Behind PESCO the Past and Future…

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Behind PESCO The past and future…

AN EXPERTISE FORUM CONTRIBUTING TO EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTING TO FORUM AN EXPERTISE SINCE 1953 ARMIES INTEROPERABILITY European Army Interoperability Center This text was drawn up with the help of Mrs. Giorgia Cervellati, member of the Finabel research team, under the supervision and guidance of the Head of the Permanent Secretariat. This Food for Thought paper is a docu- ment that gives an initial reflection on the theme. The content is not reflecting the positions of the member states, but consists of elements that can initiate and feed the discussions and analyses in the domain of the theme. It was drafted by the Permanent Secretariat of Finabel.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 3

Historical Overview 5 - The long history of PESCO: from Lisbon to 2017 5 - Why do we need a European Security and Defence Union? 6

PESCO in Detail 8 - PESCO’s Governance: Who are the Actors? 8 - The Commitments 9 Impact of the Commitments on Land Forces 11 - Projects 12 Impact of the Projects on the Land Forces 16 - Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) 17

The Economic Side of Defence 19 - The European Defence Fund (EDF): What is it? 20 - European Defence Fund and PESCO 22

What is the Future for PESCO? 24

Conclusion 26 Bibliography 27

Behind PESCO 2 INTRODUCTION

After a long period of wars that devastated 2014: “I also believe that we need to work on Europe for the first half of the 20th century, a stronger Europe when it comes to security Europeans were inspired by a vision of lasting and defence matters. Yes, Europe is chiefly a peace. More than 70 years later, Europe has ‘soft power’. But even the strongest soft pow- experienced the longest period of peace in its ers cannot make do in the long run without troubled history. at least some integrated defence capabilities.1”

It was under his presidency that European defence has started to gain importance. In his 2016 State of the Union address, he called for a Europe that protects and defends, at home and abroad. It was in that year that the idea of the Permanent Structured Coop- eration (PESCO) began, awakening the so called “sleeping beauty of the Lisbon Treaty”. In December 2016, the European Council called for work on the elements and options Figure 1 for an inclusive PESCO based on a modular approach and outlining possible projects. Despite this, the world is facing new challeng- The year 2017 represented a crucial year for es and threats. On a European level, as well as PESCO, ending with its ratification by 23 on a global level, tensions are rising and na- Member States in November and its estab- tions face challenges stemming from econom- lishment, by Council decision, in December ic, environmental and technological drivers. with 25 participants. Only the UK, Denmark Peace and security can no longer be taken for and Malta have opted not to take part in any granted and the threats Europe is facing does current projects. not respect national borders. Consequently, for the EU the best approach is to work to- PESCO could be the vehicle needed to move gether to prevent and tackle such issues, even EU defence cooperation to a higher level. It if the deployment of security and armed forc- introduced something completely different es remains in the hands of Member States. from the past, with a series of binding commitments, numerous projects and a way to as- European citizen concerns cannot be denied, sess Member States performance that will give with security becoming the number one pri- an added-value to this initiative, as it com- ority. The European Union and its Member bines carrot-and-stick enforcement measures. States have a duty and responsibility to protect its citizens and promote European inter- The aim of this paper is to underline the dif- ests and values. Citizens look to the EU for ferent features of the Permanent Structured protection, demanding to feel safe and secure Cooperation, considering the 20 commit- in Europe. As stated by Jean-Claude Junker, ments that characterize the initiative and the President of the European Commission, in first batch of 17 projects that were approved

1 Jean-Claude Junker, President of the European Commission, Political Guidelines for the European Commission, 15 July 2014.

Behind PESCO 3 on the 6th of March 2018. Close to another initiated in March 2018, stressing their im- two dozen were added on the 19th of Novem- portance, and the possible improvements in ber 2018. In analysing these aspects, particu- the future and how PESCO could be con- lar attention is devoted to the impact of such sidered to be a success in this aspect. The initiatives on Land Forces, underlining the focus will be placed on the impact of such way in which PESCO can improve their co- projects on Land Forces and consequently operation and interoperability. Focus should on Finabel Member States. Which of them also be placed on the economic aspect of the could be an achievement and in which way? initiative. This is a crucial aspect for both the The fourth and last paragraph is devoted to European institutions, the Member States and an explanation of the Coordinated Annual the national companies which deal with de- Review on Defence (CARD), underlining fence. The aim is to show that the Permanent its objectives and its close relationship with Structured Cooperation, taken together with PESCO. the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence • The third chapter goes in depth into the (CARD) and the European Defence Fund economic side of defence. It analyses at first (EDF), could represent a big step forward for why, from a financial point of view, there is European defence and security issues and that the need for more cooperation. The focus is it is important to continue its development in then shifted to the European Defence Fund the coming months and years. (EDF), explaining what it is, how it works and its relationship with PESCO. It under- This paper is organised as follows: lines how the EDF can incentivise Member States to develop and participate in projects • The first chapter shows an historical over- within PESCO’s framework. view of PESCO, underlining PESCO’s • The fourth and last chapter is devoted to slow start, from its entry into force with the the future of PESCO. It considers the varia- Lisbon Treaty in 2009 until its establish- bles to make PESCO a success and it opens ment in December 2017. The second par- some questions on the possible develop- agraph examines the reasons why we need ments of this new initiative. a European Security and Defence Union, placing emphasis on the structural and enabling factors that led the EU to concentrate its efforts on defence and security issues. • The Second chapter goes in depth inside PESCO. The first paragraph points out the different actors involved in PESCO initiative, with an explanation of the different tasks and responsibilities. The second paragraph is devoted to the analysis of the 20 commitments decided by Member States, as well as some possible future improvements in this regard. It then focuses on the impact of these commitments on Land Forces (LF), underlining which of them can improve LF capabilities and cooperation between Member States’ armies. The third paragraph analyses the 17 projects that were

Behind PESCO 4 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The long history of PESCO: from Lisbon to 2017

The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PE- felt the urgency of launching PESCO. The SCO) first appeared in the European Union sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, which in 2007 with the signature of the Lisbon Trea- dominated the European political context in ty, entering into force in 2009. Article 42.6 of those years, brought the EU to concentrate all the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) stat- its efforts on economic policies, leaving the ed that “those Member States whose military permanent structured cooperation aside. capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to The turning point for the “awakening” of one another in this area with a view to the PESCO started in 2014. The Russia’s sei- most demanding missions shall establish per- zure of Crimea in 2014, the terrorist attacks manent structured cooperation within the on European soil by Islamist fundamentalist Union framework”2. The details of such co- groups, the migration crisis, the ‘Brexit’ ref- operation are established in article 46 of the erendum in the UK, and the election of Don- same Treaty, regulating the creation of the ald Trump in the US with a consequent shift permanent structured cooperation, the acces- in US foreign and defence policy, all worked sion of Member States, and the formulation to contribute to an increased awareness that of the commitments in respect to Member Europe needs to tackle security and defence States. more seriously than before.

