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Home , AutoMaidan, Mykola Azarov, Oleksandr Moroz, Vitali Klitschko, Yulia Tymoshenko

Centre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 125 | 22.01.2014 www.osw.waw.pl

What do the Maidan protests tell us about ? Diagnosis and prospects for Ukrainian politics

Wojciech Konończuk, Tadeusz A. Olszański

The outbreak of the protests in the Maidan in , and also periodically in other Ukrainian cities, has come as a surprise to both the government and the opposition. These rallies have now been ongoing for several weeks and their most striking feature is their focus on citizenship and their apolitical nature and, by extension, a clear attempt to dissociate the protests from Ukraine’s political opposition. Neither Batkivshchyna, UDAR nor Svoboda have managed to take over full control of the demonstrations. On the one hand, this has been linked to the fact that the protesters have little confidence in opposition politicians and, on the other hand, to dispu- tes over a joint strategy and to rivalry between the three parties. As a result, the citizen-led mo- vement has managed to retain its independence from any political actors. As a consequence of the radicalisation and escalation of the protests following 19 January, the political opposition has lost a significant proportion of the control it had been in possession of until then. Maidan should also be seen as the first clear manifestation of a new generation of – raised in an independent Ukraine, well-educated and familiar with new social media, but nonetheless seeking to ground themselves in national tradition. After the initial shock and a series of failed attempts to quell the protests, the government has seemingly opted to wait out the unrest. At the same time, however, it has been creating administrative obstacles for both the political and the civil opposition, restricting their access to the media and severely limiting the legal possibility to organise demonstrations.

It should be expected that in the coming months by their differing interests and the ambitions of the social discontent witnessed at the Maidan their leaders, and by a civil society wishing to protests will continue to intensify, gradually institutionalise its actions. The ruling camp, on becoming a regular feature of Ukrainian poli- the other hand, has been focusing its domestic tics. Even if the authorities were to opt for the and efforts on ensuring victory use of force to end the protests, this would not in the presidential election at all costs. A clash only fail to solve the political crisis – it would of these very different attitudes, value systems ​​ in fact significantly exacerbate it. The group of and goals seems inevitable. The outcome of the disgruntled and frustrated citizens calling for presidential elections in early 2015, and there- a complete overhaul of Ukraine’s political life fore also the path Ukraine will take in the future, is growing in strength. Meanwhile, prepara- effectively hinges on the public reaction to the tions for the upcoming presidential elections expected . It therefore follows are already in progress at both ends of the po- that the most important test for the Ukrainian litical spectrum. The opposition camp is being civil movement that emerged at the end of 2013 represented by three political parties, divided is still to come.

