Afghan air force aircrew and NATO Air Training Command– Afghanistan air advisors stand together after first-ever all-Afghan C-130 flight, Kabul, Afghanistan, June 16, 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Vernon Young, Jr.)
Advising the Afghan Air Force
By Aaron Tucker and Aimal Pacha Sayedi
uccessful advising requires skill are gleaned from studying the Soviet Airlift as a Counterinsurgency in a broad range of competencies experience in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Tactic S that includes political-military Finally, developing effective advising The Hindu Kush mountain range relations, operations, and acquisi- postures can be guided by a conceptual extends from central Afghanistan, with tions. Advising the Afghan air force’s model that incorporates ideas outlined peaks more than 16,000 feet high, airlift mission seeks to strengthen the in Colonel John Boyd’s essay “Destruc- through the Badakhshan region in legitimacy of the Government of the tion and Creation”1 and by systems the northwest of the country, where Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as part engineering techniques. This article mountain peaks reach 24,000 feet. of the counterinsurgency strategy of breaks down the essential components Throughout history, this rugged terrain the International Security Assistance of a successful air advising posture, has isolated Afghanistan’s numerous Force (ISAF). Training at the U.S. Air applies it to the mission in Afghani- tribes, causing local government and Force’s Air Advisor Academy supports stan, and concludes with a summary family-based power structures to prevail. the initial qualification of students as of key points and suggested areas for Moreover, attempts by foreign powers air advisors, while additional lessons improvement. to install a strong central government have been strenuously resisted. Ancient invaders such as Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan simply bypassed Lieutenant Colonel Aaron Tucker, USAF, is Deputy Chief in the Turbine Engine Division at the Air terrain that was difficult to conquer, Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Colonel Aimal Pacha Sayedi, Afghan Air Force, is Commander of the 373rd Fixed Wing Squadron, Kabul Air Wing, and the first C-130 leaving ungoverned areas referred to as Aircraft Commander in the Afghan Air Force. yagistan, that is, lawless places. Deliv-
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Tucker and Sayedi 17 ering government services to isolated Successful application of advising tac- developing cross-cultural empathy and areas that would otherwise harbor tics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) the ability to relate to Afghan counter- insurgents enforces governmental could transform current Afghan capabil- parts. In contrast, most Soviet advisors legitimacy and is a critical part of the ities to a long-term, sustainable solution. during the 1980s had little specialized 6 Afghan counterinsurgency strategy. An North Atlantic Treaty Organization training or advisory experience. A air mobility capability increases Afghan Air Training Command–Afghanistan 1-week course covered the political, capacity to govern and administer (NATC-A) advisors are authorized to military, and economic situation while through presence and persistence. assist the Afghan air force in the direct instructors emphasized the importance Rotary-wing airlift is flexible and execution of their mission in support of of the Soviet internationalist mission its capability to reach remote landing the ISAF Train, Advise, Assist (TAA) and tried to impart a sense of optimism.7 zones is critical to the counterinsurgency mission under Operation Resolute During the course, Soviet advisors might mission in Afghanistan. It is expensive Support. Assessments are communi- also pick up additional reading on Afghan to operate and maintain, however. cated through the advisors’ leadership history or politics on their own initiative. Developing a less expensive, fixed-wing to indicate current trends and signs of airlift capability to replace rotary-wing definitive success. Personnel at each level Conceptual Models for assets on runway-to-runway routes would of leadership are responsible for advising Advising Postures reduce wear and tear on the rotary-wing their counterparts, so regular