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Study on Security Cooperation in The This publicaion has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publicaion are the sole responsibility of ATR Consuling and can in no way be taken to relect the views of the European Union. CONTENTs Execuive Summary 1 Acronyms 2 Acknowledgements 5 Background and 6 Context Concept and 7 Background of the Heart of Asia Building r Commitment 8 States to the Heart of Asia Process Among Membe Map 1: 9 Heart of Asia Member States Exising Studies 10 on the Heart of Asia Process Approach and 11 Methodology Approach 11 Research Quesions 11 Methodology 12 Findings 13 Security Cooperaion’ Looking Beyond the Tradiional Deiniion of ‘ 13 Security Threats 14 in the Region Security Cooperaion 17 Mechanisms in the Region Obstacles to 22 Efecive Security Cooperaion in the Region Opportuniies for 23 Intensiied Security Cooperaion Incenives for 25 Intensiied Security Cooperaion Policy Opions 26 for the Heart of Asia Conclusion 29 Appendix I: 31 Afghanistan Most Relevant 32 Security Threats to Afghanistan Exising Security 32 Cooperaion Mechanisms Obstacles to 35 Efecive Security Cooperaion Opportuniies aion and 38 Incenives for Intensiied Security Cooper Promising Policy 40 Opions for the Heart of Asia Process Map 2: 40 Proposed Route of TAPI Gas Pipeline Project Appendix II: 42 Azerbaijan Most Relevant 43 Security Threats Exising Security 44 Cooperaion Mechanisms Obstacles to Efecive Security Cooperaion 45 Opportuniies and Incenives for Intensiied Security Cooperaion 46 Promising Policy Opions for the Heart of Asia Process 46 Appendix III: China 47 Most Relevant Security Threats 48 China in Heart of Asia 49 China's Key Contribuions to the Heart of Asia Process 50 Exising Security Cooperaion Mechanisms 50 One Belt One Road 53 Map 3: Approximate Routes of One Belt One Road Projects 54 Obstacles to Efecive Security Cooperaion 55 Opportuniies and Incenives for Intensiied Security Cooperaion 56 Promising Policy Opions for the Heart of Asia Process 57 Appendix IV: India 59 Most Relevant Security Threats 61 Exising Security Cooperaion Mechanisms 62 Obstacles to Efecive Security Cooperaion 63 Opportuniies and Incenives for Intensiied Security Cooperaion 64 Promising Policy Opions for the Heart of Asia Process 65 Appendix V: Iran 67 Most Relevant Security Threats 68 Exising Security Cooperaion Mechanisms 68 Obstacles to Efecive Security Cooperaion 70 Opportuniies and Incenives for Intensiied Security Cooperaion 70 Promising Policy Opions for the Heart of Asia Process 71 Appendix VI: Kazakhstan 73 Most Relevant Security Threats 74 Exising Security Cooperaion Mechanisms 74 Obstacles to Efecive Security Cooperaion 75 Opportuniies and Incenives for Intensiied Security Cooperaion 75 Promising Policy Opions for the Heart of Asia Process 76 Appendix VII: Kyrgyzstan 77 Most Relevant Security Threats 78 Exising Security Cooperaion Mechanisms 78 Obstacles to Efecive Security Cooperaion 79 Opportuniies and Incenives for Intensiied Security Cooperaion 79 Promising Policy Opions for the Heart of Asia Process 80 Appendix VIII: Pakistan 81 Most Relevant Security Threats 82 Exising Security Cooperaion Mechanisms 83 Obstacles to Efecive Security Cooperaion 85 Opportuniies and Incenives for Intensiied Security Cooperaion 86 Map 4: Route of Proposed China Pakistan Economic Corridor 87 China Pakistan Economic Corridor 87 Promising Policy Opions for the Heart of Asia Process 88 Appendix IX: Russia 89 Most Relevant Security Threats 90 Exising Security Cooperaion Mechanisms 91 Obstacles to Efecive Security Cooperaion 94 Opportuniies and Incenives for Intensiied Security Cooperaion 95 Promising Policy Opions for the Heart of Asia Process 95 Appendix X: Saudi Arabia 96 Most Relevant Security Threats 97 Exising Security Cooperaion Mechanisms 97 Obstacles to Efecive to Security Cooperaion 99 Promising Policy Opions for the Heart of Asia Process 101 Appendix XI: Tajikistan 103 Most Relevant Security Threats 104 Exising Security Cooperaion Mechanisms 107 Obstacles to Efecive Security Cooperaion 108 Opportuniies and Incenives for Intensiied Security Cooperaion 108 Promising Policy Opions for the Heart of Asia Process 109 Appendix XII: Turkey 111 Most Relevant 112 Security Threats Exising Security 113 Cooperaion Mechanisms Obstacles to 114 Efecive Security Cooperaion Opportuniies raion and116 Incenives for Intensiied Security Coope Promising Policy 116 Opions for the Heart of Asia Process Appendix XIII: 118 Turkmenistan Most Relevant 119 Security Threats Exising Security 119 Cooperaion Mechanisms Obstacles to 120 Efecive Security Cooperaion Opportuniies raion and121 Incenives for Intensiied Security Coope Promising Policy 122 Opions for the Heart of Asia Process Appendix XIV: 124 United Arab Emirates Most Relevant 126 Security Threats Exising Security 129 Cooperaion Mechanisms Obstacles to 130 Efecive Security Cooperaion Opportuniies raion