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 125 1 The outbreak of the protests the protesters and instead caused a sharp rise in anti-government sentiment, reignited the pro- The first protests against the government’s de- tests, and prompted previously uninterested cision not to sign an Association Agreement groups to join forces with the demonstrators. with the EU were staged on 21 November by students from Kyiv, and several other cit- The Maidan in Kyiv ies in . These protests were non-political and intentionally non-partisan. In phase two of the protests, the previously From the very beginning, only Ukrainian and pro-European rallies changed into anti-gov- EU flags have appeared at what have come ernment demonstrations, with Kyiv’s Maidan to be known as the rallies, and becoming the main, or even the only, site of representatives of political parties have often protest. A tent city with barricades and a large been prevented from addressing the crowds. and efficient defence force was subsequently The protests began as spontaneous grassroots erected in the square, attracting comparisons demonstrations, without the involvement of to the Zaporizhian Sich1. Opposition activ- any organisations, and the key role in the pro- ists also occupied three public buildings. The cess was played by informal social activists and Maidan rallies brought together representa- student leaders, aided by social media. Support tives from a wide range of organisations, par- from a number of celebrities, including the ties and groups from different milieux, includ- singer Lyzhychko, also proved import- ing: the main political parties (Batkivshchyna, ant. The demonstrations were motivated above UDAR, Svoboda), Yuri Lutsenko’s “Third Repub- all by a desire to bring Ukraine closer to Europe, lic” movement (Lutsenko has been one of the main “technical” organisers of the protests), as well as several spontaneously established The protests lacked cohesion, a recognised civil groups and groups of regular support- leader, and clear and realistic objectives - ers. The Maidan itself has given rise to several in contrast to the Maidan rallies staged new movements (including “Free People” and during the in 2004. This “Automaidan”) - which oppose both political led to a number of uncoordinated actions. parties and “old” organisations, and display militant tendencies. The effectiveness and the staying power of these organisations, however, and by the idealistic belief that an Association remain uncertain. Agreement with would rapidly im- The Kiev protests were also unique in that they prove the standards of government in Ukraine incorporated a significant religious element. and facilitate visa-free travel to the EU. Within days of the launch of the Maidan ral- The rallies were organised in the hope that they ly, the demonstrators began celebrating mass would force the government to steer a more several times a day. Priests representing the pro-EU course. When it became clear that this major religions (with the notable exception of would not happen, the protests began to die the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which recog- down and would most likely have fizzled out nises the authority of the Patriarch- completely had it not been for the violent ate) erected prayer tents in the square, and crackdown on the few remaining protesters in the Maidan in Kyiv carried out by the Berkut riot 1 See: Tymur Lytovchenko, Якою має бути революція ХХІ police on 30 November. This failed to intimidate століття, 09.01.2014,. http://glavcom.ua/articles/16640. html

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 125 2 encouraged confession and public prayer. The maidan activists have continued to stage fre- participation of Greek Catholic priests in these quent protests, and still enjoy considerable activities has helped bring the Ukrainian Greek public support - the group has been organising Catholic Church another step closer to being motorcade protests outside the residences of seen as a national rather than a regional Church President Yanukovych and other government (despite its numerical minority). representatives. In early December, activists representing Ukraine’s opposition political parties made an The radicalisation of the protests attempt to take control of the Maidan demon- stration - ignoring the leaders of civil society On the 16 January, the and the - but their attempts were only partly success- Communists passed a draft of legislation target- ful. Although party leaders did eventually be- ing civil society and the freedom of the press, come the key speakers at the rally, they were breaking constitutional and parliamentary rules forced to share the stage with civil society ac- in the process. On 19 January this led to a rad- tivists, rock stars, folk bands, and parish choirs. icalisation of the protests and made them more Consequently, the protests lacked cohesion, violent – a group of several thousand of the most a recognised leader, and clear and realistic ob- radical protesters left the Maidan and made for jectives - in contrast to the Maidan rallies staged Hrushevskoho street to block parliament and during the Orange Revolution in 2004. This led government offices. A large proportion of this to a number of uncoordinated actions, such group was made up of members of the Maidan as the attempt to block off the main govern- self-defence group and nationalists from the ment and parliament buildings, and gradually “ of the Maidan” and also from Svo- left many demonstrators rather discouraged. boda. The demonstrators attacked the cordon of It is likely that the protests would have largely the troops of the Interior Ministry and Berkut, the fizzled out by mid-December had it not been special police unit. This resulted in heavy clashes for the crackdown on the Maidan protesters and the following three days saw periodic “police carried out jointly by troops from the Interior battles” between the protesters and the security Ministry and the Berkut riot police on the night forces’ cordon. Berkut’s attack in the morning of of 10 December. Instead of clearing the square, 22 January led to the death of four protesters. the action prompted an upsurge in public un- Although the circumstances surrounding their rest and swelled the ranks of the protesters. deaths are unclear, political responsibility has Towards the end of December and at the begin- fallen on the government and the opposition has ning of the New Year, the number of protesters accused parliament that live ammunition was began to rapidly decrease, and by mid-Janu- used on purpose. Later that day the body of Yuri ary, the permanent group of Maidan activists Verbytsky turned up, two days after the Maidan had shrunk to merely several hundred people. activist had been abducted, and the security forc- Marches and rallies organised across the city es continued arresting activists from the protest became infrequent. The slump in support for movement. Also on the 22nd, President Yanu- the Maidan protests stemmed from fatigue, kovych took the initiative to hold talks with the feelings of helplessness, the lack of clear lead- three opposition leaders (Klitschko, Yatsenyuk, ership, and the lack of any discernible progress. Tyahnybok) and these are meant to be continued. The attack on Yuri Lutsenko on 4 January, as It is, however, unlikely that these talks will see opposed to previous cases of force being used a breakthrough in the current conflict. So far the against protesters, did not spark mass mobili- authorities have offered “round table” talks only sation among the people of Kyiv. Meanwhile, to play for time and not as a realistic attempt to despite constant police harassment, Auto- resolve the situation.