assessments Advisors spend a great deal of energy fleet’s limited life span. In addition to help maintain coherence throughout the developing postures that guide their passenger and cargo transportation, organization. Afghan personnel should counterpart relationships toward fixed-wing airlift can also provide casualty be the visible and actual force behind achieving a sustainable solution. evacuation (CASEVAC) and nontra- the mission because they are more ef- One conceptual model of use in this ditional intelligence, surveillance, and fective among the population and lend context is presented in John Boyd’s reconnaissance (NTISR) capabilities in legitimacy to the government during a essay “Destruction and Creation.” The support of Afghan National Security counterinsurgency. Advisor assistance essay outlines a thought process of the Forces (ANSF). Due to the cultural is required when Afghans have not yet destruction of a concept down to its importance of family and tribal bonds, developed the required skill set or gained components through analysis, followed dependable CASEVAC is critical to the the necessary experience for safe, effective by the construction of a conceptual morale and fighting spirit of ANSF sol- execution. The range of options along model through synthesis.8 Boyd also diers fighting for their country far from the advise-assist spectrum offers advisors uses the mathematical concept of differ- their families and home villages.2 a great deal of flexibility in responding to entiation to illustrate how to understand the tactical situation. Coordinated pos- a concept or response based on the way The Air Advisor in Afghanistan tures allow several lines of effort to work it changes relative to a given variable. The mission of the air advisor is to together to develop combat capability The advisor can then apply inductive assess, advise, assist, train, and equip and build Afghan forces to a sustainable logic to construct a conceptual model. Afghan aviation forces to achieve coun- capability. And as is often the case in Integration of the differentiated parts terinsurgency objectives.3 Generally irregular warfare, “success in one area allows the creation of an internally con- considered experts in their career fields, may coexist with failure in another and sistent and effective advising posture. the advisors bring a wealth of opera- uncertainty in most.”4 Similarly, Afghan operational tional experience and seasoned judg- Both combat aviation advisors networks such as CASEVAC or air ment to the dynamic task of mentoring and air advisors play a significant role transportation can be analyzed as sys- Afghan airmen in a fluid and often in irregular warfare. Combat aviation tems of interconnected systems. Systems challenging combat environment that is advisors graduate from a 1-year special engineering techniques are useful for typically unfamiliar to the advisor. For operations course and receive extensive understanding complex mission sets example, the 538th Air Expeditionary training focused on independent, small- and developing lean solutions that meet Advisory Squadron (538 AEAS) advised team operations in a specific region and validated operational requirements. For the 373rd Fixed Wing Squadron (373 cultural environment. A distinct 5-week example, the functional decomposition FWS) in the Afghan air force Kabul air advisor course instructs general pur- technique is similar to Boyd’s concept of air wing. Although each advisor was pose forces in three areas: core advising destruction and is informed by the Joint an expert airlift operator, the mission skills; specialized language, culture, and Operation Planning Process applied at of the 538 AEAS was not to execute regional studies; and advanced force-pro- the tactical level.9 In this process, mission an airlift mission, but to advise Afghan tection skills. It also provides a bridge stakeholders are first surveyed to validate counterparts in establishing a sustain- between the extensive combat aviation a complete set of requirements. Next, a able method for effective and efficient advisor course and the “slap dash” type complex task is decomposed from the sys- movement of passengers and cargo. of training provided to Vietnam-era tem level into progressively simpler tasks advisors.5 These courses are critical to until an individual work unit is defined.
