Afghan National Security Forces Getting Bigger, Stronger, Better Prepared -- Every Day!
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Defense Logistical Support Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan: Issues for Congress
Defense Logistical Support Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan: Issues for Congress Valerie Bailey Grasso Specialist in Defense Acquisition September 20, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33834 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Defense Logistical Support Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan: Issues for Congress Summary This report examines Department of Defense (DOD) logistical support contracts for troop support services in Iraq and Afghanistan administered through the U.S. Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), as well as legislative initiatives which may impact the oversight and management of logistical support contracts. LOGCAP is an initiative designed to manage the use of civilian contractors that perform services during times of war and other military mobilization. The first LOGCAP was awarded in 1992. Four LOGCAP contracts have been awarded for combat support services in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current LOGCAP III contractor supports the drawdown in Iraq by providing logistical services, theater transportation, augmentation of maintenance services, and other combat support services. On April 18, 2008, DOD announced the Army’s LOGCAP IV contract awards to three companies—DynCorp International LLC, Fort Worth, TX; Fluor Intercontinental, Inc, Greenville, SC; and KBR, Houston, TX, through a full and open competition. The LOGCAP IV contract calls for each company to compete for task orders. Each company may be awarded up to $5 billion annually for troop support services with a maximum annual value of $15 billion. As of March 2010, each company has been awarded at least one task order under LOGCAP IV. Over the life of LOGCAP IV, the maximum contract value is $150 billion. -
The Afghanistan-Pakistan Wars, 2008–2009: Micro-Geographies, Conflict Diffusion, and Clusters of Violence
The Afghanistan-Pakistan Wars, 2008–2009: Micro-geographies, Conflict Diffusion, and Clusters of Violence John O’Loughlin, Frank D. W. Witmer, and Andrew M. Linke1 Abstract: A team of political geographers analyzes over 5,000 violent events collected from media reports for the Afghanistan and Pakistan conflicts during 2008 and 2009. The violent events are geocoded to precise locations and the authors employ an exploratory spatial data analysis approach to examine the recent dynamics of the wars. By mapping the violence and examining its temporal dimensions, the authors explain its diffusion from traditional foci along the border between the two countries. While violence is still overwhelmingly concentrated in the Pashtun regions in both countries, recent policy shifts by the American and Pakistani gov- ernments in the conduct of the war are reflected in a sizeable increase in overall violence and its geographic spread to key cities. The authors identify and map the clusters (hotspots) of con- flict where the violence is significantly higher than expected and examine their shifts over the two-year period. Special attention is paid to the targeting strategy of drone missile strikes and the increase in their number and geographic extent by the Obama administration. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: H560, H770, O180. 15 figures, 1 table, 113 ref- erences. Key words: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Taliban, Al- Qaeda, insurgency, Islamic terrorism, U.S. military, International Security Assistance Forces, Durand Line, Tribal Areas, Northwest Frontier Province, ACLED, NATO. merica’s “longest war” is now (August 2010) nearing its ninth anniversary. It was Alaunched in October 2001 as a “war of necessity” (Barack Obama, August 17, 2009) to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, and thus remove the support of this regime for Al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization that carried out the September 2001 attacks in the United States. -
Post-Election Challenges for the New Government in Kabul
ORF ISSUE BRIEF NOVEMBER 2014 ISSUE BRIEF # 82 Post-Election Challenges for the New Government in Kabul Aryaman Bhatnagar Introduction ith a new President—Ashraf Ghani—finally in place in Kabul, attention can shift from the protracted electoral process to the challenges likely to confront the new government. WThe ability of this government to deal with various political and security challenges will depend to a large extent on how it manages its relations with a variety of stakeholders. Reviving the peace process with the Taliban is likely to be among the top priorities of the new government. The need for a political settlement with the insurgents has become all the more important given the impending drawdown of foreign forces from the region by the end of 2014 and persisting doubts about the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The military drawdown, likely to be accompanied by a similar waning of interest and financial commitment, also makes it imperative for the new leaders in Kabul to persuade regional countries like India, Iran and China to increase their engagement with Afghanistan. Among the neighbours, dealing with Pakistan and its policy towards Afghanistan is likely to be a formidable challenge for the new government. While all these problems confronted the previous regime in Kabul as well, President Ghani could face a possible new threat from within the government itself. As difficult as the other challenges may be, keeping the government together and maintaining a good working relationship between the President and the Chief Executive will likely prove to be an extremely onerous task. -
