Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs May 20, 2013 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL30588 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Summary The United States and its partner countries are reducing military involvement in Afghanistan in preparation to end the current international security mission by the end of 2014. As agreed by President Obama and Afghan President Karzai, and announced January 11, 2013, Afghan forces will assume the security lead nationwide during the spring of 2013 and U.S. forces will move to a support role. The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in June 2011, was reduced to a “pre-surge” level of about 66,000 as of September 20, 2012. An additional 34,000 will leave by February 2014, but the bulk of that drawdown will take place in late 2013- early 2014. The size of the international force that will remain in Afghanistan after 2014 is to be announced later in May or in June 2013, with options narrowing to 8,000 – 12,000, of which the majority would be U.S. forces. The primary mission will be to train the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), but some international forces will engage in counter-terrorism missions as well. The U.S. troops that remain after 2014 would do so under a U.S.-Afghanistan security agreement that is under negotiation. Still, fearing instability after 2014, some key ethnic and political faction leaders are preparing to revive their militia forces should the international drawdown lead to a major Taliban push to retake power. The Administration remains concerned that Afghan stability after 2014 is at risk from weak and corrupt Afghan governance and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. Among efforts to promote effective and transparent Afghan governance, U.S. officials are pushing for substantial election reform to ensure that the next presidential election, scheduled for April 5, 2014, will be devoid of the fraud that plagued Afghanistan’s elections in 2009 and 2010. An unexpected potential benefit to stability could come from a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Negotiations have proceeded sporadically since early 2010, but informal discussions have continued and even evolved into exchanges of specific proposals. Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups fear that a settlement might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights and ethnic power-sharing. The United States and other donors continue to implement various development projects— particularly those for water, power, and roads. To prevent a severe economic downturn as international donors scale back their involvement, U.S. officials assert that Afghanistan might be able to exploit vast mineral and agricultural resources, as well as its potentially significant hydrocarbon resources. U.S. officials also seek greater Afghan integration into regional trade and investment patterns. Persuading Afghanistan’s neighbors to support Afghanistan’s stability instead of their own particular interests has been a focus of U.S. policy since 2009, but with mixed success. Even if these economic efforts succeed, Afghanistan will likely remain dependent on foreign aid indefinitely. Through the end of FY2012, the United States has provided nearly $83 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $51 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. About $9.7 billion in aid, including ANSF training, is being provided in FY2013 and the economic aid request for FY2014 is over $2.1 billion (excluding train and equip funding). As announced in the context of the July 8, 2012, Tokyo donors’ conference, Administration economic aid requests for Afghanistan are likely to continue at current levels through at least FY2017. See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Contents Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1 th From Early History to the 19 Century ..................................................................................... 1 th Early 20 Century and Cold War Era ........................................................................................ 1 Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period ..................................................................................... 2 The Seven Major “Mujahedin” Parties and Their Activities ............................................... 3 Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal ........................................................................ 3 The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban ................................................................ 4 Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001) ...................................................................... 5 U.S. Policy Toward the Taliban During Its Rule/Bin Laden Presence ................................ 5 The “Northern Alliance” Congeals...................................................................................... 6 Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 ................................................................................................. 7 September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom ................................................... 8 Post-Taliban Governance-Building Efforts ............................................................................... 9 U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure ............................................................... 11 Security Policy: Transition, and Beyond ....................................................................................... 12 Who Is “The Enemy”? Taliban, Haqqani, Al Qaeda, and Others ............................................ 13 Groups: The Taliban/“Quetta Shura Taliban”(QST) ......................................................... 13 Al Qaeda/Bin Laden .......................................................................................................... 13 Hikmatyar Faction (HIG) .................................................................................................. 14 Haqqani Faction ................................................................................................................ 15 Pakistani Groups ............................................................................................................... 16 Insurgent Tactics ................................................................................................................ 17 Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods ....................................... 17 The U.S.-Led Military Effort: 2001-2008 ............................................................................... 18 Obama Administration Surge .................................................................................................. 19 McChrystal Assessment and December 1, 2009, Surge Announcement ........................... 19 Progress of the Transition and Drawdown .............................................................................. 21 Surge Results/Current Security Assessments .................................................................... 22 Beyond 2014: Likely Outcomes and Size of Residual Force .................................................. 24 Likely Size and Structure of Post-2014 Force ................................................................... 24 Strategic Partnership Agreement ....................................................................................... 26 Transition Pillar: Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of Law .............................. 28 Current and Post-2014 Size of the Force........................................................................... 29 ANSF Funding .................................................................................................................. 29 The Afghan National Army (ANA) ................................................................................... 30 Afghan Air Force ............................................................................................................... 32 Afghan National Police (ANP) ......................................................................................... 32 Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector................................................................................. 36 Policy Component: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ................................................ 36 Cooperation With Allies/Managing the 2014 Exit................................................................... 37 Major Contingent Developments During the U.S. “Surge” .............................................. 38 Potential Positives: Reintegration and Reconciliation With Insurgents .................................. 39 Regional Dimension ...................................................................................................................... 43 Pakistan/Pakistan-Afghanistan Border .................................................................................... 46 Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) ................................................ 47 U.S.-Pakistani