The Politics of Identity and Interest in European Defense Industrial Collaboration
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THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL COLLABORATION A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School Of Cornell University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Willie Eugene Cobble May 2004 ©2004 Willie Eugene Cobble THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL COLLABORATION Willie Eugene Cobble, Ph.D. Cornell University 2004 This dissertation is a social constructivist analysis of the ideational foundations of West European defense industrial cooperation. Traditional analytical approaches within International Relations theory, namely structural realism, do not highlight the role that social identity may play in shaping state behaviorexcept to regard it conceptually as predetermined, as methodologically unapproachable, or as epiphenomenal. The study of European armaments collaboration, however, demands that scholars consider identity as both official elite rhetoric and mass surveys maintain that an emergent, transnational European identity not only exists within the member societies of the European Union (EU), but it may also shape certain areas of state activity. This thesis uses social constructivism as an explanatory framework in order to ascertain the degree that this regional identity facilitates the Europeanization of defense production within the EU. This dissertation explores five episodes of multinational European defense industrial collaboration conducted between 1967 and 1997: Tornado, Eurofighter, Field Howitzer 70, Self-Propelled Howitzer 70, and the Anglo-French Reciprocal Purchasing Agreement. Further, these cases are divided into high-technology and low- technology categories, with Tornado and Eurofighter forming a high-tech dyad, while the others denote examples of low-tech industrial and market-oriented cooperation. I hypothesize that the production of high-tech military equipment is bound to conceptions of self and of self-interest that promote nationalist behavior and thus restricts the potential for multinational procurement collaboration. Low-tech weapons, on the other hand, do not challenge national identity and thus may reveal the influence of an emerging, cross-cutting transnational identity. This identity subsequently can be manifest in the potential willingness of states to rationalize intra-regional production and to integrate national defense equipment markets. I find, however, that while a distinct European identity exists, its effects do not extend far into the procurement field regardless of the level of technology involved within a given collaboration. Weapons procurement in the European Union remains intrinsically national in orientation. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Willie Eugene Cobble received his Bachelor of Arts degree in 1992 with a major in political science from Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee. He graduated summa cum lade and attained membership in Phi Beta Kappa. He received a Masters of Arts degree in 1996 in Government from Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. While completing his PhD thesis, he gained employment in 1999 with the Center for Naval Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia. There he worked as a specialist on transatlantic defense industrial collaboration and Western European political integration. In addition, he also developed expertise in alternate operational concepts for amphibious assault ships, and navy force employment patterns. Later in 2004, he received his PhD in Government from Cornell University. iii For my parents, and my little sister. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am indebted to my wife Ronit, and to my stepsons, Eldad and Yuval, for their love and support throughout the life of my dissertation, from thesis conceptualization to final submission. Living with a graduate student in the throes of research and writing is never an easy task, but my family never wavered and for this I am eternally grateful. I also wish to thank my committee, Judith Reppy, Thomas Christensen, Jonathan Kirshner, and Matthew Evangelista. Their guidance and forbearance gave me both the tools and the time to wrestle with the conceptual issues that underlie my thesis, and thus helped make it a better product than it would otherwise be. I am particularly grateful to my dissertation chair, Judith, and to her husband, John. Without their support, this dissertation would not have been completed. Many within the Cornell graduate student community also assisted me during my intellectual journey, patiently listening to me as my ideas have evolved over the years and ultimately helping me to refine my arguments. I am especially obliged to Loren Gatch, David Leheny, Joshua Winchell, Alexander Moon, Steven Casper, and Nilanjana Bhattacharjya. I am also grateful