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Afghanisches Kabinett Komplett Parlamentsabstimmung Bestätigt Alle 25 Minister

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Afghanisches Kabinett Komplett Parlamentsabstimmung Bestätigt Alle 25 Minister Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Hauptabteilung INT Team Asien e.V. Politischer Bericht / Kurzbericht Thema: Afghanisches Kabinett komplett Parlamentsabstimmung bestätigt alle 25 Minister Autor: Dr. Babak Khalatbari Ort/Datum: Kabul, 25.09.2006 Länder- / Regionalprogramm: AFGHANISTAN AFGHANISCHES KABINETT KOMPLETT Afghanisches Kabinett komplett Parlamentsabstimmung bestätigt alle 25 Minister INHALT 1. Abstimmungsverlauf 2. Lebensläufe der Minister 3. Kabinettsübersicht 4. Abstimmungsergebnisse 1 AFGHANISCHES KABINETT KOMPLETT Abstimmungsverlauf Das Kabinett von Präsident Karzai, das Am Donnerstag, den 19.04.2006 und am Montag, aus insgesamt 25 den 7. August 2006 stellten sich die von Präsident Ministerien besteht, ist Karzai vorgeschlagenen Minister für die neue nun komplett. Regierung dem Parlament zur Vertrauens- abstimmung. Vorangegangen waren Anhörungen, in denen die Ziele, aber auch professionelle Erfahrung derzeit im Gespräch. Am 23.04.2006 wurde und die Nationalität der Kandidaten thematisiert unserem Büro von einem Parlamentarier mitgeteilt, worden waren. Die Presse in Afghanistan dass im Parlament zwischenzeitlich eine nicht kommentierte den Ausgang der Vertrauens- öffentliche Verfahrensabstimmung (87 Ja- abstimmung im April als Überraschung, da von den Stimmen/53 Nein-Stimmen) die Bestätigung der 25 von Präsident Karzai vorgeschlagenen drei in Frage gestellten Kandidaten ergeben habe. Kandidaten 20 angenommen und fünf abgelehnt Der Kandidat für das Amt des Kulturministers, Dr. wurden. Es mussten demnach fünf Kandidaten Sayed Makhdum Rahin, scheiterte an konservativen nachnominiert werden. Kräften, die während der Anhörungen die Einschränkung liberaler Sendungen im Fernsehen Runde 1 gefordert hatten. Rahin hatte diese Forderung Der Abstimmungsvorgang konnte als zurückgewiesen. Auch Dr. Soraya Rahim-Sobhrang, einschneidender politischer Vorgang interpretiert als Kandidatin für das Ministerium für werden, da entgegen früherer Gerüchte einige Frauenangelegenheiten vorgeschlagen und einzige Kabinettsmitglieder an der Abstimmung im Frau unter Karzais Kandidaten, scheiterte an diesem Parlament scheiterten, obwohl sie zuvor als Widerstand. Ebenfalls nicht bestätigt wurden die Favoriten gehandelt wurden. Insbesondere der Kandidaten für das Wirtschaftsministerium, Dr. transparente Ablauf wurde hervorgehoben, da die Amin Farhang, für das Handelministerium, Dr. Abstimmung einschließlich der Auszählung im Haidar Reza, sowie für das Transportministerium, Fernsehen übertragen wurde. Generell kann der Hosayn Ahmadi. Sie fielen mit zum Teil deutlichen Prozess trotz der Nichtbestätigung von insgesamt Ergebnissen durch. Für diese Ministerien sollte fünf Ministern als ein Erfolg für Präsident Karzai Präsident Karzai binnen zehn Tagen neue gewertet werden, der nachdrücklich betonte, „dass Kandidaten nominieren. In der Presse wurde nun die Regierung die Arbeit im nationalen Interesse spekuliert, ob er die zurückgewiesenen Minister aufnehmen müsse, nachdem das Parlament im nationalen erneut vorschlagen oder andere Kandidaten Interesse und ohne Vorbehalte in ethnischer, linguistischer benennen wird. und politischer Hinsicht gehandelt habe.