton of the eq- cross multple states if not all states allow public-private uity in projects they construct. Aside from having a stake in partnerships. The high regulatory burden of developing the project, developers beneft from the tax savings of the transmission projects can slow the process and discourage depreciaton generated. Additonally, private equity funds, private investors from joining into a partnership. Projects f- insurance companies, infrastructure funds, and sovereign nanced with this model ofen work best if they have a polit- wealth funds can also be a source of equity.9 ical champion (governor, senator, etc.) helping to build support for the project. They can also help the project navigate In the current low interest rate environment, long-term in- the various federal and state agencies during the permitng vestors such as insurance companies and pension funds are process. eager to invest in infrastructure projects that ofer a higher return than traditonal investments. However, currently only Historically, the PPP model has been used in the United 0.8% of the approximately $50 trillion in investable assets States for transportaton infrastructure projects. But there from insurance companies and pension funds are invested are some examples of transmission projects using a PPP f- in infrastructure.10 The lack of quality projects is the prima- nancing model. The Path 15 project used a public-private ry reason investment is not higher. Similarly, private equity partnership structure to fnance and build an 83-mile trans- funds are currently raising $30.5 billion for 43 new funds to mission line connectng northern and southern California, invest in quality North American infrastructure projects in helping to eliminate a botleneck in the grid system. The additon to the $68 billion in funds they hold, but have not Western Area Power Administraton built and operates the yet invested.11 This is evidence that there are willing inves- line. The private company Trans-Elect assembled a majority tors looking for superior projects like the NAS to invest in. of the project fnancing. In return, they were granted long- The key for the NAS will be securing the backing of stake- term transmission rights that will help them pay of banks holders and making the project atractve to new investors. and investors. As a high priority project in California, federal and state agencies expedited environmental studies and 3.2.2 Public-Private Partnerships the project permitng process.14 This was one of the frst successful PPP projects for a transmission line and it shows A new fnancing model has developed over the past two de- the cooperaton involved between governments and public cades that could be used for some segments of the NAS. and private companies. The Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model can take on many forms, but it involves the collaboraton of government The PPP model will be used for segments of the NAS that and private partes. The PPP model is partcularly useful for are less lucratve and do not have as much private fnancing projects where there is not sufcient private capital fnanc- available. As with all segments of the grid, collaboraton and ing because it can use government investment to leverage support from federal and local governments will be import- additonal private capital. It has become a popular model ant to successfully structuring PPP deals that are benefcial to fnance transmission projects in emerging markets and is to all partes. This fnancing model will be a vital mechanism beginning to be used more in the United States. The main to construct the less lucratve segments allowing the entre beneft to the PPP model is spreading risks associated with natonal grid to be completed. a large infrastructure project. It is important to structure the deal so that no one party takes on exorbitant amounts Private fnancing will likely be the primary source of funds of risk. Spreading risk can atract investors that might not for constructng the NAS. It will be crucial to partner with otherwise partcipate in a project. Private frms can provide transmission developers that have a wealth of experience project expertse and are ofen able to push projects along in securing fnancing and successfully completng projects. faster than the government. The PPP model works best The high cost of the NAS will necessitate using a variety of when there is a stream of revenue to ensure an adequate debt and equity fnancing mechanisms for each segment of return to investors.12 FERC regulatons allow each Regional the natonal grid. Transmission Organizaton (RTO) and Independent System

53 Chapter 3 Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility

3.2.3 Federal Infrastructure Spending gy Projects” will be looked at favorably in the review process.16 The NAS is likely to promote additonal investment Traditonally transmission projects have been privately f- in wind and solar generaton because more electricity will nanced with litle assistance from the federal government. be able to be transported over long distances to populaton However, infrastructure spending has come to the forefront centers. The program specifes that for transmission proj- of the natonal discussion so it is worth examining how a ects to be considered efcient, they must lower electricity potental infrastructure spending bill at the federal level losses when compared to current commercial processes in may impact the NAS. As of July 2017, no infrastructure bill the U.S. over an equivalent distance. The HVDC technolo- has been proposed in either house of Congress, and it is gy used in the NAS would limit losses of electricity through likely they will focus on other issues before infrastructure. transmission, making the technology more efcient for long However, the presidental administraton has released a distance transmission. framework for what their proposed policy might look like. Their policy would reduce regulatons and the tme need- However, there are factors that could limit the eligibility ed to receive federal permits. They also propose using gov- for the loan program for certain parts of the natonal grid. ernment investment to leverage private sector investment. Projects that could be fully fnanced by commercial banks This could indicate public-private partnerships will be much are viewed unfavorably in the review process. Projects that more common in the future. The policy also hopes to focus receive any other assistance from the federal government federal infrastructure investment on transformatve proj- (grants, loans) may not be eligible. The loan guarantee ects that change the way infrastructure is designed, built, program is designed to help new technologies prove their and maintained.15 fnancial worthiness so that future investment can be f- nanced by the capital markets. This program will most likely Many of the proposals from the presidental administra- be useful for sectons of the NAS that are projected to be ton could beneft the NAS. Fewer regulatons and a shorter less proftable and therefore need government assistance permitng tme would help expedite the project and help to secure fnancing. A secton of the grid constructed early atract private investment. The NAS could qualify as a trans- in the process may also have a beter chance of acceptance formatve project since it is diferent from the structure of into the program. Financial, technical, legal, and environ- the current electrical grid and promises to have both en- mental factors are reviewed in the approval process along vironmental and natonal security benefts. Lower direct with a review of how weltl the project fts the policy of the federal investment in infrastructure likely means the NAS program. The DOE is acceptng applicatons through at least would have trouble securing federal money for construc- September 2019, although additonal submission dates may ton. Nonetheless, a PPP model used for some segments be announced in the future. of the grid could receive federal money to leverage private investment. The One Nevada Line is an example of the loan program being used for a transmission project. The project received The uncertainty regarding federal government support for a $343 million loan guarantee to fnance a 235-mile 500 kV infrastructure development will make private fnancing a line through Nevada. The use of a new transmission tow- crucial component of funding the NAS. However, there are er design that has a smaller environmental impact was some government programs available to supplement pri- the technological innovaton in this project. The new line vate fnancing for the less lucratve grid segments. is also expected to bring wind and solar generated power from Wyoming and Idaho into Nevada.17 The NAS project 3.2.4 Department of Energy Loan Guarantee has many of the same benefts as the One Nevada Line. This Program gives confdence to the idea that the loan guarantee program would be a possible fnancing mechanism for the NAS. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issues loan guarantees to promote growth of new clean energy technology 3.2.5 Additional Funding Sources through the Loan Program Ofce (LPO). Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized the loan guarantees. 3.2.5.a State Clean Energy Funds The program applies to a wide range of technologies, including renewable energy and transmission projects. As of More than 20 states have created Clean Energy Funds us- June 2017, there is up to $4.5 billion in funding available for ing state government funds as a way to promote growth projects in renewable and efcient energy. The NAS project in renewable energy.18 While each state’s fund has their appears to meet many of the criteria for acceptance into own design, these funds ofen are used to atract private this program. Projects “that will have a catalytc efect on investment to renewable energy projects. These funds have the commercial deployment of future Renewable Ener- primarily been used to provide funding for individual re-

54 Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility Chapter 3 newable generaton projects, but there may be potental 3.3 Regional Overview to access state funding for the NAS because an improved transmission grid will drive private investment in renewable Historically, the energy sector in the United States had generaton. These funds would likely not provide direct in- been dominated by vertcally integrated organizatons that vestment to build the NAS but would instead help atract owned and operated the generaton, transmission, and dis- and guarantee fnancing for private capital investors. This tributon services within a geographic area. Beginning in would involve collaboraton between private investors, utl- 1978, deregulaton allowed some utlites to create power ity companies, and state government agencies. pools to facilitate wholesale transactons over larger geographic areas. By the 1990’s there was a need to have open 3.2.5.b Rural Utilities Service access to transmission services for all utlity companies to create competton among generators. FERC issued orders The Rural Utlites Service is a program under the U.S. De- to encourage the creaton of regional organizatons that partment of Agriculture that provides needed infrastruc- would control the transmission of energy and allow open ture development and improvement to rural communites. access to transmission lines. The program provides direct loans, loan guarantees, and grants to electric projects in transmission, distributon, and Today there are six RTO or ISO regulated by FERC: ISO New generaton. The loans are primarily made to state and lo- England, New York ISO, PJM, Midcontnent ISO, Southwest cal government enttes and cooperatve utlites, although Power Pool, and California ISO. The Electric Reliability Coun- for-proft companies are also eligible.19 The program made cil of Texas is regulated by state regulators because it is lo- $3.4 billion in loans and loan guarantees in 2015 and the cated entrely in the state of Texas. Much of the southeast- amounts are expected to contnue increasing. Most loans ern and western United States are not currently covered by are between $20 million and $200 million. General guide- ISOs. In analyzing the fnancing optons for the NAS, we look lines indicate projects should beneft populatons of 20,000 at a fnancing strategy for each ISO region. We will also look or fewer, although there is some fexibility.20 at the Southeast U.S. and Western U.S. as separate regions despite not having an organized ISO. Segments of the NAS through rural areas or segments that would improve service to rural areas are likely to be eligible One of the primary responsibilites of each RTO is manag- for fnancing through this program. While this program is ing the transmission planning process to ensure the grid not likely to be a large piece of grid fnancing, it could help contnues to meet expected future electrical demand. We secure funding for less lucratve segments in rural areas. reviewed the planning process in each region because the This program can be used in partnership with other fnanc- NAS will frst need to secure the support of RTOs through ing to help atract private investment. It would also provide each individual planning process. We also look at recent re- a source of public investment in a public-private partner- gional transmission projects. We review the fnancing an- ship. project details for recent developments to help guide our recommendatons for possible fnancing strategies in each 3.2.5.c Private Activity Bonds region.

A potental source of fnancing for private companies invest- 3.3.1 ISO New England ing in transmission infrastructure are Private Actvity Bonds (PABs). These bonds are federally tax exempt and therefore Geographic Region: Connectcut, Maine, allow borrowing at a lower interest rate. They do require a Massachusets, New private company to partner with a government agency that Hampshire, Rhode Island, acts as the issuer of the bond. However, the private compa- Vermont ny pays the debt service on the bond under a contractual Transmission Miles: 9,000 agreement. Secton 142 of the IRS tax code allows PABs for Generatng Capacity: 3,0500 MW surface transportaton projects.21 They have not been used Proposed NAS Miles: 1,167 for transmission projects in the past and it would take new legislaton to allow PABs for electric developments. Allow- Proposed NAS Cost: $7,927,385,532 ing these types of bonds to be used for the NAS would incentvize private companies to invest in the project because 3.3.1.a Transmission Planning and Approval borrowing would be cheaper for transmission projects us- Process ing PABs than investng in other types of infrastructure. The transmission planning process for ISO New England develops a regional plan for future system needs over a

55 Chapter 3 Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility

Fig 3.2 | Natonal electric markets. Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission22 ten-year tme horizon. The process begins by conductng a 3.3.2.a Transmission Planning and Approval Process Needs Assessment to determine the grid’s adequacy. Where it is determined upgrades to the grid are necessary, either NYISO engages in planning for reliability, economic, and a Solutons Study or a Compettve Soluton process will be public policy upgrades to the transmission grid. The reliabil- undertaken to fnd the most economical upgrade project. A ity plan is a two-year process that assesses the needs over Compettve Soluton process will be the most likely entry the next ten years. The economic planning process ident- point for the NAS. In this process, project sponsors submit fes areas of congeston in the grid and determines specifc proposals for projects to address the identfed need. Proj- projects that have a positve beneft to cost rato. The public ects are then selected based on the cost, electrical perfor- policy planning identfes needs driven by new public policy mance, feasibility, and future system expandability.23 requirements and solicits solutons from member frms.24 Upgrading transmission infrastructure could be part of ei- 3.3.1.b Recommended Financing Mechanism ther the economic or public policy planning process and could solve congeston problems within the state’s grid The proposed routng through the New England region is identfed in the economic planning studies. It could also the smallest segment of the NAS with an estmated cost help the state meet renewable energy goals and would be of approximately $7.9 billion. The grid in this secton will an appropriate public policy soluton. Exceeding the beneft likely be privately fnanced. Every state in this region does to cost expectatons will be the greatest hurdle for the NAS have a Clean Energy Fund indicatng there is government to gain approval in New York. support for renewable energy projects. The Clean Energy Funds also open up the possibility of using state fnancing to 3.3.2.b Current and Proposed Projects help atract private investors. This funding could be used to leverage private investment through a public-private part- A proposed 80-mile HVDC transmission line buried under nership. Vermont is the only state in the region that does the Hudson River provides insight into a fnancing model not currently allow the PPP model. that could work for portons of the NAS. The $1 billion West Point Transmission project is very similar in structure to the 3.3.2 New York ISO (NYISO) NAS. The project was proposed as part of the state’s Energy Highway Blueprint in 2012 and is stll in the development Geographic Region: New York phase securing permitng. It is similar to two other com- Transmission Miles: 11,124 pleted projects by PowerBridge, Neptune and Hudson. The Generatng Capacity: 38,576 MW proposed fnancing plan includes equity fnancers Energy Investors Funds, Starwood Energy Group, and NRG Energy. Proposed NAS Miles: 1,267 Debt fnancing would also be secured from either commer- Proposed NAS Cost: $8,607,906,983 cial banks or insttutonal private placements. The develop-

56 Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility Chapter 3 er would enter into a long-term transmission capacity pur- utlity companies, PPL Electric Utlites and PSEG. PPL Elec- chase agreement to recover the costs of constructon.25 tric built 101 miles of the line for $630 million and PSEG built 45 miles for $775 million. The project was intended 3.3.2.c Recommended Financing Mechanism to improve reliability and reduce congeston. This project was fast-tracked by the Obama administraton allowing The NYISO has a history of supportng high voltage trans- beter coordinaton of government permitng. However, mission projects similar to the NAS and there are develop- there was pushback from environmental groups because ment companies that have experience securing the private the line passed through federal park lands. State regulators fnancing required. The estmated cost of the NAS in the NY- approved the project in 2010, but the Natonal Park Ser- ISO is $8.6 billion. This cost is reasonable when compared to vice did not approve the project untl 2012.27 Despite hav- the $1 billion for the 80-mile West Point Transmission proj- ing backing from the presidental administraton, the envi- ect. A natonal grid would help upstate New York connect ronmental concerns stll caused a delay in permitng. The with the large populaton center in New York City. This con- Susquehanna-Roseland project is an example of two public necton would allow renewable hydro electricity generated companies collaboratng to complete a needed high voltage in the northern part of the state to beneft all rate payers transmission expansion. Government support allowed the in the region. The Energy Highway Blueprint approved in project to proceed more quickly and successfully satsfy all 2012 also shows there is support for transmission projects stakeholders, which illustrates the importance of gaining from the state government. The state’s regulatory bodies support from all public and private stakeholders. have approved similar projects in the past and should be receptve to new proposals as part of a natonal system. Due 3.3.3.c Recommended Financing Mechanism to the large populaton base and government support, it is likely that the NAS will be lucratve to private investment. The NAS in the PJM region is likely to be privately fnanced. This segment of the grid goes through highly populated re- 3.3.3 PJM Interconnecton gions, and will therefore be lucratve to private investors. The estmated cost of the NAS in this region is approximately $35.7 billion. Each state in this region also has legisla- Geographic Region: Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, New ton allowing public-private partnerships. The Susquehan- Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, na-Roseland Reliability Upgrade shows how two companies Pennsylvania, Virginia, can collaborate to complete a large scale project. Encour- Washington D.C., West aging partnerships between public and private partes is a Virginia strategy that should be successful in this region. Transmission Miles: 82,540 Generatng Capacity: 176,560 MW 3.3.4 Midcontinent ISO (MISO) Proposed NAS Miles: 5,265 Proposed NAS Cost: $35,755,649,493 Geographic Region: Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, 3.3.3.a Transmission Planning and Approval Process Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, PJM conducts an annual planning process resultng in the South Dakota, Texas, Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP). A 15-year Wisconsin tme horizon allows the planning to look at how reliability Transmission Miles:28 65,800 upgrades and expansion will impact the grid in the future. Generatng Capacity: 174,724 MW The planning process includes input from all stakeholders Proposed NAS Miles: 8,276 as well as changes in public policy. The PJM board ultmately approves recommended system improvements and they Proposed NAS Cost: $56,204,593,784 are added to the RTEP. Since 1999, the board has approved $29.3 billion of transmission system improvements.26 3.3.4.a Transmission Planning and Approval Process

