THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF GLOBAL AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

OLIGARCHIC PLURALISM IN THE 2014 EUROMAIDAN: HOW THE RISE OF OLIGARCHS IN GOVERNMENT SHAPED DEMOCRACY UN UKRAINE

SIOBHAN FRANCES LEONARD SPRING 2020

A thesis Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a baccalaureate degree with honors in Comparative Literature and International Studies with honors in Global and International Studies

Reviewed and approved* by the following:

JOSEPH WRIGHT PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Thesis Supervisor

JONATHAN ABEL PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE AND JAPANESE Honors Adviser

* Electronic approvals are on file.

ABSTRACT

During the 1990s, Ukraine experienced a change in its political system, becoming a nominal liberal democratic with contested multiparty elections in combination with post-Soviet oligarch community. These newly established dimensions impacted two major revolutionary periods in Ukraine, dating from 1992-2004 and 2005-2014, reaching a climax of violent civil unrest during the Ukrainian Revolution of 2014. The Ukrainian Revolution, also known as the

Euromaidan and Revolution of Dignity, illustrates the stages of modernization in a post-Soviet society. The Euromaidan mobilized a variety of regional and ethno-linguistic groups to demand political and economic reform. Members of oligarch clans, consisting mostly of ethnically

Russian economic elites, are often appointed in regional government positions largely in the

East, and hold substantial power in Ukrainian politics.

My research question poses: “How did oligarchic concentration of economic and media power influence government functions such as public service delivery, and shape corruption patterns preceding the protest uprising in 2014?” In my thesis, I seek to study the impact of oligarch clans as holding centralized power, and how this system may affect Ukrainian national politics as seen under the leadership of former democratically elected, Pro-Russian president,

Viktor Yanukovych, during the Ukrainian Revolution of 2014. I intend to explore the functioning of democracy in the Ukraine in light of the competition between public institutions and oligarchic power, while explaining how the corruption among oligarch clans motivated the

Ukrainian Revolution. Furthermore, my thesis aims to further expound on the crisis that emerged in 2014 as a result of the consolidation of power and resources among elites, in addition to the impact oligarchy clans had on Ukraine’s sovereignty during this crisis.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES ...... iii LIST OF TABLES...... iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... v Introduction...... 1 Chapter 1: An Overview of The Euromaidan and Its Implications ...... 2 Literature Review...... 2 Case Study...... 11 Chapter 2: Oligarch Influence and Geographic Region ...... 26 The Political Impact of the Ethno-Linguistic Divide in Southern and Eastern Ukraine...... 26 Oligarch Regional Holdings and Economic Interest as an Indicator of Political Affiliation...32 Chapter 3: Media Capture and Ukrainian Oligarchs...... 38 Primary Captors of Media...... 40 Chapter 4: Examining Public Service Delivery in Ukraine ...... 45 Distrust in Political and Social Institutions as a Pervasive Social Norm ...... 49 Conclusion ...... 54 BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 56

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Ukraine’s 2014 Presidential Election Results by Oblasts ...... 28

Figure 2: Top TV Programs in Ukraine, 2014...... 42

Figure 3: Top TV Programs in Ukraine, 2018...... 43

Figure 4: 2015 Pew Report on Ukrainian Approval of Government and Institutions………...... 48

Figure 5: Civil Society Index Report on Public Trust in 2006...... 52

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: 2016-2018 Major Parliamentary Groups in the Verkhovna Rada...... 20

Table 2: Main Actors in Ukraine's Media Holdings ...... 40

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The past four years I could not have successfully completed college without the support of my family. To my mom, thank you for teaching me courage, strength, and persistence. To my dad, thank you for teaching me resilience, forgiveness, and confidence. To my dearest friend and mentor Eliza, thank you for always believing in me and supporting my dreams, even when I foolishly felt they were inadequate. These are the most important lessons I have learned throughout my time at Penn State. 1

Introduction

The Revolution of Dignity of 2014 marks a key turning point in Ukraine’s democratic history, highlighting deep rifts between civil society and the ruling class. This revolutionary movement criticized power elites and institutions for the deterioration of Ukraine’s social and economic conditions along with the collapse of democratic ideals. Whereas the Revolution of

Dignity did not bring concrete or structural change, the movement mobilized large groups of

Ukranians across socioeconomic, ethnic, and political lines, who demanded reform of the current political system. The remaining sentiment of the Orange Revolution of 2004, a protest condemning the corruption of the Verkhovna Rada, and the Euromaidan of 2014, the outcry against Pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych ending negotiations with the Ukraine-

European Union Association Agreement, raises important questions regarding the oligarchic nature of post-Soviet Ukranian society, and the pervasive influence these figures have on the economy, media, and scope of domestic and international politics.

Ukraine’s political model of oligarchic pluralism is represented by various regional oligarchic clans and national political alliances based on economic holdings. The low level of competition and high concentration of firms in multiple industries, namely coal and power, metallurgy, and media, created a climate conducive to a high barrier of entry. This elite group of actors seeks political support to preserve their economic strongholds, thus becoming integrated with the political system as a means to grow and concentrate their business holdings via likeminded, goal-oriented parliamentary coalitions. Ukraine’s oligarchic political climate is largely corrupt as a result of the hoarding of power, thus preventing the spread of democratic ideals and socioeconomic advancement in contemporary Ukrainian society.

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Chapter 1: An Overview of The Euromaidan and its Implications Literature Review What began as a mass-based, non-violent protest against Ukrainian President Viktor

Yanukovych and his government, the events of the Euromaidan, also known as the Revolution of

Dignity, escalated into a “low-intensity civil war” in response to Yanukovych reneging on his commitment to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union (Ritter 2017 p. 192).

The call for action began over social media on November 21, 2013, when opposition leader

Arseniy Yatsenyuk organized, via Twitter, a protest in Kyiv’s Independence Square. At the same time, prominent political activist Mustafa Nayyem organized another anti-government demonstration. On November 22, 2,000 civilians met in the square while the movement continued to gain traction online, as the official Euromaidan Facebook page circulated 200 updates shared a total of 230,000 times (Surzhko-Harned & Zahuranec 2017 p. 759). Over a period of three months beginning in November 2013, student-led coalitions mobilized into an extensive network of highly-visible activist groups and organizations, which demanded social and political change in Kyiv’s Independence Square, the hotbed of revolutionary activity

(Krasynska & Martin 2016 p. 422). January 14, 2014 marked the beginning of a two-month period of state-led violence and civilian fatalities as conflict mounted in Kyiv between peaceful protestors and mobilizing government special forces. The predominantly non-violent political demonstrations, which rattled the country throughout November and December of 2013 escalated into a war zone, forced President Viktor Yanukovych from power by February of 2014, resulting in a new cabinet, in addition to early presidential and parliamentary elections

(Krasynska & Martin, 2016, p. 422). The civic transformation prompted by the Euromaidan challenged the structure of Ukraine’s political system, igniting an anti-regime rebellion which 3 demanded political reform of a corrupt pseudo-democracy engineered by oligarchs and political elites.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of oligarchs remains a major political problem after communism despite attempts to reform post-Soviet economic systems.

Traditionally defined as entrepreneurs who utilize their wealth for political gain, oligarchs are often associated with corruption of formally democratic regimes with authoritarian qualities as studied in Latin America, South-East Asia, and Eastern Europe (Pleines 2016 p. 106). Oligarchs, characterized by their exclusive nature and immense wealth, typically emerge in economies of large scale and poor legal security (Åslund & Dąbrowski 2012 p. 143). In the 1990s, oligarch involvement in politics was labeled “state capture” by Joel Hellman and other scholars (Hellman

& Koffman 2001). State capture, a term applied to post-Socialist countries, focuses on the success of the strongest businessmen to secure ownership over newly privatized economic assets and stack policy making in their favor during first attempts at post-Soviet market reforms. These entrepreneurs sought to “...‘capture the state’ and shape the policy-making, regulatory and legal environments to their own advantage, generating concentrated rents at the expense of the rest of the economy” (Pleines 2016 p. 107). Through state capture, oligarchs employ illegal methods to achieve their economic goals, while also meddling in political decisions to maximize profit.

Levitsky and Way conceptualize the role of oligarchs through competitive authoritarianism, defined as civilian regimes where formal, democratic institutions are in place, yet are routinely taken advantage of by oligarchs to favor incumbent governments, making competition real, but unfair (Pleines 2016 p. 108). The competition is deemed unfair as the government deploys state resources as campaign resources to secure an electoral victory over an opposition that does not 4 have access to said resources. Oligarchs, or the “industrial bourgeoisie” are dependent on the regime which sustains them (Gill 2008 p. 14).

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, both Russia and Ukraine experienced a resurgence of oligarchs by 1996. Oligarchs are not unique to Russia and Ukraine, as most middle-income countries throughout the post-Soviet region, notably in Kazakhstan and

Georgia, have prevalent oligarch communities which exert influence in state politics. This phenomenon can be credited to the concentration of wealth in countries with large markets and quick structural change. In Ukraine, the slow pace of independent economic and judicial development can be attributed to weak corporate governance, slowing the development of financial markets and the protection of property rights (Åslund & Dąbrowski 2012 p. 148). In contrast poor, underdeveloped countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and socialist economies, Turkmenistan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan, have a notable absence of oligarchic control.

Regardless, recent political history showcases that almost every post-Soviet state has adopted a single pyramid of authority, specifically a political machine relying on economic coercion and rewarding political loyalty with access to rents. Rent is defined as the amount of payment to an owner of a factor of production such as land, labor or capital that are made in excess of resource costs, potentially obtained through a manipulative means (Johnson 2005). These mechanisms allow oligarchs to manipulate the formal political regime by forming personal loyalty networks to promote their business interests while creating a symbiotic relationship between access to political power and economic rents to prevent democratization (Pleines 2016 p. 109). Following

Ukranian independence in 1991, a small number of criminally minded Soviets seized control of political power and state economic assets amidst a power vacuum. They took advantage of the political and economic conditions in Ukraine, exploiting the lack of economic knowledge of the 5 population, while using personal characteristics and qualities to consolidate political power and create economic rents, thus ensuring a higher standard of living for themselves (Andrusiv et al.

2018 p. 7). These oligarchs perpetuated a business climate in which low levels of competition, the concentration of firms in many economic sectors, and lack of privatization in favor of state owned enterprises gave them both political and economic power (Andrusiv et al. 2018 p. 8).

Monopoly, a key feature of oligarch regimes, is defined as control or advantage obtained by one entity over the commercial market in a specific area. Monopolization includes the power to fix prices and exclude competitors within the relevant market ("Competition And Monopoly:

Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 Of The Sherman Act : Chapter 1" 2015). Furthermore, monopolies have the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product or business tactics ("Competition

And Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 Of The Sherman Act : Chapter 1" 2015).

Firms with monopolies can then lobby government to preserve and protect their monopoly status.

According to scholar Karina V. Korostelina, “Ukrainian society is in crisis of legitimacy, resting on the contradiction between the capitalist-based monopoly of a few oligarchs and the preserved

Soviet ideology” (Korostelina 2003). State capture, a primary feature of a transitional economy, occurs when oligarchs manipulate policy to their own advantage (Hellman & Kauffman 2003).

State capture differs from monopolies in two fundamental ways. Firstly, state capture has the ability of firms to shape the laws, policies, and regulations of the state to their own advantage by providing illicit private gains to public officials (Hellman & Kauffman 2003). Oligarchs control firms across sectors, including the media, which allows them to directly control political elites through a variety of methods limited to not just lobbying, but also bribes, economic threats, 6 paying for campaigns, and control over media outlets. Secondly, state capture includes regional control of economic and political power across sectors.