18 Forum / Advising the Afghan Air Force JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 U.S. Army Train, Advise, Assist Command–Air personal security detail shift lead provides security while MD-530 Cayuse Warrior takes off with all-Afghan crew for combat mission, September 27, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Sandra Welch)
Lean management ensures that only destruction, and differentiation, a prop- defined mission is based on validated tasks that can be directly traced to a val- erly defined mission can be decomposed Afghan requirements and coordinated idated requirement receive resources for into relevant tasks and then individ- throughout Afghan and coalition leader- completion. Additionally, the interfaces uated for cultural and task suitability. ship. Afghans need to have direct input between tasks are defined and developed Synthesizing an advising posture starts when devising the requirements, and to support operation at system and with an assessment of the current their coalition advisors must listen care- system-of-systems levels. Applied to the Afghan capability and then establishes a fully to understand the Afghan vision that advisor mission, host nation economic, balance between advising and assisting drives their mission statement. Metrics cultural, and operational sustainability to reinforce a desired mode of opera- are derived from specific tasks that can be is the standard by which any materiel or tion. A set of advising postures estab- tracked and assessed on a regular basis. procedural solution should be judged. lishes the ability of an advising team to Advisors continually assess the effective- deliver coherent advice across a mission ness of their efforts, Afghan capabilities, Developing Advising Postures set that involves individual interactions and the assumptions in their advising Advisors leverage technical expertise in with Afghan counterparts. This allows posture. The assessment starts long be- the development and application of mil- for efficient and effective progress fore a materiel solution is identified and itary power with knowledge of Afghan toward a sustainable solution while at continues after equipment is fielded. culture and capabilities to construct an the same time advancing the coalition’s Destruct U.S. Methods/Paradigms. advising posture. This posture in turn counterinsurgency mission. The follow- Using their professional expertise in guides coordinated and coherent advice ing sections describe this process step employing airpower, advisors analyze and assistance. It is both flexible enough by step. coalition TTPs and deduce their appli- to respond to the tactical situation and Define the Mission. Good advising cability to the Afghan environment. The structured enough to direct lines of starts with a well-defined mission and an appropriate model of Afghan airpower, effort toward an identified endstate. accurate assessment based on mutually however, must be developed with intel- Through the processes of definition, beneficial security objectives. A properly lectual humility and with consideration
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Tucker and Sayedi 19 for Afghan strengths, capabilities, and coalition advisors to the Afghan air force working and flying alongside Afghan requirements. It should also be “less served 6-month tours, which were not partners are powerful mechanisms to intrusive and more insightful; less in con- long enough to enable them to become establish rapport, build relationships, and trol and more in support.”10 While there knowledgeable about their advising demonstrate a mission skill set. Thus, is institutional inertia for a technological mission and to establish a rapport with air advisors in Kabul work outside coali- solution,11 it is important for advisors their counterparts. Patience and sub- tion-secured compounds on a daily basis to weigh in on the sustainability of that tlety are required by both advisors and to properly engage with their Afghan technology in light of cultural, educa- counterparts to understand each other’s counterparts. tional, and economic considerations. perspectives, requirements, and strengths. After a period of seasoning, Afghan- Foreign military sale decisions often are When advising airlift operations, under- demonstrated proficiency allows advisors made at the diplomatic and strategic lev- standing transportation priorities helps to shift from assistance to advising while els, but make little tactical sense.12 advisors work with the Afghans to de- controlling the pace of the move to- Differentiate Regarding Afghan velop a sustainable solution. For example, ward an independent Afghan capability Mission/Culture. Advisors work with the movement of human remains to the through the enforcement of performance their Afghan counterparts to differentiate place of burial without unreasonable standards. Afghans should progress with between processes that are sustainable in delay is the top airlift priority due to diminishing mentor support without the Afghan environment and those that religious considerations. In addition, meddling merely to promote efficiencies. are not. Coalition processes are not nec- ANSF leave policies are designed to As T.E. Lawrence cautioned, it is “better essarily applicable to the Afghan air force, accommodate close ties with family and that they do it tolerably than that you and developing sustainable