Contents EDITORIAL, POLITICAL ANALYSIS, 3 a Quarterly Publication of MILITARY REPORT
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AECHAN JEHAD Contents EDITORIAL, POLITICAL ANALYSIS, 3 A Quarterly Publication of MILITARY REPORT, The Cultural Council of Grand table of Afghanwar casualties Afghanistan Resistance (April -June, 1988) Afghans and the Geneva accordon Afghanistan 14 MANAGING EDITOR: ® MAJOR DOCUMENTS: 21 Sabahuddin Kushkaki 1. Text of charter for mujaheddin transitional April-June, 1908 government; (2) Text of Geneva accord on Afghan- istan; (3) IUAM and the Geneva accord; (4) Muja- SUBSCRIPTION heddin offer general amnesty; (5) IUAM President urges trial for PDPA high brass; (6) Biographies Per Six Annual of IUAM transitional cabinet; (7) Biographies of copy months three IUAM leaders; (8) Charters of the IUAM Pakistaa organizations; (9) Annual report of Amnesty In- (Ra.) 30 60 110 ternational on Afghanistan, Foreign AFUHANISTAN IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS: (s) 6 12 30 1« Islamabad Conference on Afghan future 2. Karachi Islamic meeting 3. Paris Conference: Afghan Agriculture Cultural Council of Afghanist- 0 IRC Survey on health in Afghan refugeecamps.97 Resistance CATALOGUE OF MUJAHEDDIN PRESS House No.8861 St. No. 27, G /9 -1 99 103 Islamabad, Pakistan 0 DIGEST OF MUJAHEDDIN PRESS Telephone 853797 (APRIL-JUNE 1988) ® BOOKS BY THE MUJAHEDDIN, FOR THE 164 MUJAHEDDIN 0 CHRONOLOGY OF AFGHAN EVENTS 168 (APRIL-JUNE 1988) 0 AFGHAN ISSUES COVERAGE: 318 By Radio Kabul, Radio Moscow (April -June, 1988) 0 MAPS 319 -320 0 ABBREVIATIONSLIST 321 FROM MUJAHEDDIN PUBLICATIONS MA Juiacst-- April -June, 19 88 Vol.1, No.4 AFGHAN JEHAD Editorial Q o c':. NC(° IN ME NAME OF GOD, MOST GRACICJUS, MOST MERCI.FU AFTER GENEVA Now that the Russian troops are on than way out from Afghanistan,' the focus on the Afghanistan issue is on two subjects; the nature of government in Kabul and finding a channel for the huge humanitarian assistance which the international community has indicated will provide to the war,ravaged Afghan- istan after the Soviet. troops withdrawal. There are-no indicationsso far how these two issues are going to bè tackled. The puppet government in Kabulcorms siders itself as the legal government of Afghanistan andsays it is ready to embrace what it calls the opposition withina coalition, a posture flatly re-' jected by the mujaheddin. The mujaheddini position has been that their jehad had actua1ly begun against the Kabul atheist regime which had capturedpower at Soviet instigation in 1978 and itwas a result of a national jehad for the toppling of this very government that the Russians invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Not only did they invade Afghanistan but the government which isnow in power in Kabul was installed by the occupation forces. The Najib government is a successor of that very government. Therefore this government should also be dismantled along with the withdrawal of Soviet forces. As regards the distribution of the economic assistance to the people of Afghanistan, one should say that,before tackling that problem, the situa- tion should be made conducive for. five million refugees from neighbouring countries and another two million from the Afghan cities to return. The refu- gees are not going to return to the 'country until there is a peaceful atmos- phere and a government of their choice is installed. The Afghan mujaheddin have vowed not to stop war until they dismantle the Kabul.puppet regime. Therefore, there is not going to be peace in Afghanistan in the immediate future and no refugees will return. This vicious circle would only end if re- alismandtactfulness is heeded. This realism and tactfulness will also lead to a just and honorable solution'of the Afghanistan problem. The Russians 3 April -June, 1988 aEGNaNJENaD VOL. 1,No.4 have to come to the point to realize that the government installed by them in Kabul is not supported by the overwhelming majority of the people of Afghan- istan and this will not lead to a situation which the Kremlin is claiming to be trying to achieve, i.e. a peaceful, independent andnon -aligned Afghanis - tan, friendly to Moscow. The mujaheddin have also to make some hard choices. They have either to seek a peaceful solution acceptingsome kind of compromise government or work a decisive strategy - - entailing the speedy fall of the Kabul regime witha minimum of casualties. The kind of scenario projected by the UN mediatoron Afghanistan Diego Cordovez in which various Afghan factions- - including the PUPA - - are to share power is not only not practical and-rill not lead to peace but is rejected by all other Afghan groups including the forcesthat are considered in the Afghan scene as "liberals." Thevery idea of a coalition with the communists - - those who are to the overwhelming majority of our people traitors- - is not only repugnant to us, but such a government will not be practicalas well. The most