In post-Soviet Ukraine, oligarchs have maintained significant political prominence as a central feature in the regime. Although oligarchs do not serve as the major facilitators of change, as exhibited in their complacency throughout the election process, they act as catalysts of ongoing change by supporting the winning party (Pleines, 2016 p. 126). The “old oligarchs,” defined as those who mainly accumulated their wealth in the 1990s by the Ukranian Institute for the Future, are the most influential and organized power in the country, owning nearly 13% of the Ukrainian economy according to CES approximations (Andrusiv et al. 2018 p. 11). This concentration of wealth prevents the old oligarchs from failing, as they are “too prominent” due to their economic power (Andrusiv et al. 2018 p. 11). As a result, old oligarchs have dictated the model of the Ukrainian economy and politics for the past 20 years. On the contrary, “young oligarchs” are more susceptible to failure. For example, Serhiy Kurchenko, who rose to power during the Yanukovych era, inherited a monopoly in the petrol gas market in 2009, then lost his business in 2014 as his political contacts dissolved (Andrusiv et al. 2018 p. 12). Neo-feudalists, or local oligarchs, do not monopolize a specific industry, but a fixed territory. Neo-feudalists implement oligarchic approaches to control local authority, law enforcement, courts, and media in a certain area (Andrusiv et al. 2018 p. 12). Monopolizing economic and political power in a specific territory allows neo-feudalists to influence voters and impact national policy from a local level. Within Ukraine’s parliament, known as the Verkhovna Rada, political factions, backed by the most powerful oligarchs, are organized according to economic interest, political rivalry, and region. The largest rival oligarchic networks in the Verkhovna Rada include: the

Petro Poroshenko Bloc with 135 members, the People’s Front with 81 members, Opposition 7

Bloc with 43 members, Self-Reliance with 25 members, Batkivshchyna with 20 members,

People’s Will with 19 members, and Vidrodzhennya with 24 members (Andrusiv et al. 2018 p.

67-68). These parties consist of old and young oligarchs alike, neo-feudalists, and regional elites.

Demands of the 2004 Orange Revolution, a series of protests against the fraudulent election of President Yanukovych, insisted on the separation of business and politics; however, oligarch presence did not wane during this time, but rather they gained more control over the economy and more power in the political sphere. A core group of oligarchs who held power from

2000 to 2015 sustained political influence through unchanging strategies (Pleines, 2016, p. 105).

Oligarchs employed tactics which solidified their dominance through the formation of informal networks, acquisition of mass media, and election into formal political positions. Once in power, oligarchs prevent competition through legal and illegal means by erecting barriers to entry for entrepreneurs, harming competitors, purchasing political support from regional elites, and disseminating biased media coverage. Ukranian political history demonstrates that the greatest change over time regarding oligarchs is not concerned with democratization, but rather balancing the power between oligarchs and political elites. Oligarchic concentration of economic and media power has influenced government functions and shape corruption patterns preceding the

Euromaidan through the monopolization of media, formation of oligarchic clans on a local and national level, and prevention of democratization through state capture.

The economic conditions created by oligarchs to maximize rent-seeking behavior are concentrated in natural resource enterprises and supported by the media. One of the attributes of oligarchs is the ownership of, at the minimum, one news channel, enabling them to promote their version of political and economic news to the public in a controlled setting (Andrusiv et al. 2018, p. 10). Often, these media outlets do not generate profit, but rather are used for political gain and 8 shaping public opinion. Television, regional broadcasting, and print and electronic media are all mediums by which oligarchs reach their target population. For example, Rinat Akhmetov, the wealthiest Ukranian with a fortune of $4.1 billion in 2016, owns all shares of SCM Group, a conglomerate financial and industrial holding company consisting of 100 businesses in the metal and mining, power generation, banking and insurance, telecommunications, media and real estate industries. In 2015, this group controlled roughly 12 percent of Ukraine’s GDP ("Top 5

Ukrainian Oligarchs And Their Impact On The Economy | UAcrisis.org" 2017). Akhmetov owns the assets of the largest and most successful media network in Ukraine, TRK Ukrayina, which supported the Yanukovych presidency and his political party, The Party of Regions. Following

Yanukovych’s exile in 2014, TRK Ukrayina backed the party’s successor, Opposition Bloc

(Makarenko 2019). Ukrayina, along with Akhmetov’s newspaper publication, Segodnya, are propagate the oligarch’s political agenda, fomenting Pro-Russian sentiment which further fuels a

West v. Russia information war. Currently, 20 members of Parliament are part of Akhmetov’s sphere of influence in comparison to the 27 members in the previous assembly ("Top 5

Ukrainian Oligarchs And Their Impact On The Economy | UAcrisis.org" 2017). The case of

Akhmetov exemplifies the range of political power and influence, which shape the media and, as a result, the public opinion, to protect their own business interests.

By infiltrating state politics, major, national oligarchs utilize regional clans to consolidate and spread their influence. Oligarchs typically root their businesses in state resources, while a strong media and political presence solidify their place in the oligarchic system. This is exemplified through Rinat Akhmetov’s acquisition of the Sigma channel in Mariupol, a geopolitically strategic city located in the Southeast region of the Donetsk Oblast (Andrusiv et al.

2018, p. 78). In Odessa, regional and national elites share the media market, yet oligarchs control 9 the transportation industry within the port city (Andrusiv et al. 2018, p. 45). Regional elites copy the national, oligarchic system and have local control over media, using it to maintain their economic position and political power. Elites on the local level continue to accrue access to economic rents by supporting oligarch-backed presidential candidates, in the process cultivating local power for their own political career and controlling local public opinion (Andrusiv et al.

2018, p. 61). Positive, extensive media coverage on a regional and national level, minimizes the risk of “political unsinkability” among oligarchs and elites (Andrusiv et al. 2018, p. 55). As the

Ukranian Institute for the Future states, the national level oligarchs, whose businesses are based in state resources, utilize media and political assets to guarantee the perpetuation of the system, maintaining a program which is frequently used at the level of regions and densely populated cities (Andrusiv et al. 2018, p. 55).

In my thesis, I seek to answer the question, “How did oligarchic concentration of economic and media power influence government functions such as public service delivery, and shape corruption patterns preceding the protest uprising in 2014?” My thesis aims to further expound on the crisis that emerged in 2014 as a result of the consolidation of power and resources among oligarchs and elites. I intend to examine the influence and patterns of mass media dictated by oligarchs, who I propose can only be studied on an individual basis, rather than as a collective group. Specifically, I will look at centralized power in the Donbass region in

Eastern Ukraine, traditionally held under Russian social, economic, and political influence. I look at the effects of the Euromaidan in Donbass, and the public service delivery response conducted by the government during and after the protests, as portrayed by the media. Further, this study identifies the oligarchs who controlled Ukrainian media outlets during the 2014

Euromaidan protests and documents their economic power in the Donbass region to demonstrate 10 their role in shaping public opinion in Donbass about the anti-government protests concentrated in Kyiv. I investigate the interactions of oligarchs and regional, economic elites to show how these relationships successfully and purposefully inhibited the victory of a revolution, resulting in little change in the present government structure and preventing democratization in Ukraine.

Through conducting this research, I suggest that oligarchs are an impediment to the political system, purposefully maintaining a weak central government as a means to achieve their economic goals. I additionally suggest that the suppression of civil liberties in Donbass, which resulted in protests across the region, generated a low-level civil war as a direct outcome of the

Euromaidan, deliberately propagated and backed by oligarchs through the expansion of terrorist groups such as the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. I argue that the Euromaidan was an

“incomplete” revolution, due to the lack of political change, as well as the failure of demands from protestors not being met as demonstrated through public opinion polling and personal testimonies conducted in Donbass from 2014-2019.

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Case Study

Following Russia, Ukraine is the most economically lucrative state of the former Soviet

Union. Known for its fertile black soil, Ukraine accounted for approximately 25% of Soviet agricultural output, offering large quantities of milk, meat, grain, and vegetables to other nations

("Ukraine" 2018). Additionally, Ukraine’s diverse heavy industry supplied raw materials to other industrial sites across the USSR, alongside equipment such as pipes and drilling apparatuses for mining. Following independence in 1991, the Ukrainian government liberalized most prices and instituted a framework for privatization, however widespread resistance to economic reform within the government halted reform attempts ("Ukraine" 2018). Output in 1999 fell 40% from

1991, inciting a long term financial recession. In 2005, the Ukrainian government abolished tax and customs privileges in a March budget law, giving rise to Ukraine’s already thriving shadow economy. Despite persistent political turmoil from 2000-2008, Ukraine’s economy remained intact despite conflict between the nation’s president and prime minister. In 2009, the economy retracted 15%, ranking as one of the worst performing nations in the world. The oligarch-driven economy regained traction and experienced slow growth in 2010-2013, but still remained as one of Europe’s poorest states. Following the political exile of Viktor Yankuvich, in conjunction with the annexation of Crimea, military conflict in the East, and a trade war with Russia the subsequent year, the economy fell 17% in GDP, experienced an inflation rate of 60%, and a depletion of foreign currency reserves. The loss of heavy industry in Donbas forced the economy to contract by 6.6% in 2014, and by 9.8% in 2015, but returned to low growth in 2016-2017 at

2.3% and 2% respectively ("Ukraine" 2018). International efforts to restore Ukraine’s economy through IMF assistance, supplemented by domestic efforts to improve transparency and democracy, as seen through the creation of a national anti-corruption agency, overhaul of the 12 banking industry, and creation of a transparent VAT system, has slowly been initiated to reform the system ("Ukraine" 2018). Since the enactment of a bilateral Deep and Comprehensive Free

Trade Agreement, Russia has been displaced as Ukraine’s largest trade partner.

As witnessed through past and recent events of Ukraine’s economic history, the conditions provided for the proliferation of an oligarchic society have been sustained with minimal change to the composition of the ruling class. The impact of mass media has the power to shape public opinion, therefore inevitably attracting elites to acquire power in order to control or manipulate the news. The Ukrainian media industry had to be reinvented following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and consequently became accessible to private entrepreneurs

(Panchenko and Rybak 2020). At large, state-owned media was underfinanced during the early post-Soviet years. In turn, this fostered a media market driven by oligarch capital. The most popular form of media in Ukraine is television, as 79% of the population uses it as their main source of news, yet only 25% consider it to be trustworthy (Andrusiv et al. p. 51). Print media which has to be purchased, is the least popular source of information. The oligarchic model of media does not generate large profit margins, but rather utilizes their own means in order to promote their own political agenda. Yet, information is undoubtedly weaponized during periods of conflict, mass corruption, and competing interests. However, the media’s effects are inconclusive as demonstrated in the Euromaidan and legacy of Vanukovych who went to great lengths to control the media through framing the news, and establishing a preexisting agenda for political debates. After Vanukovych’s exile, censorship largely ceased, and a call for unity surfaced, competing Russian media outlets following the invasion of the Crimean peninsula, then

Donetsk and Luhansk, persuaded Ukrainians to believe that the interim government was no longer a functioning legal body (Pikulicka-Wilczewska & Sakwa 2015 p. 77). Zurab Alasania, 13 the former Director General of the National Television Company of Ukraine, stated, “Russia showed us that media can be not only a tool, but a nuclear weapon” (Pikulicka-Wilczewska &

Sakwa 2015 p. 77).