3.3.3.b Current and Proposed Projects The MISO develops the MISO Transmission Expansion Plan (MTEP) annually. The plan addresses reliability of the grid A 150-mile 500 kV transmission line upgrade between as well as ensuring compliance with state and federal ener- Pennsylvania and New Jersey was completed in 2015. The gy policy requirements. The planning process begins with $1.4 billion project was a joint venture between two public stakeholders submitng proposed projects for review. MI-

57 Chapter 3 Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility

SO’s Board of Directors facilitates the evaluaton of proj- 3.3.5 Southwest Power Pool (SPP) ects to determine if they are appropriate for inclusion in the MTEP. The 18-month planning process includes model Geographic Region: Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, building, reliability and economic analysis, and resource as- Louisiana, Minnesota, sessments. There are three types of projects included in the Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, MTEP: Botom-Up projects, Top-Down projects, and Exter- New Mexico, North Dakota, nally Driven projects. The NAS would likely be considered Oklahoma, South Dakota, an interregional Top-Down project because it would have Texas, Wyoming a regional and natonal impact. These projects have costs Transmission Miles: 65,755 29 shared among benefciaries. Generatng Capacity: 83,945 MW Proposed NAS Miles: 4,786 3.3.4.b Current and Proposed Projects Proposed NAS Cost: $32,505,907,344 The CapX2020 is a series of fve transmission expansion projects across North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, 3.3.5.a Transmission Planning and Approval Process and Wisconsin. The development of 345 kV and 230 kV lines spans 725 miles and will cost $2.1 billion. It is a joint The Southwest Power Pool conducts an iteratve three-year initatve between 11 transmission-owning utlites in the planning process that includes a 20-Year, 10-Year, and Near- states.30 The project was designed to bring wind energy Term Assessment in a process they call Integrated Trans- to populaton centers. Lack of transmission capability has mission Planning (ITP). These reports identfy transmission been a roadblock to additonal development of wind gener- projects that are needed within both short and long-term aton facilites in South Dakota and North Dakota. This proj- tme horizons while also identfying potental costs and ben- ect will not satsfy all the transmission needs of the region efts of each project. The Near-Term Assessment focuses on and more development will be necessary to reach the full reliability issues within the grid at current usage levels. The potental of wind generaton development.31 This expansion 20-Year and 10-Year Assessments focus on identfying larger illustrates the need for a robust transmission grid to ensure transmission projects to beneft the region using a number the growth of renewable energy generaton, a problem the of diferent usage scenarios. These scenarios account for NAS will help solve. growing demand and potental changing regulatons requiring more energy to come from renewable sources. The 3.3.4.c Recommended Financing Mechanism 20-Year Assessment is intended to create a transmission structure of high voltage (300 kV and above) lines that will The CapX2020 development shows that companies in this be able to serve the region in the long-term.32 Additonally, region are willing to collaborate to build a transmission enttes can request a Sponsored Upgrade or perform a high network to beneft the entre region. Most of the fnanc- priority study in accordance with the region’s Open Access ing for that project and for the NAS will come from com- Transmission Tarif that can lead to a transmission project panies securing private fnancing. The estmate cost for the being approved. The NAS could either request a Sponsored NAS in the Midcontnent ISO is $56.2 billion. This is one of Upgrade study or be included in one of the longer term as- the largest secton of the NAS with over 8,000 miles of pro- sessments. posed transmission lines. There is potental in this region for collaboratons between transmission developers and re- 3.3.5.b Current and Proposed Projects newable energy developers. A lack of transmission capacity has delayed some wind energy projects, while transmission The Midwest Transmission Project was a 180-mile 345 kV developers are hesitant to build transmission untl gener- transmission line between Sibley, Missouri and Nebraska aton plants are built. Partnerships between transmission City, Nebraska completed in 2017. The development was a and generaton developers will ensure both get built and joint venture between Kansas City Power & Light and the could atract investment to the NAS. Omaha Public Power District. The new line is an additonal connecton between the east and west sectons of the RTO and aims to deliver more renewable energy to the eastern half of the region. The venture cost approximately $400 million and was fnanced by the partcipatng companies. The project was one of SPP’s Priority Projects, so cost recovery will come from the entre region’s rate payers.33

58 Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility Chapter 3

3.3.5.c Recommended Financing Mechanism energy generaton, and public policy support for renewable energy it is likely that private investment will be lucratve in Financing in the SPP will likely be similar to MISO. Most of California. The state also has legislaton allowing public-pri- the NAS will be fnanced by private capital secured by the vate partnerships, which could be another avenue to atract developing companies. Rural areas may be able to use loans private investors. from the Rural Utlites Service. The estmated cost for the NAS in the SPP is $32.5 billion. There is a lot of wind gen- 3.3.7 Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) eraton in this region so there is also the potental for collaboraton with wind energy developers. Renewable energy Geographic Region: Texas developers in this region will beneft greatly from the NAS Transmission Miles: 45,600 because the energy generated in the SPP will be transmit- Generatng Capacity: 78,000 MW ted to populaton centers outside of the region. This should Proposed NAS Miles: 2,525 entce private developers and government bodies to support the NAS to help drive economic development in these Proposed NAS Cost: $17,150,753,074 regions. 3.3.7.a Transmission Planning and Approval Process 3.3.6 California ISO (CAISO) ERCOT develops a Regional Transmission Plan annually with Geographic Region: California, Nevada their Regional Planning Group and Transmission Service Transmission Miles: 26,000 Providers in the region. The plan assesses reliability and Generatng Capacity:34 71,417 MW economic transmission grid needs within six years. The ISO also conducts a Long-Term System Assessment every two Proposed NAS Miles: 2,220 years. This assessment uses scenario analysis to determine Proposed NAS Cost: $15,078,438,727 the strength of existng projects when considering the long- term transmission needs of the region.37 Stakeholders can 3.3.6.a Transmission Planning and Approval Process submit projects for evaluaton by the Regional Planning Group. A project will be included in the Regional Transmis- CAISO conducts an annual transmission planning assess- sion Plan if the ERCOT Board of Directors determines the ment. The plan identfes reliability, public policy, and project would be a soluton to identfed grid needs. economic needs of the transmission grid. The reliability planning performs a 10-year analysis of grid performance 3.3.7.b Current and Proposed Projects during projected peak usage. The public policy planning cycle largely atempts to determine needed grid upgrades The Compettve Renewable Energy Zone (CREZ) is a $6.8 to meet the state’s renewable energy goal of 50% by 2030. billion project born out of legislaton from the Texas Legisla- Economic planning determines projects that would provide ture in 2005 that designated geographical areas for poten- economic benefts to customers. The NAS could satsfy all tal renewable energy generaton. The Public Utlity Com- three of the planning mechanisms by increasing reliability mission of Texas established a transmission development and reducing grid congeston lowering costs for customers. plan and assigned constructon of the proposed lines to The grid also would help the state meet the renewable en- transmission service providers. The total development had ergy goal. The ISO also conducts “special studies” on issues approximately 3,600 miles of 345 kV transmission lines con- impacted by transformatonal change in the way electricity nectng renewable resources in West Texas to populaton is consumed.35 It might make sense for the NAS to be part centers in the eastern part of the state. This project is an of a special study due to its wide ranging interregional im- example of a government sponsored transmission project pacts. that was constructed, developed, and fnanced primarily by private companies. Because the initatve was backed by 3.3.6.b Recommended Financing Mechanism government enttes there was more collaboraton in permitng allowing efcient regulatory approval.38 California has one of the most ambitous renewable energy standards, requiring 50% of the state’s electricity to be sup- 3.3.7.c Recommended Financing Mechanism plied by renewable sources by 2030.36 The state’s aggressive approach indicates there is government support for grow- The ERCOT region is the most independent of all RTOs being renewable energy producton. The estmated cost of the cause it operates its own interconnecton and most trans- NAS in the California ISO is approximately $15.1 billion. Be- mission lines are within the state. The independence has cause of the state’s high populaton, extensive renewable allowed them to complete projects, such as the CREZ, much

59 Chapter 3 Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility more efciently than other regions. Their state government 3.3.9 Southwest and Northwest Region has shown support for transmission projects similar to the NAS and there are transmission service providers with ex- Geographic Region: Arizona, California, Colorado, perience in developing and fnancing transmission lines. Idaho, Montana, Nevada, The estmated cost of the NAS in the ERCOT region is $17.1 New Mexico, Oregon, South billion. The cost would likely be fnanced by private capi- Dakota, Utah, Washington, tal. A wealth of renewable wind and solar resources in the Wyoming western part of the state and large populaton centers in the Transmission Miles: - eastern part of the state make transmission projects lucra- Generatng Capacity: 125,964 MW tve to private investment. Proposed NAS Miles: 10,218 3.3.8 Southeast Region Proposed NAS Cost: $69,396,436,656

Geographic Region: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 3.3.9.a Transmission Planning and Approval Process Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, The Western Electricity Coordinatng Council (WECC) is South Carolina, Tennessee, charged with promotng the reliability of the bulk power sys- Virginia tem throughout the Western Interconnecton. The territory Transmission Miles: 55,000 includes the southwest and northwest regions along with Generatng Capacity: 238,000 MW California, Alberta and Britsh Columbia. WECC represents a wide spectrum of organizatons. WECC coordinates an ade- Proposed NAS Miles: 6,116 quacy planning process to determine transmission needs in Proposed NAS Cost: $41,536,690,357 the next 10 to 20 years. WECC studies are made available to stakeholders in the region who can then propose projects as 3.3.8.a Transmission Planning and Approval Process solutons to identfed needs.

The electric grid in the southeastern United States is not 3.3.9.b Recommended Financing Mechanism controlled by a RTO and thus the planning and approval process is less formalized than other regions. The Florida The Southwest and Northwest regions have the largest es- Reliability Coordinatng Council (FRCC) and the Southeast- tmated cost for the NAS at approximately $69.4 billion due ern Electric Reliability Council (SERC) are the primary bodies to covering the largest geographical area. Portons of the that oversee the bulk power system in the region. The plan- grid in this region will be privately fnanced, but govern- ning process for the FRCC includes an Annual Transmission ment support will likely be needed for other sectons due Planning Process coordinatng local utlity’s expansion plans to the high cost. The Rural Utlites Service loan programs into a regional development plan and a Biennial Transmis- could be a viable opton in this region since much of it is sion Planning Process that determines projects to make the comprised of rural areas and the grid will improve service grid more efcient.39 The planning process for SERC involves reliability to those regions. the collaboraton of many transmission providers in the region. Because planning in this region is driven by trans- Land use and sitng for the NAS will be especially import- mission providers and not a RTO, the NAS will need to gain ant in the western United States because the federal gov- support from the transmission providers in the region that ernment owns so much of the land. There are likely to be will ultmately advocate for constructon. greater environmental issues to clear when determining the exact grid route. Collaboraton and support from the federal 3.3.8.b Recommended Financing Mechanism government will be crucial to approve segments of the grid in this region so they can atract private investment. A pos- Gaining support from private transmission providers will be sible strategy is creatng a structure where proceeds from crucial to get the NAS approved for constructon, so private the more lucratve sectons of the grid in highly populated fnancing is likely to be the primary fnancing mechanism in regions can help pay for less lucratve segments. This might this region. The estmated cost of the NAS in the southeast involve bidding highly lucratve segments with less lucratve United States is approximately $41.5 billion. Each state in projects as a single project that would stll be fnancially this region has legislaton allowing public-private partner- benefcial for transmission providers. This will likely be the ships. Along with gaining support from private transmission most challenging secton of the NAS to approve and fnance, providers, there is potental for collaboraton with govern- but it is crucial to creatng the natonal network and allow ment enttes. renewable energy generated in the western United States

60 Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility Chapter 3 to reach populaton centers in the southern and eastern re- transmission developments. gions of the country. • Planning is crucial: Environmental studies, transmission line sitng, permitng, and eminent domain are all po- 3.4 National Overview tental hurdles for companies constructng the NAS. The proposal to use existng rights-of-way somewhat reduces Private investment will be the primary funder for this proj- this concern. ect, just as private capital currently funds most energy in- Transmission projects today are focused on increasing grid frastructure projects. The key to successfully fnancing the reliability and efciency and less on load growth. Improved NAS is ensuring the project is atractve to private investors. efciency of electronics has stabilized the growth of energy There is private capital available in the marketplace, but demand across the country. Additonally, grid improvements that capital can only be accessed if the interests of all stake- must enable the future transmission grid to be adaptable to holders are properly aligned making the NAS an atractve changes in load paterns and generaton sources. investment. In additon to private capital, strategic partnerships should be explored with the federal government, state There is wide spread agreement about the need for more and local governments, and government agencies. Due to investment in transmission. Improved reliability will likely the natonal security and environmental benefts, there lower costs to rate payers due to fewer congeston charges. should be government interest in this project. The NAS will allow more fexibility for RTOs to manage where electricity is generated, allowing greater access to Key areas of project development that will make the project cheaper energy. Rate payers will ultmately pay for the NAS more atractve to investors: through transmission charges, but costs for constructon will likely be ofset by the cheaper cost of energy and re- • Secure backing of federal/state governments, DOE, duced congeston fees. RTOs/ISOs: Support from the federal government and RTOs in each region will give credence to the importance 3.4.1 Cost Allocation of this project. This support will help increase the likelihood of getng the NAS approved and included in each Cost allocaton ofen becomes an important issue for in- RTO planning process opening the door for transmission terregional transmission projects. FERC mandates that cost providers to begin constructon. allocaton procedures for transmission projects must be developed by each RTO and uniformly applied. However, each RTO has slightly diferent procedures. In general, RTOs have • Reduce permitng and regulaton burden: The high shifed to a regional cost allocaton system for large trans- regulatory environment adds to the cost and tme to be- mission projects. Every rate payer in the region pays for a gin constructon. This can make it challenging to secure porton because everyone benefts from a regional trans- fnancing at a rate acceptable to both investors and transmission project that improves reliability and makes the grid mission providers. Legislatve acton can ensure that per- more efcient. Costs are generally allocated based on load mitng for the NAS grid does not get held up by any one usage. stakeholder. A reduced regulatory burden also reduces the overall cost of the grid. If there is wide spread support for constructng the NAS, • Ensure stakeholder interests are aligned in each re- cost allocaton should not create major issues. The NAS has gion: The naton’s electric grid is a large system with a di- benefts to all ratepayers so it makes sense to use a region- verse set of stakeholders. Ensuring that the interests of all al or even natonal cost allocaton system. Due to the in- stakeholders are aligned will make getng approval and creased reliability and efciency the NAS would create, the support for the NAS easier. Utlizing existng ROWs will re- overall electric costs to rate payers would remain relatvely duce the number of local stakeholders and make gaining constant because they will pay less congeston charges and natonal support more practcal. Wide spread support will have access to cheaper renewably generated electricity. help atract private investors and making fnancing the project feasible. 3.5 Conclusion • Encourage regional and natonal collaboraton: His- torically, transmission development was completed on Our investgaton suggests that the NAS is feasible without a state level. This has led states to have difering regula- requiring new public funding schemes or new taxes to gar- tons and processes governing transmission project con- ner capital. Instead, rate payers will produce returns through structon. More collaboraton between states and direc- electric bill fees. Moreover, investment in the NAS will en- ton from the federal government would reduce the tme able the creaton of millions of jobs natonwide that will not and cost to comply with multple agencies in interregional only be generated from the constructon of the transmission

