European Parliament 2014-2019

Delegation for relations with

15.1.2019

MISSION REPORT

following the 5th EU-Afghanistan Inter-Parliamentary Meeting

17-19 December 2018,

Delegation for relations with Afghanistan

Members of the mission: Petras Auštrevičius (ALDE) (Leader of the mission) André Elissen (ENF) Frank Engel (PPE)

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EN United in diversity EN

Introduction

The Delegation for relations with Afghanistan conducted a mission to Kabul from Monday 17 to Wednesday 19 December 2018. This was the Delegation to Afghanistan's second visit in the current parliamentary mandate after the 4th EU/Afghanistan IPM which took place in Kabul in February 2017.

The aim of the mission was to hold the 5th Inter-parliamentary Meeting (IPM) with Members of Parliament from the Wolesi Jirga and to gain first-hand information about the evolving situation in the country and the status of the EU's political, military and development cooperation in Afghanistan.

As in 2017, due to strict security provisions, the program of the visit was limited to Kabul, with a reduced delegation size – it was made up of only two members with the addition of the rapporteur on Afghanistan from the Committee for Development, plus, as a member of the secretariat, the Head of Unit of Asia.

The Delegation adopted an IPM joint-statement with Afghan MPs and issued a press-statement to sum up the aim and main outcomes of the visit.

Meetings

In just three working days and in spite of high security concerns, the delegation managed to have an intense and high-level programme for four days, with several meetings, mostly inside the EU compound, through the highly appreciated and committed cooperation of the EU ambassador and his deputy and the EU head of the Political Section.

Among the personalities met: President Chief of the Executive (Prime Minister) Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister of Interior Minister of Mines Former President Former minister of Interior and presidential candidate Afghan MPs Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission EUMS ambassadors EU Head of Cooperation section USA ambassador UNAMA International and domestic media NGOs and women’s networks Independent Electoral Commission and NGOs related to the election

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Context and security

Mullah Nasroddin: “I met the king’s convoy on the street and he spoke to me! The king spoke to me!” “What an honour! And what did he say to you?” Mullah Nasroddin: “He screamed: don’t stay in the middle of the road, idiot, and get behind the guards!” (from “The Mullah Nasroddin folk stories”)

The security constraints of Afghanistan, with terror attacks in Kabul and ongoing fighting in some of the provinces, heavily limited safe areas and activity in both the capital and the rest of the country. Therefore, the mission visited Kabul only, under the full protection of the office of the EUSR/EU Delegation in Kabul.

Beyond the security aspects, it seems that there is never an easy time for Afghanistan and the visit took place at a very complicated, if not confused, juncture for the country.

The results of the 2018 legislative elections are only partially disclosed, and the timeframe and main candidates of the 2019 presidential elections remain unclear. While the political calendar has few fixed points, the institutional environment is increasingly confined to heavily guarded official buildings, surrounded by high (and very costly) concrete walls. The traffic is intense and disrupted by armed official convoys that, under the nervous control of soldiers and bodyguards, have immediate priority.

Kabul seems to be a city besieged from within, with elaborate and time-consuming procedures to gain access to restricted streets and ministerial residences. The impression is not only that democratic powers are physically inaccessible to ordinary people, who are banned from the green zone, but also that the institutional world faces increasing difficulties to meeting citizens. There is a risk that the society will become de facto disconnected from its institutions, to which the donors’ community has dedicated so much investment.

This is an issue also for the international community. For example, the EU compound is protected by about a hundred security staff and experts face strong limitations in visiting provinces and meeting Afghans outside of EU premises. The USA has built a sort of city within the city, with thousands of staff restricted to huge compounds with little if any direct contact with locals.

Outside Kabul, the Taliban have expanded their control and now hold about 50% of the territory, although, as pointed out by a diplomat, they “control land that the government never controlled” and in some locations is scarcely populated. The main credit to the Taliban is their capacity to push back Daesh, confined now to a few districts of only two provinces. On the government's side, it can claim that last year's agreement with Hezbi-i-Islam (Hekmatyar) is working and that the Afghan Army is now able to carry out most of the military operations against insurgents - and it pays higher costs in terms of causalities.