Oligarchs and their clans have retained power despite fluctuating economic and political conditions via informal manipulations and strategies which remained largely unchanged from

2000 to 2015. According to Heiko Plienes of University of Bremen, oligarchs are not the major power brokers in Ukraine, as they seek accommodations from those already in positions of power (Pleines 2016 p. 105). Despite varying governments, oligarchs maintain their influence by acting as catalysts of change through supporting the winning party at the time. This social and political context enables oligarchs to impact the dynamics of the contemporary, elected regime, while also guaranteeing a greater degree of political rivalry amongst these clans. This rivalry, leading to pluralism, inevitably creates more political parties, parliamentary deputies, and mass media freedom (Pleines 2016 p. 105). Yet, Ukrainian oligarchic manipulations do not allow for genuine democratic processes. These behaviors are indefinitely supported by the climate of power within the nation-state. Ukraine, labeled as an “competitive authoritarian regime,” defined as a civilian regime in which democratic institutions exist, yet incumbents abuse state power, a term conceptualized by Levitsky and Way, prevents authentic democracy (Pleines 2016 p. 108).

The relationships between government and oligarchs are interdependent as oligarchs, “sought to fit into the hierarchy of power as it found it, using existing processes and structures to press its concerns and widen its influence” according to Gill (2016 p. 108).

With each presidency, Ukraine’s formal constitution undergoes considerable change.

During Leonid Kuchma’s first presidential term in 1994, he established Ukraine’s constitution as a semi-presidential system with a strong role at the head of the state-executive (Gill 2016 p. 111). 14

Towards the end of his regime, Kuchma monopolized his power as president and support from the oligarchs to achieve informal power over the media, therefore establishing a competitive authoritarian regime. During the Orange Revolution which lasted from November 2004 to

January 2005, then-president Kuchma and Viktor Yushchenko devised a constitutional revision in December 2004 which split executive power between the president and prime minister, eliminated the role of individual deputies, and adopted an imperative mandate which stated seats in parliament must belong to parties and not individuals (Hofmann n.d.). This revision was ultimately reversed when Viktor Yanukovych was elected president in 2010, and a semi- presidential system of the Kuchma era was reinstated. Following Yanukovych’s ousting in 2014, parliament was once again granted equalizing power, thus returning to higher democratic standards. These changes in Ukraine’s political system are consistently initiated by periods of conflict.

Oligarchic clans navigate these volatile shifts in the political system by engaging with politics at a national level, promoting their business interests through politics, and forming alliances with other oligarchs who share mutual interests. As witnessed during the Kuchma presidency, informal, regional clans emerged which united political and economic actors. Three distinct groups emerged in this era: The Dnipropetrovsk network, which was represented in the economy by the Interpipe Holding of Kuchma’s son-in-law, Pinchuk, the Kolomoyskyi and

Boholyubov group, who owned Privatbank, in addition to President Kuchma’s network which provided several prime ministers (Pleines 2016 p. 116). The Donetsk regional network, a prominent industrial city in Eastern Ukraine, absorbed two oligarchic holdings, the Industrial

Union of Donbas, and System Capital Management, formed by Rinat Akhmetov. These networks were represented nationally when Vitkor Yanukovych, the former governor of Donetsk, was 15 appointed prime minister in 2002 (Pleines 2016 p. 116). The Kiev regional network was largely financed by the “Dynamo-Kiev” group, loosely economically controlled by the Surkis family, and politically represented by Viktor Medvedchuk, head of the presidential administration in

2002. Connections between oligarchs are not exclusively limited to region, but are also formed on the basis of interest between oligarchs and the executive branch of the specific commercial interest. For example, the notable rise of Dmytro Firtash in becoming a tycoon in Ukrainian natural gas imports was accepted by both Yanukovych and Yushchenko while also maintaining his anonymity as a stakeholder in RosUkrEnergo import company (Pleines 2016 p. 117).

Following the events of the Orange Revolution, the composition of oligarchs remained unaffected, but instead the configuration changed, allowing for a new emergence of spheres of influence. Instead of a single pyramid of power with Kuchma at the apex, pyramids organized by

Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, founder and leader of the All-Ukranian Union

“Fatherland” party, came into existence. One of the three regional networks which thrived under

Kuchma fell apart during the Orange Revolution, leading to the emergence of an independent political party revolving around Yanukovych, his personal party, “Party of Regions” and

Akhmetov (Pleines 2016 p. 117). However, the uncertainty of the new dynamic of power increased rivalries amongst oligarchic clans. When Yanukovych was removed from office in

2014, similar to the outcome of the Orange Revolution, the composition and role of oligarchs did not fundamentally change. Whereas some oligarchs stayed loyal to the Party of Regions and its subsequent successor party, the Pro-Russian Opposition Bloc, other prominent figures in the

Yanukovych regime maintained a low profile, yet still exerted control over the energy sector and sponsored state activities, such as supplying humanitarian convoys to Donbas (Pleines 2016 p.

119). As examined under the Kuchma presidency, networks of oligarchs aligned to one political 16 party competed against one another, while after the Orange Revolution in 2005, most oligarchs became solitary actors and attached themselves to multiple political camps. Under Yanukovych, oligarchs reverted to supporting one party, and no longer remained a part of informal coalitions, excluding the Donbas network, and were instead confronted with the influence of nepotism.

Yanukovych’s removal of office created a new wave of political coalitions, as the Donbas group and lone oligarchs attempted to defend their business interests through lobbying (Pleines 2016 p.

119). Notably, Petro Poroshenko and Igor Kolomoiskyi headed two major camps, “Solidarity” and “Revival,” re-branded as “Economic Development,” rising to prominent political power.

Ukraine’s 2014 parliamentary election was overshadowed by the events of the

Revolution of Dignity and consequent exile of Viktor Yanukovych, annexation of Crimea, and conflict in the Donbas region. Throughout the election campaign, the stand-in president, Petro

Poroshenko, advocated citizens to vote for a "united, indivisible and European Ukraine," resulting in an overwhelming election of Pro-European parties, winning 288 seats in the 450 member parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2014).The Petro Poroshenko Bloc earned the most seats with 132 elected officials. The People's Front led by Prime Minister Arseniy

Yatsenyuk followed with 82 seats. The Samopomich bloc, or “Self-Reliance” party, run by Lviv mayor, Andriy Sadovyi Samopomich, won 32 seats, and the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, a staunch nationalist infamous for his brawls in the Rada, won 22 seats. Lastly, the Fatherland party of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko took 19 seats. Yuriy Boyko's Opposition

Bloc, which comprises members of former President Viktor Yanukovych's Party of Regions, took 29 seats, thus acting as the sole faction in parliament sharing a close relationship with

Russian Federation. Additionally, Ukraine’s Communist Party failed to win any parliamentary representation for the first time since independence in 1991. Largely seen throughout each party, 17 promises of reform, as well as the transition to a Eurocentric market economy and social framework dominated election campaigns. Echoing themes of the Euromaidan, the Petro

Poroshenko Bloc promised to continue its “Strategy 2020,” an effort to gain EU membership and boost economic recovery, fair wages, pensions, job growth, and successful private businesses.

Furthermore, Poroshenko claimed he would strengthen the national army and settle the growing unrest in Donbas. Prime Minister Yatsenyuk's People's Front stated its mission to work toward a

"strong, independent Ukraine," and implement comprehensive reforms to meet European social standards. The Radical Party pledged to end separatism to reach, in order to attain a "society of equal opportunities and universal well-being" through economic prosperity and recovery, especially witnessed in the agricultural sector. The Fatherland party supported an alliance with

NATO and mobilization of the defense industry. Similarly, the Opposition Bloc’s aim was to

"preserve Ukraine, protect its citizens, and restore peace on its land" (Inter-Parliamentary Union

2014). Due to prevailing conflict in the East, elections were withheld in 15 constituencies in

Donetsk and Luhansk in the Donbas region, and 12 single-seat constituencies in Crimea and

Sevastopol (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2014).

As a nation with weak institutionalized party systems, Ukraine’s party-political landscape is constantly changing. Since the 1990s, political competition has faced persistent challenges which continue to remain at the forefront of each election cycle to date, inciting the failure to represent social interests and maintain transparency in party financing. Ukraine’s party system continues to be unstable due to high levels of electoral volatility, low level party organization, weak involvement of political parties in society, and inadequate communication between party and voter between elections (Umland, Rybiy and Fedorenko, p. 610). Ukrainian political party ideology is often inconsistent and fails to present a firm stance on socioeconomic issues. In 2012, 18 a sociological study found that the most important factor to a Ukrainian voter is not a party’s left-wing or right-wing leanings and the associated belief systems, but rather the differences of a party’s geopolitical orientation, such as its position on NATO and EU, and the party’s stance on language issues, such as incorporating Russian as an official language of Ukraine (p. 612).

Individual personalities opposed to party ideology additionally play a decisive role in elections as these public figures which head these parties are often the largest donors. This personalization is directly reflected in the name of the party, seen through Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc ‘Solidarity’

Party, Vitalii Klychko’s UDAR Party, and Oleh Lyashko’s Radical Party. Furthermore, the extensive amount of political parties in conjunction with Ukrainian’s electoral preferences, has also alienated voters from forming close political ties. As of July 2015, 242 active political parties were registered (p. 614). Between 2013-2015, 45 parties were established, yet of this total

150 political parties participated in at least one election, and only 38 parties or 13% have been elected to parliament (p. 614).

The parliamentary elections of 2014 was an outlier of previous, volatile election cycles in response to the Euromaidan which demanded an overhaul of the party system. Of the six parties which entered Parliament, only one, Fatherland headed by Yulia Tymoshenko, was represented in the 2012 Verkhovna Rada (Umland Rybiy and Fedorenko 2016 p. 618). The overhaul of the party system brought many new actors onto the political scene while also highlighting the system’s under-institutionalization. This election introduced an influx of new civil servants, 236 out of 422 (56%) politicians elected who had never served in national parliament. Furthermore,

141 out of 225 (63%) members of parliament which held office via proportional representation in

2014 were not listed with an official party affiliation despite entering parliament on a party list

(Umland, Rybiy and Fedorenko 2016 p. 618). This record includes 70% of members from the 19

Petro Poroshenko Bloc, This included 70% of the MPs of Poroshenko’s Bloc, 94% of those of

‘Self-Reliance’, and all MPs from the Opposition Bloc. Overall, as many as 310 out of the 423

MPs of the current Ukrainian parliament lacked in 2014 an official party affiliation (Averre and

Wolczuk 2018, p. 5).