61 Chapter 3 Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility system, but will also originate from the constructon and ber 2016. htps://www.pwc.com/us/en/capital-projects-infrastruc- operaton of new (mostly renewable) electricity generaton ture/publicatons/assets/pwc-us-public-private-partnerships.pdf facilites throughout the United States. Overall, this infra- 7. Warren, Ann. “Transmission Infrastructure By Public-Private Mod- structure package will cost between $303 billion and $442 el.” Last Modifed November 6, 2009. htps://www.foley.com/fles/ billion dollars to build the transmission system (depending Publicaton/6405267f-e9fc-4fc-abc0-d3ef34aa67d5/Presentaton/ on the cost of cable burial), as well as an additonal $2.2 PublicatonAtachment/a8152aae-0a51-440b-b1dc-d40686072faf/ trillion dollars to construct additonal electricity generaton TransmissionInfrastructurelNov2009.pdf facilites. Despite these costs, the average consumer elec- 8. “Financing Clean Infrastructure: Private Actvity Bonds.” Center for tric bill will not increase as a result. Additonally, although Climate and Energy Solutons. Webinar atended July 24, 2017. confguring HVDC lines underground ofen costs three to 9. Ehlers, Torsten. “Understanding the challenges for infrastructure fve tmes that of above ground lines, this study indicates fnance.” Bank for Internatonal Setlements. Last Modifed August that this costlier confguraton is stll an economically viable 2014. htp://www.bis.org/publ/work454.pdf soluton; an underground HVDC system (that is three tmes 10. “A long and winding road: The world needs more infrastructure. more expensive than above ground lines) will cost less than How will it pay for it?” The Economist. Last Modifed March 22, contnuing the operaton of the naton’s current grid sys- 2014. htps://www.economist.com/news/fnance-and-econom- tem given that the cost of natural gas remains above $4.43/ ics/21599394-world-needs-more-infrastructure-how-will-it-pay-it- MMBtu. According to the EIA, the cost of natural gas is set long-and-winding to increase to at least $5/MMBtu by 2030, meaning that 11. Tausche, Kayla. “Private investors have cash – and strict criteria the NAS is forecasted to be a viable economic soluton by its – for US infrastructure projects.” CNBC. Last Modifed March 31, tme of completon. 2017. htps://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/31/private-investors-have- cash--and-strict-criteria--for-us-infrastructure-projects.html There is a need for new investment in our naton’s transmis- 12. “How and when to use private money in infrastructure projects.” sion infrastructure. The NAS will beneft all rate payers by The Economist. Last Modifed April 22, 2017. htps://www.econo- allowing greater access to cheaper renewable energy while mist.com/news/fnance-and-economics/21721229-public-private- also increasing natonal security. The estmated $500 billion partnerships-their-promise-and-their-pitalls-how-and-when-use cost for an underground HVDC system will require a number 13. “State Legislaton.” Natonal Council for Public-Private Partnerships. of diferent fnancing mechanisms over a number of years. Last Modifed January 2017. htp://www.ncppp.org/resources/ Private sector interest in infrastructure projects is growing research-informaton/state-legislaton/ and capital is available in the marketplace. The NAS must 14. Anderson, Hil. “Analysis: Path 15 an energy breakthrough?” UPI. build partnerships with experienced transmission develop- Last Modifed December 14, 2004. htp://www.upi.com/Analy- ers and gain support from federal and state governments, sis-Path-15-an-energy-breakthrough/73901103074353/ government agencies, and RTOs to successfully secure f- 15. “2018 Budget: Infrastructure Initatve.” White House Press nancing for this landmark energy transmission project. Release. Accessed July 2017. htps://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ whitehouse.gov/fles/omb/budget/fy2018/fact_sheets/2018%20 References Budget%20Fact%20Sheet_Infrastructure%20Initatve.pdf 16. “Loan Guarantee Solicitaton Announcement.” U.S. Department of 1. Lazard Ltd., Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis - Version 10.0, New Energy Loan Programs Ofce. Last Modifed March 2, 2016. htps:// York, NY: Lazard Ltd., December 2016 energy.gov/sites/prod/fles/2015/12/f27/DOE-LPO_REEE_Solicita- 2. “Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generaton ton_03-Jun-2014.pdf Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2017.” April 2017. htps:// 17. “One Nevada Line.” U.S. Department of Energy. Accessed July 2017. www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_generaton.pdf. htps://energy.gov/lpo/one-nevada-line 3. Rapier, Robert. “The Long-Term Outlook For Natural Gas.” 18. Milford, Lewis; Muro, Mark; Morey, Jessica; Saha, Devashree; Forbes. October 31, 2016. htps://www.forbes.com/sites/ Sinclair, Mark. “Leveraging State Clean Energy Funds for Economic rrapier/2016/10/31/the-long-term-outlook-for-natural- Development.” Brookings-Rockefeller Project on State and Met- gas/#51567e3657a4. ropolitan Innovaton. Last Modifed January 2012. htps://www. 4. “Guide to infrastructure fnancing.” Associaton for Financial Mar- brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0111_states_ener- kets in Europe. Last Modifed June 2015. htp://www.ltc.org/imag- gy_funds.pdf es/AFME_Guide_to_Infrastructure_Financing_1_1.pdf 19. “Electric Programs.” United States Department of Agriculture Rural 5. Alloisio, Isabella. “Public-Private Partnerships: a focus on Energy Development. Accessed July 2017. htps://www.rd.usda.gov/pro- Infrastructures and Green Investments.” Internatonal Center for grams-services/all-programs/electric-programs Climate Governance. Last Modifed April 2014. htp://www.iccgov. 20. Trabish, Herman K. “The Rural Utlites Service: How the USDA is org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/22_Refecton__April-2014.pdf building a clean energy future for rural America.” Last Modifed 6. “Public-private partnerships in the US: The state of the market and June 10, 2016. htp://www.utlitydive.com/news/the-rural-utlites- the road ahead.” PricewaterhouseCoopers. Last Modifed Novem- service-how-the-usda-is-building-a-clean-energy-future/420334/

62 Economic advantages and fnancial feasibility Chapter 3

21. “Financing Clean Infrastructure: Private Actvity Bonds.” Center for 31. Shafer, David. “Minnesota utlites fip switch on large segment Climate and Energy Solutons. Webinar atended July 24, 2017. of $2.1 billion CapX2020 transmission project.” StarTribune. Last 22. “Electric Power Markets: Natonal Overview.” Federal Energy Modifed May 4, 2015. htp://www.startribune.com/minnesota- Regulatory Commission. Accessed July 2017. htps://www.ferc.gov/ utlites-fip-switch-on-large-segment-of-2-1-billion-capx2020-trans- market-oversight/mkt-electric/overview.asp mission-project/302495011/ 23. “Transmission Planning Process Guide.” ISO New England. Last 32. “2013 Integrated Transmission Plan 20-Year Assessment Report.” Modifed April 6, 2017. htps://www.iso-ne.com/statc-as- Southwest Power Pool. Last Modifed July 30, 2013. htps://www. sets/documents/2017/04/transmission_planning_process_ spp.org/documents/20438/20130730_2013_itp20_report_clean. guide_4_6_2017.pdf pdf 24. Fan, Dawei. “NYISO Planning Update.” ISO New York. Last Modifed 33. Midwest Transmission Project. Accessed July 2017. htp://www. December 9, 2016. htps://www.iso-ne.com/statc-assets/docu- midwestransmissionproject.com/Default.htm ments/2016/12/2016-12-09_ipsac_nyiso_planning_update_a03. 34. “Today’s Outlook.” California ISO. Accessed July 2017. htp://www. pdf caiso.com/outlook.html 25. “Response to Request for Informaton: New York Energy Highway.” 35. “2016-2017 Transmission Plan.” California ISO. Last Modifed West Point Transmission. Last Modifed May 30, 2012. htp://www. March 17, 2017. htp://www.caiso.com/Documents/Board-Ap- nyenergyhighway.com/Content/documents/9.pdf proved_2016-2017TransmissionPlan.pdf 26. “PJM Regional Transmission Expansion Plan 2016.” PJM. Last Mod- 36. “Renewable Energy – Overview.” California Energy Commission. ifed February 28, 2017. htp://www.pjm.com/-/media/library/ Last Modifed December 22, 2016. htp://www.energy.ca.gov/re- reports-notces/2016-rtep/2016-rtep-book-1.ashx?la=en newables/tracking_progress/documents/renewable.pdf 27. Bresswein, Kurt. “Susquehanna-Roseland power line, a $1.4 billion 37. “Current Planning Guide.” ERCOT. Accessed July 2017. htp://www. project, switched on.” LehighValleyLive. Last Modifed May 13, ercot.com/mktrules/guides/planning/current 2015. htp://www.lehighvalleylive.com/breaking-news/index. 38. “The Compettve Renewable Energy Zones Process.” ERCOT. ssf/2015/05/susquehanna-roseland_power_lin_4.html Last Modifed August 11, 2014. htps://energy.gov/sites/prod/ 28. “Corporate Informaton.” MISO. Last Modifed March 2017. htps:// fles/2014/08/f18/c_lasher_qer_santafe_presentaton.pdf www.misoenergy.org/Library/Repository/Communicaton%20Ma- 39. “FRCC Regional Transmission Planning Process.” Florida Reliability terial/Corporate/Corporate%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf Coordinatng Council. Last Modifed October 30, 2015. htps:// 29. “MISO Transmission Expansion Plan.” MISO. Accessed July 2017. www.frcc.com/Planning/Shared%20Documents/Regional%20Trans- htps://www.misoenergy.org/Library/Repository/Study/MTEP/ mission%20Planning%20Process/FRCC-MS-PL-018_FRCC_Region- MTEP16/MTEP16%20Full%20Report.pdf al_Transmission_Planning_Process.pdf 30. CapX2020. Accessed July 2017. htp://www.capx2020.com/

63 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton Chapter 4 North American Supergrid permitng 4 and regulatoin Lead authors: Kathryn Binkley, Tyler Respondek

Summary

We analyze regulatory reform advocacy for a RTO/ISO-cen- a provision that alloted lands can be commandeered for tered framework for efectve operaton of the Supergrid as public purposes, if needed. The Supergrid might signifcant- well as routng and permitng processes. ly improve connectvity to the natonal energy market for renewable energy developments on tribal land. The NAS may need to utlize private land, public land, or tribal land. For private land, the NAS may require negota- Our analysis indicates that the most feasible routng for in- tons with afected landowners regarding easement and, if ter-connected Supergrid links could be mainly along exist- necessary, exercise eminent domain. Additonally, the NAS ing rights-of –way, specifcally federal and state highways will have to obtain approvals from the necessary federal, as well as abandoned rail lines. Accomplishing this would state and local government agencies (partcularly the Bu- require working with the Federal Highway Administraton reau of Land Management and Bureau of Indian Afairs). (FHWA) and other federal authorites which retain author- Tribal lands involve complicatons with the federal trust re- ity over such routes. The FHWA is authorized to consider latonship. whether proposed transmission projects are within the public interest and to grant right-of-way permission. Streamlining the permitng process involves reducing barriers to using the land for renewable energy transmission. As evidenced by the complexity in achieving line sitng Three potental state-based strategies have been identfed authority across the lower 48 contguous states, this path to facilitate the streamlining of the permit process: (a) allow would be an approach both costly and vulnerable to road- states, in determining whether a project is “necessary,” to blocks from state and local regulatory bodies. A natonwide consider regional and out-of- state benefts, which would al- approach with regional decision-making authority would low for constructon of the NAS in pass-through states while provide the Supergrid with an opportunity to go naton- also considering in-state and local concerns; (b) expand the wide, while safeguarding regional consideratons of geogra- defniton of “public use” to include specifc applicaton for phy, available resources and market conditons. Under the installaton of merchant transmission lines and allow state Energy Policy Act of 2005, a group of three or more con- and local government to consider general economic bene- tguous states can enter an interstate compact establishing fts; (c) create new RTOs/ISOs in those areas of the western regional sitng authority. Alternatvely, we recommend that and southeastern United States that are not presently in- Congress grant sitng authority through legislaton to RTOs corporated into an existng RTO/ISO. and ISOs. Such a shif in the regulatory structure is supported by the ever-evolving nature of the natonwide electricity Rights-of-way through tribal lands add another level of com- market as well as the physical nature of the grid itself. With plexity. Tribal lands are governed mainly for the beneft of Congressional involvement, the NAS can alleviate the mod- the tribes and are held in trust by the Federal Government. ern problems posed to the current grid, and strike a bal- While the Federal Government does not maintain eminent ance between local area concerns and centralized federal domain authority over tribal lands, there is authority.