solutions is home villages. As a result, there is a large do it perfectly.”16 When Soviet advisors not possible without understanding the demand for troop transport from remote were held accountable for Afghan forces’ influence of culture, religion, politics, and bases back to the population centers performance, they tended to take control social considerations as an operational ne- around Kabul and Jalalabad. rather than advise Afghan forces. This cessity.13 With a heavy reliance on donor Construct an Advising Posture. imbalance slowed the development of countries that have a finite commitment Constructing advising postures requires Afghan capabilities. timeline and budget, Afghan operations time and patience in order to listen and The force protection/personal en- must conserve resources and vigorously observe. Reconciling what is said with gagement balance is carefully considered seek efficiencies in support functions what actually happens is crucial to devel- during the synthesis of any advising while preserving operational flexibility. oping practicable postures. Furthermore, posture, but the risk of an insider or Afghan officers require sound advice on effective advising postures balance Afghan insurgent attack is never completely how to provide airpower capabilities that success with the freedom to fail. Earned mitigated. Force protection and combat are both effective and efficient, but their success is excellent positive reinforcement skills training were increased after nine insights into sustainable practices are crit- of training, and Afghans take great pride NATC-A advisors were killed on April ical to finding a sustainable path to best in knowing their efforts have directly 27, 2011. The result was a decision to serve the Afghan people. The sustainable resulted in mission success. Conversely, harden the NATC-A staff offices and process should be a mix of technology, failure is an important training tool, and levy “guardian angel”17 requirements training, and support functions that en- the advising posture should manage risks on advisors. Under these requirements, ables affordable, sustainable, and capable and mitigate the consequences of failure advisor engagement with Afghan coun- airpower. Soviet advisors only knew how while promoting the ability of Afghans to terparts suffered significantly and resulted to replicate their experience in the Soviet live with their own decisions. An advising in policies and initiatives that were re- Union and could not differentiate their posture with too much emphasis on moved from Afghan realities. This type native ideological approach into a suc- assistance will result in overdependence. of fortress mentality is anathema to the cessful Afghan solution.14 Soviet advisors tended to complete a advising spirit and mission, and it is time Integrate Through Cultural task themselves rather than training their to return to embedded advising for staff Considerations. Successful advising counterparts. As a result, Afghans had advisors. Tactical-level advisors, however, postures integrate Afghan and coalition largely stopped working, preferring to remained embedded with the Afghans cultural considerations. Study of Afghan “lay all the burden and responsibility for and were able to adjust their advising history and culture before assuming practical work on the shoulders of the posture based on threat indicators while advising duties enables understanding advisors.”15 maintaining open relationships that pro- the context of Afghan airmen and their Ensure Balance. Advisors strive for duced significant results. In the 1980s, mission. Advisors need to immerse a balance between the advise and assist Soviet advisory teams were embedded themselves in their roles by attending functions, which is continually shifting, with the Afghan forces and, although meetings, flying on missions, and forming depending on the task and the maturity not authorized to do so, assisted with strong professional relationships with of the Afghan process. When balanced combat operations. They faced a threat their Afghan colleagues. Until 2008, with force protection considerations, of mujahideen infiltration in the ranks of
20 Forum / Advising the Afghan Air Force JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 U.S. Air Force Train, Advise, Assist Command–Air advisor pilot and guardian angel Airman and Afghan air force pilot after training flight on Cessna C-208, September 21, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Sandra Welch)
Afghan troops that was similar to the cur- cabin configurations for passenger or Mi-17s. Additionally, soldiers depend on rent insider threat of insurgent attacks on floor-loaded cargo/patient transport. fixed-wing CASEVAC to return home for Afghan soldiers and their advisors.18 However, a major C-208 deficiency is care and recovery. an unpressurized cabin and low service To establish a fixed-wing CASEVAC Fixed-Wing Airlift Advising ceiling. Unable to climb above the moun- capability, advisors assist the Afghan air Airlift in Afghanistan supports the tainous terrain, the aircraft’s en route force in assessing airfields, training flight counterinsurgency mission by extending operations through mountain passes and medics, and mentoring C-208 capabili- official services to the Afghan popula- valleys are required to be daytime visual ties. Airfields without a coalition presence tion, thereby increasing the