Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs March 1, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL30588 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Summary During 2009, the Obama Administration addressed a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan. Despite an increase in U.S. forces there during 2006-2008, insurgents were expanding their area and intensity of operations, resulting in higher levels of overall violence. There was substantial Afghan and international disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and militants enjoyed a safe haven in parts of Pakistan. Building on assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration conducted two “strategy reviews,” the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009, and on December 1, 2009, respectively. Each review included a decision to add combat troops, with the intent of creating the conditions to expand Afghan governance and economic development, rather than on hunting and defeating insurgents in successive operations. The new strategy has been propounded by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who was appointed top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan in May 2009. In his August 30, 2009, initial assessment of the situation, Gen. McChrystal recommended a fully resourced, comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy that could require about 40,000 additional forces (beyond 21,000 additional U.S. forces authorized in February 2009). On December 1, 2009, following the second high level policy review, President Obama announced the following: • The provision of 30,000 additional U.S. forces. This would bring U.S. force levels to about 100,000 once all these forces deploy. Allies pledged another 9,000 in concert with the announcement, which would bring their levels to about 46,000. • A conditions-based plan to begin to draw down U.S. forces beginning in July 2011. The intention of setting this notional time frame was, according to senior U.S. officials, to focus Afghanistan’s government on improving its effectiveness and its ability to take the security lead. The new policy was announced prior to a major international meeting in London on January 28, 2010, which focused on and generally backed Afghan and NATO plans to try to persuade insurgent fighters and leaders to end their fight and join the political process. Afghan President Hamid Karzai received this backing despite going into the conference politically weakened by the extensive fraud in the August 20, 2009, presidential elections and his subsequent difficulty obtaining parliamentary confirmation of a new cabinet. He came into the conference with ten ministerial posts still unfilled. Immediately after the conference, a greater sense of optimism started to take hold with comments to that effect by Gen. McChrystal. His comments, and similar assessments by other U.S. officials as well as outside experts, coincided with the launch of “Operation Moshtarak” to push insurgents out of Marjah and establish Afghan governance there, and successful arrests of and strikes on key Afghan militants in Pakistan. Including FY2009, the United States has provided over $40 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $21 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. A wide range of other CRS reports on many aspects of the Afghanistan issue are available on the CRS website at: http://www.crs.gov/Pages/subissue.aspx?cliid=2675&parentid=29. Congressional Research Service Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Contents Background ................................................................................................................................1 From Early History to the 19th Century..................................................................................1 Early 20th Century and Cold War Era.....................................................................................1 Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal.....................................................................2 The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban .............................................................5 Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001) ...................................................................5 The “Northern Alliance” Congeals ..................................................................................6 Policy Pre-September 11, 2001..............................................................................................7 September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom .................................................7 Post-Taliban Stability and Nation-Building Efforts ......................................................................8 Post-Taliban Political Transition............................................................................................9 Bonn Agreement .............................................................................................................9 Permanent Constitution.................................................................................................10 First Post-Taliban Elections........................................................................................... 11 2009 Presidential and Provincial Elections ....................................................................12 Next Elections...............................................................................................................12 Other Governance Issues.....................................................................................................13 U.S. Policy Management and U.S. Embassy Kabul .......................................................13 The Central Government and the National Assembly.....................................................14 U.S. Efforts to Expand and Reform Central Government/Corruption .............................14 Enhancing Local Governance........................................................................................18 Human Rights and Democracy......................................................................................19 Advancement of Women ...............................................................................................20 Narcotics Trafficking/Insurgent Financing/Agricultural Development............................20 Security Policy and Force Capacity Building.............................................................................23 Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Related Insurgents and Their Strength .............................................23 Scope of the Insurgency Problem ..................................................................................23 Groups: The Taliban (“Quetta Shura Taliban”)...............................................................24 Al Qaeda/Bin Laden Whereabouts ................................................................................25 Hikmatyar Faction ........................................................................................................26 Haqqani Faction............................................................................................................26 The U.S. War Effort to Date ................................................................................................26 U.S. Efforts in the First Five Post-Taliban Years............................................................27 Perception of Deterioration and Growing Force Levels in 2007 and 2008......................27 Obama Administration Strategy Reviews and Troop Buildup...............................................29 March 27, 2009, Policy Announcement and Command Change .....................................29 Second Strategy Review................................................................................................30 Summary of Policy Decisions and U.S. Strategy as of Early 2010..................................32 Results and Implementation ..........................................................................................34 Alternative “Counter-Terrorism” Strategy Not Adopted.................................................35 Other Security Policies and Experiments Under Way...........................................................35 “Reintegration” of Insurgents ........................................................................................35 Local Security Experiments: Afghan Public Protection Program (APPP).......................37 Limiting Civilian Casualties/Status of Forces Agreement...............................................38 Alliance Issues: The NATO-Led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom ...........................................................................................41 Congressional Research Service Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy NATO Force Pledges in 2008 and 2009.........................................................................42 Provincial Reconstruction Teams.........................................................................................44 Evolving Civil-Military Concepts at the PRTs ...............................................................45 Afghan National Security Forces.........................................................................................45 Afghan National