The objectives of PESCO laid out in Proto- In 2016, the High Representative of the Un- col 10 (TEU) states that the participating ion for Foreign and Security Policy/Vice – Member States need to “develop their defence President of the European Commission (HR/ capabilities through the development of their VP) released the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), national contributions and participation, showing the EU’s core interests and principles where appropriate, in multinational forces, for engaging in the wider world. The focus in the main European equipment programs of the EUGS was on the need for a strong and in the activity of the European Defence Europe that thinks strategically, shares a vi- Agency (EDA)3”. sion and acts together4. Member states did not have the strength and the resources to act Articles 42.6 and 46 (TEU) taken together alone and address the threats that were and with Protocol 10 (TEU) represented the basis are challenging Europe. This is still the case for the Permanent Structured cooperation to today. Only after a series of meetings between be born. However, when the Treaty entered the EU foreign and defence ministers did the into force in 2009, it was evident that neither idea of PESCO come out as a possible vehi- the European Union nor the Member States cle to meet the ambitions set in EUGS, with

2 European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 13 De- cember 2007, 2007/C 306/01. 3 Novàky N. (2018), “The EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation in defence: Keeping Sleeping Beauty from snoozing”, Wilferied Martend Centre for European Studies, European View 2018, Vol. 17(I) 97 – 104. 4 European union, “European Union Global Strategy”, 2016.

Behind PESCO 5 the request by the European Commission on decades ago, evolving from the Pleven Plan December 2016, to work on the elements and and issues of Defence and Security, but it was options for an inclusive PESCO. only in December 2017 that Defence and Security reached its summit. After seven dec- The following months were crucial for the ades of peace, the longest period in Europe’s implementation of the Permanent Structured troubled history, the strategic environment Cooperation. After several speeches, studies, has deteriorated, and the European Union and questionnaires, on the 22nd of June 2017, saw the necessity to deepen its security and the European Council called for an inclusive defence policy. The reasons behind this neces- and ambitious PESCO, giving the Member sity can be identified as the combination of States three month to agree on common com- structural and enabling factors. mitments and concrete capability projects. On the 21st of July 2017, France, Germany, First, Europe cannot take for granted the Spain and Italy wrote a letter to the HR/VP US security umbrella provided through the setting out proposals, as requested by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Council, supported by Belgium, the Czech Under the Obama administration, the EU Republic and the Netherlands. This proposal relied on the transatlantic partnership which, letter represented a milestone in the genesis combined with the Eurozone crisis of those of PESCO, serving as a solid basis for its sub- years, led European leaders to put aside issues sequent establishment. On the 13th Novem- of defence. Even though the US is increasing ber 2017, 23 EU Member States5 signed the its military presence in Europe, Washington common notification to officially signal their neither has the will nor the ability to look af- intention to Participate in PESCO. On De- ter Europe. This means that Europe needs to cember 2017, 25 Member States (Ireland and assume greater responsibility for their securi- Portugal joining) adopted a Council decision ty. Furthermore, with the election of Donald establishing PESCO in accordance with Arti- Trump as the 45th US President, Europeans cle 46(3) TEU. felt that the security guarantee provided by America has become unpredictable, realis- 2017 has been a crucial year for European de- ing that there is a pressing need to “work on fence: the so-called “sleeping beauty” of the a stronger Europe when it comes to security Lisbon Treaty has been awakened, opening and defence matters”6. an unprecedented opportunity to move EU defence cooperation to a higher, and more Second, the rising instability in the strategic ambitious level. environment, both on a European and global level, as well as new emerging security threats (economic, environmental, and technologi- Why do we need a European Security cal) present important challenges to Europe’s and Defence Union? security. From the East, the EU faces an as- sertive Russia, intent on reaffirming its sphere The idea of creating a European Defence of influence. From across the Mediterranean, Community came more than six and a half the EU faces terrorist threats and attacks tar-

5 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. 6 Jean-Claude Junker, President of the European Commission, Political Guidelines for the European Commission, 15 July 2014.

Behind PESCO 6 geted towards the heart of European cities. Second, the referendum in the UK voting for In the Middle East and East Asia, regional the exit from the European Union played an rivalries are escalating. Moreover, more turbu- important role in defence and security issues. lence and conflicts may continue to arise and Since 2010, when the Conservative Party re- escalate as a consequence of climate change, turned to power, the UK became doubtful resource scarcity, demographic growth, and regarding defence cooperation with the rest of subsequent state fragility. In such an unsta- Europe. The concern was that, by deepening ble scenario, it is not surprising that Europe- European security and defence cooperation, an public opinion is much more concerned the Atlantic Alliance would be negatively about security. Opinion pools from the Eu- affected. With “Brexit”, the UK took a step ropean Commission showed that security has back, in terms of deepening cooperation in become the number one concern for most Europe on this issue. Yet this also gave the rest Europeans7. of the EU more room to work on defence and security, with the UK no longer blocking this Third, in the world of the 21st century, EU initiative. Deepening cooperation in defence Members can be considered to be small to and security issues is also seen as a signal of medium sized countries. Besides, many of strengthening unity after an event that will the threats that Europe faces today do not divide the European Union, and after frag- respect national borders, increasing the need mentation in other areas such as migration, for Member States to prevent and tackle this and the Eurozone. issues by working together. From a finance point of view, taking into account techno- Third, the restart of the Franco-German en- logical implications, the fragmentation of de- gine was a major push for European defence. fence markets, the lack of interoperability and Since Germany’s leadership in the EU has coordination, negatively affect the economy grown and the above mentioned structural of Member States and this of the European factors showed up, Germany took the initia- Union as a whole. Along with these structural tive. France hesitated but followed during the trends, some enabling factors should also be last months of Francois Hollande’s presiden- taken into consideration. cy. It was only after the election of Emmanuel Macron in France that the Franco-German First, the role of the European Commission. engine restarted completely, giving European It has been traditionally unwilling to place security and defence a new opportunity. greater focus on defence issues. The situation began to change under President Barroso but it was under President Junker that defence issues truly took on new relevance. In No- vember 2016, the European Defence Action Plan was presented with the aim of setting up financial measures to move Member States towards deeper cooperation. In July 2017, the European Defence Fund (EDF) was created, allocating, for the first time, a part of the EU budget to defence.

7 European Commission (2017) “Reflection paper on the Future of European Defence”, COM (2017) 315 of 7 June 2017.

Behind PESCO 7 PESCO IN DETAIL

PESCO was born after one year of intensive In establishing PESCO, Member States have work by the EU Member States, as well as set up 20 commitments in this respect, that by EU institutions such as the European Ex- reflects their shared goals for European de- ternal Agency Service (EEAS) and the Euro- fence. One of the most important aspects pean Defence Agency (EDA). It is an ‘am- of this new initiative is its binding nature, bitious, binding and inclusive’ framework making it different from previous initiatives. aimed at incentivising cooperation among Furthermore, the first set of 17 projects have Member States in the field of capability de- been developed, and a new set has just been velopment and operation8. It aims at ena- approved. The projects constitute the core of bling the EU Member States the capacity to PESCO. It is vital to further these projects ensure the defence and security of the Euro- and reach concrete results in the coming pean Union and its citizens. This implies the months. possible deployment of operations that are facilitated by the PESCO framework, the However, the Permanent Structured Coop- common commitments it defines and the eration does not stand alone. It has been de- projects it initiates. PESCO is a means to veloped in strict connection with the Coor- an end rather than an end on its own: it can dinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) evolve and adapt to changing circumstanc- and the European Defence Fund (EDF). es, positively contributing to more proac- CARD could serve as a basis for identifying tive EU defence cooperation in the coming future projects for PESCO, while the EDF years. Its establishment shows the will of the could provide support to the projects from a EU Member States to bring defence a step financial point of view. These initiatives must further. complete each other in a coherent and coordinated way, boosting the positive effects on PESCO will deliver more usable, deploy- security and defence issues. able, interoperable and sustainable set of capabilities and forces, contributing to the reinforcement of the North Atlantic Treaty PESCO’s Governance: Organisation (NATO) as well. By enhancing Who are the Actors? European defence efforts, PESCO aims to make Europe’s contribution to NATO more The initiative to launch PESCO did not come substantial and more effective. All Member from the European Union, but from Mem- States participating in a PESCO project can, ber States who saw the need to enhance their at any time, make their capabilities available defence efforts. There were several actors in- to NATO, to the United Nations (UN) or volved in the whole process, with different other relevant organisations. It is essential to functions at different stages. ensure there will be no overlap between organisations and the planned projects, to avoid Member States are responsible for the main unnecessary duplication. The EDA is sup- activities and decision of PESCO. They pro- porting Member States to ensure this. pose the projects and submit their National