legitimacy maneuvers even if airport approaches are are assessed for suitability by researching of the government. Airlift also provides under instrument flight rules. airfield characteristics such as runway a means to transport critical supplies Establishing a fixed-wing CASEVAC length, width, surface material and condi- across a mountainous country with capability is a military and economic tion, as well as taxi obstructions, security, limited roads. Finally, soldiers travel imperative. The Afghan system mirrors and fuel availability. C-208 pilots work home frequently to maintain the social the coalition medical evacuation process directly with Afghan flight medics from fabric of family and tribe, and airlift with rotary-wing lift from the point of the Kabul air wing hospital, attending to reduces soldiers’ time away from their injury to base hospitals. However, since litter and ambulatory patients who re- posts. These missions motivate airlift dedicated assets are expensive to operate, quire assistance during loading or flight. advisors and Afghan airmen to establish Afghan Mi-17 helicopters pick up soldiers Advisors coordinate with ANSF medics a sustainable airlift capability. close to the point of injury and take them to conduct training at their home airfield. C-208 Aircraft. The Afghan air to a forward field station or regional During these training sessions, medics force fleet of 26 C-208B Grand Caravan hospital. Wounded soldiers are next learn to configure the passenger cabin to aircraft is configured with a modern flown to the National Military Hospital accommodate litter patients, as well as to Garmin G1000 avionics suite and up in Kabul using fixed-wing CASEVAC, as load and properly secure litters. Medics to 10 removable seats (in addition to one C-208 can operate at 3 percent of and airlift planners also become familiar the pilot and copilot) to allow multiple the cost of generating the flights of two with C-208 CASEVAC capabilities and
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Tucker and Sayedi 21 in the province. The aerial photographs of the disaster area were quickly analyzed and provided to ground commanders and government officials to understand the magnitude of the mudslide and manage the risk of subsequent slides. C-130 Aircraft. In January 2013, Ashton Carter, then–Deputy Secretary of Defense, directed the U.S. Air Force to provide four C-130H aircraft and the requisite training to the Afghan air force by the end of September 2013.21 An arrival ceremony on October 9, 2013, celebrated the delivery of the first two aircraft. Expectations for the new capabilities they would provide were high as advisors worked to establish an advising posture and define the sustain- able solution while exercising the aircraft Salang Pass meanders through Hindu Kush Mountains and has been called one of most dangerous capabilities, command and control, and roads in world (U.S. Army/Michael K. Selvage) ground support infrastructure. Advisor operations, so they can request C-208 the windows thoroughly. Prior to the creativity and initiative enabled the first support instead of the more expensive start of such a mission, advisors conduct all-Afghan C-130 mission in June 2014. Mi-17 airlift. Finally, advisors educate extensive flight and ground training for The Afghan medium-airlift re- higher echelon leadership at shuras (con- the Afghan intelligence analysts. Some quirement consists of passenger, cargo, sultations) such as the Afghan National training flights might emphasize practice casualty, and human remains movement Army 203rd Corps Shura or National with camera equipment and coordination between main bases. The large majority CASEVAC Shura in December 2013. with pilots on selecting good routes and of missions carry up to 70 passengers Nontraditional intelligence, surveil- aspect angles for photographing specific and a baggage pallet loaded on the cargo lance, and reconnaissance is another ground targets. Pilots practice maneuvers ramp position. Occasionally, cargo mis- important capability that the C-208 can to orient the airplane for good photogra- sions are also tasked, but the planning provide. U.S. advisors and their Afghan phy from the windows, establish ground timelines for air transportation missions counterparts work together to differenti- tracks, and mitigate exposure to ground are centrally controlled by the Ministry ate coalition methodologies and establish threats. After the mission is completed, of Defense. Afghanistan has a robust skills that make sense for the Afghan mis- intelligence analysts apply imagery anal- ground transportation mode that moves sion, including TTPs, planning, analysis, ysis techniques to fix geospatial points, virtually all required supplies for the and exploitation. Confidence missions identify target features, and measure char- ANSF. Airlift transports passengers and and exercises are then used to validate the acteristic data. Such a continuum of flight sensitive cargo that must move quickly or training.19 Finally, the capability is proved and ground advising ensures that NTISR that is an attractive target for insurgent through success in support of real-world provides sound intelligence to the Afghan attack and theft (for example, ammuni- requirements. operational forces.20 tion, weapons, or leadership). Rather than requiring dedicated As coalition basing contracts to The C-130 is the largest and