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 125 3 The sociological face of the Maidan of the parties, and 15% said they belonged to a political party. The number of people ready The available sociological studies2 show that al- to form defence groups is of particular inter- though the majority of the participants in the est: 15% among the demonstrators and 21% Kyiv demonstrations were residents of Kyiv, at among the “core group” members. the end of December, as much as 80% of the However, those attending the Maidan demon- “core group” of Maidan activists came from strations in Kyiv (or the Euromaidan rallies in other cities) represent only one segment of the Ukrainian population. They are mainly young - The experience of the past few weeks has often born after Ukraine gained independence signalled the emergence of a new social - well educated, and have a tendency to base elite in Ukraine, prepared to fight for their their future prosperity on close links between interests if not yet fully capable of articu- Ukraine and the EU. They are also familiar with lating them. The new generation has little modern communication technologies, and confidence in politicians and politics. are either already self-sufficient or are active- ly striving for financial independence from the state. Many of them are Russian-speaking or bi- outside the capital (42% from western Ukraine, lingual, and so language choice did not become and 31% from central Ukraine3). Approximate- an important issue at the Maidan protests. ly 30% of the “core group” were young pro- There are no reliable data on the protesters’ po- fessionals with a university degree and current litical views or affiliations at the present time. university students, while industrial workers The experience of the past few weeks has sig- accounted for 14% of the “core group” - com- nalled the emergence of a new social elite in pared to just 7% among all the protesters. Ukraine, prepared to fight for their interests if The reported reasons for participation did not not yet fully capable of articulating them. The differ significantly between the core Maidan new generation has little confidence in poli- group and the remaining protesters. These in- ticians and politics. New media has enabled cluded: police violence against protesters on the emerging group to follow and contribute 30 November (70%), rejection of the Associa- to global trends (as part of the “network so- tion Agreement (40%), and a desire for a change ciety”). Furthermore, it looks for its symbolic of government (40%). Only 7% of respondents roots in national tradition (Zaporizhian Sich, said that their participation was motivated UPA traditions). Members of Svoboda, and of by an appeal for support from the opposition other nationalist organisations, have been ac- parties, although 12% admitted that they had tively promoting their ideas among this group come to Kyiv following a campaign run by one of Ukrainians, albeit in a watered down ver- sion, without the traditional elements of their

2 We refer mainly to the studies conducted on 7-8 and chauvinistic ideology. It should be noted that 20 December 2013 by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initia- the UPA is not seen by the Maidan protesters as tives Foundation and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, http://www.dif.org.ua/ua/polls/2013-year/ a criminal organisation, or even as an ideological 2013-i--politichni-pidsumki-i-prognozi-zagalnonacio- one, but rather as a heroic “army of immortals”, nalne-i-ekspertne-opituvannja.htm .T h e fi n d i n g s o f o t h er available studies do not differ significantly from the data fighting for Ukraine’s independence. Within used in this paper, especially after taking into account the a short period time, the red-and-black flag of incomplete representativeness of this type of research. the OUN has become a nationwide symbol (as 3 It is possible, however, that this group, as well as the current residents of eastern and southern Ukraine, could opposed to an official state symbol), and the include individuals who have recently relocated there traditional UPA greeting: “Glory to Ukraine! from western Ukraine.

