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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs December 30, 2009 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL30588 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Summary Upon taking office, the Obama Administration faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, despite a steady increase in U.S. forces there in recent years. Signs of deterioration have included an expanded area in which militants are operating, increasing numbers of civilian and military deaths, Afghan and international disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the ease of infiltration of Taliban militants from safe havens in Pakistan. Building on assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration conducted a “strategic review,” the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009. The outcome of the review leaned toward those in the Administration who believe that adding combat troops is less crucial than building governance. As part of that review, the President did announce an increase of 21,000 U.S. troops, which arrived by November 2009 and brought U.S. force levels to about 68,000, in partnership with about 39,000 international forces from 42 other nations, and about 190,000 Afghan security forces. The Administration also decided that more innovative military tactics were needed to promote those goals, and in May 2009, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, was replaced by Gen. Stanley McChrystal. On August 30, 2009, McChrystal submitted his review of the military strategy, recommending a fully resourced, comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy in order to avoid mission failure. He subsequently recommended that about 40,000 additional U.S. combat forces are needed to implement that strategy. A series of high level meetings to again review policy began September 30. President Obama announced, on December 1, 2009, the following: • The provision of 30,000 additional U.S. forces to begin deploying by January 2010 to “reverse the Taliban’s momentum and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that they can take the lead.” • A conditions-based plan to draw down U.S. forces beginning in July 2011. • A call for additional partner contributions, with no specific figure mentioned. U.S. strategy—which depends on the presence of a legitimate Afghan partner to implement—was complicated by the widespread fraud allegations in the August 20, 2009, presidential election. Following extensive investigation, President Hamid Karzai accepted a run-off vote with the second-place finisher, former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, as required by the Afghan constitution. However, Dr. Abdullah, pulled out of the run-off and Karzai was declared the winner of the presidency on November 2. He was inaugurated November 19 and presented to parliament a new cabinet on December 19. It retained about half the incumbents, including most of the widely praised economic sector ministers, but also included some new figures purportedly linked to traditional ethnic and political faction leaders. Including FY2009, the United States has provided over $40 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $21 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. International donors have contributed over $35 billion in the similar time frame. See also CRS Report RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin; CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard; and CRS Report R40699, Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff Congressional Research Service Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Contents Background ................................................................................................................................1 From Early History to the 19th Century..................................................................................1 Early 20th Century and Cold War Era.....................................................................................1 Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal.....................................................................2 The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban .............................................................5 Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001) ...................................................................5 The “Northern Alliance” Congeals ..................................................................................6 Policy Pre-September 11, 2001..............................................................................................7 September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom .................................................7 Post-Taliban Nation Building ......................................................................................................9 Political Transition................................................................................................................9 Bonn Agreement .............................................................................................................9 Permanent Constitution.................................................................................................10 First Post-Taliban Elections........................................................................................... 11 2009 Presidential and Provincial Elections ....................................................................12 Next Elections...............................................................................................................13 Other Governance Issues.....................................................................................................13 U.S. Policy Management and U.S. Embassy Kabul .......................................................13 The Central Government and the National Assembly.....................................................14 U.S. Efforts to Expand and Reform Central Government/Corruption .............................15 Enhancing Local Governance........................................................................................18 Human Rights and Democracy......................................................................................19 Advancement of Women ...............................................................................................20 Combating Narcotics Trafficking/Agricultural Development .........................................20 Security Policy and Force Capacity Building.............................................................................22 Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Related Insurgents and Their Strength .............................................23 The Taliban...................................................................................................................24 Al Qaeda/Bin Laden Whereabouts ................................................................................24 Hikmatyar Faction ........................................................................................................25 Haqqani Faction............................................................................................................26 The U.S. War Effort to Date ................................................................................................26 Growing U.S. Force Levels in 2007 and 2008 ...............................................................27 Perception of Deterioration in 2008...............................................................................27 Obama Administration Strategy Review and Re-Review .....................................................28 U.S. Troop Buildup in 2009, McChrystal Assessment, and Re-Review ..........................31 December 1, 2009 Announcement on Strategy and Resources .............................................33 Alternative “Counter-Terrorism” Strategy Not Adopted.................................................34 Other Stabilization Policies Under Way...............................................................................34 Negotiations With the Taliban .......................................................................................34 Local Supplemental Security: Afghan Public Protection Program (APPP) .....................35 Adopting the Dutch Approach in Uruzgan.....................................................................36 Limiting Civilian Casualties/Status of Forces Agreement...............................................37 Alliance Issues: The NATO-Led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom ...........................................................................................40 Background of ISAF .....................................................................................................40 NATO Force Pledges in 2008 and 2009.........................................................................41 Congressional Research Service Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Provincial Reconstruction Teams.........................................................................................43 Evolving Civil-Military Concepts at the PRTs ...............................................................44
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