The Presidential Election in Ukraine, October 1999 Sarah Birch * Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ, UK

Electoral Studies 21 (2002) 339–363 www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud

Notes on Recent Elections The presidential election in Ukraine, October 1999 Sarah Birch * Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ, UK

The victory of the incumbent president, Leonid Kuchma, in Ukraine’s presidential election in October 1999 enhanced presidential control over Ukrainian politics. Adroit manoeuvring and covert manipulation allowed Kuchma and his administration to create a situation in which it was not truly feasible that he could lose. Since his re-election, Kuchma has exploited his renewed mandate to tighten his grip on several other state institutions in a series of increasingly authoritarian moves. Thus, the election marked a worrying erosion of Ukraine’s fledgling democracy, making it seem unlikely that a democratic state will be consolidated in the near future. The main axis of political competition in Ukraine is a left–right dimension, in which the left represents support for state control over the economy and closer ties with Russia, while the right favours liberal market principles and espouses a more nationalist stance. Between these poles lies a large pool of ‘centrists’ whose position on specific policy issues is less prominent than a desire to protect their business interests (which, in many cases, involve rent-seeking and other forms of state capture). Leonid Kuchma was elected to the Ukrainian presidency in July 1994, defeating Ukraine’s first post-Soviet president, Leonid Kravchuk, on a centre-left platform of closer ties with Russia and state subsidies for an ailing economy (Birch, 1995). Although winning with the support of the left, Kuchma gradually edged rightwards during his term of office; by the time of his bid for re-election in October 1999, his main support base was to the right of centre. There is some evidence of a gradual change in voting patterns and the rise of a socio-economic cleavage which may have benefited Kuchma. Yet the two principal factors which accounted for Kuchma’s success were divisions among his rivals on the left and state manipulation of the electoral process.

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44-1206-872-690; fax: +44-1206-873-598. E-mail address: [email protected] (S. Birch). 340 Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 21 (2002) 339–363

1. The electoral law

The Ukrainian president is elected directly, and one of the key factors in defining Ukraine’s electoral topography was the electoral law itself. In requiring the winner to have absolute majority support and limiting the run-off to two candidates, the law generated a double logic of competition. None of the contestants was able to aspire to unconditional majority support, so their common aim in the first round was to secure one of the top two slots. Polls showed the incumbent to be in the lead from June onwards (Demokratychni Initiatyvy, 1999a; Lesyuk, 1999, p. 20). This meant that the only unknown prior to the first round was who would be Kuchma’s second- round rival. A centre-left candidate would have stood a good chance of success against the President, whereas he was bound to win against a representative of the hard left. It was therefore in the interest of the left as a whole to rally around one of their more popular members. Despite several attempts to do so, this failed to happen. In the event, Kuchma’s rival in the second round was Petro Symonenko, leader of the Communist Party, who never really stood a chance against the President. Although the Communists had a core of supporters as disciplined and committed as any party in Ukraine, there was a distinct ceiling to Communist support, and that ceiling lay comfortably below the crucial 50% mark.

2. The contestants

There were originally 15 candidates, who can be broadly grouped into those supported by the left and those supported by the right and centre-right. The largest number of candidates fell into the ﬁrst category; most prominent among them were the Communist Symonenko, Socialist Party leader and former speaker of the parliament Oleksandr Moroz; Progressive Socialist Natalia Vitrenko; and the current parliamentary speaker, Oleksandr Tkachenko, who was also leader of the Peasant Party. The favourite of the right was from the start Kuchma, although many of the tra- ditional ‘national-democratic’ parties supported the former apparatchik only grudg- ingly. In the ﬁrst round, they threw their support behind the popular independent centre-right candidate Yevhen Marchuk (a former prime minister), or rival claimants for the right-wing Rukh Party mantle, Hennadii Udovenko and Yurii Kostenko.1 The right-wing candidates—and Kuchma in particular—stressed the threat of the ‘red revanche’ and the break-up of the country that would supposedly entail. The leftist candidates campaigned on platforms of opposition to the corruption which has accompanied privatisation and varying degrees of willingness to strengthen ties with Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. These issues have dominated Ukraine’s electoral campaigns since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Birch, 2000),

