Centre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 125 | 22.01.2014 www.osw.waw.pl What do the Maidan protests tell us about Ukraine? Diagnosis and prospects for Ukrainian politics Wojciech Konończuk, Tadeusz A. Olszański The outbreak of the protests in the Maidan in Kyiv, and also periodically in other Ukrainian cities, has come as a surprise to both the government and the opposition. These rallies have now been ongoing for several weeks and their most striking feature is their focus on citizenship and their apolitical nature and, by extension, a clear attempt to dissociate the protests from Ukraine’s political opposition. Neither Batkivshchyna, UDAR nor Svoboda have managed to take over full control of the demonstrations. On the one hand, this has been linked to the fact that the protesters have little confidence in opposition politicians and, on the other hand, to dispu- tes over a joint strategy and to rivalry between the three parties. As a result, the citizen-led mo- vement has managed to retain its independence from any political actors. As a consequence of the radicalisation and escalation of the protests following 19 January, the political opposition has lost a significant proportion of the control it had been in possession of until then. Maidan should also be seen as the first clear manifestation of a new generation of Ukrainians – raised in an independent Ukraine, well-educated and familiar with new social media, but nonetheless seeking to ground themselves in national tradition. After the initial shock and a series of failed attempts to quell the protests, the government has seemingly opted to wait out the unrest. At the same time, however, it has been creating administrative obstacles for both the political and the civil opposition, restricting their access to the media and severely limiting the legal possibility to organise demonstrations. It should be expected that in the coming months by their differing interests and the ambitions of the social discontent witnessed at the Maidan their leaders, and by a civil society wishing to protests will continue to intensify, gradually institutionalise its actions. The ruling camp, on becoming a regular feature of Ukrainian poli- the other hand, has been focusing its domestic tics. Even if the authorities were to opt for the and foreign policy efforts on ensuring victory use of force to end the protests, this would not in the presidential election at all costs. A clash only fail to solve the political crisis – it would of these very different attitudes, value systems ​​ in fact significantly exacerbate it. The group of and goals seems inevitable. The outcome of the disgruntled and frustrated citizens calling for presidential elections in early 2015, and there- a complete overhaul of Ukraine’s political life fore also the path Ukraine will take in the future, is growing in strength. Meanwhile, prepara- effectively hinges on the public reaction to the tions for the upcoming presidential elections expected electoral fraud. It therefore follows are already in progress at both ends of the po- that the most important test for the Ukrainian litical spectrum. The opposition camp is being civil movement that emerged at the end of 2013 represented by three political parties, divided is still to come. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 125 1 The outbreak of the protests the protesters and instead caused a sharp rise in anti-government sentiment, reignited the pro- The first protests against the government’s de- tests, and prompted previously uninterested cision not to sign an Association Agreement groups to join forces with the demonstrators. with the EU were staged on 21 November by students from Kyiv, Lviv and several other cit- The Maidan in Kyiv ies in western Ukraine. These protests were non-political and intentionally non-partisan. In phase two of the protests, the previously From the very beginning, only Ukrainian and pro-European rallies changed into anti-gov- EU flags have appeared at what have come ernment demonstrations, with Kyiv’s Maidan to be known as the Euromaidan rallies, and becoming the main, or even the only, site of representatives of political parties have often protest. A tent city with barricades and a large been prevented from addressing the crowds. and efficient defence force was subsequently The protests began as spontaneous grassroots erected in the square, attracting comparisons demonstrations, without the involvement of to the Zaporizhian Sich1. Opposition activ- any organisations, and the key role in the pro- ists also occupied three public buildings. The cess was played by informal social activists and Maidan rallies brought together representa- student leaders, aided by social media. Support tives from a wide range of organisations, par- from a number of celebrities, including the ties and groups from different milieux, includ- singer Ruslana Lyzhychko, also proved import- ing: the main political parties (Batkivshchyna, ant. The demonstrations were motivated above UDAR, Svoboda), Yuri Lutsenko’s “Third Repub- all by a