64 Chapter 4 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton

4.1 Introduction as the projects can create mutual benefts for the railroads. Part 4.6 recommends Congressional acton to transfer some The current regulatory and permitng landscape for interstate sitng and eminent domain authority for interstate state electric transmission projects is an impediment to im- electric transmission line projects in general or the NAS in plementng the NAS. While it is important to engage with all partcular to either the FERC or RTOs. stakeholders, including state and local authorites, placing primary sitng and eminent domain authority at the state 4.2 Public Use, Public Need, Siting Authority, and local level makes it difcult to properly value the regional and natonal benefts of the NAS. As a result, Con- and Eminent Domain gressional acton transferring sitng and eminent domain authority to a federal or regional permitng entty would 4.2.1 Siting of Interstate Transmission Lines streamline the process and more fully consider the federal and regional costs and benefts in additon to state and In order to construct a transmission line, the transmission local costs and benefts. This chapter evaluates the faw in line operator must generally comply with a sitng process in the current permitng system and proposes some solutons each state through which the line will pass by obtaining a with regard to portons of the NAS on private lands, federal certfcate of need or certfcate public convenience and ne- public lands, tribal lands, and highway and railroad rights cessity from the state public utlites commission or public of way. service commission. Generally, the transmission operator obtains a certfcate of need by establishing “the ‘need’ for Part 4.2 details the local, state, and federal laws governing the line, the efect of the line on reliability, alternatves to sitng and eminent domain authority for interstate electric the proposed line, and potental environmental impacts of transmission line projects like the NAS. State statutes re- the line.”4 In most states, the certfcate of need allows the garding sitng vary across the United States. It is important operator to exercise eminent domain authority to assem- for state and local enttes to address their individual needs, ble the necessary property easements to build the line if but it ofen results in delaying or completely preventng the voluntary contracts with landowners cannot be obtained. In transmission projects needed to integrate more renewable some states, the operator must make a separate applicaton energy into the grid. to the commission for eminent domain authority beyond the certfcate of need. In many states, the relevant state Part 4.3 of this chapter discusses the challenges of sitng a law does not allow companies other than public utlites to transmission line on federal land. When using federal land, seek a certfcate of need or exercise eminent domain and a project must deal with both the federal government and in other states the law is unclear. state governments. A transmission project must comply with strict federal standards when crossing federal land.1 The determinaton of need difers across states, but many The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) within the U.S. De- states “have some concept of ‘need’ pertaining to the partment of Interior has set aside land aimed at developing state’s own citzens… .”5 For example, in Florida, the Public renewable energy projects on federal land.2 Federal land Utlites Commission (PUC) considers the “need for electric use may be an important asset, partcularly for projects in system reliability and integrity, the need for abundant, low- the western United States. cost electrical energy to assure economic well-being of the residents of the state, the…startng and ending point of the Part 4.4 discusses the responsibilites of a transmission op- line, and other maters…deemed relevant.”6 On the other erator when the project crosses tribal lands that are unique, hand, Arizona statute urges the state PUC to balance, “in because such land is held in trust by the United States gov- the broad public interest, the need for an adequate, eco- ernment.3 Projects on such lands may be expedited by giv- nomical and reliable supply of electric power with the de- ing the tribes a more central role in allowing sitng of renew- sire to minimize the efect…on the environmental and ecol- able energy projects over their land and creatng concrete ogy of this state.”7 benefts for tribes associated with the NAS projects. Some states, such as New York, provide detailed regulatory Part 4.5 explores potental issues with transportaton rights requirements for obtaining a certfcate. Title 16, Part 86 of of way. The U.S. Department of Transportaton works in the New York Compilaton of Codes, Rules, and Regulatons conjuncton with the BLM and state transportaton depart- outlines the several requirements for an interstate trans- ments for sitng along highway corridors. Diferent regulato- mission line. An applicaton is required to “submit detailed ry requirements in multple state departments of transpor- maps…[that] shall include” the locaton of a right-of-way taton can impede progress and delay build tme. Railroad and possible damage to the environment as well as histori- rights of way may also be an opton for NAS projects so long cal areas.8 Further, the applicant must “submit a statement

65 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton Chapter 4 explaining what consideraton, if any, was given to: (1) any Utlites Act’s defniton of a public utlity contained the lan- alternatve route; (2) the expansion of any existng right- guage “now or hereafer…may” in regard to controlling or of-way…[and] (3) any alternate method which would fulfll owning transmission infrastructure.19 The court interpreted the energy requirements with comparable costs” where the removal of this language as requiring potental projects the applicant may compare the benefts and drawbacks of to own or control “utlity-related property or equipment.”20 the alternatve.9 The applicant is also required to “submit a The court also challenged an administratve law judge’s statement describing” economic efects on the “residental, (ALJ) argument that “imposing such a requirement would… commercial or industrial land-use paterns of any area adja- create an unworkable ‘Catch-22’” in requiring an entty to cent to any porton of the proposed facility.”10 only apply for a certfcate of need untl that entty “already owned public utlity infrastructure.21 In other words, such an Other states have arguably limited the ability of transmis- interpretaton would only allow previously established pub- sion lines to obtain a certfcate of need by limitng the lic utlites to qualify as public utlites. The Illinois Supreme defniton of a public utlity. In 2012, Illinois replaced their Court countered that the statute would allow Rock Island previous Public Utlites Act with new legislaton.11 The act to develop the line “as a purely private project,” and “[o] defnes a public utlity to include: nce [the] projects are further underway” and own, control, or manage the “utlity-related property,” Rock Island could every corporaton, company, limited liability company, asso- “then seek certfcaton” to operate as a public utlity.22 ciaton, joint stock company or associaton, frm, partnership or individual, their lessees, trustees, or receivers appointed The Illinois Supreme Court seems to understate the impact by any court whatsoever that owns, controls, operates or of the statutory interpretaton on merchant transmission manages, within this State, directly or indirectly, for public lines. While it is true that a line could operate a purely pri- use, any plant, equipment or property used or to be used for vate basis, it would not be able to fnd a customer base to or in connecton with, or owns or controls any franchise, li- sell to and it may not be able to acquire land through em- cense, permit or right to engage in: inent domain. The court also did not specify what stage a (1) the producton, storage, transmission, sale, delivery, or transmission infrastructure needs to be in for a merchant furnishing of…electricity… .12 transmission line to quality as a public utlity. While the Catch-22 is not technically unworkable, it does create signif- The new bill was interpreted as providing a more restrictve icant barriers to any merchant transmission line looking to defniton of public utlity in Illinois Landowners Alliance v. enter the market. This decision, and any similar decisions, Illinois Commerce Commission. In the case, the Illinois Land- could have signifcant impact on the NAS. The NAS would owners Alliance challenged an Illinois Commerce Commis- have to build transmission infrastructure before knowing sion order “grantng a certfcate of public convenience and whether it would qualify as a public utlity. Forcing compa- necessity to Rock Island Clean Line…for constructon of a nies to sink costs into a project without knowing how those high voltage electric transmission line… .”13 Rock Island is a costs can be recovered could create a chilling efect on mer- merchant transmission project that planned to “construct chant transmission lines hoping to enter the market. and manage” the line, but did not “yet own, control, operate, or manage any plants, equipment, property in Illi- While states difer in their “need” requirements for certf- nois….”14 The Illinois Landowner’s Alliance argued that Rock icates, each one has some concept of weighing potental Island could not qualify as a public utlity since “it did not benefts against economic or environmental costs. There already have in place the transmission infrastructure that has been some debate as to how broadly these benefts would qualify it as a public utlity… .”15 The Illinois Supreme may be construed. At one extreme, one could consider na- Court, in holding that Rock Island did not qualify as a public tonal benefts to the grid as whole. At the other extreme, utlity, focused on the specifc language of the Illinois Pub- one could only consider the in-state benefts. The Illinois lic Utlites Act. The court noted that secton 2-105 requires Landowners Alliance decision also seems to suggest that a a company to “own, control, operate or manage…a plant, project must signifcantly invest in a state before the state equipment, or property” for the transmission of electric- grants a project with the beneft of being a public utlity. The ity.16 A company that simply sells electricity “does not, in debate focuses on whether a state should sacrifce econom- itself, make the enterprise a public utlity” since that com- ic and environmental resource for the beneft of the region pany could sell the electricity to “a select group of industrial or the naton. customers” without being a public utlity.17 The Illinois Su- preme Court reasoned that Rock Island only held “an op- 4.2.2 Federal Siting Authority ton to acquire a parcel of real property,” and “having an opton to buy something is not the same as owning or even Federal sitng authority could consider natonal or region- controlling it.”18 The court noted that the previous Public al benefts as opposed to only in-state benefts.23 A federal

66 Chapter 4 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton approach would streamline permitng, creatng a more ef- thority withholding approval or grantng approval “with fcient approach for interstate transmission projects. There project-killing conditons,” and a state sitng authority that has been an efort to expand federal sitng authority, but it “denies an applicaton outright.”38 The former “misuses its has been unsuccessful. authority,” while the later “acts with transparency and engages in a legitmate use of its traditonal powers.”39 The In 2005, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EP- dissentng judge, however, argued that § 216 was intended Act 2005”), which amended the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) to override state authority in the interest of natonal grid by adding § 216.24 The amendment granted FERC authority security” and would have upheld FERC’s interpretaton of to override state sitng authority under certain circumstanc- its statutory authority.40 es. The law directed the U.S. Department of Energy to eval- uate and identfy natonal interest electric transmission cor- The Piedmont decision severely limited federal backstop sit- ridors (NIETCs).25 An NIETC is an “area experiencing electric ing authority.41 As of today, FERC has not exercised its back- energy transmission capacity constraints or congeston.26 stop sitng authority.”42 An atempt to pass new legislaton Once DOE identfes a NIETC, FERC may issue a permit for a on the mater was made in 2009, but it was unsuccessful.43 project to relieve congeston if it fnds that the potental line Creatng more federal sitng authority will require enactng (1) is “used for interstate commerce,” (2) is “consistent with new federal legislaton, a difcult task in recent decades. the public interest,” (3) will “signifcantly reduce transmis- Furthermore, federalizing the permitng process would sion congeston in interstate commerce,” (4) is also “consis- come at the cost of local control. If the federal government tent with natonal energy policy,” (5) and will “[m]aximize is leading the process, there may be some concerns as to the use of existng towers and structures.”27 where the line is built and which communites bear the cost. It is important to keep a decentralized process while In order for FERC to grant a sitng permit under these cir- providing some uniform standards for the implementaton cumstances (ofen called “backstop-sitng authority”) the of the NAS through federal legislaton. project must also meet one of the following conditons.28 First, the state must lack authority to site the transmission 4.2.3 Eminent Domain Authority line or it is unable to “consider the interstate benefts” of the potental line.29 Second, “the applicant” is unable to obtain If negotatons are unsuccessful, a common technique for a permit, “because the applicant does not serve end-users acquiring land is the power of eminent domain. The Fifh in the State.”30 Third, the state has “withheld approval for Amendment to the U.S Consttuton allows private property more than 1 year afer the fling of an applicaton.”31 Fourth, to be taken for a “public use upon payment of just compen- the state has approved the permit, but has “conditoned its saton.”44 Most states have similar provisions in their own approval” in a way that the line will not “signifcantly re- state consttutons. State consttutons, however, have vary- duce transmission congeston in interstate commerce or is ing requirement before grantng eminent domain authority. not economically feasible.32 Afer Congress enacted EPAct 2005, FERC enacted a rule interpretng its authority to allow Eminent authority is partcularly important because it al- it to exercise backstop-sitng authority afer a state denied a lows a transmission project to use land if there is a land- sitng permit within a NIETC.33 owner who chooses not to sell or an agreement cannot be reached.45 While some enttes can aford to invest without In Piedmont Environmental Council v. FERC, some state utl- eminent domain, “sitng costs, litgaton and constructon ity commissions fled suit against FERC’s interpretaton of § delays” may increase due to landowner expectatons.46 On 216(b)(1)(C)(i) of the FPA.34 FERC construed “withheld ap- the other hand, under a natonal interstate transmission proval for more than 1 year…to include a state’s denial of a project, such as the NAS, private buyouts could add up rath- permit within the one-year statutory tme frame.”35 The U.S. er quickly.47 Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the plaintfs and against FERC. However, there are problems regarding eminent domain for interstate transmission due to the varying defniton of The court noted that § 216(b)(1) contains a “list of fve cir- “public use” among the states.48 Most states include trans- cumstances when FERC may preempt a state and issue a mission lines as a public use by statute, so long as the op- permit.”36 Since an outright denial of a permit was not a erator has received a certfcate of need. But, the queston part of the fve circumstances, the court found that FERC’s has arisen in many states whether a merchant transmission interpretaton did not make sense. The court added that, line designed to carry electricity to customers several states if FERC’s interpretaton prevailed, the federal government away is a public use with regard to a state where the line could overrule any state sitng decision.37 Circuit Judge Mi- passes through but does not provide electricity.49 chael compared the diference between a state sitng au-

67 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton Chapter 4

Some states extend eminent domain authority only for proj- The varying defnitons of public use and difering values ects that are of “use by the public” and provide “electricity among states could pose a signifcant obstacle to the NAS. immediately to [the] in-state residents.”50 Some states de- It could be difcult for the NAS to meet the requirements of fne “public use” quite literally in that the project must be North Dakota in proving more than general economic ben- used by the residents of that state. These states are very efts while also developing the natural resources in Idaho restrictve in how they defne public use. For example, Art- and providing in-state benefts. The NAS could beneft from cle 1, secton 16 of the North Dakota Consttuton states, “a state legislatures revising their eminent domain statutes to public use or public purpose does not include public bene- include merchant transmission lines as a public use or allow fts of economic development including…general economic for legislatve-made exceptons. health.”51 The secton also states that private property may not be taken by “any private individual, or entty, unless that Legislatures will have to consider how expanding the defni- property is necessary for conductng a…utlity business.”52 ton of public use under eminent domain statutes to include The North Dakota consttuton suggests that, while emi- merchant transmission projects could afect their state. nent domain may be used to transfer property between pri- Perhaps instead of focusing on whether the line provides vate enttes in the context of transmission, general public electricity to citzens of the state, the legislature could fo- benefts cannot be used as means of proving a public use. cus on the overall economic benefts in the form of jobs. Additonally, the Idaho Consttuton defnes “public use” A state receiving energy could fnd a way to trade benefts as, “[the] necessary use of lands for the constructons of with pass-through state. It is clear that for the NAS to work reservoirs…, for the purpose of irrigaton, or for the rights- legislatures need to think about benefts beyond the form of-ways for the constructon of canals…to convey water to of energy delivery. States could be creatve with how they the place of use for any useful purpose…, or any other use trade benefts to each other. necessary to the complete development of the material resources of the state … .”53 Other states can expand or re- An interstate transmission line ofen provides regional or strict the defniton of public use through statute. Califor- natonal benefts in additon to state and local benefts. This nia statute states that when the legislatures provides that may not be considered a public use since it does not directly when the power of eminent domain may be exercise, “such beneft the people of that state. This is of the most concern acton is deemed to be a declaraton…that such use…is a in cases where the line merely runs through the state with- public use.”54 Additonally, the California Consttuton allows out providing any direct benefts such as allowing exports of for government taking and conveyance to a private person renewable energy or reducton in electricity prices through when it is done “for the purpose of protectng public health imports of renewable energy. Those states are asked to and safety… .”55 California, unlike North Dakota and Idaho, sacrifce their environmental resources for the beneft of is more permissive in regard to public use and potental ex- the generaton-state and the end-user state. There may be ceptons for conveyances made to private enttes. states where the transmission line passes through without providing any power to that state. It is important to fnd The varying defnitons of “public use” can be partcularly ways to instll benefts on “pass-through” states. It would problematc for merchant transmission lines since in some be prudent for the NAS to focus on the broader economic states they are considered to be for private gain only and impact of the line in these states. not a public use.56 Merchant transmission lines “are distnguished from traditonal public utlites in that the develop- 4.3. Interstate Transmission Projects on ers of merchant projects assume all of the market risk of a project and have no captve pool from which to recoup Federal Land the cost of the project.”57 Merchant transmission projects can be allowed to “charge for transmission service at ne- An interstate transmission project is likely to cross some gotated rates, unencumbered by traditonal cost of service federal land. Federal land use brings new challenges that ratemaking principles.”58 Negotated rates, as opposed to the NAS must meet. Much of the federal land ownership cost-based rates, could provide a transmission operator is located in the West.59 There are fve “source of access” with more fexibility when it comes to cost recovery. The problems for interstate transmission projects hoping to use ability to charge higher rates could atract investors. As a federal lands.60 First, there are fragmented parcels of land result, it has been difcult in many states for merchant lines owned by private and state enttes within federal lands.61 to seek a sitng permit or establish that the line is a public Second, there are many “alleged rights by use, prescripton, use for purposes of exercising eminent domain. Generally, or ancient statute.”62 Third, surface and subsurface rights merchant transmission lines may be hard pressed to prove are severed in areas of “known or suspected mineral oc- their use is a public use beyond general economic benefts, currence.”63 Fourth, people are ofen informally allowed to especially in states where a line would be passing through. wander onto unsetled lands and this may interfere with