Before this devastated picture, the international community is showing more signs of fatigue, after decades of military, civilian, political and financial commitment. The main sign of the “disengagement temptation” is the unexpected decision by President Trump to both reduce US troops and to open direct talks with the Taliban in Abu Dhabi, a very controversial (for both local and international actors) peace-process or some sort of one.

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This was the context of the EP visit to Afghanistan and of the EU presence in the country. A presence, as re-assessed by the delegation, which appears also to the Afghans, to be one of the few stable, durable and genuinely committed engagements to help this unfortunate country which for the past decades has been the playground of terrible mistakes made by both world powers and local elites.

Inter-parliamentary Meeting

“In one year, 2017, there were 30.000 casualties: what is the price of democracy?” (Afghan MP)

Although outgoing and still waiting for the complete results of the legislative elections, the members of the Wolesi Jirga offered an impressive picture of the feelings of Afghan society in these troubled times. This, after all, is what should be expected from a lively and pluralistic parliament such as the Afghan one.

The main topic of debate of the IPM was the prospect of a possible agreement with the Taliban, as sponsored by the USA, and its degree of acceptance by Afghan society. The MPs showed a variety of opinions on this, underlining that the Taliban themselves do not have unique policies. In some of the districts under their control (such as in the province of Herat), they allow girls to go to school with boys, while in others (as in the Kandahar province) they do not. There was consensus on the fact that the Taliban should not object to the current constitutional structure based on a President, government and parliament, and that the territorial integrity of the country is not negotiable. Concern was high over potential social policies the Taliban could introduce - such as regards health and education - as well as the media, sectors which they would seek to put under Sharia law. Some MPs, notably women MPs, felt that putting the Taliban in power would be an existential threat to the young Afghan democracy and insisted that women will never accept going back twenty years in terms of rights. Other MPs, mostly men, expressed the opinion that a 2020 Taliban may be quite different compared to those who ruled the country in the late nineties and that they should be able to “learn from their own mistakes”.

Although they had different views about the future, the Afghan MPs shared a feeling of disappointment over the failure of the democratic system - ravaged by corruption, nepotism, and military challenges. With a sense of realism, the IPM agreed that the cost of ongoing fighting is too high, both in human and financial terms. As stated in the joint declaration adopted by the IPM, both MPs and MEPs agreed that any reconciliation process has to be in the hands of Afghans and cannot be imposed by the USA or and should never jeopardize progress achieved in providing core human rights to all citizens.

Peace, but not any peace

“Without foreign troops, we can last six months” (President Ghani) “He could have said six weeks” (a Western expert)

The very morning of the IPM, the Taliban had released a press statement indicating four “pre- conditions” to engaging in full peace-talks with the Americans (withdrawal of American troops, lifting of individual sanctions, amending the constitution and releasing prisoners). Only two years ago, it would have been unthinkable to see the Taliban bullying the USA with such

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ambitious, although clearly tactical, requests. The Taliban delegation in Abu Dhabi, moreover, was a senior one, including two former ministers and the former Chief of Army. All anyone was talking about was the peace process.

Although a few weeks after the return of the EP delegation to Brussels the talks seemed to have stopped (perhaps or probably, only temporarily and as part of the usual exhausting Afghan tactics), Kabul's concern remains that any negotiation must be an “Afghan led process”. There is an explicit fear that the Trump Administration may be willing to seek an agreement directly with the Taliban and Pakistan. Former President Karzai was very loud and clear in denouncing what is taking place for being a similar scenario to when the Mujahidin government was imposed by the USA in 1992, “which has provoked the destruction of the country”. Several Afghan interlocutors also focussed on the negative role of Pakistan, the traditional sponsor of the Taliban and declared that “some regional actors believe that our country is as important to them as it is to us”, and questioned the American ties with Islamabad - “they give money to Pakistan and they bomb our country, why?” In Islamabad many people believe that domestic conservative forces should focus on Afghanistan rather than Pakistan internal policy – (“and this is the same fatal mistake that also Turkey made”, noted a Western diplomat). Yet, Pakistan could also change its traditional policy and realize that in the long-term, Afghan instability is not sustainable for Islamabad. Pakistan, as usual, was often quoted to be an interferer in Afghan politics.