and130 Incenives for Intensiied Security Coope Executive Summary ATR Consuling analyzed the opportuniies and challenges facing the Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperaion for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan1 using various research techniques, including expert interviews in fourteen countries, desk review, on-line survey of regional experts, and media monitoring. Accordingly, ATR has developed recommendaions for advancing the process. Due in part to the diversity of the diferent countries’ perspecives, expert analysis of the current threats in the region varies greatly. However, they reach a consensus in idenifying violent radicalizaion as the principal threat. Experts also agree on the risks caused by geopoliical tensions and rivalries, and they comment at length regarding how these impacts on each Heart of Asia member state. Although not all countries regard Afghanistan as the sole, or even the main, source of these threats, many stress Afghanistan’s inability to control the spread of terrorism and violent extremism or accuse the country of looding the region with narcoics. Throughout the Heart of Asia region, the need to support Afghanistan in ataining peace and stability is recognized as a criical pillar to building a secure and prosperous region, as ariculated in the Heart of Asia’s goals. Experts unanimously agree that none of the exising security cooperaion mechanisms are capable of addressing these regional challenges. The Heart of Asia, with its broad-based membership and clear objecives, thus provides an opportunity to bring greater coherence to the eforts of these various regional processes and organizaions and focus their energy on Afghanistan. The Heart of Asia can harness the increased role of China on security and economic maters in the region (and speciically its interest in Afghanistan) by supporing or complemening eforts made under the Shanghai Cooperaion Organizaion (SCO) and the Trilateral Agreement between China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The Heart of Asia can also strengthen the economic cooperaion agreements (under Economic Cooperaion Organisaion (ECO) or Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperaion (CAREC) Program) that are struggling to grow beyond bilateralism and military cooperaion (under the Collecive Security Treaty Organizaion (CSTO)) and that thus far appear to beneit only the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia. Geopoliical rivalries are viewed as the foremost hindrance to security cooperaion. The long-standing rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran takes the focus away from Afghanistan; Pakistan’s atempts to block Afghan access to the Indian market and, more generally, the deep distrust characterizing the Afghanistan–Pakistan relaions are problemaic. Experts also emphasize that the concept of security in the region is largely guided by the governing elites’ interest in retaining power, thus undermining any cooperaion atempt. Many experts see economic integraion in the region as the only realisic approach to fostering peace, and hope that economic interests will overcome geopoliical tensions. They also advocate for increased eforts to design and implement joint border management iniiaives to reach common objecives. Based on this analysis, ATR Consuling proposes that the Heart of Asia Process adopt the following policy opions: 1. Harness forces, interests, and relaionships with other organizaions and mechanisms 2. Design and implement security cooperaion plans in support of economic development projects 3. Culivate economic, cultural, academic, and social integraion across the region 4. Intensify cooperaion in border regions to improve general border environment 5. Pilot military cooperaion with Heart of Asia members 1 Hereater referred to as the Heart of Asia Process. 1 ACRONYMS AGE Afghan Gas Enterprise AKDN Aga Khan Development Network AKP Jusice and Development Party (of Turkey) ANSF Afghan Naional Security Forces APTTA Afghanistan Pakistan Transit and Trade Agreement AQAP Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula BOMCA Border Management Programme in Central Asia BOMNAF Border Management Northern Afghanistan BSA Bilateral Security Agreement BTC Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Gas Pipeline BTK Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway CACGP Central Asia China Gas Pipeline CAR Central Asian Republics CAREC Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperaion CASA-1000 Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project CBM Conidence Building Measure CENTO Central Treaty Organizaion CPEC China Pakistan Economic Corridor CICA Conference on Interacion and Conidence-building CIED Counter Improvised Explosive Device CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CN-CBM Counter Narcoics Conidence Building Measure
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