“ Einige unabhängige Zeitungen zitieren hingegen auch Runde 2 Parlamentarier, die beklagen, dass hinter den Präsident Karzai nominierte die fünf noch Kulissen Absprachen getroffen und Wahlparties für ausstehenden Kabinettsmitglieder nach. Alle manche auf der Kippe stehenden Parlamentarier Personen wurden vom Parlament am 07.08.2006 ausgerichtet worden seien. Auch Korruption wurde bestätigt. Mohammad Amin Farhang ist mit 137 Ja- teilweise hinter dem Ausgang der Stimmen, 80 Nein-Stimmen und 3 Enthaltungen Vertrauensabstimmung vermutet. Einige Stimmen neuer Handelsminister geworden. Farhang war kritisieren das Verfahren, da drei der Minister zuvor Wirtschaftsminister und ist ein Politiker aus (Communications/Sangin, Refugee Affairs/Akbar, den Kreisen der Royalisten. Jalil Shams ist mit 137 Housing and Town Planning/Pashton) nicht die Ja-Stimmen, 67-Nein-Stimmen und 16 absolute Mehrheit der Stimmen erhalten hatten und Enthaltungen neuer Wirtschaftsminister. Shams war trotzdem bestätigt wurden. Diese Frage ist jedoch zuvor Deputy-Minister im Ministerium für Wasser auch im Parlament selbst noch derzeit umstritten, und Energie, dessen Vorsitz Ismail Khan innehat. und es wird erörtert, ob eine neue Abstimmung Shams stammt wie Ismail Khan aus Herat und ging benötigt wird. Auch die Anrufung einer mit ihm dort auch zur Schule. Frau Hosonbano unabhängigen Expertenkommission, welche die Ghazanfar ist mit 159 Ja-Stimmen, 55 Nein- Geschäftsordnung autoritativ interpretieren soll, ist Stimmen und 6 Enthaltungen neue Ministerin für 2 AFGHANISCHES KABINETT KOMPLETT Frauenangelegenheiten. Frau Ghazanfar gehört zur auch Direktor des dortigen Institute for Third usbekischen Minderheit und arbeitete als Dekan für World Studies. Bis zu seiner Rückkehr nach Sprachwissenschaften an der Universität Kabul. Afghanistan fungierte Dr. Spanta als Sprecher der Karim Khoram ist mit 125 Ja-Stimmen, 87 Nein- Alliance for Democracy in Afghanistan und war Stimmen und 7 Enthaltungen neuer Kulturminister. aktives Mitglied der “Grünen”. Seit Januar 2005 Nayamatullah Ehsan Jawid ist mit 122 Ja-Stimmen, unterrichtet Dr. Spanta an der Kabuler Universität 88 Nein-Stimmen und 7 Enthaltungen neuer und wurde noch im gleichen Jahr von Hamid Karzai Transportminister. Khoram war zuvor zu dessen Berater in internationalen Präsidentenberater und ist ein ehemaliger Angelegenheiten berufen. Seit dem 02. Mai 2006 Gefolgsmann von Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Im fungiert Dr. Spanta, der fließend Dari, Türkisch und gesamten Kabinett von Präsident Karzai befindet Deutsch spricht, als afghanischer Außenminister. sich mit der Ministerin Ghazanfar somit nur eine Frau. Finanzminister Der Minister für Finanzen, Dr. Vier „Deutsche“ im Kabinett Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi, wurde 1951 Unter den von Karzai nominierten Kandidaten in Kabul geboren. Er studierte befanden sich fünf Personen mit deutschem Wirtschaft und Politikwissenschaft Hintergrund, von denen Außenminister Dr. Rangin an der American University of Dafar Spanta, Hochschulminister Dr. Azam Dadfar, Beirut und der Northwestern Wirtschaftsminister Dr. Jalil Shams und University, wo er 1984 promovierte. Handelminister Dr. Amin Farhang