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Report 5Th EP-Afghanistan IPM, 17-19

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Report 5Th EP-Afghanistan IPM, 17-19 European Parliament 2014-2019 Delegation for relations with Afghanistan 15.1.2019 MISSION REPORT following the 5th EU-Afghanistan Inter-Parliamentary Meeting 17-19 December 2018, Kabul Delegation for relations with Afghanistan Members of the mission: Petras Auštrevičius (ALDE) (Leader of the mission) André Elissen (ENF) Frank Engel (PPE) CR\1175047EN.docx PE629.305v01-00 EN United in diversity EN Introduction The Delegation for relations with Afghanistan conducted a mission to Kabul from Monday 17 to Wednesday 19 December 2018. This was the Delegation to Afghanistan's second visit in the current parliamentary mandate after the 4th EU/Afghanistan IPM which took place in Kabul in February 2017. The aim of the mission was to hold the 5th Inter-parliamentary Meeting (IPM) with Members of Parliament from the Wolesi Jirga and to gain first-hand information about the evolving situation in the country and the status of the EU's political, military and development cooperation in Afghanistan. As in 2017, due to strict security provisions, the program of the visit was limited to Kabul, with a reduced delegation size – it was made up of only two members with the addition of the rapporteur on Afghanistan from the Committee for Development, plus, as a member of the secretariat, the Head of Unit of Asia. The Delegation adopted an IPM joint-statement with Afghan MPs and issued a press-statement to sum up the aim and main outcomes of the visit. Meetings In just three working days and in spite of high security concerns, the delegation managed to have an intense and high-level programme for four days, with several meetings, mostly inside the EU compound, through the highly appreciated and committed cooperation of the EU ambassador and his deputy and the EU head of the Political Section. Among the personalities met: President Chief of the Executive (Prime Minister) Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister of Interior Minister of Mines Former President Former minister of Interior and presidential candidate Afghan MPs Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission EUMS ambassadors EU Head of Cooperation section USA ambassador UNAMA International and domestic media NGOs and women’s networks Independent Electoral Commission and NGOs related to the election PE629.305v01-00 2/9 CR\1175047EN.docx EN Context and security Mullah Nasroddin: “I met the king’s convoy on the street and he spoke to me! The king spoke to me!” “What an honour! And what did he say to you?” Mullah Nasroddin: “He screamed: don’t stay in the middle of the road, idiot, and get behind the guards!” (from “The Mullah Nasroddin folk stories”) The security constraints of Afghanistan, with terror attacks in Kabul and ongoing fighting in some of the provinces, heavily limited safe areas and activity in both the capital and the rest of the country. Therefore, the mission visited Kabul only, under the full protection of the office of the EUSR/EU Delegation in Kabul. Beyond the security aspects, it seems that there is never an easy time for Afghanistan and the visit took place at a very complicated, if not confused, juncture for the country. The results of the 2018 legislative elections are only partially disclosed, and the timeframe and main candidates of the 2019 presidential elections remain unclear. While the political calendar has few fixed points, the institutional environment is increasingly confined to heavily guarded official buildings, surrounded by high (and very costly) concrete walls. The traffic is intense and disrupted by armed official convoys that, under the nervous control of soldiers and bodyguards, have immediate priority. Kabul seems to be a city besieged from within, with elaborate and time-consuming procedures to gain access to restricted streets and ministerial residences. The impression is not only that democratic powers are physically inaccessible to ordinary people, who are banned from the green zone, but also that the institutional world faces increasing difficulties to meeting citizens. There is a risk that the society will become de facto disconnected from its institutions, to which the donors’ community has dedicated so much investment. This is an issue also for the international community. For example, the EU compound is protected by about a hundred security staff and experts face strong limitations in visiting provinces and meeting Afghans outside of EU premises. The USA has built a sort of city within the city, with thousands of staff restricted to huge compounds with little if any direct contact with locals. Outside Kabul, the Taliban have expanded their control and now hold about 50% of the territory, although, as pointed out by a diplomat, they “control land that the government never controlled” and in some locations is scarcely populated. The main credit to the Taliban is their capacity