urgent question in the mind of the Russians ought to bethe emergence of a system in Afghanistan which will live with it inpeace and har- mony. If it tries'to sustain a Marxist regime- - no matter under what guise- - it contradicts the very claim it makes. For a communistregime will not be able to maintain peace in the country but it will further theAfghan anti - Russian sentiments. The Afghanistan mujaheddin, represented in the framework of theIUAM, had proposed a government comprised of the mujaheddin themselves,the Afghan refugees and the Afghan Muslims who now live inside the country.Although only recently the IUAM came out with a list of twelvecabinet members for its in- terim government, the Afghan nation expects it to reallymove fast and come out with a complete government list showing that it hasbroadened its bases. Although, according to a mujaheddin new plan, electionsare to tie held until mid - October to convene a council to also ratify theinterim government, the fact is that this interim government has to be formed in itsentirety and ought to be assigned with specific tasks. In case there isa peaceful solution of the remaining of the Afghanistan issue- - i.e. there'is an agreement on the establishment` of a mujaheddin supportedgovernment in Kabul - - this govern- 4 April -June, 1988 OMAN JENAD VOL. 1,No.4 ment ought to tackle four main issues: (1) maintain law and order; (2) pave the way fòr the return and repatriation of the refugees;(3) rebuildsome of the essential infrastructure of the economy and(k) hold general elections to be . held in a peaceful Afghanistan throughout the country and draft a constitution to be approved by the first elected parliament convened on the basis of a na- tion -wide elections in a peaceful Afghanistan. The mujaheddin proposed interim government, in addition to being closely associated with the commanders inside the country, ought to be very much in a position to tackle the immediate problems of economic revival of the country at least to the point of pre -1978. The second scenario calls for a master military plan which will require coordination of all military forces of the mujaheddin.The biggest stumbling block in the implementation of an allout military plan, after the Soviet withdrawal and in case the mujaheddin are determined to embark upon a war of the cities, is the fear about civilian casualties. In order to minimize civilian casualties, the Kabul regime has to be dismantled both from the outside and from the within. Dis- mantling it from the outside would require coordinated, united and joint military action. And dismantling it from the within requires utmost resort to psychological warfare prompting the civilian population to also bring about the fall of the regime by any method, fall short of wasting innocent lives. These are trying times for the Afghan nation. The socalled Geneva peace accord has proved to be no more than a mockery, for through it the Russians are now been left,free to achieve what they failed to get on the battle front: the establishment of a puppet regime in Kabul suceptible to Kremlin dictates. The Afghans are resolved not to allow the Russians to get away with this. But the Afghans, in order to undo and frustrate this Kremlin strategy, should do a lot of homework. We should move fast but prudently. We should not hestitate in imple- menting our plans just because it might deprive this or that interest from a share in the power. For as long as we are stead -fastly moving towards our ulti- mate goal -- - the establishment of the government of God in Afghanistan - - we are safe. In summary we should demonstrate clearly and in black and white termsthat we have gone as far as Islam - - the religion of_ peace, justice and fairness - - has allowed us to seek a peaceful and honorable settlement of the remaining of the Afghanistan issue. But if the other side does not heed, we have to inflict decisive blows to it to bring a fall of the regime at the earliest. 5 Vól.1,No. 4. April-June, 19e8 AIRMAN JEHAD Political Dimensions TOPPLING KABUL REGIME, RESETTLEMENT, TOP AFGHAN EVENTS Drive for Capturing Courtrysitle Accelerates After the signing of the Geneva accord 14 April,the pace of international developments in regard to solving another crucial aspect of the Afghanistan - - the formation of an interim govern- ment - - issue slowed down. The Russians began their troops pullout from Afghanistan 15 May as envisaged in the accord and the UN monitoring teams went to Afghanistan and Pakistan to observe primarily the troops withdrawal from Afghanistan and non -interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Russians officially made it known that they lost more than 13,500 of their men in the Afghan war since their invasion December 27, 1979. They had more than 35,000 in- jured and more than 300 un- accounted for.The Kremlin and its Kabul puppets launched an international drive to obtain the release of Russian prisoners with the mujaheddin.