KBR 2020 Proxy Statement
TO OUR FOR MAKING ANYTHING POSSIBLE NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS AND PROXY STATEMENT Dear KBR, Inc. Stockholders, As I write this letter to you for our Proxy Statement, the world is in the middle of a global health crisis. The COVID-19 outbreak is an unprecedented event, and although this is a time of significant uncertainty, we are taking actions to support our people, their families and our customers. With operations in China and South Korea we had an early warning of the potential impact of the virus, and this allowed us to plan ahead and stress test our operations for remote working. I am humbled by the amazing efforts of our people around the globe who have pulled together, shared ideas and implemented best practices to continue to provide world-class service for our customers while also protecting their well-being and the health and safety of their colleagues. It is this can-do, people-centric and forward-thinking culture that makes KBR a great company to be part of. It is thus a great honor to share with you this special Proxy Statement, which marks the 100-year anniversary of our company, and to dedicate it to the people who made it possible — our incredible employees. It is remarkable to think of all they have accomplished throughout KBR’s history, beginning in the earliest days, when they worked with teams of wagons and mules to pave rural roads, to today, when they are helping NASA return to the moon and discover life beyond Earth. Over the past 100 years, KBR has grown into an innovative and dynamic global company, and I am proud to be a part of this journey. -
Migrationsverkets Novemberprognos 2014
Verksamhets- och kostnadsprognos November 2014 1 SVENSKT MEDBORGARSKAP Prognos Diarienummer Planering och styrning 2014‐11‐04 Dnr 1.1.3‐2014‐5644 Till Justitiedepartementet Verksamhets‐ och kostnadsprognos 2014‐11‐04 Migrationsverket ska redovisa anslagsprognoser för 2014–2018 vid fem tillfällen under året. Prognoserna lämnas i Hermes enligt instruktion från Ekonomistyrningsverket. Vid fyra tillfällen ska prognoserna kommenteras både i förhållande till föregående prognostillfälle och i förhållande till budgeten. Prognosen ska innehålla en analys av vilken verksamhet som kan bedrivas med tillgängliga medel och eventuella skillnader mellan tillgängliga medel och behov av medel ska förklaras. Migrationsverket ska lämna nödvändig information till och inhämta nödvändig information från samtliga berörda myndigheter för att kunna presentera en samlad analys. Prognoskommentarerna lämnas till Justitiedepartementet: Prognos 2 (P2‐14) 4 februari Prognos 3 (P3‐14) 24 april Prognos 4 (P4‐14) 24 juli Prognos 5 (P5‐14) 23 oktober 4 november Enligt regeringsbeslut den 16/10 flyttades tidpunkten för när myndigheterna ska lämna den sista prognosen för året till den 4 november 2014. Migrationsverkets prognos 2014‐11‐04 (P5‐14) 1(63) Innehållsförteckning. 1. Övergripande analys och slutsatser .............................................................................. 2 2. Migrationen till Sverige under prognosperioden ........................................................... 6 2.1 Prognos nya asylsökande 2014‐2015 ......................................................................................... -
Common Afghans‟, a Useful Construct for Achieving Results in Afghanistan
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 1 No. 6; June2011 „Common Afghans‟, A useful construct for achieving results in Afghanistan Fahim Youssofzai Associate Professor (Strategic Management) Department of Business Administration, RMC/CMR P.O. Box: 17000, Stn. Forces Kingston, Ontario, K7K 7B4, Canada E-mail: [email protected], Phone: (613) 541 6000 Abstract Considering the seemingly perpetual problems in Afghanistan, this paper defines a new construct – the Common Afghans – and argues why it should be considered in strategic reflections and actions related to stability of this country. It tries to show that part of ill-performance in comes from the fact that the contributions of an important stakeholder “the Common Afghans” are ignored in the processes undertaken by international stakeholders in this country since 2002. It argues why considering the notion “Common Afghans” is helpful for achieving concrete results related to different initiatives undertaken in Afghanistan, by different stakeholders. Key words: Afghanistan, Common Afghans, Accurate unit of analysis, Policies, Strategies 1. Introduction Afghanistan looks to be in perpetual turmoil. In a recent desperate reflection, Robert Blackwill, a former official in the Bush administration and former US ambassador to India suggests partition of Afghanistan since the US cannot win war in this county (POLITICO, 2010). On same mood, Jack Wheeler defines Afghanistan as “...a problem, not a real country…”. According to Wheeler, “…the solution to the problem is not a futile effort of “nation-building” – that effort is doomed to fail – it is nation-building‟s opposite: get rid of the problem by getting rid of the country…” (Wheeler, 2010). -
