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Great Power Competition in the Arctic

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Great Power Competition in the Arctic Food for thought August 2020 GREAT POWER COMPETITION IN THE ARCTIC Written by Julien Dalman, Alexandre Delepierre, Camille De Sutter, AN EXPERTISE FORUM CONTRIBUTING TO EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTING TO FORUM AN EXPERTISE SINCE 1953 ARMIES INTEROPERABILITY European Army Interoperability Center Gaultier Fort and Alberto Rizzi This paper was drawn up by Julien Dalman, Alexandre Delepierre, Camille De Sutter, Gaultier Fort and Alberto Rizzi under the supervision and guidance of Mr Mario Blokken, Director of the Permanent Secretariat. This Food for Thought paper is a document that gives an initial reflection on the theme. The content is not reflecting the positions of the member states but consists of elements that can initiate and feed the discussions and analyses in the domain of the theme. All our studies are available on www.finabel.org TABLE OF CONTENT Introduction 3 Great power competition and the growing importance of the Arctic 4 Reasons for Arctic great power competition: Opportunities and importance of the area 4 Legal perspectives and territorial claims 6 The challenges of cohabitation in the Arctic region 8 The actors in the Arctic power play 12 Russia 12 China 13 The U.S. and Canada 16 Scandinavian and Nordic Countries 20 Assessing the EU’s Role in the Arctic: The great absentee of geopolitical competition? 24 Conclusion 28 Sources 30 Great power competition in the Arctic 2 INTRODUCTION reat power competition is return- China has a more recent history in the Arctic ing to the Arctic region. This paper than Russia. It has only recently declared itself outlines the reasons for this return a “near-Arctic state” to legitimise its presence and determines what role regional in the region and buy into the race for eco- actors play in the area. First, we nomic resources. Additionally, China is inter- will account for the reasons for great power ested in the opening of new Arctic routes that Gcompetition in the Arctic, outline the legal per- will allow it to conduct international trade at spectives mitigating competition in the region, lower costs because of reduced shipping times – and spell out what challenges exist in allowing an Arctic Silk Road. all great powers to coexist in the region. In the second part of the paper, we will spell out the The U.S. and Canada are considered separately role of each actor present in the region, namely in this paper because of their very different for- Russia, China, the United States and Canada, eign policy approach to the Arctic. The U.S. the Scandinavian and Nordic countries, and had been a dormant actor for several years until the EU as a whole. 2009 when the Bush administration launched its renewed Arctic policy. Still, the U.S. relies The reasons for the return of great power com- on outdated technology and limited finan- petition in the Arctic region are rather to be cial resources that weaken its presence in the found in the international system than in the area. Canada, however, is more assertive in its characteristics of the region itself. Valuable eco- claims over the Arctic. Indeed, since 2007, it has nomic and natural resources, and military and launched several initiatives to improve capac- research bases can be found scattered around ities to enhance and assert its sovereignty in the area, each power claiming sovereignty on the region. Still, the efforts are deemed insuf- a different parcel of the ground and surround- ficient compared to the important stakes the ing seas. However, the international system region holds. However, unlike the aforemen- lacks structured organisations that have the tioned actors, Canada is less concerned about power to regulate great power competition in the economic potential of the region than about the region, which incentivises some of the more environmental issues. assertive powers to claim sovereignty on areas that should belong to the global commons. This Likewise, the Scandinavian and Nordic coun- is even though the UN Convention on the Law tries adjacent to the Arctic (Norway, Denmark, of the Seas (UNCLOS) aims to mitigate any Sweden, Finland and Iceland) are focused on excessive territorial claims in the Arctic. Addi- sustainable development of the region and its tionally, great powers with the capacity to do populations, whilst preserving peace and cooper- so occasionally navigate the Arctic sea routes, ation. All five states determine a common Arctic to demonstrate that they consider their free strategy and cooperate to achieve the objectives occupancy of the area as legitimate. set out. With two coastal states among them and one country that has one-third of its area Each actor active in the region asserts its pres- located above the Arctic Circle, the Nordic states ence differently. Russia has been an active Arctic have high stakes in asserting their place in great actor since the 1920s and has considered the power competition in the Arctic. region as part of its foreign policy ever since. It views the Arctic as a vantage point as well as Finally, we will determine the role the