desire to bring Ukraine closer to Europe, lic” movement (Lutsenko has been one of the main “technical” organisers of the protests), as well as several spontaneously established The protests lacked cohesion, a recognised civil groups and groups of regular support- leader, and clear and realistic objectives - ers. The Maidan itself has given rise to several in contrast to the Maidan rallies staged new movements (including “Free People” and during the Orange Revolution in 2004. This “Automaidan”) - which oppose both political led to a number of uncoordinated actions. parties and “old” organisations, and display militant tendencies. The effectiveness and the staying power of these organisations, however, and by the idealistic belief that an Association remain uncertain. Agreement with Brussels would rapidly im- The Kiev protests were also unique in that they prove the standards of government in Ukraine incorporated a significant religious element. and facilitate visa-free travel to the EU. Within days of the launch of the Maidan ral- The rallies were organised in the hope that they ly, the demonstrators began celebrating mass would force the government to steer a more several times a day. Priests representing the pro-EU course. When it became clear that this major religions (with the notable exception of would not happen, the protests began to die the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which recog- down and would most likely have fizzled out nises the authority of the Moscow Patriarch- completely had it not been for the violent ate) erected prayer tents in the square, and crackdown on the few remaining protesters in the Maidan in Kyiv carried out by the Berkut riot 1 See: Tymur Lytovchenko, Якою має бути революція ХХІ police on 30 November. This failed to intimidate століття, 09.01.2014,. http://glavcom.ua/articles/16640. html OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 125 2 encouraged confession and public prayer. The maidan activists have continued to stage fre- participation of Greek Catholic priests in these quent protests, and still enjoy considerable activities has helped bring the Ukrainian Greek public support - the group has been organising Catholic Church another step closer to being motorcade protests outside the residences of seen as a national rather than a regional Church President Yanukovych and other government (despite its numerical minority). representatives. In early December, activists representing Ukraine’s opposition political parties made an The radicalisation of the protests attempt to take control of the Maidan demon- stration - ignoring the leaders of civil society On the 16 January, the Party of Regions and the - but their attempts were only partly success- Communists passed a draft of legislation target- ful. Although party leaders did eventually be- ing civil society and the freedom of the press, come the key speakers at the rally, they were breaking constitutional and parliamentary rules forced to share the stage with civil society ac- in the process. On 19 January this led to a rad- tivists, rock stars, folk bands, and parish choirs. icalisation of the protests and made them more Consequently, the protests lacked cohesion, violent – a group of several thousand of the most a recognised leader, and clear and realistic ob- radical protesters left the Maidan and made for jectives - in contrast to the Maidan rallies staged Hrushevskoho street to block parliament and during the Orange Revolution in 2004. This led government offices. A large proportion of this to a number of uncoordinated actions, such group was made up of members of the Maidan as the attempt to block off the main govern- self-defence group and nationalists from the ment and parliament buildings, and gradually “Right Sector of the Maidan” and also from Svo- left many demonstrators rather discouraged. boda. The demonstrators attacked the cordon of It is likely that the protests would have largely the troops of the Interior Ministry and Berkut, the fizzled out by mid-December had it not been special police unit. This resulted in heavy clashes for the crackdown on the Maidan protesters and the following three days saw periodic “police carried out jointly by troops from the Interior battles” between the protesters and the security Ministry and the Berkut riot police on the night forces’ cordon. Berkut’s attack in the morning of of 10 December. Instead of clearing the square, 22 January led to the death of four protesters. the action prompted an upsurge in public un- Although the circumstances surrounding their rest and swelled the ranks of the protesters. deaths are unclear, political responsibility has Towards the end of December and at the begin- fallen on the government and the opposition has ning of the New Year, the number of protesters accused parliament that live ammunition was began to rapidly decrease, and by mid-Janu- used on purpose. Later that day the body of Yuri ary, the permanent group of Maidan activists Verbytsky turned up, two days after the Maidan had shrunk to merely several hundred people.