Sun Yat Sen Memorialized in Macau and China, Neglected in HK
CTM REPORTS SLIGHT MEAT BAN CONFIRMED PROFIT DECREASE MACAU A spokesman for China’s The company’s CEO said TO HOST commerce ministry confirmed yesterday that an objective for SUPERMODEL yesterday the ban on imports 2017 is “to reach close to a full SHOW of Brazilian beef to the 4G customer base” country P2 P6 P7 FRI.24 Mar 2017 T. 19º/ 24º C H. 70/ 98% facebook.com/mdtimes + 11,000 MOP 7.50 2770 N.º HKD 9.50 FOUNDER & PUBLISHER Kowie Geldenhuys EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Paulo Coutinho www.macaudailytimes.com.mo “ THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ ” WORLD BRIEFS Perpetrator IDENTIFIED AP PHOTO IS claims responsibility SINGAPORE-VIETNAM Vietnam and Singapore signed several business P15 agreements yesterday during for London attack a visit by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong aimed at boosting the island state’s investment and trade with the communist country. Singapore, one of Vietnam’s top investors and trading partners, hopes to step up investments in the country, Lee said. More on p12 AP PHOTO INDONESIA About 50 farmers and activists opposed to a cement factory in Indonesia’s Central Java province have encased their feet in concrete during a dayslong protest in Jakarta, the capital. Farmers in the village of Kendeng have battled against plans for the factory for years, saying it could taint their water. JAPAN Prime Minister Shinzo Abe donated 1 million yen (USD9,000) through his wife to a school run by a group of ultranationalist educators, the group’s leader told Parliament yesterday, while also suggesting there was “political influence” in a land- buying scandal involving the HERITAGE school. -
Houston, We Still Have a Problem
HOUSTON, WE STILL HAVE A PROBLEM AN ALTERNATIVE ANNUAL REPORT ON HALLIBURTON, MAY 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. MILITARY CONTRACTS III. OIL & GAS CONTRACTS IV. ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS AGAINST HALLIBURTON V. CORPORATE WELFARE & POLITICAL CONNECTIONS VI. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS COVER: An Iraqi National Guard stands next to a burning US Army supply truck in the outskirts of Balad, Iraq. October 14, 2004. Photo by Asaad Muhsin, Associated Press HOUSTON, WE HAVE A PROBLEM HOUSTON, WE STILL HAVE A PROBLEM In the introduction to Halliburton’s 2004 annual report, chief executive officer David Lesar reports to Halliburton’s shareholders that despite the extreme adversity of 2004, including asbestos claims, dangerous work in Iraq, and the negative attention that sur- rounded the company during the U.S. presidential campaign, Halliburton emerged “stronger than ever.” Revenue and operating income have increased, and over a third of that revenue, an estimated $7.1 billion, was from U.S. government contracts in Iraq. In a photo alongside Lesar’s letter to the shareholders, he From the seat of the company’s legal representatives, the view smiles from a plush chair in what looks like a comfortable is of stacks of paperwork piling up as investigator after investi- office. He ends the letter, “From my seat, I like what I see.” gator demands documents from Halliburton regarding every- thing from possible bribery in Nigeria to over-billing and kick- People sitting in other seats, in Halliburton’s workplaces backs in Iraq. The company is currently being pursued by the around the world, lend a different view of the company, which continues to be one of the most controversial corporations in U.S. -
Afghanistan Orbats
Coalition Combat Forces in Afghanistan AFGHANISTAN ORDER OF BATTLE by Wesley Morgan January 2013 This document describes the composition and placement of U.S. and other Western combat forces in Afghanistan down to battalion level. It includes the following categories of units: maneuver (i.e. infantry, armor, and cavalry) units, which in most cases are responsible for particular districts or provinces; artillery units, including both those acting as provisional maneuver units and those in traditional artillery roles; aviation units, both rotary and fixed-wing; military police units; most types of engineer and explosive ordnance disposal units; and “white” special operations forces, described in general terms. It does not include “black” special operations units or other units such as logistical, transportation, medical, and intelligence units or Provincial Reconstruction Teams. International Security Assistance Force / United States ForcesAfghanistan (Gen. John Allen, USMC)ISAF