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Libya Weekly Operational Preview . Libya Weekly Operational Preview April 11, 2021 Prepared by: Risk Analysis Team, Libya © 2021 GardaWorld Proprietary GardaWorld & Proprietary GardaWorld 1 1 202 © Table of Contents Outlook .................................................................................................. 3 Short Term Outlook .............................................................................................................................. 3 Medium to Long Term Outlook ............................................................................................................. 3 Executive Summary ............................................................................... 3 Political Developments ......................................................................................................................... 3 Security Developments ......................................................................................................................... 4 Infrastructure ........................................................................................................................................ 4 Coronavirus .......................................................................................................................................... 4 Threat Matrix .......................................................................................... 5 Key Dates .............................................................................................. 5 Assessment ........................................................................................... 5 Political Developments ......................................................................................................................... 5 Security Developments ......................................................................................................................... 6 Coronavirus .......................................................................................................................................... 6 Regional Assessment ............................................................................ 6 Tripolitania Region ................................................................................................................................ 6 Cyrenaica Region ................................................................................................................................. 7 Fezzan Region ..................................................................................................................................... 8 Acronym List .......................................................................................... 9 GardaWorld .......................................................................................... 10 Information Services ........................................................................................................................... 10 Global Leader in Comprehensive Security and Risk Management.................................................... 10 This is an abridged version of the GardaWorld Weekly Libya .Xplored report. To subscribe to our full report or to request a quote for security services in Libya please contact Nicholas Bennett, Regional Director, Libya. GardaWorld & Proprietary GardaWorld 1 2 202 © Outlook Short Term Outlook ▪ The political landscape in Libya continues to evolve at a pace. The new Presidential Council (PC) is driving forward, keen to realign international stakeholders and promote domestic reconciliation and reconstruction. The formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) is another major milestone in the country’s progress back to stability, but both the GNU and PC face a number of challenges in the coming months as the country prepares to move to elections in December. ▪ While the political environment is seeing significant movement, the military situation remains stagnant. The Sirte to Jufra frontline remains in situ, as do foreign fighters. The situation is however calm, although there remains the potential for isolated incidents in response to political developments. The 5+5 Joint Military Commission continues its work, but it is unclear how much progress can be expected this year with the GNU restricted in how much it can meaningfully shape the security track. ▪ COVID-19 continues to affect Libya and travel in and out through Turkey and Tunisia although, at present, PCR testing is helping to keep travel corridors open. The country is expected to begin its delayed vaccination program and despite localized lockdowns and curfews, coronavirus continues to have little effect on normal daily life. ▪ Crime (including carjacking's, armed robberies, murders, and kidnappings) remain common in many areas of the country with perpetrators exploiting local gaps in security to carry out attacks. Crime reporting remains high across all regions. Medium to Long Term Outlook ▪ The successful implementation of the new PC and GNU are notable achievements, putting Libya back on a path to unity, but many threats to this progress remain. In many respects, the GNU has been seen as a relatively weak body, but this could work in Libya’s favour, leaving the prime minister room to continue driving the process forward as he builds a broad support base across the various factions. The country is gearing up for elections in December 2021, an ambitious timeframe that will need various foundations to be laid in the months ahead by the new government. ▪ Islamic State continues to suffer attrition in Libya and remains mostly dormant from an operational perspective. However, political fragility will continue to present conditions in which the group could begin to reconstitute some of its capability and it retains a presence in the country. Increasing political unity could prove a motivating factor for the group to try and destabilise Libya as it moves towards scheduled elections in December. Other terrorist factions also remain active with some representing a kidnap threat, especially in more remote areas, while some have exploited the last conflict with the LNA to embed themselves within security forces in Tripoli. Executive Summary Political Developments ▪ The new Presidential Council has continued high levels of domestic and international engagement. The Prime Ministers of Malta and Italy as well as the EU Council President all visited Tripoli this week as a number of nations look to reopen their embassies and consulates. The return of international diplomats to Tripoli and Benghazi marks a new era after conflict saw many leave. Prime Minister (GNU) Abdulhamid Dbeibah also conducted visits to both Kuwait and the UAE. ▪ Bilateral relations with Greece have been restored after a visit by the Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, to Tripoli. Efforts are now underway to reopen their embassy and consulate. ▪ The Head of the Presidential Council, Mohamed Menfi, launched the National Reconciliation Commission on April 05. The move is part of a comprehensive national reconciliation effort by the new government which saw a number of visits by both Menfi and Debibah to marginalized and GardaWorld & Proprietary GardaWorld 1 3 202 © areas in need of reconstruction through the week. National reconciliation efforts are expected to focus on reconstruction and the provision of services by the government, the latter of which is a key policy for the GNU. ▪ The legal committee of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) met in Tunisia this week and was able to agree on the constitutional norms. It is now due to present these along with its final report to the LPDF. This reportedly includes a mechanism for the President to be appointed by the HoR rather than a popular vote. Unconfirmed reports have suggested that the agreement was strongly opposed by six of the 18 committee members, all of who are reportedly linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. Security Developments ▪ The head of the Zuwara Security Directorate, Imad Al-Din Masoud Abaza, was detained by a suspected SDF force on April 06. The arrest triggered a demonstration at the entrance to the nearby Mellitah Oil & Gas Facility however reports indicate that the facility remained operational. ▪ SDF targeted security force elements in Tripoli as well through the week. On April 05, Ayan Anjim, a member of TRB who holds a command position at the Ain Zara/Ruwaimi prison, was arrested. On April 09, SDF carried out a raid at the 427 Battalion Border Guard Camp to arrest what they called “criminal elements.” ▪ Tensions between SDF and the General Security Agency (Zintani) have also continued in the Hay Andalous and Gorji areas after SDF again attempted to enter the area on April 04. As with previous incidents, the General Security Agency forced SDF to withdraw and fired shots into the air in a warning to stay out with tensions remaining high into the following day. On April 07, a minor clash occurred between the two armed groups. ▪ The General Authority for Research and Identification of Missing Persons announced that two further mass graves were discovered in the Alrabet area of Tarhuna. These are the latest to be discovered in the area with reporting suggesting most, if not all, are dating back to the last offensive on Tripoli when the town was controlled by Kani Brigade (aka 9 Brigade after they aligned with the LNA). At least 300 bodies have been found so far in several mass graves in the town since the end of the conflict. ▪ Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has confirmed that one person was killed and two teenagers
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