vom Parlament Seine Lehrtätigkeit führte ihn nach Chicago an das bestätigt wurden. Providence College. Dort arbeitete Dr. Anwar-ul- Haq Ahadi gleichzeitig bei der Continental Bank, bevor er 2002 zum Vorsitzenden der Da Lebensläufe der Minister Afghanistan Bank ernannt wurde. Der Präsident der Folgend die Lebensläufe der wichtigsten Minister: afghanischen sozialdemokratischen Partei spricht Außenminister fließend Dari, Pashto und Englisch. Außenminister Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta wurde 1954 im Distrikt Verteidigungsminister Karokh der Provinz Herat General Abdul Raheem geboren. Nach dem Besuch der Wardak wurde 1940 in der Grund- und weiterführenden gleichnamigen Provinz Schule in Herat besuchte Dr. Afghanistans geboren. Spanta die Universität von Kabul. Nach Abschluss des In den 70ern des letzten Jahrhunderts ging er zum Gymnasiums studierte er an Studium in die Türkei. Als die Sowjetunion in der Cadet-Universität, der Afghanistan einmarschierte, ging Dr. Spanta in den Ali-Naser-Akademie in Iran, um sich dort dem afghanischen Widerstand Kairo und in den Vereinigten Staaten. Zu seinen anzuschließen. Dort war er an der Publikation Tätigkeiten gehörten unter anderem die Arbeit als “Sada-ye Afghanistan” (Stimme Afghanistans) Dozent der Cadet-Universität, als Assistent im beteiligt. Vom Iran reiste er nach Pakistan und Verteidigungsministerium und als militärischer nahm auch dort an Aktivitäten des Widerstands teil. Assistent bei mehreren Vereinigungen. Als 1982 ließ sich Dr. Spanta in der Bundesrepublik kommandierender Mujaheddin kämpfte er gegen die Deutschland nieder, war dort in den ersten vier sowjetischen Invasoren. Nach dem Jahren Vorsitzender einer Studentenvereinigung, Zusammenbruch des kommunistischen Regimes engagierte sich aber weiterhin im demokratisch wurde General Wardak unter anderem Mitglied des orientierten Teil der afghanischen Sicherheitskommittees von Kabul, Direktor der Widerstandsbewegung. Für seine Dissertation über Erziehungskommission, Direktor des die Gründe für die Unterentwicklung Afghanistans Entwaffnungsprogramms und war zuständig für die und die Widerstandsbewegung wurde Spanta 1991 Reformation der Nationalarmee. Er verfasste der Doktortitel verliehen. Von 1992 bis 2005 war er mehrere Artikel in Pashto, Dari und Englisch. sowohl Professor an der Universität Aachen als 3 AFGHANISCHES KABINETT KOMPLETT Handelsminister Justizminister Dr. Mir Mohammad Amin Sarwar Danish wurde 1951 in Farhang wurde 1940 in Kabul der Provinz Daikundi geboren. geboren, wo er auch seine Nachdem er die Schule in Ausbildung erhielt. Er schloss Afghanistan abschloss, besuchte 1959 die Esteqlal High School ab er Universitäten im Irak, Iran und erwarb an der Universität und in Syrien. Er erwarb einen Köln in Deutschland einen Bachelor-Grad in Rechtswissen- Doktorgrad in schaft, ein Zertifikat in Entwicklungsökonomie. Zwischen 1974 und 1978 Journalismus, einen Bachelor-Grad in Islamischer unterrichtete Dr. Farhang Wirtschaft an der Kultur und Bildung sowie einen Master in Islamic Universität von Kabul und war dort Direktor des Fiqh, worin er zur Zeit promoviert. Danish National Economy Institutes. 1978 kam er in publizierte zahlreiche Bücher und Aufsätze. Er war Gefangenschaft in das Gefängnis von Pul-e-Charkhi
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