20

Table 1: 2016-2018 Major Parliamentary Groups in the Verkhovna Rada

Faction Number of Members Number of Pressure Groups Oligarch Ties (2016) Members (2018)

Petro Poroshenko Bloc: 147 135 Kononenko Kononenko: business men, including young “Solidarity” (Hranovskyi, oligarchs and agricultural moguls, Prodan Osanka: Vadaturskyy), “UDAR” group represents the interests of small and medium (Prodan Osaka), Vinnytsia group business owners; remnants of the powerful group, (Berezenko), Matviyenko group, “UDAR” which Poroshenko eliminated, Tretiakov group, or Vinnytsia: this group consists of political and “Donetsk People,” Group of business protegees from Vinnytsia Oblast, “young” headed by Matviyenko group: the most “predictable,” loyal Honcharenko, Kolomoyskyi’s group to Poroshenko headed by the President’s People townsman of Odessa Oblast, Tretiakov group: controversial group of businessmen and least loyal to PPC, Kolomoyskyi’s People: members of parliament who participate in political projects with the former owner of PrivatBank, Ukraine’s largest commercial bank

People’s Front 83 81 Yatsenyuk group, Avakov group, Political coalitions to Arseniy Yatsenyuk, former Turchynov group, Martynenko prime minister, Arsen Avakov, Minister of group, Parubiy group, and Internal Affairs, and Oleksandr Turchynov, along Kolomoyskyi’s people with his alliance with former members of the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc. Martynenko, Parubiy, and Kolomoyskyi groups include businessmen who are loyal to each corresponding oligarch

Opposition Bloc 40 43 Akhmetov group, Firtash & Akhmetov group: entrepreneurs, politicians, and Lyovochkin group, and former employees of Akhmetov’s businesses, Medvedchuk’s people Firtash & Lyovochkin group: , Medvedchuk’s people: Influenced by Viktor Medvedchuk, described as a tool of Russian influence in Ukranian politics, controls 2.48% of media outreach

Samopomich: “Self Reliance” 32 25 Sadovyi Lviv group, Bereziuk Christian, pro-democratic faction lead by Andriy or “Self Help” group, and Kolomoyskyi’s Sadovyi, which grew after “The Revolution of people Dignity,” serving as a key actor in state reform and advocacy

Batkivshchyna: “Fatherland” 19 20 Kuzhel-Nemyria Kuzhel-Nemyria group: politically allied with Group, Lutsenko-Krulko Yulia Tymoshenko, former prime minister, who group supported her during several election cycles, Lutsenko-Krulko group: leaders who joined the Fatherland about five years ago, intending to strengthen the party

People’s Will 20 19 Moskalenko, Controlled by Yaroslav Moskalenko; known as a Onyshchenko Pro-Europe, Centrist group which frequently “backstops” the coalition in the Rada through voting

Vidrodzhennya: “The 0 24 Khomutynnik group A group personally loyal to the oligarch, Igor Revival” Kolomoisky, co-founder of PrivatBank Sources: "IPU PARLINE Database: UKRAINE (Verkhovna Rada), Last Elections." 2016. Archive.ipu.org. http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2331_E.htm., Andrusiv, Victor, Oleg Ustenko, Yurii Romanenko, and Ihar Tyshkevich. 2018. The Future Of Ukranian Oligarchs. Ukranian Institute for the Future. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-future- ukrainian-oligarchs. 21

The Euromaidan protests were a direct consequence of Ukraine’s oligarchic media landscape. During Yanukovych’s presidency, lasting from 2010-2014, Ukraine’s mainstream media was privately owned and largely composed of large media companies. The most popular media companies are managed by oligarchs who are directly involved with the political sphere.

The three largest actors include U.A. Inter Media Group, currently owned by Valerii

Khoroshkovskii and Dmytro Firtash, StarLightMedia Group, owned by former President

Kuchma’s son-in-law Viktor Punchuk, and 1+1 Media Group, bought in 2007 by Ihor

Kolomoiskyi (Pikulicka-Wilczewska & Sakwa 2015 p. 78). Rinat Akhematov, Ukraine’s wealthiest man, financed Viktor Yanukovych’s campaign, and additionally owns the media group, “Ukraine,” which is composed of a newspaper, website, and multiple TV channels. In addition, Akhematov owns Ukraine Media Group, the country’s largest industrial conglomerate.

Post-Euromaidan, the creation of the state funded National Broadcasting Company was established in order to promote an equal and fair broadcasting platform minus the pressure of external enterprises. According to legislation, the National Broadcasting Company was granted

0.2% of the previous year’s state budget expenditures, and only received $28.55 million

(Makarenko 2019). As a result, the company accrued debts and was forced to downsize. The ultimate failure of the National Broadcasting Company highlights the oligarch battle for media influence and prominence, highlighting government interest, which serves the wellbeing of corporate concerns rather than the general population. These attempts at reform have proven to be unsuccessful, and although the response to the Euromaidan evoked strong sentiment of change, international and domestic efforts did not fundamentally alter the oligarchic dominance in media and society as a whole. 22

In the early 2000s, the political affiliations among broadcasting enterprises were clearly delineated between Pro-Western media and Pro-Russian media sources. While the majority of

Ukrainians believe that Russia invaded Crimea illegally and provided separatist forces in the

East, Eurosceptic narratives find little support amongst the general population. However, several media maintains editorial lines such as Vesti (News), Strana.ua (Country.ua), 112 Ukrayina (112

Ukraine), NewsOne or Ukraina.ru, still exist to promote the Russian nationalist agenda in a bid to appeal to naturalized Russian citizens (Panchenko and Rybak 2020). Similar to the Kremlin,

Ukranian oligarchs explicitly and implicitly propagate politicians, parties, and blocs, in addition to promoting a certain set of stereotypes with both positive and negative connotations through entertainment. According to the International Republican Institute, the top three trusted

Ukrainian television channels in 2009 include, “Inter,” includes 100% of NTN, K1, K2, Mega and Zoom, and 90% of Inter, Enter-Film and Pixel owned by Valerii Khoroshkovskii and

Dmytro Firtash, “1+1,” a holding company which unites several information and entertainment television channels, foreign broadcasting, and news agencies owned by Ihor Kolomoyskyi, and lastly, “ICTV,” which consists of a multitude of socio-political channels, owned by Viktor and

Olena Pinchuk ("Ihor Kolomoyskyi" 2016). As of 2018, the top four channels include “Ukraine,” owned by Rinat Akhmetov, “Inter,” “1+1,” and “ICTV.” Yet, 80.5% of the Ukrainian television audience is controlled by oligarchs, and among these key players, the four largest financial and industrial groups in the country have access to 76.2% of the audience (Andrusiv et. al 2018 p.

52).

Polling conducted by the International Republican Institute, a non-partisan organization dedicated to advancing global democracy, has collected data from 2009-2018 by utilizing public opinion polls, election observation and reports, research tools, and manuals as a means to assess 23 the current political climate in Ukraine. Through the data provided by IRI, I seek to answer the question, “Does media influence public opinion and public service response in the regions of

Donbass and Crimea as examined through media sources and their oligarchic ties?” By examining the content of Ukrainian media such as television, newspaper, radio, and social networking websites, I aim to address whether citizen’s perception of service delivery and corruption is impacted by factors such as geographic region, consumption of media, access to the internet, and approval of local and national media. I examine polling data conducted from 2009-

2012, evaluating popular attitudes toward Russia, the occupation of Crimea, and the population’s exposure to media, to post-Euromaidan attitudes from 2014-2018. The evidence provided from

IRI suggests that although Eastern and Southern Ukraine are more supportive of Russian occupation than Western and Central Ukraine, the desire for Ukraine to remain a united, autonomous nation remains the collective response to the invasion of Russian backed forces.

The emphasis of regional identities serve a crucial role in politician’s appeal to Ukrainian voters. Ukraine’s deeply rooted geographic division inevitably impacts the politics of the region, and conversely the media holdings as exhibited in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, a region which harbors a proportionally higher Russophone and ethnically, culturally Russian population opposed to Central and Western Ukraine. Ukrainians who identify with an Eastern Slavic background, commonly associated with the Crimea and Donbas region, have more authoritarian tendencies and prioritize economic stability and growth over democracy (Kuzio 2015 p. 178).

The partiality to economic stability over democracy in Eastern Ukraine can be attributed to

Soviet nostalgia. This demographic is more likely to support the Party of Regions and KPU, or the “Communist Party of Ukraine,” which both target the less formally educated, working-class, pensioners, and veterans as their main voting bloc, comprising an estimated one third of the 24 population (p. 175). At large, this “stable, disciplined, and authoritarian” voter base solidified the

Donetsk clan and the monolithic political machine, The Party of Regions. The Eastern Slavic identity values ethics such as stability, which incites sentiment of discipline and productivity, a trait commonly affiliated with the leadership of Putin and Yanukovych (p. 178).

The degree of oligarchization in the media is directly proportional to their political impact; therefore the oligarchs with the largest holdings in media, Dmytro Firtash, Ihor

Kolomoyskyi, Victor Pinchuk, and Rinat Akhmetov, utilize their platforms to push thematic agendas through their respective channels. Peripheral oligarchs and national television are unable to break into the media sector due to the inability for other channels to develop, causing the failure of independent, non-biased outlets. A 2016 public service survey conducted by IRI, that

88% of Ukrainians receive their news via television, 48% of Ukrainians obtain their news through the internet, 36% via friends and relatives, 25% via Ukrainian newspapers, and 17% via radio. Ukrainian’s' exposure to the internet has increased since November 2011 where only 19% of the population used the internet once a day, while 53% of the population never accessed the internet. The amount of Ukrainians who use the internet every day in February 2016 increased to

33% in everyday usage, and decreased to 37% of residents who do not use the internet.

According to FreedomHouse.org, access to the internet in 2016 remained at 49%, with an overall score of 39/100, 0 being least free and 100 being most free ("Ukraine | Freedom House" 2020).

Since the Party of Regions consolidated power in 2016, all the major stations have adopted a pro-government position, thus affecting the overarching goals of the media, which is to bolster popular support for oligarch clans or party members (Olszański 2010). Stanislav Markus and

Volha Charnysh summarize the role and relationship of oligarchs in the media by writing, “As

Modern Ukrainian history demonstrates rudely that oligarchs do not expire—Politicians do. 25

Support of political parties and media ownership are velvet gloves on oligarchs’ iron fists:

Compared with direct power, these strategies both mask and magnify the punch over time” (2017 p. 1660).

26

Chapter 2: Oligarch Influence and Geographic Region

The Political Impact of the Ethno-Linguistic Divide in Southern and Eastern Ukraine

Following the 2014 election, the newly elected President Petro Poroshenko stated, “The key position that I am starting from is the deoligarchization of the economy. We’re trying to build order in the country, but [oligarchs] are the chaos” (Konończuk 2016). This sentiment largely embodies the aftermath of the Euromaidan, and the anti-government protests which criticized the symbiosis between big business and power. Yet despite this resounding call of action, the oligarchy demonstrated its vitality and capacity to adapt to the changing political circumstances, and did not change, but rather worked with authorities to maintain their dominance in economic sectors, and capitalized off a poorly organized state government with an ineffective and corrupt bureaucracy (Konończuk 2016). On a global scale, Ukrainian oligarchs are also required to navigate the competing interest of the EU and Russian camps. Ukraine, as a

“contested neighborhood,” is a pawn in the geopolitical competition between the EU and Russia.

Rent-seeking domestic elites manage the effects of the EU and Russian economic conflict through domestic change (Langbein 2015). The rise of the “Anti-Maidan” in Eastern Ukraine as a direct consequence to the movement of the Euromaidan in the West, unearthed Pro-Kremlin attitudes alongside the illegal invasion of Crimea and Donetsk. Whereas geographic location impacts regional and cultural differences, this concept is overrepresented in the debate surrounding the changing political landscape of the Verkhovna Rada, and the election of either

Pro-Western or Pro-Russian officials following the 2014 Euromaidan. The ethno-linguistic divide in Ukraine remains unchanged in the past 10 years. Eastern regions including Luhansk,

Donetsk, Kharkiv and Zaporizhya, along with Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson and Nikolaev in the

South, are predominantly Russian speaking and contain significant ethnic Russian populations 27

(The Real Oligarchs Of Donetsk p. 2 2014). Despite several Russian speaking regions, the only region where the separatist movement localized is Donetsk, a territory which directly borders

Russia. However, the role of oligarchs in conjunction with their political and economic power has more impact on voter choice than regional, cultural identity.

