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Three Essays in Development & Applied Micro

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Three Essays in Development & Applied Micro UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE THREE ESSAYS IN DEVELOPMENT & APPLIED MICRO A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY By SAMUEL ABSHER Norman, Oklahoma 2018 THREE ESSAYS IN DEVELOPMENT & APPLIED MICRO A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS BY ____________________________________ Dr. Kevin Grier, Co-Chair ____________________________________ Dr. Daniel Hicks, Co-Chair ____________________________________ Dr. Ronald Keith Gaddie ____________________________________ Dr. Jaeho Kim ____________________________________ Dr. Ariel Weinberger Copyright by SAMUEL ABSHER 2018 All Rights Reserved. Acknowledgements I would like to acknowledge my coauthor and co-chair, Dr. Kevin Grier for his assistance and direction in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, From Hashtags to Bodybags. In Chapter 2, I would like to acknowledge my coauthors Dr. Kevin Grier and Dr. Robin Grier. iv Table of Contents Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. iv List of Tables ........................................................................................................................... vi List of Figures ........................................................................................................................ viii Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... x Chapter 1. From Hashtags To Bodybags: Horizontal Media’s Effect On Conflict In The Libyan Revolution .............................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 1 1.2 Background ................................................................................................................................................. 4 1.3 Digital Protest As A Substitute For Physical Protest .................................................................................. 7 1.4 Data ........................................................................................................................................................... 8 1.5. Empirical Strategy ................................................................................................................................... 10 1.6 Results ...................................................................................................................................................... 12 1.7 Robustness Checks .................................................................................................................................... 17 1.8 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 20 References ........................................................................................................................................................ 37 Chapter 2. The Economic & Social Consequences of Left-Populist Regimes in Latin America: Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, & Venezuela ................................................... 41 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 41 2.2 Method, Inference, and Data ..................................................................................................................... 43 2.3 Average Treatment Effect Results .............................................................................................................. 48 2.4 Individual Country Results ........................................................................................................................ 50 2.5 Discussion ................................................................................................................................................. 64 References ...................................................................................................................................................... 108 Chapter 3. The Persistent Effects of Military Violence Against Civilians: A Geographic Regression Discontinuity Analysis of the Soviet Occupation of East Germany in WW2 ................................................................................................................... 112 3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 112 3.2 Historical Background............................................................................................................................. 114 3.2.2 Soviet War Crimes ............................................................................................................................... 115 3.3 Data ....................................................................................................................................................... 117 3.4 Empirical Strategy .................................................................................................................................. 118 3.5 Results .................................................................................................................................................... 122 3.6 Improvements .......................................................................................................................................... 125 3.7 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 125 References ...................................................................................................................................................... 143 v List of Tables Table 1. Summary Conflict Statistics by Libyan District ........................................................................... 23 Table 2. Blackout Effect on Conflict ............................................................................................................ 24 Table 3. Blackout Effect on Conflict (Restricted Sample) ........................................................................ 25 Table 4. Blackout Effect on State-Initiated Conflict .................................................................................. 26 Table 5. Blackout Effect on State-Initiated Conflict (Restricted Sample) .............................................. 27 Table 6. Blackout Effect on Riots, Protests, and Rebel-Initiated Conflict ............................................. 28 Table 7. Blackout Effect on Riots, Protests, and Rebel-Initiated Conflict (Restricted Sample) ..................................................................................................................................................... 29 Table 8. Blackout's Effect upon Conflict around Communication Infrastructure's Reactivation ............................................................................................................................................. 30 Table 9. Placebo Effect on Conflict in the Libyan Revolution ................................................................ 31 Table 10. Placebo Effect on Conflict in the Libyan Revolution .............................................................. 32 Table 11. Placebo Effect on Conflict in Libyan Civil War ........................................................................ 33 Table 12. Placebo Effect on Conflict in Libyan Civil War (Restricted Sample) .................................... 34 Table 13. Jackknife Regression Results ........................................................................................................ 35 Table 14. Donor Countries by Case ............................................................................................................. 65 Table 15. Summary Statistics ......................................................................................................................... 66 Table 16. Shenanigans Summary ................................................................................................................... 67 Table 17. Nicaragua's Estimated Synthetic Control Weights by Case ..................................................... 68 Table 18. Nicaragua’s Income Predictor Means ......................................................................................... 69 Table 19. Nicaragua’s Infant Mortality Predictor Means ........................................................................... 70 Table 20. Venezuela’s Estimated Synthetic Control Weights by Case .................................................... 71 Table 21. Venezuela’s Income Predictor Means ......................................................................................... 72 Table 22. Venezuela’s Infant Mortality Predictor Means .......................................................................... 73 Table 23. Venezuela’s Inequality Predictor Means ..................................................................................... 74 Table 24. Bolivia’s Estimated Synthetic Control Weights by Case .......................................................... 75 Table 25. Bolivia’s Income Predictor
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