Enduring Crisis in Ukraine a Test Case for European Neighborhood Policy
Introduction
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Enduring Crisis in Ukraine A Test Case for European Neighborhood Policy
Rainer Lindner SWP Comments
As negotiations over an “enhanced agreement” begin between the European Union and Ukraine, the EU’s neighbor is again embroiled in a stubborn internal conflict over power and resources that will lead to early parliamentary elections and possibly to a premature presidential election too. Although the economy is stable and the country has good prospects of joining the WTO in fall 2007, Ukraine is currently politically paralyzed. The conservative left alliance of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and the quarreling democratic nationalist forces around President Viktor Yushchenko and former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko continue to face off irreconcilably. The Ukrainian parliament that was elected in free and fair elections just one year ago is on the point of being dissolved. The EU is regarded as a mediator, and it should adopt this role as part of its neighborhood policy.
Three processes are currently under way elections of 2004 (presidency) and 2006 in Ukraine: Firstly, a two-party system is (parliament) in fact mirrors the state of the forming, with a left conservative party transformation process after fifteen years of labor and industry (Party of Regions, of independence. After making important Socialists, Communists) and a democratic steps toward democracy and the free nationalist camp (“Our Ukraine,” “Yulia market Ukraine is currently suffering a Timoshenko Bloc,” “Self-Defense Party,” constitutional and parliamentary crisis, “Forward Ukraine”); secondly, the power and foreign policy disorientation. struggle between president and prime minister is currently mushrooming into a broader conflict over power and resources Constitutional Crisis between the two camps of parties and The constitutional reform of early 2006 oligarchs; and thirdly, the left conservative shattered Ukraine’s already fragile political block is currently—at the beginning of equilibrium. Alarmed at the prospect of a May—celebrating a symbolic counter- Yushchenko succession, former President revolution, filling Independence Square Leonid Kuchma initiated amendments to with its colors of blue, yellow, and red. weaken the office of the presidency, to The political stalemate resulting from the narrow the president’s powers in general,
Dr. Rainer Lindner is a researcher at the Russian Federation / CIS Research Unit of SWP SWP Comments 9 May 2007
1 and to considerably restrict his prerogatives Crisis of the Parliamentary System even in the fields of foreign policy and The current Verkhovna Rada was elected defense. Kuchma failed to realize that his in the “first free and fair elections in rearguard action would leave Ukraine Ukrainian history.” But the exhausting facing a situation of political paralysis. power struggle between president, govern- President Yushchenko lost even more ment, and parliament in summer 2006 power and influence in January 2007 when over the authority to make appointments parliament overrode his veto to pass the already revealed the fragility of the parlia- cabinet law. Following democratic proce- mentary order. Despite spectacular changes dure, the president then sent the matter to of loyalty (for example the leader of the the Constitutional Court, but with little Socialists, Oleksandr Moroz, moving from prospect of success. Under the new law the the Orange camp to Yanukovych’s, for prime minister will appoint not only the which he gained the office of speaker of foreign and defense ministers but also the parliament) the constitutional democratic regional governors. This would mean that procedures have served tolerably both in after surrendering final authority in elections and in the formation of parlia- foreign policy the president would also lose mentary majorities. Parliamentary defec- an important source of domestic political tions soon began, however, and have influence. Although the Yulia Timoshenko prevented the Verkhovna Rada from devel- Bloc had participated in overriding the oping an effective working routine. At the presidential veto, in spring 2007 it also end of March 2007 19 deputies left the asked the Constitutional Court to review Yulia Timoshenko Bloc and another six the government’s legitimacy. left the Our Ukraine group. Most of them The executive’s loss of authority became joined the National Unity Coalition made blatantly obvious when President Yush- up of the Party of Regions, the Commu- chenko dissolved the Verkhovna Rada on nists, and the Socialists, which as a result 2 April but parliament simply continued grew from 243 to 260 deputies. The “im- to meet regardless. After the president’s perative mandate” introduced by constitu- decision had been referred to the Constitu- tional amendment is designed to prevent tional Court, the crisis became total when precisely such changes of parliamentary the political loyalties of the constitutional group—which are motivated not least by court judges became apparent and several financial incentives. of them who are close to Yushchenko There were also differentiation processes. initially said they would recuse themselves The Orange camp is disintegrating into from involvement in the hearing. In the groups within and outside parliament. The end the Constitutional Court’s ruling was “coalition” of Our Ukraine and the Yulia made irrelevant by the president’s removal Timoshenko Bloc, reconstructed at the of two judges during the case and Yanu- beginning of 2007, directs its efforts toward kovych’s May 4 agreement to the holding revising the constitution, implementing of new elections. The prime minister hoped the imperative mandate, dissolving par- to win the elections while the president liament, and holding new elections. In all wanted at all costs to avoid losing at the these efforts it is acting not as a force for Constitutional Court. Agreement to hold reform but more like a defensive alliance early parliamentary elections does not attempting to block a complete take-over of mean the end of the crisis, however, power by the Party of Regions. The decisive because the Party of Regions is also calling integrative force here is no longer Our for the presidential election to be brought Ukraine, but rather the Yulia Timoshenko forward to the same date. Bloc, which had to deal with the aforemen- tioned parliamentary defections but on the other hand has been able to integrate both
SWP Comments 9 May 2007