fastest assets, the C-208 is a suitable NTISR Kabul, an Afghan airfield assessment aircraft in the Afghan inventory. It is a platform due to its low operating cost, its capability is critical to survey airfields source of national pride, an indicator prevalence in the Afghan air force, and to support the dynamic airlift needs of of governmental legitimacy, and, as a its low visual and aural signatures. For counterinsurgency and humanitarian direct threat to the insurgents’ narrative, conducting NTISR, intelligence analysts relief operations. For instance, one of the a high-value target. As such, it normally receive a mission tasking and prepare a first airfields assessed was Feyzabad in flies to airfields where coalition security simple brief with global positioning sys- Badakhshan Province. Based on this as- is available to provide external security to tem coordinates and descriptions of the sessment, the Afghan air force was ready the aircraft and crew. To deliver sustain- targets. Pilots plan approach routing to to establish an air operations detachment able cargo and passenger capabilities, a mitigate threats and exploit advantageous there in late 2013. In May 2014, C-208 loadmaster posture that would work for sun angles. No modifications to the and C-130 crews executed airlift and both coalition-assisted and all-Afghan aircraft are typically required, although NTISR missions in support of humani- crews was developed. Cargo and passen- particular attention is paid to cleaning tarian relief operations after a mudslide ger loads that did not meet standards
22 Forum / Advising the Afghan Air Force JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 for safe transport were identified by the While their technical abilities had been a successful milestone in the medium air- loadmaster and assessed as an advising developed in a similar airlift aircraft, lan- lift capability of the Afghan air force was opportunity, with notification made to guage barriers remained. Second, damage achieved on June 16, 2014. the aircraft commander and the aerial to any of the small fleet of Afghan C-130s Aviation English Language port advisor. The aircraft commander would have a lasting, strategic impact Training. Advisors were developing a determined the time available to assess, on its medium-airlift operations due to passenger-only C-130 loadmaster sylla- advise, train, and assist aircrew and aerial limited heavy repair capability. Finally, bus in December 2013 when Raytheon port personnel. If time was not sufficient passenger missions with no cargo except a English language instructors announced to correct the problem, the cargo or pas- baggage pallet constituted 80 percent of that they had unfilled capacity for avia- sengers were refused. Discrepancies were the missions. tion English training. Because the four distributed to the appropriate advising Integrating the resulting Afghan mis- passenger-only loadmaster candidates teams to facilitate coordinated advising sion requirements with advisor resources were not proficient in English, they had postures. and capabilities allowed the synthesis of a not been identified for the loadmaster While pilots and a flight engineer practicable advising posture. Additional training pipeline in the United States. were in U.S. training programs in 2013, English instructors were available as a The fixed-wing advisors thus joined Afghan loadmaster students were not result of a realignment of a Raytheon their technical knowledge and expertise scheduled to complete training until contract (see below) to develop language with the Raytheon instructors’ language 2015. Therefore, to accelerate an initial lessons tailored to the loadmaster training instruction and curriculum development all-Afghan C-130 capability, advisor requirements. English instruction was skills to train loadmasters in Kabul. In initiative created a limited loadmaster integrated with C-130 aircrew proce- addition, Raytheon had remaining ca- course. Advisors noted that the vast ma- dures and systems training to support pacity to instruct more students. Thus jority of Afghan C-130 missions carried a loadmaster qualification course. The a 10-week Aviation English Training passengers, patients, or human remains, risk of aircraft damage was mitigated by (AET) course was developed in January with only a baggage pallet loaded on reserving training in winching operations 2014 to prepare 8 aircrew and 17 mainte- the cargo ramp. Advisors from the 538 or vehicle loading for the formal training nance students for success at the Defense AEAS were familiar with U.S. Air Force course at Little Rock Air Force Base, Language Institute (DLI) and follow-on training paradigms, as most had experi- Arkansas. Local loadmaster training technical training conducted in English. ence as schoolhouse instructors. U.S. Air focused on cargo compartment config- Four follow-on AET courses similarly Force loadmaster training is conducted uration for passengers, litter patients, or identified requirements from NATC-A using a syllabus that is structured around human remains. Only a baggage pallet stakeholders, resulting in a functional lesson plans and that employs classroom was loaded on the aft pallet position on English course for 108 students from learning, static load trainers, and flight the cargo ramp using a forklift. the Kabul air wing and DLI preparation instruction. (Static load trainers are non- The