1 None of the other candidates managed to win more than 1% of the vote, and so they will not be considered here. See Table 1 for a full listing of candidates and votes. Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 21 (2002) 339–363 341 but the emphasis in this election was more firmly on ‘communism’ versus ‘capi- talism’ rather than independence versus a revival of the Soviet Union. One of the most important factors enabling Kuchma to win re-election was the failure of his left-wing rivals to co-ordinate an effective effort to defeat him, a failure due in no small part to the President’s own efforts to divide the left. There have been repeated allegations that Kuchma gave behind-the-scenes backing to the rise of Natalia Vitrenko when she broke away for the Socialists to form her own Progressive Socialist Party (Wilson, 2000:200–201). But Oleksandr Moroz was by all accounts Kuchma’s strongest rival, even after this split. The President attacked the Socialist’s reputation for political probity by allegations of murky financial deals, accusations of violence, and blatant invective. Moroz’s counter-strategy was to form a pact with three other candidates of the centre and the left: Marchuk, Tkachenko, and a minor candidate Volodymyr Oliinyk. This group—known as the ‘Kaniv four’ after the town where the agreement was brokered—vowed that between them they would put for- ward one candidate only, and that the choice would be made partly on the basis of opinion poll ratings nearer the date (Den, 5 October 1999). They were, in essence, attempting to conduct an informal primary election using opinion polls in lieu of votes. This pact came to little in the end, however, as the only candidates who did stand down were Tkachenko and Oliinyk, who were in any case the weakest. There was speculation that Kuchma was again machinating to prevent any pact from being honoured when Marchuk was ‘rewarded’ for his perseverance in the campaign by being made head of the National Security Council between the two rounds of the election. This was a clear—and undoubtedly deliberate—echo of Yelts- in’s similar effort to win the support of General Lebed’s voters in the Russian presidential election of 1996 (although in Ukraine’s case, not an entirely successful move as Marchuk’s voters appear to have divided between left and right in the second round). Even had the terms of the pact had been honoured, and the three candidates who stood down had been able to deliver all their votes to the agreed candidate, it is still unclear that their combined support would have secured second place for their candidate; the first round votes for Moroz and Marchuk, taken together, amounted to just over 19%, still below the 22% won by Symonenko. The great unknown is what Tkachenko’s real support was. Opinion polls gave him approximately 2% throughout September, but there is an indication of a later rise—perhaps to as much as 5%—in October (Demokratychni Initiatyvy, 1999b, p. 23). If these figures are to be believed, the ‘Kaniv four’ could, in theory, have had sufficient combined strength to win second place, but it would have been tight. A second effort was made to rally the left between the two rounds of the election. Six left-wing candidates—Symonenko Moroz, Tkachenko and the minor figures Oliinyk, Karmazin, and Haber—issued a joint statement in which they threw their support behind Symonenko and urged their supporters to do the same. The statement included a belated attempttosoftenSymonenko’s hard-line stance by appeals to Ukrainian nationalism and a pledge to protect private enterprise.2 But most commentators agreed that this was

2 The appeal was published widely. See, for example, Komunist, 6 November 1999, p. 1. 342 Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 21 (2002) 339–363 too little too late, and as a blatant political ploy it failed to convince even those voters (probably the minority) whom the message reached at all.

3. The campaign

The conduct of the campaign was described in a Council of Europe election obser- vation report as ‘a disgrace’ (PACE, 1999, p. 9). There was agreement among observers that President Kuchma was responsible for widespread abuse of his position (OSCE, 1999; PACE, 1999; Wilson, 2000:200–204). The most noteworthy problems were media bias, the use of state resources for electoral gain, and obstructing the campaigns of opposition candidates. The Council of Europe delegation concluded that media coverage was ‘grossly biased’ in favour of the president (PACE, 1999:4); the OSCE mission found that the media ‘comprehensively failed to meet their obligations to provide a balanced coverage of the campaign’ (OSCE, 1999:2). There were two aspects to the problem. First, the state media, which dominates Ukrainian broadcasting and publishing, overtly favoured President Kuchma. Secondly, with the exception of Natalia Vitrenko, the state media gave virtually no coverage to opposition candidates; and what coverage there was, was generally negative. The media bias did not hurt Symonenko as much as the other candidates, for the Communists could rely on their network of supporters on the ground to talk to people and distribute campaign litera- ture. But the other candidates, whose grass-roots networks were less well developed, suffered considerably from what was essentially a media blackout.3 Coverage by the private media was by no means objective, but at least their combined views presented a greater balance. Even so, the private media were repeatedly harassed by various government inspectors with threats; although such harassment is common even during non-electoral periods, the pace was stepped up considerably prior to the elections (OSCE, 1999:17–18; PACE, 1999:5). Moreover, the National Television and Broadcasting Council, which was meant to monitor the impartiality of the media during the campaign, was inquorate at the time because Kuchma had failed to make the appointments necessary for it to function. The use of state resources for electoral gain included the alleged deployment of state funds to finance Kuchma’s campaign, both directly through the production of campaign material and indirectly through selective largesse from the Social Protection Fund. There also appears to have been considerable pressure on local and regional officials (including election staff) to back the incumbent and secure a win for him in their regions. In many cases officials actively campaigned for the president: the OSCE reported that it had ‘uncovered clear evidence that this campaign by State institutions was systematic and co-ordinated across the country’ (OSCE, 1999:2). Between the two rounds of the election Kuchma sacked three regional governors whose electorates had