Karzai also insisted that regional actors be included in the talks, given their prominent role in the implementation of any possible agreement. The USA ambassador, who was clearly concerned that the Administration's efforts could go nowhere if countries such as Russia, Iran and China were not part of the peace exercise, also raised this crucial point. Chief of the Executive Abdullah emphasised the positive role played by post-Karimov Uzbekistan as an honest peace-broker, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs reminded everyone that Afghanistan did not attend the third round of talks in Moscow because it was not agreed upon with Kabul, but instead participated in unprecedented trilateral talks with China and Pakistan. Several regional partners are indeed essential in any sustainable peace for Afghanistan and, with no surprise, the main message of the US ambassador to the EP delegation was that Washington would need the help of the EU to somehow liaise with Teheran.

The key issue in any peace agreement is the nature of the State. Interlocutors in Kabul all share the view that “We need to keep the Islamic Republic and not establish again an Islamic Emirate where sharia would be superior to the law” (Mohammad Hanif Atmar). It is not an easy goal, since the Taliban are likely to try to do whatever they can to obtain a return to the concept of an emirate, where religious leaders play the role of the head of state. The red line, as again expressed by Atmar, is that the republican law should be inspired by Islam but remain above sharia with a strong human rights component in the constitution. Mohammad Hanif Atmar expressed also the position of many Afghans regarding the Taliban's capacity to deliver stability, given their connection with organised crime and their instrumental role in pursuing some regional powers’ interests, notably Pakistan but also Russia - which became a sponsor of the Taliban because of their capacity to push back Daesh from the country.

Eventually, the delegation came to the conclusion that the very much needed peace-settlement in Afghanistan needs much more clarity, both on actors invited to the party, with a full role for Afghan authorities, and with a shared Western democracy vision for the Afghan society of tomorrow.

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On this, the EU may regret the lack of direct information delivered by the USA and find that Europe and the USA, as well as India and other partners, should coordinate much more on their agenda. The risk is that decades of political and financial commitment to the country could be quickly spoiled for the sake of having a fragile and unfair “stability”.

The electoral process

“Afghan elections are very expensive, 34 US $ for each vote. This is 600 times more than in India” ()

One of the burning issue for a possible peace-process is who will be in charge from the Afghan side, and this depends on who will be the next President. Whether the presidential elections should precede a formal launching of the peace-process or the other way, is a matter of discussion, although the EU Ambassador underlined that the EU firmly believes that two processes should not be interlinked and that the presidential elections should proceed according to their own calendar. It would be highly dangerous that they could become hostage of deliberate attempts to delay the peace talks. According to some diplomats, the correct sequence should be: 1) commencement of peace negotiations; 2) Presidential elections; 3) peace process outcome; 4) approval by a Loya Jirga.

However, within the EP delegation visit to Kabul, there was still uncertainty about who will be the main candidates, beyond the already announced ones - in particular current President Ghani and the former Minister of Interior Atmar. Both of them look quite hostile to make significant concessions to the Taliban. Atmar’s background, moreover, is the one of a former Najibullah’s officer, with a strong experience in security apparatus and a more secular vision of the Afghan State.

