Henrik Meinander

15 Part I The National Armies 99781316510346_pi-426.indd781316510346_pi-426.indd 1155 88/11/2017/11/2017 33:08:34:08:34 PPMM 16 99781316510346_pi-426.indd781316510346_pi-426.indd 1166 88/11/2017/11/2017 33:08:35:08:35 PPMM 17 1 Finland Henrik Meinander On the evening of 26 June 1941, Finns gathered around their radio receivers to listen to a speech by their President Risto Ryti. His message was dramatic but predictable: Finland, a sparsely populated but territo- rially large Scandinavian democracy on the northeastern shores of the Baltic Sea, had once again stumbled into a war with its mighty neighbor to the East. Since the launching of Operation Barbarossa four days earlier, the Soviet air force had bombed Finnish coastal defenses. During the following days airfi elds and large towns also became the targets of air attacks, prompting the Finnish parliament, on the afternoon of 25 June, to give its unanimous backing to a government statement declaring a state of war. This was the second time in one and a half years that the two countries had come into confl ict. The fi rst clash took place in the winter of 1939– 40, when as a consequence of the secret demarcation line agreed in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, Finland fought a three- month war against the Soviet Union. The Finns managed to ward off an occu- pation, but were forced to sign a peace treaty ceding substantial border territories close to Leningrad. After this, Moscow gradually increased its pressure on Finland to fulfi ll the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and to act as the same kind of buffer zone for the USSR as the Baltic States and eastern Poland. In his radio speech, President Ryti characterized these measures as nothing less than an attempt to destroy Finnish sovereignty, thus accus- ing the Soviet Union of being solely responsible for the new confron- tation. Not a word was mentioned of Finland’s far-reaching military preparations, that in collaboration with Germany had been carried out secretly since January 1941 in order to prepare the Finnish army for a war of revenge. Nevertheless, it was clear to Ryti’s audience that the sub- text of his speech was retaliation. Since Finland would now fi ght side-by- side with the Greater German Reich, its chances of surviving this ‘second defensive struggle’ were greatly improved compared to the Winter War 17 99781316510346_pi-426.indd781316510346_pi-426.indd 1177 88/11/2017/11/2017 33:08:35:08:35 PPMM 18 18 Henrik Meinander of 1939– 40. This time, the Soviet Union would face an equally strong enemy, and according to Ryti, it was self- evident that there would be ‘a successful outcome to our own war of defense’. 1 The outcome, of course, was not self- evident, and nor would the war be successful. Why, then, did a parliamentary democracy such as Finland agree so readily to participate in Operation Barbarossa? The short answer is that the harsh experience of the Winter War had convinced both the political elite and the population at large of the urgent need to create a strong deterrent against the Soviet Union’s plans to incorporate Finland into its buffer zone. To provide a more complete answer, we will focus fi rst on geopolitical developments in Northern Europe during the period leading up to 1939, asking why Finland was included in the Soviet security zone established by the Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact. We will then seek to determine how a mutual understanding arose between the German and Finnish governments during the winter of 1940– 41, and will exam- ine the manner in which this was received by Finnish citizens and the country’s parliament. Finally, an analysis will be made of how thorough and systematic the Finnish- German war preparations were in the weeks and months before the battle cries of Operation Barbarossa resounded across Europe. Defi ned by Geography A swift glance at the geographical position of Finland is enough to explain why its destiny has been so dependent on relations between the great powers surrounding the Baltic Sea. Until the nineteenth century Finland was an integral part of the Swedish kingdom; due to its loca- tion it was repeatedly the battleground in wars between Sweden and the expanding Russian Empire. In 1808– 9 Russia occupied Finland for the third time within a century and forcibly annexed the region to its empire as an autonomous Grand Duchy, permitted to maintain its Swedish leg- islation and Lutheran faith. 2 In other words, Finland remained a Nordic society, developing gradually into a state within a state before fi nally severing its ties with Russia during the revolution of 1917. But even as Finland declared its inde- pendence, support for a comparable revolution grew, and in the spring 1 Helsingin Sanomat, 27 June 1941; http:// yle.fi / aihe/ artikkeli/ 2006/ 09/ 08/ presidentti- rytin- puhe- jatkosodan- alussa (last accessed 4 January 2016). 