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The Pennsylvania State University Schreyer Honors College THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE DEPARTMENT OF GLOBAL AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES OLIGARCHIC PLURALISM IN THE 2014 EUROMAIDAN: HOW THE RISE OF OLIGARCHS IN GOVERNMENT SHAPED DEMOCRACY UN UKRAINE SIOBHAN FRANCES LEONARD SPRING 2020 A thesis Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a baccalaureate degree with honors in Comparative Literature and International Studies with honors in Global and International Studies Reviewed and approved* by the following: JOSEPH WRIGHT PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Thesis Supervisor JONATHAN ABEL PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE AND JAPANESE Honors Adviser * Electronic approvals are on file. ABSTRACT During the 1990s, Ukraine experienced a change in its political system, becoming a nominal liberal democratic with contested multiparty elections in combination with post-Soviet oligarch community. These newly established dimensions impacted two major revolutionary periods in Ukraine, dating from 1992-2004 and 2005-2014, reaching a climax of violent civil unrest during the Ukrainian Revolution of 2014. The Ukrainian Revolution, also known as the Euromaidan and Revolution of Dignity, illustrates the stages of modernization in a post-Soviet society. The Euromaidan mobilized a variety of regional and ethno-linguistic groups to demand political and economic reform. Members of oligarch clans, consisting mostly of ethnically Russian economic elites, are often appointed in regional government positions largely in the East, and hold substantial power in Ukrainian politics. My research question poses: “How did oligarchic concentration of economic and media power influence government functions such as public service delivery, and shape corruption patterns preceding the protest uprising in 2014?” In my thesis, I seek to study the impact of oligarch clans as holding centralized power, and how this system may affect Ukrainian national politics as seen under the leadership of former democratically elected, Pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, during the Ukrainian Revolution of 2014. I intend to explore the functioning of democracy in the Ukraine in light of the competition between public institutions and oligarchic power, while explaining how the corruption among oligarch clans motivated the Ukrainian Revolution. Furthermore, my thesis aims to further expound on the crisis that emerged in 2014 as a result of the consolidation of power and resources among elites, in addition to the impact oligarchy clans had on Ukraine’s sovereignty during this crisis. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES ..............................................................................................................................iii LIST OF TABLES.................................................................................................................................iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....................................................................................................................v Introduction.............................................................................................................................................1 Chapter 1: An Overview of The Euromaidan and Its Implications .......................................................2 Literature Review.......................................................................................................................2 Case Study................................................................................................................................11 Chapter 2: Oligarch Influence and Geographic Region ......................................................................26 The Political Impact of the Ethno-Linguistic Divide in Southern and Eastern Ukraine..........26 Oligarch Regional Holdings and Economic Interest as an Indicator of Political Affiliation...32 Chapter 3: Media Capture and Ukrainian Oligarchs............................................................................38 Primary Captors of Media........................................................................................................40 Chapter 4: Examining Public Service Delivery in Ukraine .................................................................45 Distrust in Political and Social Institutions as a Pervasive Social Norm ................................49 Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................................54 BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................................56 iii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Ukraine’s 2014 Presidential Election Results by Oblasts .............................................28 Figure 2: Top TV Programs in Ukraine, 2014...............................................................................42 Figure 3: Top TV Programs in Ukraine, 2018...............................................................................43 Figure 4: 2015 Pew Report on Ukrainian Approval of Government and Institutions……….......48 Figure 5: Civil Society Index Report on Public Trust in 2006......................................................52 iv LIST OF TABLES Table 1: 2016-2018 Major Parliamentary Groups in the Verkhovna Rada...................................20 Table 2: Main Actors in Ukraine's Media Holdings .....................................................................40 v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The past four years I could not have successfully completed college without the support of my family. To my mom, thank you for teaching me courage, strength, and persistence. To my dad, thank you for teaching me resilience, forgiveness, and confidence. To my dearest friend and mentor Eliza, thank you for always believing in me and supporting my dreams, even when I foolishly felt they were inadequate. These are the most important lessons I have learned throughout my time at Penn State. 1 Introduction The Revolution of Dignity of 2014 marks a key turning point in Ukraine’s democratic history, highlighting deep rifts between civil society and the ruling class. This revolutionary movement criticized power elites and institutions for the deterioration of Ukraine’s social and economic conditions along with the collapse of democratic ideals. Whereas the Revolution of Dignity did not bring concrete or structural change, the movement mobilized large groups of Ukranians across socioeconomic, ethnic, and political lines, who demanded reform of the current political system. The remaining sentiment of the Orange Revolution of 2004, a protest condemning the corruption of the Verkhovna Rada, and the Euromaidan of 2014, the outcry against Pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych ending negotiations with the Ukraine- European Union Association Agreement, raises important questions regarding the oligarchic nature of post-Soviet Ukranian society, and the pervasive influence these figures have on the economy, media, and scope of domestic and international politics. Ukraine’s political model of oligarchic pluralism is represented by various regional oligarchic clans and national political alliances based on economic holdings. The low level of competition and high concentration of firms in multiple industries, namely coal and power, metallurgy, and media, created a climate conducive to a high barrier of entry. This elite group of actors seeks political support to preserve their economic strongholds, thus becoming integrated with the political system as a means to grow and concentrate their business holdings via likeminded, goal-oriented parliamentary coalitions. Ukraine’s oligarchic political climate is largely corrupt as a result of the hoarding of power, thus preventing the spread of democratic ideals and socioeconomic advancement in contemporary Ukrainian society. 2 Chapter 1: An Overview of The Euromaidan and its Implications Literature Review What began as a mass-based, non-violent protest against Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and his government, the events of the Euromaidan, also known as the Revolution of Dignity, escalated into a “low-intensity civil war” in response to Yanukovych reneging on his commitment to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union (Ritter 2017 p. 192). The call for action began over social media on November 21, 2013, when opposition leader Arseniy Yatsenyuk organized, via Twitter, a protest in Kyiv’s Independence Square. At the same time, prominent political activist Mustafa Nayyem organized another anti-government demonstration. On November 22, 2,000 civilians met in the square while the movement continued to gain traction online, as the official Euromaidan Facebook page circulated 200 updates shared a total of 230,000 times (Surzhko-Harned & Zahuranec 2017 p. 759). Over a period of three months beginning in November 2013, student-led coalitions mobilized into an extensive network of highly-visible activist groups and organizations, which demanded social and political change in Kyiv’s Independence Square, the hotbed of revolutionary activity (Krasynska & Martin 2016 p. 422). January 14, 2014 marked the beginning of a two-month period of state-led violence and civilian fatalities as conflict mounted in Kyiv between peaceful protestors and mobilizing government special forces. The predominantly non-violent political demonstrations, which rattled the country throughout November and December of 2013 escalated into a war zone, forced President Viktor Yanukovych from power by February of 2014,
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