However, both the past legislative elections and the 2019 presidential ones, as well posed other problems. The delegation met extensively with the Independent Electoral Commission, with the UNAMA and with local electoral NGOs, to learn and discuss the lessons of the 2018 parliamentary elections. There were various challenges: for the first time biometric devices were used, with no previous experience and little time to test; more than 2.000 voting centres were closed because of their location in Taliban controlled areas; the Taliban were also reported to have provoked about 160 incidents, including in Kabul, and with a number of casualty; however, according to intelligence sources most of security incidents were caused by competing candidates and not by insurgents; the electoral code is too strict in the terms of eligibility criteria, notably for women (higher education is required); coordination among donors should be increased and UNDP’s role was reported as disappointing (see dedicated reporting sheet attached to this report); a consolidated list of potential voters should be published, also to make corrections on demand; more training should be provided to local observers and in general, civil society should be more involved in the preparation and monitoring processes.

The Independent Election Commission filed more than 11.000 complaints, a 70% increase than in previous elections, partially also because of the new procedure makes “much easier to complain”. The IEC has elaborated a system to classify complaints according to three kinds of violations subdivided in 35 types and 21 kinds of negligence, while the priority is given to violations potentially affecting the results.

Although all these issues are of paramount importance, the Delegation was confronted with

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several discussions - for instance, with the former President Karzai, former cabinet members, journalists, diplomats, and NGOs - with a more structural, although a well-known problem: the validity and the morality of the entire electoral process. Several reliable interlocutors reported about the massive frauds and frequent financial transactions to literally “buying” parliamentary mandates, and disclosed astonishing details of the practices also imposed by the powerful donors/foreign countries with the list of “already elected” candidates, the final percentage of the votes for the presidential candidates, or the requests to delay announcements of the results. The consequence is that the credibility of all the efforts to build democracy may be undermined and, as bluntly stated by an Afghan journalist, eventually “people want peace more than elections”.

Human Rights

“Our main message through the constitution is that no Afghan citizen is inferior to any other, including young, poor and women” (President Ghani)

Although the main political agenda is relating to the peace and the electoral processes, Afghanistan has to struggle with many other priorities. Both the President Ghani and the Chief of the Executive (Prime Minister) Abdullah hold long and detailed meetings to engage with the EP delegation on current reforms, achieved results and various pending challenges. They both presented an honest overview, with no trumpeting successful stories but also expressing a genuine commitment to strengthen the rule of law.

The effort of reconstructing Afghanistan is a major challenge, notably in the current political volatility, both internally and internationally. It would be unfair not to recognise the progress achieved by Afghanistan in different sectors. The team of selected ministers and senior advisers - mostly young women, accompanied President Ghani. Results are tangible in tackling corruption on high level, with improved record of Afghanistan in international ranks, and President Ghani emphasised how he has taken this issue personally, by chairing himself more than one hundred sessions of the National Procurement Authority. In spite of those results, corruption remains a daily experience for the citizens at a local level and this is a plague of the outmost importance in Afghanistan due to its political implication. As stated by human rights organisations, “when civil servants are not delivering without getting pocket money for them, citizens join the Taliban, who are perceived as more reliable in providing social protection”.

Corruption is just one of the daily challenges for the majority of the Afghans. As disclosed by the EU expert and local NGOs, there are still more dying children in Afghanistan than in Yemen or Syria, while per capita health expenditure is only 4$.

People are not silent about the corruption or the poverty plagues, and the country has developed a vibrant society, with pluralistic views about the society and the politicians - and during the visit to Kabul, the EP delegation was confronted with lively debate among the Afghans themselves.

However, a genuine space is limited, since some ministries have created their own controlled NGOs in order to channel public and international funds. The work for human rights defenders always implies a variety of risks, including for the ones who try to report about the lack of social rights. Attention was called, for instance, on the appalling conditions of workers in brick production, paid about 3-5 dollars a day for 70 hours a week, with heavy use of child labour,

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no security protection at all and mafia style owners.

A special category under threat is the one of journalists, who lose their lives in high number because of killing and general insecurity. Interestingly the Taliban have a pro-active media oriented activity: not only are present on social networks, but also organise press conferences in the areas under their control, for instance, by showing causalities caused by the NATO attacks or opening their social services. For this purpose, the Taliban sent the bus to Kabul, to gather journalists, and bring to their areas and safely return them to the capital before dark.