2 Henrik Meinander , ‘ On the Brink or In- between? The Conception of Europe in Finnish identity ’, in Mikael af Malmborg and Bo Stråth (eds.), The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention within and among Nations ( Oxford : Berg , 2002 ), 149– 54 ; Henrik Meinander , A History of Finland , ( London : Hurst , 2011 ), 15 – 66 . 99781316510346_pi-426.indd781316510346_pi-426.indd 1188 88/11/2017/11/2017 33:08:35:08:35 PPMM 19 Finland 19 of 1918 the Finns fought a three- month war against one another. The Reds received weapons from the Bolsheviks, but the Whites were victorious due to a decisive intervention by German forces who remained in the country until the capitulation of their homeland at the end of the Great War in November 1918. During this brief period Finnish defence, economic and political interests were so strongly subordinated to those of Berlin that the country was swiftly being transformed into a German vassal state. Following Germany’s defeat, the Finnish government was obliged to perform a hasty U- turn in order to convince the victorious Western powers that Finland could be trusted as an independent state, a parliamentary democracy and a trade partner. 3 This urgent need for Western recognition was one reason why Finland in the summer of 1919 adopted a republican constitution with strong democratic institutions and guarantees of civil rights. Similar liberal con- stitutions were implemented in most of the new states that were born from the collapse of the four European empires, but during the interwar period most of these reverted to more autocratic power structures. The only exceptions were Czechoslovakia and Finland, but the democratic order of these countries was also challenged at times by radicals on the right and left. 4 In Finland, communist activities were considered the strongest threat to parliamentary democracy and national sovereignty. Finland signed a peace treaty with the Soviet government in 1920, but relations between the two countries remained strained. While the mutual distrust had its roots in earlier epochs, it was further nurtured by bitter memories from the revolution in 1917– 18, thus thwarting any hopes of improved ties. Moscow systematically supported the Finnish communists’ challenge to the societal order, at the same time as the Finnish Civil Guards were very outspoken in their anti- communist slogans. Between 1930 and 1932 this ideological clash led to a right- wing protest movement that culminated in an abortive coup d’état.5 One outcome of this crisis was a total prohibition of communist activities. Another was a growing readiness to defend the country’s democratic institutions, which resulted in moderate political forces emulating the Scandinavian example and forming, for the fi rst time, a Centre- Left 3 Risto Alapuro , State and Revolution in Finland , ( Berkeley, CA : University of California Press , 1988) ; Juha Siltala , ‘ Being absorbed into an Unintended War ’, in Tuomas Tepora and Aapo Roselius (eds.), The Finnish Civil Wars 1918: History, Memory, Legacy ( Leiden : Brill , 2014 ), pp. 51 – 89 . 4 Eric Hobsbawm , The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991 ( London : Abacus , 1995 ), pp. 109 – 141 ; Meinander, A History of Finland , pp. 131– 46. 5 Juha Siltala , Lapuan liike ja kyyditykset 1930 ( Helsinki : Otava , 1985 ) . 99781316510346_pi-426.indd781316510346_pi-426.indd 1199 88/11/2017/11/2017 33:08:35:08:35 PPMM 20 20 Henrik Meinander coalition in 1937. This alliance also clearly represented a defensive reaction to the harsher atmosphere in European security policy. Hitler’s con- solidation of power and the Soviet military build- up spurred Finnish attempts to establish a Finno- Swedish defence pact that could deter the Soviet Union. In the end, however, Sweden proved unwilling to jeopard- ize its policy of neutrality for Finland’s sake. 6 Despite this setback, Finland retained close ties to Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries. Due to Finland’s long history of Swedish rule, its civil society and public life followed the same legisla- tive tradition and societal values as in the other Scandinavian countries. One- tenth of the population was Swedish- speaking, and a substantial proportion of the societal elite was bilingual. The democratic reforms implemented in Finland (in 1906, 1918 and 1919) were thus buttressed by a political culture that was more tolerant of different opinions and ideologies than those in the other fl edgling states between Russia and Germany. True, Finland had been dragged into a revolution in 1917– 18, and experienced radical-right unrest in the early 1930s, but in both cases the discord was predominantly a reaction to European geopoli- tics. Furthermore, the confl icts in both cases ended with the election of democratic parliaments.

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