Challenges in the East V90

Preliminary and background studies Challenges in the East V90 1. Rupnik 1995 I?Hassner M. Tatu M.C. Brands and R. Havenaar Sdu Uitgeverij Plantijnstraat, The Hague, 1995 Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy CIP-GEGEVENS KONINKLIJKE BIBLIOTHEEK, DEN HAAG Challenges Challenges in the East 1 J. Rupnik, P. Hassner, M. Tatu, M.C. Brands and R. Havenaar. - The Hague : Sdu Uitgeverij Plantijnstraat. - (Preliminary and Background Studies I Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, ISSN 0169-5688 ; V 90) ISBN 90-399-0899-0 Trefw.: vrede en veiligheid ; Europa. Preface One of the most daunting challenges of Europe in the immediate future is to overcome the consequences of the unnatural division of Western and Eastern Europe in separate geopolitical spheres, without relapsing into older, historical patterns of division between East and West. In preparation of its report 'Stabiliteit en veiligheid in Europa' to the government on Dutch foreign policy in coming years, the Scientific Council has commissioned a number of studies and analyses on developments in Eastern and Central Europe that are inclu- ded in the present publication. A discussion on the future of Europe without due regard to developments in Russia is unthinkable. This aspect is covered by an analysis on future developments in Russia by Michel Tatu, a well-known expert in this field. Two studies deal with the situation and developments in Central Europe and the Balkans. Jacques Rupnik, author of 'The other Europe', provided us with a lucid analysis of the political situation in Central Europe and its implications for the European Union. Pierre Hassner contributed an analysis of the most complex region of Europe, the Balkans. Finally a Dutch contribution deals with Germany, a country that will play a central role in bringing about a new political configuration of post-Cold War Europe. J.P.H. Donner M.C. Brands Chairman Scientific Council Advisory Member WRR for Government Policy (WRR) CHALLENGES IN THE EAST PRELIMINARY AND BACKGROUND STUDIES Contents Preface 3 1. The implications of changes in East-Central Europe for European integration 7 J. Rupnik 2. The European Union and the Balkans P. Hassner 3. Russia and the world M. Tatu 4. De centrale plaats van Duitsland in de Europese politick; Bindende kracht of bron van divergentie? 85 M.C. Brands and R. Havenaar CHALLENGES IN THE EAST PRELIMINARY AND BACKGROUND STUDIES The implications of changes in East-Central Europe for European Integration J. Rupnik CHALLENGES IN THE EAST PRELIMINARY AND BACKGROUND STUDIES Contents Introduction A new map of Europe and the limits of integration Transitions and EU differentiation policies Central European (CE) cooperation versus fragmentation Western policies and the implications of EU enlargement The American approach Western European dilemma's The Franco-German relationship and EU enlargement Conclusions CHALLENGES IN THE EAST PRELIMINARY AND BACKGROUND STUDIES I. I Introduction The changes associated with the collapse of the Soviet empire are of a magni- tude similar to those of 1919 or 1945. With one major difference: this time there was no war and therefore no victorious power ready or willing to impose a new international order. The victor was not a single power but rather the Western model of liberal democracy and of a market economy whose very exis- tence contributed to the erosion and eventual collapse of the communist system. The EEC served as a 'magnet' for the nations of East-Central Europe before and after 1989. No less importantly, the Cold War structure no longer provides cohesion and a sense of purpose to the European Union (as well as the Atlantic Alliance) which often makes it necessary to speak about Western European policies in the plural: differences of perception, of priorities or emp- hasis appear not just between the United States and its allies but among the countries of the European Union in dealing with the 'other Europe'. The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War has brought about an entirely new situation not just for the Eastern part of the continent. Both early hopes for a rapid democratic unification of Europe from West to East or attempts to continue Western European integration as 'business as usual' have now faded. Five years after the Berlin Wall came down it became appa- rent to proponents of both views that the peaceful collapse of the communist empire was not an 'event' with a beginning and an end (November 1989: fall of the Berlin Wall - December 1991: dissolution of the Soviet Union) but a historical process which will take years, probably decades to settle down. It brings to the fore new political, economic, and military actors, as well as new regional alignments in a context of fragmentation of the European strategic space. The key European dilemma at the end of the 20th century is someti- mes formulated in terms of fragmentation versus integration. Rather, it should be put as follows: the geopolitical centre of