Airpower in Afghanistan 2005—10 The Air Commanders’ Perspectives Edited by Dag Henriksen Foreword by Hon. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer Airpower in Afghanistan 2005–10 The Air Commanders’ Perspectives Edited by Dag Henriksen Lieutenant Colonel, Royal Norwegian Air Force Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy Foreword by Jaap De Hoop Scheffer 11th Secretary General of NATO, 2004–09 Air University Press Air Force Research Institute Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama Project Editor Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jerry L. Gantt Henriksen, Dag. Copy Editor Tammi K. Dacus Airpower in Afghanistan 2005-10 : the air com- manders’ perspectives / edited by Dag Henriksen, Cover Art, Book Design, and Illustrations Lieutenant Colonel, Royal Norwegian Air Force, Daniel Armstrong Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy ; foreword by Composition and Prepress Production Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, 11th Secretary General of Michele D. Harrell NATO, 2004-09. pages cm Print Preparation and Distribution Includes bibliographical references. Diane Clark ISBN 978-1-58566-235-7 1. Afghan War, 2001—Aerial operations 2. Air power—Afghanistan—History—20th century. 3. Norway. Luftforsvaret—Foreign service—Afghani- stan. 4. United States. Air Force—Foreign service— Afghanistan 5. Canada. Royal Canadian Air Force— Foreign service—Afghanistan 6. Afghan War, 2001—Participation, Norwegian. 7. Afghan War, 2001—Participation, Canadian. 8. Afghan War, AIR FORCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE 2001—Personal narratives. 9. Combined operations (Military science)—Afghanistan. I. Title. AIR UNIVERSITY PRESS DS371.412.H46 2014 958.104’748--dc23 Director and Publisher 2014038665 Allen G. Peck Editor in Chief Oreste M. Johnson Managing Editor Demorah Hayes Published by Air University Press in November 2014 Design and Production Manager Cheryl King Air University Press 155 N. Twining St., Bldg. 693 Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6026 [email protected] http://aupress.au.af.mil/ http://afri.au.af.mil/ Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the organizations with which they are associated or the views of the Air Force Research Institute, Air University, AFRI United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. This publication is cleared Air Force Research Institute for public release and unlimited distribution. ii Contents List of Figures v Foreword vii Honorable Jaap de Hoop Scheffer Author Biographies xi Acknowledgments xxi Introduction xxiii Lt Col Dag Henriksen, RNoAF Abbreviations xxxv PART I THE STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN, 2005–06 1 Silence before the Storm 3 Maj Gen Jaap Willemse, RNLAF, Retired 2 Airpower: The Theater Perspective 19 Lt Gen Allen G. Peck, USAF, Retired PART II ISAF ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR AFGHANISTAN 3 Operation Medusa 41 Maj Gen Charles S. Sullivan, Canadian Forces, Retired 4 The US-NATO Military Dichotomy 57 Maj Gen William L. Holland, USAF, Retired 5 From Saint-Mihiel (1918) to Afghanistan 69 Lt Gen Frederik H. Meulman, RNLAF, Retired 6 Airpower as a Second Thought 107 Maj Gen Maurice H. Forsyth, USAF, Retired 7 Moving toward Counterinsurgency 123 Lt Gen Jouke L. H. Eikelboom, RNLAF, Retired PART III THE COUNTERINSURGENCY DEBATE 8 The Shift from Iraq to Afghanistan 137 Maj Gen Douglas Raaberg, USAF, Retired 9 Game-Changing Strategies for Counterinsurgency and Complex Joint Operations 157 Maj Gen Charles S. Sullivan, Canadian Forces, Retired 10 Airpower over Afghanistan: Observation and Adaptation for the COIN Fight 235 Lt Gen Stephen L. Hoog, USAF Epilogue 259 Lt Col Dag Henriksen, RNoAF Appendix 283 Bibliography 291 iv List of Figures Figures 1 US Central Command area of responsibility 284 2 Map of Afghanistan 286 3 US close air support sorties, Afghanistan and Iraq, 2004–10 287 4 US CAS strike munitions dropped, Afghanistan and Iraq, 2004–10 288 5 US ISR Sorties, Afghanistan and Iraq, 2004-11 289 v vi Foreword Afghanistan has been a rewarding, complex, and challenging mis- sion for all nations involved, not least for Afghanistan itself. Few, if any, anticipated that the initial attacks on the Taliban regime in Af- ghanistan in fall 2001 would become the longest war in the history of NATO and the United States of America. Today, more than 12 years later, it is still too early to conclude the successes and failures of this campaign or predict how Afghanistan will evolve once the majority of international military forces leave the country in 2014. In the end, it will be up to the Afghans themselves to make their own decisions, destiny, and future. When I took office as the 11th secretary general of NATO in early 2004, the transatlantic wounds from the US invasion in Iraq in spring 2003 were still fresh. Many European nations rigorously opposed that war and felt the United States had manufactured the rational for the invasion. But the wounds healed sooner than I thought. In summer 2003, NATO