2 the People’s Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) of Crisis of Foreign Policy sacked foreign minister Borys Tarasyuk and The foreign policy dimension of the crisis Viktor Penzenik’s Reform and Order Party. reveals itself in the drama surrounding the The Party of Regions financed by oli- dismissal of the long-serving pro-Western garchs such as Rinat Akhmetov has ad- Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, which vanced to become the new party of power. It played out between December 2006 and supplies most of the ministers and deputy January 2007, and in the subsequent twice ministers as well as countless officials in failed candidacy of Volodymyr Ohrysko, a the central and regional bureaucracies. professional diplomat close to Tarasyuk. The situation that governors and mayors, According to the Party of Regions Ohrysko’s factory directors and oligarchs owe their appointment could have “disturbed rela- position to the Party of the Regions is tions with Russia,” while the Communists certainly no longer restricted to eastern complained that the president’s favored Ukraine. Despite regular friction, the candidate to succeed Tarasyuk was the Communists and Socialists remain stead- same but worse. The outcome was another— fast to the coalition and further reduce the avoidable—erosion of the president’s room for political compromise, to which authority. Avoidable because the new some of the moderate Party of the Regions foreign minister appointed on March 21, deputies would certainly be open. Arseniy Yatsenyuk, is also close to the Since the election in 2006 the Verkhovna president. Yatsenyuk, a commercial lawyer, Rada has become an arena for demonstra- former economy minister, and author of tive gestures with parliamentary groups a business studies textbook on banking regularly quitting and returning, sessions supervision who is only thirty-two years demonstratively boycotted, and occupa- old, hails from the western Ukraine and tions of rostrums, microphones, and voting had already made a reputation as a civil systems. The distance between the political servant in senior central and regional camps became clear in the list of demands positions. issued by the opposition in March 2007, The bickering over the foreign minister calling among other things for a consti- appointment clearly revealed three ten- tutional referendum, confirmation of the dencies that make it more difficult for the president’s foreign policy agenda and international community to deal with policy sovereignty, an end to the massive Ukraine. Firstly, foreign policy has become restrictions on the Ukrainian language and an arena where domestic crises are fought culture, the dismissal of Interior Minister out. Secondly, Ukrainian foreign policy is Vasyl Tsushko and Prosecutor General currently expressed by many voices, often Oleksandr Medvedko, the appointment of contradictory. Prime Minister Yanukovych the secretary of the National Security and is currently attempting to grab the lead Defense Council by the president, the in negotiations with the EU. The foreign dismissal of ministers with business con- ministry risks losing the initiative in the nections, the termination of all treaties tensions between the presidency and with the gas trader RosUkrEnergo, and the the prime minister’s office. For example, securing of a direct gas supply from the Mr. Yanukovych’s team bypassed the presi- producing regions of Russia and central dent and the foreign ministry to conduct Asia, as well as popular demands such as negotiations (that have not so far produced raising wages, salaries, and pensions, any results) over full Ukrainian member- fighting corruption, and reversing deci- ship in the Common Economic Space sions made by the Yanukovych govern- with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, about ment in connection with its cabinet law. a Ukrainian gas production project in western Siberia, and about a 50 percent stake for Russia in the Ukrainian gas trans-
SWP Comments 9 May 2007
3 port system. Thirdly the EU will have to “enhanced agreement,” every month of contend with regular leadership changes political deadlock means lost negotiating in Ukraine as political fortunes fluctuate. time for the new agreement and above all lost time for the reform agenda for Ukraine itself. Practical Test for the ENP Among the provisions of the agreement Negotiations on the “enhanced agreement,” are the creation of a free trade area and for which EU will provide almost u500 the intensification of neighborly relations million by 2010, started in early March with Ukraine. The EU, the Council of 2007. The EU hopes the agreement will Europe, and the German EU Presidency bring about: a) a new reform agenda for have following options for finding a way Ukraine, b) the emergence and consolida- out of the current crisis: tion of a democratic system of government, Forming a Ukraine contact delegation made c) an improvement in the investment up of members of the European Parlia-
© Stiftung Wissenschaft und climate in Ukraine for domestic and foreign ment, the Council of Europe, and inter- Politik, 2007 investors, d) a constructive Ukrainian con- national mediators. These must be All rights reserved tribution to European energy security, and figures who are accepted by the whole
SWP e) a new role for Kiev in resolving regional Ukrainian political class (such as for Stiftung Wissenschaft und conflicts, for example the Transnistria example former Polish President Alex- Politik German Institute for conflict. ander Kwaśniewski); International and The discussions between President Setting up a judicial advisory team made Security Affairs Yushchenko, Commission President José up of lawyers and (former) constitutional Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 Manuel Barroso, and EU External Relations court judges to draw up proposals for 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner on resolving the constitutional crisis; Fax +49 30 880 07-100 March 8, 2007, reinforced the Ukrainian Intensifying inter-parliamentary cooperation www.swp-berlin.org impression that “the door to the EU is not with the national EU parliaments; [email protected] closed to Ukraine,” as Oleksandr Chalyi, Continuing and accelerating the existing ISSN 1861-1761 Yushchenko’s deputy chief of staff, put it. programs for implementing the action In particular, Chalyi regarded Ferrero- plan in the ENP framework; Waldner’s statements that the neighbor- Supporting Ukraine’s efforts to join the hood policy explicitly avoids defining the WTO in 2007 or 2008; format of future relations between the EU Expanding neighborhood policy to cover and Ukraine as a breakthrough in mutual civil society projects such as the German relations. Ukraine development program (currently Developing these mutual relations, how- in planning), which also covers eastern ever, would require an end to Ukraine’s regions of Ukraine. domestic and foreign policy paralysis. Although the request for international mediation expressed on April 9 by groups in the Ukrainian parliament (and later also by the government in Kiev) came at a point where the internal options for con- flict resolution had not yet been exhausted, the EU will not be able to avoid taking a mediating role in the constitutional con- flict and in the normalization of institu- tional relations between parliament, the executive, and the judiciary. In view of the upcoming Ukraine-EU summit on Sep- tember 14, 2007, that is due to finalize the
SWP Comments 9 May 2007
4