gravity of the continent has shifted eastward (towards the centre of Europe) while the institutional centre of gravity has shifted West: after the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and of Comecon, NATO and the European Union are 'the only game in town'. Central Europe is where this contradiction is most deeply felt today. Hence the question behind any discussion of EU enlargement: is Central Europe the central auestion of Euro~e?And what kind of EU will be needed to face the challenges posed by diverging trends in what used to be post-communist Europe? The answer to some of these questions will require an examination of the fol- lowing issues: 1, the new post-Soviet geography and its implications for the EU; 2, the transition and differentiation process in Eastern Central Europe and its impact on EU integration prospects; 3, Central European fragrnenta- tion andlor cooperation: a bridge or an alternative to the EU?; 4, Western policies towards Central and Eastern Europe and the implications of enlargement for the EU. 1.2 A new map of Europe and the limits of integration Old and new dividing lines. The end of the bipolar system in Europe has brought about a new political and economic geography of Europe which some- times revives older historical patterns, but also new regional groupings that challenge existing borders. If it can be difficult to speak about the West, it has become almost irrelevant to speak of Eastern Europe. At best the word can be used to describe Russia (possibly also for Ukraine and Belarus). Central Europe is back even if its contours still remain unclear. In the 1980s it used to be a cultural phenomenon mixing nostalgia for the Austro-Hungarian past with the hope of overcoming existing ideological and political-military boun- daries. Today it is becoming a geopolitical reality with three possible versions: CHALLENGES IN THE EAST a historical/cultural 'Habsburg' definition of Central Europe; a contemporary definition based on recent regional cooperation attempts such as the Visegrad group or the Pentagonale; and a broader definition, more flexible and opti- mistic about the future, stretching from the Baltic countries (whose period of Sovietisation was only five years longer than that of Poland) to the Adriatic coast. In all three cases a crucially important issue will be the nature and extent of German influence in the reshaping of Central Europe. A negative component in the self-definition of Central Europe is the desire to insulate itself from the return of great power ambitions in Russia and from the spill- over of nationalist conflicts in the Balkans. The Balkan question has returned with a vengeance. Besides the threat of extension of the war in former Yugoslavia there is, as the conflict drags on, the tendency among its protagonists to position themselves vis-a-vis traditional major powers in the area: Austro-German support for the Northwestern Catholic axis (Croatia), Russia's return to the Balkans through the Southeastern orthodox axis (Belgrade-Athens with an ongoing rapproche- ment with Bucharest and Sofia), Turkey's revived role through the backing of Muslim minorities (Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania) but also through the redis- covery of a formerly Ottoman space stretching from the Balkans and the Black Sea area to Central Asia or as the late Prime Minister Demirel put it (in 1992), at the risk of overstretch, 'from the shores of the Adriatic to China' ... This is where old historical divides catch-up with new geopolitical trends. When one looks at a prospective map drawn by geographers trying to identify the most likely 'reconnection zones' between ex-communist countries and the European Union according to socio-economic criteria (industrialisation, urba- nisation, networks of communication) one is struck by the overlap with the map of Europe before 1914 and to some extent with the divide between Eastern and Western Christendom. If one adds to it the first balance sheet of five years since the collapse of communism, one can identify a 'Habsburg' fac- tor in the transition to democracy and a market economy. As to the old question about the connections between cultural and religious 'deep structures' and the prospects for democratidmarket oriented change one has to update Max Weber's thesis about the 'protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism' at least in one important respect: the contrast is not between Catholic and Protestant societies but between Western Christendom and the Orthodox Church: not just the religiously lukewarm and mixed (Protestant and Catholic) Czechs or Hungarians are doing well, Catholic Poles show sur- prising capacity for entrepreneurship and adaptation to the market economy; this in contrast to Orthodoxy combined with nationalism, economic back- wardness, and reluctance to adopt market-oriented change (reliance on the state) in the Balkans and in the Slavic peoples of the former Soviet Union.

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