assumed responsibility for the ISAF mission in Afghan- istan, and I saw how NATO, through its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, gradually brought the allies together. Looking back at the Iraq war, I learned two important lessons: (1) whenever Europe presents itself as a counterweight for the United States, the result is a divided Europe, which saddens me as a European; and (2) a United States that thinks it can do it all alone is also doomed to fail. To a certain extent, these lessons guided my approach to Afghanistan in my numerous discussions and meetings with alliance members and representatives from the wider international community. Afghani- stan was always going to be a team effort if we were to succeed. If anything, the international effort in Afghanistan has required patience. Patience with the political process of NATO and its mem- ber nations; patience with the government in Afghanistan and its ca- pability to address the many challenges of its nation; patience in transforming our mentality, structures, and organizations to adhere to the comprehensive approach we all knew was a prerequisite for success; patience with the political dynamics of Western govern- ments seeking quick and identifiable results, as opposed to the con- ventional wisdom of counterinsurgencies that prolonged time is often required and results seem to have a pace and presentation style of their own; patience from our domestic constituencies, which year after year saw an ever increasing accumulated number of their service men and vii FOREWORD women sacrificing their lives and limbs without a clear end state or exit strategy in sight. The handling of Afghanistan should be seen as a process. In the early twenty-first century, NATO forces were not adequately pre- pared, trained, educated, and equipped to fight a counterinsurgency in mountainous Afghanistan. International and security politics lit- erally changed overnight after 9/11. It had taken years to change our mentality and international structures after the Cold War a decade earlier, and in many ways we were still in that transformational mode when the airplanes hit the Twin Towers and Pentagon. Adapting to the new situation and the war in Afghanistan (and Iraq) needed time. I sometimes felt the often harsh criticism of our efforts in Afghani- stan did not reflect that reality. When evaluating our efforts, there are positives and negatives that need to be addressed. Surely a commonly agreed upon and cohesive strategy of how to handle Afghanistan took too long to develop. With Iraq draining much of the US resources, Afghanistan for years did not receive the resources and political attention this difficult opera- tion needed to make the progress we all wanted for this nation. For years the operation was an allied patchwork of individual nations be- ing responsible for PRTs and provinces without a sufficient overarch- ing allied cohesive effort. It proved difficult to implement the theo- retical construct of a comprehensive approach to real-life challenges in theater. The Afghan ability to deal with corruption, narcotics, and governmental competencies has proved less efficient and more chal- lenging than first expected. Although these efforts have had dedi- cated operational lines since 2006, achieving the level of “security,” “governance and reconstruction,” and “development” we all strived for has proved very difficult. None of these issues had its origins in ill will, lack of empathy with the Afghans, or lack of dedication. Some- times it is just hard to succeed. Conversely, there is no doubt that progress has been made. The influence of al-Qaeda in the theater has diminished significantly. Democratic elections have been held, a government elected, a parlia- ment formed, and a constitution adopted. Infrastructure has been strengthened, and the Afghan economy is much stronger today than before the international involvement. Basic health care in Afghani- stan has improved dramatically, and education is now a norm for millions of Afghan children. Women’s status has improved in Af- ghanistan, and the millions of young girls attending school compared viii FOREWORD to the pre–9/11 situation is perhaps the most heartening success of all progress made in this country. The number and competence of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are increased to a level that hopefully soon enables them to provide basic security and stability for Afghanistan. This is a fundamental for any nation. It is a basic foundation to ensure the long-term economic and political invest- ments necessary to meet the expectations of most Afghans and en- able Afghanistan to face the challenges of a volatile and increasingly economic competitive region. Educating, mentoring, and growing its military and police forces to be better positioned to provide basic security and the rule of law will perhaps be our most significant con- tribution and legacy. As the ISAF and OEF mission comes to an end in 2014, it is time to identify the lessons we have learned after more than a decade of war.