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 125 4 Glory to her Heroes!” has become equally levels of trust stood at the following levels: Oleh widespread (albeit with minor changes). As Tyahnybok – 58.8%; – 55.1%; a consequence, nationalist attitudes are be- – 48.2%; Yuri Lutsenko – 60.1%; coming increasingly common, but at the cost of and – 45.2%5. It appears that a weakening of their radicalism and particularly Yatsenyuk - an “office” politician, a poor public of their xenophobic elements. speaker, and Batkivshchyna’s “Prince Regent” Despite the seemingly large scale of the pro- (following ’s imprisonment) - tests, the “disgruntled” Ukrainians who attend- ed the Maidan rallies represent a minority group among Ukrainian voters. The majority of the Following their initial surprise, the par- Ukrainian electorate is made up of manual work- ties attempted to take the reigns - making ers, civil servants, rural residents, and members a series of errors in the process. There were of older generations (including recipients of in- also visible differences of opinion regard- capacity benefits and state pensions). They live ing the strategy and objectives. Many of mainly (but not exclusively) in the most populous their demands and threats were unrealistic. eastern and southern regions of the country and tend to be apprehensive about their future and fearful of change. Their common denominator was the most surprised by the protests. Klitschko is their passivity and credulity regarding media proved more capable of dealing with the new sit- propaganda. Similar attitudes are also present uation - despite his poor political acumen and or- in western Ukraine, among Ukrainian speakers. atorical skills, as a former athlete Klitschko knew It therefore follows that without convincing ar- how to act at a rally. Nonetheless, he too felt the guments and objectives that address the needs protests were premature and detrimental to the of these groups of voters, the current civil move- behind-the-scenes negotiations on his nomina- ment cannot succeed4. tion as the opposition’s presidential candidate. Following their initial surprise, the parties at- Opposition parties and the protests tempted to take the reigns - making a series of errors in the process. There were also visi- The leaders of the Ukrainian opposition were ble differences of opinion regarding the strat- taken by surprise by the outbreak of the protests egy and objectives. Many of their demands at the end of November. They felt the demon- and threats were not only unrealistic (for ex- strations were decidedly premature, since their ample, their calls for a general strike) but also own strategic objectives were focused on the ran contrary to their political interests, includ- 2015 presidential elections. The opposition par- ing calls for early presidential and parliamenta- ties were also surprised by the aversion of many ry elections. In reality, the opposition were far protesters to both the parties themselves and to from ready for a - they had not their leaders. This stemmed mainly from the lack produced an election manifesto, and were not of credibility of the political opposition and the ready logistically or financially. At the same lack of confidence in political decisions among time, the leaders of the opposition ignored the majority of the population. According to an a number of realistic goals, such as the removal opinion poll carried out in late December 2013, 5 According to the same opinion poll (conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation), 61.4% 4 The need for such arguments has been stressed of Ukrainians do not trust President Yanukovych, and by a number of Ukrainian analysts. See, for exam- 66.2% have no confidence in Prime Minister Azarov. ple, Maksym Vikhrov, Чому Схід не з майданом, http://www.dif.org.ua/ua/polls/2013-year/2013-i--poli- 1 Sept 2014, http://zaxid.net/home/showSingleNews. tichni-pidsumki-i-prognozi-zagalnonacionalne-i-ek- do?chomu_shid_ne_z_maydanom&objectId=1300466 spertne-opituvannja.htm