Ukraine’s campaign elections have historically been linked to ethnolinguistic issues, namely language policy, minority rights, historical narratives and foreign policy. The annexation of Crimea in March of 2014 and the support of the secession activity in Donbas has prompted a change in the focus of campaigns from ethnolinguistic issues to securing Ukraine’s future as a sovereign state. Polls from the International Republican Institute and Socis have consistently shown majority support for Ukraine’s unitary status: 73% of Ukrainians prefer a unitary status in the May, 2014 poll by Socis/KIIS (Kudelia 2014). In April, 2014, an IRI poll found only 1% of

Ukranians favored splitting Ukraine into several states, and only 15% in the South-East favored seceding from Ukraine. About 85% of Ukranians opposed Russian intervention as found in an

April, 2014 IRI poll (Kudelia 2014). The circumstances of the Euromaidan prompted voters to choose a candidate not based on policy priorities, but rather a candidate who could deliver on the shared objective of maintaining Ukraine’s territorial integrity and ending violence in the East.

This national consensus ultimately favored a more centrist candidate whose position was closer to a median voter, like Poroshenko, and disadvantaged those candidates viewed as more extreme, like Tymoshenko or other far right candidates (Kudelia 2014). For this reason, the 2014 election resembled Ukraine’s first independent presidential election of December 1991. Following independence in 1991, the main issue was the support for Ukraine’s independence, and most voters were looking for a moderate candidate who could secure Ukraine’s statehood. As a result, the former communist speaker of the parliament, Leonid Kravchuk, defeated a nationalist and 28 political dissident, Vyacheslav Chornovil, gaining majorities in all but three Western Ukrainian oblasts (Kudelia 2014).

Figure 1: Ukraine’s 2014 Presidential Election Results by Oblasts

Sources: Kudelia, Sergiy. 2014. "Ukraine’S 2014 Presidential Election Result Is Unlikely To Be Repeated." Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/02/ukraines-2014-presidential-election-result-is-unlikely-to-be- repeated/.

Figure 1 shows the results of the 2014 presidential election according to oblast. Petro

Poroshenko, who won the majority in every oblast, challenges Ukraine’s clearly pronounced region-based electoral divisions which have been firmly established since 1991 (Kudelia

2014).While pro-Western candidates and parties consistently won in Western and Central

Ukrainian oblasts, pro-Kremlin candidates and parties have been victorious in the East and

Southern regions. Variation in the linguistic composition across the regions was strongly and consistently correlated with variation in political preferences in 2004 and 2010 elections

(Kudelia 2014). While the success of Poroshenko may suggest that linguistic composition across 29 the region is diminishing in importance, this is not the case. The annexation of Crimea and support for the Donbas secessionist movement has changed focus from ethnolinguistic issues to a united future for Ukraine. The election of 2014 indicated that voters were no longer choosing candidates based on their policy priorities, but rather looking for a single candidate who could deliver on the shared objective of reunifying Ukraine (Kudelia 2014). Therefore, the outcome of the 2014 presidential election was surrounded by unique conditions: the ousting of a president and a usually divisive voter population uniting on one issue. According to political scientist

Sergiy Kudelia,“Once the political context changes and well-established cleavages regain their salience, the earlier dividing lines are likely to reemerge on Ukraine’s electoral map” (Kudelia

2014).

National identity politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine have shaped the ethno-political dynamics of each region, yet the concept of a singular Ukrainian or Russian ethnic identity has failed to encapsulate the complex, mixed demographic of Ukrainians. Despite turbulent historical narratives, Southern and Eastern Ukraine are strategic and essential political regions which are crucial to Ukraine’s future. These regions contain a diverse ethnic population and a prevalent formation of regional and ethnic identities. Inter-ethnic marriage, language, and urbanization are all factors which contribute to “mixed-self identification,” a main feature of the national identity of Southern and Eastern Ukraine, where the Donbas conflict has manifested post-Euromaidan

(Pirie 1996 p. 1079). Whereas nearly 22% of residents living in Ukraine identify as ethnically

Russian, this group is also likely to identify as Ukrainian as well (p. 1080). Recent Western scholarship has attempted to study the correlation of ethnic identity and its implications for

Ukrainian politics, yet the assumption remains that these identities are neatly categorized. The oversimplification of national identity, such as the belief that a person can only be Russian or 30

Ukrainian, leads to misconceptions regarding the national orientation of these individuals. Those who choose to identify as Ukrainian often associate themselves as connected to a specific region, city, or the former Soviet Union, in place of a “vague Ukrainian identity” (p. 1080). Furthermore, labels such as “Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine '' or “russified” Eastern Ukrainian suggest that the region's identity is essentially Russian. While language usage also informs national self- identification and general political attitudes, it is not a determining factor of national identity in

Ukraine (p. 1081). Therefore, the ethno-linguistic divide in Ukraine is not as rigid as scholars suggest and polarized as exacerbated by political opponents. However, Eastern and Southern

Ukraine is highly urbanized, has high rates of inter-ethnic marriage, and additionally has a higher number of residents born outside Ukraine, namely Russia (p. 1088). The large population of ethnic Russians in Crimea relative to Donbas and Odesa, are in a state of transition from a weak

Russian identification to a mixed Ruso-Ukrainian identity, or an indifferent “cosmopolitan” identity (p. 1088).

In Eastern and Southern Ukraine, the Maidan movement never had majority support.

While the growth of pro-separatist sentiment was nonexistent following the Orange Revolution of 2004, the “Anti-Maidan” of 2014, known as the alliance of Viktor Yanukovych favoring closer ties with Russia, mobilized in Donetsk and other Eastern regions, leading to violent protests, vandalization, and seizure of administration buildings. This was witnessed on April 12,

2016, where gunmen occupied a police station and security services building in the town of

Sloviansk in Donetsk ("Gunmen Take Ukraine Police Buildings" 2014). Where the Euromaidan movement was advocating for a neoliberal government, and “European utopia,” the Anti-Maidan sought to protect Russian ideals. As journalist Volodymyr Ishchenko writes,“Maidan was called 31 a ‘revolution of dignity’ but people in eastern Ukraine are also proudly talking about their dignity, regional identity, historical memory, Soviet heroes and language” (Ishchenko 2014).

The Anti-Maidan movement is not a consequence of the ethno-linguistic divide in

Ukraine, but rather the results of the financial interests of oligarchs. Donetsk is the heartland of

Viktor Yanukovych and Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine’s richest man who has significant metallurgical assets in the region. Akhmetov, an ethnic Tatar, had an estimated net worth of

$15.4 billion in 2013 (The Real Oligarchs Of Donetsk p. 3 2014). In Donetsk, there is a clear convergence of interests between Russia and the local oligarchs and members of Yanukovych’s inner circle, known as "the family," who mobilize locals and rely on organized crime groups to help destabilize the region (The Real Oligarchs Of Donetsk p. 3 2014). The nexus which links the separatist movement and organized crime is the financial support from local oligarchs. This is witnessed in the case of Armen Sarkisyan, a mobster associated with “the family” who heads the separatist movement in Gorlovka in the Donetsk Oblast, which orchestrated a seizure of municipal government buildings (The Real Oligarchs Of Donetsk p. 3 2014). Furthermore,

Sarkisyan was reportedly involved with sending “titushkas,” or mercenary agents loyal to the administration of Viktor Yanukovych, to perform illegal acts such as the alleged tortures and assassinations in Kiev during the Euromaidan riots (The Real Oligarchs Of Donetsk p. 3 2014).

However, the Dnipropetrovsk region which borders Donetsk, is not plagued by terrorist activity.

The mayor of Dnipropetrovsk, considered the most essential industrial region of Ukraine, is billionaire Igor Kolomoisky, who vocally condemned the Russian separatist movement. Instead,

Kolomoisky offered a monetary reward of $10,000 to anyone who captured a separatist rebels, in addition to offering rewards for handing in weapons belonging to insurgents: $1,000 for each machine gun, $1,500 for a heavy machine-gun and $2,000 for a grenade launcher handed over to 32 his authorities (The Real Oligarchs Of Donetsk p. 4 2014). In total, Kolomoisky has paid more than $100,000 in rewards. These incentivization tactics have successfully maintained relative peace in a hotbed of secessionist activity.

Oligarch Regional Holdings and Economic Interest as an Indicator of Political Affiliation

The Crimea and Donbas Oblasts embody Ukraine’s pervasive political corruption, notorious for their strong support for separatism as financed by mafia, oligarchs, and politicians, namely the infamous billionaire Rinat Akhmetov. Viktor Yanukovych entered the political scene in 1996 when he ran for governor with the support of the local, organized crime group, “The

Donetsk Mafia” who were later integrated into the Party of Regions (Kuzio 2015 p. 360). As reported to a US embassy cable in 2006, Yanukovych’s Party of Regions is a “haven for Donetsk based mobsters and oligarchs” as a result of “tapping the deep pockets of Donetsk clan godfather

Rinat Akhmetov” (Kuzio 2015 p. 360). Rinat Akhmetov, who currently has an estimated network of $5.5 billion, earned his wealth in the 1990s following the privatization of industry and fall of communism by selling coal, although details regarding how he earned his wealth remains controversial. Akhmetov previously stated, "I have earned my first million by trading coal and coke, and spent the money on assets that no one wanted to buy. It was a risk but it was worth it" (Demkovich 2010). Claims regarding Akhmetov’s criminal past date back to 1985, where he became an assistant to Akhat Bragin, a powerful crime boss who gained his fortune through the illegal cloth business. Andrew Wilson, a Ukranian political scholar, classifies

Akhmetov as a “'enforcer' and 'leader' of ‘[Akhat] Bragin's 'Tatar' clan,'” by ousting the “red directors” of the Industrial Union of the Donbas (Wilson 2005 p. 10). In 1995, Akhmetov allegedly inherited Bragin’s fortune following the bombing of Donetsk's Shakhtar football stadium, killing several people including Bragin. As an ethnic Tartar, Akhmetov became the 33 region’s mafia boss, succeeded Bragin as chairman of the football club, and absorbed his local business interests, including the Lyuks Corporation, which according to historian Sergei Zhuk was, “the first official firm to legalize the criminal activities of the Donetsk Mafia” (Hess 2020).

Akhmetov emerged on the national stage in 2004 when he became business associates with Victor Pinchuk, son-in-law of President Leonid Kuchma. Victor Pinchuk, Ukraine’s second-richest man and head of Interpipe Corp., controls a clan nearly as powerful as

Akhmetov’s Donetsk group (Murphy 2004). A third powerful clan, the Kiev based Slavutich group which has substantial assets in trade, agribusiness and energy, is headed by Viktor

Medvedchuk, Kuchma’s then-powerful chief of staff (Murphy 2004). Akhmetov’s $800 million bid for the steel giant conglomerate in 2004, Kryvorizhstal, Ukraine’s largest steel company, was accepted by Kucma and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, also a Donetsk native. Following the Orange Revolution of 2004, Akhmetov emerged as a dominant political player by gaining a seat in Parliament as an Yanukovych ally. In 2010, his fortune exploded when Yanukovych won the presidential bid, allowing Akhmetov to buy stakes in regional energy companies throughout

Ukraine, from Dnipropetrovsk to Lviv (Hess 2020). When the Euromaidan movement rose to prominence in 2013, Akhmetov had effectively bought and controlled a large portion of

Ukraine’s power networks, alongside other ventures in coal mining, electricity production, and power distribution (Hess 2020). However, armed factions began to seize Akhmetov’s assets in

Donbas, most importantly Yenakiieve Steel.