Economy and growth, reforms and migration

“We are finally able to provide jobs for skilled Afghans who stay or return” (acting Minister for Mines and Petroleum)

The Afghan government, and with the support of the international community, cannot be blamed for remaining inactive. On the contrary, it shows a dynamic of genuine efforts. Education is more accessible than ever in the country, some sectors of the public administration are improving, and innovative legislation asserts a spirit of rule of law.

Although for the time being no multi-national is operating in the country, Afghanistan is slowly attracting some foreign investment and the government is joining forces with some neighbouring countries for common projects and new infrastructures. The young and dynamic acting Minister for Mines presented fresh legislation and transparency mechanism (for example, contacts and benefits are now online). Government efforts to regulate and improve efficiency of both import and export received an excellent score by the World Bank in terms of economic reforms.

Nevertheless, all those positive efforts clash with a basic data: the economic growth is not enough to match the natural population growth combined also with the increasing return of refugees. Returners come mostly from Pakistan (which may deliberate use the return of refugees to Afghanistan as a pressure tool), and Iran. An additional negative effect of the American sanctions on is a rampant economic crisis, with more than 25% unemployment with direct consequence for Afghans refugees who are going back in high numbers. Turkey repatriates about 500 Afghans every week. Unfortunately, Afghanistan does not have enough jobs nor social services to cope with growing needs.

President Ghani reported the huge problems related to the resettlement of more than four million returnees and of one million internally displaced persons, and in this context the issue of limiting migration to the EU is certainly not a priority for the Afghan authorities. Just to note, compared to early 2017 expectations, the forced-repatriation schemes from the EU seems to be disappointing: not only less than 1.000 Afghans were back, but also the cost can be as high as €40.000 for involuntary repatriation.

EU presence in Afghanistan

“There is one thing on which Afghans all agree; gratitude to Europe” (Mohammad Hanif Atmar)

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As stated also in the mission 2017 report, the presence and the commitment by the EU is well established and is considered as one of the most reliable by Afghan institutions and people.

There are high expectations following the EU-Afghanistan Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (CAPD) and the development cooperation is well established although is facing logistic limitations due to the overall security situation in the country. The EU is also unanimously perceived as the best player in assisting the complicate electoral processes of Afghanistan.

This role, however, brings responsibility and difficult decisions. As the main civilian donor, the EU and the EUMS, should probably be more vocal in asserting adequate coordination among donors - a difficult task indeed but a needed one. The financial commitment of the EU needs to have more political recognition and impact. This should include a role in a credible peace- process if serious negotiations will ever start. The High Representative spelled out in Geneva five clear pillars of the EU engagement and the EU. Just to mention one of them, could have the unique capability of connecting Afghanistan to the rest of the region.

One limitation to the diplomatic action of the EU is the decision not to talk with Taliban - an understandable move that receives the credit of the government. However, given the fact that all main actors engage with Taliban in one way or another - from Russia to the USA, not to mention the Afghan authorities and Pakistan - the EU position could be backdated and should be a matter of discussion in view of a possible revision.

Follow-up

“In Afghanistan we have a saying: the West has all the watches, the Afghans all the time” (Hamid Karzai)

As the entire world has learnt in the past decades, Afghanistan is a country that requires care and time. The complexity of the situation on the ground is such that several EP committees should be implicated in constant monitoring on what happens and on what the EU should do or can do. The well-established cooperation between the EU and the Afghan authorities should be fully exploited, including the consolidate ties between the European Parliament and the Wolesi Jirga, a sister legislative institution where several members deserve a constant European support.

The status of the EP activity on Afghanistan should be a matter of reflection in view of the 2019-2024 European Parliament, including the further integration of Afghanistan in the Central Asia dimension, the possible appointment of a permanent draftsperson by AFET, the exact structure and mandate of the relevant standing delegation.

The commitment to support the Afghan people who have been suffering for decades by a multiplicity of tragic mistakes mostly (but not only) committed by foreign powers, requires a follow-up based on a moral and political endurance.

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