Opora Final Report on Observation at the 2019 Regular Presidential Elections in Ukraine

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Opora Final Report on Observation at the 2019 Regular Presidential Elections in Ukraine OPORA FINAL REPORT ON OBSERVATION AT THE 2019 REGULAR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN UKRAINE Kyiv― 2020 The publication was made possible due to support of American people pro- vided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Any opinions and statements expressed in this publication may not coin- cide with the official position of USAID and US Government. Authors Oleksandr Kliuzhev Oleksandr Neberykut Olha Kotsiuruba Robert Lorian Iurii Lisovskyi Grygorii Sorochan Endorsed by Olga Aivazovska Translation Svitlana Bregman Design by Viktoria Arkhypenko ISBN 978-617-7142-56-9 © OPORA, 2020 CONTENT ABOUT OPORA OBSERVATION 5 BACKGROUND INFORMATION OF THE REPORT 7 DETAILED SUMMARY 13 ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ELECTORAL LAW 31 REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES FOR THE POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE 35 CAMPAIGNING ACTIVITIES OF PARTIES AND CANDIDATES 39 Peculiarities of the early campaigning 40 Format of campaigning activities and early campaigning subjects 41 Campaigning activities of candidates within the electoral process 46 Campaigning activities of candidates during the preparation for the second round of voting 51 ADMINISTRATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN UKRAINE 55 CEC operations 56 Formation and activities of district election commissions 64 Establishing district election commissions 64 The first sessions of district election commissions 69 Rotation of the DEC membership 72 Formation of precinct election commissions 72 Launch of operations of precinct election commissions 78 Formation and organization of DEC operations during the re-election 79 Establishment of PECs during the re-election 83 Establishment of polling stations for servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 86 PROCEDURE OF TEMPORARY CHANGE OF VOTING LOCATIONS WITHOUT CHANGE OF ELECTORAL ADDRESS 91 Court disputes to clarify voter lists 94 3 VIOLATIONS OF ELECTORAL LAW 99 Bribery and technology for financial incentives to voters 100 Abuse of administrative resources 107 Counter-campaigning and misinformation at the regular presidential elections in Ukraine 111 CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS ON CRIME AGAINST THE ELECTORAL RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 113 SENTENCES DELIVERED ON ELECTORAL FRAUD 121 ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF ELECTORAL LAW 125 ELECTION CAMPAIGN FINANCING AND REPORTING OF ELECTORAL SUBJECTS 131 Legal background 132 Discipline and reporting of electoral actors 133 Revenues and expenses 137 CANDIDATES CAMPAIGNING ON THE FACEBOOK SOCIAL NETWORK 145 NATIONAL OBSERVATION 157 INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION 165 ELECTION DAY, VOTE COUNT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF ELECTION RESULTS 167 Voting and vote count on March, 31, 2019 168 Voting and vote count on April, 21, 2019 175 REPORT CONCLUSIONS 183 RECOMMENDATIONS 191 4 ABOUT OPORA OBSERVATION 5 Civil Network OPORA has provided independent, non-partisan observa- tion in the regular 2019 presidential election. The organization’s monitoring campaign began three months before the official start of the election pro- cess. The OPORA observation covered all of its stages, for which a net- work of long-term and short-term observers was deployed in the regions of Ukraine. From October 2018 to April 2020, 151 long-term observers monitored the election process in all regions of Ukraine. The activities of the LTO were coordinated by 25 regional coordinators, while press secretaries in each re- gion professionally covered the electoral process. To monitor the voting process and vote count, OPORA recruited, trained and engaged more than 3,000 short-term observers. They recorded all election procedures at a sta- tistically representative number of polling stations in Ukraine. The unique products of OPORA’s short-term observation were the assessment of the quality of the election procedures at polling stations, the parallel tabulation of the turnout, and the parallel vote tabulation, as well as the proper legal documentation of the facts of violations. OPORA’s comprehensive observation allowed for an objective assessment of the regular presidential election in Ukraine. The OPORA observation methodology involves not only detecting violations of electoral law but also formally responding to them in a statutory manner. This circumstance required OPORA observers to systematically work with law enforcement agencies through the filing and legal support of official statements, requests, inquiries, or reports. OPORA is grateful to its observers for the work they have done, as well as the words of support for those law enforcement officials who have respond- ed in good faith and competence to the organizations’ reports on violations. 