Uprising and Post-Qadhafi Tribal Clashes, Displacement in a Fragmenting Libya

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Uprising and Post-Qadhafi Tribal Clashes, Displacement in a Fragmenting Libya 30 March 2015 LIBYA Uprising and post-Qadhafi tribal clashes, displacement in a fragmenting Libya The political instability and crimes against humanity that accompanied and followed the uprising which overthrew President Muammar Qadhafi in October 2011 drove tens of thou- sands into displacement. Those perceived to have supported Qadhafi or to have benefited from privileges he dispensed through tribal patronage networks were attacked in retalia- tion. They were often driven out of their cities, unable to return. Some 60,000 IDPs who had fled during the uprising were still living in pro- tracted displacement by February 2015. Civilians walk along Tripoli Street in Misrata. Photo: UNHCR/ H. Caux / June 2011 Following the failure of political processes, Libya’s situation became increasingly anarchic, culminating in the collapse of a fragile central authority and the emergence of two rival centres of power in mid-2014. Against this backdrop, and ensuing infight- ing among myriads of militias, violence increased. There was more than a six-fold rise in the number of IDPs, reaching at least 400,000 by December 2014, some eight per cent of the population. Precise figures are not available given lack of access and on-going pervasive chaos. IDPs’ basic needs for shelter, food and medical services remain grossly unmet. Their physical security has been seriously threatened by indiscriminate shelling, attacks on IDP camps and sieges that have pre- vented them from seeking security. The situation of tens of thousands of displaced migrants who remain trapped in Libya and are particularly vulnerable is a cause for serious concern. State collapse and fragmentation of Libya’s essentially tribal society have hampered an effective national response to displacement and coordination of policies to address IDPs’ needs. Security constraints have forced international actors to operate from Tunisia since July and August of 2014. In this context of politi- cal chaos and on-going conflict, durable solutions appear ever more remote. Lack of coordination of relief and assistance is a crucial impediment to an effective response to the plight of IDPs. www.internal-displacement.org MALTA GREECE M E D TUNISIA I T E R AMAZIGH R A CONTROLLED N E 269,000 IDPs A N AREA S E A JIHADISTS ah CONTROLLED r h s (Tripoli) a a lu COUNTRYSIDE iy u w w b LIBYAN ARMY u a a Z r Derna) Z h ( CONTROLLED z a ms a T hu arn COUNTRYSIDE A K D l A 90,000 IDPs A - Al Bayda Al' Aziziyah l'Azizi- Zlīten N aAl'f uAziziyahs a M o u n yah Tubruq (Tobruk) t Taai r . nhsū .. Misratah Banghazi Al Marj . n , Yafran a . ... Gharyan h . (Benghazi) (Barce). , Gharyan .. ... Nalut Bani .. Al Adam - . Walid . .. Surt (Sidra) . m Sinawin amza -i Z a- d Ajdabiya W h . Al Qaryah ig .. Al Qaryah ar . Dirj -- l F .. .. ashash Sharqiyah i a . .. .. SURT Wad . ... .. Al Ghadāmis Marsa al Brega . Ghadāmis . Jaghbub ... AL JABAL . .. AL WAHAT LIBYANAL GHARBI DAWN AL BUTNAN CONTROLLED Waddan Maradah Awjilah ALGERIA Hun Waddan COUNTRYSIDE Jalu Zillah EGYPT ASH SHĀȚI Al Fuqaha Birak- - - Birak AL JUFRAH Adiri Total number of people - LIBYAN ARMY Sabha displaced in Libya: - - CONTROLLED Awbari 18,500 IDPs 400,000 COUNTRYSIDE TUAREGGHAT Tmassah CONTROLLED Umm al - Aranib - - AREAAl' Uwaynat Marzuq TazirbuTazirbu Ghat- Waw al Kabir Zighan Ghat TEBU Al Qatrun CONTROLLEDMURZŪQ MadrusahAREA JIHADISTS Al Kufrah CONTROLLEDTahrami Al Wigh COUNTRYSIDE Rabyanah Al Jawf ToummoToummo NIGER CHAD Ma'tan as Sarra AlAl Awaynat Awaynat Internal displacement in Libya March 2015 Capital Main areas of displacement Regional capital Large scale attacks by armed Towns or villages groups as of January 2015 International boundary SUDAN 0 100 200 300 km www.internal-displacement.org Map by: IDMC More maps are available at www.internal-displacement.org/search?Type=Map Libya: Uprising and post-Qadhafi tribal clashes, displacement in a fragmenting Libya Background and causes of for the election of a House of Representatives. displacement The Islamist-dominated GNC lost elections in August 2014 for which there was only 18 per cent The arrest of a prominent human rights lawyer turnout. The GNC refused to dissolve and recon- on 17 February 2011, at a time of widespread vened in Tripoli, while the newly elected House of regional movements which became known as the Representatives moved to Tobruk (Refworld, 12 Arab Spring, brought peaceful protesters to the November 2014). streets in Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Tobruk and Derna in the east, as well as Zintan in the west (BBC, 16 In mid-2014, a retired general, Khalifa Haftar, February 2011). Protests intensified after govern- launched an armed attack on Benghazi, which ment forces used live fire Al( Jazeera, 18 February they dubbed “Operation Dignity”. Opposing him 2011) and quickly spread to western cities of was an alliance between Ansar al-Shari’a and Misrata, Zawiya and the capital, Tripoli where other Islamist armed groups, notably the Shura they were brutally supressed (A/HRC/17/44, Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries which be- June 2011). A few days later, demonstrators in sieged parts of Tripoli as part of their own opera- Benghazi formed a National Transitional Council tion they called “Libya Dawn” (UNSMIL/OHCHR, (NTC). Across the vast country hundreds of militias 4 September 2014; Al Jazeera, 08 September emerged, the protests turning into an armed 2014). In October, the House of Representatives conflict between opposition forces and the army allied itself officially with Haftar (Reuters, 21 (Geneva Academy, 12 February 2012; Chatham October 2014). Sitting in Tripoli alongside the House, 2014). GNC, the Supreme Court ruled that the House of Representatives was unconstitutional (New York After increasing international concern at the Times, 7 November 2014). escalation of violence and continuing serious violations of human rights and international hu- Throughout his 42-year rule, Qadhafi relied on an manitarian law, the UN Security Council adopted a extensive political network of patronage, delegat- resolution imposing a no-fly zone, sanctioning “all ing authority to the local level and thus systemati- necessary measures to protect civilians and civil- cally preventing the creation of national or central ian populated areas under threat of attack” (UNSC, institutions. Qadhafi favoured Libya’s south S/RES/1973). After airstrikes by members of the (Fezzan) and the western region of Tripolitania. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in March 2011, There he provided disproportional resources, Qadhafi’s forces were expelled from Misrata in granting privileged access to state institutions mid-May. Tripoli fell to the opposition at the end and security services to people from those re- of August. In October 2011, three days after rebels gions that became his strongholds. At the same had killed Qadhafi, the NTC declared the “lib- time Cyrenaica (eastern Libya) was systematically eration” of Libya, ending nine months of armed neglected. The Qadhafi regime nurtured Libyans’ conflict and 42 years of authoritarian rule. sense of geographical and tribal identity and manipulated ethnic and tribal tensions, engag- 2014: A failed transition and the splintering of Libya ing communities in a competition over resources Under Qadhafi, Libya had virtually lacked any and favours at the expense of developing a strong civil society. The tenuous institutions that had sense of national identity. For example, Qadhafi existed under his regime were dismantled. A alternatively granted or denied citizenship to the General National Congress (GNC) that succeeded Tebu and Tuareg minorities in the south (ICG, the NTC in July 2012 was tasked with putting in September 2012; Small Arms Survey, February place a democratic constitution, paving the way 2014). 30 March 2015 www.internal-displacement.org 3 Libya: Uprising and post-Qadhafi tribal clashes, displacement in a fragmenting Libya Key events and internal displacement in Libya As of 19 March 2015 600 4 Aug 2014 20 Oct 2011 Escalation of conflict, 15 Feb 2011 Fall of Ghaddafi two competing Parliaments Beginning of 500 25 Jul 2014 the Arab Legislative elections of Spring Council of Representatives uprising 25 Nov 2013 400 State of alert declared following armed clashes 13 Jul 2014 19 Mar 2011 Operation NATO Dawn 300 intervention 17 May 2014 Operation Dignity 200 Number of IDPs, in thousands 7 July 2012 Elections, 100 GNC replaces NTC* 0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 *GNC = General National Congress; NTC = National Transitional Congress Sources: Amnesty International, European Commission, IRIN, UNHCR The fragmented and weak authorities that (Operation Dignity), fighting involves a complex set emerged after his downfall and the end of the of motives, including tribal and ethnic identities, patronage system have not been able to address power and security (Al Jazeera, 10 August 2014; inter-tribal conflicts over oil, administrative power, Al-Monitor, 14 September 2014). Internal fight- land and control of smuggling routes. Instead, ing erupted against the backdrop of an inherently they have heavily relied on local elders to negoti- weak state and an emerging security vacuum. ate ceasefires. These have remained largely unen- There are serious regional repercussions as Libya forceable and impossible to translate into lasting has become a base for radical groups such as Al peace agreements (ICG, September 2012). The Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic State. lack of centralised authority and functioning judi- cial or security institutions and the inability of el- ders to exert
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