8 Fiott D., Missiroli A., Tardy T. (2017). “Permanent Structured Cooperation: What’s in a name?”, European Union institute for Security Studies (IIS), Chaillot Paper n°142 – November 2017.

Behind PESCO 8 Implementation Plans (NIPs) to the PESCO more, the implementation of the European Secretariat, which is composed of the EDA Defence Fund (EDF) relies to a large extent and the EEAS. Member States have the re- on the EDA, both in research and in capabil- sponsibility of the projects in which they ity domains. The EDA also plays the role of are the lead Nation and they have to provide CARD Secretariat, gathering all the informa- information on their development. Member tion from Member States, providing analysis States, within the framework of the European and identifying possible future cooperation. Council, can decide about on the suspension of a participant, taking the decision through The European External Action Service qualified majority voting. All other decisions (EEAS) is a part of the PESCO Secretariat taken in the PESCO framework, with the with the EDA. It supports the operational di- exception of the possible participation of a mension of common commitments and the third state that is taken by qualified majority operational projects. Within the EEAS, it will voting, are taken through unanimous voting be the EU Military Staff (EUMS), together procedure. Member States act also as coor- with the Crisis Management and Planning dinators, together with other actors, for the Directorate (CMPD), which will take the European Defence Fund (EDF). lead in assessing progress from an operational point of view. It will also be involved in the TheEuropean Defence Agency (EDA) is part management of the capability window for the of the PESCO Secretariat. It plays a key role European Defence Fund (EDF). in relation to the capability dimensions of the common commitments, and to the capability The High Representative of the Union for projects, as well as in the annual assessment Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice of nations’ contributions to PESCO. The President of the Commission (HR/VP) is EDA represents the preferred cooperation the supervisor of the whole PESCO process. forum and management support structure at It will be up to the HR/VP to conduct the the EU level for participating Member States annual review of the binding commitments to engage in technology and capability devel- made by Member States’ governments. It is opment activities. It acts as the interface and on the basis of their evaluation that Member central operator for EU funded defence activ- States can decide to suspend a State that has ities9. not fulfilled its commitments.

The EDA is also responsible for the gathering of information for CARD and, together with The Commitments the EU Military Staff (EUMS), it is engaged in bilateral dialogues with Member States. It The 25 Member States have set up 20 commit- supports the assessment of the projects, ensur- ments, embodying the participating Member ing there is no unnecessary duplication with States’ shared ambition for European defence. existing initiatives, as well as in other institu- The core aspect that differentiates PESCO from tional contexts. The EDA can also support the previous initiatives on defence cooperation practical implementation of PESCO’s project is the binding nature of these commitments. at the request of the Member States. Further- In providing a binding aspect to this project,

9 Domecq J., (2018). “Coherence and focus on capability priorities: why EDA’s role in CARD, PESCO and EDF matters”, Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 54/2018.

Behind PESCO 9 Member States demonstrated their willingness framework of the ‘Capability Development to “share the burden and create conditions for a Mechanism.’” greater EU role in crisis management”10. • “(e) take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or European As settled in the “Notification on Permanent equipment programmes in the framework Structured Cooperation (PESCO)”11, the of the European Defence Agency.”12 20 commitments can be divided into five different areas: The first five commitments are related to ex- • “(a) cooperation, as from the entry into penditure. Besides the first one that is to “reg- force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a view ularly increase defence budget in real terms, in to achieve approved objectives concerning order to reach agreed objectives”13, Member the level of investment expenditure on de- States have committed to allocate 20% of their fence equipment, and regularly review these defence spending to investment and 2% to re- objectives, in the light of the security envi- search and technology. In order to deepen de- ronment and of the Union's international fence cooperation within the EU framework, responsibilities.” the defence budget is fundamental. One of the • “(b) bring their defence apparatus into line aims of PESCO is to help Member States allo- with each other as far as possible, particular- cate their budget in the most efficient manner, ly by harmonising the identification of their avoiding duplications and consequently avoid- military needs, by pooling and, where appro- ing inefficient cost expenditure that would be priate, specialising their defence means and prevented through closer cooperation. More capabilities, and by encouraging cooperation details on the economic side of PESCO are in the fields of training and logistics.” provided in the next chapter. • “(c) take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and One of the most tangible of these 20 commit- deployability of their forces, in particular ments is the obligation to “take part in at least by identifying common objectives regard- on project under PESCO which develops or ing the commitment of forces, including provides capabilities identified as strategically possibly reviewing their national deci- relevant by Member States”14 (Commitment sion-making procedures.” No.17). With this obligation, none of the • “(d) work together to ensure that they take Member States can refuse to take part in any the necessary measures to make good, in- project, leading to a consequent increase in cluding through multinational approaches, cooperation between them, as well as an in- and without prejudice to undertakings in crease in the strength of PESCO itself. This this regard within the North Atlantic Treaty obligation is linked to the general commit- Organisation, the shortfalls perceived in the ment in helping to address the common capa-

10 European Defence Agency (2018), “Quantum Leap: How PESCO could shape European Defence”, issue #15 view of Rudolf Štědry, Deputy Defence Policy Director, Ministry of Defence, Czech Republic. 11 Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2017). 12 ibid. 13 ibid. 14 ibid.