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 125 5 of Azarov’s government from power or gible rivalry between the leaders of the three a victory in early elections in five single-mem- parties. Although Yatsenyuk and Klitschko ber constituencies (15 December 2013). Regard- have tried to conceal their disagreements, over ing the former issue, although the opposition time the tension has become more evident. did manage to put a vote of no confidence on The decision to prioritise preparations for the the parliamentary agenda, it did nothing to win presidential race has laid bare differences of over the undecided independent and coalition opinion between Yatsenyuk and Klitschko with MPs. Meanwhile, the Party of Regions success- regard to the opposition’s election strategy as fully contained a crisis within its own ranks (see well as their personal presidential ambitions. below), persuaded the Communists to abstain While Batkivshchyna would like to see several from the vote, and the motion was defeated. opposition candidates enter the first round, The opposition’s defeat in the snap elections did UDAR insists that the opposition must agree on a single candidate well ahead of the vote. The real dispute, however, boils down to whether He has found it relatively easy to respond both Yatsenyuk and Klitschko, or only Klitschko, to the new circumstances, and has treated should enter the first round. the protests as an opportunity to achieve Unable to secure a nomination from the op- his party’s main objective - namely, to ex- position coalition, the leader of Svoboda, Oleh pand its electorate by employing moder- Tyahnybok will not run for president; he is, ately nationalist slogans which can appeal however, likely to be active during the pres- to new social groups and organisations. idential campaign. He has found it relatively easy to respond to the new circumstances, and has treated the protests as an opportunity to not come as a complete surprise, since the oppo- achieve his party’s main objective - namely, to sition parties had done little to win extra seats in expand its electorate by employing moderate- parliament - mainly because the seats would not ly nationalist slogans which can appeal to new have been enough to significantly change the social groups and organisations, and the radi- balance of power in the . calisation of Ukrainian society. To this end, Svo- Of the three main opposition parties, only Svo- boda activists, who turned out for the protests boda seems to have clear tactical and strate- in large numbers, toned down their chauvinist gic goals. For a long time, Batkivshchyna and rhetoric and abandoned their anti-European UDAR did not know how to respond to the ral- slogans entirely. lies, and it is likely that they would have wel- comed the end of the protests since they saw The ruling camp and the protests them as premature from the point of view of their own electoral strategy. It should be noted The outbreak of protests and their scale stunned that the more pronounced the rift between the the members of the Ukrainian government, two parties, the greater the importance of their who for quite some time were unsure about the alliance with Svoboda. A Batkivshchyna-UDAR appropriate course of action and attempted to coalition could not work due to the rivalry be- play down the significance of the unrest. The tween the parties - a third coalition partner decision of 30 November to use force against would act as a stabilising force, especially since the protesters in the Maidan (most probably Svoboda is not looking to enter its own presi- with the approval of President Yanukovych) dential candidate in 2015. However, the coali- proved to be a mistake not only because it led tion is being hamstrung by the increasingly tan- to an upsurge in demonstrations, but also be-