3 This even included a partial suspension of the regular broadcasting of parliamentary sessions, on the grounds that many of the candidates were members of parliament (see Tyshchenko, 1999:168–173). Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 21 (2002) 339–363 343 not voted for him in large enough numbers. Finally, election officialsfailedtoinvesti- gate many complaints made by opposition candidates, and they engaged in selective enforcement of the law. Even where complaints were found to be valid, the Central Election Commission had little power to enforce its rulings and the courts could not overturn the results of the election (as confirmed in a Supreme Court ruling shortly after the election). This resulted in a situation in which there was no effective legal recourse even in cases of the most egregious violations of the electoral law. Once the result had been declared, it could not be challenged. Techniques employed to obstruct the campaigns of opposition candidates ranged from armed assaults on groups of campaigners to refusal to grant access to public buildings for the purpose of holding campaign meetings (RFE/RL Weekly Digest, 5 October 1999; OSCE, 1999:13). There were also cases of forgery of newspapers and the distribution of anonymous defamatory leaflets (OSCE, 1999:12; PACE, 1999:5; Tyshchenko, 1999:chap. 6). It is noteworthy that very few irregularities at the polling stations were reported. As in the Communist period, outright fraud seems to have been far less prevalent than more subtle forms of pressure, intimidation, and obstruction.4

4. The results

Although rising slightly in the 1998 parliamentary elections, the strength of the left has held steady throughout the post-independence period at approximately two- fifths of the voting population, whilst the right has regularly won about one-fifth. The remaining two-fifths of the vote has gone to a variety of centrist and independent options on the ballot. The result of the first round of the 1999 presidential election confirmed this pattern: the leftist candidates’ combined vote in the first round was 45%; Kuchma won 36.5%, and Marchuk 8.1% (see Table 1). The left together had received 11.7 million votes in the first round in 1994, virtually identical to the 11.8 million it gained in 1999. But a leftist candidate (Kuchma) won then, whereas the left lost in 1999. Moreover, Kuchma had a much better win in 1999 than in 1994. Not only did he have the lead in the first round (unlike in 1994), but he alsowonbyamuchlargermargin—56% to 38%—in the decisive second round. In 1994 he just scraped past Kravhcuk, beating the incumbent by 1 905 247 votes, whereas in 1999 his second-round margin over Symonenko was a solid 5 205 302, not far below his challenger’s first-round total of 5 849 077. Kuchma also gained more votes between rounds than the communist. Whereas Symonenko picked up 4 816 343 votes in the second round, Kuchma’s support rose by 6 272 050. There was little rallying round the common left-wing figure; certainly Symonenko failed to win many of the 5 858 868 votes that had gone to his fellow leftists in the first round.

4 There were more violations reported in the second round than in the ﬁrst, however (OSCE, 1999:22– 23; PACE, 1999:7–8). Such violations mainly included multiple voting and breaches in the secrecy of the vote. 344 Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 21 (2002) 339–363 Votes Votes (%) Votes Votes (%) a kyi 96 515 0.4 ’ Onopenko (centre) ’ Source: Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine website at www.cvk.ukrpack.net a Party of the Defenders of the HomelandParty of Greens of UkraineSlavic Party of UkrainePatriotic Party of Ukraine 90 793 76 832 0.4 36 012 31 829 0.3 0.1 0.1 Communist Party of UkraineSocialist Party of UkraineProgressive Socialist Party of UkrainePopular Rukh of UkrainePopular Rukh of UkraineUkrainian Social-Democratic Party 5 849 077 2 886 972 2 969 896 22.2 10.9 570 623 124 040 11.3 10 665 319 420 778 2.2 0.5 37.8 1.2 Yuryi Karmazin (left) Vitalyi Kononov (centre) Oleksandr Bazylyuk (left) Mykola Haber Turnout 70.2% 74.9% CandidateLeonid Kuchma (centre-right)Petro Symonenko (left) Oleksandr Moroz (left) Natalia Vitrenko (left) Yevhen Marchuk (centre-right)Yurii Kostenko (right) Hennadyi Udovenko (right) Vasyl Oleksandr Rzhavs 9 598 672 First round 2 36.5 138 356 15 870 722 Second round 8.1 56.3 Table 1 Results of the 1999 Presidential Election in Ukraine Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 21 (2002) 339–363 345

5. Conclusion

The presidential election in Ukraine played out in much the same way as its 1996 counterpart in Russia: an unpopular incumbent retained power because of the weak- ness of post-Communist forces, combined with an unfair playing ﬁeld. And as in Russia, this has led to a greater concentration of political power in the hands of a few and even less respect for the rule of law in what was already acknowledged to be a highly corrupt administration. In sum, Kuchma’s victory was mainly due to the inability of the left to coalesce around a common candidate. In this sense, the 1999 Ukraine presidential election appears to support the claim that two-round absolute majority presidential electoral laws have a fragmenting effect on political competition (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Jones, 1995). But the margin of victory in this instance seems to be largely the product of the abuse of state power. Further evidence that this was the case surfaced the following autumn when one of Kuchma’s former security guards released tapes, allegedly recorded in the President’s ofﬁce, in which Kuchma can be heard orchestrating pre-election strategies of intimidation. The ensuing scandal over this and other revelations engulfed Ukraine in a severe constitutional crisis and has led to greater authoritarianism on the part of the executive. Thus, neither the election itself nor its aftermath bode well for Ukraine’s aspirations to join the world of democratic states.

References

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