Rinat Akhmetov and Vadim Novinsky's Metinvest Group announced the loss of control over all enterprises located in the Anti-Terrorist Operation Zone (ATO) in March of 2017. This succession of business has been preceded by a trade blockade, ongoing fighting in the ATO area, specifically the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, along with the continuous shelling of 34

Avdiivka, where Metinvest Group's coke and by-product plant is located ("Expropriation Of The

Entities In Donbass: Entire Ukraine Will Feel The Loss Of These Enterprises By The End Of

Summer, Says Metinvest CEO" 2017). Yuriy Ryzhenkov, Metinvest's CEO, emphasizes the scale of this loss as reported to HB Business, “These enterprises represent a sizable part of our

Group. They accounted for 5% of Metinvest's EBITDA in 2016. Furthermore, some of them, for example, Yenakiieve Steel, were a focus of Group's investments in the last decade”

("Expropriation Of The Entities In Donbass: Entire Ukraine Will Feel The Loss Of These

Enterprises By The End Of Summer, Says Metinvest CEO" 2017). In Mariupol, a port city in southeastern Ukraine, Akhmetov’s largest assets, Ilych Iron, Steel Works, and Azovstal were additionally seized by rebels. This loss of industry is represented in Akhmetov’s reported net wealth according to Forbes, which was listed as $15,400,000,000 in 2013 as compared to

$2,300,000,000 in 2016 following the aftermath of the Euromaidan and the subsequent fighting in the ATO region ("Expropriation Of The Entities In Donbass: Entire Ukraine Will Feel The

Loss Of These Enterprises By The End Of Summer, Says Metinvest CEO" 2017).

Oligarchs appear to have mixed motives and alliances depending on their economic interests, which ultimately impacts the regional civilian populations where their businesses are located. According to Dmitry Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center think tank, none of Ukraine’s political elite are “Pro-Russian,” as this would limit their economic sovereignty and autonomy. Russia, which sponsored Ukraine’s economy for 23 years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, had been unable to create a Pro-Russian union across the nation, spanning from the country's southeast from the Kharkiv region to Odessa that would have acted as a counterbalance to pro-Western authorities in Kiev (Nechepurenko 2014). The source of this failure was because those areas lacked strong pro-Russian elites, according to Trenin. Vladimir 35

Bruter, an analyst at the International Institute of Humanitarian and Political Studies, a Kiev- based think tank, suggests that Ukrainian elites will remain mostly pro-Western, as the orientation toward Europe and the EU does not threaten the individual interests of its members

(Nechepurenko 2014). Three months before Yanukovych was exiled from Kiev, he spoke at an

Eastern Partnership summit in Lithuania, where he stated, "Pro-European choice remains the strategic direction of Ukraine's further civilizational development" (Nechepurenko 2014).

However, this sentiment is not necessarily represented in Yanukovych’s policy, who was sentenced to thirteen years in jail for treason by inviting Russia to invade Ukraine as a means to reverse a pro-Western revolution. The previous year in 2013, Putin met with the Ukrainian

Choice organization, a Pro-Russian NGO led by Victor Medvedchuk, the former head of

Ukraine's presidential administration under Leonid Kuchma. An observer who took part in organizing that meeting, stated that the group gathered "all the pro-Russian people in Ukraine," and that it ceased with "nothing, as there was no agenda for the future, and everybody realized that it was not possible to create such a movement" (Nechepurenko 2014).

Whereas certain oligarchs are backing the Pro-Western, pro-Ukrainian movement, such as Rinat Akhmetov who has emerged as a vocal peacekeeping figure, the Anti-Maidan, separatist group is more grassroots, decentralized, and leaderless. However, notable oligarchs such as

Viktor Medvedchuk and Yuriy Boyko, the former minister of energy under the Yanukovych administration, have advocated for better relations between Russia and Ukraine while condemning the Ukranian government for failing to facilitate better trade deals and boost national employment levels. The social base of the Anti-Maidan protests belong to a poorer and less educated population than Maidan, as more workers and pensioners are represented as opposed to intellectuals and higher-educated professionals who would help to formulate clear 36 demands and defense in the media ("We Have Clear, Solid Plan To Lead Ukraine Out Of Crisis,

- Boyko" 2019). Boyko, who formerly belonged to the Party of Regions, notoriously known as a pro-Kremlin political force, joined the newborn 'Opposition Bloc', along with many of his allies from the Party of Regions following the Euromaidan of 2014 ("We Have Clear, Solid Plan To

Lead Ukraine Out Of Crisis, - Boyko" 2019). In 2019, Boyko ran for president representing the

Opposition Platform-For Life. His platform entailed to stop the bloody opposition in eastern

Ukraine,” ''to stop the poverty”, and “provide the citizens of Ukraine with the accessible and high-quality medical service,” in an effort to cater to the communist, poorer populations of

Eastern Ukraine ("We Have Clear, Solid Plan To Lead Ukraine Out Of Crisis, - Boyko" 2019).

Furthermore, during Poroshenko’s presidency, Medvedchuk became a beneficiary of a fuel business, which sourced oil from Russian fields and supplied Ukraine’s gas stations. In Russia,

NZNP Trade produces oil from one of the largest oil fields, the controlling stake of which is indirectly owned by TV host Oksana Marchenko, Medvedchuk's wife ("Parties' Funding: How

Pro-Russian Oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk Is Regaining Power In Ukraine" 2019). As journalists of the Skhemy program discovered, the state-owned, petroleum processing enterprise, Rosneft, was unable to partake in the competition for production rights. The Russian oil is then processed at the Novoshakhtinsk Refinery, 60% of which is owned by Marchenko, while the remaining

33% is mediated by Medvedchuk's associate Taras Kozak, as reported by Russian outlet, Proekt

("Parties' Funding: How Pro-Russian Oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk Is Regaining Power In

Ukraine" 2019). As a result, both Medvedchuk and Boyko are incentivized to support the

Kremlin as a means to strengthen gas trade relationships and greater returns on their business investments. 37

The importance of ethnolinguistic identity offers unique insight to the cultural dynamic of

Southern and Eastern Ukraine where the Anti-Maidan emerged as a counterrevolution to the

Euromaidan, a Pro-Western movement which proclaimed modern, European ideals as the emerging front of Ukrainian politics. The Euromaidan garnered financial support from prominent oligarchs, such as Rinat Akhmetov and Igor Kolomoisky, who backed Ukranian officials and industry which sought to integrate European interest into Ukraine’s Kremlin dominated economy. Akhmetov’s economic and political influence, often disputed as having mafia roots, further emphasizes his intention of solely protecting his assets in Ukraine, which involved cooperating with government compliances in light of his operation facilities being seized by separatists. Conversely, Victor Medvedchuk and Yuriy Boyko, who hold considerable investments in the Russian oil industry, seek to integrate stronger Pro-Kremlin sentiment into the

Verkhovna Rada to their economic gain. Ultimately, oligarchs aim to protect their financial interests above the political domain, which consequently leads to the formation of oligarchic clans, who propagate specific agendas to assert economic dominance. These clans protect their financial interest above maintaining social, cultural norms, yet monopolize preconceived divides in society as a means to support their own narrative.

38

Chapter 3 Media Capture and Ukrainian Oligarchs The most notable method as to how oligarchs acquire and retain power is through ownership of the media. Media capture, according to political scientist Alina Mungui-Pippidi, is a companion to state capture, otherwise known as systemic corruption where private interests influence government functioning (Ryabinska, Umland, and Dyczok 2017 p. 55). State capture as a defining feature of Ukrainian politics, is representative of the plight Post-Soviet states face when media reform fails to mediate media-politics relationships, thus becoming a considerable obstacle in the democratic performance of Ukraine’s media. Media capture is “a situation in which media have not succeeded in becoming autonomous and manifesting the will of their own, nor able to exercise their main function, notably of informing people” (Ryabinska, Umland, and

Dyczok 2017 p. 57). Furthermore, media capture manifests as a “form of a concentrated, opaque ownership of media outlets, with important political actors controlling the media” (Ryabinska,

Umland, and Dyczok 2017 p. 57). A major feature of media capture is the informal influence on the media through informal techniques, where the “informal (patrimonial) and formal

(bureaucratic) logics of action coexist,” in countries such as Ukraine produce formal rules through the establishment of informal rules and regulations that have been introduced in the absence of communist framework (Ryabinska, Umland, and Dyczok 2017 p. 57). In Ukraine, the monopolization of media outlets poses a significant barrier to democratic processes. Whereas the media market additionally encapsulates print and radio, the focus of this study targets television, as Ukrainians receive most of their information through this medium. According to research conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the Razumkov Centre, and the Socis

Centre, 75.7% of Ukrainians receive worldwide and national news from TV channels 39

(Makarenko 2019). Yet, no more than 25% of viewers consider it to be a reliable source of accurate information (Andrusiv et al., 2018 p. 51).

From 1994-2003, Ukraine exhibited two main types of media ownership: state/municipal media and private media. During this era, the appointment and dismissal of public sector government media managers was a politicized issue. Since public media is a state sponsored venture, most of these municipal outlets focused on the political interests of the state institution, retrieving information from government sanctioned press conferences and briefings. During electoral campaign cycles, authorities use their own media as propaganda at the regional and national level. However, state and municipal owned media is largely unpopular, and privately owned outlets are more consumed by the public. In 2014-2015 Ukraine expanded public service broadcasting which established a basis of state television and radio broadcasting. The privatization of state media post-Maidan became effective in 2015 when Parliament passed a corresponding law, “On reforming state and communal print mass media” (Ryabinska, Umland, and Dyczok 2017 p. 59).

Ukraine’s private media encapsulates all features associated with media capture: the media is highly concentrated, non-transparent, and owned by those directly related or involved in politics. Ukrainian oligarchs, whose main business interests are outside the media industry, such as gas, metal, coal, energy, agriculture, and other sectors, acquire media holdings to promote and safeguard their economic interests as represented in their political positions. As stated by

Melnykovska and Schweickert 2008, these oligarchs exercise close political ties because incomes from their main businesses offer opportunities to grow their business empires through privatization of state-owned enterprises, alongside the chance to safeguard their property under the poor conditions of weak rule of law characteristic to Ukraine (Ryabinska, Umland, and 40

Dyczok 2017 p. 60). As a result, oligarchs are enticed to purchase media holdings to equally

protect and expand their economic interests while solidifying their status as a political actor.

Primary Captors of Media in Ukraine Table 2: Main Actors in Ukraine's Media Holdings

Owner Enterprise Media Holding Political Involvement

Viktor Pinchuk Starlight Media Holdings ICTV TV channel Viktor Pinchuk: LLC. STB TV channel member of parliament from 1998- Novy TV channel 2006 with strong connections to the Fakty i kommentarii Kuchma family newspaper Sobytiia i liudi newspaper Ekonomik publishing house: Daily Delo, Invest gazeta, and others Shares in music channels: M1, M2 Shares in Russkoe Radio, Hit-FM, Kiss-FM

Serhiy Liovochkin, Dmytro InterMedia Group: “Inter” 61% share of independent Serhiy Liovochkin: 2010-2013 head Firtash Ukranian TV channel: Inter of presidential administration 90% share of KinoTV Dmytro Firtash: 2007-2013 (EnterFilm TV channel) financial advisor for various 90% share of Music TV political parties and politicians (Enter Music TV channel) K1, K2, Megasport TV channels 60% share of NTN TV channel 90% share of Ukrainian News Information Agency

Rinat Akhmetov Rinat Akhmetov Group “Channel Ukraine” TV Rinat Akhmetov: Main financial System Capital Management Segodnia, daily newspaper supporter of Viktor Yankuovych Salon Dona i Basa, regional during the 2004 election; influential newspaper member of the Party of Regions KID news website

Ihor Kolomoisky 1+1 Media Group 1+1 TV channel Ihor Kolomoisky: Financed 2+2 TV channel Yankuovych during the 2004 SITI TV channel election; allegedly supported Yulia TET TV channel Tymoshenko, financed the “Our Kino TV channel Ukraine Party” in the 2006-2007 parliamentary elections, allegedly supported the Udar Party in 2012 parliamentary elections Source: Ryabinska, Natalya, Andreas Umland, and Marta Dyczok. 2017. Ukraine's Post-Communist Mass Media. Berlin: Ibidem Verlag.