to push back Daesh, confined now to a few districts of only two provinces. On the government's side, it can claim that last year's agreement with Hezbi-i-Islam (Hekmatyar) is working and that the Afghan Army is now able to carry out most of the military operations against insurgents - and it pays higher costs in terms of causalities. Before this devastated picture, the international community is showing more signs of fatigue, after decades of military, civilian, political and financial commitment. The main sign of the “disengagement temptation” is the unexpected decision by President Trump to both reduce US troops and to open direct talks with the Taliban in Abu Dhabi, a very controversial (for both local and international actors) peace-process or some sort of one. CR\1175047EN.docx 3/9 PE629.305v01-00 EN This was the context of the EP visit to Afghanistan and of the EU presence in the country. A presence, as re-assessed by the delegation, which appears also to the Afghans, to be one of the few stable, durable and genuinely committed engagements to help this unfortunate country which for the past decades has been the playground of terrible mistakes made by both world powers and local elites. Inter-parliamentary Meeting “In one year, 2017, there were 30.000 casualties: what is the price of democracy?” (Afghan MP) Although outgoing and still waiting for the complete results of the legislative elections, the members of the Wolesi Jirga offered an impressive picture of the feelings of Afghan society in these troubled times. This, after all, is what should be expected from a lively and pluralistic parliament such as the Afghan one. The main topic of debate of the IPM was the prospect of a possible agreement with the Taliban, as sponsored by the USA, and its degree of acceptance by Afghan society. The MPs showed a variety of opinions on this, underlining that the Taliban themselves do not have unique policies. In some of the districts under their control (such as in the province of Herat), they allow girls to go to school with boys, while in others (as in the Kandahar province) they do not. There was consensus on the fact that the Taliban should not object to the current constitutional structure based on a President, government and parliament, and that the territorial integrity of the country is not negotiable. Concern was high over potential social policies the Taliban could introduce - such as regards health and education - as well as the media, sectors which they would seek to put under Sharia law. Some MPs, notably women MPs, felt that putting the Taliban in power would be an existential threat to the young Afghan democracy and insisted that women will never accept going back twenty years in terms of rights. Other MPs, mostly men, expressed the opinion that a 2020 Taliban may be quite different compared to those who ruled the country in the late nineties and that they should be able to “learn from their own mistakes”. Although they had different views about the future, the Afghan MPs shared a feeling of disappointment over the failure of the democratic system - ravaged by corruption, nepotism, and military challenges. With a sense of realism, the IPM agreed that the cost of ongoing fighting is too high, both in human and financial terms. As stated in the joint declaration adopted by the IPM, both MPs and MEPs agreed that any reconciliation process has to be in the hands of Afghans and cannot be imposed by the USA or Pakistan and should never jeopardize progress achieved in providing core human rights to all citizens. Peace, but not any peace “Without foreign troops, we can last six months” (President Ghani) “He could have said six weeks” (a Western expert) The very morning of the IPM, the Taliban had released a press statement indicating four “pre- conditions” to engaging in full peace-talks with the Americans (withdrawal of American troops, lifting of individual sanctions, amending the constitution and releasing prisoners). Only two years ago, it would have been unthinkable to see the Taliban bullying the USA with such PE629.305v01-00 4/9 CR\1175047EN.docx EN ambitious, although clearly tactical, requests. The Taliban delegation in Abu Dhabi, moreover, was a senior one, including two former ministers and the former Chief of Army. All anyone was talking about was the peace process. Although a few weeks after the return of the EP delegation to Brussels the talks seemed to have stopped (perhaps or probably, only temporarily and as part of the usual exhausting Afghan tactics), Kabul's concern remains that any negotiation must be an “Afghan led process”. There is an explicit fear that the Trump Administration may be willing to seek an agreement directly with the Taliban and Pakistan. Former President Karzai was very loud and clear in denouncing what is taking place for being a similar scenario to when the Mujahidin government was imposed by the USA in 1992, “which has provoked the destruction of the country”.
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