Behind PESCO 10 bility shortfalls that the EU identifies, and to The production of NIPs by Member States look for collaborative options first, even when does not guarantee that they will meet all certain shortfalls are national issues. These of their commitments, but they will have binding commitments are at the very heart of to explain the failure to do so to the other PESCO. These are also the elements that dif- Member States, to the public and to their ferentiate PESCO from previous initiatives. national parliaments. Furthermore, the pres- They ensure that PESCO is here to stay. ence of many participants in the projects will incentivise states to not withdraw from them. It is paramount for PESCO’s credibility and The commitment to enter into collaborative success for Member States to fulfil their com- capability projects will mean collective en- mitments and to have an assessment process gagement, and this will mean it would be dif- for this fulfilment. The mechanism in place to ficult to renege without an adverse reaction ensure Member States will accomplish these is from the other participants. The presence built into the National Implementation Plans of an assessment process to check Member (NIPs) that the 25 participating Member States States’ fulfilment of their commitments is a presented at PESCO’s launch. The NIPs will big step towards increased transparency and be updated once a year, outlining how each of cooperation between participants. However, them intends to meet the overall commitments some commitments could be interpreted dif- and the more specific objectives to be fulfilled ferently and thus could lead to the Member at each phase. This differs from the voluntary States building their NIP in different ways. approach that was the rule within the EU’s Take, for example, the first commitment of Common Security and Defence Policy. “regularly increasing defence budget in real terms”. Some Member States wrote their plan A great role in this assessment process is played to achieve this result in a detailed way, step by the PESCO Secretariat. It is composed of by step, while others simply stated that they the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the committed to increase their budget. In order European External Action Service (EEAS), infor the PESCO Secretariat to assess and eval- cluding the EU military Staff and it represents uate the situation, there is a need to develop a single point of contact for the participating a standardized way of writing the NIPs. This Member States. PESCO’s Secretariat will de- also implies a higher degree of transparency, termine to what extent the commitments are which is fundamental for reaching the agreed met. On the base of this assessment, the High upon objectives, as well as for increasing pos- Representative of the Union for Foreign Af- sible future cooperation in capabilities and fairs and Security Policy (HR) will present an operations. annual report to the Council describing the status of PESCO in the different Member Impact of the Commitments on Land Forces States. It is then up to the Council to decide whether the different countries are continu- Within the 20 Commitments undertaken by ing to fulfil their commitments or not, and Member States, numbers 12 to 14 concen- in the worst case to decide on a suspension trate on the availability, interoperability, flexi- from PESCO membership, through qualified bility and deployability of the forces. This can majority voting15. have a substantial impact on Land Forces and

15 European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01. Article 46.4.

Behind PESCO 11 could represent a positive achievement for interoperability of their forces and to opti- Finabel Member States. mise multinational structures. For the latter, Member States “could commit to joining and One of these commitments is to ensure strate- playing an active role in the main existing gically deployable formations are made availa- and possible future structures partaking in ble, in addition to a potential deployment of European external action in the military field EU Battlegroups (EUBGs). This can be useful (EUROCORPS, EUROMARFOR; EURO- for achieving the EU’s military level of ambi- GENDFOR, MCCE/ATARES/SEOS)”16. tion, and to provide substantial support every All these points could represent a great advan- time the EU launches an operation. EUBGs tage for improving the cooperation between are part of the European Union’s military rapid European armies and also for increasing the reaction capacity in responding to an emerg- presence and deployability of European ar- ing crisis. In a world in which these crises are mies when needed, for example in the case of rising and more threats are arising, the need to an attack or crisis. It is pivotal for the military increase European military capacity cannot be to reach a high level of operational readiness, denied. In relation to EU Battlegroups, Mem- ensuring speed in reacting to what happens in ber States are committed to provide substan- the international arena. tial support within the means and capabilities of CSDP operations and missions, providing Furthermore, as stated in the 10th commit- personnel, materiel, training, exercise support, ment, it is essential for Member States to con- infrastructure and other relevant measures. sider the joint use of existing capabilities. This can bring savings in terms of defence spend- To boost interoperability and cooperation ing, an optimisation of the available resources between Member States’ armies, the 12th and an improvement to the effectiveness of commitment underlines the need to create the forces. a solid instrument (for example, a data base) to record available and rapidly deployable ca- The 20 commitments are clearly ambitious, pabilities in order to facilitate and accelerate but they represent the opportunity for Euro- the Force Generation Process. This tool can pean defence, and consequently also for Land bring an unprecedented benefit to European Forces, to take steps towards a more coopera- armies as, when needed, every country could tive environment, with an increase in capabil- have a complete picture of the European Un- ities and a decrease in costs. ion situation as a whole and consequently the reaction can be faster and easier. Related to this goal, Member States have also committed Projects to “simplifying and standardising cross border military transport in Europe for enabling On the 6th of March 2018, the EU Council rapid deployment of military materiel and of Ministers formally adopted the first set of personnel”. 17 PESCO Projects. Each of them is led by one Member State and promoted by a group In the 13th commitment, participating Mem- of participating countries that vary for each ber States bind themselves to developing the project. The 17 projects adopted vary great-

16 Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2017).

Behind PESCO 12 ly in their focus and strategic outreach. Most Operations (SJO) – (SOCC) for SJO of them are linked to operational needs, with • Electronic Warfare Capability and several stemming from lessons identified in Interoperability Programme for Future the field. For a better understanding of the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and different areas, they can be organised into Reconnaissance (JISR) Cooperation, four different categories: capability needs, • Chemical, Biological, Radiological and logistical / training needs, maritime surveil- Nuclear (CBRN) Surveillance as a Service lance, and cybersecurity needs (see Table on (CBRN SaaS), next page). • Co-basing, • Geo-meteorological and Oceanographic More recently, on the 19th of November 2018, (GeoMETOC) Support Coordination another set of 17 projects were approved: Element (GMSCE), • EU Radio Navigation Solution (EURAS), • Helicopter Hot and High Training • European Military Space Surveillance (H3 Training), Awareness Network (EU-SSA-N).17 • Joint EU Intelligence School, • EU Test and Evaluation Centres, Along with this, the official PESCO • Integrated Unmanned Ground System website was recently launched under (UGS), https://pesco.europa.eu/, where relevant in- • EU Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) Land formation and documents relating to the pro- Battlefield Missile Systems, ject can be found and accessed. • Deployable Modular Underwater Intervention Capability Package PESCO’s projects provide the EU with an (DIVEPACK), opportunity to address European capability • European Medium Altitude Long shortfalls, harmonising the European defence Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft capability landscape, and enhancing inter- Systems – MALE RPAS (Eurodrone), operability and deployability of European • European Attack Helicopters TIGER forces18. As Domecq points out: “It is impor- Mark III, tant that we choose the right projects with • Counter Unmanned Aerial System the right impact. At the end of the day, what (C-UAS), we need is a more coherent set of deploya- • European High Atmosphere Airship ble, interoperable, sustainable capabilities Platform (EHAAP) – Persistent and forces”19. These projects will be the real Intelligence, Surveillance and test of PESCO. The numerous proposals for Reconnaissance (ISR) Capability, the first set demonstrated the enthusiasm and • One Deployable Special Operations Forces dynamism coming from the Member States, (SOF) Tactical Command and Control along with the second set that have just been (C2) Command Post (CP) for Small Joint approved.

17 (2018), “Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) updated list of PESCO projects” - Overview - 19 November 2018. (Accessed on the 30th of November https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37028/table-pesco-projects.pdf). 18 European Defence Agency (2018), “Quantum Leap: How PESCO could shape European Defence”, issue #15 view of Rudolf Štědry, Deputy Defence Policy Director, Ministry of Defence, Czech Republic. 19 Domecq J., (2018). “Coherence and focus on capability priorities: why EDA’s role in CARD, PESCO and EDF matters”, Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 54/2018.