Headquarters, Kabul Special Operations Joint Task ForceAfghanistan / NATO Special Operations Component CommandAfghanistan (Maj. Gen. Raymond Thomas III, USA)Camp Integrity, Kabul1 Combined Joint Special Operations Task ForceAfghanistan (USA)Bagram Airfield; village stability operations, advisors to Afghan Defense Ministry special operations forces, and other missions2 Special Operations Task ForceEast (USA)Bagram Airfield; operating in eastern Afghanistan Special Operations Task ForceSouth (USA)Kandahar Airfield; operating in Kandahar Province Special Operations Task ForceSouth-East (USN)U/I location; operating in Uruzgan and Zabul Provinces Special Operations Task ForceWest (USMC)Camp Lawton, Herat; operating in western Afghanistan and Helmand Province TF Balkh / 2-7 Infantry (Lt. Col. Todd Kelly, USA)Camp Mike Spann, Mazar-e-Sharif; operating in northern Afghanistan 3 TF Paktika / 3-69 Armor (Lt. -
Recent Military Fatalities in Afghanistan and Iraq by Cause And
Recent military fatalities in Afghanistan by cause and nationality: (PERIOD 20 SHORT REPORT ~ 23 December 2013 to 11 May 2014; posted on 19 May 2014) Sheila M. Bird, MRC Biostatistics Unit, CAMBRIDGE CB2 0SR Memo: A surge of 30,000 US troops was deployed to Afghanistan to facilitate Operation Moshtarak, which began in 2010. By PERIOD 11b through to PERIOD 16, US deployment was at least 90,000. In June 2011, towards the end of PERIOD 14a, US President Obama announced the start of draw-down of US troops – an initial 5,000 to 10,000 in 2011. By the end of September 2012, US deployment to Afghanistan had reverted to around 68,000; and was around 47,000 by the end of PERIOD 20. Canadian troops had no combat role after 2011. Withdrawal of French troops was to begin in July 2012 and be completed by the end of 2012. UK troops had reduced to 9,500 by early 2012, and to 9,000 by the end of 2012. At 1 August 2013, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops numbered 87,200 and Afghan National Army (ANA) troops 187,000. The UK contingent had reduced to 7,700 and US troop-deployment was 60,000. By the end of PERIOD 20, UK troops numbered 5,200 among around 75,000 ISAF troops. In September 2012, six US Harrier strike aircraft, whose replacement cost is $30 millions each, were destroyed and two others seriously damaged in a Taliban attack on Camp Bastion which claimed the lives of two US personnel. -
Eagle's Summit Revisited
Noah Arjomand Eagle’s Summit Revisited Decision-Making in the Kajaki Dam Refurbishment Project EXECUTIVE SUMMARY and the British military to show their mettle to a dominant US Department of Defense. The turbine The USAID-led effort to install an additional thus took on significance beyond the actual 18.5 hydroelectric turbine at the Kajaki Dam power megawatts of electricity that it was to provide, station in northern Helmand has been among the especially bearing in mind that this would, in fact, most costly development projects in Afghanistan put only a small dent in the ever-increasing since 2001, yet nearly eight years after the demand for electricity from southern Afghanistan’s contract was signed for its installation, the turbine cities. And so, this paper argues, the transport remains offline. Of particular note in the saga was operation went forward not because it was in a large-scale British-led military transport some objectively logical sense the best way to operation that brought parts for the turbine to the serve the war effort at the time, but because it dam by force in summer 2008. This paper revisits served the particular interests of the organizations that operation, seeking to explain why, despite that championed it. widely recognized warning signs that the turbine would not be producing electricity for destination 1. INTRODUCTION cities in the foreseeable future and at a time when insurgency was raging and British troops were In summer 2008, in what was hailed as the largest spread thin in Helmand, the decision was made to 1 British-led ‘route clearance operation’ since World devote enormous military resources to War II, nearly 5,000 International Security and transporting the turbine to the dam. -
The Silent Revolution Within NATO Logistics: a Study in Afghanistan Fuel and Future Applications
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2012-12 The silent revolution within NATO logistics: a study in Afghanistan fuel and future applications Evans, Michael J. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/27827 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS THE SILENT REVOLUTION WITHIN NATO LOGISTICS: A STUDY IN AFGHANISTAN FUEL AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS by Michael J. Evans and Stephen W. Masternak December 2012 Thesis Co-Advisors: Keenan Yoho E. Cory Yoder Second Readers Brian Greenshields and Frank Giordano Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED December 2012 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS THE SILENT REVOLUTION WITHIN NATO LOGISTICS: A STUDY IN AFGHANISTAN FUEL AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS 6. AUTHOR(S) Michael J. Evans and Stephen W. Masternak 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8.