EU as a space to store its nuclear deterrence arsenal. a whole plays and needs to play in the region. Great power competition in the Arctic 3 As the only great power not holding a seat in integrated approach to foreign policy in the the Arctic Council – in which even China was region. The result of this lack of strategy is that granted a spot as a permanent observer – the the EU is lagging behind in great power com- EU needs to assert its role as a defender of its petition in the Arctic. Nordic states by creating a comprehensive, GREAT POWER COMPETITION AND THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF THE ARCTIC Reasons for Arctic great power competition: Opportunities and importance of the area In the last decade, the Arctic region has seen a strong return of great power competition, gain- ing prominence in international affairs after a long period of rel- ative stability. While the Arctic had for much of the Cold War represented an area of militarised competition between the U.S. and Ice-breakers are a key asset in Arctic competition, for both commercial and the Soviet Union, the region soon military purposes. (Photo: Coast Guard Senior Chief Petty Officer NyxoLyno became characterised by coop- Cangemi, United States Department of Defense). eration after the Soviet Union collapsed. Russia and the U.S., together with The drivers of the quick rise of the Arctic power most of the Arctic countries, were able to estab- play are twofold: some are internal to the region, lish frameworks, such as the Arctic Council in due to its characteristics, while the others are 1996, to deal with regional (and mainly tech- external and tend to effectively reproduce the nical) issues in a concerted approach (Rottem, already existing reasons for global competition. To 2020). Even as the first signs of the collapse of explore these factors, this paper adopts a typical the post-Cold War order started to appear, the neo-realist perspective of international relations, Arctic situation remained rather peaceful and presenting first the environmental reasons for cooperative, partly due to the technical, rather great power competition in the Arctic system, than political, dynamics of the regional fora. and then the causes related to the global system. However, in recent years, the region has been shifting away from this cooperation and has Regional Drivers of Arctic Competition rapidly turned into an arena for great power competition. The military presence has risen, as The Arctic regional system is characterised by a have competing economic investment and polit- relatively large number of actors, including states, ical involvement coming from different actors. local governments and autonomous communities Great power competition in the Arctic 4 concentrated in a small area that is important in 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil, 30% of itself, due to both its geographic location and the global stock of undiscovered natural gas, its resources. The Arctic region, despite being and 20% of the world’s undiscovered gas liquids highly inhospitable and difficult to access, is (Zandee, Kruijver and Stoetman, 2020: 10). strategically located between North America While the extraction of those resources was and Eurasia, connecting two crucial regions in previously largely impossible due to the harsh case of a military confrontation. It also domi- climate and the lack of adequate technologies, nates the North Atlantic and its supply routes, global warming and developments in machin- pivotal for NATO and American support to ery are making their exploitation a feasible per- European defence (Burke, 2020). spective. Additionally, the Arctic soil is rich in rare earth, which are crucial raw materials for On the other hand, the Arctic also constitutes many advanced technologies (including military Russia’s northern flank, and its waters are the first ones), representing for many countries the only layer of the “bastion” defensive system inherited alternative source to China (Northam, 2019). from the Soviet military doctrine. This concept Unimpaired access to those resources is there- is based on the idea of highly-protected mar- fore desirable not only from a purely economic itime areas where ballistic missile submarines point of view but would also constitute a way can be based together with their support facili- to enhance security (Soare, 2020). ties without being exposed to attacks (Mikkola, 2019). Furthermore, in Moscow’s perspective, Furthermore, the melting of the icecaps is also the Arctic represents the only way to access the allowing for commercial use of several sea routes Atlantic Ocean easily and thus threaten NATO’s that would significantly reduce shipping times lines of communication (Melino & Conley, from Asia to Europe. All these economic oppor- 2020). An effective military presence in the tunities, despite being largely unprofitable due Arctic region is therefore essential to Russia, to the high costs associated with insurances, to avoid being at a disadvantage and blocked weather, distance and lack of adequate capa- on its shores without the possibility to coun- bilities, are prompting a sort of race for the terattack.
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