first C-130 mission with an courses for A-29 pilots and maintainers, flying aircraft that allow for continuous all-Afghan crew represented the conver- MD-530 helicopter pilots, students iden- training opportunities without the ex- gence of 9 months of assessing, training, tified for pilot training in the United Arab pense of using an aircraft maintained for advising, and assisting. The main risk Emirates, and Kabul air wing maintainers flying operations or the risk of damage was crew inexperience, and advisors identified for supervisory positions re- resulting in expensive repairs and impact and Afghan aircrew worked together to quiring English proficiency. on the flying mission.) This progression mitigate that risk. The mission was lim- To develop the AET advising pos- of instruction builds knowledge and skills ited to passengers, patients, and human ture, regular meetings with stakeholders for demonstration and practice with in- remains, with a baggage pallet loaded on defined the mission through an open creasing degrees of risk and expense. The the main ramp. A single stop at a familiar discussion of requirements. AET was highest risk of injury and damage occurs coalition-controlled field eased crew designed to instruct students in technical during cargo load training, particularly coordination and security concerns, and English to accelerate follow-on technical that involving winching operations or enabled a straightforward maintenance training. An analysis of the U.S. Air Force driving vehicles on board. recovery plan. High-ranking government process revealed a series of training events Advisors understood the risk of officials and international media were for each student: several months at DLI aircraft damage during loadmaster train- invited to welcome the crew at the end until the student achieved functional flu- ing and sought to mitigate the risk by of the mission, but no interviews were ency, followed by basic technical training differentiating U.S. Air Force training granted during preflight and departure (for example, maintenance, aircrew), and regarding the Afghan mission. First, for- to allow the crew to concentrate on ex- then specialized technical training (for mer C-27 instructor loadmasters assigned ecuting a safe airlift mission. A generous example, fuels, hydraulics, flight engineer, to the 373 FWS in Kabul were not slated timeline allowed for response to unfore- loadmaster). Differentiating this process for C-130 training in the United States seen delays without imposing stress on regarding Afghan considerations, advisors because of English language deficiencies. the aircrew. As a result of these measures, determined that it would be valuable
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Tucker and Sayedi 23 5 to shorten the time that Afghans are posture by which advisors can develop John A. Nagl, Institutionalizing Adapta- tion: It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor deployed for overseas training and that, and deliver airlift capabilities to the Corps (Washington, DC: Center for a New under an existing contract, Raytheon Afghan air force. American Security, June 2007), 4. See also had the expertise to develop and deliver A critical requirement that enables Michael A. Keltz, “Getting Our Partners Air- technical English training in Afghanistan. advisors to adapt coalition techniques to borne: Training Air Advisors and Their Impact Additionally, through a stakeholders’ the Afghan airlift mission is an intimate In-Theater,” Air & Space Power Journal, May– June 2014, 7. meeting, C-130 maintenance and knowledge of what works in Afghanistan. 6 Olga Oliker, Building Afghanistan’s Se- Pohantoon-e-Hawayee (Air University) To achieve this level of knowledge, ad- curity Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience advisors identified Afghans who could visors must immerse themselves in their (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), 43. benefit from a DLI preparation course. missions, develop personal relationships 7 Artemy Kalinovsky, The Blind Leading At this meeting, 538 AEAS advisors with their counterparts, and seek to learn the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan, Working obtained NATC-A/J7 approval to con- and understand—and then create—advis- Paper #60 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson struct an AET capability. The integrated ing postures that are imposed on Afghans International Center for Scholars, January solution included Raytheon English in a coalition-centric environment. 2010), 8. instructors, advisors from the 538 AEAS It is time to return to the embedded 8 Boyd. to oversee operations and provide aircrew advisory posture and invert the ratio of 9 Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, subject matter expertise, NATC-A/J7 time spent between coalition and Afghan August 11, 2011), IV-1. to administer the Raytheon contract and workspaces. Afghans have had mentors 10 Jim Garamone, “Mullen Stresses Pre- advise the Afghan air force/G7 (Training for a generation, and their knowledge cision, Innovation to Graduates,” Air Force Office), and the 440 AEAS to provide and vision must be integral to the devel- Print News Today, June 10, 2010, available at maintenance subject matter expertise. opment of advising postures, not as an
24 Forum / Advising the Afghan Air Force JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016