68 Chapter 4 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton land-use projects.64 Fifh, there are “partal…property in- agencies, and tribes, as well as comment received in pre- terests” held by many users that may get in the way of an liminary applicaton review meetngs…and the public meet- interstate transmission project.65 ing[s].”80 Furthermore, the project must comply with the Natonal Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).81 The NAS could 4.3.1 Federal Land Policy and Management Act take advantage of these specialized provisions to help the project move forward. The FLPMA provides special areas If an interstate transmission project passes through federal for renewable energy development that ft the NAS goals. It land, then the BLM is generally the permitng authority act- would be in the best interest of the NAS to work with BLM ing pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management using the specialized provisions of the FLPMA. BLM rules Act (FLPMA).66 The relevant sectons of the FLPMA are sec- show that the agency has had an eye toward renewable tons 1761 to 1171 which “provide comprehensive guide- energy development on federal land. If the NAS can get lines for nearly all rights of way on BLM public lands and na- through the stakeholder meetng and screening process, it tonal forests… .”67 Secton 1761(a)(4) of the FLPMA grants could use public lands as a way to develop renewable ener- the Secretary of the Interior “with respect to public lands… gy transmission. are authorized to grant, issue, or renew rights of way over, upon, under, or through such lands for—[4] systems for 4.3.2 Bureau of Land Management Segregated Land generaton, transmission, and distributon of electric energy.”68 The act also grants power to the Secretary of Agricul- 43 C.F.R. § 2804.25(f)(1) authorizes the BLM to segregate ture “with respect to lands within the Natonal Forest Sys- federal land in a “right-of-way applicaton…for the genera- tem (except for public lands designated as wilderness).”69 ton of electrical energy from wind or solar sources.”82 BLM Subsecton 4 also requires applicants to “comply with all is also authorized to segregate public lands for potental applicable requirements of the Federal Energy Regulatory ROWs for wind or solar energy generaton “when initatng Commission under the Federal Power Act.”70 a compettve process for solar or wind development on partcular lands.”83 Segregaton would be important to the An interstate transmission project must then submit the NAS, because it allows BLM to only use the land for renew- appropriate paper work for a federal right-of-way.71 If the able energy development.84 The NAS, however, has to keep project is unable to “submit all requisite informaton,” BLM in mind the purpose of the public land. If the potental use could “reject…[the] ROW applicaton.”72 Additonally, the is contrary to the purpose of the public land, BLM may deny applicant is encouraged “to make an appointment for a the applicaton.85 BLM may also deny the applicaton if the preapplicaton meetng[.]”73 The meetng is important be- potental use is not in the public interest.86 The NAS would cause “BLM can: (1) Identfy potental routng and other also have to ensure they are qualifed to receive the grant constraints; (2) Determine whether the lands are located for the ROW.87 To qualify for a grant, an operator must be a inside a designated or existng right-of-way corridor or a business entty “authorized to do business in the state where designated leasing area; (3) Tentatvely schedule the pro- the right-of-way” is located as well as be able to “[t]echnical- cessing of your proposed applicaton; (4) Inform [the appli- ly and fnancially [be] able to construct, operate, maintain, cant] of…fnancial obligatons, such as processing and mon- and terminate the use of public lands” in the applicaton.88 itoring costs and rents.”74 Being apprised of the process and The NAS must also make sure that the grant is not contrary maintaining regular contact with BLM can make the process with the FLPMA or any other laws or rules. BLM may also more efcient. The BLM processes the project applicaton deny an applicaton if the project cannot prove technical or in several ways. First, BLM holds “public meetngs” if there fnancial feasibility.89 In partcular, the applicaton “must… is “sufcient public interest…to warrant their tme and ex- demonstrate technical and fnancial capability to construct, pense.”75 BLM has established “17 Solar Energy Zones (SEZ) operate, maintain, and terminate a project throughout in Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah.”76 the applicaton process and authorizaton period.”90 If an SEZ “are deemed priority areas for commercial-scale solar applicant is unable to “demonstrate and sustain technical development.”77 Further, BLM “authorizes commercial solar and fnancial capability,” the applicaton may be denied.91 projects using a FLPMA [ROW] that authorizes…electrical Additonally, the project may be denied under 43 C.F.R. § and transmission facilites … .”78 BLM also allows for trans- 2804.25(e)(2).92 If the NAS is unable to meet any of the re- mission lines for wind energy that “may be authorized with quirements, the project may ask for a variance.93 In order a…linear [ROW] authorizaton.”79 A solar or wind project to receive the variance, the project must show good reason must (1) hold a meetng for people “afected by the poten- for not meetng the original requirement, bring forth an ap- tal right-of-way,” (2) go through a screening process where propriate alternatve requirement, and send the alternatve applicatons with “lesser resource conficts” are prioritzed, requirement in writng to BLM.94 The NAS is allowed to ap- and (3) the applicaton is evaluated “based on…input from peal an applicaton denial from BLM.95 It is not clear if the other partes, such as Federal, State, and local government segregated land would apply to transmission, as opposed to

69 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton Chapter 4 generaton, facilites. There needs to be more inquiries as to in the process, there may be delay from stakeholder back- whether the rule applies to transmission constructon. The lash, possibly in the form of lawsuits. It remains to be seen if NAS could ask for a variance for transmission as it advances the Trump administraton can expedite infrastructure proj- the goal of renewable energy development ects while also providing transparency and accountability. It will be important to see how the Trump administraton 4.3.3 Effect of the Executive Order Establishing implements the Executve Order. Discipline and Accountability in the Environmental Review and Permitting Process for Infrastructure 4.4 Rights-of-Way and Tribal Land on Federal Lands Tribal ROWs add another layer of complexity because the On August 15th, 2017 the Trump administraton issued an NAS would be dealing with a sovereign entty in a trust re- Executve Order outlining processes for improving environ- latonship with the federal government. The Department of mental review and permitng for infrastructure projects on the Interior is charged with grantng ROWs on tribal lands federal lands. The order aims to “develop infrastructure in held in trust by the federal government.103 In United States an environmentally sensitve manner” and “provide trans- v. Navajo Naton, the Court examined the trust relatonship parency and accountability to the public regarding envi- in light of a specifc statute.104 The Court explained that “a ronmental review and authorizaton decisions.”96 The order general trust relatonship between the United States and also calls for conductng environmental reviews and autho- the Indian people…is insufcient to support jurisdicton un- rizing permits “in a coordinated, consistent, predictable, der the Indian Tucker Act.”105 The Court held that a statute and tmely manner… .”97 must create a “duty-imposing” prescripton that would allow a tribe to sue to the federal government. The NAS will The Executve Order discusses “Performance Priority Goals” have to examine the specifc statute under which the land and how the federal government should meet them.98 “Per- is being used to learn of a partcular trust relatonship and formance Priority Goals” are met using Cross-Agency Prior- potental recourse on the part of tribes. While the federal ity (CAP) Goals. CAP Goals are used to accelerate progress trust relatonship is well established, it can also lead to in- “in priority areas that require actve collaboraton among efciencies in the transmission ROW process.106 It is import- multple agencies… .”99 The Trump administraton creates a ant for an interstate transmission project to understand the tme table of not more than an average of two years “from tribal legal landscape and possible routes for streamlining the date of the publicaton of a notce of intent to prepare an the process. environmental impact statement or other benchmark….”100 The administraton also implements the One Federal Deci- 4.4.1 Allotted Land and Federal Trust Land sion principle where “[e]ach major infrastructure…have a lead [f]ederal agency” to be responsible for getng a project There are several diferent types of tribal land but among through the federal environmental review and permitng the most basic are alloted lands and federal trust lands. It process.101 The principle allows for one federal agency to be is important for an interstate transmission project to know the lead agency of a project while coordinatng with other the diference because it drastcally changes the procedure agencies. The idea is that all of the agencies cannot work for acquiring an ROW. Tribal trust lands are for the beneft of against each other. The order also authorizes the Depart- the tribe but are held in trust by the federal government.107 ment of the Interior and Agriculture to designate “energy Federal trust lands are the most common among types of [ROW] corridors on [f]ederal lands for [g]overnment-wide tribal land, so an interstate transmission project is likely to expedited environmental review for the development of run a line across these lands.108 The distncton between energy infrastructure projects.102 tribal trust land and alloted land is that the federal government has not granted the authority of eminent domain over The Executve Order could potentally afect the NAS, if it tribal trust lands.109 Congress, however, has the power to plans to work with multple agencies. Working with multple abrogate treates and allow condemnaton of tribal lands.110 federal agencies on several fronts could make maters com- For example, FERC, under the FPA, is authorized to issue a plicated. For example, if the NAS planned had to deal with license for transmission lines on tribal lands subject to fed- multple agencies, there may be some confusion as to which eral jurisdicton and sometmes that license will include the one is in charge. It is also not yet known what is meant by an power of eminent domain.111 Before issuing a license, FERC expedited environmental review for energy ROW corridors. is required to show that the license is consistent with the The manner in which the permitng process is accelerated purpose of the reservaton and contains protectons for could be benefcial to the NAS, but it may prevent stake- the tribe.112 On the other hand, alloted lands can be con- holders from adequately partcipatng in the process. If the demned for a public purpose.113 Federal statute authorizes expedited review keeps stakeholders from fully partcipatng condemnaton of alloted lands under state law.114 While

70 Chapter 4 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton condemnaton is an opton, a transmission project is usually distributon facility located on tribal land or a facility locat- required to make an atempt negotate and purchase the ed on tribal land that processes or refnes energy resources right frst.115 developed on tribal land.”127 As of 2014, the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determinaton Act of 2005 A signifcant inefciency in tribal transmission sitng is “the has not been fully utlized.128 The Act allows tribes to play a requirement that the Secretary of the Interior (and the more central role in the sitng process. The NAS could part- Bureau of Indian Afairs (BIA)) approve leases of Indian ner with a tribe to be one of the frst to administer a TERA. lands.”116 Fortunately, there are several avenues to make This route could help the NAS build a transmission line more the process more efcient. Many of the current solutons efciently while paving the path for other renewable ener- involve tribes pettoning for a more central role in the deci- gy projects. Energy development on tribal land could be a sion-making process. “method to achieve economic diversifcaton, promote tribal sovereignty…, and provide employment and other eco- 4.4.2 The HEARTH Act nomic assistance to tribal members.”129 Former Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell explained that “[m]ost tribes do not Allowing tribes to exercise central authority in land devel- have the fnancial resources to fund extensive energy proj- opment could open the door to renewable energy devel- ects…, and so must partner with private industry, or other opment on tribal lands.117 The Homeless Emergency Assis- outside enttes, by leasing out their energy resources…in tance and Rapid Transiton to Housing (HEARTH) Act aims return for royalty payments.”130 to reduce the amount of tme it takes to obtain a lease on tribal lands. A tribe hoping to beneft from the HEARTH Act 4.4.4 Renewable Energy Lease must petton the Secretary of the Interior and prove that “the tribe’s leasing regulatons meet the enumerated re- An interstate transmission project does not necessarily have quirements of the HEARTH Act.”118 to obtain a ROW to build a line on tribal lands. Wind and Solar Resource leases (“WSR leases”) are a means of using Allowing tribes to play a more pivotal role in the permit- tribal trust lands for wind and solar energy development.131 tng could streamline the process for the NAS. Apart from Among the uses allowed under a WSR lease is the trans- the tribes playing a more central role, there are other ways mission of electricity.132 A WSR lease does not exactly shif for the NAS to gain access to tribal land without a statutory the central authority to the tribes, but it does serve as an ROW.119 adequate alternatve. BIA must approve a WSR lease before constructon can begin.133 Additonally a potental transmis- The HEARTH Act could be a potental revenue source. Re- sion project must seek authorizaton from the tribe.134 The moving obstacles for private enttes to obtain a lease on regulaton notes other requirements for WSR leases on trib- tribal land could incentvize tribal land development as well al lands including alternatve payments for lease based on as partnerships between the tribes and renewable energy income.135 developers. 4.5 Highways and Renewable Energy 4.4.3 Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self- Determination Act of 2005 Along with BLM lands, state and federal highways are a source of public lands that can be helpful to the NAS. A po- The Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determina- tental obstacle to the NAS is the amount of involvement ton Act of 2005 authorizes tribes to enter into an agree- from state departments of transportaton (DOTs). The fed- ment with the Secretary of the Interior known as a tribal eral government and State DOTs have been developing ways energy resource agreement (TERA).120 The Secretary must for utlites to access ROWs with renewable energy.136 Since consider the “best interests of the tribe and the Federal pol- the NAS is likely to be a merchant transmission line, it will icy of promotng tribal self-determinaton.”121 Additonally, have to obtain a ROW use agreement.137 ROW use agree- the Secretary examines several factors to determine if the ments involve “[a]ny non-highway use of real property in- tribe has proven “sufcient capacity” to use a transmission terests.”138 A party seeking such an agreement must obtain line.122 If the Secretary of the Interior approves the TERA, approval from the FHWA,139 authorized to consider whether then tribe will be able to grant ROWs without approval from the proposed project “is in the public interest, is consistent the Secretary.123 The TERA must specify the procedure for with the contnued use, operatons, maintenance, and safe- the administraton of ROWs for the tribe.124 There are, how- ty of the facility and such use does not impair the highway ever, some limitatons to the TERA.125 The ROW under the or interfere with the free and safe fow of trafc … .”140 TERA may not exceed 30 years.126 Additonally, the transmission line must serve “an electric generaton transmission, or

71 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton Chapter 4

4.5.1 Variance of State DOT Statutes and Rules The cost of building a transmission line on a railway right- of-way may be an obstacle. Solutonary Rail has proposed State DOTs statutes and rules, on the other hand, impose the Steel Interstate Development Authorites as a means to a wider variety of requirements on enttes that may wish fnance its project. The Authorites would be comprised of to construct projects on highway ROWs. A utlity must ob- several government agencies that could collectvely fund tain a use and occupancy agreement from state DOTs.141 the project along with the federal government. Perhaps the The agreement must refer to state DOT standards, which NAS could partner with Solutonary Rail for transmitng re- are likely to vary.142 As of 2012, most states “indicated that newable energy. their utlity accommodaton plans (UAPs) do not charac- terize renewable energy facilites as utlites in regarding However, it is unknown whether a railroad would want to to accommodatng them in highway ROW.”143 Other states be involved in an interstate transmission project. There is “do not make distncton between renewable and non-re- the queston of how the benefts would go to the railroads. newable energy facilites” while some states are silent on It might be necessary for the designaton of the NAS as a the mater.144 Eforts to create uniform state laws can assist natonal project with incentves to achieve that goal. Thus it interstate transmission projects in streamlining the process. might be seen as a follow-on to the Inter-Contnental Rail- Interstate transmission projects may also fnd success in way of the 19th century for which so much federal land was looking at routes other than state highways. originally given to railroads.