Behind PESCO 13 Focus Area Project Leading Country Participants CZ, ES, FR, IT, NL, European Medical Command DE RO, SK, SE European Secure Software BE, DE, IT, NL, PL, Defined Radio FR PT, FI Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package IT EL, ES, HR, AT Energy Operational Function Capabilities FR BE, ES, IT / Needs from (EOF) Operational Strategic Command and Control Lessons System for CSDP Missions and ES DE, IT, PT Identified Operations Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault IT EL, SK Vehicle / Light Armoured Vehicle Indirect Fire Support SK IT EUFOR Crisis Response ES, FR, IT, CY Operation Core DE Network of logistic Hubs BE, BG, EL, ES, FR, in Europe and support to DE HR, IT, CY, HU, Operation NL, SI, SK BE, BG, CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, FR, HR, Military Mobility NL IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, Logistical / HU, AT, PL, PT, Training RO, SI, SK, FI, SE EU Training Mission BE, CZ, IE, ES, FR, Competence Centre (EU DE IT, CY, LU, NL, AT, TMCC) RO, SE European Training Certification Centre for European Armies IT EL Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine BE EL, LV, NL, PT, RO Countermeasures (MAS MCM) Maritime Surveillance Harbour & Maritime EL, ES, PT Surveillance and Protection IT Upgrade of Maritime BG, IE, ES, HR, IT, Surveillance EL CY Cyber Threats and Incident ES, IT, CY, HU, AT, Response Information Sharing EL Platform PT Cybersecurity Cyber Rapid Response Teams ES, FR, HR, NL, and Mutual Assistance in Cyber LT Security RO, FI

Behind PESCO 14 Regarding the capability projects, each par- ensure that the EU has a broad toolbox to ticipating State will acquire the same equip- address a large variety of security challenges. ment, serving as the foundation for more Furthermore, it is important for PESCO to integrated forces. Once a project has been focus on projects that, because of their need completed, the resulting capability will be co- of a large mass of participating Member owned, as part of a unified force, by all States States and because they address a common that were participating in the project. In this shortfall, cannot be tackled efficiently by a way, Member States can avoid the issue of du- single country. plication that usually occurs, additionally aid- ing in making the European defence industry An important point in which Member States, more competitive. together with PESCO Secretariat and the HR/VP, should work together is the estab- Furthermore, cooperative collaborative pro- lishment of general conditions under which jects that have been developed outside the a third state can be invited to participate in EU framework, have not always reduced costs individual projects. One possible solution or improved interoperability20. For example, could be to associate third states with PES- some EU governments can develop a new CO through their participation in a CSDP capability together, but the outcome would operation, that is in some way supported by be different. Common capabilities may look a PESCO project. However, there is a need the same from the outside, but the techni- to clarify the conditions and analyse in depth cal specification could differ from country possible cooperation with PESCO states. It is to country. Consequently, it is quite difficult important for PESCO and the European Un- for countries to actually work together or, for ion as a whole to be open to the participation example, the development of a joint training of such states that could add value to these capacity. The development of collaborative single projects. This is particularly relevant projects in the PESCO framework would also in the context of the imminent “Brexit”, aim to improve interoperability and will add but it has also implications beyond the UK. new possibilities for collaboration and devel- In the world we are facing today, threats and oping joint programs. challenges are global and have taken on a hy- brid nature Thus responses to these threats In the coming years, the key issue will be to can no longer be confined to the EU alone. avoid dispersing European strengths. To this end Member States have to build a coherent A possible improvement for future lists of set of projects. The success of PESCO will be PESCO projects would be to distinguish determined from the ability to propose and between ‘strategically relevant’ projects and implement a balanced mix of both capabili- others. It would be a step further if Member ty-oriented projects and operational projects. States could commit themselves to participate An encouraging sign is the presence of some in at least one ‘strategically relevant’ project, projects in non-traditional areas such as cy- aside from the commitment of participating bersecurity. Looking at the coming years, it in at least one collaborative project, already will be increasingly important to assure the present in the binding commitments. Yet presence of projects to face such needs, to there would be an issue in deciding how ex-

20 Fiott D., Missiroli A., Tardy T. (2017). “Permanent Structured Cooperation: What’s in a name?”, European Union institute for Security Studies (IIS), Chaillot Paper n°142 – November 2017.

Behind PESCO 15 actly projects will be defined to be ‘strategi- most optimised way possible22. It will support cally relevant’, but this could be done by the the commitment of simplifying and standard- European Defence Agency while analysing ising cross-border military transport proce- the different projects from the outset. dures. With this project in action, European forces can react faster when needed, avoiding Success and results, even regarding small pro- barriers such as legal hurdles for cross-border jects, will demonstrate PESCO’s added value. movement, lingering bureaucratic require- The achievement of tangible results will en- ments, and infrastructural issues. courage a higher level of cooperation on more ambitious projects and will show the impor- Some of the projects have as their goal the in- tance of the Permanent Structured Coopera- crease of interoperability between countries. tion in defence and security issues. PESCO For example, the project on the European projects could be considered to be a success Medical Command (EMC) will provide crit- when the results are seen on the ground, when ical medical resources, evacuation facilities, the military will use the capabilities developed triage and resuscitation, treatments and it will for defence operations. However, this will ensure an efficient joint EU management of only be possible in a few years as the first set scarce European medical services. It will con- of projects are still under development. tribute to the harmonisation of national medical standards for legal framework conditions Impact of the Projects on the Land Forces and sanitary service principles.

In order to maximise the effects of PESCO’s Furthermore, the European Secure Software projects, it is crucial that the military will play defined Radio aims to develop common tech- a central role in the process, as they are the nologies for European military radios. This end-users of defence capabilities. As stated by will guarantee the interoperability of EU the EUMC chairman, General Mikhail Kos- forces in the context of joint operations, re- tarakos, “the military are those who, better than gardless of the radio platform used, and thus any other, know which capabilities and assets enhancing communicative avenues between are critical, and which are just a ‘nice to have’21. the different Member States’ forces.

Within the initial set of 17 projects, most of The Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle / them could have a positive impact on Land Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armoured Forces (LF) and represent an improvement Vehicle project will develop a vehicle based for cooperation and joint development be- on a common platform and it will support tween armies. fast deployment manoeuvre, reconnaissance, combat support, logistic support, command One of the projects already underway is the and control, and medical support. These are Military Mobility project. Led by the Neth- examples of how projects developed under erlands and joined by almost all Member the PESCO umbrella can represent a step States, the aim is to enhance the deployment forward for European armies, both in terms of forces by enabling freedom of movement of capabilities developed and in terms of infor military personnel and equipment in the teroperability. Other projects represent a valid