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 125 6 cause it caused a split in the ruling elite. One of of the Euromaidan Forum in on 11-12 the symptoms of the crisis was the resignation January). The government also used its powers of as Yanukovych’s chief of to intimidate the protesters, as demonstrated staff (though this was refused at that time by by the exceptionally harsh sentence of six years the president), and the decision by two Party in prison for plotting to blow up a statue of of Regions MPs to leave the party. The risk of Lenin in the Ukrainian city of Vasylkiv in early a split in the government became most pro- 2011. Furthermore, it is likely that the govern- nounced at the end of November but was sub- sequently averted and the ruling elite does not at present appear to be in danger of another President Yanukovych from adopting more major rift. This has been achieved by buying radical solutions to the current crisis are lo- the loyalty of the more pro-opposition groups cal oligarchs. Although with promises of business licences, or by si- do not constitute a homogeneous group, lencing dissent through threats and blackmail. nearly all of them are fearful of the con- Nonetheless, the Maidan protests have shown sequences of potential Western sanctions that the ruling elite is not monolithic, and in which could be imposed if the government the event of a serious political crisis in the fu- were to crush the protests by force. ture, divisions in the government could become much more serious. The existing disagreements have been temporarily muted mainly because ment is hoping for further disagreements to some groups in the ruling camp concluded surface within the opposition over its strategy that the Ukrainian opposition is too weak and (and it will seek to incite them), which would does not enjoy sufficient public support to pose undoubtedly significantly weaken the effective- a real challenge to President Yanukovych. Ser- ness of any actions taken by the opposition. hiy Lyovochkin was dismissed on 17 January; The government is aiming to subdue the op- this can be interpreted that those upon whom position and intimidate the general public. Its the president is unable to rely will be removed most decisive response to the recent protests to from the immediate circle. However, at present date has been the passing of a new legislative nothing indicates that further significant dis- package by the Verkhovna Rada on 16 January. missals will follow. The new law, which was adopted unexpectedly Following another failed attempt (on the night and in flagrant violation of parliamentary pro- of 10 December) to resolve the Maidan problem cedure and which violates the Ukrainian Con- by force, President Yanukovych and his team stitution, includes restrictions on freedom of decided instead to wait out the protests, hop- assembly, imposes high penalties for engaging ing that inaction would be the best course of in illegal forms of protest (for example, block- action. Moreover, the government recognised ading buildings) and increases the state’s ability the power of Ukrainian society to organise it- to monitor the Internet. self and did not feel strong enough to resort It seems that the group preventing President to mass repressions - perhaps feeling unsure Yanukovych from adopting more radical solu- of the loyalty of the law enforcement agencies. tions to the current crisis are local oligarchs. At the same time, the authorities continued to Although Ukrainian oligarchs do not consti- harass members of the opposition and tried tute a homogeneous group, nearly all of them to hamper their activities by introducing a se- are fearful of the consequences of potential ries of administrative obstacles (as evidenced Western sanctions which could be imposed if by the problems encountered by the organisers the government were to crush the protests by

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 125 7 force. The majority of the oligarchs are pragma- the differences will at least in part be mitigated tists interested in maintaining the political and by joint opposition to the legislation adopted on business status quo. In a statement released 16 January by the Verkhovna Rada. on 13 December, for example, Ukraine’s richest Furthermore, the Maidan protests have brought man, , acknowledged the peo- forward preparations for the presidential elec- ple’s right to protest and called for dialogue6. In tion and have produced a number of new ini- fact, already at the beginning of December, the tiatives and social networks, which may prove government launched “round table” talks with very useful during the campaign. There are in- the opposition, chaired by former President dications that the opposition will fail to agree . Despite several meetings, the on a single candidate for the first round of the initiative failed to produce any significant deci- presidential elections, and that at least 3-4 can- sions and was seen rather as a delaying tactic didates will enter the race (Klitschko, Yatsenyuk, employed by Kyiv. The government hoped at Tyahnybok, Poroshenko). Consequently, the the time that the protests would gradually die Ukrainian opposition will remain divided by its down and it launched the talks fully convinced divergent interests and the competing ambi- that an agreement would not be possible. tions of its leaders and this will translate into a less efficient coordination of its activities. This Ukrainian politics in the run-up will be further compounded by the financial to the presidential election problems of the opposition, by increasingly lim- ited access to the media, as well as by legal and Over the coming months, the presidential elec- administrative obstacles created ​​by the author- tion scheduled for March 2015 will have a major ities and attempts to discredit the opposition impact on any measures taken by the political leaders in the eyes of the Ukrainian public. or civil opposition groups or by the ruling camp. President ’s camp, mean- The opposition has been trying to institution- while, has launched its campaign for re-elec- alise the protests, which seems shrewd consid- tion, significantly strengthened by its December ering the imminent collapse of the Maidan rally. agreement with . The deal has allowed In late December, civil parties and civil society Yanukovych to achieve his main objective of se- activists formed an All-Ukrainian Maidan (AUM) curing a large loan and negotiating lower gas movement, and on 11-12 January civil society prices without significant economic and politi- organisations convened a Euromaidan Forum cal concessions that could cause social discon- - envisaged as a transition to a new form of tent (at least in the perspective of the upcom- opposition activity. However, the effectiveness ing elections). This will help stabilise the poorly of the new structure remains uncertain due to performing Ukrainian economy in the run-up to a growing conflict between the political parties the elections, and will leave a significant sur- and civil society activists, also with regard to plus in the budget - allowing the government election strategy7. Nonetheless, it is likely that to increase social spending and to avoid imple- menting socially painful reforms. In addition to the focus on economy, President Yanukovych 6 Ахметов призвал политиков «остудить головы» и сесть за стол переговоров, 13 Dec. 2013, also hopes to ensure victory by further increas- http://www.unian.net/news/611768-ahme- ing state control of the media, including forcing tov-prizval-vseh-sest-za-stol-peregovorov.html 7 A similar strategy was adopted in 2001, resulting in owners of TV channels to provide at best a neu- the formation of the “” mo- tral information service. This, in turn, will pre- vement. The initiative collapsed after it began to be taken over by political leaders pursuing conflicting vent opposition parties from gaining access to programmes and advancing different interests (inc- the major television stations in the country. The luding Yulia Tymoshenko and ).

