Presidential Election in Ukraine Implications for the Ukrainian Transition Presidential Election in Ukraine Implications for the Ukrainian Transition
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Helmut Kurth/Iris Kempe (Ed.) PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN UKRAINE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UKRAINIAN TRANSITION PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN UKRAINE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UKRAINIAN TRANSITION KIEV – 2004 The following texts are preliminary versions. Necessary corrections and updates will be undertaken once the results of the election process are final. These preliminary versions are not for quotation or citation, and may only be used with the express written consent of the authors. CONTENTS Preface ................................................................................. 5 Timm Beichelt/Rostyslav Pavlenko Presidential Election and Constitutional Reforms in Ukraine ............................................................................ 7 Olaf Hillenbrand Consensus-Building and Good Governance – a Framework for Democratic Transition ........................... 44 Oleksandr Dergachov Formation of Democratic Consensus and Good Governance ....................................................... 71 Oleksandr Sushko/Oles Lisnychuk The 2004 Presidential Campaign as a Sign of Political Evolution in Ukraine....................................... 87 Iris Kempe/Iryna Solonenko International Orientation and Foreign Support of the Presidential Elections ............................................ 107 5 Preface Long before Kiev’s Independence Square became a sea of orange, it was clear to close observers that the presidential election in 2004 would not only be extremely close and hard fought, but also decisive for the country’s future development. Discussions regarding the succession to President Leonid Kuchma were well underway in 2001 when constitutional changes were proposed that would have given more power to Parliament but also could extend Kuchma’s term in office. While these changes did not pass, the proposal showed that Kuchma and the “party of power” would not easily leave the stage. Moreover, unlike the Presidential election 1999, the opponent of Kuchma’s selected heir, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, was not a member of the Communist Party but opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko. He not only aspires to build closer EU-Ukraine relations but also has proclaimed the goal of fighting the country’s widespread corruption and the influence of economic clans. Although the first round of the presidential election, which was held on 31 October, received an OSCE evaluation considerably worse than the previous presidential election in 1999, its results were still more or less accepted. The second round turned out to be another matter. During the run-off between Yushchenko and Yanukovych, which was held on 21 November, Ukraine experienced a black day for propriety, fairness and transparency. All of the independent election observation groups reported evidence of serious fraud, violations intended to aid Yanukovych. These ranged from voter intimidation to abuse of mobile polling stations. Reported violations also included destruction of ballots, multiple voting and administrative pressure. In the opinion of the opposition, this fraud, along with media manipulation and other anti-democratic advantages during the campaign gave Yanukovych his reported winning margin of 3 percent of the votes. This obvious deception exceeded the limits of the population’s tolerance. Even the opposition was surprised at the number of ordinary citizens who found the courage to take to the streets, at the outpouring of support for democracy. For most citizens, marching against the fraud was the first step in this direction and required a lot of strength because it contradicted a heritage dominated by doubts and hesitation. This rebellion against the perceived unfairness of the authorities seemed to draw out new feelings of self-worth and self-confidence, 5 and to motivate at least some political actors to take the real wishes of the population into greater account. As this preliminary version goes to print, the outcome is still uncertain, and the authors have been asked to reflect on a rapidly changing situation. What has not changed, of course, is the background of the years since the beginning of Ukrainian independence. The chapter by Olaf Hillenbrand provides the framework for the project, discussing not only Ukraine’s transition but also how it compares with similar transitions around the world. Timm Beichelt and Rostyslav Pavlenko discuss the links between constitutional reform and the present election. Oleksandr Dergachov addresses democratic consensus and good governance. Oleksandr Sushko and Oles Lisnychuk examine political evolution in Ukraine, seen through the lens of the 2004 election. Finally, Iris Kempe, Iryna Solonenko investigate the international context of the election and foreign involvement in the campaign, voting and aftermath. Taken together, the essays in this volume provide an analysis of the transition in Ukraine, centered on the 2004 presidential election. They disclose the shortcomings in that transition, which, with internal effort and external support, can be alleviated. The preliminary political recommendations will be reviewed after the new President of Ukraine is determined. Possible changes or additions will be included in the final version of this publication, which will be available in late December. Iris Kempe Senior Research Fellow, Center for Applied Policy Research, Munich Helmut Kurth Head of the Regional Office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation to Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova 6 7 Presidential Election and Constitutional Reforms in Ukraine Timm Beichelt, Rostyslaw Pavlenko* 1. Introduction Ukraine, like other European CIS states, exists in the “gray zone” between democracy and authoritarianism. Neither regime type is fully consolidated.1 On the one hand, power abuse and corruption are wide-spread, the power system is centralized, checks and balances are often ineffective, human rights are infringed upon, the media are biased, and – as is obvious to by the recent presidential elections in 2004 – the will of the people in elections is not considered very important by those in power. On the other hand, the constitutional framework is based on the checks and balances principle, the political system is pluralistic, the opposition is quite active and shows considerable successes during elections, some media provide independent information and civil society is viable and actively developing (Haran/Pavlenko 2004). The approach used in this text is to characterize and analyze this system as a “defective democracy” (Merkel et. al. 2003). The Ukrainian legal and political system bears the seeds of both democracy and authoritarianism. The presidential elections of 2004 can be seen as an important milestone, which marks the choice that Ukrainian establishment and society are to make between these alternatives. The constitutional and legal * Timm Beichelt – Europa-Universität Viadrina Rostyslaw Pavlenko – National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, School of Policy Analysis 1 The authors would like to thank Tania Astashkina and Nadiya Russ for their support in assembling material and reviewing the text. 6 7 framework has been tested for the ability to provide important safeguards against power abuse and unfair play. Moreover, as the Ukrainian constitutional system concentrates considerable powers in the hands of a president, “the winner takes all” mood within all political camps led to the unprecedented tense campaign, which outgoing President Leonid Kuchma called “the dirtiest ever.”2 Needless to say, the 10-day delay of result announcements after the first round of elections, as well as the failure to follow up on fraud accusations after the second, were also major indicators of a dirty election – although it is not completely clear if that was exactly the point Kuchma was referring to. However, the system did not altogether degenerate into an outright autocracy. Although it was called unfair by the OSCE observers, the campaign still remained competitive, and the outcome of the elections resulted in power change. At the time this article was finished, it was still an open question as to whether this change will be accepted by all major players in the mid-term.3 The citizens proved ready to protect their rights, with actions ranging from checking their names on voter lists to protesting electoral forgery. This demonstrates the potential demand for democracy in society, the existence of the basis on which democratic values can develop. Given the unpopularity of the authorities within Ukrainian society, the incumbents had to wage an uphill battle. Thus, their task, unlike most other CIS governments, was not to further consolidate their powers but to safeguard against the risk of losing the whole of it. It is noteworthy that the way they sought to fulfill this task was through reform of the constitutional model, in order to deprive the president of his exceptional powers – especially his powers over the nomination and expulsion of the Cabinet and local administrators. Thus, the liberalization of the system was used by the incumbents to ensure the status quo, which consists in their control over the political agenda. The instrumental character of this reform prevented its completion before the elections. However, all political forces, including those behind the newly elected president, declared their intention to fulfill the reform. The mode of its fulfillment – the appearance or absence of the broad consensus of main political forces, the free or forced support from the parliamentary factions, the timing and means of enactment of the amendments