4.5.2 Railroads Another possibility is to explore the use of abandoned railway corridors for the NAS. Where the railroad received fed- Use of railway ROWs to construct interstate transmission eral granted rights of way (FGROW), there are long estab- lines might be important where the highway system does lished rules regarding the nature of the interest granted and not cover certain important geographic areas and to avoid the dispositon of FGROW upon cessaton of railroad use.152 certain state statutes that vary regarding parts of the high- In additon, there are special rules for rail banking under way system. The NAS project has done a large amount of re- Surface Transportaton Board (STB) jurisdicton for aban- search regarding areas of the country where use of railway donment under more recent legislaton. These rules have ROWs could help complete the NAS. been primarily used for the rails to trails program established by the non-proft Rails to Trails Conservancy. These The federal government has broad authority to preempt later rules for actons immediately upon abandonment by state and local governments when it comes to railroads.145 a railway do not appear to ft the necessites of the NAS as Federal preempton was created to ensure that state and lo- discussed below but might be adjusted as part of a legisla- cal enttes did not halt the railroad through varying statutes tve package for the implementaton of the NAS. We plan and rules.146 The Surface Transportaton Board has author- to work with the Rails to Trails Conservancy to explore this ity over railroad, including intrastate tracks.147 There have possibility as part of the next stage of this Project. been many unsuccessful challenges to federal authority of railway from state and local enttes.148 The NAS could use Regarding FGROW, 43 U.S.C. secton 912 provides that such federal preempton of railroads as a way to bypass a high- a right-of-way contnues to exist as a railway right-of-way way system that is subject to more state and local control. usable for railroad or other public highway purposes untl either Congress adopts a statute transferring ttle or untl However, at present, federal law says nothing about what there is a judicial declaraton of abandonment, whichever railroads should do with property it owns, including the comes frst. As a necessary preconditon to that judicial dec- grantng of easements or rights of way to other private par- laraton, STB must “authorize an abandonment,” thus that tes. Thus, there must be a reason and incentve for a rail- the line is no longer required for interstate commerce. road to permit an existng railway right-of-way to be used as part of the NAS. If there is judicial declaraton of abandonment, then, secton 912 states that the ttle vests in the person or entty Solutonary Rail is a proposal from a team of “rail experts, owning the legal subdivision traversed by the FGROW. Thus economists, and public interest advocates” that advances to the municipality concerned or to a state or local govern- the idea of transmitng electricity through rail lines.149 Rail- ment if a public highway is established on that parcel within roads have been linked to energy sources. When the naton- one year of the judicial declaraton of abandonment. al highway system was built, coal distributon kept railroads afoat.150 With coal gradually being phased out, it may be Later, in the Natonal Trails System Act Amendments of tme to supplant the railroad industry with renewable ener- 1988, 16 U.S.C. secton 1248(c), it was provided that unless gy transportaton.151 a public highway was set within the one year tme limit then

72 Chapter 4 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton the federal interest in the FGROW “shall remain in the Unit- The Railway Revitalizaton and Regulatory Reform Act of ed States.” This later requirement was set to assist the rails 1976 (4-R Act) provides authorizaton for the STB to impose to trails movement but could conceivably be used also for a Public Use Conditon as part of an abandonment autho- a transfer to the NAS as another type of envisioned public rizaton. That Conditon defers the dispositon of railroad use. rights of way for 180 days to allow for possible transfers for public use.156 Recent federal court decisions have, however, challenged that remaining federal FGROW interest based on Takings The restrictons on railway abandonments were then loos- Clause under the Fifh Amendment to the United States ened in 1980 under the Staggers Act. Railways that had Consttuton. The Federal Tucker Acts designate the U.S. been out of service for two or more years could abandon Court of Claims to resolve takings claims against the United their lines under an abbreviated notce process.157 Howev- States.153 The “Litle Tucker Act” permits claimants seeking er, this led to sale ofs of underlying property or allowing compensaton from the federal government under $10,000 claims of adjacent landowners that risked making the rail to be heard by the relevant federal district court.154 system very fragmented.

The queston of a taking turns on what ownership interest Then in 1983, Secton 8(d) of the Natonal Trails System was originally acquired by the railroad. This applies not only Amendments Act set up a natonal policy to preserve estab- to rights on federal land but also to other rights not acquired lished rights of way for future re-actvaton of rail service, by rail-banking procedures as below. It is the important ele- to protect rail transportaton corridors, and to encourage ment also in deciding quietng of ttle to the land concerned energy efcient transport use.158 This Law established a rail under state law by judicial declaraton that resolves adverse banking process under the STB by which a railway could claims of ownership and rights in property so it can be used free itself from an unproftable rail line by transferring it to for trails or other public uses as under rail banking below. a qualifed private party or public authority for interim use as a trail untl the line is needed again for rail service.159 The important factors include the method by which the railroad interest was acquired (private grant, condemnaton, The rail banking procedures are complex and have a num- federal grant or adverse possession) and the property inter- ber of problems that make them difcult to use for the NAS. est acquired (fee simple absolute, determinable or subject The railroad concerned must agree to enter negotatons to conditon subsequent, general or limited easement, or li- with the interested party and reach a voluntary agreement cense). A railroad deed may not clearly state the right grant- within the 180-day period set under the 4-R Act for the ed and whether the right-of-way is included. Grant of a con- transfer by sale, lease or donaton. What is issued by the ditonal (defeasible) fee may mean its extnguishment upon STB is a Notce or Certfcate of Interim Trail Use. Thus the the occurrence of a specifed event, such as cessaton of rail agreement must provide that the corridor remains available service. Where the railroad acquired an easement, non-use for future restoraton of rail service. A rail banking order will alone may not be sufcient for abandonment but may have not be issued by STB if the railroad has already sold sectons to be coupled with afrmatve actons such as piecemeal of a corridor for non-transportaton uses. STB loses its ju- sales of the corridor or removal of tracks and tes.155 Thus risdicton if the railroad “consummates” its abandonment the acquiring of rights in abandoned railway rights of way in authority prior to the issuance of the above notce. Also, federal land are complex and must be dealt with on a case- once STB loses jurisdicton over the corridor, then state law by-case and state-by-state basis. The preparaton of inital principles would apply. Some states have no clear answer case studies will put these issues in more concrete focus. as to who owns a railway corridor. Many states give priority to the rights of nearby landowners according to ownership Finally, the second possibility is to explore the abandoned principles discussed above. railways legislaton enacted to protect the railway system for future use following the increasing number of abandon- In some cases, abandonment of a railway easement may be ments and railway bankruptcies startng in the 1970s. These inferred when the corridor is put to uses outside the scope rules are difcult to apply for use by the NAS but indicate of the easement. Trail use has been considered as within what is now being done to use such railways for public uses the easement as a broader public use (shifing public use such as trails. policy). This rule might apply to an NAS right-of-way as well, but diferent states have diferent policies. The STB has jurisdicton over interstate railway service, and thus exclusive authority to issue a certfcate of public con- Finally, the federal defniton of abandonment under these venience and necessity authorizing abandonment. STB au- laws is where STB grants the railway permission to termi- thority preempts any confictng state or local law. nate its common carrier obligaton to provide rail service

73 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton Chapter 4 and liquidate its property interest in the rail corridor. How- oretcally possible—but could prove to be functonally im- ever, that authorizaton is permissive only. Abandonment possible once the sitng process begins across the lower 48 under state law generally requires actons of implementa- states. Specifcally speaking, the circumstances justfying a ton, such as removal of tracks and tes and transfer of the regulatory shif in authority include: line for non-railroad use. 1) the physical nature of the grid which long ago grew There are many general problems with the use of aban- from local and state based origins to a regional, mult- doned railway rights of way that must be considered on a state network that facilitates interstate, wholesale elec- case-by-case basis. There is a strong policy reason that the tricity market transactons; NAS has a strong public use justfcaton for such use. The 2) the growth of renewable energy, partcularly wind en- next step will be a review of the rails to trails program to ergy which is ofen located far from populaton centers see whether legislaton can be provided to fulfll that public and can only be transported by interstate transmission use. Railroad rights of way, in general, can be an important lines, in contrast to fossil fuels which can be transported supplement to highway rights of way for the creaton of the by train, pipeline, truck, or ship throughout the country; NAS that avoids where possible the purchase of private land 3) the growth of RTOs—federally-approved nonproft en- rights. ttes that manage the transmission of electricity within mult-state regions in many parts of the country, operate 4.6 Regional Approach: The Argument for wholesale market transactons for electricity, and oversee a Regional Transmission Organization or the planning of transmission grid expansions within their Independent Service Operator Centered foot prints; and 4) developing state and federal clean energy policies such Regulatory Structure for the North as state renewable portolio standards and the U.S. En- American Supergrid vironmental Protecton Agency’s (EPA’s) 2014 proposed greenhouse gas (GHG) rule for existng power plants, which has the potental to fundamentally shif the dom- Incorporatng the NAS into the existng regulatory frame- inant electric energy sources throughout the country work for transmission line projects would not be impossi- in future years toward increased renewable energy.”160 ble; however, it would be costly and possibly temporally However, it is very uncertain whether these rules will be prohibitve. A naton-wide electricity transmission project implemented under the Trump administraton. Since the within the existng regulatory scheme would require coor- tme of writng, the Trump Administraton’s EPA Director dinated compliance with regulatory sitng bodies across the Scot Pruit has proposed a new rule to repeal the Clean lower 48 states. Sitng authority across states results in mul- Power Plan’s emission guidelines for existng Electric Gen- tple decision-makers applying multple legal standards. A eratng Units (EGUs).* new regulatory framework with a consistent, naton-wide structure for interstate transmission projects like the NAS 5) lastly, the current grid as is is ill equipped for three would best be provided through Congressional legislaton. main security challenges: EMPs, structural integrity, and Thus, Congress should pass legislaton which transfers au- cybersecurity. thority from the individual states to create a new regulatory framework to accommodate the NAS, and contribute to its A startng point for regulatory analysis regarding the NAS overall goal of a natonal energy market with increased ca- is the WPP, a connecton between Arizona and California pacity for renewable technology connectvity. This secton created by installing the wire overlay technology along the will address this topic, and proposes a RTO or ISO centered path of the I-10 freeway. The WPP specifcally highlights framework in order to retain regional power, in a cooperate the large number of diferent regulatory authorites for just form, without surrendering sitng authority to the FERC. two states individually. This is representatve of the multple permitng agencies and stakeholders involved in each stage This proposal draws heavily from the writngs of University of sitng a transmission line. of Minnesota Law School Professor Alexandra Klass, who has served as a member of the NAS Steering Commitee. While the need for an updated regulatory framework is evidenced by the changing nature of the electric grid, what 4.6.1 The Need for Change to change and where to start can be a dauntng task for developers of projects like the NAS. It is useful to consider 4.6.1.a Barriers to the NAS * Repeal of Carbon Polluton Emission Guidelines for Existng Statonary Advancing the NAS in the current regulatory state is the- Sources: Electric Generatng Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017)(to be codifed at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).

74 Chapter 4 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton the process for previously developed natonwide energy in- ously) transported by pipeline and rail.165 frastructure projects and compare those circumstances to those implicated in the proposal for the NAS. While the regulatory framework for the natural gas pipeline system is useful as guidance in the development of regu- 4.6.1.b Parallels from the Natural Gas Pipeline System latory reform consideratons for the NAS, it should not be followed for this project. The rise and resultng success of The development of the natural gas pipeline system is a regional organizatons like RTOs and ISOs ofer a less fed- comparable illustraton with regard to the regulatory con- erally-centralized opton—a beneft to states and local re- sideratons for an interstate system. Congress granted fed- gions, whose diverse energy resource portolios would be eral sitng and eminent domain authority for interstate nat- benefted by localized focus. ural gas pipelines under the Natural Gas Act of 1938, with amendments in 1947.161 For a developer to begin construc- What is also apparent from this history is that it “shows ton, it must frst apply to obtain a Certfcate of Public Con- that Congress is able to move beyond state authority in the venience and Necessity from FERC (states have their own energy law context when there is a drive to turn what has respectve certfcates for intrastate projects). In its evalua- historically been a locally constrained energy resource into ton, FERC determines whether the applicant is willing and a natonal one.”166 The reality is that the modern electric able to perform the operaton, sale, service, constructon, grid’s potental for capacity and technological progress is extension or acquisiton while in compliance with any rules stymied by the slow pace of achieving the regulatory go- or regulatons of the Commission, and that the acton “is ahead state by state. Therefore, a regionally-centered ap- required by the present or future public convenience and proach, like placing the decision-making authority in the necessity.”162 If the applicant is unable to meet this statutory hands of a regional body, can streamline the line sitng pro- criteria, the applicaton will be denied. cess while safeguarding local control.