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 125 8 new laws restricting civil society freedoms and na Rada completed amendments to Ukraine’s the right to protest must also be analysed in the tax code and decided to equate domicile with context of the upcoming election. Finally, the tax residence9. Since Klitschko has not been res- by-elections held on 15 December have shown ident in Ukraine for tax purposes for an uninter- that the government is able to constantly im- rupted period of ten years, it is possible that the prove its capacity for electoral fraud, including Verkhovna Rada’s interpretation may be used the use of large-scale bribery of the general to strip him of his right to run for president. public. It is expected that these methods will Paradoxically, however, should Klitschko be be made use of during the presidential election eliminated from the race, this would remove and will inevitably affect the outcome. one of the main points of contention within the Finally, it seems highly probable that the gov- Ukrainian opposition, and could result in a fur- ernment will try to eliminate Vitali Klitschko ther consolidation of opposition activities. The expectations of political and social change produced by the Maidan rallies among large New forms of social organisation will parts of the Ukrainian public will not disap- make it harder for the current ruling camp pear and will constitute an important element to govern through repression, confirm- of the upcoming election campaign. At the ing that Ukraine is not a country in which same time, new forms of social organisation mass coercion will be tolerated. will make it harder for the current ruling camp to govern through repression, confirming that Ukraine is not a country in which mass coercion from the presidential race since, from all the will be tolerated. On the other hand, it is also opposition candidates, Klitschko has the best likely that the authorities will draw appropriate chance of winning. According to the Ukrainian conclusions from the Maidan protests, and that Constitution (Article 103 Section 3) a presi- this will shape their conduct also following the dential candidate must have been “domiciled upcoming election. Finally, the rise in social ac- in Ukraine for ten years prior to polling day”; tivism indicates that, as in 2004, it will be down however, no existing legal act defines the term to the Ukrainian people to decide the outcome “domiciled”8. In November 2013, the Verkhov- of the election in a run off.

9 Although the provision in question does not refer direct- 8 In an interview given in 2013 Vitali Klitschko admitted ly to electoral law, it is nonetheless permissible to apply that he has lived in Ukraine since 2007. this particular definition to the entire legal system.

EDITORS: Adam Eberhardt, Centre for Eastern Studies Katarzyna Kazimierska, Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw TRANSLATION: Maciej Kędzierski phone: +48 | 22 | 525 80 00 CO-OPERATION: Nicholas Furnival e-mail: [email protected] DTP: Bohdan Wędrychowski The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not Visit our website: www.osw.waw.pl necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities

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