These dominant players known as the “Big Four,” or rather Pinchuk, Akhmetov, Firtash-

Lyovochkin, and Kolomoyskyi, have systematically consolidated their assets and developed a 41 joint information policy where each outlet compliments the other (Andrusiv et. al 2018 p. 54).

Additional owners of popular media outlets include former president Petro Poroshenko, who founded the TV channel “5 Kanal,” which served a crucial role during the Euromaidan and

Orange Revolution. This channel ran programs with reports and analyses of real-life footage which was banned on other Ukrainian TV channels. This tool has played an effective role in

Poroshenko’s political career. “TV should be the first asset Poroshenko sells as president,” then

OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Dunja Mijatovic stated (Makarenko 2019).

Following the passing of legislation in 2015 which required greater transparency, popular belief suspects that 5 Kanal is not the president’s only media outlet. During the past five years, additional broadcast media have been established, most importantly, the information channel,

Priamyi (Makarenko 2019). Officially, the channel belongs to Volodymyr Makeienko, who is a former member of the Party of Regions, otherwise known as the party of ousted President Viktor

Yanukovych (Makarenko 2019).

The explicit and implicit advertising of certain politicians and shaping of persistent stereotypes and attitudes is mainly accomplished through entertainment content, TV-shows, and thematic programs which assist the viewer in forming opinions of the audience, affirming either positive and negative connotations. The lack of confidence in news media makes entertainment programs more retaining to viewers, as most people are resistant to only watch the news

(Andrusiv et. al 2018 p. 51). Ukrainian oligarchs noticed this feature in 2006-2007, and have since invested large sums of money to adapt the foreign entertainment formats to apply to

Ukrainian conditions, or to create their own original content (Andrusiv et. al 2018 p. 52). As a result, oligarchs attempt to dominate the information space with their own channels, as television largely constitutes the future composition of the Verkhovna Rada. This theory is represented in 42 the comparison of 2014 to 2018 top programs as reported by the Television Industry Committee, an organization devoted to representing interests of the television industry of Ukraine to promote the development of television and the advertising industry. Established on August 27, 2002, Oleg

Popenko, CEO of Publicis Groupe for Eastern Europe, has been TIC’s Chairman since its foundation, with Sergiy Syomkin, the owner of InterMedia Group, as the TIC’s Executive

Director ("About TIC / ИТК - Индустриальный Телевизионный Комитет" n.d.).

Figure 2: Top TV Programs in Ukraine, 2014

Source: Top-Programms ТВ." 2014. Television Industry Committee. http://tampanel.com.ua/en/rubrics/programms/.

43

Figure 3: Top TV Programs in Ukraine, 2018

Source:"Top-Programms ТВ." 2018. Television Industry Committee. http://tampanel.com.ua/en/rubrics/programms/.

Figure 2, Top TV Programs in Ukraine, 2014, and Figure 3, Top Programs in Ukraine,

2018, demonstrate the influx of dominant tv channels from 2014 to 2018, and the tendency of one media holding to dominate the top 10 most viewed programs of each year. In 2014,

InterMedia Group, owned by Serhiy Liovochkin and Dmytro Firtash, had the highest amount of annual viewers. In 2018, “Channel Ukraine” owned by Rinat Akhmetov, emerged as the dominant media source. The cyclical nature and balance of these spheres of influence can serve to illustrate the parties that have passed to the Verkhovna Rada (Andrusiv et. al 2018 p. 54).

Considering the regional popularity of channels, such as Inter which is more popular in the

South-East, and 1+1 which has a larger audience in the Center and in the West, it is possible to postulate that politicians and oligarchs are playing Eastern Ukraine off against Western Ukraine

(Andrusiv et. al 2018 p. 54). In order to understand the construction of public attitudes to past 44 and present events, it is necessary to assess the outreach of news blocks and their intended audience.

45

Chapter 4: Examining Popular Perceptions of Public Service Delivery and Government in Ukraine Public services, a term which encapsulates government-sponsored and -regulated education, water sanitation, and health services for the benefit of the population, is largely regarded as poor in Ukraine because of widespread poverty and the centralization of government, both of which hinder effective local government. Ukraine initiated a decentralization movement in 2014 with the adoption of, “The Concept of the Reform of Local Government and Territorial

Organization of Authority (4/1/2014) Laws On Cooperation of Territorial Communities,” based on the European Charter of Local Self-Government. This initiative sought to promote the creation of an “effective and capable institute of local government on a basic level” in amalgamated territorial communities (ATCs) ("Cabinet Of Ministers Of Ukraine -

Decentralization Reform" n.d.). During four years of reform, a total of 882 ATCs were by amalgamating 4,043 communities, approximately 36.7% of the total number of local councils as of January 1, 2015. This program covered 38% of the geographic area of Ukraine and about 69% of the population ("Cabinet Of Ministers Of Ukraine - Decentralization Reform" n.d.). Goals listed by Ukraine’s national government include: voluntary amalgamation and consolidation of territorial communities, financial decentralization, and establishing new powers and capabilities of local governments ("Cabinet Of Ministers Of Ukraine - Decentralization Reform" n.d.). These reforms seek to close the gap between the national government and Ukrainian citizens, as a means to streamline the public service system, involve citizens in elections and referendums, and assess inadequate public services.

Despite efforts to consolidate public finances, Ukraine’s growth potential remains undermined by a large public sector, high public debt levels, and inefficient provision of essential public services (World Bank 2017 p. 1). Efforts to reduce the government deficit, which 46 was reduced from 10% in 2014 to 2.2% in 2016, alongside other steps to stabilize the economy after a recession due to war in East Ukraine, have encouraged economic growth (p. 1). Yet, fiscal imbalances, a drop in GDP, and currency depreciation raised the public debt-to-GDP ratio from

40.6 percent in 2013, to over 70 percent of GDP in 2014 (p. 2). Public sector spending remains elevated as a share of GDP, proving to be higher than neighboring countries in 2001. Yet, these high social expenditures do not improve the quality of public services. Whereas Ukraine spends an estimated 6% of GDP on education and 4.5% on health services, life expectancy has not changed over a 20-year period. While general education development has improved, higher skilled jobs positions remain vacant. Government spending on social transfers compromise about

11% of GDP spent on pensions and 4% spent on social assistance, meaning Ukraine ranks among the highest in the region. However, this funding is not evenly distributed, as the bulk of pensions and social assistance payments go to the bottom 40% of income levels (p. 2). To combat this, the Verkhovna Rada increased the minimum wage in 2017 and is currently considering pension reform. As supported by figures from the World Bank, ultimate failure to fulfill public service delivery has consequently impacted the way in which citizens view and assess government capacity, as citizens continue to lack confidence in government processes.

In anticipation of the presidential election on March 31, 2019, a Gallup Poll reported a record low of voter faith in the Ukrainian government. An estimated 9% of Ukrainian residents had confidence in the national government, the lowest confidence level in any electoral system in the world for the second straight year (Bikus 2019). This figure is lower than both the regional median for former Soviet states (48%) and the global average (56%, as reported in 2018) (Bikus

2019). Approximately 12% of adults in Ukraine said they had confidence in the honesty of elections in 2018, representing a decline from the 26% who felt this way in 2014. This decline 47 demonstrates a growing disdain toward the electoral system in Ukraine (Bikus 2019).

Additionally, businesses in the country are viewed with similar suspicion, as 82% of adults in

Ukraine say that corruption is widespread throughout them (Bikus 2019). Overwhelmingly,

Ukrainians have low trust in the government as well as government-affiliated ventures, which in countries captured by oligarchs, includes most public functions. This source of distrust and skepticism in the government stems from a variety of issues such as freedom of expression in the press and media, and a fragmented health care system, among other failed social institutions as a result of pervasive corruption.

In 2015, Pew Research interviewed all regions of Ukraine except occupied territory,

Luhansk, Donetsk, polling approximately 80% of Ukrainians (Simmons, Stokes, and Poushter

2015). Pew researchers found that Ukrainians are overwhelmingly disappointed in Ukraine’s economy, are becoming increasingly more critical of the national government, and have little hope for peace in the Donbas region. About a third (32%) of the population believe that the government in Kyiv is having a good impact on the nation (Simmons, Stokes, and Poushter

2015). Ukrainians rate the military the most highly, with 72% of the population agreeing they have a good influence on the country. Eastern Ukrainians outside of the Donbas region are less happy with the military than Ukrainians residing in the West. Majorities in both regions still find that the armed forces have positive reviews, as 63% see the armed forces as a good influence in the East opposed to 79% in West (Simmons, Stokes, and Poushter 2015).

48

Figure 4: 2015 Pew Report on Ukrainian Approval of Government and Institutions

Source: Simmons, Katie, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter. 2015. "3. Ukrainian Public Opinion: Dissatisfied With Current Conditions, Looking For An End To The Crisis." Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/06/10/3-ukrainian-public-opinion- dissatisfied-with-current-conditions-looking-for-an-end-to-the-crisis/.

In recent years, effort to improve the public service system has been recorded by the EaP

Think Bridge, a platform which serves to distribute analytical products of the Eastern Partnership region for stakeholders. In 2016, Ukraine adopted the Public Administration Reform Strategy and declared a commitment to the Principles of Public Administration created by SIGMA

(Support for Improvement in Governance and Management). SIGMA’s Principles of Public

Administration includes six core principles: “the strategic framework for public administration reform; policy development and coordination; public service and human resource management; accountability; service delivery, and public financial management” (Kupriy 2019 p. 23). Ukraine was evaluated by the UN as achieving three or more points out of five in half the criteria.

However, only small amounts of work have been done on about 20% of the criteria (p. 24). 49

Additional post-Maidan public administration reform in Ukraine has been initiated in

2019 by Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman with the adoption of the “Strategy for Public

Administration Reform for 2016–2020,” has passed the halftime of its planned roll-out. This strategy, together with a new Law on the Civil Service that went into effect in 2016, is intended to bring greater efficacy and accountability to Ukraine’s public administration (Iarema 2019).

Although this program has lagged behind in the ambitious schedule envisioned in the strategy, the reform effort has produced notable results. Yet despite these achievements, Ukrainian citizens are not optimistic that the government will start to embody democratic ideals or make efforts to improve the standard of living, as exemplified by the Orange Revolution and most recently, the Euromaidan.

Distrust in Political and Social Institutions as a Pervasive Societal Norm

In 1993, a sociological study was commissioned by the director of the Ukrainian National

Academy of Sciences as a means to evaluate and monitor the current social state of Ukrainian society, specifically: public perspectives, formal institutions, economics, politics, and national and cultural features as reflected in public opinion (Denzin 2009 p. 9). Later in 2001, the volume

Tendencies in the Development of Ukrainian Society 1994-2001: Sociological Indicators was produced. The report includes 170 testimonies to summarize the polling data of civilian evaluations and attitudes on the current economy, economic reform, standards of living and living conditions, consumption orientations, working activities, employment, and satisfaction with jobs (Denzin 2019 p. 10). Additionally, attitudes towards political affiliation, social and political activity toward state and institutional power structures, religious beliefs, effectiveness of the legal system, general state of health, environment, and perception of health services. Informal institutions were studied as well, involving leisure activities, interpersonal relationships, and 50 psychological conditions, thus making Tendencies in the Development of Ukrainian Society

1994-2001: Sociological Indicators an all-encompassing study regarding Ukrainian civic life.