Once a pipeline receives a Certfcate of Public Convenience 4.6.2 Proposed Modified Framework and Necessity from FERC’s predecessor (the Federal Power Commission), the pipeline operator is granted natonwide 4.6.2.a Introduction and Politics of RTOs/ISOs eminent domain authority along the path of the pipeline if they cannot not frst enter into voluntary easements with Regional bodies like RTOs and ISOs are “FERC-approved implicated landowners.163 Such a structure is benefcial for nongovernmental agencies that manage portons of the pipeline developers because it ofers a centralized authority transmission grid and regional markets for wholesale pow- and, in many cases, greater certainty and lower costs of im- er for much of the country.”167 RTOs/ISOs provide three key plementaton by eliminatng roadblocks created by multple functons: 1) while utlites maintain ownership of their state permitng and eminent domain requirements. lines, RTOs/ISOs handle day-to-day operatons like run- ning the transmission grid, 2) operatng and setng prices In comparison to current circumstances, using a federal reg- for wholesale electricity markets within each jurisdicton, ulatory approach in implementng the NAS would require and 3) planning for grid expansions.168 The EPAct of 2005 a major shif in regulatory structure. Even though grid con- preserved the status of the organizatons “as central to the nectvity implicates both interstate commerce and naton- wholesale markets.”169 The structure of RTOs and ISOs allow wide security, electricity transmission line sitng and permit- the bodies to provide signifcant benefts, specifcally low- tng is a power held primarily by the individual states.164 This ering prices for end consumers.170 We provide describe the allows states to have fnal authority on the lines which run geographic layout of all the RTOs and ISOs in 3.3. through them, requiring consideraton of local market interests, as well as geographic and aesthetc concerns. Shifing In the FERC Notce of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) frst au- such a power to FERC would federalize the line sitng pro- thorizing RTOs in 1999, the Commission found RTOs could cess and has the potental to be not just politcally unpop- improve efciencies in grid management, improve grid re- ular amongst states, but could produce economically inef- liability, remove opportunites for discriminatory transmis- cient results for localized interests not taken into account. sion practces, improve market performance and “facilitate lighter-handed governmental regulaton.”171 On the other hand, increased transmission capacity is necessary for the inclusion of renewable energy resources, It is important to consider why RTO membership is not al- specifcally wind and solar, as well as natural gas, as the ready mandatory, and the circumstances surrounding that transmission lines are the sole opton of transport for such decision. Initally, FERC considered mandatng RTO mem- resources. This is in contrast to other modes of energy gen- bership, though “it eventually instead required that public eraton, such as oil, which is easily (and sometmes danger- utlites either join a FERC-approved RTO or report on their

75 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton Chapter 4 progress toward joining one.”172 Through FERC Order No. on these issues.”179 Existng RTO and ISO bodies act as an 2000, codifed in 1999, the Commission encouraged utlity example for how such regional structures can bring togeth- partcipaton in RTOs in order to shif to a regional approach. er all relevant stakeholders and craf workable solutons Order No. 2000 requires that “each public utlity that owns, for providing electricity. Next it is important to look at how operates, or controls facilites for the transmission of elec- RTOs functon, and then how they can serve as a model for tric energy in interstate commerce make certain flings with a natonalized regional soluton. respect to forming and partcipatng in an RTO.”173 4.6.2.b Mechanics of RTOs While RTOs and ISOs already cover roughly two-third of the U.S. populaton, a main contributor to the lack of naton- To be considered an RTO sanctoned by the Commission, Or- wide partcipaton has been politcal oppositon centered der No. 2000 sets out minimum characteristcs, which are in the Southeast and the West.174 Oregon Representatve “1) independence from market partcipants; 2) appropri- Greg Walden commented in a 2017 congressional hearing ate scope and regional confguraton; 3) possession of op- that there have been failed atempts for RTO formaton in eratonal authority for all transmission facilites under the Oregon and Washington—a failure fueled by oppositon RTO’s control; and 4) exclusive authority to maintain short- which is stll present today.175 While FERC Order No. 2000, term reliability.”180 which was a compromise of sorts, was released in 1999, the regional politcs of forming an RTO or ISO might not have The gaps in RTO/ISO coverage leave an opportunity for un- changed enough over that tme to make natonalized par- associated utlites to form their own RTOs or ISOs, or join tcipaton a reality. This only highlights the need for gov- existng ones to work collaboratvely on transmission line ernment partcipaton to incentvize unassociated regions. sitng. States choosing to form their own regional bodies In light of this, the proposed regulatory reform should not can look within their own public utlites for guidance. West- be squashed as a politcal impossibility as the movement ern states have begun to organize in an impressive regional toward cleaner energy has gained momentum natonwide. wholesale market in the form of the Western Energy Imbal- RTOs and ISOs have been leaders to including more renew- ance Market (WEIM). WEIM formed out of CAISO and is a able resources onto local grids, and implementng the NAS bulk power market with utlity membership spanning across only increases the amount of accessible renewable energy 8 states – Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona, Neva- sources with connectvity capability. da, Utah, Wyoming and Idaho. Regional leadership such as WEIM could be benefcial for implementng the NAS across Many states have already passed legislaton declaring a com- the West. mitment to grid modernizaton technology and are in the developing stages of their own respectve plans. The North 4.6.3 Paths to Achieving the Regional Approach Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center—out of North Car- olina State University—tracks grid modernizaton strategies In order to meet the goal of an RTO-centered regulatory in all 50 states and published a report176 with some existng structure, there are two promising paths; the frst centered regulatory consideratons. The largest commitments so far on states themselves and the later requiring Congressional come from both Illinois and Ohio. Illinois’ project NextGrid acton—though there is room for Congressional partcipa- is described as a “utlity of the future study.”177 The state’s ton along both paths. Commerce Commission just ended the public comment period for proposals on both technology and utlity and regu- First, EPAct 2005 “allows three or more contguous states latory models to modernize the energy grid and beneft end to enter into interstate compacts to establish regional sitng use consumers. Ohio’s Power Forward is an initatve of the authorites to determine the need for future transmission state’s Public Utlity Commission to examine technologies, facilites within those states and carry out the transmission ratemaking and regulaton recommendatons from stake- sitng responsibilites of those states.”181 Such authorites holders.178 In additon, in the wake of withdrawal from the could then review, certfy and permit the sitng lines for Paris Climate Accord, states and cites across the country transmission facilites.182 The Natonal Center for Interstate have publicly asserted their individual leadership in achiev- Compacts (NCIC) has proposed a model compact for this ing the goal of a more sustainable energy future. opton, including:

In the tme since their creaton, RTOs and ISOs have proven 1. A state project review panel within each member state to have the expertse when it comes to “setng wholesale to coordinate the views of diferent agencies and inter- electricity rates, planning new transmission lines, and act- ests in the state. ing as a forum where multple stakeholders, including regu- 2. A combined mult-state sitng authority, consistng of lated enttes, consumer interests, and state can collaborate states afected by the project authorized to make sitng

76 Chapter 4 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton

decisions for the project. 4.6.4 Political Hurdles 3. Interstate Compact Commission to provide administratve support and rulemaking capability.183 The overall likelihood of Congressional legislaton grantng line sitng authority to regional bodies is quite uncertain. This would provide the structure for states to have represen- As previously mentoned, regional politcs has been a main taton, meaning each state’s local concerns can be voiced, contributor to the lack of natonal RTO/ISO partcipaton and while the ultmate decision will likely weigh what is best for could translate to natonal politcs as well. However, there the region as a whole. Such a democratc system could avoid are some members of Congress who recognize the role of the problem of individual state holdouts blocking interstate regional organizatons in the natonal wholesale electrici- transmission projects which would be regionally benefcial. ty market and are open to hearing if any federal acton is As an example, Southwest Power Pool President and CEO needed. In July of 2017, the House Energy and Commerce Nick Brown recently testfed before Congress that the RTO Commitee held a hearing on just that, including witnesses formed a Commission with representaton from each mem- from the leadership of various RTOs and ISOs.191 While the ber state to invest in $10 billion into transmission across the focus of that hearing was the broad role of RTO/ISO partc- RTOs 14 state footprint.184 Brown also testfed that but for ipaton in wholesale electricity markets, the discussion of transmission growth in the region such as this, the rise of the hearing here will be limited to the scope of this policy wind energy would not have been possible.185 document—which is how RTO/ISO-centered authority for transmission line sitng is preferable for implementng the One problem with this interstate compact approach is that NAS. there is no incentve for states to engage with partners to form regional authorites. A possible soluton would be to NYISO Chairman and CEO Bradley Jones told the story of stpulate in the delegatng legislaton that absent an in- how the New York power grid was “a tale of two grids”— terstate compact, transmission line sitng authority would upstate the grid is fueled by nuclear, hydro, wind and solar default to FERC or ofer additonal funds for partcipatng energy, whereas the southern porton of the state is pow- states.186 In order to retain authority over transmission line ered with 75% fossil fuel generaton.192 This highlights the sitng, states would be incentvized to form compact agree- importance of transmission lines in remedying grid dispari- ments rather than lose representaton. tes amongst regions. Jones testfed that focusing on transmission projects would help the state meet its goal of 50% A second opton would be for Congress to pass legislaton energy from renewables by the year 2030.193 delegatng line sitng authority to RTOs and ISOs within their footprint.187 It’s useful to consider federal precedent of sup- Representatve Jerry McNerney posed an open queston port for RTO planning in analyzing the likelihood of federal to all witnesses in the hearing asking what federal policies legislaton. FERC has supported RTO planning eforts in both could encourage investment needed to address the chang- Order No. 1000, which mandated “a regional transmission ing circumstances on the grid.194 While the responses varied planning process for the frst tme with RTOs playing a cen- amongst region, the most occurring answers covered grid tral role in the process in the areas where they exist, and resiliency, and regulatory certainty and stability.195 If legis- places regional planning process requirements on all public laton grantng RTO/ISO transmission line sitng authority utlity transmission providers regardless of whether they are succeeded, the NAS initatve would best be equipped to part of an RTO.”188 Such an exercise of FERC authority was address these organizatonal goals. upheld in subsequent legal challenges189 and the 2013 decision in Illinois Commerce Commission.190 In additon, both 4.7 Conclusion RTOs and ISOs have a history and reputaton of successfully creatng a forum for implicated stakeholders—including Constructng and obtaining the necessary permits for the utlites, consumer advocates and local governments. NAS will be an arduous and lengthy task. Fortunately, there are several pathways to success. The NAS can use private Any discussion of encouraging of congressional legislaton lands and can petton state and local governments for ex- requires a subsequent discussion on the likelihood of po- panded uses of eminent domain. By partcipatng with local litcal success. However, rather than a general discussion state Public Utlity Commissions, the NAS developers can on the politcs of including increased renewable resources apply for eminent domain authority to serve regional goals. onto the naton’s grid, the scope of politcal discussion here Expanding federal authority may also streamline the per- will be limited to the specifc legislatve requests of the NAS, mitng process but could also ignore state and local con- i.e. a legislatve grant of line sitng authority with incentves cerns. On the other hand, a state-based approach could for natonwide RTO/ISO partcipaton. meet those concerns but may become tedious. An RTO could provide a balance between both approaches as long

77 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton Chapter 4 as states are willing to work with each other. 17. Ibid. at ¶ 38 (quotng Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Illinois Com- merce Comm’n, 1 Ill. 2d 509, 516 (1953); Peoples Energy Corp. v. If private lands are inaccessible, the NAS could use BLM seg- Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 142 Ill. App. 3d 917, 930 (1986)). regated lands and take advantage of the compettve pro- 18. Ibid. at ¶ 40. cess or use highway corridors. The problem, however, with 19. Ibid. at ¶ 42. highway corridors is varying state statutes and regulatons. 20. Ibid. at ¶ 48. Using railroads as potental ROWs could sometmes be sim- 21. Ibid. at ¶ 21. pler. 22. Ibid. at ¶ 48. 23. Klass, supra note 4, at 1918. The NAS could also obtain a ROW through tribal lands held 24. Summary of Regulatons Implementng Federal Power Act Secton in trust by the federal government, so the NAS would have 216(h), Dept. of Energy, September 2008, htps://energy.gov/sites/ to work the tribes and BIA. Finding ways to allow the tribe prod/fles/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/Summary_of_216_h__ to play a more central role in grantng ROWs could be key to rules_clean.pdf, Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § streamlining the process. 1221, 119 Stat. 594, 946 (2005), Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 824, 824p (2005). While planning a process for implementng such a wide 25. The Natonal Council on Electricity Policy, Coordinatng Interstate scale initatve, the NAS must consider the existng regula- Electric Transmission Sitng: An Introducton to the Debate, 1, 5 tory framework and must ofer concrete changes to exist- (July 2008). ing regulatory policy to best accommodate the project. In 26. Ibid. the case of the NAS, the HVDC wire overlay would best be 27. Ibid. implemented and operated through a regional body such 28. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission as an RTO or ISO. While these bodies exist and currently Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 serve regional markets in a benefcial way, we advocate for Vand. L. Rev. 1801, 1818-1819(2012). a natonwide and independent RTO/ISO structure to be the 29. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824p(b)(1)(B)(i-ii)., Klass, supra note 28, 1819. primary regulatory authority governing interstate transmis- 30. Ibid. § 824p(B)(1)(B), Klass, supra note 28, 1819. sion lines. This strikes a balance between local concerns and 31. Ibid. § 824p(b)(1)(C)(i). Klass, supra note 28, 1819. centralized federal authority. Such a regulatory shif would 32. Ibid. § 824p(b)(1)(C)(ii). Klass, supra note 28, 1819. require Congressional acton. 33. Klass, supra, note 28, 1819. 34. Piedmont Environmental Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com- References mission, 558 F.3d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 2009). 35. Ibid. at 313. 1. George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Public Natural Re- 36. Piedmont, 558 F.3d 304, 313, supra note 24. source Law § 15:2 (2d ed. 2007) (Westlaw current as of June 2017). 37. Piedmont, 558 F.3d 304, 314. 2. Ibid. § 15:27. 38. Ibid. 3. Colby L. Branch et. al., Indian Lands Rights-of-Way, No. 5 RM- 39. Ibid. MLF-Inst. Paper No. 9, Energy and Mineral Development in Indian 40. Michael S. Dorsi, Piedmont Environmental Council v. FERC, 34 Harv. Country, Part Two- The Legal Landscape Paper 9, 9-1, 9-22 (2014). Envtl. L. Rev. 593, 597 (2010). 4. Alexandra B. Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional 41. Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1079, Approach to Sitng Transmission Lines, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1895, 1136 (2013). 1916 (2015). 42. Ibid. 5. Elena P. Vekilov, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Federal Regulaton of Electrical 43. Ibid. Interstate, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 695, 706. 44. U.S. Const. amend. V. 6. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 403.537 (West 2006). 45. Klass, supra note 40, at 1104. 7. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-360.07 46. Klass, supra note 28, at 1846, E.g. Eileen O’Grady, Update 1-FPL 8. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tt. 16, § 86.3 (1970). Power Line May Complicate Texas Wind Growth, Reuters (Oct. 28, 9. N.Y. Comp. Codes. R. & Regs. tt. 16, § 86.4 (1970). 2009), htp://in.reuters.com/artcle/2009/10/27/utlites-wnid-idI 10. N.Y. Comp. Codes. R. & Regs. tt. 16 § 86.7 (1970). NN2725847720091027. 11. 220 ILCS 5/3-105 (West 2012). 47. Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce 12. Ibid. Clause Review for Interstate Coordinaton 130 Minn. L. Rev. 129, 13. Illinois Landowners Alliance, NFP v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 153 (2015). 2017 Il. 121302, 2017 WL 4173350 (Ill. 2017). 48. Klass, supra note 4, at 1917. 14. Ibid. at ¶¶ 4, 6, and 8. 49. Klass, supra note 40, at 1106. 15. Ibid. at ¶ 21. 50. Ibid. at 1107. 16. Ibid. at ¶ 39. 51. N.D. Const. art. I, § 16.