21 European Defence Agency (2018), “Quantum Leap: How PESCO could shape European Defence”, issue #15. 22 ibidem.

Behind PESCO 16 achievement for Land Forces, like the Energy ed a methodology to implement the CARD, Operational Function (EOF), the European starting from September 2017. The starting Union Training Mission Competence Centre point was the analysis of the relevant informa- (EU TMCC), the development of a Deploy- tion already available by Member States. The able Military Disaster Relief Capability Pack- second phase (October 2017 – April 2018) age, the Indirect Fire Support (EuroArtillery), consisted of bilateral dialogue between EDA/ the Network of logistic Hubs in Europe and EUMS and Member States in order to vali- support to Operations, the European Train- date, complement and consolidate the infor- ing Certification Centre for European Armies mation of the previous phase. The third phase which, for example, aims to promote the (June 2018) is the CARD analysis: the EDA standardisation of procedures among Europe- compiled and analysed Member States’ con- an Armies. All these projects are a great sig- tributions and producing an analysis, present- nal of the fact that Member States are more ing aggregate data and identifying trends re- and more willing to cooperate and to develop garding defence spending plans, implementa- joint capabilities in order to increase their in- tion of CDP priorities as well as opportunities teroperability. Hopefully, this will make coop- for future cooperation in defence issues. This eration and collective action part of European analysis will then be discussed with Member culture which can lead to more ambitious and States and will be the base for the final report. effective military operations. The fourth and final phase (Autumn 2018) is the CARD Report. It will be drafted by the EDA, based on the outcome of previous steps Coordinated Annual Review and it will present the main results of the re- on Defence (CARD) view as well as recommendations on the next steps to undertake. The CARD process will be The EU Global Strategy of 2016 identified fully implemented in 2019. many challenges. One of them was the lack of defence coordination between governments. CARD can provide added value but, in order The strategy called for a gradual synchronisa- to achieve its objective, it is necessary that the tion of national defence planning cycles and information collected from Member States capability development practices. Therefore, are as detailed and as up-to-date as possible. the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence This implies a high level of transparency and a (CARD) was established in 2017 with the high degree of willingness to collaborate com- objective “to develop, on a voluntary basis, a ing from the Member States. more structured way to deliver identified capabilities based on greater transparency, polit- CARD is a tool that was created before PES- ical visibility and commitment from Member CO and is not directly linked to it. However, States23”. It primarily focuses on the monitor- it is not meant to stand alone either. It works ing of national defence spending plans to help together with the Capability Development identify new collaborative initiatives. Plan (CDP), PESCO and the European De- fence Fund (EDF). Together they represent The role of gathering information is played a cornerstone of a coherent EU mechanism by the European Defence Agency (EDA) who to boost collaborative defence capabilities. acts as the “CARD Secretariat”. EDA present- The CARD analyses the priorities identified

23 European Defence Agency, “Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)”, Factsheet.

Behind PESCO 17 in the CDP. Following this, new projects can be launched in various formats (for example under PESCO) and some of them could be co-funded by the EDF. CARD’s reach and re- mit in respect to all Member States will help to avoid the duplication of efforts and guarantee full transparency of the CDP24.

As stated above, CARD is a voluntary initiative. However, it is important to translate it into a more mandatory process, at least inside PESCO. This would guarantee a situation in which all Member States have to present their defence plans to the EDA, with a consequent increase in the possibilities that the Agency could find for collaborative projects.

24 European Defence Agency (2018), “Quantum Leap: How PESCO could shape European Defence”, issue #15 view of Gianni Candotti, Defence Capabilities & Policy Director, Ministry of Defence, Italy.

Behind PESCO 18 THE ECONOMIC SIDE OF DEFENCE

As stated before, the world is facing new chal- procurement and more than 90% of Research lenges and threats that make internal securi- and Technology are run on a national basis, ty and external defence borders increasingly leading to a costly duplication of military ca- blurred. Europeans citizen are looking for a pabilities. Up to 30% of annual defence ex- Europe that protects them within and be- penditures could be saved through pooling of yond its borders. Due to the nature of these procurement25. Focusing on strategic issues, challenges and threats, Member States cannot dysfunctional cooperation and EU fragmen- afford to face them on their own. It is pivotal tation in defence contributes to the lack of for Member States to collaborate and work deployability of our armed forces. Less than together on joint efforts, both on a capability 3% of European troops (40,000) are deployed and operational level, as well as for financial due to the lack of interoperability and short- aspects. ages in equipment.

The costs of defence equipment, including Comparing the actual situation of the EU, development costs, are increasing faster than and the situation of the US, the biggest mili- the available defence budgets. The lack of co- tary power in the international arena (see Fig- operation between Member States is estimat- ure 226) is particularly revealing. The Europe- ed to cost annually between €25 billion and an Union has 178 different weapon systems, €100 billion. This is due to inefficiencies, a while the US only has 30. The EU spends half lack of competition and a lack of economies as much as the United States, but it is not of scale for industry and production. 80% of even half as efficient as them.

Figure 2

25 European Commission – Fact Sheet “The European Defence Fund: Questions and Answers”. 26 European Commission, “Defending Europe, the case for greater EU cooperation on security and defence”.

Behind PESCO 19 The first step toward an improvement in se- The European Defence Fund (EDF): curity and defence in the EU is to increase What is it? Member States’ defence budgets. In the 30 plus PESCO commitments, the first five are The European Defence Fund will “boost the devoted to financial aspects. The Member EU’s excellence and efficiency in defence States declare a commitment to “regularly in- equipment and technology by supporting crease defence budgets in real terms27”, to suc- the whole production chain: research, proto- cessively increase defence investment expend- type development and ad acquisition28. Un- iture to 20% of total defence spending, to til 2020, the Commission will allocate €590 increase joint collaborative strategic defence million to the EDF. After 2020 the proposal capabilities projects and to increase the share is to allocate a minimum of €1.5 billion every of expenditure allocated to defence research year. The Fund will not substitute Member and technology with a view to nearing the 2% States’ defence investments, but its role is to of total defence spending goal. enable and accelerate cooperation.

When Member States begin to increase their It is estimated that, together with Member defence budgets, the EU can aid them in States’ contributions, the Fund could gen- allocating these funds in the most efficient erate a total investment of €5.5 billion per manner. Member States can achieve greater year after 202029. It consists of two legally output by pooling resources than developing distinct but complementary windows: a re- capabilities separately on a lone national scale. search window and a capability window. Increased collaboration also reduces the prob- Both will be coordinated by the Commis- lem of duplication that every year results in a sion, the High Representative, the Member waste of expenditure. This will also promote States and the European Defence Agency. the standardization of equipment and ensure The programs and tools that are developed increased interoperability. Additionally, the under these two windows will be open to the increased collaboration may allow an econo- participation of beneficiaries from all Mem- my of scale, reinforcing the competitiveness ber States. of the EU defence industry. While the down- turn in European defence spending during One important aspect is that all the compa- the economic crisis has been reversed, to nies, regardless of their size or located coun- reach Europe’s strategic autonomy there is a try, can benefit from the tools available. The need to spend more efficiently, which in turns defence industry is not made up of only big means collaborating spending efforts. To help companies acting as prime contractors, but Member States develop and acquire strategic also of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) defence capabilities quickly, jointly, and in that often act as sub-contractors in the supply a more effective manner, in 2016 European chain. Particularly, they will benefit consid- Commission President Junker announced the erably, becoming the heart of innovation in establishment of the European Defence Fund Europe, critical for the supply chains. Boost- (EDF). ing the competitiveness of the European de-

27 Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for For- eign Affairs and Security Policy (2017). 28 European Commission – Fact Sheet “The European Defence Fund: Question and Answers”. 29 ibidem.