to the staffs of Northrop-Grumman International in Brussels, and of the PREST Institute in the University of Manchester. Both of these organizations invited me not only to use their facilities as a guest researcher, but also to use them as springboards for contacting European defense notables and gaining access to state, NATO, and European institutions. I would especially like to thank Thomas Darcy at Northrop-Grumman, and Philip Gummett and Andrew James at PREST. v I am also thankful to the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), which supported me during the writing of this dissertation. Not only did the Center provide me with employment, my friends and colleagues there—notably Henry Gaffney, Peter Schwartz, Katherine McGrady, Michael McDevitt, Eric Thompson, Kenneth Gause, Daniel Whiteneck, Dmitry Gorenburg, Dean Cheng, Peter Perla, and Christopher Weuve—encouraged me to complete the dissertation, assisted me on some lingering empirical questions, and above all, gave me the time to balance both writing and work in order to satisfy the requirements of each. On that note, I also wish to thank Captain Michael Franken, U.S. Navy, and his staff in the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) assessments branch (N810). Captain Franken, in agreement with his CNA counterparts, released me from duty for a critical month during which I made some finishing touches to the thesis. The Einaudi Foundation provided my principal funding. I also received support from the Cornell Peace Studies Program and the Mellon Foundation. Last, but not least, I wish to thank Katherine Kelleher and her late husband, Jim. The Kellehers welcomed me as their guest and allowed me to spend a summer with them in Brussels to conduct field research. Without their generosity and without their contacts in the American defense establishment in Belgium, this dissertation would have been a far less pleasant exercise. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Biographical Sketch iii Dedication iv Acknowledgements v Table of Contents vii CHAPTER ONE Introduction 1 CHAPTER TWO The Foundations of a Constructivist Analysis 18 CHAPTER THREE Background 71 CHAPTER FOUR The Tornado Multirole Combat Aircraft 112 CHAPTER FIVE Eurofighter — Lessons Learned, Unlearned, and Lost 170 CHAPTER SIX The “Euro” Howitzers 212 CHAPTER SEVEN Trade, Counter-Trade and Last Best Hopes: The Anglo-French Reciprocal Purchasing Agreement 235 CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusion 268 Bibliography 292 vii CHAPTER ONE Introduction The idea of Europe is inseparable from the idea of defense -François Mitterrand1 Ideas are important. For two generations, we have seen the "idea of Europe"— the drive toward West European integration embodied first in the European Communi- ties (EC) and later in the European Union (EU)—progress from promise, to crisis, to rejuvenation and renewed dynamism.2 Decades of incremental change have produced "reinterpretations" of national interest and of autonomy that differ considerably from past periods.3 Today, Western Europe is closer to economic union and political con- federation than at any other time. Multiple, overlapping institutions make this environment possible, influencing European affairs in almost every issue area. Yet as the idea of Europe has broadened and deepened to embrace a new collective identity and symbolize "pooled sovereignty," the idea of European defense stands unfulfilled and theoretically under-explored. Defense cooperation in Western Europe is both considerable and long-lived, predating the formal creation of the regional integration movement.4 Regional militar- 1 Cited in Marthias Jopp, Reinhardt Rummel, and Peter Schmidt, Integration and Security in Western Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 16. 2 See Dorette Corbey, "Dialectical functionalism: stagnation as a booster of European integration," In- ternational Organization 49 (Spring 1995); Stanley Hoffman, "The European Community and 1992," Foreign Affairs 68 (Fall 1989): 26-34. 3 See Ulf Hedertoft, "The State of Sovereignty in Europe," in National Cultures and European Integra- tion, ed. Staffan Zetterholm (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1994), 23, 27. 4 Josef Joffe and David Calleo, for example, argue that the institutional regional presence of the United States through NATO mitigated traditional enmity between Western European states. Moreover, it pro- vided an informal security guarantee that permitted the integration movement to begin via NATO and 1 2 ies have been denationalized and harmonized under an integrated command structure formed forty-nine years ago, and have been bound together in increasingly sophisti- cated ways through a tapestry of interlocking alliances and policy-coordination groups. Nonetheless, the goal of regional security remains fundamentally incomplete, nationalized and fragmented in the critical area of arms procurement.