78 Chapter 4 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton

52. Ibid. 99. Ibid. 53. Idaho Const. art I, § 14. 100. Ibid. 54. Cal. C.C.P. § 1240.010 (West 1976). 101. Ibid. 55. Cal. Const. Art. I, § 19 (West 2008). 102. Ibid. 56. Heidi Wentz, Let’s Make A Deal: Negotated Rates for Merchant 103. 25 U.S.C.A. § 323 (1948) (current through P.L. 115-43); Elizabeth Transmission, 28 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 421, 425 (2011). Ann Kronk Warner, Tribal Renewable Energy Development Under 57. Ibid. the HEARTH Act: An Independently Ratonal, But Collectvely 58. Ibid. Defcient, Opton, 55 Ariz. L. Rev. 1031, 1060 (2013), Johnson v. 59. Coggins, supra note 1, at § 15:2. M’intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 60. Ibid. 104. United States v. Navajo Naton, 123 S. Ct. 1079 (2003). 61. Ibid. 105. Ibid. at 1091; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1491 (The Tucker Act waives the federal 62. Ibid. government’s sovereign immunity with respect to certain lawsuits). 63. Ibid. 106. Warner, supra note 103, at 1043. 64. Ibid. 107. Defniton of “Indian Country,” United States Department of Agri- 65. Ibid. culture, Natural Resources Conservaton Service, htps://www.nrcs. 66. Ibid. at § 15:1. usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/nrcs141p2_024362.pdf 67. Ibid. at § 15:7 108. Ibid. at 1. 68. Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1761(4) 109. Colby L. Branch et. al., Indian Lands Rights-of-Way, No. 5 RM- (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-43). MLF-Inst. Paper No. 9, Energy and Mineral Development in Indian 69. Ibid. Country, Part Two- The Legal Landscape Paper 9, 9-1, 9-24 (2014). 70. Ibid. 110. Ibid. 71. Coggins, supra note 1, at § 15:21 111. Ibid. 16 U.S.C.A. § 792 (2014). 72. Ibid. 112. Ibid. 16 U.S.C.A. § 797(e). 73. 43 C.F.R. § 2804.10 (2017). 113. Ibid. at 9-23. 74. Ibid. 114. Ibid. 25 U.S.C.A. 357 (Current through P.L. 115-43). 75. 43 C.F.R. § 2804.25(e) (2017). 115. Ibid. 76. Roxanne J. Perruso & Kathleen C. Schroder, Flexible FLPMA: Renew- 116. Warner, supra note 103, at 1044. able Energy Development on Public Lands, 2014 No. 3 RMMLF-Inst. 117. Ibid. at 1052. Paper No. 7 (May 8-9, 2014) at *7-4. 118. Ibid. 25 U.S.C.A. § 415 (West 2012). 77. Ibid. 119. Branch, supra note 109, at 9-16. 78. Ibid. 120. Ibid. at 9-20. 79. Ibid. At *7-6. 121. 25 C.F.R. § 224.71 (2008). 80. Ibid. at § 2804.25(e)(2)(i-iii). 122. Ibid. at § 224.72. 81. Ibid. at § 2804.25(e)(4), E.g. 43 C.F.R. Part 46, 40 C.F.R. Parts 1500 123. Ibid. and 1508. 124. Ibid. at 9-21. 82. Ibid. at § 2804.25(f)(1). 125. Ibid. 83. Ibid. 126. 25 U.S.C.A. § 3504(b) (West 2005). 84. Ibid. 127. Ibid. 85. 43 C.F.R. § 2804.26 (2017). 128. Branch, supra note 109, at 9-21. 86. Ibid. 129. Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: The Un- 87. Ibid. intended “Great Mischief for Indian Energy Development, 29 Pace 88. 43 C.F.R. § 2803.10 (2005). Envtl. L. Rev. 811, 815 (2012). 89. 43 C.F.R. § 2804.26 (2017). 130. Ibid. at 816 (citng 149 Cong. Rec. s74590-60 (daily ed. June 5, 90. Ibid. 2003) (statement of Senate Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. 91. Ibid. Comm. on Indian Afairs)). 92. Ibid. 131. Branch, supra note 109 at 9-19, 25 C.F.R. § 162.538 (2013). 93. Ibid. 132. Ibid. 94. 43 C.F.R. § 2804.40 (2017). 133. 25 C.F.R. § 162.563 (2013). 95. 43 C.F.R. § 2801.10 (2005). 134. Ibid. 96. Presidental Executve Order on Establishing Discipline and Ac- 135. Ibid. at § 162.555. countability in the Environmental Review and Permitng Process 136. Renewable Energy Generaton in the Highway Right-of-Way, for Infrastructure, 2017 WL 3484552 (August 15, 2017). FWHA-HEP-16-052, 1,2. 97. Ibid. 137. Id. at 5, 23 CFR 710 Subpart D (2016). 98. Ibid. 138. 23 C.F.R. § 710.405 (2016).

79 North American Supergrid permitng and regulaton Chapter 4

139. Ibid. 175. Powering America: A Review of the Operaton and Efectveness of 140. Ibid. the Naton’s Wholesale Electricity Markets: Hearing Before the H. 141. 23 C.F.R. § 645.213 (Current through August 3, 2017) (West). Energy and Commerce Comm., 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of 142. Kronk, supra note 129, at 5. Rep. Greg Walden (R-OR)). 143. Alternatve Uses of Highway Right-of-Way: Accommodatng Renew- 176. North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center, The 50 States of able Energy Technologies and Alternatve Fuel Facilites, U.S. Dept. Grid Modernizaton: Q1 2017 Quarterly Report, May 2017. of Transportaton, Jan. 2012 at 14. 177. “NextGrid” Utlity of the Future Study, Illinois Commerce Commis- 144. Ibid. sion, available at htps://www.icc.illinois.gov/NextGrid/. 145. Diane W. Whitney, Land Use Regulaton and The Railroads: Who’s 178. PowerForward, Ohio Public Utlites Commission, available at in Charge?, Connectcut Law Tribune, Jan. 12, 2015, htp://www. htps://www.puco.ohio.gov/industry-informaton/industry-topics/ pullcom.com/news-publicatons-671.html5 powerforward/. 146. Ibid. 179. Klass supra note 4, at 1944-45. 147. Ibid. 180. Order No. 2000 at 152. 148. Ibid. 181. Klass supra note 4, at 1946. 149. Ibid. 182. Ibid. at 1947. 150. Ibid. 183. Ibid. 151. Ibid. 184. Powering America: A Review of the Operaton and Efectveness of 152. 43 U.S.C. § 912 (1922). the Naton’s Wholesale Electricity Markets: Hearing Before the H. 153. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2011). Energy and Commerce Comm., 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of 154. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2013). Nick Brown, President and CEO of Southwest Power Pool). 155. What Consttutes Abandonment of a Railway Right of Way, 95 185. Ibid. A.L.R. 2d 468-499 (1966) 186. Klass supra note 4, at 1947. 156. 45 U.S.C. § 801 (1976). 187. Ibid. at 1948. 157. 49 USC § 10101 (1980). 188. Ibid. 1939. 158. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2014). 189. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. V. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (hold- 159. 49 C.F.R. 1152.29 ing FERC has the authority under the Federal Power Act to require 160. Klass, supra note 4, at1888-89. transmission providers to partake in the regional planning process). 161. Ibid. at 1907. 190. Ibid. 162. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e). 191. Powering America: A Review of the Operaton and Efectveness of 163. Ibid. at 1943. the Naton’s Wholesale Electricity Markets: Hearing Before the H. 164. Ibid. at 1900. Energy and Commerce Comm., 115th Cong. (2017). 165. Ibid. 192. Powering America: A Review of the Operaton and Efectveness of 166. Ibid. 1942. the Naton’s Wholesale Electricity Markets: Hearing Before the H. 167. Ibid. at 1936. Energy and Commerce Comm., 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of 168. Ibid. at 1937. Bradley Jones, Chairman and CEO of New York Independent Service 169. Powering America: A Review of the Operaton and Efectveness of Operator). the Naton’s Wholesale Electricity Markets: Hearing Before the H. 193. Ibid. Energy and Commerce Comm., 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of 194. Powering America: A Review of the Operaton and Efectveness of Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ)). the Naton’s Wholesale Electricity Markets: Hearing Before the H. 170. Ibid. Energy and Commerce Comm., 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of 171. Regional Transmission Organizatons, 89 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,285, at p. 71 Rep. Jerry McNerney (D-CA)). (1999) [hereinafer Order No. 2000]. 195. Powering America: A Review of the Operaton and Efectveness of 172. Klass, supra note 4, at 1938. the Naton’s Wholesale Electricity Markets: Hearing Before the H. 173. Order No. 2000 at 1. Energy and Commerce Comm., 115th Cong. (2017). 174. Klass supra note 4, at 1938.

80 Chapter 5 Areas of further study 5 Areas of further study

Building upon the research described in this publicaton, 4. Load balancing in natonal centralized systems can our team has identfed several additonal tasks that will fur- impact electricity prices. Modelling of transmission load ther refne each area of research included in this document balancing utlizing the North American Supergrid as a as we contnue to study the challenges and benefts of the theoretcal test case would allow for quanttatve deter- NAS: minaton of price changes with an integrated, renewables-based system. 1. Additonal technical feasibility studies encompassing 5. EMP threats are an imminent concern. While shielded more varied geographical regions will be conducted, sup- HVDC cables aford some protecton, it remains unclear plementng the two completed case studies that analyze if the transpositon of DC lines (in both above and below grid confguratons in the Western US and of the Atlantc ground confguratons) would further cancel excess cur- Coast. rent in the event of an EMP or GMD event. 2. Determinatons of the new system’s consumer price al- 6. Outreach to key players in relevant aspects of this ini- locaton structure must be made. Preliminarily, we have tatve (manufacturers of major components, construc- identfed lucratve locatons for possible inital line sitng. ton companies, regional governing bodies) must be To date, litle defnitve research has been done examin- strengthened to promote the eventual constructon of a ing the issue of rate allocaton in a single natonal market pilot project (originatng from one of our case studies). once inital lines are built, and the network is expanded. Similarly, we will examine which of these lucratve regions in the NAS system are most essental to natonal security. 3. The potental for black startng (afer an EMP or GMD event) to be more reliable or occur more rapidly with a EMP-GMD-cyber protected overlay system working in conjuncton with a more outdated, non-EMP protected system. We will examine whether estmates of remaining critcal infrastructure be made in current conditons so authorites can conduct precautonary planning.

81 Acknowledgments

For decades, the Climate Insttute has fostered the development of emerging leaders in the environmental movement by providing unique opportunites for innovaton, project management, and creatvity. The North American Supergrid Initatve is an outstanding example of this vision, and has been rooted in intergeneratonal collaboraton from the start. Students and recent graduates from around the world (many working on a pro-bono basis) have driven the technical, regulatory, economic, and security research that has made this brief a reality, guided by leading experts in many sectors of industry, academia, and government. This winning combinaton ensures that the crucial task of mitgatng and adaptng to climate change is nurtured as the next generaton of leaders take their place in the ranks of society.

Chief Editor: Brian Fowler Coeditors: Rudy Baum, Amanda Borth, Rachel Levine, Joshua McBee

Steering Commitee

Chair: Charles ‘Charlie’ Bayless

Charles Bayless is the retred CEO of Illinois Power and Tucson Electric as well as the retred President and Provost of the West Virginia University Insttute of Technology and a Board Member of the Climate Insttute. Mr. Bayless has a BSEE and MSEE in Electric Power Transmission Engineering and a JD, all from West Virginia University and an MBA from the University of Michigan.

Other Commitee Members: Roger Ballentne (President, Green Strategies Inc.) Richard Beeman (Retred Chairman, The Private Trust Company, N.A.) William R. Harris (Secretary, Foundaton for Resilient Societes; Former Legal Advisor, Congressional EMP Commission) John Noel (President, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy) Tim Petri (former Congressman, Wisconsin’s 6th congressional district) Scot Sklar (Owner, The Stella Group LTD) Carol Werner (Executve Director, Environmental & Energy Study Insttute)

Special thanks to Our Chairman, Sir Crispin Tickell, and his son, Oliver Tickell (former Editor-in-Chief of The Ecologist), for their counsel throughout the duraton of this initatve.

We thank the following individuals for their guidance in their respectve felds

Charles Bayless (former CEO of Tucson Electric and Illinois Power; former President of the West Virginia University Inst- tute of Technology) Dr. David S. Bunch (Professor of Management, University of California – Davis) Dr. George H. Baker (Professor Emeritus, James Madison University; Director, Foundaton for Resilient Societes) Kevin Edget (Director of Contract Administraton, Power Contractng LLC) Michele Fetng (Nonproft Consultant) Mark Frankel (There’s A Word for That Communicatons & Editorial Services) Rob Gramlich (Founder and President, Grid Strategies LLC) William R. Harris (Secretary, Foundaton for Resilient Societes; Former Legal Advisor, Congressional EMP Commission) Dr. Michael MacCracken (Chief Scientst, Climate Insttute) Gueta Mezzet (President, Mezzet & Associates; previously 17-year tenure at the Pentagon) Samuel Sherer (Senior Fellow, Climate Insttute) Gib Sorebo (Chief Cybersecurity Technologist, Leidos) Ross Tyler (Strategy & Development Advisor, Business Network for Ofshore Wind) Jack Werner (Senior Fellow, Climate Insttute)

82 We thank the following Undergraduate Research Fellows for their diligent research eforts pertaining to the North American Supergrid initatve

Michael Damasco HayleyMichael Ann Hoverter-Trujillo Damasco Caroline Polly Arianna Efstatos AriannaErika Koontz Efstatos Kate Walker Anna Gomes AnnaKiana GomesOuten Charlie Xu Sarah Holland Sarah Holland Hayley Ann Hoverter-Trujillo Erika Koontz We thank the following Graduate Research Fellows for their diligent research eforts pertaining to the North American Supergrid initatve Anne Joost David Astley Nisheeth Kakarala Philip Reid-Green Benjamin Bryce Aoife Leonard Jake Schwartz Diego Calderon-Arrieta Xin Li Daniel Schwiebert Megan Egan Jefrey Morgan Tobyn Smith Stefan Fernandez Lu Wang

Our project partners include

Citzens’ Climate Lobby - DC Chapter Copper Development Associaton GridStrategies LLC Insight Engineering Intertribal Council on Utlity Policy Les Grands Explorateurs and Martn Internatonal Southern Alliance for Clean Energy Spire Global, Inc. Stella Group LTD Union of Concerned Scientsts Washington College (Geographic Informaton System Program) Worldwatch Insttute

We thank the following ‘Friends of the Supergrid’ for their generous support throughout the duraton of this initatve

Chair: Robert M. Pennoyer, Esq., New York, NY Canadian Co-Chair: Serge Martn, Montreal, Quebec

Dartmouth College Class of 1964 William C. Bullit Foundaton

Josiah Lee Auspitz, Allston, MA Robert Bartles, Meriden, NH Richard Beeman, Esq., Vero Beach, FL Rosina Bierbaum, PhD., Ann Arbor, MI Peter V. Baugher, Esq., Chicago, IL Jesse Brill, Esq., Oakland, CA William E. Craig, Esq., Savannah. GA Devra Lee Davis, Ph.D., M.P.H., Jackson Hole, WY William A. Davis, Jr., Esq., Washington, DC Reid Detchon, Washington, DC

83 Jay Freedman, Esq., Washington DC Rob Gramlich, Washington, DC Chuck and Barbara Herz, Moose, WY Paul Hof, Esq., Washington, DC Lee and Berna Huebner, Washington, DC Lawrence S. Jackier, Esq., Bloomfeld Hills, MI Richard Kessler, Great Falls, VA Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, US Senator (retred) Curts W. Litle, Jr., Esq., Manchester, NH Loren McGean, Meriden, NH John Menke, Esq., Oakland, CA Ray Peters, Ph. D., Kingston, Ontario E. Christopher Palmer, CPA, Weston, MA Christy Pennoyer, New York, NY John R. Price and Svetlana S. Price, Pitsburgh, PA Harold Rabner, Esq., Montclair, NJ Dorothy L. Raizman, Ligonier, PA Terry P. Segal, Esq., Gloucester, MA Stephen Sharfstein, MD, Baltmore, MD Michael C. Smith, Esq., Washington, DC Steven Smith, DVM, Knoxville, TN William Roger Strelow, Esq., Corona del Mar, CA Harvey Tetlebaum, Esq., California, MO Antony Vaz, PE, Largo, MD Melinda Welton, Franklin, TN Huntley Whitacre, Hanover, NH Lyndon A. S. Wilson, Esq., Portland, OR