Behind PESCO 20 fence industry could undoubtedly benefit lishing the calls for proposals, organising the defence-related SMEs. The EDF seeks to en- evaluation and managing the research projects sure great participation of cross border SMEs, selected to receive EU funding. with a proportion of the budget for the projects involving their participation. Further- The Capability window supports the joint more, in assessing the projects to finance, the development and joint acquisition of key de- participation of these companies is taken into fence capabilities, complementing, leveraging account. and consolidating cooperation among Mem- ber States. It focuses on collaborative projects The Research window aims at financing col- to develop prototypes in strategic priority ar- laborative defence research, and technology eas that are defined by Member States in the development activities across Europe. De- Capability Development Plan (CDP). While fence research is essential to face emerging the research window is fully financed by the and future threats and to fill technological EU budget, here the approach is mainly fo- gaps in key areas. However, defence compa- cused on co-financing. Financial contribu- nies do not invest in R&D if they do not have tions mainly come from Member States, but a commitment by the government to acquire the European Union makes a budgetary con- the products. The EU, under the EDF, offers tribution to encourage defence cooperation, direct funding, fully financed from the EU reducing the risks associated with the indus- budget. The projects it finances can include trial development cycle, as well as providing the ones under the Permanent Structured leverage to national contributions and sup- Cooperation and they take into account the porting the competitiveness of the European defence capabilities priorities agreed by the defence industry31. Member States within the EU. This approach is different, considering the current and the The Commission proposes a budget of next budgetary cycle. The current one will run €500 million for 2019 and 2020. The pro- until the end of 2019, with the allocated €25 gram will leverage national financing with million in the year 2017 and it will allocate a an expected multiplying effect of 5. There- total amount of €90 million until the end of fore, it is expected to generate a total invest- 2019. In reference to the next budgetary cycle ment of €2.5 million for the first two years that will run after 2020, the Commission pro- and €5 million every year after 2020. In or- poses to establish a dedicated EU defence re- der to encourage cooperation, only projects search program and to allocate a total amount involving at least 3 companies from at least of €500 million, making the European Union 2 Member States will be eligible for the EDF. one of the biggest defence research investors The program enhances cross-border coopera- in Europe30. tion among industries and contributes to the competitiveness of the whole defence sector. The commission, in cooperation with Mem- For this reason, it should benefit both large- ber States and the European Defence Agency scale companies and SMEs. Furthermore, in (EDA), will establish the annual work pro- order to be eligible for the program, industries grams. The EDA will be responsible for pub- have to demonstrate that Member States have

30 European Commission – Fact Sheet “The European Defence Fund: Question and Answers”. 31 European Commission, Communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions, Launching the European Defence Fund. Brussels, 7.6.2017 COM (2017) 295 final.

Behind PESCO 21 Figure 3 committed to jointly finance development to them is voluntary. It is important to integrate procure the final product or technology in a the key aspects of these Financial Toolbox coordinated manner. with the Permanent Structured Cooperation, considering its inclusive character. The Commission is responsible for the exe- cution and the management structure of the Figure 3 explains schematically these three program. It can delegate tasks related to the different aspects of the European Defence implementation of the work program to the Fund: the research window, the capability EDA. The Agency also plays an important window and the financial toolbox. role in the identification of defence capability priorities commonly defined by Member States through the Capability Development European Defence Fund and PESCO Plan. The EEAS is also involved in the program, including in the work of its Program The European Defence Fund was established Committee. before PESCO but they are closely connected. For example, the Permanent Structured Another important tool to take into consider- Cooperation’s projects may be eligible for ation is the European Defence Fund’s Finan- a higher rate of EU co-financing in the ca- cial Toolbox. It will provide different types of pability window, through the EDF, reaching arrangements that Member States can decide 30% instead of 20%. Financial incentives are to use, for example to address challenges from vital to ensure that governments continuous- a financing perspective. The standardised and ly invest in capabilities and defence research predefined financial tools provided can be through PESCO, and the EDF represents one used flexibly for Member States and the use of of these incentives.

Behind PESCO 22 The European Commission’s hope is that, in exchange for financial support under the EDF, participating Member States will be in- centivised to agree to early harmonisation and interoperability requirements for common defence capabilities programs32. However, PESCO projects do not have any type of priority inside the European Defence Fund. This means that PESCO projects are considered the same as other initiatives when assessed, the only difference comes after the project is financed, where it is given 10% more for the ones developed under the PESCO framework. However, participation in the Struc- tured Cooperation is not a pre-requisite for obtaining support under the program.

It is important for PESCO to synchronize with EDF and CARD in order to reach full capability in defence and security issues. There is a need for coherence and complementarity among the tools, to avoid duplication of efforts, resources and manpower within Euro- pean organisations and institutions, as well as between Member States.

32 Fiott D., Missiroli A., Tardy T. (2017). “Permanent Structured Cooperation: What’s in a name?”, European Union institute for Security Studies (IIS), Chaillot Paper n°142 – November 2017.

Behind PESCO 23 WHAT IS THE FUTURE FOR PESCO?

PESCO has been in a state of “hibernation” evolve as some countries (and/or the Europe- for many years, but the changing strategic an Union itself) will face new challenges and environment led EU Member States to take situations (for example, the economic crisis, European defence more seriously. The Perma- or the increase of terrorism). Another situ- nent Structured Cooperation shows that the ation to consider is what will happen when EU is moving from vision to action when it there is a change of government in one Mem- comes to defence issues. Now that PESCO ber State, that has a different approach to de- has been put into practice, it is important to fence and more specifically towards PESCO. keep this initiative and momentum going. It The question then is how binding are these could be a game changer for European securi- commitments? How they will work with a ty and defence. However, at the same time, it country that does not wish to respect them? raises a lot of expectations, from the Member For now, the answer to this question has not State, as well as from the citizens. There is a yet been found, but it would be interesting to need to develop a spirit of cooperation be- see how (and if) PESCO will manage such tween countries, where the collective Europe- situations of non-compliance. Will there be an interest has to come first, before separated non-compliance procedures? What exact and lone interests. Citizens should feel pro- form would these procedures take? Would a tected, they should see the European Union carrot over stick approach be favoured due as the driver for peace, stability and security. to the overall initial voluntary nature of the commitments? One of the main questions that arise from this new initiative is: under which conditions Hypothetically, this could lead to a simple could we say that PESCO is a success? First combination of the two approaches, the of all, it is important to say that PESCO was more classic carrot-and-stick approach: using established at the end of 2017, with the first the strategy of ensuring transparency so as 17 projects entering into force in 2018. Con- to employ a naming-and-shaming approach, sequently, the concrete results of PESCO can along with stronger punitive measures should be assessed only according to a few months of a Member State continue to fail to carry out data. However, there is a need to show how its commitments, such as suspension from the initiative has been successful so far and participation in PESCO. how it is producing concrete and tangible results. This will encourage a higher level of co- For this reason, highlighting the results gar- operation between Member States, and an in- nered by PESCO can play an important role: crease in the development of more ambitious if the results are clearly visible, it would in projects, making PESCO a self-sustaining theory be difficult for a new government to process. PESCO can be considered a success deny them and to change its commitment if, in 3 or 5 years, the results are visible “on towards the initiative in the eyes of the pub- the ground”, with the capabilities used by the lic. For now, there is a need for a concrete military of the whole European Union and commitment to the 20 binding commit- the joint projects put into action. ments, as well as a need for a way to assess them, with concrete consequences in case a Before achieving this, it is important to look Member State does not fulfil its obligations. at the commitments of the Member States If this does not happen, the binding nature and it will be interesting to see how these will of PESCO, that constitutes one of its major

Behind PESCO 24 strengths, will be lost and every effort taken in the last year would be seen as ineffective.

In regards to the current projects, it will be interesting to see how the first 17 approved on the 6th of March 2018 will evolve and, how the more recent second set of 17 projects, approved on the 19th of November 2018, will develop. The first round already involves some crucial topics, but some of them were already in development before the Permanent Structured Cooperation, led by single countries that then decided to submit the project to PESCO with the help of other Member States. The next round of projects could in- volve some that have been developed, from initial conception to full implementation, by Member States together, giving PESCO an even stronger, cooperative character.