6 BACKGROUND INFORMATION OF THE REPORT 7 According to the results of the long-term and short-term observation in the regular presidential elections, OPORA recorded the competitive nature of the election process. The voting process and election campaign peri- od largely met the basic international standards for democratic elections. Voters were well versed and provided with real alternatives for expression of will, which broadly covered the political parties represented in society and illustrated the entire spectrum of sociopolitical sentiment. The state provided the citizens with the proper conditions for exercising their voting rights, without pressure and obstacles from the authorities or other entities during the March 31 and April 21 ballot. However, according to observers, parliament, election administration and law enforcement must make every effort to address the legislative and practical issues identified in the elec- toral process. The presidential elections were organized under conditions of incomplete compliance by the state with its commitments to run the full-fledged elec- toral reform. The ineffectiveness of legislation regarding the proper legal conditions for investigating electoral crimes adversely affected the state’s ability to counter voter bribery and illegal electoral finances. Neither did it fully protect the electoral rights of citizens abroad, internally displaced per- sons and workers. Also problematic was the process of exercising certain powers by official observers from NGOs, whose rights are an integral part of international standards for democratic elections. At the same time, the electoral process was conducted in accordance with the basic standards of democratic elections and free expression of the will of citizens. The election campaign was characterized by high competition between candidates who were able to conduct intensive and financially costly elec- tion campaigns. The regular election of the President of Ukraine set a re- cord for the number of candidates running for the presidential post — 44 persons. By comparison, in 2014 presidential election, 23 candidates were registered, in 2010 — 18, in 2004 — 26, in 1999 — 15, in 1991 — 6. The process of registration of election nominees was conflict-free, and the main reason for rejection of candidates registration was their failure to pay the obligatory financial collateral. Of the 44 registered candidates, there were only 4 wom- en, which again confirms the need to strengthen the guarantees of equal participation of two genders in the election process in Ukraine. The informal campaigning for about 20 candidates began 3–4 months be- fore the start of the election process provided by the Law. Although candi- dates could not be held accountable for early campaigning, the government 8 should pay attention to the problem of violating transparency and account- ability standards of candidates’ expenses before acquiring official status. One of the key features of the official period of the election campaign was the refusal of the most popular candidate Volodymyr Zelensky to campaign in its traditional forms, while the second most influential campaign leader, Petro Poroshenko, actively combined the duties of the President of Ukraine with the candidate status. OPORA observers have noted the mass violation of the election campaign rules by Ukrainian presidential candidates. This conclusion is confirmed by the data from the National Police of Ukraine. 71%, or 457 of the 642 ad- ministrative reports drawn up, concerned the production or placement of campaign materials without source data thereon. This number of protocols covered both the early campaign phase and the official election campaign period. Given the shortcomings in the legislation, the courts of Ukraine used different approaches when considering violations of the election cam- paign procedure. Particularly difficult were the cases of campaigning in favor of unregistered candidates. According to the organizations’ provisional data, national courts have handed down only 106 decisions on bringing offenders of electoral legislation to administrative liability. The CEC and NAZK monitored compliance with the submission deadlines and reconciled the contents of the interim and final financial reports of the election fund administrators. All candidates for the post of President of Ukraine submitted the reports envisaged by the Laws of Ukraine, but their documents contained violations, including the payment of contributions by persons with tax debt, the appointment of persons unauthorized by the law as accounts managers, the lack of complete information in payment docu- ments. OPORA drew attention to the need for the supervisory authorities to take into account not only the information on the candidates’ official financial statements but also direct information on the actual orientation and amount of expenditure at the constituency level. Instead, the lack of operational data
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