A close examination of the report discloses that Ukrainians exhibit high levels of distrust in all aspects of social and political life. This exhaustive survey emphasizes this sentiment as the authors write, “You can only look at the population’s trust in main social institutions and power structures and see that in the average citizen’s field of trust, there are only the citizen himself, the family, and God” (Denzin 2019 p. 10). Recognized as a national crisis by editor, Evgeniĭ

Ivanovich Golovakha, and author Natali︠ia︡ Viktorivna Panina, these high levels of distrust present a serious issue for the national future of Ukraine. According to sociologist Norman K. Denzin who compiled Studies in Symbolic Interaction The Interaction Order Vol: 50, high levels of distrust amongst the citizens of Ukraine is a result of their lived experience of betrayal of political promises by the national, political state and civil institutions as reinforced by political actors and parties (2009 p. 15). A publication by Ukrainian sociologists and pollsters Evgeniy

Golovakha and Natalia Panina offers a similar insight:

“This conflict between democratic ideals and realities has a rational foundation. It

influences the formation of negative evaluations regarding both the rate and depth

of democratic transformation. The current duality in attitudes about democracy

reflects this ambivalence in social and individual consciousness. Social-

psychological ambivalence divides the society into supporters and opponents

surrounding the myth of security and equality for people living under socialist

state patronage. Proof of individual ambivalence is evident in the perspectives of

Ukrainian political and economic development. These may be mutually exclusive, 51

for instance, support for market economy and price controls or approval of a

multi-party system and distrust of all parties” (Denzin 2009 p. 15).

The institution of democracy is born out of a meaningful cultural and historical context, to then develop and advance over time. The distrust of Ukrainians may be transformed by progressive political action and social change by introducing a more transparent, political processes and open procedural justice alongside an independent judiciary (Denzin 2009 p. 17). The effort to expand social justice also needs to be realized, to incorporate a broader mission of interests from groups and organizations. According to Norman Deinzen, until large numbers of Ukrainians begin to believe that an accomplishment of social justice is possible, it is otherwise a smart idea to distrust politicians and their rhetoric. As illustrated by the failed social movements, the Orange

Revolution of 2004 and the Euromaidan of 2014 did not generate sufficient traction to remove the deeply embedded oligarchic state capture structure. These attempts at revolution fell short of establishing long-lasting political and social change, as oligarchs adapted to changing political parties and leaders to continue and indeed further their informal over public institutions and the political system. Kiev-based political analyst Serhiy Leshchenko summarizes this sentiment by speaking of Yanukovich and his lack of justice following his escape to Russia, "Promises ended with a deception because the incumbent president came to power to enrich himself" (Mirovalev

2019). Corruption and lack of justice contribute to the widespread public consensus of suspicion regarding politics and social institutions.

52

Figure 5: Civil Society Index Report on Public Trust in 2006

Source: Kuts, Svitlana, and Lyuba Palyvoda. 2006. "CIVIL SOCIETY IN UKRAINE: “DRIVING ENGINE OR SPARE WHEEL FOR CHANGE?” CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report For Ukraine." Civicus.org. https://www.civicus.org/media/CSI_Ukraine_Country_Report.pdf (27 April 2020).

The 2006 CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report covers public trust in various institutions as represented in Ukrainian society. CSI observed a lack of responses to social concerns as a result of the low level of public trust for Ukrainian civil society organizations (CSOs) (Kuts and

Palyvoda 2006 p. 73). According to a June 2003 poll by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the most trusted institution in Ukraine is the church (Kuts and Palyvoda 2006 p. 73). The establishment of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 2019 was a landmark event. The granting of autocephaly, or self-governing status, by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople,

Bartholomew I, established the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as an independent religious institution (Dickinson 2020). For centuries, Ukraine’s Orthodox population had been governed by Moscow’s jurisdiction and sphere of influence. The collapse of the Soviet Union witnessed the rise of a Kyiv Patriarchate to rival the Moscow Patriarchate, but the Ukrainian Orthodox

Church lacked international recognition. When Putin came into power over 20 years ago, 53

Russian Orthodoxy was promoted as a way to spiritually unify the “Russian world” (Seddon

2019). The Donbas conflict beginning in 2014 triggered this split. A poll conducted in 2020 by the Kyiv-based think tank, The Razumkov Center, found that 34% of Ukrainians belong to the

Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 14% identify belong to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the

Moscow Patriarchate, 8.2% belong to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, 27.6% stated they were Orthodox Christians but didn’t specify a particular branch of church ("One-Third Of

Ukrainians Say They Belong To Church Independent Of Moscow" 2020). Bartholomew’s declaration that Ukraine’s church is now independent of Moscow has created “a new competition, likely to last years, for the loyalty of Ukraine’s 18,000 parishes,” two-thirds of which have been under Russian authority” (USIP Staff 2019).

The trust of other CSOs include the following: NGOs are more distrusted (49.8%) than trusted (15.2%), trade unions are more distrusted (41.6%) than trusted (16.3%), political parties are also more distrusted (59.9%) than trusted (8.5%) (Kuts and Palyvoda 2006 p. 73). According to CSI, trust remained highest with church, followed by NGOs, labor unions, and armed forces.

The lowest trust lies with political parties, the media, companies, and the police. Therefore, these sentiments prior to the Orange Revolution have largely remained unchanged, and consistently continue to be represented in current polling today as proved by the earlier Gallup poll conducted in 2019. In addition to this feeling of distrust and hopelessness in government, public service delivery remains underdeveloped which further undermines public perception of government efficacy.

54

Conclusion

The status of Ukraine’s democracy continues to remain uncertain. The institutions which support Ukraine’s oligarchic pluralism, a society built around the integration of oligarchic clans as key actors in the political and economic sphere, remains intact with no threat of facing immediate change. The Orange Revolution and Euromaidan, social revolutions with the intention of toppling the widespread corruption within the Ukrainian government that ultimately failed in achieving their set goals, highlights the corruption, general distrust in the government, and lack of social freedoms which continue to impede Ukrainians from living in a totally free society. In my thesis, I recount important facts and figures of the Euromaidan and the impact this had in the direction of political, economic, and social aspects of government, as attributed by regional oligarchic influence, oligarch captured media, and poor-quality public service delivery. These three main factors, which I evaluate in the aforementioned chapters, remain impediments to forming a true democracy in Ukraine and were exacerbated by the Euromaidan.

My intention and motivation in writing this thesis is to demonstrate that Ukraine, a pivotal nation in the global political domain, is an essential player in our increasingly globalized world in the dichotomy of the “West v. East” phenomenon. I present the profiling of crucial oligarchs, who through their assets and economic holdings, fundamentally influence the composition of the Verkhovna Rada and perpetuate this strict binary of either Pro-Kremlin or

Pro-West political alignment. The diversity of ethno-linguistic groups, namely in Eastern and

Southern Ukraine, oftentimes conflates this phenomenon, supported by the monopolization of the media industry by oligarchs. Public service delivery and general attitudes toward government harbor overwhelmingly negative and pessimistic sentiment seen in the larger governed body, that suggest a socioeconomic transformation is not on the horizon. 55

In conclusion, my hope is that the research I have conducted will continue to assist broader scholarship in understanding the impact of oligarch control in Ukraine. This study aims to prove that the hope for a democratic future of Ukraine lies in dismantling the oligarchic foundations which continue to perpetuate the conditions that hinder growth, prosperity, and peace.

56

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ACADEMIC VITA

Education The Pennsylvania State University | Schreyer Scholar and Paterno Fellow Graduation: May 2020 University Park, PA Bachelor of Arts in Global & International Studies: Human Rights Bachelor of Arts in Comparative Literature Certificate in Holocaust and Genocide Studies ● The Paterno Fellows Program is an honors liberal arts experience that includes advanced academic coursework, completion of a thesis, courses in ethics, leadership, community service, and a study abroad experience or internship. ● The Schreyer Honors College represents the top 2% of students at Penn State University, ranking as one of the best honors colleges in the country.

New York University New York City, NY Expected Graduation: May 2021 Masters in Global Affairs ● Ranked by the Foreign Policy Association as one of the nation’s leading institutions in preparing students for international careers, the MS in Global Affairs provides a multidisciplinary approach for building effective communication and leadership skills in the global arena.

Internship Experience Hanbidge Law, LLC: Divorce and Family Law June 2016 – August 2017 Blue Bell, PA Intern ● Assisted Elizabeth Hanbidge Esq., Ed.M., M.Sc. in filing documents ● Organized data, compiled evidence, and mailed subpoenas for pro bono cases

State Representative Elizabeth Hanbidge 61st District June 2019 – July 2019 Blue Bell, PA Intern ● Administered Senior SEPTA passes, attended mobile office, and worked on individual projects aimed toward benefitting senior and veteran constituents in the district.

Leadership Experience and Activities Dressage Team ● Dressage, also known as “horse dancing,” is often referred to as the highest form of horseback riding. In the Penn State Dressage Team, we perfect our horseback riding skills by taking lessons and competing in horse shows, but we also do activities such as volunteering at animal shelters and nature conservation centers, in addition to hosting educational clinics. Comparative Literature Club ● Along with four other people, I helped launch a club for my major, Comparative Literature. I worked as a web designer and maintained the website for the club. IES Abroad Ambassador ● Through this position, I represent the program I attended, Trinity College Dublin, to prospective students by answering questions and providing first hand insight into my time abroad. 61

Teaching Experience Teaching Assistant for BI SCI 003: Environmental Science August 2019 - May 2020 ● This course covers different kinds of environments and their functions, such as past and present uses and abuses of natural resources, disposal of human wastes, and prospects for the future state of Earth. ● As a TA for BI SCI 003, I have improved my public speaking skills, conflict resolution abilities, and time management in order to educate a generation of environmentally conscious women and men.

Honors and Awards ● Dean’s List ○ Received a 3.5 GPA or higher throughout every semester enrolled at Penn State ● Samuel P. Bayard Award (2017) ○ Awarded to exemplary undergraduate and graduate students, the Samuel P. Bayard Award is granted to students representing the Department of Comparative Literature. ● Student Marshal of Comparative Literature Department, Class of 2020 ○ I had the privilege of being chosen as the class representative of the Comparative Literature department at Pennsylvania State University for Spring 2020 graduation

Conferences Attended International Conference on Global Human Rights at South Dakota State University (2018) ● Presented paper: Militarization and Feminization of Refugee Camps in Waltz with Bashir ○ “This paper explores the representation of the Sabra and Shatila massacre, a genocide committed against Palestinian refugees by Lebanese Phalangists and the Israeli Defense Force, in the film Waltz with Bashir by Ari Folman. Waltz with Bashir, an animated autobiography of director Ari Folman, narrates his role in the 1982 Lebanon War and more specifically, the Sabra and Shatila massacre. This analysis evaluates the role of masculinity in a war setting from the stance of an Israeli soldier and Palestinian refugee. The repercussions of militarization, displayed through the refugee camp becoming a war zone, and feminization, witnessed as the overrepresentation of women and children in the camps, affects the way in which refugees are perceived and treated.”

Undergraduate Thesis Title: Oligarchic Pluralism in the 2014 Euromaidan: How the Rise of Oligarchs in Government Shaped Democracy in Ukraine ● My research question poses: “How did oligarchic concentration of economic and media power influence government functions, such as public service delivery, and shape corruption patterns preceding the protest uprising in 2014?” In my thesis, I seek to study the impact of oligarch clans as holding centralized power, and how this system may affect Ukrainian national politics as seen under the leadership of former democratically elected, Pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, during the Ukrainian Revolution of 2014.

Study Abroad ● Nanjing University Nanjing, China ○ Studied Chinese globalization and literature May - June 2017

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● Trinity College Dublin Dublin, Ireland ○ Studied History of Art & Architecture and English August - December 2018