Behind PESCO 25 CONCLUSION

The Permanent Structured Cooperation can training programs) that will allow countries to appear as a small step, if measured against the cooperate in a more efficient manner. magnitude of the security challenges Europe is confronted with today. It is an initiative that Furthermore, in order to achieve the agreed will take time to garner concrete result, and upon objectives, the economic aspect of this can even be seen as a type of “bet” upon Eu- new initiative should not be underestimated. ropean defence. However, if measured against The lack of interoperability between countries the difficulties European security and defence costs a fortune each year, decreasing the ca- has experienced in the past decade, it can be pability of the European Union to deploy its seen as a giant step forward for the European forces. To conclude, cooperation is the key Union in terms of defence and security. for European defence and security. Many of the threats and challenges that we are facing This paper underlined the different character- today do not respect national borders, lead- istics of the Permanent Structured Coopera- ing to a desperate need to work together to tion. It considered the overall structural char- tackle them, as otherwise there will always be acteristics of the over 20 different commit- the risk of remaining one step behind these ments and projects that have been approved, threats, at all times, forever playing catch up. as well as its relationship with existing initia- In a connected and complex world as the one tives and the economic aspects. The analysis we are facing today, Member States need to focused on the actual situation and looked at cooperate to protect themselves and their cit- the advice given on how to improve the status izens, using the EU’s resources in the most of the process so far. It is important to con- efficient manner. tinue to work deeply on these commitments, and their clarification. Furthermore, a strong and strict way of assessing them is an essential characteristic which will emphasise the binding nature PESCO is supposed to have.

Another aspect which must be emphasised is the projects themselves. There is a need to provide tangible results on the ground in order to increase the willingness to cooperate: if the first 17 projects will work and the result are tangible and visible, Member States will continue to increase their cooperation and interoperability for the second set for example. The projects will undoubtedly have a significant impact on European Land Forc- es and consequently on Finabel’s Member States, encouraging the development of new capabilities and as well as cooperation on new joint projects. This will decrease duplication between Member States and encourage the development of joint programs (for example

Behind PESCO 26 BIBLIOGRAPHY

• Angelet B., Vrailas I., (2008). “European • European Union, “European Union Global Defence in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty”, Strategy”, 2016 Egmont – Royal institute for International • European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending Relations the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty • Biscop S. (2017), “European Defence: Establishing the European Community, What’s in the CARDs for PESCO?”, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01. Egmont – Royal Institute for International • Fiott D. (2017), “Promoting European Relations, Security Policy Brief No 91 Defence cooperation and the promise of • Biscop S. (2018) “European Defence: Give financial incentives”, Armament Industry PESCO a Chance”, Survival, 60:3, 161-180 European Research #16 • Coelmont J. (2017), “With PESCO • Fiott D., Missiroli A., Tardy T. (2017). Brought to Life, Will European Defence “Permanent Structured Cooperation: What’s Live Happily Ever After?”, Egmont – Royal in a name?”, European Union institute Institute for International Relations, for Security Studies (IIS), Chaillot Paper Security Policy Brief No 90 n°142 – November 2017. • Domecq J., (2018). “Coherence and focus • Jean-Claude Junker, President of on capability priorities: why EDA’s role in the European Commission, Political CARD, PESCO and EDF matters”, Real Guidelines for the European Commission, Instituto Elcano, ARI 54/2018 15 July 2014 • European Commission – Fact Sheet “The • Kozina G., Kurečić P., Peternelj B. “The European Defence Fund: Questions and Permanent Structured Cooperation Initiative Answers” (PeSCo)s a step towards the European • European Commission (2017) “Reflection Defence Union” paper on the Future of European Defence”, • Marrone A., Pirozzi N., Sartori P., (2017). COM (2017) 315 of 7 June 2017 “PESCO: An Ace in the Hand for European • European Commission, “Defending Defence”, Istituto Affari Internazionali Europe, the case for greater EU cooperation (IAI) on security and defence” • Notification on Permanent Structured • European Commission, Communication Cooperation (PESCO) to the Council and from the commission to the European to the High Representative of the Union for Parliament, the Council, the European Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2017) Economic and Social Committee of the • Novàky N. (2018), “The EU’s Permanent Regions, Launching the European Defence Structured Cooperation in defence: Keeping Fund. Brussels, 7.6.2017 COM (2017) Sleeping Beauty from snoozing”, Wilferied 295 final Martend Centre for European Studies, • European Defence Agency (2018), European View 2018, Vol. 17(I) 97 – 104 “Quantum Leap: How PESCO could shape • Tocci N. (2018), “Towards a European European Defence”, issue #15 Security and Defence Union: Was 2017 a • European Defence Agency, “Coordinated Watershed?”, Journal of Common Market Annual Review on Defence (CARD)”, Studies (JCMS), JCMS 2018 pp. 1–11 Factsheet • Wolfstädter L.M., Kreilinger V. (2017) • European External Action Service (EEAS), “European integration via Flexibility Tools: (2018), Factsheet on Permanent Structured the cases of EPPO and PESCO”, Jacques Cooperation Delors Institut Berlin, Policy Paper 209

Behind PESCO 27 improve thedailytasksofpreparation, training,exercises, andengagement. freely appliedby itsmember, whoseaimistofacilitateinteroperability and address thetopics.Finabel studiesandFood forThoughtsare recommendations the landforces andprovides commentsby creating “Food forThoughtpapers” to also athinktankthatelaboratesoncurrent events concerningtheoperationsof Groups for situations that require solutions. In short-term addition, Finabel is In the current setting, Finabel allows its member states to form Expert Task engagement ontheterrainshouldbeobtained. shared capabilityapproach andcommonequipment,ashared visionofforce- the harmonisationoflanddoctrines.Consequently, before hopingtoreach a focused oncooperationinarmament’s programmes, Finabel quicklyshiftedto structures butcontributestotheseorganisationsinitsuniqueway. Initially ad hoc coalition;Finabel neithercompetes norduplicatesNATO orEUmilitary framework oftheNorth Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), theEU,and Finabel contributestoreinforce interoperability amongitsmemberstatesinthe understanding viaannualmeetings. among memberstates’ officersandChiefs of Staff in aspirit ofopen andmutual on consensusandequalityofmemberstates.Finabel contact favours fruitful European ArmiesoftheEUMember States. The isbased Finabel informalforum Finabel aimstobeamultinational-, independent-,andapoliticalactorforthe future ofitsmembers.Finabel, theonlyorganisationatthislevel, strives at: reflections, exchange studies,andproposals oncommoninterest topicsforthe for cooperationbetween European for Armies:itwasconceived asaforum Created in1953,theFinabel organisation committeeistheoldestmilitary • • Finabel focusesondoctrines,trainings, andthejointenvironment. Contributing toacommonEuropean understandingoflanddefenceissues. bring togetherconcepts,doctrinesandprocedures; Promoting interoperability andcooperationofarmies,whileseekingto You findour studies will at GSM: +32 (0)483 +32 GSM: 712193 E-mail: [email protected] Quartier Reine Elisabeth Tel: (0)2 +32 441 79 38 www.finabel.org B-1140 BRUSSELSB-1140 Rue d’Evere 1

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